Jaina Concept of Omniscience

Author(s): Ramjee Singh
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/001547/1

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THE JAINA CONCEPT OF OMNISCIENCE
L. D. SERIES 43
BY
GENERAL EDITOR DALSUKH MALVANIA
RAM JEE SINGH PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY BHAGALPUR UNIVERSITY BHAGALPUR 7
L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY AHMEDABAD 9
SO
For Private
Personal use only
www.janelas

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भारतीय
to a
संस्कृति
बाद
Patati
THE JAINA CONCEPT OF OMNISCIENCE
L. D. SERIES 43
با
ERAL EDITOR
DALSUKH MALVANIA
BY

RAMJEE SINGH, PH.D., D. LITT
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY BHAGALPUR UNIVERSITY BHAGALPUR 7
L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY AHMEDABAD 9
ATEST SIKERLAY

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Printed by K. Bhikhalal Bhavsar Swaminarayan Mudran Mandir 46, Bhavsar Society Nava Vadaj Ahmedabad 13. and Published by Dalsakh Malvania Director L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad 9.
FIRST EDITION March, 1974
LD INS...JTE Revised Prints Rs.5

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FOREWORD
It gives me great pleasure, indeed, .in publishing Dr. Ramjee Singh's thesis entitled “The Jaina Concept of Omniscience" on the auspicious occasion of 2500th year of Nirvāna of Lord Mabavırā who is cherished as an
mniscient Tirthankara by the Jainas. The author has done full justice to the subject and has given unmistakable evidence of wide study of the works pertaining to the subject. He has dealt with all those topics that have beasing on the subject. He has examined all those traditional arguments for and against omniscience. His Conclusion (chapter IX) is worthy of note. Thus the present study is thorough and systematic; it touches every aspect of the Jalna theory of Omniscience.
.
DO
I am most thankful to Dr. Ramjee Singh for agreeing to the publication of his thesis, the present work, which earned him the Ph. D. Degree of the Bhagalpur University. I wish the book will be welcomed by all students of Philosophy.
L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad-380009 5th March, 1974.
Dalsukh Malvanla
Director.

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PREFACE
The concept of omniscience has been a matter of great significance for both Indian philosophy and culture. It is one of the most central topics which figure in Jaina philosophy and religion. My aim, however, in this work is neither to support nor to refute the Jaina theory. I am interested primarily in presenting a philosophical account of the ways in which this concept functions and to examine the arguments and counter-arguments for the plausibility of the belief in the existence of an omniscient being. I do not wish to assert or deny whether or not there has actually been any omniscient being because this is a purely historical question. I have concerned myself with making conceptual analysis, classification and categorisation of the basic issues involved and with examining the foundations of the Jaina theory of omniscience within the context of Jaina metaphysics and epistemology. I have considered the various arguments for and against omniscience, but it seems to me, as I have suggested in the conclusion, that the utmost one can do for omniscience is to attempt its vindication; to attempt its validation will not be successful. But I do feel that the concept of omniscience poses many really philosophical problems and that is why I have given a purely philosophical treatment to it.
To the best of my knowledge no independent work has been done on the concept of omniscience in any modern language. Therefore, though the present work contains mainly what has been written by the ancient masters and hence cannot claim any originality in the literal sense of the term, yet it is hoped to fulfil a hitherto unsatisfied need. This is also perhaps the first systematic attempt on the subject in an independent and non-theological way. I hope, therefore, that it would be able to exhibit necessary independent judgement and critical attitude.

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Soon after I joined the teaching profession, I developed interest in Jaina epistemology and logic, especially in Syādvāda. During the course of my studies, I found, however, that a great deal has been said and written on the subject by several Jaina and non-Jaina scholars, both ancient and modern. I felt I could hardly make any significant contribution to the subject. At this stage of my struggle my revered teacher Dr. D, M. Datta suggested the hitherto neglected topic of Sarva. jñatā or omniscience. Incidentally, Sarvajñatā is also the logical culmination of the doctrine of Syādvāda.
When I started my research, I wished to present a study of the Jaina theory of omniscience in the background of Indian philosophy. Accordingly, I went on studying the Vedas, Upani. şads, Rāmāyanıs (Vālmiki, Adhyātma, Ananda, Mānasa, Agniveśa, Ātma and Bhānu-Bhakhta), the Mahābhārat, Smộtis and Mahāpurānas. These works offered a very rich source of information. I also had my further plan to go ahead with the Upapurānas, Tantra, Yoga-vāśiştha, Tripițakas and the source books of the six systems. But I was advised by Dr. D. M Datta and Dr. Kalidas Bhattacharya to stop with the materials collected so far. Moreover, when I completed my explorations into the Jaina works, the results obtained for the Jaina portion alone was more than enough. Now, it was a problem for me to give such a shape to this huge stock of information derived from all these sources, that it could fit into the structure of a doctoral dissertation. Fortunately, my learned teacher, Rajendra Prasad of 1.I.T, Kanpur came to my rescue, and suggested to present the Jaina portion only, a plan of work which got the approval of Dr. D. M. Datta. The present work is the outcome of this very plan.
I feel my solemn duty to express my sincere gratitued and thanks to many scholars and pandits with whom I had the privilege to discuss, during the last iwelve years, either personally or through correspodence, many issues connected with this work. I am specially indebted to the late Dr. Bhagavān Dās, Pt. Mahendra Kumar Jaina, Pt. Rahula Sankstyāyan

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and Shri P. C. Divanji. I am also indebted to M. M. Gopinath Kaviraja, Pt. Sukha Lal Sanghvi, Dr. Vasudeva Saran Agrawal, Pt. Kailasa Chandra Shastri, Principa!, Syādvāda Jain Mahavidyalaya, Varanasi, Dalsukh Malvania, Director, L. D. Vidyamandir, Ahmedabad, Dr. N. M. Tatia, Director, Prakrt Institute, Vaiśālī, Pt. Chain Sukha Das, Principal, Jaina Sanskrt College, Jaipur, Rev, J. Kasyapa, formerly Director, Pāli Institute, Nālandā. Dr. M. L. Maheta, Director, Parśva. nātha Jain Research Institute, Varanasi, Dr. Kalidas Bhattacharya, Director, Centre for Advanced Studies in Philosophy, Visva-Bharati, Shantiniketan and others. I am very thankful to Pt. Darbari Lal Kothia Jaina, Professer of Jaina Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University, Pt. Udai Chandra Jain, Professor of Buddhist Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, Dr. Nemi Chandra Jaina, Secretary, Bhartiya Jaina Sansad, under whom I studied some very obstruse Jaina and Buddhist texts. To the authorities of the Central Library, Banaras Hindu University (Varanasi), Devakumar Jain Oriental Library (Arrah), Parśva Natha Jajna Research Institute (Varanasi), Visva-Bharati (Shantiniketan) and I. I. T., I am very thankful for kind help.
Last but not the least, I sincerely express my deep gratitude to my teachers Dr. Dhirendra Mohan Datta and Dr. Rajendra Prasad for the unfailing light and guidance received from them during my studies and in the actual preparation of the work.
15 March, 1974.
Ram Jee Singh

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ABBREVIATIONS
1. Books
BORI BJP CSS CJPH DJS GOI JCRS JSS JSUK KPJRI KSS MDJG NSP PSPM PTS RJS SBB SBH SBJ SJG SJJ
Bhandarkara Oriental Research Institute Bhārtiya Jñāna Pitha Chowkhambhā Sanskrit Series Central Jaina Publishing House Digambar Jaina Sangha Gaekwad Oriental Institute Jaina Cultural Research Society Jaina Svetāmbara Sangha Jaina Sähitya Uddhāraka Kāryālaya Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute Kashi Sanskrit Series Manikcandra Digambara Jaina Granthamālā Nirnaya Sagar Press Parama Śruta Prabhāvaka Mandala Pali Text Society Rājacandra Jaina Śástramālā Sacred Books of the East Sacred Books of the Hindus Sacred Books of the Jainas Sanātana Jaina Granthamālā Singhi Jaina Jñāna Pitha Varni Jaina Granthamālā Vira Sevā Mandira
VSM
II.
Journals, Proceedings, Seminars, Special Volumes, etc.
IPC
ABDP Akhila Bhārtiya Darsana Parisad AJP Australasian Journal of Philosophy IP Philosophical Quarterly, Amalner
Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress IPP Proceedings of the International Philosophical Congress IJP Indian Journal of Parapsychology JA Jaina Antiquary RJSS Research Journal of Philosophy and Social Sciences SY Lucknow Seminar on Parapsychology and Yoga SK Madras Seminar on Karma and Rebirth

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter: One
THE PROBLEM OF OMNISCIENCE
An Introduction
I. The Meaning Of Omniscience (A) Lexicographical Description (B) Conceptual Classification
II. The Omniscient Being
(A) General
(B) Omniscience and Personality (C) Human Omniscience (D) Moksa and Omniscience
Chapter Two
THE CONCEPT OF OMNISCIENCE

1. Some Misconceptions 2. Sarvajñata & Nayavada 3. Some Conceptual Questions (a) General
(b) Reality and Duty
(c) Omniscience as Knowledge of Reality (d) Omniscience as Knowledge of Duty (e) Concluding Remarks
A Study of the Indian Background
I. The Non-Believers in Omniscience
(A) Introductory
(B) The Carvāka Materialists
(C) The Indian Sceptics and Agnostics (D) The Mimāmsakas
II. The Believers in Omniscience
(A) Introductory
(B) The Devotional Approach
Pages

1-27
1-17
1
5
5
8
12
12
14
15
16
17
18-27
18
19
20
21
28-46
28-35
28
29
30
33 35-43
38355
36

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6
.
Pages
38
(C) The Approach of Self-knowledge (D) The Approach of Practical Utility (E) The Yogic Approach (F) The Approach of Faith
(G) The Approach of Reason III. Concluding Remarks
43
44-46
47
Chapter : Three EVOLUTION OF THE JAINA THEORY OF
OMNISCIENCE 47–72 I. Classification and Categorisation
47-61 (A) Reasons and Motives (B) Chief Senses of 'Omniscience'
50 II. Darsana and Jñāna
61-67 Relation Between Darśana & Jñāna in
the state of Omniscience 1. Kramavāda 2. Sahavāda
3. Abhedavāda III. The Jaina Theory of Omniscience : Chronology 67-72
Chapter : Four SOUL PSYCHOLOGY AND OMNISCIENCE 73-103 1. Soul Psychology and Omniscience
73–79 II. Gradation of Souls and Stages of Omniscience 79-92 Introductory
79 (A) Gradation in the Form of Pañca-Parameshi
and the Concept of Omniscience (B) Five Types of Conditions of the Existence
of Soul (Gati) (C) Gradation of Functions of the Jivas and
Omniscience (Mārgana)

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A
7
Pages
(D) Gradation According to the Stages of Spiritual Development (Gunasthana) of the Soul and Omniscience
(E) Gradation of Transcedental Self and Omniscience Par-excellence
88
III. Proofs for the Soul being the Ground of Omniscience 93-103
(A), General
93
(B) Proofs based on the Doctrine of Pramanas 97
Chapter
Five THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY OF KARMA AND OMNISCIENCE
I. The Basic Postulate of the Theory: Its Genesis and Meaning
II. Karma: The Material Basis of Bondage & Nescience
(A) Karma and Matter (B) Karma and Soul
III. The Passage from Nescience to Omniscience, The Ultimate Ideal
Chapter : Six
OMNISCIENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
I. Metaphysical Foundations of Knowledge II. Knowledge of Knowledge
III. Validity of Knowledge and Omniscience
Chapter
Seven
SYADVĀDA AND SARVAJÑATĀ
I.
II.
III.

86

104-136
104-111
111-122
111
117
122-136
163-172
Absolutism and Non-absolutism
163-165
Is Knowledge Absolute ?
166-168
Dsitinction Between Syadvāda & Sarvajñatā 168-172
137-162
137-145
145-150
150-162

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203
Chapter : Eight ARGUMENTS FOR OMNISCIENCE
173-220 I. Introductory Remarks
173-175 II. Mimāmsakas' Objection Answered
175-195 (A) Ohjections Regarding the Nature of Omniscience
175 (B) Orections Based on the Instruction D'. uma
186 (C) Some Other Objections
194 III. Arguments Based on Classical Pramāņas 195-211 (A) Argument Based on Perception
196 (B) Argument Based on Inference
198 (C) Argument Based on Postulation (D) Argument Based on Analogy
205 (E) Argument Based on Scriptures
206 (F) Argument Based on Non-apprehension 208 IV. Some Positive Jaina Arguments for the Existence of the Omniscient Being
211--220 (A) Argument From the Nature of the Soul as Consciousness
211 (B) Argument from Inferability
213 (C) Argument from the Progressive Development of Knowledge
214 (D) Argument based on the Truth of Astronomical Prediction
218 (E) Argi ment based on the Absolute Non
existence of any Obstructive Pramānas 219 3) Argument from the Natural Tendency of
Thought to go from Part to Whole 220
Chapter : Nine
221-230
CONCLUSION INDEX
233

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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM OF OMNISCIENCE :
AN INTRODUCTION
1. The meaning of omniscience
(A) Lexicographical description The word omniscience and its derivatives have got many Indian equivalents and their occurrences are found in almost all classical Indian languages like Sanskrit, Pāli, Prākrit, etc. But the most commonly used Sanskrit word is Sarvajña (for 'omniscient”) and its derivatives. Important lexical works? enumerate a number of synonyms for 'omniscient'. There is also a striking parallel between 'omniscient' and 'sarvajña' because the Latin 'omnis” corresponds to the Sanskrit 'sarva'. 1 (a) Amara Simha, Amara-Kośa (Nama-lingānušāsana), ed., V. D. Śaramā,
(Bombay, Venkteshwar Press, 1929), p. 196. (b) Sastri H. G., ed., Abhidhāna-chintamani with Mani prabhā comy.
(Varanasi, CSS, 1964) I. 25; II 56. (c) śruta Sagara, Sūri, Jina-Sahasra-nāma, ed., with comy., Āsādhara,
(Kasi, BJP, 1954), pp. 42 and 63. (d) Dhananjaya, Nama-mala (Sabhāsya), ed., S. Tripathi (Kāsi, BJP,
1950), pp. 58–59. (e) Hemacandra, Anekārtha-Sangraha, ed., J. Šāstri (Varanasi, CSS,
1929), III. 150. (f) Irugapa Dandādhinātha, Nanartha-ratna-malā ed., B. R. Sarmā,
Poona, Deccan College, 1954) verse 1365 (g) Raghava, Nanartha-Mañ jari, ed. K. V. K. Śarmā (Poona, Deccan
College, 1954), 974. (h) Patkar M. M. ed., Sāradi yükhyā nāma-mālā (Poona, Deccan College,
1957), p. 3. 2 Lewis C. T. and Short C. ed., A Latin Dictionary (Founded on
Andrew's edition of Freund's Latin Dictionary), Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1879, rev., Imp. 1927, p. 1265. JCO-1

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2
THE MEANING OF OMNISCIENCE
As is the case with all the words in use, 'omniscient has got both straight-forward and idiomatic meanings. Sometimes, when we call a man 'omniscient', we do not mean that he knows everything, we simply mean that he is very learned and he knows a lot.: But when God is described to be
omniscient', the meaning is certainly straight-forward and in a very important sense, the omniscient God knows everything or He has infinite knowledge. The important English dictionaries 8 also distinguish between the 'strict and the 'hyperbolical meanings of the term as described above. The dictionary meanings of other important European languages like German, Russian,5 French, Italian,' Spanish ® etc. are generally grounded on the Latin meaning. Like Sanskrit Sarva', 'Omni' is a combining form of Latin 'omnis', used already in ancient Latin in forming compound adjectives as omnifer (all-bearing), omnigenes (of all kinds) etc. The number of these adjectives was increased in Christian and Late Latin by such additions as omniscius (all-knowing), omnivalens (all-powerful) etc. and in mediaval scholastic Latin by such as omniprasens, omniscientia, and
Murray James, ed., A New English Dictionary (10 Vols., 1888-1928, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1909) VII, p. 109; Webster's New International Dictionary (Springfield, G. C. Merium & Co., 2nd ed (1950), p. 1700; The Oxford Universal Dictionary (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 3rd ed., 1955), P. 1368; The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (2 vols:, Oxford, Clarendon Press, rev. 1947), Vol. II, p. 1386.
Breul, Karl, rev., A New German and English Dictionary (London Cassell & Co., 1906), p. 321 "all wissend".
Segal Louis ed., New Complete English Russian Dictionary (London, Lund Humpheries & Co., 1st ed., 1948), p. 654, “OMHVIIEHT.”
James Boulhe & De V. Payen--Payne, A New French and English Dictionary (London, Cassell & Co., 1905), p. 331.
Wessely J. E. & Payn G. R. & G. Dictionary of the English & Italian.
Bensely Edward R., A New Dictionary of Spanish and English Languages (Paris, Garnier Brothers, N. D.), p. 453.

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THE MEANING OF OMNISCIENCE
finally in modern Latin and especially in English itself by a multitude of words formed more or less on the model of these. The Encyclopaedia Britannica discusses the notion of omniscience as an attribute of God or Jesus Christ, and the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics10 deals with the concept of prescience as a necessity of God's omniscience.
As my objective in this work is to study the notion of omniscience as depicted in the ancient Indian thought and especially Jainism, I think, it would be worthwhile if I state what the important lexical works of the classical Indian languages say about it.
According to the Sanskrit grammar, the etymological derivation of the term 'sarvajña' is governed by a particular rule according to which "the affix 'ka' comes after a verbal root that ends in long a', when there is no prefix preceding it, and when the object is in composition with it."" Thus, the etymological meaning of 'Sarvajña' is 'one who knows everything'. The great Sanskrit dictionary Vacaspatyam '1o also defines Sarvajña' 'as one who knows everything'. It has given five different denotata of it, viz., Śiva, Buddha, Parameśvara, Sarvajñānakartari, and Durgā. An another Sanskrit lexicon Sabdakalpadruma'13 while agreeing with the above
C
9 Encyclopaedia Britannica (24 vols. Chicago, Ency. Brit. Co., 15th ed., 1960), IX. 746; XIII. 17.
10 Hastings J. (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (13 Vols., Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1908-1927), X. 226, 228, 420; VI. 126-127. 323-324.
11 Panini, Astādhvayi, ed. & trans., S. C. Vasu (Allahabad, Panini Office, 1897), III.2.3. (atoanupsarge ka), Vaiyakarana Siddhanta Kaumudi ed. Shiva Dutta (Bombay, Venkteshvara Press, 1971 (Samvat), III. 2.3.
12 Bhattacharya T. (ed.), Vacas patyam (8 Vols., Varanasi, Chowkhamba S. S., 1962), Vol. VI, P. 5268.
13 Deva R. K. (ed.), Benarsidas, 1961) Vol. V., P. 303

Šabdakal pādruma (5 Vols., Delhi, Motilal

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THE MEANING OF OMNISCIENCE
meaning of Sarvajña' mentions Śiva, Buddha, and Visnu as its denotata, in its masculine form and Durga in its feminine form. Apte's Practical Sanskrit Dictionary1 practically agrees with them. According to Monier and Monier Williams, the15 term 'Sarvajña' means 'all-knowing'. There are about thirty references chosen from the varied fields of Sanskrit literature, to explain the meaning of the term. The Pāli equivalent for the Sanskrit Sarvajña' is Sabbaññu.16 According to the rules of Pali grammar, if the verbal root' ña' comes after the object, a suffix known as 'ku' takes place.17 However, the meaning of Päli 'Sabbaññu' is the same as Sanskrit Sarvajña'. The Prakrit equivalent of Sarvajña' is very similar to Pāli, as, "Savvannu" so is the Ardhamāgadhi equivalent 'Savvaṇņu'.19
19
Grammars like Jainendra,20 Katantra,21 Haima12 etc.
14 Gode P. K. and Karve C. G. (ed.), Apte's Practical Sanskrit English Dictionary (Poona, Prasada Prakasana, 1959, Part III., P. 1656.
15 Monier and Monier Williams (ed.), A Sanskrit English Dictionary (Oxford, Clarendon Press, New ed., 1956), p. 1185.
16 Rhys Davids T. W. and Stede W. Pali-English Dictionary (Surrey, Pali Text Society, 1921), pp. 139-140.
17 Kashyapa J., Pali Mahā Vyakaraṇa (Saranatha, Mahabodhi Society 1940), P. 192.
18 Suri V. R. (ed.), Abhidhana Rajendra (7 Vols., Ratlam Jain svet. Sangha, 1925) VII, p. 567, 585.
19 Ratnacandra (ed.), Ardhamagadhi Kosa (4 Vols., Limbdi, S. S. Jaina Conference, 1932), IV., p. 692.
20 Devanandi, Gunanandi (Com.), Jainendra Prakriyā, ed., Shri Lal Jain, (Kasi, Bharatiya Jaina Siddhanta Prakaśini, 1st ed. II. 2.3, p. 276. Devanandi, Abhayanandi (Com.), Jainendra Mahāvṛtti, ed., S. Tripathi, Kasi, Bharatiya Jñanapitha, 2013 (V. E.), II.2.3., p. 102.
21 Sarma Sarva, Bhava Sena (com.), Katantra Rūpamālā Jaipur, Vir Pustak Bhandar, 2481 (V. E.), Section. 587.
22 Hema-Laghu-Prakriya-Vyakaraṇa,
Hemachandra, Vinaya Vijaya, (com.), Bhavanagar, Jaina Dharma Prasaraka Sabha, 1974 (V. E.), p. 276.

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THE MEANING OF OMNISCIENCE
also practically follow the Sanskrit rules of derivation of the term Sarvajña, Abhidhāna Rājendra, a Jaina Encyclopaedia, discusses the notion of omniscience in the context of Jaina philosophy and religion. In Jainism, Sarvajña denotes a person having perfect knowledge (Kevala jñāna).23 However, even here two meanings have been distinguished. One is the common meaning which is almost the literal meaning, i.e., "all-knowing, omniscient being'. The other is the special meaning determined by the philosophical and the religious background of Jainism. In the second sense, an omniscient being is he “who knows all substances with all their modes ”. This knowledge is gained only after the complete destruction of all obstructive veils. 24
(B)
Conceptual Clarification
1. Some Misconceptions :
It should not be construed from what has been said that I am trying to determine the meaning of 'Sarvajña', just by referring to various lexicons, gram nurs, etc. It is now a common place that the lexical works cannot decide the meaning of any word. They report only the existing usages. One may conclude from what has been said in the preceding pages that there is almɔst no disagreement about the meaning of
Sarvajña', because the various ways in which its meaning has been explained by the classical dictionaries do not differ from one another in any fundamental way. But this would be
23
Abhidhana Rajendra, Vol. VII, p. 585.
24 Umāsvāmi, Tatlvārthadhigama Sutra, ed. S. C. Ghosal (S. B. J. Vol.
II, Arrah, 1920), I. 29: Sruta Sāgara Suri, Tattvärthavștti, ed. M. K. Jaina, (Kasi, Bharatiya Jñanapitha, 1949), I 29; Pūjyapāda, Sarvarthasiddhi, ed. P. C. Siddhanta Šāstri. (Kasi. B. J. P. 1944). 1. 29: Vidyānanda, Tattvärthaślokavārttikam (Bombay, Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1918), I. 29.2; Akalanka, Tattvārthara javarttikam ed. M. K. Jaina, (Kasi, B. J. P., 1953), "Vol. I, 1.29.

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6
a gross misunderstanding. While retaining its lexical identity, the word has got differing connotations when used by philosophers of different metaphysical and logical reorientations. I hope to make this point clear in the coming pages. In a sense, this is one of the main tasks, which the present work aims to fulfil.
THE MEANING OF OMNISCIENCE
Literally, 'omniscience' means 'all-knowledge' or 'knowledge of all'. But the term 'all' is used in different senses in different contexts. Hence the meaning of the term 'omniscience' will differ accordingly. Some grammarians say that the man who knows the meanings of 'all' will also know its referants, ie., what it denotes or stands for. But this may be so in the name only, for no one can prevent another person from giving a word any meaning he likes. 25 The naming of words depends upon human stipulation. The term 'all' may also be applied to ordinary things like oil, water or butter, and then the person knowing all about such things, will be all-knowing. This means that even if one knows a little of the universe as a whole, he could be called all-knowing. It will be interesting to note that this is precisely the hyperbolic or idiomatic meaning of the term 'omniscient' as used in various dictionaries, i.e., when a very learned person is described as 'omniscient'. A third meaning of 'all' may be given as the epitome of the world included under the two terms 'positive' and 'negative'. Hence if one who knows this epitome of the world should be all-knowing. However, this is a very vague use of the term which does not mean knowledge of all things in full detail. Another defective approach would be to delimit the use of the term 'all' in a particular system by saying that all things mean only such and such things. In this way, the context of omniscience will vary from
25 Santarakṣita, Tattvasangraha (Com. by Kamalaśila) trans., G. N. Jha (2 Vols., Baroda, Oriental Institute, 1939), Vol. II. K. 3129-3135. The Mimamsakas have no objection to accepting the five senses in which 'omniscient being' has been discussed there.

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THE MEANING OF OMNISCIENCE system to system and consequently there will be only discord and disharmony in interpreting reality.
For instance, to the Buddhists, omniscience' will mean knowledge of the Pasch-Skandhas (Five groups of bodily and psychical states ), to the Vaišeşikas that of the seven cate gories, to the Naiyāyikas that of the sixteen categories, to the Sārkhyas that of the twenty-five principles, and so on. In this way, it will lead to unnecessary disagreements, To remove this difficulty, one may say that the term 'all' may stand for the Object of Cognition through all the six means of cognition recognised in Indian philosophy. Then, one who has such a knowledge will be called 'all-knowing'. But then one may argue like the Mimāṁsakas that there are suprasensible things like Dharma, Adharma etc. which cannot be cognised by any of the six means of cognition. Therefore the claim to omniscience is not glorified. In this sense, the term 'omniscient' (all-knowing) will apply to a person who knows all things except Dharma and Adharma. This is in fact robbing the term of its meaning and unduly restricting its scope. On the contrary, the Mimāṁsakas and the Buddhists will understand by 'omniscience', not the knowledge of all individual details of the universe. For the Mimāṁsakas it means knowledge of Dharma and Adharma and for the Buddhists that of the things which ought to be acquired or rejected (heyopādeya). This again is restricting the application of the term 'omniscient' in a difficult way. Hence, the Jaina approach, according to which, 'omniscience', being the knowledge of all things, will also include the knowledge of duty or morality as the Mimāṁsakas and the Buddhists would like to emphasise. However, to equate the Buddhistic conception of omniscience with the knowledge of the five groups of Bodily and Psychical states (Pañca skandha) will be certainly an over simplication. This is clear from Kamasila's Commentary of the Tattvasangraha of śāntarakṣita. Professor Jayatilaka in his book Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (London, 1963) (p. 648 ) holds that "apart from the negative conclusions,

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8
THE MEANING OF OMNICIENCE
we have the positive claim on the part of the Buddha that he should be regarded as one who has a three-fold knowledge, which even other can develop." This attitude of not claiming omniscience for the Buddha seems to have been maintained upto the time when Vibhanga was composed as it does not mention Buddha's power of omniscience. In the Nikaya also, the words sabbaññu (omniscient) or sabba-dassăvi (all-seeing) do not find their places in the list of 100 epithets of the Buddha.
However, the Buddha appears to be recognised an omniscient in the Theravada School before the completion of the Pali Canon-in Patisambhidāmagga and the Kathavatthu. Here Buddha's omniscience means "Knowing everything conditioned and unconditioned without remainder" "" or Knowing everything in the past, present and future."
This meant that the omniscience is claimed for the Buddha by his desciples far removed in time from the Buddha himself. (Ibid., p. 448)
2. Sarvajñata and Nayavāda:
Realising the apparent inadequacies in the analysis made by the Mimmāsakas, I propose to attempt an analysis of the concept of omniscience through the logical apparatus of Nayavada. At the outset, it would be interesting to note that although the Jaina logicians have attempted elaborate analysis of the concept of omniscience, I have not found anywhere the application of Nayavada to this concept. Nayavada is an unique organon of analysis to help the understanding of reality. Its remarkable feature is that it enables us to avoid looking at a thing from just one point of view by neglecting other possible approaches. It does not produce confusion of standpoints but facilitates an integration and synthesis of the different ways of approach. This naturally leads to thoroughness and comprehensiveness The seven nayas or standpoints are seven approaches to understand any object of knowledge. I think, this seven-pronged logical apparatus

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can also be fruitfully applied to the notion of omniscience, I do not claim that what I am going to present offers a complete analysis but it certainly would exhibit the logically possible ways of interpreting omniscience in seven ways.
For the sake of convenience, I shall start with the last of the seven nayas - Evambhūta and end with Naigama, the first, in order to show that each preceding stand-point is subtler and more specialised than the succeeding one.
To start with the grammarians, they reach the climax when they identify reality with a highly specialised form of the verbal method lile the sixth kind or such-like-root of the various speech-forms used in the expression of an object. However, only one is designated by the term in question, while an altogether different attitude must be designated by a different term under different conditions. It is even more rigorous than the etymological viewpoint in that it treats the different attitudes of the object denoted by different designations as numerically different entitles. Now, the term 'sarvajña' will here signify a specialised meaning desirable from its etymology, and will then mean, " true in its entirety to the word and sense. 28 This means that an object denoted by a particular word is recognised only when the object is in the actual state of performing its own natural function as suggested by the derivative meaning of that word, because if a thing be really recognised even when it does not fulfil its function, then cloth can also be called a jar and so on. 27
26 Vinays-Vijaya, Naya Karnika ed., M. D. Desai (Bombay, Jaina Śvetambara Conference, 1915), p. 54, See, N. M. Tatia, Nayas, ways of Approach & Observation (Bangalore, Jaina Mission Society, N. D.) p. 9. Also see Y. J. Padmarajiah's A Comparative study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge. (Jaina Sahitya Vikas Mandal, Bombay, 1963), p. 324.
27 Ibid. Verse 18. This is the approach of Evambhūta Naya. We have discussed the derivation of Sarvajña from the root jña' (Aşṭadhyayi of Panini. III. 2.3).
JCO-2

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Samabhirudha Naya (etymological standpoint) distinguishes between terms according to their roots. "With the difference of the words expressing the same object, the significance also differs,"28 just as Jinendra, Sugat, Sarikara etc., though synonyms of Sarvajña signify differently according to their derivative senses. But it would be wrong, if we identify the reality with the root of the word. This will be the fallacy known as Samabhirudhābhāsa.29
Then comes the 'Sabda Naya' (verbal standpoint). Each name no doubt, has its own particular meaning, for example, Jinendra is not Sugata though both of them are omniscient beings. "Different words or synonyms may also refer to the same object."80 In grammar, all the synonymous words of cmniscience like Sarvajña, Sarvavit, Sarvcdarši, Aseṣavit, Akhiladṛk, Viśvavit, etc. will have the same sense because they are expressions of one and the same object. So the relation between terms and meaning is relative. When we take them to be absolute, we commit the fallacy known as 'Sabdabhāsa'31 generally committed by the nominalists and the grammarians.
All the three preceding standpoints refer to the etymological or the verbal aspect, so they are more or less of the same type. Such verbal analysis, however, may interest the grammarians and linguists but the common man will be interested only in the real and natural state of a thing, which to him is of immediate utility. For instance, an ordinary man, in order to understand the meaning of 'Sarvajña' will not care very much for the specific root derivation of the word or of its various synonyms. He will also not trouble himself with the past, future or even of the super-natural
28 Vinaya-Vijaya, Ibid., Verse 15.
29 Divakara, Siddhasena, Nyāyāvatāra, ed., P. L. Vaidya, (Bombay, J. S. Conference, 1935), Verse 29 (Notes).
30 Vinaya-Vijaya, Ibid., Verse 14.
31 Divakara, Siddhasena, Ibid.

