Book Title: Jaina Concept of Omniscience
Author(s): Ramjee Singh
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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Page 235
________________ 222 CONCLUSION the Jivan-mukti of Sārkhya and Vedānta, with the Turiyāvasthā or, Brahmananda. Now, it is also perhaps true to a great extent that we cannot validate any fundamental principle or ideal like this without being involved into what Feigal calls “vicious circularity.'', J. S. Mill also holds that “questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof.”3 It is necessary always to distinguish between “questions within a presupposed frame" and "questions concerning the frame" itself, as Carnap would say.4 In order to grasp this situation, a fundamental distinction, often neglected and blurred, must be made between the two types of justifying principles or knowledge-claims, namely, validation and vindication.5 Validation generally means a rigorous logical proof or "legitimising of knowledge-claims”. Vindication on the other hand, means the justification of an 2 Feigal claims that we cannot without “vicious circularity" disclose any more ultimate grounds of validation in the field of deductive logic or in the rules of inference. Similarly, the rules of maximal probability in inductive inference form the ultimate validating basis of all empirical reasoning..... Rational argument presupposes reference to a set of such principles at least implicitly agreed upon. Disagreement with respect to basic principles can thus only be removed if the very frame of validation is changed. This can occur either through disclosure and explication of a hitherto unrecognised common set of standards, i.e., still more fundamental validating principles to which implicit appeal is made in the argument, of it can be achieved thro. ugh the pragmatic justification of the adoption of an alternative frame, or finally, through sheer persuation by means of emotive appeals”. Sellars and Hospers, Ibid., p. 675. J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government, ed. A. D. Lindsay (London, J. M. Dent & Sons, Everymans Library, 1960), p. 4. R. Carnap. “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” Revue Internationale 11, Jan. 1950. 3 4 5 Without agreeing with Feigal on all the points that he has made ir his article under reference, I have borrowed his above two terms which are extremely suitable for my present purpose. Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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