Book Title: Jaina Concept of Omniscience
Author(s): Ramjee Singh
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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Page 212
________________ ARGUMENTS BASED ON.. 199 one insists that there is such a middle term (hetu), it would have to be either based on non-apprehension (anupalambha), or on causal concomitance (kārya-kāraņa-avinābhāva) or on the nature of things (srabhāra ).104 It cannot be the first since what is needed here is a positive reason; it also cannot be the secord, sirce causal relationship is always based on previous perception, but no perception is possible of omniscience; the third reason is also out of question, since an omniscient person himself being imperceptible, his nature, which must be inseprarable from himself cannot also be perceived. The reason (hetu) can be supplied only by perception or inference. If it is the first, it is absurd since the relation of universal concomitance cannot be established on the basis of perception and without this relation no inference can be valid. If it is said to be established by another inference, it will lead to circular reasoning and also to infinite regress. 105 Further, the reason that would be employed to establish the existence of the omniscient being would be vitiated by the fallacies of being inadmissible (asiddha), contradictory (viruddha) and inconclusive (anaikāntika).106 For example, when a reason is given, it is adduced as a property belonging either to a positive-entity (bhāra-dharma), or a negative-entily (abhāvadharma), or both (ubhaya-dharma). If it is the first, t'ie reason would be inadmissible (asiddha) because unless the existence of omniscience is not established, there can be no reason regarding his positive attribute (bhāva dharma); if the second alternative be accepted, there will be the fallacy of contradicted (viruddha), since instead of establishing the existence of omniscience, his non-existence becomes established through the reason of negative-attribute (abhāva-dharma-hetu); and if the 104 Prabhacandra (Nyaya-kumudacandra, Vol. I. pp 86-87) mentions only the last two. Kamalašila mentions all the three (Tattvasangraha 3186); Vidyānanda, Aşțasahasri, p. 45, Apta parikṣā, 88. 105 Prabhācandra, Prameya-kamala-martanda, pp. 247-248. 106 Ibid., p. 248, cp. Śantarakṣita, Ibid., 3286; Anantavīrya, Ibid., p. 86, Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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