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aspects of 'omniscient', since they do not serve any purpose. To him the real and natural state of a thing is the most straight-forward approach (Ṛju-Sūtra Naya),32 But such an approach will not be as practical as it seems. The omniscient being may not be present here and now, but this does not mean that he is non-existent. This is looking at things with a straight or direct glimpse, devoid of temporal dimensions. This is therefore a fallacious argument known as ṛjusūtrābhāsa.33
So the Vyavahara Naya3 (Practical standpoint) in understanding the meaning 'omniscient' amounts to thinking the omniscient being possessing specific properties only, because generalities cut off from particulars are non-entities. This means that a general idea about an omniscient being as knowing everything is not enough. We must know the particular and specific individual possessing omniscience. "As no wound or scratch can possibly be healed by the application of the general property of poulticeness"35 because the healing properties only inhere in specific poultices, so an idea of omniscience in general without referring to any particular omniscient being, is false. This line of approach which ignores general qualities, is entirely defective and it leads to the fallacy known as Vyavaḥārābhāsa.
11
The Sangraha Naya (Collective standpoint) deals with "the general properties alone while recognising that there exists no specific property apart from general property, i. e., both Viseṣa and Samanya are co-existing and coincident."36 We can illustrate this point with the example of the omniscient being itself. Not a single omniscient being can ever be conceived apart from the general quality of omniscience.
32 Vinaya-Vijaya, Ibid., K. 10-12.
33 Divakara, Siddhasena Ibid.
34 Vinaya-Vijaya, Ibid., K. 9. 35 Vinaya-Vijaya, Ibid., K. 10. 36 Ibid., K. 6.

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It would, however, be a fallacy (Sangrahābhāsa) to treat omniscience apart from omniscient beings.
The most reasonable view will be, perhaps, to treat an object as possessing both the general and specific qualities, "because no particular thing in nature is possessed of a general property unaccompanied with some specific property or vice versa."37 This is the standpoint of Naigama (Nondistinguished). This way of pantascopic observation criticises the Nyāya-Vaišeșika realism which the Jainas consider to be one sided and wrong. According to the latter, Samanya and Višesa have separate existences from the object in which they inhere. In fact, in the sentence 'I am omniscient, the property of omniscience is a general quality that exists in other beings also, whereas I' indicates one particular individual. Hence, the Nyāya-Vaiseșikas commit the fallacy known as Naigamābhāsa.
The above analysis shows that the concept of 'omniscience' can be interpreted variously. It would be worthwhile to consider the merits and demerits of each standpoint. As philosophers, we should welcome all the light that come from different approaches and try to work out a synthesis. Nayavāda is an unique instrument of analysis of both meaning and verbal usages, that reminds us of the linguistic analysis of the present time.
However, since this Naya-analysis fails to take into account the historical senses in which omnisciene' has been used in the ancient Indian thought, an independent analysis in the historical perspective is necessary. 3. Some Conceptual Questions
(a) General From the foregoing discussion, we have seen some of the
37
Ibid. K. 5. See also Jaina C. R. The Science of Thought (Bijnor, Jaina Publishing House, 2nd ed.) Ch. I.

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difficulties in defining the term 'omniscience'. It is necessary, therefore, to analyse the concept thoroughly so that we can arrive at its correct definition
13.
We can start our analysis by asking whether omniscience is false or true knowledge? If it is the former, it is sheer delusion but if it is the latter, we can ask further whether it is knowledge of only the important things or of all the things? If it is the former, it is not omniscience in the sense it is restricted in scope, but if the latter, it raises a further question: Is it the knowledge of all objects without or with their attributes? If the first alternative is the case, it lacks the "knowledge of attributes". Besides, it raises many metaphysical issues, such as whether or not an object can be known without knowing its attributes or whether objects and their attributes are so separable in knowledge even if not in reality. I shall not, however, discuss such points at this stage of analysis. Rather, I shall mean by knowledge, knowledge of objects with their attributes. But this sense also raises another question, whether omniscience is knowledge of of all objects with some or all of their attributes. If we accept the first alternative its scope is again limited. If we accept the second, we are faced with a further problem: Is such a knowledge restricted only to some particular place or to all the places? If the former, it ceases to be omniscience being spatially limited, but if the latter, we must answer, whether this knowledge covers the entire present or the entire span of time, i.e., past, present and future. In the former case, it cannot be omniscience being restricted to the present only. In the latter case, we are faced with another difficulty. Is such a knowledge existing in any moment of time successive or simultaneous ? If it is successive, there cannot be omniscience, since in this way the knowledge of all the objects with all their attributes at all the places and at all the times can never be exhausted and the knowledge so conditioned would never be completed But if it is simultaneous, there would be another difficulty. Is it obtained by a single cognition

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or by a series of cognitions ? The first alternative is unacceptable, since it is impossible to know the contradictory things like heat and cold simultaneously by one single cognition. But if it be possible to know them through a single abnormal cognition brought about by communion, then there can be no means of cognition to vouch for such knowledge since it is not produced by perception, inference, or authority. But if we accept the second alternative, we must say whether such a simultaneous knowledge apprehended by several cognitions is actual or possible only. If it is said to be actual, this view would be unacceptable since such a knowledge obtained by several cognitions covering even mutually contradictory things have never been found to exist at one and the same time. In fact, it is impossible to apprehend even in hundreds of thousands of years, each one of the inumerable things, past, present and future. But suppose, if the knowledge is only possible, we are then confronted with another question: If it be possible to know all things simultaneously, nothing will remain to be known by the omniscient being. In that case, after having this knowledge, he would behave as an unconscious being, since he will have nothing more to cognise, Supposing, for the moment, that this difficulty is somehow overcome, we shall still be faced with the question whether past and future are known as present or as they are, i.e, the past as past and the future as future. If we accept the first alternative, in that case, the distinctions of time as past, present and future will be lost as past and future will merge into the immediate present. But if we accept the second alternative, it will mean that the omniscient being cognises the past and future which are at present non-existents. Thus in both the cases, our knowledge would become illusory and wrong.
(b) Reality and Duty
To avoid many of the difficulties involved in the foregoing position, omniscience has been interpreted to mean knowledge of the important and essential things through

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their important characteristics, and not of each and everything in their numerical details. But it may be asked, unless all the objects with all their attributes are known, how can the distinction between the essential and the non-essential be made ? Even if it be scmehow possible, some of the old difficulties will reappear. I propose to discuss them alsewhere. Presently, I shall give an exposition of omniscience understood in the sense mentioned above.
In the history of the Indian thought, I find that some who believe, on some grounds or other, in the possibility of omniscience take it to mean by it the knowledge of all reality or duty (ułat we cuķht to do) or of both reality and duty. These are the two aspects of the knowledge of important and essential things of the universe. As a matter of fact, when we say that cmniscience is knowledge of important and essential things of this universe, we are obliged to answer to make the investižation ccmplete, whether it refers to knowledge of reolity, or duty or tecuty. But sirce in the history of the Indian thought we do not find emphasis upon the knowledge of teauty as a constituent of omniscience, we can postpone its discussion here.
(c) Omniscience as knowledge of the Reality If omniscience means “Knowledge of the reality ", we shall have to answer another question : whether it means knowledge of the transcendental and ultimate reality or that of the empirical reality ? If it be taken in the former sense, it will have a restricted meaning acceptable differently to different systems of thought. Then in that sense it would stand merely for the knowledge of a particular metaphysics Knowledge of the essential reality may also mean the knowledge of class concepts or ideas as in Plato's philosophy. For example, instead of speaking of this table and that table, we sometimes speak of table'. So the entire physical world cannot be covered by knowing such quetsions as matter, space, time etc. But if we do not bind ourselves to a particular

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metaphysics and instead hold the general view that omniscience means "knowlodge of essential things", we are faced with a difficult task of explaining the status of the contingent and its relationships to the essential. One may say that the knowledge of essential things implies the knowledge of the contingent thing, as is done by the Sārkhyas. The knowledge of Praksti implies the knowledge of the conitngent world. But if we admit that the knowledge of the essence does not contain the knowledge of the accident, we shall have to turn towards the pluralistic ard realistic systems like the Nyāya-Vaišeşika which hold that the categories' imply the structure of the world.
If we accept that omniscience is knowledge of the empirical reality, there is no need of philosophy; as sciences are already doing the same work. But no scientist ever makes any claim to omniscience.
Now, supposing, we do have knowledge of the reality anyhow and in any sense, there will still remain the problem whether it is knowledge of temporal or ron-temporal, If it means the former, we shall have to argue with science that omniscience is not possible. But if it is said that the ultimate reality is free from spatio-temporal limitations, we shall be committed to an idealistic view of the universe. So either we accept the scientific view, in which case omniscience is not possible, or we accept the idealistic view, in which case there is no unanimity as to what the ultimate reality is.
mniscience as knowledge of the Duty
In the second sense, omniscience is knowledge of the duty (or dharma) or of the principles of good conduct. According to this view, since our moral life is of supreme value to us knowledge of the morality is the real knowledge. Hence, omniscience (Sarvajñalā) will have to be the knowledge of dharma (dharmajñatā). This is an ethical approch. It also has certain logical difficulties. For example, it must be stated whether dharma

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referred to is any dharma prevailing at any particular place and at any time, or it is one particular dharma at a particular place and particular time. In the former case, there may be a conflicting dharmas since what is dharma according to one may not be according to the other. In the latter case there will arise another question. Whether the particular dharma in question is private or public? If it is the former, it may lead to narrowness and fanaticism and if the latter, we shall have to seek some eternal universal dharma, which is not yet in existence. It means that inspite of the great efforts by many religious thinkers, a universal religion is still an utopia and we are all following particular dharmas resulting in religious rivalries etc. Even what are called the Cardinal principles of morality, do vary from one religion to another.
There can be a third sense of omniscience different from these two senses. Contrary to the common presupposition of the duality of the knower and the object of knowledge, the Vedantins and the Upanisadic thinkers adopt a different attitude. According to them, ultimately there is no distinction between the subject and the object. In this sense, omniscience is interpreted in terms of knowledge of the self or Brahman. The knowledge of all' here means the knowledge of the one ultimate Brahman, since one is all and all is one. However this meaning of omniscience is highly technical and metaphysical. It can be accepted only when we subscribe to its underlying metaphysics.
17
(e) Concluding Remarks
After this brief exposition of the different senses of omniscience, we can state the following as the prerequisite to make the concept of omniscience workable. First, it should be regarded as a true and valid knowledge, for if it is false, it would be only illusory. Secondly, it should not be regarded merely as a potential but as actualised knowledge. Thirdly, it cannot be indirect knowledge like inference or even direct knowledge like sense-perception. If it is indirect, it cannot JCO-3

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can
be always indubitable and definite; if it is sensuous, not comprehend knowledge of things beyond a limited range of time and place. Fourthly, it cannot be either successive or obtainable through the help of more than one cognition, because in the former case, it can never be complete, while in the latter the same omniscient person will have to contain several cognitions, some of which will even be contradictory. Fifthly, omniscience must mean the knowledge holding good for all the places and all the times. Sixthly, it must mean knowledge of all things with all their attributes. Seventhly, since it is the knowledge of all things, it must naturally include the knowledge of the reality and the knowledge of the duty.
THE OMNISCIENT BEING
In short, it must be a synthesis of the different partial views. This is briefly, the outline of the Jaina view of omniscience, which may be now defined as an immediate and direct knowledge of all the objects of the universe, past, present and future, subtle and remote, far and near, by a single ever-lasting act of knowledge requiring no assistance from the senses and even mind.
2. The omniscient being
(A) General
Etymologically, the term Sarvajña (Omniscient) and Sarvajñata (Omniscience) are derived from the same root. Both terms are based on the root jñā (Jānāti), to know and Sarvajnata is formed by adding the abstract affix- ta' to Sarvajña. The etymological meaning of the term 'Sarvajña' will be therefore 'one who knows everything'.
First we have to ascertain, whether there is or is not any omniscient being? If there is none, then the question 'who is omniscient' ? needs no answer. If we say that there is one, we must be prepared to prove our claim by giving suitable arguments. For the present, let us assume that we can give some such proofs. The actual proofs will be given a

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little later. Now accepting that there is an omniscient being, we can further ask : what sort of being it is? Is it personal or non-personal? Supposing that the omniscient is a personal being, we can further ask: has it some extra-ordinary and supernormal personality like that of Gods or has it an ordinary and normal personality like that of human beings? In case if it is claimed to be impersonal, the question, 'Is knowledge possible without a personality as its substratum ?' It will demand an answer. Apparently it merits a negative answer. However, the Mimāṁsakas do hold the possibility of impersonal knowledge when they regard the beginningless authorless, Vedas as the only source of knowledge of dharma. There are objections to this view. First, many human names like Katha etc. are given to the different sections of the Vedas imply human authorship. Then, the Vedic words, being caused entities, cannot be eternal. To these objections, the Mīmāmsakas say that the names occurring in the Vedas like Katha and the like may be taken as conventional without any reason because the name may be for the portion of the Veda being explained by such people.
Apart from the Mimārsakas, who claim all knowledge of dharma to be derivable from the Vedas, there are also the Vedāntins according to whom the impersonal Atman or Brahman is the highest principle of knowledge. Obviously the Vedāntins ascribe the power of omniscience, omnipotence etc. to īśvara but iśvara is after all the phenomenal and not the noumenal reality. Hence, omniscience as the real knowledge, has to be ascribed to Brahmın alone who is certaily impersonal
(B) Omniscience and Personality It is a truism that there must be somebody to acquire or possess the omniscient knowledge. It is also necessary that the knower should be endowed with personality. It is a common feeling that he must have at least the central unity which is

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responsible for anybody for being a person. But personality has been conceived in the Indian tradition of admitting of various degrees of unification and development, so much so that it has been attributed to superhuman subjects like Gods, deities, angels and demons as well as to subhuman agencies like animals and birds, besides the human beings. Very often God is described as omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient. But since the believers in polytheism or ditheism do not, however, accept any Surpeme God but believe in many deities, variously described, the deities are also treated as omniscient beings. Angels are also supposed to be supernormal beings with goodness within while the demons etc. are supposed to know everything of the world and also the minds of man. The demons etc. described in epic mythologies are also equipped with supernormal vision.
(C) Human Omniscience
It is interesting to find out the concept of omniscience associated with human beings. The notion of human omniscience is completely absent in Western thought, where only God is described as omniscient. In Indian thought, the concept of omniscience has generally been associated with Yogic attainments or salvation. Through Yoga, one can attain omniscience. Among the Yogis, we have the two main types, -yukta and yunjñana. The former is one who has attained through spiritual perfection such intuitive knowledge of all objects which is constant and spontaneous, while the later is the kind of Yogi who require the help of concentration as an auxiliary condition for the attainment of intuitive omniscient knowledge. The Yoga Sutra mentions many kinds of Yogic concentrations like Dharmamegha (Cloud of virtue), 38 Asamprajñāta (Super-conscious)39 which is also called Nirbija
38 Patanjali, Yoga Sutra, Vivekanand (trans. ed.) called Raja Yoga (Almorah, Ramkrishana Mission, (1951) IV. 28.
39 Ibid., I. 18.

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21
(Seedless) 40 or the state of salvation.41 In short, they result in spiritual clearness and in absolutely infallable right knowledge (Rtambharā).42 This is the perception par-excellence having knowledge of all things (Sarvavisayam), and the entire nature (Survārthavişayam )43 simultaneously. This is what the Jainas call omnisciene or Kevala Jñāna. The state of Dharmamegha samādhi is also the state of Final Beatitude as well as omniscience. 4 4 This raises an important question that there is a vital relationship between the two concepts of omniscience and salvation which requires a separate treatment.
(d) Mokșa and Omniscience It is important to note that the liberated souls like the Arhats, Buddhas and Jivan Muktas are also described in Indian philosophy as omniscient beings. It is perhaps because the notion of a liberated being implies the idea of prefection and since omniscience is perfection of knowledge, it has been associated with him. There may also be other reasons. The two concepts of omniscience and salvation are value-concepts and Indian philosopły being value-oriented, puts a great emphasis on our faith in the objectivity and realisability of these values, which are generally found to exist together. Thirdly, since the idea of mökşa has been regarded as the highest value and the ultimate purpose of the life of the individual (mokșa eva paramzpuruṣārtha), 4 5 the state of Mokşı is generally described as the state of
40 Ibid., I. 51. 41 Ibid., II. 25; III. 51; III. 55. 42 Ibid., I. 48. 43 Ibid., III. 55. 44 Ibid., IV. 33; III. 50; I. 25; I. 48. 45 Deshmukh C. D., “The Concept of Liberation", The Philosophical
Quarterly (Amalner, Indian Institute of Philosophy, July 1937), Vol. XIII, N. 2, p. 135.

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supreme and untramelled knowledge. Hence a close relation between the two concepts of Mokşa and omniscience becomes inevitable. Fourthly, the genesis of the idea of Maksa has also been traced to "the endevour of man to find out ways and means by means of which he could become happy. "46 This naturally presupposes that the knowledge is at the very root of salvation. The mechanism of Moksa is therefore the mechanism of the knowledge through which we eradicate our sufferings and achieve happiness. Now, an omniscient being will be best fitted to attain Mokşa, since he will have the infallable knowledge about the ways and means of removing misery and acquiring happiness. Fifthly, Mokşa has been described as the annulment of avidyā or nescience and the consequent dawn of knowledge, so much so that knowledge has been regarded as an essential precondition of Moksa and ignorance that of the bondage. This tendency of emphasising knowledge as a condition of Mokşa reaches its climax in the Upanişadas and Vedānta, where knowledge has been identified with emancipation, as we find in the dictum : “ To know is to become Brahman.” Omniscience alone is absolutely faultness knowledge. Sixthly, the state of omniscience involves a direct, immediate, intuitive apprehension of Truth. This is very much similar to the mystic state of mind of a liberated soul, capable of enjoying itself as saprem intelligence and bliss and identifying itself with or evolving into some higher personality. Seventhly, the description of Moks a as the state of “ sound sleep "47 (suşupti) is not the negation of consciousness; rather it is the affirmation of it. It denotes that there are so many levels of consciousness and in order to know
46 Ramachandran N., “ The Concept of Mukti in Indian Philosophy"
Proceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress (Lucknow, 1944),
p. 243. 47 Shamsastri R., Jha Commemoration Volume (Poona Oriental Book
Agency, 1937), p. 357. Also see R. Bhattacharya, "Moksa Darsana". Darsnika Traimāsika (Faridkot, A. B. Darśana Parishad, July, 1955), Vol. I, N. 3, p. 63.

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fully, one must be aware of all the levels viz., waking (jāgrat) dreaming (svapna) and sound sleep (susupti ). In fact, susupti is said to be at the bottom of our entire conscious phenomena. Therefore it is the most comprehensive form of consciousness. Mokṣa has been conceived to be "the seat of happiness wherein the liberated soul possesses all-vision, all-knowledge etc."48 Lastly, soul is the common abode of salvation and omniscience. Mukti refers to the soul, not to the body. Similarly, the state of omniscience is also the perfection of the cognitive faculty of the self, whereas Mukti is the highest goal of his spiritual life. To many of the systems, the soul is pure consciousness. Hence the liberated soul is described " as endowed with knowledge and happiness. "49
23
With the above brief introduction, I now proceed to discuss this relationship between omniscience and salvation as presented in different systems.
The Cārvākas, in accordance with their materialistic conception of soul (caitanya-visiṣṭa-deha eva ātmā) and mokṣa (dehocchedaḥ mokṣaḥ or mokṣas tu marane ca prāṇavayunivartanam) cannot accept consciousness in Moksa, what to speak of omniscience. To the Buddhist, since the so-called ego is nothing more than the Five-fold aggregate of bodily and psychical states (pañcha-skandhas), Nirvana will aim at the destruction of this mental continuum (cittam vimucyate) or at least the "arrest of the stream of consciousness (santati-anutpāda)" leading to the cessation of the possibilities of future experience (anāgatānutpāda). Obviously, it is difficult to talk of omniscience during such a state. But the Buddhists do speak of Buddha's omniscience on the same ground that has been used to refute others' claims to omniscience. He is said to be
48 Yogindu, Paramatma-Prakasa, ed., Upadhye A. N. (Bombay, ParamaŚruta-Prabhavaka-Mandala, 1937), II. 3, 9-11, etc.

49. Kundakunda, Pravacanasara, ed., Upadhye A. N. (Bombay, ParamaŚruta-Prabhavaka-Maṇḍala, 1935), I. 68,

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omniscient because “at the very outset, it was Buddha who expounded the doctrine of Non-substantiality, 50 since according to them “ that person alone could be omniscient who knows the whole world in its real form of being without soul.”81 In Buddhism, "omniscience results from the removal of obscuration of Moral defilement and of ignorance of the cognisable things. 5 2 It is because of this that Buddha is said to stand at the head of all philosophers. Here it may be noted that by emphasising so much the concept of non-substantiality along with omniscience, the Buddhists have introduced valuational interpretation of omniscience. So it is said that Buddha's omniscience does not rest upon his knowledge of such things as the number of insects in the world but upon the knowledge of the doctrine of Non-substantiality, “Three paths,” “Four Truths” etc.
According to the Nyāya, first the senses grasp the object, then the mind transfers the mental image of the perceptual cognition to the soul. Hence, consciousness comes to the soul when it is related to the mind, which in turn is related to the senses and the senses to the external objects. So in the dis. embodied condition, self will be devoid of consciousness. Thus the state of Moksa is like the state of deep dreamless sleep, devoid of consciousness, 53 since, mokṣa is freedom from pain. So long as soul is related to body, pain is inevitable; hence in order to avoid pain, the contact of the soul with the body and the mind has to be ended. In the Vaśesika philosophy, since the “Self has cognitions of things only when connected with body"54, it is only when soul is free from the qualities
50 Santarakṣita, Tattva-Sangraha, 3340. 51 Ibid., 3337. 52 Ibid., K. 3338. klesajñe ya-avarana-prahāṇato hi sarva jñat vam. 53 Gotama, Nyāya Sūtra, ed. Vidyabhūṣaṇa S. C. ( Allahabad, S. B. H.
No. 8, 1913) IV. 1.63. 54 Sridhara, Nyāya Kandali, p. 57.

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25
produced by contact with name and form (ātmaviśesaguņānāmatyant occhedah) or, as Sridhara would say, the destruction of nine specific qualities (navānām ātmavisesa gunānām atyantocchedah Mok şah) that liberation is possible. Thus, the state, of Mokşa, in both Nyāya and Vaiseșika comes perilously near the unconscious condition of a pebble or a piece of stone, as is the criticism of the Cārvākas. To the Mimāmsakas also, the state of literation is free from pleasure and pain. Consciousness is an adventitious quality of the soul and knowledge of objects is due to the activities of the manas and the senses. According to the Prābhākaras, liberation is not even a state of bliss, since attributeless soul cannot have even bliss. Moksa is therefore simply the natural state of the soul (svātmasphuranarūpah).55 According to the Bhattas, however, Moksa is the realisation of the intrinsic happiness (ātmasaukhyānubhūti) but Pārtha Sārthi Miśra 59 and Gangābharța deny this against Nārāyana Miśra, Bhatta Sarvajña and Sucaritra Miśra. We can conclude that since the soul is regarded as consciousness associated with ignorance (ajñānopahitacaitanyātmavāda) in the state of Mukti, omniscience is co-existent with it.
However, this is not the case with other systems like Sārkhya, Yoga, Vedānta, Jaina etc. According to these systems, consciousness is not a mere quality but very essence of the soul. Freedom consists in full manifestation of the glory of the self. According to Sānkhya-Yoga, it is only when we can effect a cessation of the link with matter that the state of absolute isolation and redirection of our consciousness is possible. There is, however, a clear ambivalence in Sārkhyadoctrine of release in so far as it maintains that “it is the spirit that is to obtain release, and yet the apparently predomi
55 śālikānātha, Prakarana Pañcika, P. 157. 56 Mišrā Pārtha Sārathi, Sastra-di pikā (with commentaries of Somanatha
and Rāmakrişna) (Bombay, 1915), pp. 125–30. JCO-4

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THE OMNISCIENT BEING
nant characterisation of spit is such that it is impossible that it should either be bound or released. "57 Anyway, the state of Mokṣa is the state of knowledge and so long avidya remains there is no release. We have earlier discussed that in Yoga Philosophy, the state of Mokṣa is also the state of omniscience because it requires absolutely clear knowledge through concentration. In Jainism, the soul is essentially a knowing substance and is potentially omniscient, omnipotent etc. So in the state of Moksa, when the Karmic-veil is removed, the soul shines in its full splendour and possesses omniscience. Mallisena, a Jaina philosopher, ridicules the Naiyayikas for reducing Moksa to a negative condition in which there is no consciousness and no joy.58 The Jainas like the Upanisadic
thinkers, 59 Buddhists,60 Nyaya-Vaiseṣikas, 01 Sānkhyas, 02
Yogins,63 Vedāntins, etc. admit the possibility of Jivan-Mukti, which is not accepted by the Rāmānujists, Nimbārka, Mādhva and some others. The duality of Mukti in Jainism is perhaps a legacy of the Upanisads. The Jainas believe in Mokşa as the result of the annulment of nescience and the consequent dawn of wisdom, hence Jivan-Mukti seems to be one and the only legitimate concept. Mukti is, however, Mukti-it is one and indivisible. "It refers to the soul, not to the body, and the
57 Godwin W. F., "Theories of Consciousness and Liberation in Sankhya Philosophy and the Philosophy of G. Santyana, "Pr. Ind. Phil. Congress" (Banglore, 1954, Ceylon Session), p. 17.
58 Mallisena, Syadvāda Mañjari, ed. A. B. Dhurva (Poona, Bombay Sanskrit Series No. 83, 1933), 8.
59 Kath. Up. II. 3.14; Mundaka, III. 2.6; Bṛhad, IV. 4.6-7:
60 Buddhaghosa, Visuddhi Magga, ed. Warren H. (Cambridge, H. O. S. No. 41, 1950), XVI. 73.
61 Vatsyayana, Nyaya Bhasya ed. Jha G. N. ( Poona, Oriental Book Agency, 1939), IV. 2.3.
62 Isvara-Kṛṣṇa, Sankhya-Kārika (University of Madras, 1948), 67.
63 Patanjali, Yoga-Sutra, IV. 30.

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27
dissolution of the body is neither an inevitable precondition nor an integral feature of Mukti."64
It will be found that those systems which do not believe that consciousness is an essential element of soul are also asatkāryavādins. Hence their logic is that since consciousness did not exist in the soul in its natural state, it cannot emerge in its final state. As constitutional freedom of the soul is a logical necessity, so is its power of omniscience. Hence, the doctrine of omniscience vis-a-vis mokşa rests or falls on the doctrine of Satkāryavāda.
64 Šāstri, S. Sūryanārāin, “ Jivan-Mukti”, The Philoso phical Quarterly,
Vol. XIV, No. 14, Jan. 1939, p. 313.

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CHAPTER II
THE CONCEPT OF OMNISCIENCE : A STUDY OF THE INDIAN BACKGROUND
1. The Non-believers in Omniscience ( Asarvajñavādins )
(A)
Introductory
The problem of omniscience has been a matter of abiding interest for Indian philosophy, religion and culture. It is therefore necessary to discuss its ancient philosophical background. Every idea or ideology in order to be properly understood, needs to be studied both in its background and fore. ground.
Though it is quite clear that idea of omniscience has been accepted, in some form or other, by almost all the Indian systems of Philosophy except the Cārvākas,' it is not possible to present a chronological account for want of historical records. The idea of omniscience is as old as the Indian culture and its germs are found in many Vedic and non-Vedic sources which date long before the canonical scriptures came into being. This is also because the Hindus, the Buddhists and the Jainas believe that there respective religions are eternal and are taught at different cycles of tim by sages called the Buddhas, the Tirthārkaras and the Avatāras, and they were all omniscient beings.
1 Even to the Mimāṁsakas“ all that is pertinent is the denial of
knowledge of dharma by man........who is denying the possibility of a person knowing other things”-Tattva Sangraha, K. 3128. Also see Kumārila's Sloka-Vartika, II.110-11, “ The passage in question does not set aside omniscience. ...,

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THE NON-BELIEVERS IN OMNISCIENCE
29
This almost universal existence of the idea of omniscience in Indian culture and philosophy from the very beginning is proved by the idea of Mokşa, because there is a close relation between the concept of omniscience and the doctrine of moksa. For the spiritual seekers, the most important problem is to find out the path of salvation, for which the . sarvajña' is the best fitted. But it is controversial whether we can have a direct preception of the path of salvation i.e. dharma. The Buddhists and Jainas believe that their teachers had a direct knowledge of dharma but the Mimāṁsakas hold that “senseperception, which is the cognition of the person brought about by the correct functioning of the sense organs, is not the means (of knowing dharma), because perception only consists in the appreciation of what already exists,"9 and so on. However it must be made clear that the 'dharma of the Buddhists is not identical with the 'dharma' of the Mimāṁsakas. The Jainas and the Buddhists, since they do not believe in the authority of the Vedas, insist that the Arhats and the Buddhas did perceive the dharma because they were omniscient beings. This might have led to the presentation of arguments and counter-arguments.
Those who reject the idea of onniscience were perhaps motivated by the religious or epistemological considerations. The Cārvākas and the Indian agnostics and sceptics were motivated by the epistemological considerations, however the Mimāmsakas' motives were mainly religious and metaphysical.
(B) The Cārvāka Materialist
The Cārvākas will naturally reject the existence of any omniscient being because according to them perception alone is the valid source of knowledge. Attempts have, however, been made to show that this version of the Cārvāka episto
2 Mimāṁsā Sūtra ( Šabara Bhāşya ), ed. Jha G. N. (3 vols., Baroda,
G.O.s. Vol. LXVI, 1933) 1.4.4.

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THE NON-BELIEVERS IN OMNISCIENCE
mology, as presented by Madhavācārya3 and some others emphasising " the purely distinctive or negative character of the Lokāyata-epistomology"4 is incorrect. It has been claimed that “though the Lokāyata-emphasis is on the primacy of sense-perception, it accepts reason also.”5 But without attemp. ting a final verdict on this controversial question, even if we accept that some Cārvākas accept inference also as a source of knowledge. we can call them empiricists in the broad sense of the term. But even if we discard their epistemology, we can infer their view on omniscience from their metaphysical positions.
The Cārvākas deny the existence of the disembodied soul, God, Paraloka (other world ) Karmaphala (fruits of karma) etc. Now, since the individual soul or God form the substratum of omniscient knowledge, there is no question of their accepting the theory of omniscience. Vidyānandi, in a recent published work, criticising the Cārvākas says that on the basis of perception alone, no one can prove the non-existence of the omniscient being.
(C) The Indian Sceptics and Agnostics The Indian sceptics are called Ajñā navā lins. They are identified with Sañjaya and his School, Jocobi has freely translated 'Ajñānikas' as agnostic (a term coined by Huxley in 1859). But although the two terms are, etymologically or morphologically, the sam, we shall huve to distinguish between them. Viśvakarmin defined an agaostic or sceptic as one who is enwraped in misty cloud ( nehāreni prariti) and
3 Madhavācārya, Sarva Darśanı Sangrahi, trans. E. B. Cowell and
R. E. Gough (London, Kegan Paul, Popular ed., 1914), p. 42. 4 D. P. Chattopadhyāya., Lokāyata (Bombhy, People's Publishing House,
1949), p. 30. 5 Ibid. Ch I. Section 8. 6 Vidyanandi, Satyaśāsana Parikṣā, ed. Jaina G. C. (Vācānasi, Bhartiya
Jñāna Pitha, 1964), Section 22, p. 19.

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THE NON-BELIEVERS IN OMNISCIENCE
31
has "lips that stammer”.? Mahāvira employs two terms 'Ignorant' and 'Perplexed' (annāņa=ignorance, vitigiccha=perple. xity) for agnostics; Buddha's expression is Eel Wriggling (Amarāvikkhepa)' which signifies being "indifferent” or having neutral attitude towards metaphysical problems. Accord. ing to Sañjaya “the same philosopher tends to be an agnostic when he freely confesses his inability to know the ultimate beginning and end of things, which virtually amounts to accepting the existence of the unknown and unknowable; and a sceptic “when he doubts or hesitates to admit the correctness of all told assertions about matters beyond human cognition."10 The tendency of Sañjaya's teaching was sceptical or agnostic, but “it seems to have been not a morose but healthy agnosticism,"11 tased on studious evasion or suspension of judgments over the vital metaphysical questions. Hence the Buddhist and the Jaina accounts describing Sañjaya as an “intellectual coward ”12 exhibit only mutual hostility. Sañjaya and other leaders of the “sophistic movement "18 of the "Age of Post-Upanisadic Ferment”14 were “discussed and stubbornly hated and refuted by both Mahāvīra and Gotama Buddha,"15 which are amply found in Brahmanical
7 Jacobi H. (tr.), Gaina-Sutra (Oxford, Sacred Book of the East Series,
Clarendon), Part II, p. XXVI (Introd). 8 Ibid., Sutra-Kștānga, I. 12.2. 9 Digha-Nikāya, ed. Kashyap J. (Nalanda Pali Publishing Board, 1958),
I. 28; I. 58. 10 Baruā B. M. A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy (Calcutta,
Calcutta University, 1921), pp. 323-324. 11 Belvalkar S. K. and Ranade R. D., History of Indian Philosophy
(The Creative Period), (Poona, B.O.R.I., 1927), Vol. II, p. 454 12 Barua B. M., Ibid., p. 330 13 W. Rhys Davids Buddhist India (London, 1903), p. 247 14 Belvalkar & Ranade, Ibid., p. 445 15 Mehta R. N. Pre-Buddhist India (Bombay, Examiner's Press, 1939),
p. 334,

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THE NON-BELIEVERS IN OMNISCIENCE
ard ron-Biał manical works. On the other hand, Sañjaya, the father of Indian dialectics may be regarded as the precursor of the sevenfold dialectics16 of the Jainas and the four-cornered antinomical formulations of the Buddhists. Whatever may be the reason for the studious evasion or suspension of judgments over some vital metaphysical questions, we cannot deny that their attitude was sceptical. The utterance typical of Sañjaya -"I do not say that it is so; I do not say that it is otherwise; I do not say that it is not so; nor do I say that it is not so."17 fully exhibit his sceptical standpoint. It is natural to expect them that agnostics and sceptics will never accept the very idea of omniscience. They cannot recognise the potentiality in the human mind of knowing everything. They seem to resemble those referred to in the Vedas as Parmesthins! who denied the possibility of knowing any cause or reality beyond the original matter.
The sceptical tendency which has its germs in the Vedas and which received nourishment in the age of post-Upanisadic ferment by the free thinkers, known as the Six Heretics, has been continuing in the Indian philosophy. An interesting example is found in the recently discovered work of Jaya Rāśi Bhațța.19 The auther in order to refute the various theories of the different systems has found out an easy way of upsetting the very doctrine of Pramāṇas, 90 which is the
16 Dutta N., Early Monastic Buddhism ( Calcutta, Cal. Oriental Series
No. 30. 1941), p. 40 17 Basham A. L. History and Doctrine of the Äjīvakas (London, Luzac
& Co., 1951), p. 16. 18 Rg. Veda, X. 129. 6–7. There are references to those who doubted
the existence of Indra, Rg. Veda, VIII, 89.3; and to Dīrghatamas, who became ignorant, for the sake of knowledge of the first cause.
Rg. Veda. I. 164.6. 19 Bhatta Jaya Rāsi, Tattvo pa plava Simha, ed. S. Sanghavi (Baroda, Baroda
Oriental institute, 1940). 20 Sanghavi Sukhalal “Tattvopaplava Simba” Darśana Aur Cintana
(Ahmedabād, Gujarat Vidyā Sabhā, 1957), p. 105.

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THE NON-BELIEVERS IN OMNISCIENCE
33
basis of the entire Indian metaphysical speculation. He says that some of the Pramāņas are not free from defect and hence no metaphysics can be built on their basis. This is the doctrine of Pramāṇopaplava Vāda (overthrowing all means of knowledge ) which leads to the metaphysical doctrine of Tattvopaplavavāda ( upsetting of all principles ). This is indeed the culmination of s
ism,
(D) The Mimāṁsakas
The Cārvākas, and the Sceptics and agnostics have objected to the idea of omniscience mainly on epistemological grounds. To them human knowledge by its very nature is limited because the means of knowledge are limited
The Mimāṁsakas, on the other hand, object to the idea of omniscience either of God or of man, partly on metaphysical but mainly on religious grounds. Being ritualists, they think that only the proper performances of rituals can guarantee the realisation of the highest good of life.“ When an action is performed, there arises in the soul of the performer a certain potential energy, in the shape of a particular property or character, that, at the future time, brings about an eminently satisfactory result; and it is the potential energy that is called 'Dharma', 'Punya', 'Subhādışta' and so on "21 Now, there is no means of knowing the dharma except through the Vedic injuctions. Statements made by human beings are liable to be vitiated by carelessness, deliberate desire to cheat etc., while the Vedic sentences being not composed by any human agency are free from these defects. They have got self-evidencing authority in this matter. The knowledge of dharma being of a different character, cannot be the subject of sense-perception, 33 because the senses are restricted to the present.
21 Bhatta Kumārila, sloka Vārtika, trans. ed., G. N. Jha (Calcutta,
Biblioetheca Indica Series, 1909), P. II (Intro.).
22 Ibid., II 115-118. JCO-5

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THE NON-BELIEVERS IN OMNISCIENCE
The Yogic perception also being based upon memory of preconceived things cannot cognise Dharma, which has never been perceived or thought of and is yet to come.3% On the one hand, the excellences of the source of words only serve to set aside the chances of unauthoritativeness, 94 the absence of an author safeguards the Vedas against all reproach?s and their eternality having been established all other assumptions of an omniscient author and the like become needless
The above account will show Kumārila's zeal to establish the reign of dharma which is universal, eternal and unchangeable. It is only the eternal and infallible Vedas that can be the source of its knowledge. It is significant, however, to find that Kumārila's opposition to the theory of omniscience is apparently partial, i.e. restricted to the sphere of dharma. He does not deny the possibility of omniscience in other matters except dharma. Kumārila asks, “who is denying the possibility of a person knowing other things ? ”26 Thus, if omniscient means a person, who knows all things except dharma and adharma, Kumārila has no objection to it. But this is only Kumārila's strategy in arguments. When the Buddhists expose this generous offer made by Kumārila showing that the possibility of regarding 'all-knowing', the man who knows all things except dharma and adharma is superfluous, he tries to silence them by saying that “in every case, the term 'all' is used in reference to the context, hence if there is a person knowing all things relating to a certain context, what harm does that do to our position ?”97 He then narrates the different meanings of the term 'all', which I have discussed earlier in Chapter I.
23 Ibid., p. III (Introduction). 24 Kumārila, Ibid., II. 65-66. 25 Ibid., II. 68. 26 Šantarakṣita, Ibid., K. 3128. 27 Santarakṣita, Ibid., K. 3129,

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35
The other objection of Kumarila is, also though quite unassuming, yet very forceful. Arguing his case for the rejection of the theory of omniscience with restricted sense mentioned above, he says, "if there really existed a person knowing all things, through all the six means of knowledge, how could such a person be denied? But if such a person be assumed to be knowing all things by a single means of knowledge i.e., perception, such a person would doubtlessly perceive taste and all other objects, by means of the sense-organs alone."28 Kumārila's main object has been to show that in matters of dharma, Veda is the sole authority, Even if it be supposed to be composed by Buddha, he cannot be expected to be present everywhere to guide the mankind. Further, when there are many omniscient persons preaching mutually contradictory doctrines - the grounds of reliability being the same in all, which one of these should be accepted or rejected? "If Buddha is omniscient, then what is proof for Kapila not being so? If both are omniscient beings, then how is it that there is difference of opinion between them? "29 Kumārila would not therefore accept even the divine omniscience of Brahmā, Viṣṇu or Maheśvar, and would simply interpret their so-called omniscience in terms of "self-knowledge".30
1
THE BELIEVERS IN OMNISCIENCE
II. The Believers in Omnseience (Sarvajñavādins)
(A) Introductory
Since, the belief in omniscience in some form or other has been a matter of faith, closely connected with the spiritual aspirations of the people in India, it has been accepted sometimes as a religious dogma, sometimes as a philosophical doctrine and sometimes as both. The opponents of this idea, the Cārvākas, the Indian sceptics and agnostics, do not weild
28 Ibid., 3135 also Kumarila's Ślokavārtika, II. III-112.
29 Santarakṣita, Ibid., K. 3148-3149.
30 Ibid., 3206.

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THE BELIEVERS IN OMNISCIENCE
much influence either philosophically or culturally. The case of the Mimāṁsaka is different. His position though quite formidable, is yet devided between his emphasis upon the denial of the knowledge of dharma (dharmajñatā) and the denial of the knowledge of everything (sarvajñatā ), so much so that he had to confess openly that he “ does not set aside the idea of omniscience” and “what is signified by its denial is only the denial of omniscience in particular cases ” (ie, Dharma).31
Since the problem of omniscience is closely connected with the metaphysical and religious views of the various schools of Indian thought, differences in their respective attitudes and approaches to the problem are bound to occur. But instead of discussing the views of each particular school separately, an attempt is being made to present a brief survey of the dominant trends in a synoptic way in order to enable us to appreciate the particular views of some selected schools which will be discussed in the second part of the work.
(B) The Devotional Approach Divinity and prayer very often go together. The form of worship may vary from one sect to another, but it is an essential feature of religious life. The main aim of a religious life is to attain liberation from the bondage of birth, death and rebirth. But people may differ about means of achieving it, because of their views about God, soul, matter etc. The cult of devotion, known in India as Bhakti-Yoga is regarded as the easiest way for an ordinary person, who may have neitheir the strength and facilities for the performance of karma nor the intellect needed for the path of knowledge (IñānaYoga ), nor stupendous endurance to follow the path of yogic meditation and concentration. On the other hand, Bhakti is more fascinating to the heart and mind as it is enriched by various sorts of concrete symbolism. The model of deity is
31 Kumārila, Ibid., II. 110-111.

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THE BELIEVERS IN OMNISCIENCË
Set before the individual and all its great and good qualitis are vividly described in a prayerful mood of self-resignation. If he is in affliction, he prays for its merciful help, if he is keen on having knowledge of God, he seeks its divine light and if he has some mundane desires, he prays to it for their fulfilment. But the best devotee is he who desires to pray for prayer's sake. Of the nine kinds of Bhakti, Kirtanam is one of them, which consists in praising the deity in all respects. The devotee attributes to the Deity all the excellences like omnipresence, omnipotence, omniscience etc.
This approach of worship and devotion is found in all religious sects, and it seem to have its origin in the Vedas. There is a tendency in the Vedas, to extol each of the many deities as the suprenie God, in course of the prayer offered to him or her. Naturally, every deity is described as the creator of the universe possessing all divine excellences including omniscience. In the Vedas, however, the term sarvajña or sarvajñatā does not occur but there are many words3 2 denoting the same meaning, e.g. “omniscience”. For them omni science is solely a divine attribute and never a humanone. Then, there are expressio.is such as, Sahasrākşa, 33 Viśvadrastā.34 Visvatocakşuh,35 Viśvacarşaņe36 etc., in which the omniscience suggested, however, is more physical than psychological or spiritual. The power of vision glorified more often than the power of mind. The words paśyati, pratipas yati. mahāpaśyati and sarvampaśyati37 are very much suggestive in this context.
The concept of omniscience in the background of divine worship and practice is also found in the “Stotra” literature
32
3.4;
R.V.X.
33 34 35 36 37
Sarvavit (Atharva Veda, XVII.T.II ), Visvavit (A.V.I.1 91.3), Visvavedas (R.V.1.21.1) Sama Veda, 1.1.3) etc. A.V., IV. 28.3; S.V., III.1.1; Y.V. XXXI.1. A.V., VI. 107.4. R.V., X.81.3 R.V., IX.48.5; A.V., IV. 32.4. A.V., IV. 16.2.

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THE BELIEVERS IN OMNISCIENCE
of all sects. The Stotras are devotional prayers addressed to the different deities. There are some independent Stotra works38 but most of them39 form parts of some bigger works like the Purānas, the Mahābhārata, etc. In these works, the divine attri 6 utes of omnipotence, omniscience etc, are attributed to each individual deity.
(C) The Approach of Self-Knowledge (Atmajñatā)
For the Upanişads the real is the Atman or Brahman, the two words were being used very often synonymously. It follows therefore that “By knowing the Atmail, one knows everything ”40 or “ Ātman being known everything is known.”41 Similarly, when Saunaka asks Angiras “By knowing what one knows everything", the reply is given “Brahman”.49 In short, the Upanişadic thinkers want to bring home the truth that one who knows the cosmic spirit, either as Brahman or Ātman, knows everything. Thus, omniscience means knowledge of the Self (Atmajñatā) or knowledge of Brahman (Brahmanjñatā).
The tetm 'Sarvajñatā' does not oscur even once in any of the Vedas, however it occurs at least thirtyone times in the whole of 120 Upanisads; but whereas in the principal Upanişads, the term Sarvajñarā denotes the knowledge of the Self, in the minor ones, we fiad references to the omniscience of God and other deities. The Vedic conception of physical
38 Svayambhi Stotra of Samantabrica, ed., Jugal Kishore Mukhtār
(Sahāranapur, Vir Sevā Mandir, 1951); Putra Kesari Stotra of Vidyananda, ed. Lälā Rāma (Calcutta, Bhartiya Jaina Siddhānta Prakāśini Samsthā, N.D.); etc.
Siva Sahasranını etc. in various works Radha Sahasranāma, etc. 40 Chăndoz ya Upanişad, VI.2.1; I$2.6.7; Brhal. III.7.1.; IV.5.6; Prašna,
IV.10.11; Ka tha II.3; II.2.15; Sandilya II. 3; Tripadvib'rūti Mahānāra
yana Ch. VIII. p. 382; Ganesa Ch. IV, p. 637, Ch. VI. p. 640. 41 Brhad. IV. 5,6. 42 Mund, 1.1.3; 1.1.6.

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omniscience changes into the metaphysical omniscience. It means the complete negation of nescience or cosmic-illusion, by grasping the world's underlying reality. The Vedanta generally subscribes to this view. In this sense of knowledge of Self or Brahman, omniscience is different from the common notion which treats it as the knowledge of each particular detail of the world. Strangely enough, some of the Jaina thinkers like Kundakunda, Yogindu and others sometimes seem to advocate this inward approach to knowledge. "From the real point of view, the omniscient perceives and knows his soul only, 43 says Kundakunda and declares that the practical point of view is unreal. Yogindu says "When Atman is known, everything else is known so Atman should be realised by the strength of knowledge.". "44 Acārānga's statement "one who knows one, he knows all", 45 being supported by monistic trends elsewhere46 can also be similarly interpreted. Of course, majority of the Jaina scholars do not agree to this view and insist upon the interpretation of omniscience as the knowledge of all objects with all their modifications. For the Upahisads, Atman or Brahman is omniscient but for Jainas, Jīvas (souls) are many and they might function as omniscient beings without any couflict.
(D) The Approach of Practical Utility (Margajñata)
The Buddhist attitude to omniscience is practical and not metaphysical. It equates Sarvajñatā with Mārgajñata. Dharmakirti says that they are not concerned with such useless controversies 'as to whether a man perceives the entire objects of this world. They are concerned only with the fact, whe
43 Kundakund, Niyamasära, ed. & trans., U. Sain (Lucknow, Central Jaina Publishing House, 1931), Gatha. 158.
44 Kundakunda, Samayasara, ed. & trans., A. Chakravarti Kashi, Bhartiya Jñana Pitha, 1950), Gathā 11.
45 Acaranga Sutra, I. 2.3; Kundakunda, Pravacanasara, I. 48, 46 Sthananga Sutra 1.1; 1.4 (Ege Aya, Ege Loe)

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THE BELIEVERS IN OMNISCIENCE
ther he knows about the desirable goal. He ridicules the idea of total omniscience and asks “what is use of knowing the infinite number of insects and worms for our spiritual realisation ?”47 and concludes that “true knowledge consists in knowing about what is desirable and what is not along with their causes, e.g., the four noble truths of Buddha."48
The motive behind Dharmakirti's stress on knowledge of dharma is to counter-act Kumārila's saying that he does not set aside omniscience as knowledge of everything. What he means is the denial of omniscience only in matters of dharma. The same idea is expressed in the Hindu epic by the term “dharmajñatā". This view is in opposition to the view of the Mimāṁsakas. The Jainas also accept that omniscience consists in the true knowledge of the ultimate principles of morality49 and reality (namely, Ahimsā ānd Anekanta) but this is so because all-knowledge will automatically comprehend the knowlede of duty and reality. This challenge to the Buddhistic position has led the later Buddhistic scholars like Prajñākaragupta, 50 Sāntaraksita 51 and others define and prove Buddha's omniscience in terms of knowledge of all objects of all the times.
(E) The Yogic Approach
In the Nyāya-Vaiseșika, Sārkhya-Yoga, Tantras and the yogic literature of Buddhism and Jainism, we find reference to Yogic disciplines, which if perfected can enable one to
47 Dharmakjrti, Pramāņa Vārtika, ed. Rahula Sankrtyāyana, Allahabad
Kitab Mahal, 1943), I. 33. 48 Ibid., II. 34. 49 Satkhandagama, ed. (Amaravati, 1939), Sut. 78 (Payadi-Sūtra). 50 Prajñākaragupta, Pramāna-Vartika-bhāşya (Vartikalankāra), (Patna.
K. P. J. R. I., Tibetan Sanskrt Series Vol. III), p. 29.
51 Śaptarakṣita, Tattvasangraha, Trans. G. N. Jhā, Baroda, G.O.S., 1939,
2 Vols.

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THE BELIEVERS IN OMNISCIENCE
have extra-ordinary powers of cognition like the extra-sensory perception, clairvoyance, clair-audience, pre-cognition, etc. and they may also lead to omniscience. The Nyāya-Vaiseșikas recognise Alaukika Pratyaksa, of which the Yogaja (Yogic-intuition) is one of the three varities. The latter may also produce omniscience, though every yogi does not possess the power of omniscience but only those who acquire it through special yogic efforts. Yogic omniscience thus differs from divine omniscience in that it is produced, while the latter is eternal.58 According to Yoga, omniscience rests in the intellect and is brought about by practice and conquest of desires, 5B Sāmādhis4 etc. This omniscience is the truely discriminative knowledge of all Inings existing at any times.55 The Tantras present "the most extensive reading of the Yoga”.50 They declare that "an insight and pure life combined with a deep and intense appeal to devotion to the divinity automatically awaken the Divine Sakti in man."57 Whereas Patañjali-Yoga has been essentially the yoga of knowledge, the Tantric Yoga "never looses sight of the dynamism of the spirit and underestimate the creative power of will. The world is will and will is power.”58 The Kundalini is the great hidden reservoir of psychic and spiritual force, and when stirred up, it generates a force which activates our whole being and endows it with a colossal power and super-human omniscience. “The yoga of kundalini moves the fibres of our existence so powerfully that our knowledge moves from the personal to the supra-cosmic."5 9
52 Prasasta pada Bhāșya, p. 187; Nyāyakandali, p. 195. 53 Yoga Sutra 3.2. 54 Ibid., III. 49; IV. 29. 55 Ibid., III.54. 56 Sircar M. N. Mysticism of the Hindus (Calcutta, Bharti Mahavidyā
laya, 1951), p. 72. 57 Bose D. N. & Haldar H. Tantras. Their Philosophy and Occult Sc
jences (Calcutta, Orintal Publishing, 1956), pp. 99-100. . 58 Sircar M. N. Ibid., p. 76. 59 A Ibid., p. 140. JCO-6

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THE BELIEVERS IN OMNISCIENCE
It is the sakti that pervades the entire universe through Yoga of different types.
The Tantra literature as a whole consists of two divisions : Kriya and Yoga. " The elaborate rites of worship and the yogic practices often go hand in hand.”C0 Besides the orthodox systems, the Buddhists and the Jainas also admit the existence of yogic knowledge. Dharmakīrti and Prajñākaragupta and others clearly mention yogic perception. They have also a fullfledged system of Yoga. The Jainas have very greatly developed the science of yoga. Haribhadra compares anālambana yoga to asamprajñāta samādhi,62 of Patañjali which culminates in omniscience. Similarly, the concentration of the Jivas in the fourteenth Gunasthāna (stages of spiritual development) is compared to dharmamegha samādhi' 3 of Patanjali's. To him, since there is unanimity about the aims and objects of yoga as the rcalisation of tiuth, there should be no controversy about its nature also.
(F) The Apprcach of Faith The belief in omniscience has been, to many, more a matter of faith than of reason. The common people hardly question why God is omniscient. Hence, we find in the Rāmāyaṇa, Mahātkārata, Purānas etc, which to a great extent represent the faith, aspirations and attitudes of the common people, a sort of universal acceptance of omniscience of God, deities, and yogins. But accordingly, no appeal is made to logic. There is however some reason behind this apparent neglect of reason. Logic has its own limitations in dealing with super-sensible phenomena. On the other hand, faith being different in nature,
60 Chakravarti C. Tantras, Studies in their Religion and Literature
(Calcutta, Punthi Publishers, 1963), p. 4. 61 Pramāņavārtika, II. 81-87; Nyāya-Bindu, I. 11. Vārttikalankāra,
III. 282–287. 62 Haribhadra, Yoga Vimśika (Agrā, 1922), p. 20. 63 Haribhadra, Yoga-bindu (Ahmedābāda, 1940), 17-18.

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may overcome these limitations. The basis of religion is ultimately faith. “The heart has reason of which reason has no knowledge,” says Pascal. Many things are unanswerable to perception and inference but can be taken on faith. Siddhasena says that “Agamas which propound dharma consist of rational and dogmatic portions 64 depending upon the nature of things concerned. The basis of the dogmatic portion rests on spritual intuition of the seers, and the unfailing authority of the Sastras. This also is rooted in man's temperament which is composed of two elements, faith (Sraddhā) and knowledge (Buddhi). Thus omniscience is accepted by the majority of religious people as a matter of faith or religious dogma. As Santyana says "Religion is the poetry which we believe.”
(G) The Approach of Reason One who relies mainly on faith is willing to remain always dependent on others, thus stopping his further intellectual development and thereby may prove to admitting faleshoods. So there is the need of reason and logic. We, therefore, find a host of logicians trying to prove the theory of omniscience with great dialectical skill. This creates an atmosphere of enlightened faith on the one hand, but also creates narrow sectarian rivalries between the opposing factions. Postponing a fuller discussion for a latter occassion,65 we can say that there is a splendid tradition of logicians, bɔth Buddhists and Jainas, who have tried not only to meet the most formidable objections of the Mimāṁsakas but also have adduced independent arguments for omniscience. This has led to the clarification and analysis of the concept to a great extent no doubt, but it has also made some unnecessary demands upon our think
64 Divākara Siddhasena, Sanmati Tarka with Comn. of S. Sanghavi &
B. Doshi, ed. Dalsukh Malvaņia (Bɔmbay, Jaina Śvet. Education
Board, 1939), III. 143. 65 See Chapter VII.

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CONCLUDING REMARKS
ing by widening its meaning, which we have earlier discussed to some length in this work.co
III. Concluding Remarks The objectivity of concepts like God, soul, karma and the authority of the Vedas have been accepted by some while rejected by others, either as a result of faith or philosophical thinking.67
According to the popular view, belief in the creator God is the criterion of being an āstika. According to ihis principle not only the Jainas, the Buddhists and the Cārvākas but also the Sānkhyas, Mimāṁsakas, Advaitins will be treated as Nastika. The Sārkhyas need no such hypothesis as God, and the Advaitins regard the concept of creator God ( īśvara ) as the product of cosmic illusion or Māyā. This principle of division, therefore, is unsatisfactory, since it chooses only one principle namely the belief in God, and neglects the other equally vital and perhaps more comprehensive principles like soul, karma, etc.
The Vedicist like Manu suggests that an orthodox system is that which believes in the authority of the Vedas. According to this view, the Lokāyatas, Jainism and Buddhism will be called nästika, whereas some frank or concealed atheists like the Mimāṁsakas, the Sānkhyas and the Advaitins will be called āstika. Thus this classification is also based on a sectarian bias for the Vedas.
66 See Chapter I. 67 According to V. S. Agrawala India as known to Panini, (Lucknow
University, 1952), p. 337. Pāņini's reference to the terms astika, nāstika and daiş fika ( vide, Astādhyāyi, IV. 4.60 ) does not refer to beliefs, and non-belief in other worlds only. Astika is that whom the Buddhists books call Issarakaranavādi ( Vide, R. N. Mehta, PreBuddhist India, p. 333; C. D. Chatterjee, “A Historical Character in the Reign of Ashoka", Bhandarkar Com. Volume, Vol. I, (Poona, 1917).

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CONCLUDING REMARKS
45
Pāṇini's suggestion is more comprehensive when he says that those who believe in the existence of the other world are astika. According to this scheme, except the Cārvākas, all others will be regarded as āstika. The belief in the other world is vitally connected with the doctrine of karma. Therefore, the aim of this classification is to emphasise the importance of the law of karma, which is accepted by all systems of Indian philosophy except the Cārvākas.
Haribhadra makes a modification in Panini's scheme. According to Haribhadra nāstika is he who does not believe in the existence of soul (besides Moksa, merit, demerit, virtue, vice and the other world ).88 Even 'according to this scheme, only the Lokāyata system is nästika. The case of the Buddhists is a little doubtful since although they do not believe in the existence of a permanent soul-substance, but they recognise the mechanism of the Pañca-Skandhas and also believe in merit, demerit etc.
Now, with the following, an attempt will be made to classify Indian systems according to their belief or disbelief in omniscience.
First, all the theistic systems believe in the existence of omniscience of some form or other, e.g. the Nyāya-Vaišesika and the Yoga. Put negatively, we can say that all non-believers in omniscience namely, the Lokāyatas, the Indian Sceptics and the Agnostics and the Mimāmsakas, are also non-believers in God. Secondly, the converse of the above rule is however not true because not all believers in omniscience are theists, e.g., the Buddhists, Jainas, Sārkhyas and Advaitins. Negatively, all non-believers in God are not necessarily the non-believers in omniscience. This shows that the category of omniscience is wider than that of the category of belief in God. Thirdly, we know that with the exception of the Mimāṁsakas, all
68 Haribhadra, Sadılarśana Samuccaya, (with Gunaratna's Comm.
Tarka-Rahasya Dipika ), ed. Luigi Suali ( Calcutta, 1905), Verse 80 p. 300.

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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Vedic systems believe in omniscience. So we can conclude that some believers in the Vedas are also believers in omniscience and vice-versa. However, when we shall put this statement negatively, picture will change, because some nonbelievers in the Vedas are believers in omniscience, e. g. the Buddhists and the Jainas. This shows that there is not as close a relation between the believers in the Vedas and that of omniscience, as there is between the belief in God and omniscience. But then there cannot be also a relation of contradiction. This implies that the doctrine of omniscience can also be supported on the basis of the belief in the Vedas. Fourthly, all believers in Karma or Karmaphala are believers in the doctrine of omniscience and also the viceversa, This shows a very close relation between the Karma doctrine and the doctrine of omniscience. Fifthly, this is not the case with the believers in soul. We can neither say that all the believers in the omniscience are believers in the soul like the Buddhists. However, there is only one objector on each side. This shows a close affinity between the two doctrines. Even the Buddhists can be accommodated because the concept of pañca-Skandhas is very much like the soul of other system. Sixthly, considering the relationship between the believers and the non-believers in omniscience in relation to the believers or non-believers in God, soul and karma, taken separately or collectively, we can have numerous positions. We can definitely say that in Indian philosophy, there is no system "which does not believe in omniscience but believes in the existence of God," or "which does not believe in the doctrine of karma but believes in omniscience." Lastly the Lokayata is the only system which does not believe in omniscience, God, Vedas, soul and karma. This shows that belief in omniscience is incompatible with materialism and hedonism.

*

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CHAPTER III
EVOLUTION OF THE JAINA THEORY OF OMNISCIENCE
1.
Classification and Categorisation
(A) Reasons and Motives
The Jaina theory of omniscience is the result of an evolutionary process. Both the inner necessity of the Jaina philosophy ard the influences of socic-cultural conditions have played important role in its development.
I shall first discuss briefly the reasons for the enunciation of the theory of omniscience in Jairism in general and then shall take up its particular motives.
The first and foremost reason for the formulation of the theory of omniscience in Jainism seems to be religious and cultural. Jainism denies toth God and the Vedas, but it is nonetheless a religion. Hence, it needed the Tirtharkaras, who would function as the source of its scripture. The Tirthankaras in order to be reliable (apta) must be omniscient, the knower of the universal principles ( jñātārcm visvatattvānām )i besides being the spiritual guides and the destroyers of the mountain of karmas. Samantabhadra clearly points out that a Tirtharikara like Mahāvīra is accepted as a Tirthcrkara because he is omniscient and not because he possesses super
1 Mangalācarana of Tattvartha Sutra, Com. by Pujyapada. Also see
Āpta-Pariksā of Vidyānanda, verse 3; For discussion see Āpta-Parikṣā (ed.) D. Kothia (Saharānpur, Vira Sevā Mandir, 1949, pp. I-II, Intro.)

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CLASSIFICATION AND CATEGORISATION
normal qualities which may be found to some extent even in beings not otherwise perfect."
This view is also supported by common sense. Unless a Tirthankara is all-knowing, how can he create a reliable agama? The importance of this point is also admitted by the Mimamsakas, when they attribute the power of omniscience in matters of dharma to the Vedas. The Nyaya-Vaiseṣika holds that the omniscient God is the creator of the scripture (Vedas). In short, in order to ensure the reliability to the Agamas, Omniscience of Tirthankaras becomes a necessity. Secondly, the Jainas did not believe in the efficacy of rites and rituals as a means for spiritual salvation; they accept the path of knowledge, faith and conduct. It is likely, therefore, that they glorified the concept of knowledge into omniscience. Thirdly, Jainism is a religion of self help and so it wanted that man should realize his highest good through his own efforts and finally attain infinite knowledge Omniscience for the Jainas is a realisable ideal for human beings. Fourthly, Jaina thinkers hold that knowledge is the nature of the soul. Omniscience, therefore, if once attained is never lost, because it inheres in the soul and the soul is immortal. Here the Jaina concept of omniscience can be distinguished even from the highest yogic intuition of the Nyay-Vaiseṣika and Pātañjala--Yoga, According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika," the power of apprehending reality in its fulness and harmony, " i. e. omniscience, is produced, and whatever is produced is bound to be non-eternal.'
2 Samantabhadra, Āpta-Mimāmsa, K., 1-3, 9; Also see Asta Sahasri, pp. 3-50; Apta-Parikṣa, K. 3-5; Ratna Karanda Śravakacāra of Samantabhadra, K. 5.
3 Kumārila, Śloka-Vārtika, II. 110–111.
4 Umāswāmi. Tattvartha Sutra, I. 1.
5 Kundakunda, Pravacana Sāra, I. 9: I. 13.
6 Prasastapāda, Padartha-dharma-samgraha with Sridhara's NyāyaKandali, trans, Jha G. N.., p. 258.
7 Ibid., p. 187,

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: 49
In Patanjala-Yoga, “the Yogin acquires omniscience when the all-pervading state of citta is restored. When it becomes as pure as the purusa, the latter is liberated."'This is because it is "by means of citta that the self becomes aware of objects and enters into relation with the world."9 So until the body is cast off, the final liberation is not possible. Fifihly, the Jaina theory of omniscience follows from the Jaina theory of soul as the possessor of four-fold infinities, namely, infinite knowledge, infinite faith, etc. It means that the soul is potentially omnipotent ad omniscient. It is the obstruction of the Karmic matter which covers the Jivas with impurity. As soon as these impurities are removed, the soul is restored to its natural state, 10 Sixthly, the concept of omniscience also follows from the Jaina concept of Mokşa. Moksa means freedom of Jīvas from its Karmic particles and the state of Moksa is the state of infinite knowledge. infinite faith, bliss and power." Lastly, the concept of omniscience has been a matter of abiding faith and spiritual aspiration in Indian culture. So it was natural for the Jainas to fall in line with the dominant traditions of the Indian thought 12
However, it must be admitted that the Jainas are the most ardent and systematic exponents of the theory of omniscience. This is supported by the fact that the Jaina thinkers have described their Tirtharkaras as omniscient beings from the very beginning as is shown by the oldest religious records. 1 3 But there has also been important changes in their theory which might have been necessitated by the inner logic of
8 Radhakrishnana S., Indian Philosophy ( 2 Vols., London, George
Allen & Unwin, 1948 (rev.), Vol. II, p. 346. 9 Yoga-Sutra, I.2; II.6; II.7; 11.20. 10 Aşşusahasri, p. 50. 11 Kundakunda, Pravacana Sara, I. 19. 12 Cp. Mimāṁsā śloka Vārtika, II. 110; Pramāņa Vārtikam, I. 34. 13 Ācārānga Sitra; 11,3 Āras yaka Nir, Gáthā 127, Bhagavaii Sutra,
IX,32; Apta Mināmsä, K.5. JCO-7

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CLASSIFICATION AND CATEGORISATION
Jainism as well as by some external circumstances. In what follows I shall try to outline this process of change.
(B) Chief Senses of Omniscience' . Like any other topic in ancient Indian Philosophy, the concept of omniscience is not amenable to a rigorously historical treatment. It is very difficult rather almost impossible to sketch the origion, development and growth of this concept, if it is intended to present the history of its successive modifications and formulations. Therefore, in what follows, I shall present an account which may not be historically all correct but will certainly depict the besic strands in the complicated growth of the concept.
Pt. Sukhalālaji claims that in the beginning, omniscience meant "knowledge of everything conducive to spiritual realisation.” I have not been able to find out statements supporting this view in the classical Jaina literature but to accept it on the authority of Sukhalālajī does not seem to be unreasonable specially because it fits in very well with the general trend of Jainism lcíh as religion ard philosophy. It is in keeping with the religious and spiritual tone of Jainism also. The path of moksa consists in right-knowledge, right-faith and right-conduct. 14 Right-knowledge is said to be the clear idea of the real nature of the ego and the non-ego, freed from the doubt, perversity and indefiniteness."15 Hence spiritual seekers have to gain such knowledge. And this is nothing but omniscience.
But in many early works of Jainism, I do find statements which make omniscience identical with self-knowledge or self
14 Umāswāmi, Tattvārtha Sutra, I. 1; Kundakunda, Pañcāstika yasāra,
Gāthā 169; Nemicandra, Dravya Sangraha, Gāthā 39; Viranandi, Candra prabhacaritam, (ed.) Durga Pd. & V.L. Sāstri (Bombay, 1912), XVIII. 123; Hariscardra Kavi, Dharmaśarmabhyudayam, (ed.) Durgā
Pd. (Bombay, 1894) XXI. 161. 15 Dravyasangraha, Gāthā 42.

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51
-realisation.16 Knowing the self, in Indian Philosophy and in Jainism is not like knowing an object in the ordinary sense. Knowing here means realising. Therefore, omniscience as “self knowledge” means self-realisation. Self-realisation is the same as spiritual realisation.
Omniscience as self-realisation is logically very much different from omniscience as conducive to spiritual realisation In the former sense, it is the end of life, therefore it is of intrinsic value. In the latter sense, it is a means to the acqui. sition of the end; therefore, it is of instrumental value. The same thing can be both means and an end but it cannot be a means to itself. Therefore, we can not accept that omniscience is both conducive to and identical with self-realisation. How. ever, it seems to me that it is quite natural to pass from one to the other, though the transition is not logical. This is what seems to have happended If Sukhalālaji is to be trusted in his interpretation of Jainism, the Jainas started with the conception of omniscience as “the knowledge of the means of spiritual realisation" and then passed on to omniscience as "self-realisation."
This latter view is in accordance with the Jaina belief that self is the central entity, being the ground of knowledge, morality and spiritual effort. The characteristic of the soul is to be always knowing; therefore, the soul is certainly the subject of knowledge, the knower par excellence.1? The know. ledge of this basic reality is the supreme knowledge.
At this point we find a very remarkable agreement between the Jaina and the Upaniaşdic standpoints.18 It is, no
16 Kundakunda, Niyama Sara, Ch. X & XI, Gāthās 149-150, 158;
Pancastikā ya Sara, Gāthā 166, Pravacana Sara, I. 27; I. 36, Samaya
Sāra, Ch. X (All Pure Knowledge), Gātnā 403; Asta Pahuda, 58, 61. 17 Kundakurda, Saina ya Sara, Gathā, 403. 18 For Upanișadic view, vide, Mundaka, 1.2.11; Bịhad, II. 5.6 : Chand,
VI.21. To the question “By knowing what one knows everything", it is replied that by “knowing Atman one knows everything”Bșhad. II. 4.5.

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CLASSIFICATION AND CATEGORISATION
doubt, true that it was the explicit aim of Jainism to rebel against the Upanisadic tradition, but it is wrong to think that the Jainas disagreed with everything in the Upanişads. This conception of the self knowledge as the knowledge of basic reality is one in which the Jainas are very close to the Upanişadic trend of thinking inspite of their disclaimer that they are opposed to the basic ideas of the Upanişadic philosophy metaphysics and theology.
There is also another sense in which the Jainas use the term 'omniscience'. In this sense, it means the knowledge of the essential principles and not knowledge of concrete details. Ācārānga says, “He who knows one, knows all. ”19 This passage when read in the actual context refers to the knowledge of passions ( Kaşāyas ) which hinder right knowlege. The “ One ” referred to here, therefore, means knowledge of some essential moral principle. Pt. Sukhalālaji, who is one of the most important and modern exponents of this view of omniscience tries to interpret Mahāvīra's statement addressed to Jamāli in such a way that would give support to his position. Mahāvīra said to Jamāli that right-knowledge could be had only if things are known from the points of view of both substances and modes.20 Sukhalālaji reads into this utterance the view that only he is omniscient who adopts both these points of view. This statement, however, has to be distinguished from an analogous statement emphasising the knowledge of all substances and all modes. If omniscience means knowledge of all substances and all modes, then it becomes knowledge of all things and therefore this view of omniscience will be the same as the second view which Sukhalālaji does not accept. But Sukhalālají does not make it clear
19 20
Ācāranga Sutra, I. 3.4. Bhagavati Sūtra, IX. 6. “From the point of view of substance, the world is eternal; from the point of view of modes, it is non-eternal”. Rcal knowledge is knowledge of both substance and their modes and not of either substance alone or of modes alone. Cf. Syadvada Mañjari, K. 13-14; 16-19.

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CLASSIEICATION AND CATEGORISATION
33
how knowledge acquired from both these points of views (Dravya and Paryāya) will make anybody omniscient, because everything can be known from these two points of view. And just to know a certain thing in this manner quite obviously is not to make the knower omniscient. It seems, however, that another interpretation can also be given. It may mean I:nowledge of essential things from both of the two points of view. i, e., only he can be omniscient who knows all the essential reality and knows them from the points of view of both substances and modes. In this sense, Sukhalālaji's position becomes a much more precise version of the view that omniscience is the knowledge of the essential things and at the same time it remains different from the view that omniscience is the knowledge of all things.
But in the body of Jaina philosophy, the meaning of omni. science as the knowledge of essential principle is substantially the same as the knowledge of self because the self is regarded as the most essential principle Therefore, to know what is most essential is to know the self. He who knows the self, knows everything. It is mentioned by some important thinkers like Kundakunda, Pūjyāpāda, Yogindu and others that knowledge of the self underlies the knowledge of everything. Sthānanga Sūtra's suggestion about 'one soul' (Ige āyā) and one universe' (lge loye)21 is very significant. In Niyama Sāra, Kundakunda clearly says : “It is from the practical point of view only that the Omniscient Lord perceives and knows all; from the real stand-point, the Omniscient perceives and knows his soul only.??? It means that the spiritual seeker should not engage himself in the flickering thought-activities concerning various attributes and modifications of all the six dravyas. He should devote his full attention to the realisation of his own self. Yogindu's words are also remarkable when he declares “ that Ātman is known, everything else is known, so Arman should
21 Sthānanga Sutra, I.1, 1.4. 22 Kundakunda, Niyama-Sara, G. 158.

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be realised. "23 Pujyapada's emphasis on Self-knowledge as distinguished from "self-delusion "24 is also important. It seems very close to the Upanisads and the Vedanta.25
CLASSIFICATION AND CATEGORISATION

to
23 Yogindu, Parmatma-Prakāśa, I. 103.
24 Pujyapada, Samadhi Tantra, G. 20, 21, 22.
25 It is worthwhile to emphasise at this point some outstanding similarities between the Jaina and Upanisadic-Vedantic philosophies. The gāthās of Kundakunda, Pujyapāda and Yogindu read like passages from the Upaniṣads and Vedanta. The Upanisads also declare, "he who knows the self, knows everything" ( Brhad. III. 7.1). Here it may be interesting to know some of the common points of agreement between Upanisad-Vedanta and some of the Jaina thinkers like Kundakunda, Pujyapada, Yogindu and others. Firstly, the decriptions of the Pure soul given by the Vedanta and some of the Jaina thinkers are very much similar. According to the Vedanta the soul is "eternal, pure, conscious, free, real, supremely blissful"-Vedanta Sāra, 171. Kundakunda also describes it as "absolutely pure, having the nature of perception and knowledge, always non-corporeal and unique." (Samaya Sara, Gatha 38 Cp. Sanidhi Tantra of Pujyapāda, 6; Parmatma-Prakasa of Yogindu, II. 213). Secondly, both maintain that there are two kinds of selves-Empirical and Ultimate or Phenomenal and Noumenal. Śankara distinguishes between Atma and Jīva (Sankara Bhasya on Brahma-Sutra, I. 3.24; Svet. Up. IV.6.7; Mund. Up. I. 1). Kundakunda calls them Sva and Para (Pravacana Sāra, II.2; Samaya Sara Gatha 2), Yogindu calls them Atma and Paramātmā (Paramatma-Prakasa, I. 92; II.17-18; I-23 I.16; I.25.) and so does Pujyapada (Samadhi Tantra, 30,1, etc.). Thirdly, the concept of three-fold individuality is also common to both Upanisadic phiolosophy (Tait. Up. II. 1-5. Pañca-Kosa; Katha, I. 3-13 (Three kinds of Atman) Chard. Up. VIII. 7-12 (Deussen deduces three positions) and the Jaina thinkers like Kundakunda (Mokṣa-Pahuda, 5-8), Pujyapāda (Samadhi-Tantra, 4. etc.), Yogindu (Para:natma-Prakasa-I. 12-15-external, internal and supreme soul). Fourthly, though the distinction i made between the empirical and ultimate self, in fact, it is the one single reality that is signified by the two terms (3: Sankara Bhayṣa IV. 1.3 Cp. Samaya Sara, 3; Paramatma Prakāśa, II. 174; 1.26; II. 175; Samadhi Tantra, 28). The doctrine of identification between Jivātma and Paramimi is so much common to Sankara and Kundakunda that both of them use the

29

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It should not, however, be understood that omniscience in the sense of the knowledge of essentials (or knowledge of self) is acceptable to all Jaina thinkers. There are quite a few Jaina thinkers who do not hesitate in giving a very straight
55
term "advaita" which indicates oneness. (See Introduction p. CLiii to Samayasara by A. Chakravarti). It is surprising that the Upanişadic phrase " I am that " (So aham) is repreatedly asserted by Pujyapāda (Samadhi Tantra, 28, 31, 32, etc.) Fifthly, the carcer of the individual self (Jvia) has been sketched in a similar way by Sankara and Jaina thinkers. Sankara regards the individual self as "the doer, the enjoyer and the sufferer (S.B. II. 3.33, II. 3.40, Cp. Tait. Up. III. 5; Brhad. Up. IV. 3.12 ), so does Kundakunda. This individual self which is merely the Paramātman limited by the limiting conditions (Upadhis) is subject to transmigration, the cycles of births and deaths. A perfect soul is 'therefore' free from birth, old age and death...... rebirth and is eternal, non --transient and independent. (Niyama sāra, Gathā 176-178; Cp. Samayasara, G. 92, 93.)
Sixthly, both Sankara and Amṛtacandra (the commentator on Kundakunda's Samaja sāra) refer to Adhyasa (cognitive confusion)" on account of which the self puts on the qualities which really belong to not-self," (Samayasāra-Gāthā-92, com. of Amṛtacandra ). This is the same as the Vedantic conception of super-imposition of the unreal upon the real. (Vedāntasära, 32). This term "Adhyasa" (in the technical sense meant here was perhaps not found in any of the philosophical writings before Sankara, and it is likely that he got the suggestion from Amṛtacandra's commentory on Samayasära known as Atma-khyāti.

Seventhly, both the Upanisadic-Vedantic and the Jaina thinkers use the two points of view, i.c. those of Vyavahara (Practical) and Niścaya (Ultimate), because, in India, dharma "embraces in its connotation on the one hand spiritual and transcendental experience of á mystic of rigorous discipline and on the other a set of practical rules to guide a society of a people pursuing the same spiritual ideal." (Parmatma--Prakasa of Yogindu, (ed.), A. N. Upadhaye, p. 29. (Introd.). Dr. Upadhye further says that "Amṛtcandra in his commentary on Samaya Sara, 12, quotes a beautiful verse from an unknown source which indicates the relative importance of these viewpoints. This very verse is quoted by Jayasena with some dialectical

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farward sense to the term Accroding to them omniscience means knowledge of everything in full details. In fact, these are the two important senses, namely, omniscience as knowledge of essentials and omniscience as universal knowledge,
pain of
difference in Samaya Sāra, 235. ” (Paramātma--Prakāśa of Yogindu, (ed.), A. N. Upadhye, p. 29 ff. (Introduction). Sankara often appeals to Vyavolāra and Parcmartha, Kunda kunda and other speak of Vyavahara and Niscaya. Sometimes Yogindu uses the word Para närtha for Niścja (1.46, Parmatma Prakasa) so does Kundakunda (Sama yasära, 8). Its parallel may be found in the Upanişadic distinction between Parā and A para Vidya (Mundak. 1.4-5) and also
that of between Samvști or Vyavahara Satya and Paramartha Satya of Buddhism (Ency. Re. Ethics, IX, P. 849, X. 592). Eighthly, both accordirg to Jainism and Vedānta, avidyā or ajāna (ignorance) is the cause of bondage, and liberation, therefore, is the stoppage of this process. The Jaina term for avidyā is Mith yātva and both agree that the cause of pain is simply error or false knowledge (See Sankara-Blasia 11.3.46, Clānd Up. VIII. 8.45 Cp. Tattvärtha Sutra, VII!.1.2.). The path of freedom, therefore, is the path of knowledge. Ninethly, there is much agreement in the Vedāntic ard Jaina conception of Moksa as a state of positive bliss. Even the Advatin emphasis on a realisation of identity between Atman and Brahma signified by the Mahāvākyas 'Thou art That' or 'I am Brahman', finds its ocho in Jainism (Samadhi Tantra, 28, (So aham). Pujyapāda's rejection of the false notions of self (Samādhi Tanira, 80) is exactly similar to that of the Vedānta (Vedanta Sara. 105-136). Füjyāpada and Yogindu speak the language of the Vedānta when they compare the body with robe that we cast away when it is worn out. (Samadhi Tantra, 64, Parmaima-Prokāśa, II, 179.) Tenthly, both Vedanta and the Jainas accept the doctrine of substantial identity between the cause and effect or Satkūryavāda, which is self-evident. Lastly, we find similarity also between Vedānta and Jainism in their notion of omniscience. In Advaita Vedānta also, omnisciene is the culmination of the faculty of cognition. Omniscience, however, characterises God, the limited principle of Brahman. The nature of Brahinan is pure knowledge and when it is limited by an object to be known, Brahman becomes the knower or the subject of knowledge. (S.B. I.

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57
which ultimately survive and represent as two opposed views on the subject. There are equally respectable thinkers who subscribe to the view that omniscience is universal knowledge i. e., complete knowledge of complete details of which the world is composed.
To define omniscience as knowledge of everything may seem to make it an unreasonable ideal, but without it the appeal to common sense is also likely to be weakened, This is the historical cause which explains why the Jainas, who were very much logically sophisticated thinkers and sufficiently aware of the reactions of logical people, were keen about a theory of omniscience as the knowledge of all substances with all their attributes and modes. This cause is rooted in the religious motive for exalting the status of Mahāvīra and other Tirtharkaras to the maximum. A religion whose prophet knows everything will be very easily accepted to be higher than another whose prophet is not so. It was this very
4.9). Isvara is cridowed with superior limiting adjuncts (Niratisayopādhi) (S.B. II.3.45). Vedānta links nescience with misery, the Jainas link omniscience with eternal bliss. Perhaps, it is on the basis of similar reasoning as sketched above that some people think that Sankara borrowed a large part of his metaphysical apparatus from the Jainas. Whatever might be the truth of this contention, it is doubtlessely true that the Jainas used many concepts which become prominent in the Vedāntic philosophy and which later continued to be claimed as exclusively Vedāntic. It will be interesting to note that Sankara, while criticising the wrong notions of self enumcrates various schools such as Bauddha, Sankhya. Yoga, Vaiścsika, Pāšupata etc. but he does not mention the Jaina view of self as one of the erroneous views. (See A. Chakravarti, Introduction to Kundakunda's Sama ya Sara, p. CLX). It might be, therefore, concluded that Sajikara's own central doctrine of identity between Jhātmā and Paramātmā, is very much similar to the Jaina view. I have discussed this problem more elaborately in my paper on “ Advaita trends in Jainism”. read before the Nāgpur Session of Indian Philosophical Congress, 1956. A Hindi version has been pub
lished in Dārsnika, Faridkot, Vol. IV, No. 2. JCO-8

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desire of some Buddhists which motivated them to declare Buddha to be the knower of everything. I, therefore, quite agree with Pt. Sukhalālaji that the religious rivalry existing at that time motivated the rival religions to claim for their prophet this kind of omniscience.2 • This seems to be true of Jainism as well as of Buddhism and it explains the psychology behind the attempt to treat omniscience as knowledge of each and every details of the universe.*?
As I have already pointed out, this interpretation of omniscience does exalt it to such a height which may seem unreachable to many. It is likely, therefore, that this interpretation may not be acceptable to the logical mind, It is not that this fact was not noted by the Jaina logicians; rather they were clever enough to anticipate the reactions of the possible objectors and they also tried, in their own way, to manufacture explanations and justifications to take care of possible objections. In this attempt of theirs, they had to bring in many logical subtleties and complexities. No body can say, however, that they completely succeeded in this venture
It is one of the most fundamental things in Jain philosophy, accroding to many Jaina thinkers, that what matters is not the knowledge of this thing or that thing, but the complete knowledge of all aspects of reality. Therefore it is not of much use if it is said that this prophet knows more than that prophet. What is important is the possession of complete or full knowledge of reality by the prophet. It is held that "you cannot know a single thing in its entirety unless you know all : thus one and the all are organically related, and so the knowledge of one
26 Sukhalālaji, “Sarvajñatva Aur Uska Artha", Darsana Aur Chintana,
(Sukhalalaji Sanmāna Samiti, Ahmedabad, 1957), pp. 554-555. 27 We can note the difference of attitude between Dharmakirti and
Prajñākara Gupta. The former treats Buddha as knower of the four noble truths only, (Pramāņavārtika, II. 32-33) while the latter ca!13 Buddha as the knower of all individual details (Vartikalankara on above ).

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implies the knowledge of all.” 28 A single substance has got infinite modes and infinite are the classes of substances. So, "unless he knows all of them simultaneously, how will he be able to know all of them "99 The Jainas believe, as Whitehead does, that every small particle of universe is related to the entire universe in space and time. So, "One who does not know simultaneously the objects of the three senses and in the three lokas, he cannot know even a single substance with its infinite modifications.”go The Buddhist position that "it is immaterial whether one knows everything or not; what matters is whether he knows the essential things, i.e., what he ought to know; it does not matter at all if one does not know the number of bacteria in any thing, the knowledge that matters is the knowledge that has a bearing on life or practice,"31 is not acceptable to the Jainas. For them, life is not compo. sed of watertight compartments, admitting of different spheres of reality and duty. For example, unless one knows the doctrine of manifoldness of truth (Anekanta), he cannot pra. ctice non-violence (Ahimsā) in life, since the one rests upon the other. Ahimsā is an extension of the theory of Anekānta in life.
Quite early in the history of Jainism, i.e., in the age of the Āgamas coming upto Aklanka, Vidyānanda, Prabhācandra Yośɔvijaya and others, there is the tendency to justify the above sense of omniscience. Even Kunda kunda, Haribhandra and Yasovijaya, who are supposed to have supported the other view, have also supported in their earlier writings, this view of omniscience as the knowledge of all substances with all their modes.
This present notion of omniscience is in keeping with the
28 Often quoted lines, See Haribhadra : Sad-darśana-Samuccaya, p. 48
(Maibhadra's Com.). 29 Pravacana Sara, I. 49. 30 Ibid., I. 48. 31 Dharmakirti, Pramāņa-Vārtika, I. 33; I. 35.

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realistic tone and temper of the Jaina metaphysics. To the Jainas, there is no ambiguity in knowledge when it comprehends the entire modes of all the entities, because the universe is an integrated systems whose relations are equally real and objective. Dr. Nath Mal Tātia says, "Symbolically, the relations are links between A and the contents of not-A. This means that the complete knowledge of A implies the complete knowledge of not-A and this is obviously the knowledge of the whole universe."'3 2
After going through the arguments presented by both of the opposing parties, it is very difficult for a philosopher to take any side. However, to me, there seems to be a contro. versy between what ought to b and what actually is the nature of Kevala Jñāna. The anxiety on the former side is to establish the theory of Ouniscience on a scientific and logical basis which would be acceptable to the modern mind. It tries to be liberal, accommodative and synthetic.
The earlier theory which treats omniscience as knowledge of the essentials has got very scanty textual support and soms of the texts may be interpreted to suit even both the sides of the controversy.33 The supporters of this view rely mainly on Kundakunda,34 Haribhadra35 and Yasovijaya36, but these thinkers have also advocated the other theory of omniscience.37 But all this does not make the theory concerned cease to be å less sactarian and rigid and more acceptable and plausible to the common sense. Due to the rigid attitude on the part
32 N. M. Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy (Vārānasi, Jaipa Cultural
Research Society, 1951), p. 70. 33 The statement of Acārānga I. 3.4 is one such. 34 Niyamasāra, 158. 35 Haribhandra, Yoga Dosti Samuccaya, K. 102-108. 36 See Darśana Aur Chintana, p. 539. 37 Pravacana Sara, I. 48-49; Yoga Drsti Samuccaya, K. 140--47; Jnang
bindu-Prakarana, Sec, Jaina Tarkabhāsā, Sec. 21.

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of the second group of philosophers, the Mimāmasakas got sufficient opportunities for pointing out many inconsistencies in their theory of omniscience. I have discussed them elsewhere. But the Jaina logicians like Samantabhadra, Aklanka, Prabhācandra, Vidyānanda, Anantakirti and others have very ably replied to these charges and have shown that omniscieto be omniscience must be the simultaneous cognition of all substances with all of their attributes. This also includes the knowledge of what is essential, i.e. knowledge of Self and duty.
nce
II. Darśana and Jnana
The relationship between Kevala Darśana38 and Kevala Jñana is also a matter of great controversy. According to the important Agamas39 and also the general trend of Jaina thinkers, 40 Upayoga (consciousness) has got two varieties indeterminate (Anakara) and determinate (Sākāra), known as darśana and juna respectively.41
61
42
Thinkers like Kundakunda, Virasena, Brahmadeva have independent views on this problem. Some Agamas like Prajñā panā recognise a new faculty of knowing called Pasanaya +2 in addition to Upayoga each being divided into Anakara and Sākāra. The distinction between Upayoga and Pasanaya is said to consist in the different schemes of classifications of their Sākāra and Anakāra varieties.43
38 'Darsana' has a specialised meaning in Jainism.
39 Bhagavati Sutra. XVI 7; Tattvärtha Sutra, II. 9.
40 Sidha Sona Gani, Tattvartha Sitra Bhasya Tika, II. 9; Apia Mimämsä, K. 101 with Asta Satī & Asta Sahasri; Pujyapada, Sarvartha Siddhi, II. 9. Tattvärtha Sitra Bhasya, II. 9.
41
42 Prajñā panā Sutra, Pada, 20, 30.
43
Upayoga is of two varieties, Sākāra and Anakāra, being divided into eight and four kinds respectively. Pasanaya is also of two kinds (Sakara and Anakara) each subdivided into six and three kinds respectively. See also Malayagiri's Tika on Prajña pana Satra, pada, 20, 30.

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Other thinkers like Virasena, Kundakunda, Nemicandra, Brahmadeva etc. hold different views. To Virasena “ what comprehends an external object of the nature of universal-cum -particular is Jūāna and the grasping of the self of the same nature is darśana. ”44 Kundakunda tries to give an absolutistic interpretation when he says “ Jñāna illuminates other objects only, darśana iliumines the soul and the soul illuminates it. self and other objects. "4 5 Nemicandra thinks that “ Jñana is the detailed cognition of the real nature of the ego and non-ego, whils darśana is that of the generalities.”?46 Brahmadeva, the commentator on Dravya Sangraha distinguishes between the logical and scriptural meanings of Jñana and darśaria.47 According to the transcendental point of view, however, darśana and jñāna lose their identity in the Self.48 But apart from these three views on the subject the Jaina scholars generally admit the two fold division of consciousness into indeterminate and determinate. Relation between Darsana and Iñāna in the
State of Omniscience There are three views regarding the relationship between darśana and Jñāna in the state of omniscience. They are known as Kramavü:la ( Theory of Succession of darśana and jñāna), Sahavāda, (Theory of Simultaneity) and Abhedavāda ( Theory of Identity ). 1. Kramavāda :
According to this view Kevala darśana and Kevala jñāna are two different states of consciousness and they also occur alternatively in th: state of omniscience. It is argued that the
44 Virasena, Dhavalā Tīkā on şakhandāgama, I. 1.4. 45 Kundakunda, Niyama Sāra, 169. 46 Nemichandra, Dravya Sangraha, 142, 143. 47 Brahmadevi, Dravya Sangraha Vịtti, 44 (pp. 81-82). 48 Ibid., 82. 49 Siddha Sena Divākara, Sanmati-Turka, II. 4.

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same consciousness is incapable of grasping the general and the particular aspect of things simultaneously, hence it must be known consecutively.50 This view is deeply rooted in the Pre-Umāsvāmi Āgamas51 and is also held by Jinabhandra,59 Siddhasena Gani53 and others. 2. Sahavada :
The advocates of the theory of simultaneity (Sahuvāda) do not accept the above view. They say, “When the obstruction in the way of absolute knowledge is completely removed absolute knowledge springs up as a matter of course. Similarly, when the obstruction in the path of absolute perception is completely removed, absolute perception springs forth as a matter of course. ”54 Thus it is wrong to argue with respect to Kevala jñāna on the analogy of sensuous knowledge Kevala iñana has got beginning but no end, but according to Kramavāda it has both beginning and end, because it is not present at the time of Kevala darśana. So Kramavāda is also against the Scriptures.55 Moreover, Kramavādins cannot answer objection of the Mimāṁsākas that if omniscience is successive knowledge, it cannot really be omniscient, since there is no end of the period of succession.56 Then, if the removal of obstruction is common to both darśana and jñāna, which of the two will spring forth first ?57 There is no reason why Kevala darśana should come first and Kevala jñāna afterwards, or vice versa. They shall have to answer further why there should be succession at all when the removal of obstruction is simultaneous ?
50 Ibid., II. 4 (Tika) • 51 Avaš yaka Niryukti, 973, 979; Bhagavati Sūtra, XVIII. 8; Pra jñā pana
Sutra, 30. 52 Višeşāva'ś yaka-Bhāşya, Gāthā 3090; Viseșandvati, Gāthā, 184. 53 Tattvārtha Sitra Bhāşya Tika, I. 31. 54 Siddhasena Divākara, Sanmati Tark, II. 5. 55 Ibid., II. 6-8. 56 Śântarakṣita, Tattva Sangraha, 3248-49. $7 Şiddhasena, Ibid., II. 9,

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It is precisely for these reasons that even without unanimous support from the Agamas, Jaina thinkers have advocated Sahavada or the Theory of Simultaneity of Darśana and Jñāna. It has got a large number of supporters with Mallavādi as its strongest champion. This theory of simultaneity is perhaps the unanimous view of the Digambara tradition with partial suppo:1. in the Svetāmbaras also. Pūjyapāda says that for thrun-omniscient being, the knowledge of darśana and jñāna is successive and for the omniscient, it is simultaneous.59 Samantabhadra says that Kevala jñāna is simultaneous while the Syādvāda or relative knowledge is successive.co Akalankai and Vidyānanda a have tried to advance certain arguments in support of this theory.
However, there are some objections of the Mimāṁsakas regarding the simultaneous nature of Kevala jñana which I have discussed elsewhere.63 According to the theory of simultaneity, the omniscient comprehends all things at one and the same time. Now, unless it is admitted that he comprehends all things of all times, there is no meaning in his omniscience.64 Then even if it is granted that darśana is indeterminate and jñāna is determinate knowledge, there is no sense in admitting their separate identity in the case of a person whose knowledge is absolute. For him, knowledge is knowledge and not distinct or indistinct knowledge.65 Granting that in Sahavāda, both these functions (darśana and jñāna) are said to take place simultaneously, still the province of each function is strictly limited, e.g., darśana is concerned only with the
59 Pujyapāda, Sarvärtha Siddhi on T. S., I. 30.. 60 Samantabhadra, Āpta Mimämsā, K. 101. 61. Akalanka, Astašati, on Apta Mimämsä, K. 101; Tattvärtha Rāja
Vārtika, VI. 13.8 62 Vidyānanda, Asta Sahasri, p. 281.. 63 Ch. I (Vide Tattva Sangraha, K. 3248-51, Niyamasāra, 159). 64 Siddhsena Divākara, Sanmati Tarka, II. 10. : 65 Ibid., II. 11.

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particulars while Jñana only with universals. There are scholars who hold the opposite view. To them darśana is knowledge of the Universals and Jñana, the knowledge of the Particulars basing their contention on Siddhasena Divākara's view (Sanmati Tarka, II. 25). Hence, when an omniscient has got darśana, he has not jñāna and, vice versa. Thus he will be always either a speaker of unknown things or else a speaker of unperceived things.66
3. Abhedavāda:
It is on account of the reasons stated above and some other logical difficulties which led to the rejection of both the views by Siddhasena Diväkara. He propounded the Theory of Identity of Darśana and Jñana in the state of omniscience. As a matter of fact, darśana and jñāna are not two different things functioning at one and the same time, but just one thing functioning at the same time. The rule is that these two cognitions-darśana and jñāna, do not occur at one and the same time, holds good only up to that kind of knowledge called manaḥaparyāya. In the case of Kevala Jñana, no such separation between darśana and jñana is necessary. They synchronise in Kevala Jñana, and they are one and the same.67
Siddhasena Divakara levels five charges against the earlier theories and anticipating their objections tries to reply to them. The advocates of Kramavāda try to defend their theory by saying that as in the case of the four kinds of knowledge (mati, śruta, avadhi and manaḥparyāya), a man perceives consecutively, it means also the same in the case of Kevala Jñana also. But Siddhasena points out that this is an analogical argument based on imperfect similarity. In fact, the omniscient cannot be said to be the possessor of fivefold knowledge. He is said to be omniscient etc. not merely
66 Ibid., II. 12-14.
67 Siddhasena Diväkara, Ibid., II. 3.
68 Siddhasena Diväkara, Sanmati Tarka, II. 15. JCO-9

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because he has the capacity of Kercla Darsor:a ard Kevala Jñana etc. but because he actualises these powers. Omniscience is not a potentiality but an actuality. Further, there is also no scriptural inconsistency in this position.6' So he comes to the conclusion that Kerala darśana and Kevala Jñana are one. In practice, two words, darśana and jñāna are used with reference to the non-liberated stages. 70 The first four kinds of knowledge which are imperfect and limited would cease to be completely replaced by absolute knowledge on the attainment of liberation.
Absolute knowledge is understood in two ways --- in its general and in its particular aspects. It may be asked if both are one and the same, how is it then that in practice they are spoken of as being different ? It is said that this is so because it has been stated in the śāstras,71 Siddhasena Divākara formulates his own defination of darśana as "that kind of knowledge which takes place as regards things untouched and which does not come within proper provirce. This cognition does not admit in its fold låt knowledge which takes place by virtue of Hetu (middle teim) as regards things that are to happen in future and other things."79 Jñana and Darśana can occur simultaneously without distinction as in the case of a perfect being who, as a rule, perceives and knows things simultaneously.73 Hence the view attributed to the so called śāstras that “there is an interval of one Samaya between the production of darśana ard ji ana should rct te accepted as a true Jaina doctrine,74 because one and the same Upayoga is responsible for both Jñāna and Darsana.
Yasovijaya, although he supports this position of Siddhasena Divākara, is rather reconciliatory in his attempt. He wants to reconcile these conflicting views with the help of
69 70 71
Ibid., II. 18. Ibid., II. 19. Ibid., II. 20.
72 Ibid., II. 25. 73 Ibid., II. 30. 74 Ibid., II. 31.

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the Jaina doctrine of standspoints or nayas. Accroding to him, the theory of successiveness of darśana and jñāna has been formulated from the analytic standpoint (r jusūtra naya ), whereas the theory of simultaneity is the result of the empirical standpoint ( vyavahāra naya ), and Siddhasena's Doctrine of Identity is the application of collective standpoint (Sargraha naya).75 This is indeed a new approach designed to work out a synthesis between the conflicting theories. As a matter of fact, the advocates of the theory of identity also do not have enough justification to account for there being two concepts if darśana and iñana are identical. Whatever Šāstras may say (ie. though Kevala jñāna and darśana are one and one only, it has been practice to speak of knowledge and perception as being different), it has been proved beyond doubt that perfect knowledge and perception are one but they are said to be different not because cognitions are different but because the objects of this knowledge are twofold viz , general and particular.?
III. The Jaina Theory of Omniscience : Chronology
I shall try to sketch the chronology of the theory of omniscience in Jainism. But there are great difficulties in properly determining the chronology. Firstly, the antiquity of the Jaina thought is traced back to the pre-historical era,?? of which there are no records. We have to be satisfied with some stray references here and there in the Vedas. Secondly the Jaina canons and the principal Jain a writers fall into two distinct orders—the Svetāmbaras and the Digambaras. These two principal sects run on separate lines, the writers of one
75 Yagovijaya, Jñāna-bindu-prakarana, p. 48. 76 Sanmati Tarka II. 20 (Tíkā by Sukhalalaji and B. Doshi thereon). 77 For the views of many authoritative scholars about antiquity of
Jainism, Jyoti Prasad Jaina's book “ Jainism, the Oldest Living Religion " (Vārānasi, Jaina Cultural Research Society, 1951 ) is very important.

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68 THE JAINA THEORY OF OMNISCIENCE : CHRONOLOGY
school rarely quoting those of the other. Thirdly, a vast majority of works have not yet been made available to the public. They are still lying in manuscript form in some old libraries or Jaina temples. Fourthly, the extant Sūtras need not be the first of this kind but may be the last which have supplemented their predecessors as a result of survival of the fittest. Fifthly, great historical researches are yet in progress to fix up correctly the dates of these works and at present there is considerable controversy regarding these dates. Sixthly, Jainism has been relatively a more neglected branch of Indological research than others. There are less authortative and independent works on the history of Jaina philosophy.78 Seventhly, Jainism because of being regarded as heterodox and being associated with certain religious traditions of nudity, it has not been treated favourably by non-Jaina writers of ancient and medieval period. Lastly, unlike Buddhism, Jainism received very little royal patronage and hence its chronological or historical records were not preserved to the extent they deserved. There were only a few Jaina kings like Kumārapāla, who encouraged literary and philosophical activities.
Under these circumstances, it is not possible to trace satisfactorily the chronological development of the Jaina theory
78 Except for a few. brochures published by Jaina Cultural Research
Society, Varanasi and sketchy History of Jaina Literature written by late Sri Nāthu Rām Premi and other by Pt. Kailasa Candra Sastri. I do not find any other material of use. Of course, M. Winternitz's magnum opus A History of Indian literature", Vol. II, Calcutta, 1933 devotes 170 pages to Jainism (pp. 424-595) and describes materials relating to omniscience on pages 575-595. In German Helmuth Von Glasenapp's Der Jainismus (Berlin 1925); W. Schubring's Die Lehre der Jainas (Berlin 1935); in French A Guerinot's La Religion Jaina (Paris 1926) and Y. J. Padmarajiah's A Comparative Study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge (J. S. Y. M. Bəbiy 1933) and K. N. Jayatilleke's Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (Landon George Allen & Unwin, 1963) are no doubt very useful.

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THË JAINA THEORY OF OMNISCENCE : CHRONOLOGY 69
of omniscience, In the pre-canonical period, which has been presented mostly through legendary history, the omniscience of Mahāvīra was accepted as indisputable. This legendary history has been generally presented in latter times in the different Jaina Purānas e.g. Padma of Ravisena, Harivamsa and Ādi of Jina Sena, Uttara of Gunabhadra etc.
In the old Jaina literature, I find discussion of Kevala Jñāna in Acārārga, 80 Uttarādhyayana, 8 1 Kaşāya Pāhuda (Jaya dhavalā),82 Prajñāpanā,83 Rājapraśnīya,84 Bhagavati,85 Mahābandha (Mahādhavalā),56 Sthānānga, 57 Avaśyaka Niryukti, 88 Anuyogadvāra,89 etc.90 But we find here only stray remarks and no systematic account. For Umāsvāmi and Kundakunda, omniscience was a religious dogma and a religious heritage. Umāsyāmi, in his Tattvārtha Sūtra91 defines omniscience as the “simultaneous knowledge of all substances with all their modes." Kundakunda's 'Pravacana Sāra, 92 Pañcâstikāya Sāra, 93 Samaya Sāra,94 Niyama Sāra,95 Aşta Pāhuda’96 etc. refer to this conception of omniscience of which Pravacana Sāra takes special note.
The philosophical approach of the problem of omniscience begins with Samantabhadra. In his Āpta Mimāṁsā,?? he introduces inferential reasoning in support of omniscience. His
80 I. 3.4; II. 3.
85 1. 9.76; XVIII. 81 XXIII; X; V.1-32.
86 Vol. II, pp. 22–24. 82 Vol.I, pp. 21, 43, 46, 64-5.
87 II. 1.71. 83 29, 30.
88 Gäthā 127 etc. 84 165.
89 V. 5.81-82 90 Satkhadnāgama, 1.1.21-23 (of Puspadanta & Bhatabali with Dhavala
of Virasena, V. 5.81) 91 I. 29
95 158, 159, 160-65. 92 I. 28-31; I. 48; II. 105, etc.
96 I. 10-20. 93 28,29.
97 5,6. 94 Ch. I, X. 403.

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70 THE JAINA THEORY OF OMNISCIENCE : CHRONOLOGY
Svayambha Stotra98 is also full of discussion on omniscience. Siddhasena Divākara also discusses the problem of Kerala darśana and Kevala Jñāna in his Sanmati Tarka.99 In his Nyāyāvatāra, 100 he simply classifies knowledge into direct and indirect. Pujyapāda Deva Nandi discusses omniscience in his Sarvārtha Siddhi,101 and also in his Samadhi Tantra,102 Deva Vāeaka in his Nandi Sūtra refers to the concept of omniscience at many places. Similarly, Jinabhadra Ksamā Sramana, in his famous works, Višesāvas yaka-Bhāş ya'03 with Hemacandra's commentary and Višeşanavati10% discusses in detail many problems concerning omniscience. Haribhadra Sūri in his Anekānta Jaya Patākā, 105 Sad-darśana-Samuccaya106 and his works on Yoga, namely, Yogadrsti Sanuccaya, 107 Yoga-bindu 108 etc. refer to it. Anantakirti's two works on the proofs of omniscience known as Brhat Sarvajña Siddhi 109 and Laghu Sarvajña Siddhi 110 are of special significance. Pātrakesari has also dealt with this problem in Brhat Pañcha Namaskāra Stotra, 111 Bha ja Akalarka in his Rāja-Vārtika, 112 Siddhi Viniścasya,113 Laghī yastraya,114 Nyāya Viniscaya, 115 and Pramāņa Samgraha,116 has discussed it in detail from the philosophical point of view. Vidyānanda's Aşta Sahasri, 117 Tattvārtha Slokavārtika,118 and Apta Parikṣā 119 are logical works of the first rate on this
98 1. 5; VII. 5; XVIII. 11. 99 Kānda II. 100 K. 4. 101 II. 29. 102 9. 103 3090. 104 184-85. 105 p. 172--173. 106 45. 107 102-102; 140-147; 179-184; 208–7. 108 3, 17-18, 31. 109 pp. 130-204.
110 pp. 107–129. 111 4, 18-20. 112 I. 29; I. 30. 113 VIII, 1-13. 114 61. 115 165-163. 116 91. 117 pp. 44-71. 118 I. 29.1-39; I. 30.1--34. 119 pp. 206-239,

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THE JAINA THEORY OF OMNISCIENCE: CHRONOLOGY 71
12
128
problem. Similarly, Prabhācandra's Nyaya Kumuda-Candra,120 Prameya-Kamala-Martanḍa121 and Anantavirya's PrameyaRatna Maia122 give separate treatment to the problem of omniscience after meeting the objections of the Mimāṁsakas Abhayadeva Suri's monumental commentary on Sanmati Tarka Prakarana 123 is also important. Nemicandra in his Gommata Sāra (Jīva Kāṇḍa124 and Karma Kāṇḍa125), Dravya Sangraha, 196 Labdhi Sara, 127 Amṛtacandra in his Puruṣārtha Siddhyupāya;1 Umāsvāmi in Prasamarati Prakaraṇa, 129 Rāja Malla in Pañcādhyayi;180 Hemacandra 131 in Pramana Mimamsa;19 132 Santi Suri in his Nyayavatāra Vārtika Vrtti 133 Mānikyanandi in Parikṣa Mukham;134 Vādībha Simha in Syadrada Siddhi;135 Yogindu in Paramātma-prakāśa136 and Yoga sāra; 137 Dharmabhuṣaṇa in Nyāya-dipikā;138 Yasovijaya in Jñana-binduprakarana 12 139 and Jaina Tarka Bhāṣā; 140 Mallisena in his Syadvāda Mañjarī, 141 Gunabhadra in ātmānusāsana 142 etc have made valuable contribution to the study of the problem of
120 Vol. II. pp. 86-97. 121 pp. 247-256.
122 pp. 85-99.
123 Second Kända.
124 14.
125 10.
131
See also Ayoga-Vyavacchedika & Anya-yoga-vyavacchedikā.
132 I. 9.18.
133 pp. 51-56.
134 11.
135 Chapter on Omniscience Verses 1-21.
136 p. 333 Gāthā 195.
137 99.
138 Section 13.
126 42-44.
127
606-644.
128 1.5; 1.6.
129
267-269
130 II. 20.

139 Section 57-58.
140 Section 21.
141 K.1.17 (with Anyayogavyavacche da Dvātrimsikā of Hemacandra). 142 176, 264.

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72 THE JAINA THEORY OF OMNISCIENCE : CHRONOLOGY
omniscience. So far as the logical side is concerned, the names of Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, Akalarka, Vidyānanda, Prabhācandra, Anantakirti, Hemacandra, Yaśovijaya, Vādibha Simha, Dharmabhūşana etc. are important. Though the concept of omniscience was at first a religious dogma, later it acquired a rational status. The Jaina logicians had to fight the Mimāṁsakas on the one hand and the Buddhists on the other in their defence of the possibility and desirability of omniscience as a religious and philosophical ideal.

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CHAPTER IV
SOUL-PSYCHOLOGY AND OMNISCIENCE
I. Soul-psychology and Omniscience Knowledge is the natural and distinguishing characteristic of the soul Jiva.' If it were not the nature of the soul, it would be either the nature of the none-soul (Ajīva) or of nothing whatsoever. In the former case, the unconscious becomes the conscious, and the soul would be unable to know itself or anything else, because it would be then devoid of consciousness. In the latter case, there would be no knowledge, nor any conscious being which, happily, is not a fact. The presupposition behind any kind of knowledge-Syādvāda (relative) or Sarvajñatā (absolute) is the belief that the soul is the knower.
Knowledge and the Knower cannot be separated from each other. For Jainas, unlike Vaiseșika, a thing and its attributes are not two separate entities brought together by a third category Samavāya or inherence. According to Jaina metaphysics, a substance and its attributes form an inseparable and indivisible unity. This means that self and knowledge are inseparable. Spiritual progress, therefore, consists in “the gradual enfolding of consciousness of the self to a higher and higher states resulting in the progressive widening of knowledge till the self becomes perfect and knowledge becomes co-extensive with reality. This is the state of omniscience for the self.”. It is also his final salvation. The soul is a sub
1 Uttaradhyayana Sūtra, XVIII, 10-11 2 Kundakunda, Sama yasära, 403. 3 Amrtacandra, Atmakhyāti, a commentary on Kundakunda's Şamaya.
sāra, 404. JCO-10

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74.
SOUL-PSYCHOLOGY AND OMNISCIENCE
stance, which is the respository of knowledge. Knowledge and memory do not exist in it “like lcose images stocked in a drawer, or photos in an album, but as the diversified aspect of a partless entity, the mutually interpenetrating flashes or coruscations of a huge undivided conscious illumination, or as a multitude of inseparable and co-existing notes or rhythms cf unitary intelligent force."4 Knowledge is the essence of the soul. There is ro soul without knowledge and there is no knowledge without soul.5 This is a consequence of the general
thesis of Jaina metaphysics that "there is no attribute with out substance and no substance without attribute." All this follows from the very definition of substance or Dravya : “ Whatever has substantiality, has the dialectical triad of origination, decay and permanence and is the substratum of qnalities and modes, is Dravya.". But it should be noted that Jainas do not say that attributes alone are sufficient to constitute a reality. For them esse is not percipi. On other hand, the substance is also not a featureless object like Advaita Vedānta i.e. absolute. The quality of Sat or reality as the characteristic of Dravya clearly indicates that it is not merely the form of the intellect rather it has its existence in Rerum Naturata. Considered in the light of the above description of the nature of the coul, omniscierce becomes the natural pro. perty of the soul and non-omniscience only adventitious and accidental owing to its existence to some external causes or obstructions. Omniscience, can therefore be gained by destroying these causes which are four types of Karmas. i.e., deludeproducing (Mahanīya), apprehension-obscuring (Darsanāvaraṇīya) comprehension-obscuring (jñānāvaraṇīya) and obstructive
4 C. R. Jain. Jainism and World Problems : Essays and Addresses
(Bijnour, Jaina Parished, 1934), Part II; p. 174. 5 Umāsvāmi, Tattvārtha Sūtra, II.8; cp. Rājamalla, Pañcādhyayi, 3, 192. 6 Pañcāstikāyasāra, 13 & 50. 7 Pañcāstikāyasāra, 10; Tattvärtha Sūt. V. 38. 8 Pañcāstikāyasāra, 10; Cp. T. Sat., V. 29.

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75
( Antarāya).9 Their removal brings four types of perfections ( ananta-catus taya ).10 The Tattvārtha Sūtra definition of Upayoga (consciousness ) is wide enough to cover not only apprehension (darśana) and comprehension (jñāna) but also bliss and power.11 A pure soul has destroyed the four Ghātī Karmas, existing in an auspicious body, possessed of infinite apprehension, comprehension, happiness and power.13 It is inherently possessed of these fourfold infinities. But there is no pure or perfect soul in the empirical world. This means that the soul in its perfect form is ontologically real but not empirically real. However, there are different degrees of purity, extent, depth and fineness of apprehension and comprehension in different individuals. We can justifiably assume at the end of the series, a perfect soul, having perfect apprehension, comprehension, power and bliss. Every soul must be potentially perfect, because if it is not, it cannot gain perfection which is said to be its destiny and goal. The logic is simple : “there can be no destruction of things that do exist, nor can there be creation of things out of nothing."15 This state is the total separation of soul from the matter. But it remains only an ideal for mundane or embodied selves. The liberated souls alone attain this pure and perfect state.”'14
The Nyāya-Vaišeșika does not accept the Jaina position. Consciousness to them is an adventitious quality of the soul which comes temporarily as an effect of a complex cognitive machinery i.e. grasp between sense and object and then be.
9 T. Süt. X. 1.
10 Ibid., II. 12. 11 Tattvārtha Sutra, II. 8 (Laksanı or differentia of soul may be either
inseparable (Atmabhita) or separable (Anātmabhuta). Consciousness is inseparable but a celestial condition of existence is a separable qua
lity of the soul. 12 Drav yasangraha, 50. 13 Pañcāstikayasāra, 15, Cp. Gita, II. 16; Sankhya-K ārikā & Sankhya
-Tattva-Kaumudi, 8. 14 Samayasāra, 406.

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SOUL-PSYCHOLOGY AND OMNISCIENCE
tween sense and the mind and finally between the mind and the soul. They do regard soul as the substratum of all cognition but they maintain that self and cognition are two different things. Soul is, therefore, inherently devoid of all cognition. This fact is also reflected in the state of the final liberation. But the15 Jainas argue that if cognition is absolutely different from the soul, knowledge will be well-nigh impossible because they will always remain unrelated. Even the hypothesis of an inherent relationship between the two will not do.
There seems to be an appreciable amount of truth in the Jaina contention. In fact, the problem involved here is the one to which Bradley draws our attention in his criticism of the concepts of the substance and quality. If quality is different from the substance, i.e., if the relation between the quality and substance is external, then the attempt to relate the one to the other is bound to be an infinite regress. Using Bradley's general arguments agiiast substance and quality, one can say in refutation to the Nyāya-Vaisaşika position that if knowledge is an external quality of the soul, no intermediary link will be able to bridge the gulf between the two without producing an infinite regress. The Jainas do not put their arguments exactly in this way, but it can be reconstructed out of what has been said by them. It cannot also be said that since the soul is the agent (Kartā) and cognition the instrument (Karana the distinction between the two is necessary. Their relation is like that of eye and the vision and not like that of lamp and vision. :. Knowledge is in fact identical with the soul, though it has different types of modes,“ just as a serpent is identical with the coil of his body that he mikes. "16 This views of consciousness and self is also corroborated by actual experience,
15 Nyaya Mañ jari, p. 77. 16 Syadvāda Mañjāri, p. 43. (Anyayoga-Vyàvacched1.D vatrimšika Com.
on verse 8).

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SOUL-PSYCHOLOGY AND OMNISCIENCË
73
we are always aware of ourselves as the knower and never as unconscious, or first being unconscious and then becoming conscious as a result of our relation with the consciousness. The Nyāya-Vajśesika cannot save the situation by playing on words that in the sentence, I have knowledge', there is a proved distinction between the self and consciousness.
The position of Särikhya is quite different. Puruşa is of the nature of consciousness.17 Intellect is not innate to Purusa but an evolute of Prakrti, which is itself unconscious. As a result of separation af Puruşa from Praksti, the intellectual processes come to a stop leaving Purusa in the state of pure consciousness. 18
To the Vedāntins, the quality of knowing does not constitute the nature of Brahman, for Brahman is above these limitations. He is pure existence-consciousness. The quality of knowing is the function of consciousness when associated with the internal organ i.e., antahkarana. Brahman is free from the duality of subject and object, knower and known.19.
The agreement between Sārikhya and Jaina position is really very great. In fact, the Sānkhya, Vedānta and Jaina schools of thought are united in their opposition against the Nyāya-Vaiśesika theory of soul and its relationship to the knowledge in so far as according to all of the three schools, consciousness is not merely a quality of the soul but is its very nature. Therefore, the question of relating knowledge to the soul becomes an unwarranted question. However, there are certain things which can be said against the Sānkhya-Vedānta positions. The Sankhya school holds a very peculiar view about the role of intellect. Intellect accroding to it is really not a source of knowledge but it is material (therefore unconscious evolute of Prakrti. This means
.
17 18 19
Yoga-Bhaşya, I. 9. Yoga-Sutra, I. 3. Vedānta Paribhāṣā, p. 17.

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SOUL-PSYCHOLOGY AND OMNISCIENCE
by making intellect unconscious, Sārkhya weakens the foundation of knowledge because, speaking commonsensically, intellect plays a very important place in the preservation and protection of knowledge. However, there is also an opposite view. They say that even if the 'buddhi' as the first evolute of Praksti is unconscious by itself, in the combination with the Purusa which mirrors itself in it, 'knowledge' is certainly not weakened. Similarly, in the system of Advaita Vedānta, even if it is true that from the paramārtha point of view all empirical knowledge forms parts of Avidyā, on the Vyavahāra level all the true criteria of Knowledge are valid. Hence, we cannot discover any weakening of the intellect in Sankarā. cārya himself, nor in that of his followers.
The Vedāntic position goes to the other extreme of regarding all empirical knowledge as only psuedo-knowledge. This condemnation of empirical knowledge also weakens the intellect because what is left out as real knowledge after the rejection of intellectual or emperical knowledge is extremely ethereal and intangible.
The Jainas claim that they preserve the concreteness of knowledge and the empirical knowledge, because they neither treat intellect as unconscious nor do they accuse emirical knowledge as being of the nature of psuedo-knowledge. This amounts to saying that the Jainas are realists and empiricists in the broad sense of the term.
To the Buddhists, there is no problem of relation between the soul and consciousness. They do not believe in the exi. stence of any substance like soul. Cognition to them, is a function of the beginningless stream of consciousness (citta) which takes the form of Alaya Vijñāna and Pravrtti Vijñāna. There is no permanent substratum or central matrix of the process. But in the state of Mukti or salvation, when con. sciousness is devoid of the influx of avidyā or trsņā,20 it does not cognise any external object.
Sole.
20 Tattva Sangraha, p. 184; Cp. Saunlaranındı, XVI. 28, 29.

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GRADATION OF SOULS AND STAGES OF OMNISCIENCE 79
The Mimāṁsakas, on the other hand, like the Jainas, rega rd consciousness as the attribute of soul and posit a very intimate relationship between them. But the great difficulty with the Bhatta Mimāṁsakas is that they regard khowledge as not selfrevelatory but only " inferentially cognisable by something other than itself (Parānumeya).” According to them, cognition is by nature non-perceptible (Paroksa) and is to be known by means of an inference where “cognizedness produced by the concerned piece of cognition”21 acts as the middle term, that is, by means of an inference of the type where existerce of a cause is inferred from that of its effect. But if we say that knowledge is not self-revelatory, we cannot establish validity of this position because even an explanation of its meaning is an attempt at knowing it and this knowing, if not self-revelatory (which it must be ex hypothesi) will not be intelligible. But this is absurd position. It is commonly accepted that a non-perceptible unknown piece of knowledge cannot establish its meaning. That which is itself unconscious cannot help cognising other things.
Then, there are further difficulties conrected with knowing our pleasures and pains. It is common feeling that we experience pleasures and pains and the clearest examples of self. revealing knowledge is the knowledge of pleasures and pains. Unless we ourselves know our own experiences, how can we claim to know others?
II. Gradation of Souls and Stages of Omniscience
Besides consiousness, there are also some other characte-. ristics of the soul. In Uttarādhyayana Sūtra, the characteristics of soul other than Upayoga (consciousness ) are given as "faith, austerities, energy, and realisation of its developments”22 Nemicandra says that Jiva, besides having Upayoga, is "form
21 Pārthasārthi Mišra, śāstra-Dipikā, p. 157.. 22 Uttaradhyayana Sutra, XVIII. 11.

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80 GRADATION OF SOULS AND STAGES OF OMNISCIENCE
less, an agent, has the same extent as its own body, is the employer, exists in Samsāra, is Siddha and has a characteristic upward motion."'23 A similar list of soul's characteristics is also given in Pañcāstikāya Sara24 and some other works25 of Jainism. The self in Jainism is described in a dual manner as tianscendent and empirical, liberated or bound, pure and impure. However, these words express two points of view and not two different kinds of self unrelated to each other. 26 A man, who is in his youth, cannot be regarded as merely a child. He is something more than a child. But at the same time he cannot be considered altogether different from the child he was, for, in that case he need not be ashamed of the in discretions of his childhood. 21 Similar is the case with the soul. When we look at it from the point of view of bondage and literation, haspiness and misery”, 28 etc. the various points of view must be duly considered for a proper description of what the self is.
23 Nemicandra, Dravyasangraha, 2, 4-14. 24 Ku ndakunda, Pañcāstikāja Sara. 27 It has the single ommission of
the last named characteristic of 'having the upward motion', which
is mentioned in the next verse, Pancastikāya Sara. 28. 25 Puruşārtha Siddh yu pāya of Amrtacandra also regards soul as the agent
and enjoyer (Verse 10). According to Pravacanasāra of Kundakunda, "the real nature of soul is knowledge and bliss" (I. 19). Though modification is the nature of soul (Pravacanasara II. 31), it in fact has the triple characteristics of origination, decay and permanence (P. S., II. 62). The empirical self is also described as “bound up with Karmas from an indefinite past" (P.S., II. 20-22, Cp. Pancadhyāyi of Rajamalla, 17, 18, 33) Reference may be made to K. C. Sogani's article "The Concept of Self and Various Expressions of the Ethical Ideal in Jainism” published in Mahavira Smārikā (Jaipur, Rajasthan Jain Sabhā, 1693),
p. 27. 26 Nemicandra, Dravyasangraha, 7, 13; Kundakunda, Sama ydsāra, 7-9,
14-16; Pravacanasāra, II. 30; Amstchandra, Puruşārtha Siddh yu pāya, 4. 27 Siddhasena Divākara, Sanmatitarka I. 44. 28 Ibid., I. 46; See also I. 43,

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GRADATION OF SOULS AND STAGES OF OMNISCIENCE 81
Samantabhadra adopts non-absolutistic attitudes in his treatment of the question of self and its relation to body. How. ever, the distinction between the empirical and the spiritual self is based on the distinction between what man actually is and what he may become.50 But this should also be noted that the Jaina theory of soul applies not only to man but to any form of life including animals, birds, insects, plants, devils, angels, etc.
The empirical self is the soul in wordly bondage due to karmas. Therefore this state is said to be impure. The empirical self is agent, enjoyer, limited to the extent of body, resident of this world, undergoes change, admits of plurality, owes material karmas and last but not the least is conscious.31
Jaina thinkers have made great efforts to classify souls in several ways.32 One is struck at their patience for endless classifications, division and enumeration, which exhibit their scientific attitude, though quite naturally out of tune with
29 Samantabhandra, Yukt yanusasana, ed. Jugala Kishore Mukhtara
(Sarsāwā, Vira Sevā Mandir, !951), 10, See his criticisms of the
Buddhist position, 11, 17. 30 H. Warren, Jainism (Ārrāh, Central Jaina Publishing House, 1916
2nd Ed.,), Ch. III "Man As He Actually is" and Ch. IV "Man As
He May Be." 31 Dravyasangraha, 2, Pancastikayasara 27, 28; Tattvartha Sutra, 11.10
53; Tattvartha Rā pavārtika, pp. 124-158; Sarvärtha Siddhi., pp. 164202; Tattvartha Vrtti, pp. 86-110; Tattvārtha Ślokavārtika, pp. 311-344;
Gommața Sara (Jivā Kānda), 70-117. 32 Gommatasära (Jiva Kānda) gives many classifications having 14, (Gatha
72), 57 (Gatha 73), 570 in 19 varities (Gathas 75-78), 98 (Gathas 80) varities of Soul-classes (Jiva Samāsa). Great pains have also been taken to ascertain the bodily sizes of a soul (Gathās 94-101), Kinds of births and their nuclie going to 84 lacs (Gathās 81-93) and total kinds of bodily materials of all bodied souls reaching to one Koda Kodi (i.e. one hundred million, 10 m. * 10 m.) ninety seven lacs,
and fifty thousand crores (Gatha 117). JCO-11

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82 GRADATION OF SOULS AND STAGES OF OMNISCIENCE
the modern scientific temper. We are more concerned with the principles of their classifications than with its actual details. ::.. [A] Gradation in the form of Pañca-parames thi and
the Concept of Omniscience :: The Namokāra Mantra (Salutation-chant) with which every cevout Jaina makes his daily obeisance and worship indicates a gr adaul unfolding of the potentialities of the self. The pañcaParc naşthi is a collective name for the five kinds of divine souls namely the Arhats or Perfact and embodied souls possessing infinite knowledge, happiness and power, Siddhas or the perfect soul in Nirvana which are formless, bodiless, and free from all kaimic attachment, the Ācāryas or the experts in the field of spirituality, the Upādhyāyas or the experts guiding ascetics ard finally Sadhus or the ascetics devoted to the contemplation of self 38 The Arhathood is the culmination of the faculties and powers of the soul and it is blessed with the four-fold infinities after destroying the four obstructive kaimas.34 However, even an Arhat is describable from both the poir.is of view. From the transcendental point of view, an Arhat is without a body but from the ordinary point of view, he possesses a very illuminating body.85 The nature of other divire beings such as Siddhas, 36 Ācāryas,37
33 For details please see Dr. Nemichandra Šāstri's Mangala Namokara:
Eka Anucintana (Kāsi, Bhāratiya Jñāna Pitha, (2nd ed.), 1960), where the different meanings of these words have been analysed. This chant has a mystical significance in Jaina literature (Bịhat-Dravya Sangraha, 49). This chant originally consists of letters (Dravya Sangraha, 49) which can be reduced to even one letter viz. OM (Vide Sākatā yana Vyakarana, 1.1.77; 1.1.81) and be lengthened into twelve
thousand verses (Pañca Namaskāra). 34 Nemichandra, Dravyasangraha, 50. 35 Bịhat Dravyasangraha, p. 191 (Com. on Dravyasangraha, Verse 50) 36 Ibid., Dravyasangraha, 51; Gommațasara (Jiva Kānda), 68. 37 Dravyasangraha, 52; Bịhat Dravyasangraha, 52; Gommațasāra (Jīva
Kānda), p. 193,
KA

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Upadhyayas,38 and Sadhus39 have been described separately. Arhathood is the stage of final destiny or the stage of Ayoga Keyalin (stage of absolute motionlessness) in the 14th i.e., the last stage in the ladder of spiritual development (Guṇasthāna) of the soul. He has attained lordship of peaceful perfection; his Karmic influx (aśrava) is wholly stopped and is entirely freed from particles of karmic dust. His vibrartory activity has also ceased and is motionless omniscient lord.1 The Arhats see the whole truth and preaches it but add nothing since the truth is perfect and one for all, and for all times, and must necessarily be without beginning and without end.
[B] Five Types of Conditions for the Existence of Soul (Gati)
In Mangalacarana of Tattvartha Sutra, generally found and used in Jaina temples, we get a gift of Jainism. There it has been stated that there are five kinds of conditions for existence (Gati) of soul, namely, hellish (Narkiya), sub-human (Tiryañca), human beings (Manuṣya), celestial beings (Deva) and liberated beings (Siddha ).42 Nemicandra describes four. teen different ways of soul-quests (Märgaṇā), 43 which are intended to give us a detailed knowledge of souls. Existential condition (Gati) is the state of a soul, brought about by the operation of the body-condition-making Karmas (Gati-namaKarma). It is the cause of the soul's passing in either of the
38 Dravyasangraha, 53; Bṛhaddrayasangraha, 53.
39 Dravyasangraha and Bṛhat-Dra yasangraha, 54.
40
83
Devendra Suri, Karma Grantha, (ed.) Sukhalälaji (Āgrā, Ātmānanda Jaina Pustaka PrachārakaMandala, 1918), II. 2 (with comment); Gommaṭasara (Jiva Kanda), 9-65.
41 Gommaṭasarā (Jīva Kāṇda), 65.
42 J. L. Jaina, Tattvarthadhigamsutra (Arrah, Central Jaina Publishing house, 1920), pp. 2-3..
43 Nemicandra, Gommaṭasara (Jiva Kā ņda), 141-142.

1

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four conditions of existence, namely, hellish, sub-human, human and celestial.* + : The different states of existence are the different modifications of Jīva brought about by Karmic conditions which are the real causal conditions that lead to the soul to manifest itself in a particular form of birth or death. The soul is neither born nor dead but due to its Gati-nāma-Karma it assumes different forms. 45 Here we find different grades of existence. The Arhats and Siddhas have no sensuous activities; nor they experience any sensuous pleasure. They enjoy infinite knowledge and happiness without the help of any senses. 46
The above view about the conditions of existence is almost a religious dogma, All ancient systems of thought, eastern or western, have postulated same patterns of existence. This scheme is combined with a religious schedule of reward and punishment. Apparently all this looks quite preposterous, but . there is nothing inherently impossible in the conception of these forms of living beings, who live, think and feel can and change their bodies at will, as described by Milton in his “ Paradise Lost. "47 The state of liberation (Siddha-Gati) is free from birth, dotage, death, fear, miseries, feeling, diseases etc. 48 It is also the state of omniscience or the ideal state of existence. [C] Gradation of Functions (Mārgaņā) of the Jīvas
and Omniscience Märgaņā (Soul-Quest)49 is the means for the identifica.
44 Ibid., 146. There is a detailed description of the characteristics of
each Gati along with the size, shape, number, characteristic cognisability, etc. (Gomma fasāra Jiva Kanda), 147-162) Kundakunda also thinks that the different Gatis are caused by their respective Nama
Karma-Prakytis (Pañcastikaya Sāra, 61). 45 Kundakunda, Pañcāstikāya Sara, 19, 60, 61, 46 Nemicandra, Gommatasarā (Jiva Kanda), 174. 47 Ibid., p. 52 (English Introduction of J. L. Jaini). 48 Ibid., 152. 49 J. L. Jaini's Translation.

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tion of souls.50 It gives a detailed knowledge about them in their multifarious aspects. They deal with Gati (conditions of existence), Indriyas (senses), Veda (Sex-activity), Kāya (embodiment), Yoga (vibratory activity), Kaşāya ( passions ), Jñāna (knowledge), Samyama (control), Darsana (conation), Leśyās (thought-colourations), Bhavyatā (capacity of attaining liberation from Karmic bondage), Samyakatva (Right-belief), samjñitva (Rationality) and Ahāra (assimilation).51 This is a classifica. tion of souls according to the different functions they perform in their different embodiments. However, there is a strong tendency towards a serial gradation from the less perfect to the more perfect. For example, the moving (trasa) worldly (saṁsāri) souls are classified on the basis of the number of senses they possess - one-sensed, two-sensed and so on. The one-sensed Java is the lowest in the grade of existence possessing only four Prānas (i.e. only the sense of touch and the three Balas) while the five-sensed soul (of human being) possess ten Prānas, and it is also rational.53 There is a tendency in Jaina works to classify souls according to the degrees of their development, as for example, into mu idane and liberated, 53 and mundane into rational and irrational 54 and mobile and immobile, 55 and mobile souls into two-sensed worm to five-sensed man 56 and immobile into five kinds of bodies---earth, water, fire, air and vegetable, 57 from non developable to developable. This perhaps is due to the belief 58 in the natural upward move. ment of the soul by virtue of which one can reach to the highest state of existence. Every soul is potentially equipped
50 Nemicandra, Gommațasara (Jiva Kända), 141. 51 Ibid., 142. 52 Kundakunda, Pañcastikāyasära, 114. Cp. Gomnatas ära (Jiva Kānda),
74-76. 53 Umāsvāmi, Tattvärthasutra, II. 10. 54 Ibid., II. 11.
56 Ibid., II. 23. 55 Ibid., II. 12.
57 Ibid., II. 13. 58 Nemicandra, Gomnaţsara (Jiva kända), 78.

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with four-fold infinities and, hence, if proper efforts be made, there is no reason, why one cannot attain the state of superknowledge, faith and happiness [D] Gradation according to the Stages of Spiritual Development
(Gunasthānas) of the Soul and Omniscience The spiritual progress of the soul has fourteen stages, from impurifying bondage to purfied freedom, from wrong-belief to right-belief, from nescience to omniscience. Bondage is due to five causes, namely, wrong belief, vowlessness, carelessness, passions and vibratory activity.59 From the first to the third stage of spirituality (Gunasthāņa), all the causes are found, though in the second, the first is absent for a very short time. In the fourth stage, all but the first (Mithyādarśana) are found, in the fifth and sixth stages, all but wrong belief and vowlessness are present. In the seventh to tenth stages, all but the first three, i.e., wrong-belief, vowlessness and carelessness are found and in the eleventh to thirteenth stages, all but the first four are found. However, none is present in the last stage.60
The inner light, the quest for perfection, is never extin. guished in the soul, even in its bondage. The eternal impulse towards the good is not always like a working volcano but remains like a sleeping one with the greatest possible potentiality. This spiritual slumber can be broken only by cutting the spiritual knot (granthi) of desire (kāga) and aversion (dveşa) by means of three-fold mechanism 61 of moral purification and spiritual enlightment known as slumbering impulse (Yathāpravịtta Karana), new spiritual impulse (apūrvakarņa) and impulse of spiritual dawn (anivșttakarana)( with their respective sub processes.63 Omniscience is attained in the one
59' Ibid., VIII. 1. (Mithyadarsona, Avirati, Pramili, Kaşayu and Yoga). 60 Ibid., II. 27; Viseşāvas yaka Brāşya, 1204-12 17. 61 Nemicaidra, Gunnat sära (Jiva Kāņda), 47. 62 Ibid., 43-54. 63 Viseșāvas yaka-Bhāşya (Brahadyrtti), 1202-1217; Nemican dra, Labdhi
Sāra, 3-7.

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but the last stage of spirituality (Sayoga Kevalin) but the soul still is subject to certain activities conditional upon matter. 84 However, in the fourteenth and final spiritual stage, when the inflow of Karmic-particles have absolutely stopped and his vibratory activity has completely ceased, he is said to be a non-vibrating omniscient lord (Ayoga-Kevalin).65 Such a soul is devoid of eight kinds of karmas and instead possesses eightfold excellences of omniscience (Kevala Jñana), perfect cona. tion (Kevala darśana), infinite power ( Ananta Virya), perfect right belief (Samyaktra), un-disturbability (Ayrābādha), interpenetrability (Avagāhanatva), and neither of low nor of high family (Agurulaghutva).66 These excellences of the liberated souls or the siddhas are mentioned to refute the views of the following sects, namely, Sadāśiva (the view that the soul was never actually bound by the Karmas), Sārkhya (which holds
that bondage, liberation and transmigration, happiness and : misery are merely in Prakrti), Maskaris (according to which the soul after liberation can be affected by the Karmas and can return to the world again), Buddhas (who believe that everything is transcient), the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiseșikas (according to whom liberation means annihilation of happiness or the qualities of the soul), Issaravādins (for whom God is always free and creates the world) and the Mandalins (who hold that the liberated soul has an ever-lasting upward motion.$)
We can say on the basis of the above that for Jainas, omniscience is the legitimate claim of every soul, as it follows from the essential nature of the soul as. consciousness. Whatever might be its religious and spiritual implications, omniscience is the natural culmination of consciousness. If soul is inherently possessed of the infinite knowledge c'c. (vide the doctrine of Ananta-Catustaya) which is temporarily lost due to Karmic-obstacles, its recovery is natural, if cre is able to
64 Nemicandra, Ibid., 64. 65 lbid., 64.
66 67
Ibid., 68. Ibid., 69.

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remove those obstacles. Further, it is not going to be the acquisition of an altogther new attribute, because neither a real thing is liable to destruction nor an unreal one can come into being, 08 Out of nothing, nothing comes. [E] Gradation of Transcendental Self and Omniscience
Par excellence In accordance with the spirit of non-absolutism, the Jainas make a distinction between the real and the ordinary points of view regarding the soul, but there are writers like Kundakunda, Yogindu and a few others, who deal with this problem more from the standpoint of Niscaya. The treatment naturally turns to be highly spiritual. Ātman turns out to be really Paramātman.9 From practical point of view, the Arman because of Karmic association undergoes various operations, 70 but from the real point of view, Atman is not subject to bondage and liberation."1 The author of the work, Sri Yogindra has, no doubt, used both these points of view but ultimately the practical point of view is discarded in favour of the real point of view. Practical view-point is useful and essential in so far as it leads to the realistic view-point, but by itself, it is inadequate. Analogy of a 'cow can do only so long we have not seen a 'gavaya'.
In the final spiritual evolution, the subject-object relation is very much different because the spirit, being endowed with the power of omniscience, is able to see all objects without having senses.72 Kundakunda in Samaya Sāra, gives instructions how to know the real self (Sva-Samaya). This SvaSamaya73 or the Ego-in-itself is the pure and ultimate reality.
68 Kundakunda, Pancastika yasāra, 19. 69 Yogindu, Paramätina prakasa, I. 16. 70 Ibid., I. 60, Cp. Pravacanasära, II. 30. 71 Yogindu, Ibid., I. 64-68. 72 Kundakunda, Pravacanasära, I.21; 1.35; 1.36; 1.56. 73 Kondakunda, Samayasära, 2.

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This self, which has realised its oneness, is the beautiful ideal and absolutely free from bondage.74 This description of the self very much resembles that of the Upanişadic and Advaitic Brahman or Atman. But since, it is not the only reality in the whole world, it falls short of the status of the Upanişadic Ātman. From the real point of view, the soul is not bound, not touched, not other than itself but steady, same and not combined." 5 Here the knowledge of the knower is also the knowledge of the known.76
The classification cf the transcendental spirit into external (Bahirātman), internal (Antarātman) and absolute (Paramātman) is very significant. These are, in fact, only three stages of the progress of soul. This characterisation roughly corresponds to the method of Arundhati Nyāya or Sakha Candra Nyāya adopted in the Upanişad and Vedānta literature to point out the subtle nature of the soul by depicting the spiritual ladder starting from the food-sheath (Annamaya-Koşu) and leading to the blissful-sheath (ājanda-maya-kosa)?? or from the crude doctrine of soul as son (putrātmavāda) to the Advaitic conception of Self as "pure, consciousness, eternal, free etc."7 8 Similarly, the Bahirātman represents the materialistic view of self, in as much as, it is identified with the gross-physical body and other material objects of enjoyment.79 It remains engaged in sensual and carnal pleasures of life80 and is desirous of getting material enjoyment here and hereafter and so is necessarily under the fear of death.81 In the next stage, naturally, the soul will transcend this physical barrier and
74 Ibid., 3. 75 Ibid., 14.
76 Ibid., 16. 77 Tait. Up. II. 1-7 (Bralunānanda Valli). 78 Sadānanda, Vedanta Sara, 123-135. 79 Pujyapäda, Samadhi Tantra, 7,11,13, etc.; Cp. Kundakunda, Sama ya
sära, 25; Yogindu, Paramātma-Prakaśa, I. 13. 80 Pujyapāda, Ibid., 7-55 (Samadhi Tantra). 81 Ibid., 42, 76; Yoga Sāra (of Yogindu), 10; Rāja Malla, Adhyatma
Kamala-Mārtanda, III. 12, JCO-12

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will realise itself as the interral self which is separate and
distirct from the body, is of the nature of knowledge and well-established in perfect tranquility. 88 It is truly spiritual self, who 85 has no lust for material enjoyment84 and is the way to liberation.85 Rāja Malla, further, subdivides this internal self into three types - superior, inferior and in between the two. 86 Atman though dwelling in the body is absolutely different from the body. It is not even a miniature of any universal self as is held by some of the Upanişads. Rather, the Jīva, according to Jainism, retains its separateness even in immortality. In the Vedānta, the Atman and Brahman are the two aspects of the same reality; in Jainism, spirit and superspirit are the two stages of the same entity, but spirit and world remain two different things, whereas in the Vedānta, the soul, God and the world all are one. Hence, as the description of a city does not constitute that of its rular, the adoration of its body is not the adoration of the omniscient lord. 87 The antarātman or spirit becomes the super-spirit (Paramātman) when it knows itself, exists in knowledge, and is free from Karmas. 88 He after subjugating the senses, realises that the self is of the nature of real knowledge, is called a conqueror. 8 9 This is the state of embodied (Arhat) or disembodied (Siddha) Paramātman, and the Arhat is free from birth, old age, death 9 0 and other obstructions, is independent of the senses, unparalleled, liberated and free from rebirth. He is eternal, nontranscient and independent.91 He is Siddha, pure, omniscient
82 Yogīndu, Paramatma Prakāśa, 1, 14. 83 Pūjyapāda, Ibid., 27, 30; Mokşa Pahuda 5 (Kundakunda). 84 Pujyapāda, Ibid., 17. 85 Pujyapāda, Ibid., 15, 37. 86 Rāja Malla, Adhyatma-Kemala-Martanda, III, 12 (Notes). 87 Kundakunda, Sama yasāra, 30. 88 Yogindu, Ibid., 15. 89 Kundakunda, Ibid., 31. 90 Kundakunda, Ni yamasara, 176,
91 Ibid., 177

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and conqueror of senses. 92 This super-spirit has been classified ințo spirit (Arhat) and super-spirit (Siddha) by Rāj Malla 98 The former has destroyed the obstructive Karmas and is embodied, while the latter has destroyed non-obstructive karmas and is disembodied. But each represents the anantacatus taya. The Paramātman of Yogindu, however, much it resembles the Upanisadic Brahman, cannot be compared with it. Upanişadic Brahman is one and only one and is the very source and support of everything; it is self-created and is self-existent. The Paramātman of the Jainas must maintain its basic individuality and independence from the world which is equally real. Even the mystic Yogindu clearly says : “Atman is never anything but Atman; the non-soul (Para Padārtha) is always different from the soul; neither the Atman can b the non-soul nor can the non-soul ever become the Atman.”9+.
From the above, the pluralistic and the realistic bias of Jainism is perfectly clear. The Paramātman, unlike the Upanişadic Brahman, is not self-created (Svayambhū) but it is the Ātman which becomes the Paramātman. The Upanişadic for. mula of the identity of Atman and Brahman exhibits' uncompromising unity but the Jaina-formula of relationship between Ātman and Paramātman points only to the identity of the different states of the same individual. Hence, any monistic or pantheistic interpretation will be, I am afraid, not in keep. ing with the basic tenets of Jainism.95
The Paramātman of the Jainas is not absolutistic or pan. theistic yet Jainism has worked out a system of Godhead contained in the very conception of spiritual evolution from Atman to Paramātman. The diversity of Siddha, Arhat, Tirtharikaras, Munis, etc. is a logical consequence of this evolution.
92 Kundakunda, Mokşa-Pahuda, 35. 93 Raja Malla. Ibid., III. 12 (Sakalatman & Vikalatman). 94 Yogindu, Paramātma-Prakāśa, 1. 67. 95 Radhakrishnan's Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, pp. 334-340 offers an
absolutistic interpretation of Jainism.

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However, it must be remembered that the Paramātman of the Jainas is not like the creating Isvara of the Nyāya but it is the highest ethical ideal, the summun bonum, and the spiritual terminus of self-development. The Paramātmanhood is at once the realisation of the metaphysical, ethical and religious ideals of the self. Realisation of the essential nature of the self (Svarūpa Sattā) as consciousness, is the same as the attainment of Siddhahood, which is at once the highest ethical and religious state one can aspire after. All this shows an unmistakable element of mysticism. The Paramātman in Jainism, though not creative, is nearer to the idea of a personal absolute, but there is constant stress upon the attainment of the highest type of knowledge through self-development. Self is the embodiment of knowledge. Hence, it is said that when the Atman is known, everything else is known. This again sounds like the Upanisadic idealism. "One who knows the self, knows everything."96. The super-spirit or Paramātman of the Jainas is also omniscient.97 However, the subject matter of knowledge according to the Upanişads and the Jainas is not the same. For Jainas, the subject-matter of perfect know. ledge consists of all the substances with all their modifications. There will be so many theoretical and practical difficulties if we literally follow this definition of omniscience. Nor, we can accept the Vedāntic or Upanişadic interpretation of omniscience as self knowledge. However, Kundakunda works out a via media between the two extremes. He says : "From the practical point of view (just as) knowledge illuminates other (objects), so does conation. From practical standpoint (just as) soul" illuminates other objects, so does conation (also)."98 In fact, soul is the very embodiment of knowledge; so, when one knows the soul, he knows everything.
96 Brhad. Up. III. 7.1. 97 Yogindu, Ibid., 15; Kundakunda, Moksa Pihuda, 35; Piarasa la sära,
I. 16; I. 20; I. 22; Pañcāstikāyasära, 35, 36; Nemicandra, Gomm a t
sāra (Jiva Kānda), 65, 66; Dravya Sangraha, 50, 51. 98 Kundakundia, Ni yamasara, 163, See also 164 & 165

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93 III. Proofs for the Soul being the Ground of Omniscience
(A) General Omniscience, having been shown to be an innate poten: tial property of the soul, the fact of its being the ground of omniscience is also thereby established. The soul is, for the Jainas, the knower, who possesses four-fold perfection, both in its natural state and liberated states. Without the soul, the whole edifice of Karma-phenomenology, and that of ethics and morality will remain unexplained and untenable. Similarly, without it, transmigration, rebirth, etc. cannot be explained.
But can we not say that, although Buddha said that there was no soul,99 his attitude was never less ethical and moral than anyone else's and he also regarded Karman and rebirth as acknowledged facts. Let us find out the reasons. At the outset, this may be mentioned that Buddha did not reject the soul altogether. What he rejected was the substantial conception of self (sakkāyiditthi), which is avidyā par excellence and hence cause of all passions. Buddha simply rejected the Brahmanical conception of s vul, which was regarded as the inner core of the fundamental reality, immutable, permanent and eternal. In its extremely radical for a, namely Advaita Vedānta, this soul or Ātman is said to be one without a second and hence the denial of all plurality and reality of the phenomenal world. Now according to Buddhism, if we regard soul as such an unchanging, permanent, being, there will be no scope for moral endeavour. On the one hand it might lead to moral
99 "Practically inseparable from the doctrine of Annica is that of
Anatta” (A. Coomarasvamy, Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1956, p. 88). See Samyutta Nikaya, XII. 70. 32-37; XXXV.85; Digha Nikayı (Miālidārı Sutta) 15; Vinaya Pitaka (Maha Vagga), I. 6.38-46. Säntarakṣita goes to the length of saying that Doctrine of Non-substantialism (Nairatin yavada) is the distinguishing feature of Buddha, and therefore he stands at the head af all philosophers, Tattva Sangraha, 3325, and “ he who believes in Atman, perishes,” Tattva Sangraha, 3340.

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lethargy (akriyāvāda), and on the other it might be the cause of all attachment and pain 100 This belief in a permanent substance in man called the soul, is inconsistent with the Buddhist law of universal change and impermanence, which has been subsequently developed into that of momentariness (kşanikavāda), which has been deduced from the criterion of existence as causal efficiency (artha-kriyā-kāritva-lak saņam )! Although Buddha denies the continuity of a permanent, identical, eternal, substantial soul, he does not deny the continuity of the stream of successive states of life which are causally conditioned. This makes the past, present and future lives continuous. Thus, Buddha does not propound the theory of Non-substantiality;101 he simply replaces the conception of substantial soul by that of an unbroken stream of consciousness, as we find in the philosophy of William James and David Hume. On the positive side, we have the doctrine of Puñca-skandhas or five groups of physical and psychical states, namely, (i) rūpa (four elements, the body, the senses), sense data, etc., (ii) Vedanā (feelings), (iii) Sanjñā (conceptual knowledge), (iv) Samskāras (predispositions) and (v) Vijñāna (consciousness). 109
100 cp. S. Radhakrishnan's statement in the Introduction to Dhammapada,
p. 31 (London, Oxford University Press, 1958) “The proposition that there is no permanent unchanging self in persons or things (Sarvam anätman) is not a speculative theory, or a sentimental outburst on the transitoriness of the world, but the basis of all ethics." ...." The passionate sense of egotism is the root of the world's un
happiness” Mathyanika-Kārikā of Nāgārjuna, XXVIII.2. 101 Mai ihima Nikaya (Alaguddupama Sutta). I. 140. There are nu
passages attributed to Buddha and his disciples asserting the reality of self. "It is better Lord, for us to go in search of self”-Vinaya Pițaka, 1.23; "the self is the Lord of self”-Vinaya Pitaka, I. 23; see also, Ilala parinirvana Sutta. II. 26; "This is not mine: I am not this this is not myself;" Sanyutta Nikaya, III. 23 “Self is our light
(attadi pa), our refuge (attasarana)." 102 Sam yutta Nikaya, III. 86. See Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology,
Chapter III.

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95
But there are difficulties in this position. Is the self a mere empirical collection identical with five-fold aggregates of physical and psychical states? In other words, is the self identical with body and mind? If so, there would be no self after death. This will lead to materialism or nihilism (ucchedavāda) and will also make moral and spiritual progress lead. ing to Nirvāṇa meaningless. True, to questions like these, the usual Buddhist answer is that the relationship is indescribable (avacya).1 108 But then, this is not really an answer. However, on behalf of the Buddhist, it can be said that Buddha adopted a neither-nor approach quite characteristic of the doctrine of the middle path (Madhyama Pratipada) i.e, he thought that soul is neither different from nor identical with the body,10. in order to get rid of both eternalism (Śāśvatavāda) and nihilism (Ucchedavāda).
The second difficulty in the Buddhist view of Self is that it misses the sense of identity. It is true that the theory of a mind -continuum governed by the natural law of causation provides not only for continuity, but also for change. Each succeeding state is the result of the preceding state which means that nothing is lost. Now if the doctrine of Karma means an assertion of the inexorable moral law of causation, and rebirth implies not the physical continuity of the body but the emergence of a new series of states caused and conditioned by the preceding ones, then Buddhists say, they have no difficulty in accepting them. Similarly, memory also becomes expicable. Vasubandhu says "Memory is a new state of consciousness directed to the same
103 Nagarjuna observes: "There is the self, there is the not-self, as also that there is neither the self nor the not-self"-Madhyamika Kārikā, XVIII. 6.
104 Samyutta Nikaya, XII. 35.5; Majjhima Nikaya, I. 256. cp. "Eternalism implies inherent perfection while nihilism implies its impossibility. It is in order to avoid these two undesired consequences that the Buddha adopted the middle course and left these problems avyakata unexplained" N. M. Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 14.

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object caused by its previous states.” 105 This means that "as the present state of consciousness inherits its characters from the previous ones, the past in a way continues in the present, through its effect." 106 Similarly they also explain such "rudi. mentary experiences as sensation or feeling and higher forms of experience, such as judgement and inference.”107 The Buddhists believe that by accounting for continuity in the series of mental states and events, they can explain everything for which the identity of the soul has been considered necessary. But this is not correct. The successive constituents of a continuous series have to be held together in order that the series may form a continuity. Any constituent cannot do this work of holding together. This means that there must be some identical substance however refined it might be which performs its functions. Therefore, it is wrong to think that identity of self is an unnecessary notion.
It is now evident that Indian philosophers, including the Buddhists, think that we cannot adequately explain the fact of knowledge and morality without the hypothesis of a soul. So, even the Buddhist, who denied the substance-view of soul, have simply replaced it by the theory of a mind continuum and Pancha-skandha. The Cārvākas are the only exception. According to them the soul is nothing more than this conscious living body, which perishes along with the body at the time of death. They do not worry to explain knowledge beyond sense-perception and to them liberation with the sense of complete cessation of sufferings can only mean death. Hence, they do not care whether the soul exists or not. But all
105
106
Yosomitra, Abhidharma Kosa Vyākhya, ed. Woghihara, Tokyo, pp. 711-712, quoted in T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 33. S. C, Chatterjee & D. M. Datta. An Introduction to Indian Philosophy (Calcutta University Press, 6th ed. 1960), p. 138. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1955), p. 34.
107

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97
other systems of Indian philosophy give their best attention to prove the existence of self.
The Jainas have also offered arguments for the existence of soul. Their discussion also, like others, has Pūrva-paksa (statement of the opponent's view) and Uttara-paksa (statement of their own view). Here, I shall confine myself to the examination of arguments for the existence of soul and shall not discuss Jaina criticisms of the different conceptions of soul in Indian philosophy, I shall also not discuss those Jaina arguments which are of general nature108 and too well known. They can also be found elsewhere. I shall, therefore, concentrate only on those arguments which are based on the doctrine of Pramānas. [i] Argument for the existence of Soul based on Perception
(Pratyakşa) :
The existence of Self is directly proved by our uncontradicted immediate experiences Hence, to argue that the soul does not exist since neither it nor its functions are ever perceived directly109 is wrong because it is proved by experience like happiness, sorrow, memory, etc, In fact, our own experience is the basis even of doubts and denials.110 All the mental
108 The Psychological Argument states that the various psychological
functions of mental life cannot be explained without the hypothesis of a soul. But we can say that William James, David Hume, Buddhists and the Behaviourists do not accept this.
It is further said that self cannot be doubted or denied, because it is the self that by which we know" - Acaranga Sūtra, I. 5.5., cp. Śarkara's statements, "self cannot be doubted for it is the essential nature of him who denies it"-Brahma-Sutra (S.B), II. 3.7); "everyone is conscious of the existence of his own self and no one thinks "I am not"-Brahima Sutra (S.B.) I. 1.1. "If there is no doubt, how do you realise aham"??-Viseșāvas yaka-Bhāşya, 1554-6. In a manner very much similar to Descartes (Cogito ergo sum), Mahāvīra
also proves the existence of self. (Vide, Viseşāvas yaka-bhasya, 1557). 109 Viseșāvas yaka-bhāsya, 1549 110 Ibid., 1557.
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states are the functions of the self and all these are quite evident in our everyday experiences. This is the knowledge of ahampratyaya111 ('I sense') or the 'Cogito' of Descartes and unity of apperception of Kant. This is not realised through the external senses but through the internal sense.
But we can say that this argument contains a jump from the psychological to the ontological No one denies the occurrence of our mental states but to posit a reality behind them is to stretch the idea too far. The Behaviourists, who explain everything in terms of behaviour, will not agree to it, nor will it be acceptable to Hume or James. [ii] Argument for the Existeitce of soul based on Inference
(Anumāna):
Anumāna is a knowledge which comes after perception. (tat pūrvakam anumānam). Now, since no one has perceived the soul in the past, it cannot become the subject-matter of inference. Further, inference, to be valid, requires a relation of universal concomitance ( vyāpti ) between the major term (sādhya) and middle term (hetu). Here, as pointed out earlier, there is no relation between the soul (major term) and its recollection based on past perception (middle term), hence it can be inferred that there is no soul 112
But it is said, as has been shown earlier, the existence of soul is self-evident and is proved by such uncontradicted experience as 'I feel pain' etc. The soul is supposed to be the substratum of consciousness, which is self-evident. Now, as substance cannot exist without attributes, so there can be no soul without consciousness. Now, we can say that since we realise the attributes (i.e., consciousness), we cannot avoid realising its substance (i.e., soul).113 However, it may be pointed out that this assertion is based on the commonsense view of the relation between substance and attributes, the myth of which has been exploded by Berkeley, Bradley; Sankara and
111 Ibid., 1554. 112 Ibid., 1550 113 Ibid., 1558

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others. There is also a quite serious objection from the side of the Cärvākas who hold that consciousness is the product of material elements, and hence there is no independent thing like soul as the substratum of consciousness. But the Cārvākas cannot prove it through perception, their only valid means of knowledge, because we never perceive anywhere the generation of consciousness by unconscious material elements. Even inference cannot prove it, because if the body were the cause of consciousness, it would have existed so long as the body existed i.e., during sleep, swoon, or even in a dead body,114 which is not a fact. We cannot prove causal connection between the matter and consciousness also because growth or decay of the body is not always followed by development and decay of consciousness. Even the organisation of the different material collocations to produce some consciousness requires some organiser, which is no other than the soul. To prove the identity between soul and body on the basis of such statements, 'I am fat', 'I am weak’ is due to taking literally what has been said figuratively. Then to prove the non-existence of soul on the basis of such negative judgements "there is no soul in the body is self-contradictory. We cannot make a negative judgement in the case of absolutely non-existent object. Denial of something in the place implies the knowledge of its existence somewhere in some form 115
The Jainas build up their argument for the existence of soul on the classical criticism of materialism that if consciousness is not implicit in the material elements, it cannot become explicit. Whatever is non-existent (asat) cannot be made to exist (sat). As Vācaspati says " blue cannot be turned into yellow even by one thousand artists”116, so says Haribhadra "as oil is absent in each particle of sand, it cannot be produced
114 Prabhācandra, Prame ya-Kamala--Martanda, p. 114. 115 Gunaratna's Commentary on Haribhandra's Sad-darsana-Samuccaya.,
48-49. 116 Vacaspati Misra, Sankhya-Tattva-Kaumudi, 9 (notes).

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from the combination also”,117 as “an unreal being cannot come into being."118 This means that if consciousness is absolutely unreal, it can never become real, so it must exist in the soul. If it were not so, man might have been turned into matter and vice versa if the underlying material elements would have found favourable developments.119
It can also be argued for the exisience of soul that since attributes of a substance having form must be with form, so knowledge etc. being formless, it must be with the formless, i.e, soul. Like begets like and hence qualities like consciousness cannot be produced by material body.
The soul is also knowable mediately through many other agencies. One argument is advanced on the analogy of a controller (Adhisthāna).120 The human body can be moved and controlled at will like a machine or motor-car, and, therefore, there must be someone that moves and controls it. There must be some agent who moves and controls our diffe. rent organs and senses. However, an objector can point out that as an automatic machine moves itself or as our different instincts, reflexes work themselves, so to posit something else may not be quite correct. However, it cannot be denied that this argument is in line with common-sense, of which the Jainas are the great champions.
The existence of soul is also proved on the ground that the term Jīva (soul) is a singular term having its own derivation and consequent significance and meaning and this meaning is the concept of soul.121 There is a relation of uni
117 Haribhadra, śāstra-Vārtā-Samuccaya, 44. 118 Kuniakunda, Pancastikaya Sarz, 19, cp, Sinky 2-käriki, 9; Charlıgya
Up. VI. 2.2; Brahma Sutra (S.B.), 11.1.18; Bhagavat Gitā, II. 16. 119 Sukhalal Sanghavi, Darsana Aur Cintana, pp. 231-232. He lists
seven proofs for the existence of soul. 120 Viseşāvas yaka-bhās ya, 1557. 121 Ibid., 1575.

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versal concomitance between a singular derivative term and its meaning. As a negative example, we can take the case of 'Dittha', which has no derivation, hence no meaning. However, this is an argument of linguistic nature and it can hold good only with regard to Sanskrit language. I do hold that linguistic argument is no argument at all. No ontological problem can be solved by etymology, neither in Sanskrit nor in any other language. But I have tried to place for historical reasons which depict the extreme anxiety of the Jaina thinkers to prove the existence of the soul.
In short, the self cannot be denied. To say that 'my self does not exist is self-contradictory, because its existence is asserted in its very denial. To say that my self does not exist is like saying ‘my mother is barren'. [iii] Argument based on Scriptural Authority (Āgamas):
It is true that scriptures do support the existence of soul and doubtlessly they contain the most impartial findings of the sincere and strenuous labour of the elevated souls. But then the difficulty arises when they differ among themselves and propound contradictory theories.122 The Jaina thinkers try to meet this objection by distinguishing between valid and invalid scriptures.123 But then this has to be told what would be the criterion of a valid scripture and who will decide that this is a valid criterion. For example, Akalanka uses consistency (Avisamvāda)1 24 as the criterion of a valid scripture, but is he prepared to transcend the limitations of Jainism ? It is also said that scripture contains infallible statements made by the omniscient persons who directly perceive everything and have got self-realisation. But the old question is still there “If Sugata is omniscient, why not Kapila also ? And if both
122 123 124
Ibid., 1553. Siddhasena Divākara, Nyāyāvatāra, 8 & 9. Vidyānanda, Asta Sahasri, p. 236 (see Aşta Sati of Akalarka), cp. Siddhasena Divākara, Sanmati Tarka, III. 45; Samantabhadra, AptaMimāṁsā, 78.

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are omniscient, why there are differences of opinion between them ?":125 Any reply to it will only be a shifting of position or a dogmatic assertion of one's own position. (iv) Argument based on Analogy (Upamāna) :126
Analogical argument is based on similarity but since there is no object found like the soul, there can be no analogical argument about the soul. But this is not a fact. My consciousness of a table is just like yours and the soul is the substratum of such consciousness. Hence, there is no difficulty. But we see that from the resemblances between the attributes, the existence of the soul substance is inferred, hence, this is in fact an inferential argument. (v) Argument based on Circumstantial Implication121
(Arthāpatti) :
In the Pūrva-paksa, one may say that even arthāpatti cannot prove its existence since there is no object whose existence can be explained only by assuming the existence of the soul.128 But this is wrong. The Jainas say, we cannot explain all kinds of experiences without postulating the soul. The postulate of consciousness present in our immediate experience is no other than the soul whose existence is undeniable. (vi) Argument based or Non-Cognition (Abhāva Pramāņa) :
The function of Non-cognition or Abhāva is to establish non-existence of something, hence it can only prove the nonexistence of soul. But we can say that mind, sense-organs and all other material instruments like the microscope etc, cannot
125 śāntarakṣita, Tattva Sangraha, 3149; see Akalarika, Siddhiviniscaya,
VIII. 19. 126 Vadībhā Simha Sūri, Syadvada Siddhi, Ch. I, (Jiva-Siddhi). 127 I owe this term to Dr. Rajendra prasad, I. I. T., Kanpur. He had
also suggested another term 'Contextual Implication' but he preferred
the former. 128 Vadībhă Simha Sūri, Syadvāda Siddhi, I. 9-10.

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fully explain perception without soul. It means, therefore, that soul is definitely existent and its existence is proved negatively, It is true that everything cannot be perceived through eyes, for example, we can see our body with eyes but we cannot see our consciousness with them, but this does not mean that consciousness does not exist.12 9
we can conclude that these proofs for the existence of soul may be regarded as indirect proofs to omniscience since soul is the subtratum of omniscience. If soul does not extist, there is no locus for knowledge, since knowledge subsists in the soul itself and omniscience is knowledge par-excellence.
129
Ibid., I. 15.

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CHAPTER V
THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY OF KARMA AND OMNISCIENCE
I, The Basic Postulate of the Theory : Its Genesis and Meaning
The soul according to Jaina metaphysics, being constitutionally free and potentially divine. its corruption in the state of worldly existence needs to be explained. If soul is consciousness itself, whence came his association with the body of physical matter ? The Jainas maintain that karma is the matrix of the universe and the whole world undergoes evolution due to karma. Karma is not only the ground-mass of indivi. dual's destiny but also the mould in which anything and everything takes shape. Our past karmas put a world before us otherwise it would not be possible to get appropriate pleasures and pains. Like the Leibnizian world, the set is different for different individuals. As a matter of fact, the function of karma is to produce appropriate experiences including pleasurable and painful ones. Hence, there have to be suitable objective world sets and suitable personal, individual sets, both conditioned by karmas. This will be a sort of idealism which may be called Karmic Idealism - distinct from either the subjective or the objective variety of metaphysical idealism.
Idealism here does not mean idealism in the conventional metaphysical sense. Karma can be either physical or mental and a world determined by karma is not completely a mental or idealistic world. Therefore, when I speak of Karmic-Idealism, I mean something else. A man's karmas are the ideal causes in the sense that they determine what a man ought to

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get. The theory of karma holds not only that an individual ought to get what he deserves in virtue of his karma but also that he, infact, gets what he deserves in virtue of them Therefore, karmas, which are the ideal determinants of an individual's private as well as public world, turn out to be also their actual determinants. This means that the private and the public worlds are determined by such causes (karmas) by which they also ought to be determined. All this gives enough justification for using the term Karmic-Idealism1 in the sense it is used here.2
Various other attempts have also been made to explain the facts. These theories are materialism (bhautikavāda), naturalism (svabhāvavāda),* temporalism (kālavāda),5 determinism (niyativada), fortuitism (yadṛacchāvāda),' scepticism and agno
105
1 Please refer to my article "Karmic Idealism of the Jainas" before the Seminar on Karma & Re-birth, held in August 1965 under the auspices of the Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras. The above is the gist of the said article and is also relevent to our present purpose.
2 cp. "The Law of Karma is thus the general moral law which governs not only the life and destiny of all individual beings, but even the order and arrangement of the physical world."-S. C. Chatterjee & D. M. Datta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy pp. 15-16.
3 Digha-Nikaya, I. 2; Chandogya Up., VIII. 8; Tait. Up. II. 1.2; Brahmajala Sutra; Sutrakṛtanga, I. 1.1.; II.1.9.; Madhvācārya, Sarvadarsana-Sangraha, Chapter I.
4 Svetasvatara Up., I. 2.; Asvaghosa, Buddha Carita, 52; Mahabharata Santi Parva, XXV.16: Bhag. Gita, V. 14; For criticism, see Udyanacārya, Nyaya Kusumañjali, I. 5.
5 Atharva-Veda. XIX. 53-54: Mahabharata, Santi Parva. XXV; XXVIII; XXXII; For criticism, see Mathara Vṛtti, 61; Nyaya-Siddhānta-Muktāvali, 45.
6 Digha-Nikaya (samajjña-phala-sutta); Upāsagag-Dasão, VII; Sutrakṛtanga, I. 1.1.; Buddha Carita, p. 171 (ed. D. D. Kosambi); Blagavati-Sutra, XV.
7 Gotama, Nyaya-Sutra, J.V.1.22; Njojo-khāṣja cf cf Vatsyayana, III. 2.31; Mahabharata, Śanti Parva, XXXIII.23.
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sticism (samsayarāda & ajñānavāda) etc, But none of these theories is broad based and successful as the karma theory. This explains the popularity and continuous influence of the karmic theory in Indian life and thought from ancient times down to tne present age. It is not merely an accident of history that only the Cārvākas do not accept the karmic theory.
There are two important schools of karmic idealists-Pra. vartaka and Nivartaka, one emphasising and the other minimising the value of participating in worldly affairs. The former school is more attached to life and the social order and therefore upholds the banner of dharma and deprecates adharma. The practice of dharma leads to a more happy and gracious life here and hereafter in accordance with the merit and demerit acquired. This is the axle of the wheel of exist. ence. So, according to them, there is no importance attached to liberation. They concentrate on the three purusārthas only ie., duty (dharma), material wealth (artha) and enjoyment (kāma). This view is upheld by the Vedicist Mimāṁsakas and ritualists. However, the śramanic schools of Buddhism and Jainism as weil as the vedic schools of Nyāya-Vaiśesikas and Sānkhya-yoga stick to the ideal of Moksa. They recognise karma to be the cause of bondage and advocate freedom from karma as the means to salvation. The Nyāya-Vaiseșikas, however, hold that God's instrumentality is required for the frui. tion of karma9 which remains as an unseen potency (adrsta) consisting in the merit and demerit of the soul. The Sankhya does not accept the hypothesis of a creating 1 śvara. The God of Yoga is also no dispensasor of the fruits of action but simply the object of worship (dhyāna). Personal God, though dispensasor of fruits, has no ontological status in Advaita Vedānta.10 The Jainas cɔmbine the atomism of the Nyāya
.8 Samyutta-Nikāya, XLIV; Digha-Nikāya (Sāmajjña-phala sutta); Sütra
kstānga, I. 12.2. 9 Gotama, Nyaya-Sūtra, IV. 1.21; Prasastapāda, Prašasta pāda-Bhāşya,
p. 48. 10 Śankara, Brahma-Sutra (s. B.), II. 1.26.

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Vaišeşikas with the real modification of self. Karma is material or non-material as it is the modification of matter or consciousness, The thought activity is Bhāva-karma; the actual matter flowing into the soul and binding it is Dravya-karma.
The reasons behind the Jainas putting greater emphasis on the doctrine of karma and working out a science of karma in greater detail than what has been done by other systems are as follows. Firstly, they had to substantiate the sovereignty and independence of the soul over matter. This was a reply to the Cārvākas who had reduced the soul to an epiphenomenon of matter and had also rejected rebirth and salvation. Secondly, the Jainas could not reconcile with the radical Vedāntins like Śarkara who would accord karma a place only in the realm of māyā, which is unreal as a metaphysical entity. “From the level of Paramārina, karma is irrelevant because the domain of Paramartha is the supreme truth which is non-dual."11 Thirdly, the Jainaz also wanted to refute che one-sided fluxism of Buddhism which could not adequately explain the fact of fruition of karma without the identity of a permanent soul. Lastly, the Jainas also wanted to correct the wrong Brahmanical notion that karma is subservient to God and hence what is more important is not karma but the compassion of God.19 If God is regarded as the creator, preserver, destroyer of the universe as also the dispensasor of fruits of actions as well as the inner-controller and guide, then God's grace is the only rescue and support. Therefore, apart from theoretical difficulties of introducing God in the realm of nature and his occassional intervention etc. this
11 T. M. P. Mahadevan's observations in the Madras Seminar on Karma
and Rebirth; Dr. R. V. De Smet 'The Law of Karma : A Critical Exposition.' Dr. N. Veezhināthan 'Karma and Rebirth', and others held similar views in the seminar. See also Brahma-Sūtra (S.B.), III.
1.1.; III. 1.13. 12 cp. Ķg Veda, X. 19.3; Tair. up., III. 1; Manusmệti, I. 5.9.

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leads to fatalism and pessimism 13 The doctrine of grace is indeed a disgrace to the idea of man as the maker of his own destiny. This loss of ethical autonomy takes away the very basis of our moral life and perhaps is generated by a false belief that the potency of karma is also destroyed with the destruction of the human body.
The Jaina theory of karma might be accused of plac'ng the destiny of man in the hands of ruthless law and not in those of a merciful God, who might be pursuaded easily to improve it.
Mr. Sinclair Stevenson makes a similar projection when she says that "the belief in karma and transmigration kills all sympathy and human kindness for sufferers, since any pain a man endures is only the wages he has earned in a previous birth."14 But in view of tremendous inequalities pervading the
13 Prof. P. M. Bhambāni raises this question : " if all creation is
grounded on God's volition, how can any non-voluntary action be at all ? ” and replies " God being the Universal Consciousness, the epithet of voluntary and non-voluntary cannot be implied to Him." However, I can say that if God is only conscious, his karma cannot be a result of choice but when God said 'I am one, let me be many there is act of choice. To this a Višistādvaitin may say that God has in Him both' the aspects-Ciia and Acita and so on. (See Proceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress (Hyderabad), 1939, Symposium on "Karma and Fatalism" in which Profs. P. M. Bhambani, M. A. Venkata Rao & R. Ramānujachári had participated. Prof. S. Süryanārain Sāstri also contributed an article (Advaitic Approach) in the same Proceedings). Dr. R. V. De Smet holds that the theory of Acquinas on God as the universal cause of everything in the evolving universe is strikingly parallel with the view of Sajkara." (See Madras Seminar
on Karma & Rebirth, 1965 and Brahma-Sutra (S.B.) II. 1.34). 14 S. Stevenson, The Heart of Jainism, p. 163, cp. Dr. R. V. De Smet
“The Law of Karma, when it is given (as by Sankara and Aquinas) its correct and subordinate place within a general theory of the total causation of the universe (with or without temporal beginning) by Brahman or God, ceases to be an iron law and to give rise to impossible antinomies, but to be retained in its core of reasonable:ess with its connotations of justice and ethical government of the world” --See Madras Seminar on Karma & Rebirth, 1965.

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world, I hope, Mrs. Stevenson, if she cares to be a little impartial, will agree that if everything is attributed to Him, then a God all-merciful (being also omnipotent) has to be a God un just. In fact, the science of karma is the real science of spirituality, in so far as it tries to unfold the real nature of spirit or self. This is self-knowledge or self-realisation. But to know the self is also to know that it is different from the non-self, with which it is in beginningless .conjunction. Karma is the material basis of this conjunction which is nothing other than the bondage of karma. Unless, we have a thorough knowledge of karma, we cannot know about the true nature of spirit or self. The knowledge of karma removes the false notion of identity between the body and the self and so on. Individual differences and acquisitions all being due to karmas, its knowledge is essential for both self-knowledge and selfrealisation. The entire doctrine of karma is based on the belief that the universe is a system subject to laws inherent in its own constitution.15 It also involves the idea of immortality of soul and metempsychosis because if the work of fruition has not been fully worked out in one life, future ife is a logical necessity. Hence the belief in the transmigration and immortality also follows This is nothing other than the science of spiritulity. The explanation of the world and the place of man in it have always proved the Procrustian bed of spiritualistic metaphysics, so much so that some like the Advaitins, while trying to explain them had to explain them away. Others like the Buddhists had to reduce them to mere nothingness.
Literally, karna means 'action' or deed. The common poople use it in the sense of 'work' or 'profession'. But the Sāsiras give a much wider denotation to it to include all types of actions-voluntary or non-voluntary, of human beings or
15
cp. William James' statement : "Spiritualism means the affirmation of an eternal moral order....”--Pragmatism, pp. 106-107.

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other beings. It is also used in the sense of "rites and rituals”16 by the Mimāṁsakas, in the sense of duties of the 'four-fold occupations (varņas) and stations (Aśramas)' by the Smộtikāras, in the sense of 'religious vows and disciplines' by the Paurānikas, in the sense of the object or the second case' by the Grammarians, in the sense of movement' and not voluntary action or the law of moral causation, residing only in one substance devoid of qualities and direct and immediate cause of conjunction and disjunction by the Nyāya-Vaiśesikas,17 in the sense of 'function of Rajas' aspect of Prakrti in Sārkhyayoga 18 etc. However, as technical philosophical term, it sig. nisies not only action but also its actual potential effects. In Jainism, this means the activity of the soul which invites and enables matter to flow into it, as also the matter which does flow into the soul. The first is known as thought-activity (Bhāvakarma) and the second as material-activity (Dravyakarma), In other words, karma is that “finest matter which a living being attracts to itself by reason of certain impellant forces which are in the individual; not only attracted to but assimilatted by the individual itself; and it changes the individuality of living being.19 Different systems of Indian philosophy adopt different terms to express the same thing for which 'karma' is used in Jaina literature. We can trace back the origin of the karma principle to the RgVeda in its concept of Order (Rta).20 Buddha's concept of Law (Dhamma)ai practically signifies the same thing. Fate (Daiva) and luck (Bhagya) are the distorted forms found in the general use. The Nyāya
16 Pārthasārthi Mišra, śāstra-Di pika, p. 80; Šabara-bhāşya, II. 1.5.;
Šalikanātha, Prakaraṇa-Pañcika, pp. 184-85. 17 Kanāda, Vaisesika-Sutra, 1. 1.17. 18 Isvara Krşņa, Sankhya-Karikā, 13. 19 V. R. Gāndhi, The Karma Philosophy (Bombay, D.L.P. Fund
1913) p. 3. 20 Rzvedu, 1.1.8; 1.23.5; 1.54.9; 1.123.13. 21 Mahānidāna Sutta.

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Vaiseṣikas speak of merit and demerit (dharmadharma), unseen potency (adṛṣṭa) and even past impressions (samskāras ),22 the Sankhya-yogins use past actions (asaya); the Mimāmsakas call it unseen force (apūrva); the Advaita-vedantins rather recommend to cosmic-ignorance (Maya)25 or ignorance (avidya). Predisposition (vāsanā) is a common term for karma to the Buddhist and the Yogins.
II Karma: The Material Basis of Bondage and Nescience [A] Karma and Matter
The soul being infected with four-fold passions, namely, wrong belief (mithya-darśana), vowlessness (avirati), carelessness (pramāda), passions (kaṣāya) and vibrations (yoga), attracts matter 26 These karmic particles attached to the soul are called karmas.27 Matter (pudgala) is a non-soul substance (ajiva-dravya)28 which has got form and qualities.99 Matter is eternal, uncreated and has a huge magnitude.30 There is some controversy about the meaning of form (rupa) which pudgala possesses. Some hold that the pudgala has only shape or form31, still others hold that it also has qualities.32 This view is corroborated in a passage of Tattyartha-Sūtra 33

111
22 Nyaya-Sutra, IV.1.3-9; I.1.17; Nyaya-bhāṣya, 1.1.2
23 Yoga Sutra with Bhasya, I. 23-29; II. 2; III. 45.
24 Śabara-bhāṣya, II.1.5.
25 Brahma-Sutra (S.B.), II. 1.9.
26 Umasvāmi, Tattvartha-Sutra, VIII. 1-2.
27 Devendra Suri, Karma-Grantha, ed., Sukha Lala Sanghvi (Agra Atmananda Jaina Pustaka Pracharaka Mandala, 1953), I. 1.
28 Nemicandra, Dravya-Sangraha, 15.
29 Ibid., cp. Tattvärtha-Sutra, V. 5.
30 Kundakunda, Pañcastikaya-Sāra, 4. 31 Umāsvāmi, Tattvartha-Sutra, V. 5. 32 Nemicandra, Dravya-Sangraha, 15. 33 Umāsvami, Tattvartha-Sutra, V. 23.

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Vardhamāna-Purāņa also says that pudgala is endless and eharacterised by colour, smell, taste and touch.34 It has two chief forms - atom and molecules. 35 An atom is obtained by a process of division leading to the indivisible,36 whereas molecules can be decomposed into their constituent parts by division.37 Matter (pudgala) is of six kinds depending upon the refinement of its constituents. They stand in this order : earth (grossgross), water (gross), shade (gross-fine), objects of the four senses (fine-gross), karmic-matter (fine) and atom (fine-fine). The karmic-matter is very fine. It cannot be perceived by the senses. It is that kind of matter which is capable of becoming gross-matter.38 Now, the material-molecules called vargraņās are groups of the same kind of matter. 39 They are of twenty-three kinds40 of which the thirteenth is the karmicmolecule (karma-vargaņā).41 Karma-vargaņā consists of more atoms but occupy less space in comparison with mind-group of molecules (mano-vargaņās) which precede it, 42
The karmic-matter has the “Peculiar property of developing the effects of merit and demerit. 43 " So even if it is considered to be physical in nature, it has a tendency to determine the psychic characteristics. Each of the five classes of
34 Vardhamana-Purāņa, XVI. 16. 35 Umāsvāmi, Ibid., V. 25. 36 Ibid., V. 27; Kundakunda, Niyama-Sāra, 35. 37 Umāsvami, Ibid., V. 26; Nemicandra, Dravya-Sangraha, 26 ( for
tripple process of division, fusion and both). 38 Nemicanvira, Gommațasāra (Jiva-kānda), 602-603, Kundakunda, Pan
cāstikā ya-sāra, 83. 39 Jinabhadra Ksamā śramana, Viseșāvas yaka-b'rūsja,636. 40 Ibid., 637-638; Karma-Grantha, V. 75; Gommatasära (Jiva-Kānda)
594-95. 41 Nemicandra, Gommatasāra (īva-kānda), 594. 42 Jinabhadra Kșania śramana, Vi.bh., 631-7; Bhadrabālu, Av. Nir.,
39, Kg. gr. V. 76 43 Radhakrishanan, I. P., Vol. I., p 319.

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karmic-condition determine its corresponding physical states of the Jivas with the exception of the last one (pariņāma or self-conditioned), which is not causally connected with the wheels of existence or liberation. These conditions are rise (udaya), suppression (upaśama), eradication (kşaya), mixed process of eradication and suppression (kşayopaśama) and the unconditioned (pariņāma). 4 4 Being effected by the change in karmic-material Jiva experiences certain emotional states in which Jiva is only the substantial or the proximate cause (nimitta-kartā), while the karmic-material is the extrinsic or immediate cause (upādana-kartā). 45
• Many of the difficulties arising out of this position will be over if we remember the Jaina. distinction between phy- . sical and psychical karma and also the Jaina philosophy of standpoints. Karmas are of two kinds - physical (Dravya) and spiritual (Bhāva). 46 The thought-activity is Bhāva-karma whereas the actual matter flowing into the soul and binding it is Dravya-karma. The Bhāva-karma may be compared with latent tendencies (Saṁskāras) of other systems. Similarly, the Nyāya-Vaišeșika view of activity (pravịtti) and the Yoga concept of modifications (vịtti) are very near the Jaina concept of Dravya-karma. As our latent tendencies (saṁskāras) determine our overt actions, life and personality, so Bhāva-karmas affect our physical side of personality. Even the Naiyāyikas believe that all kinds of pravștti bind us to the chains of samnsāra and lead to some kinds of birth, high or low. “Pain, birth, activity, faults, false notions : on the successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before."41 This compares well with the Buddhist chain of causation also. Yoga also believes that every vịtti leaves behind a latent tendency and it is only when the mind gets rid
41 Kundakunda, Pancastikaya sāra, 62. 45 Jbid. 63. 45 Brahmadeva, Dravya-Sangraha-Vịtti, 8. 47 Gotama, Nya ya-sūtra, IV. 1.68. JCO-15

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of all its modifications, it is said to be in a balanced state. 48 To the Jainas, karmas are not only latent spiritual tendencies but also very refined kind of matter. They infect the Jīvas in accordance with its passional vibrations. The Dravya-karma is also said to be cover (āvarana) and the Bhāva-karma to be faults (dosa).49 However, both of them are related to each other as cause and effect. 50
The approach of Gomma tasāra to karmas is slightly diffe. rent. It holds that karmas belong to one kind when we look at them from the point of view of generality or karmaness. Viewed as Dravya-karma (karmic-matter) and Bhava-karma (its capacity of fruition), it is of two kinds. But the material aggregate of karmic molecules is Dravya-karma; its power to operate is Bhāva-karma,51 Anyway, this way of regarding material particles as karma is a bit peculiar way of describing them. But the reason for doing so is the fact they produce bondage 52 The different forms of Bhāva-karmas cannot occur in the consciousness of a Jīva without corresponding changes in Dravya-karmas. 53 Similarly a change in Dravya-karma must bring a change in Bhāva-karma, Bhāva-karmas will condition out emotional states (Bhāvas), which may be either pleasant or unpleasant. Thus the chain of causation is as follows : Dravyakarma, Bhāva-karma, and Bhāya.54 However, an objection might be raised as follows : if the states of emotion or Bhāvas are realy brought about by karmic-matter how can Atman be said to be the cause of this Bhāvas ? To this, we can reply that emotional states (Bhāvas ) are conditioned by Dravyakarma and karma in its turn is conditioned by karmic-thought
48 Patanjali, Yoga-sútra, I. 41. 49. Sım intabhadra, Āpta-Mimāṁsā, 4. 50 Vidyānanda, Aşța-sahasri, p. 51. 51 Nemicandra, Gommațasāra (Jiva-kānda), 6. 52 Amţtacandra's commentary on Pravacana-sūra of Kundakunda, 25. 53 Kundakunda, Pancastikā ya-sāra, 64. 54 Ibid., 64 (Notes by a Chakravarti thereon).

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or Bhava. Jiva is not the essential cause in that case and still without Jiva these changes cannot happen. Infact the Jiva is essentially responsible for the Bhāras because its passions are the factors which attract karmic-matter. Hence, it is quite correct to say that Jiva does play a causal role in the production of Bhavas, and it can therefore also contribute to their stoppage.
A better understanding of the whole problem becomes easier if we adopt the Jaina doctrine of standpoints (naya). Viewed in this light, from the practical point of view (Vyavahara-naya), the soul is the doer of material-karmas but according to the real standpoint (niśchaya naya), he is the doer of spiritual karmas (Bhava-karma).55 For example, in making a pot, the existence of the idea of pot in the mind of the potter is the spiritual-karma while its material existence is known by material-karma, The potter is directly the cause of the Bhava-karma and the Bhava-karma again is the cause of Dravya-karma. Therefore, from the real standpoint, the "potter having the idea of the pot" is the agent but according to the practical standpoint, he is the agent of Dravya-karma i.e., the perceptible actual pot. Really, the Jiva is neither the material nor the efficient cause of material karmas but only the agent of its own emotional states (Bhāvas). Therefore, it is only from the practical standpoint that the Jivas are said to enjoy happiness and suffer misery which are the fruits of material karmas. Infact, he is the possessor of consciousness 56 only. This becomes quite clear from a gathā of Samaya sara "all the eight kinds of karmas are material in nature and also suffering which is the effect of karmic fruition said to be material. "57 But it further adds: "it is only from the practical point of view that these various psychic states
55 Nemicandra, Dravya-sangraha, 1.
56 Ibid., 9.
57 Kundakunda, Samaya-sära, 45.

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are declared to be the nature of self. "58 The real self is the unitary substratum of which these are empirical modifications.59
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It is clear from the above that the Jainas have tried very hard to preserve their fundamental non-absolutistic attitude with regard to the conception of the nature of karman. Karman, for them is neither absolutely identical with Pudgala nor completely distinct and different from it. This standpoint is not shared by the other systems of Indian philosophy. The Nyaya-Vaišeṣikas, no doubt, holds creation to be the product of the union between matter and spirit, God functioning as the efficient cause. Merit and demerit do belong to the soul but again only to create the conditions of bondage. This leads to a tragic situation that the soul, being immutable and obiquitous remains unrelated with everything either moral or material. This is the consequence resulting from admitting absolute difference between matter and conciousness. The case of Sankhya-Yoga or even Vedanta is no better. The Puruşa or Brahman is said to be an absolutely immutable and incorruptible principle of pure consciousness. The world-process or the karma process belong to the realm of Prakṛti or Māyā with the result that in case of Sankhya it leads to a hopeless irreconcilable dualism between Puruşa and Prakṛti and in the case of Vedanta to mayavada.
The Buddhists too suffer from one-sidedness, when they regard ignorance to be the enveloping cover of right-knowledge. The world of matter, which is also the stage on which actions are done, cannot affect the consciousness; only ignorance which is formless affects it. This means that Buddhists, at least some of them, fail to relate actions with consciousness. However, for the Yogacara, there is no such problem of relationship between the material and the spiritual because for them everything is spiritual. The Cārvākas present a position
58 Ibid., 47.

59 Ibid., 48.

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entirely contrary to this because for them, there is nothing spiritual and whatever looks spiritual is only an epiphenomė. non of the material. The Cārvākas, the Yogācāras and the Advaitins advocate absolute identity while the Nyāya-Vaiseșika and the Sānkhya-Yoga advocate absolute difference. The Jainas have tried to work out a modus-vivendi, i.e. a kind of identityin-difference. The material and the spiritual are causally related, for there cannot be any existence without the co-operation of the two. The Dravya-karma and the Bhāva-karma are not contradictory but are supplementary,
Karma and Soul
The Jaina position about nature of soul (Jiva) is completely unambiguous, But when the soul is completely free, potentially divine and innately perfect, it is natural to ask how and why it gets infected with such defects as are found in any empirical Jīya. This problem is really crucial one for Indian metaphysics. The Jaina reply is that the inherent fourfold-infinities of the Jiva are vitiated by something outside the soul, called karma. But we may ask why they should be any vitiation at all? This they attribute to nescience and further hold that the pre-condition of nescience are prepared by karmas. This is obviously circular reasoning. But it may not be proper to jump to this conclusion because the Jaina position on this point is full of several complexities and refinements. They hold that both nescience and karma are beginningless. The postulate of nescience has to be accepted because without it karma cannot be explained, while karmas work as the actual, material cover of knowledge, and lead to strenghen nescience. This is their relationship as exhibited in the lives of empirical Jivas. But if we ask what is their original relationship in the life of the first Jīva, the question is simply insoluble, because, logically speaking, for the Jainas, their relationship is beginningless, i.e., not acceptable in terms of time. Infact self also is above space, time and causation, To explain why it has been caught in the snares of worldly

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existence and consequent relativity of cause and effect, bondage and liberation, the Jainas like many other Indian scholars say, we can do no better than assert that relationship between nescience and self has to be postulated as beginningless. We can discuss only the 'how of the soul's bondage and not the 'why' of it.
For nescience, the Jainas use the term mithyātva. It means perversity of outlook. It leads one to wrong-perception, he perceives non-soul as the soul, irreligion as religion, wrong way as the right way, etc. Different authors have presented different divisions and sub-divisions of mithyātva. 6° Mithyātva is at the root of all evils and is also the cause of wordly existence. Jainas like others do not question further whence and why of nescience (mithyātva). But though nescience is beginningless, it is not endless. The Jainas say that as the luminousity of the sun is obscured by clouds, fog, etc., SO the all-knowing nature of the self is obscured by the faithand knowledge-obscuring karmas. And, just as the sun shines in its full splendour when the cloud is removed, so the self emerges as all-knowing when the veil of karma is lifted by the practice of prescribed methods. The analogy of sun and cloud has further been utilised to point out the degrees of knowledge and status of souls. As there is some light left even when the sun is covered with a very dark cloud, so fragment of pure knowledge remains in the soul;01 it dues possess partial knowledge in forms of mali, śruta etc. Hence the distinction between all-obscuring (sarva-ghātin) and partial
60. Unāsvami (Tat-sūt., VIII. 1.) and Siddhasena Gani (Tat-süt-Vr.,
VIII.1.) divide mith yātva into two kinds, firm (abhigrahita) and notfirm (anabhigrahita); Pūjyapada (Sarvārtha-siddhi, VIII.1.) also gives iwo forms - inborn (naisargika) and acquired (paro padeśa pārvak 1) the latter again sub-divided into four sub-classes; Kundakunda (Samayasāra, 89) presents a three-fold division into wrong-faith (mith yātva), wrong-knowledge (a jñāna) and wrong-conduct (avirati); Devendra
Sūri (Ka.Gr. IV. 50) gives five-fold division of it. 61 Nandi-Sutra, 42.

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obscuring (deśaghatin) karman leading to complete or partial obscuration of the capacity for knowledge. As the cloud can be lifted, so the veil of karma can also be lifted. But, one might say, there is a flaw in this argument. The obscuration of the sun by the cloud is an event in time, while the obs curation of the self by karmas is not temporal event because it has been earlier said to be beginningless. To explain this, the Jainas refer to the chemical action of an alkaline in completely removing the dross of gold from it, though the dross is coeval with gold. Similarly, the spiritual chemistry of concentration and right conduct can remove the karma from the self which has been associated with it from the very beginning of existence.2
119
If karma is regarded as prior to self, then self would be its product but karma being material, this is not possible. We cannot also regard karma as posterior to self, for in that case the pure and perfect self will be made responsible for it. However, if we maintain that both the self and karma came together, there is no bondage or suffering which is otherwise regarded as consequence of karma. Nor can we bring God to solve this problem, for it will create many new difficulties wellknown to the theistic conception. Hence the Jainas find it more reasonable to postulate a relation of beginningless conjunction between the soul and the karma. This vlew is not based on logical considerations alone, but also on religious and moral considerations. How the conscious Jivas can be infected by the unconscious matter can also be explained with the help of some common, homely, examples. A liquor or drug obscures the power of consciousness, so that the affected person goes out of his senses.63 Hence it is nothing very startling if the conscious soul is said to be infected by material karmas. Further, the worldly-souls are not absolutely non-material. It is in the

62 cp. Nemicandra, Gommaṭasara (Karma-kaṇḍa), 2. "The eternal relation of soul and karmic-matter is their nature.
""
63 Hemacandra, Pramāṇamīmāmsa, I. 1.52.

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body and this is an instance of universal union of Jīva and Ajiva. Jiva possesses the same extension as the body does. 64 This has been very beautifully described by Shri J. L. Jaini :
"Lifeless matter is found united with the living soul. The whole drama of life is played or danced together by the living soul being in close grasp of lifeless matter. Lifeless space is the stage; lifeless time is the duration; and lifeless dharma and adharma, the indispensable assistants for the dancers to move or to rest. The exercise of dancing is their eternal movement in the cycle of mundane existence. At each stop, the momentum for a new movement is gained. At each embrace of matter, the delighted deluded soul throbs and vibrates for a fresh embrace. Wily matter is ever ready to attack the soul and flow into it with its million insinuations and to keep alive and vigorous the bondage of the living by the non-living."65
The link between the spirit and matter is found in the doctrine of subtle body or karma-sarira. This is resultant of the unseen potency and the principle of susceptibility due to passions (kasāyas) and vibrations (yoga). Šārkhya admits of four forms of pure (sättvika) and four impure (tāmasika) modifications of intellect (buddhi), such as knowledge, virtue, nonattachment and super-normal powers and their opposites. They are called the psychical factors that make up the psychicalcreation (pratyaya-sarga).67 They also determine the subtlebody (linga-sarira) of various forms of existence.68 The subtle-body receives the impressions of karma and the form of embodiment is determined by it. This constitutes character. The union of the subtle body with the gross-body leads to the birth and their disunion to death except in the case of a free
64 Nemicandra, Dravya-Sangraha, 2; Kundakunda, Pañcâstikaya-sära; 27. 65 J. L. Jaini, His notes on Nemicandra's Gommatasära (Karma-kända),
p. 3. 66. Išvara Krşna, Sankhya-karikā, 43. 67 Ibid., 40-41.
68 Ibid., 40–45. .

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soul. In Jainism, the effects of dispositions metamorphosed into material-particles which form the physical basis of our life are called karma-sarira like the linga-sarira of Sankhya. These are the finer particles of matter of our past experiences being embodied in which the soul passes out the living body dead. The subtle-body, according to Vedanta, which consists of seventeen elements, is material but transparent, so it remains imperceptible at the time of migration from one body to other. So here the Advaitins almost agree with the Jainas. According to Jainism, the Jiva migrates out with the potentialities of the organs of its future body, which are manifestations of its thought and will. Jung's theory of Racial Unconscious seems very close to this idea. Nahar and Ghosh say: "the action-currents of the human thought and will have their vestiges on the experiential body which brings about a new arrangement in the atomic distribution of the karma-pudgala comprising the karma-Sarira."70
We can close the discussion of the subject of karma-sarira with a significant observation from Hartman: "the experience gained in our life may not be remembered in their details in the next life, but the impressions which they produce will remain." The idea of karma-body or inner nature of Huxley is suggestive for belief in the persistence of personality which stores up various experiences. The outer nature or the neural
121
69 Bṛhad. Up. (S.B.), I. 4.17.
70 P. C. Nähar and K. C. Ghosh, An Epitome of Jainism, Calcutta, 1957, pp. 327-328. cp. Dr. Wiesman's theory of the "continuity of germ-plasm and transmission of those characteristics which are potentially contained in the structure of the germ-plasm from the common-stock. Odrigen is supposed to be the possible link between universal life and the gross matter"-(See Dr. Irene Bastow's article "Heredity as it affects immortality". Aryan Path, Bombay, March 1950); Gommaṭasara (Karma-kanda), 27; M. K. Jaina, Jaina Darsana, p. 168; Gommaṭasāra (Jiva-kāṇḍa), 199, Doctrine of Emanation of Soul or Jiva-samudghata, 202; Dravya Sangraha, 10 (See also Vṛtti, pp.10-12). 71 Quoted by P. C. Nähar & K. C. Ghosh, Ibid., p. 294.
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frame (audarika-ŝarira) is the vehicle of gross sensations. It has no interest in the inner nature or cognitions, affections, conations of man, but nevertheless it is of great interest for the karmic-body The entire presentations of the outer nature (audarika-sarira) become meaningful, and are referred back to the inner nature which determine it. So the outer and the inner determine each other.
Most of the difficulties of the Jainas here are due to their doctrine of the material nature of karman. With others, karman is non-material. To the Jainas, the karmas are no doubt crystallised effect of the past actions or energies but in order to act and react and produce changes, the energies must have to be metamorphosed into different forms. The material nature of karman can be inferred from its effect i.e. body, which has a physical frame. But unless, the karman is associated with the soul, it cannot produce any effect because it is only the instrumental cause and it is the soul which is the efficient cause of all experiences. Hence the Jainas regard the soul as the possessor of material karman.
III. The passage from Nescience to Omniscience-the ultimate ideal
The soul due to nescience takes matter into itself and gets into bondage. The role played by passions (kaṣāyas) and activity vibrations (yogas) in bondage are very important. Yoga is the vibrational activities of mind, body and speech in the soul. It creates subtle karmic - particles, that are attracted towards the soul and the soul due to its susceptibility to attachment and aversion, is naturally infected by the matter. This principle of soul's susceptibility towards karmic-matter is called passion (kaṣāya). If there is no kaṣaya, karmic-particles born out of the vibrational activities, will no doubt, flow to. wards the soul but they will not be able to stay there since there is no adhesiveness without passions. Similarly, if there is no vibration in the soul, no karma-particles will be created; then the soul will be free from them and hence no bondage. Pt. Hira Lal Jaina, in his introduction to the Hindi edition

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of Kaṣāya-pāhuḍa-sutta" of Shri Gunadhara with Yati Vṛşabha's Churni, illustrates the function of and relations between Jiva, Karma, Kaṣāya and Yoga in a very beautiful manner by taking recourse to some analogies. Self is likened to the wall, karmas to dust-particles, yoga to the gush of wind and kaṣāya to the adhesive gum. Now, even if the wind blows and carries dust-particles to the wall, the wall does not keep them unless there is a gum applied to it. The stronger the gush of wind, more dust particles will flow in; similarly stronger the application of the gum, greater the adhessiveness. Similarly the quality of karmic-particles to be created depends upon the strength of the vibrations in the soul. So stronger the passions, stronger will be the bondage, because it is the passion that binds the karmic-matter to the soul.73 Yoga merely creates the karma-particles but does not bind them to the soul. So kaṣāya becomes the most important factor in the causation of bondage. 74
72 Gunadhara, Kaṣāya-Pāhuda-Sutta, with Curni of Vṛsabha, ed. Pt. Hira Lal Jain (Calcutta, Vīra Sasana Sangha, 1955), p. 62. 73 Gunaratna (in his com. on Haribhadra's Sad-darśana-samuccaya, p. 181) explains this with another example. He says the influx of karma means the contact of the particles of karma matter, in accordance with the particular kind of karma, with the soul, "just like the sticking of dust on the body of a person besmeared with oil. In all parts of the soul there being infinite number of karma atoms it becomes so completely covered with them that in some sense when looked at from the point of view of the soul is sometimes regarded as a material body during its samsara stage." (Eng. trans. by S. N. Das Gupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I., p. 194). This also explains "the copresence or interpenetration of matter and the conscious living substance (i.e., the soul) (which) is as good a fact of experience as the interpenetration of milk and water in a mixture of two, or of fire and iron in a red hot iron ball"-Gunaratna, ibid. p. 181 (Eng. trans. S. C. Chatterjee and D. M. Datta, Introduction to I. P., p. 103).
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74 The importance of kaşaya is evident from the fact that it forms the the main title of the great work of Gunadhara, known as Kaşayapahuḍa or Treatise on Passions. This is said to be the Third Sectior

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The importance of kaṣaya can also be realised from the side of deluding (mohaniya) karma which is said to be the root of all the eight kinds of karmas. Mohanīya karma is of two kinds-faith-deluding (darśana-mohaniya) and conductdeluding (caritra-mohaniya). On the basis of the presence of passions, Caritra-Mohaniya has been further divided into (a) karmas with full-fledged passions (kaṣaya-vedaniya) and (b) karma with impoverished or weaker passions (no-kaṣaya-vedaniya). Karmas of type (a) are of sixteen kinds. To start with, they are classified into four kinds according to four kaṣāyas, namely, anger (krodha), pride (māna), deceit (māyā) and greed (lobha), each of which is again said to consist of four subdivisions: (i) Effor-feeding-passions (anantānubandhi-kaṣāya) or passions which keep the soul tied to the world which is infinite (ananta) and in which the soul is kept wandering by these passions-feeding karmas its erroneous belief. They are also called anantānubandhi-kaṣaya because they nourish or feed wrong-belief. They also keep very long. (ii) Partial-vowpreventing (apratyākhyāna). They do not last very long. (iii) Total-vow-preventing (pratyākhyāna). They are mild. (iv) Perfect-right-conduct-preventing (samjvalana). They are very mild.75 In Gommaṭasāra (Jiva-kāṇḍa), Nemicandra, in the chapter on Kaṣāya-mārgaṇā discusses in detail the problem of Kaşaya-karmas and their effects on different kinds of living beings.70
It would also be interesting to know the two etymological derivations of the term kaşaya given by Nemicandra. In the
of the Tenth Book of Jñana Pravada, one of the fourteen Puúrvagatas. The Purvagatas are five in the all form the five parts of Drştivada. which is regarded as the Twelfth-Anga, containing the direct sermons of Lord Mahāvīra. Vira Sena's Jayadhavala (ed. Phula Candra, Mahendra Kumar & Kailash Candra, Muttra, All India Digambara Jaina Sangha, 1947) is a commentary upon it.
75 Umāsvāmi, T. Sut., VIII.9; Devendra Suri; K. gr. I. 17-22, 57. 76 Nemicandra, Gommațasāra (Jiva-kāṇḍa), 283-298; Devendra Suri, K.gr., I. 17-22.

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first place, kaşaya is derived from the root kṛs which means 'to plough'. Thus kaṣaya will mean that which ploughs (kṛṣati) the field of soul's karmas," which (ploughing) leads to the huge harvest of pleasure and pain. Kaṣāyā, therefore, is also described as two kinds of passions known as love (raga) and hate (dveṣa) or better, as pleasure and pain. So the second name of Gunadhara's sacred work Kaṣāya-Pahuḍa is given as Pejja-dosa-pāhuḍa's by its commentator Yati Vṛṣabha. The Prakrit term pejjadosa means rāga-dveṣa in Sanskrit or love and hate in English. Hence, treatise which deals with love and hate, attachment and aversion, the twin principles of worldlyfetter, is called Pejja-doṣa-pāhuḍa. Gunadhara, in his very invocation (mangala) to the work says that attachment and aversion these two are the causes of worldly existence and kaṣāya is at the root of them. The term kaṣāya can also be derived from the root kas to destroy'. It means that it destroys the right belief and right-conduct of the soul.80 Then the different kaṣāyas are said to possess different characteristics, in so far as they are produced by intensity (śakti), thought paints (lesyas) and the bondage or non-bondage of age (@yubandha-abandha). ®1
77 Nemicandra, Ibid., 283.
78 Gunadhara, Kaṣāya-pāhuḍa-sutta, Gatha 14, Sutra 21.
79 Gunadhara, Ibid., 1.
80 Nemicandra, Gommaṭasara (Jiva-kanda), 283.
81 J. L. Jaini [English trans. of Gommaṭasara (Jīva-kānda), p. 169] has presented a big table of kaşayas and lesyas and detailed mathematical calculation regarding the number of operation-places (Udaya-sthana) of passions with spatial units (Ibids;, pp. 170-171) and the number of persons affected by kaşayas (Ibid., pp. 173-174). For example, anger (krodha) is deep like a furrow in stone, or in a earth, or mild like a line in dust or water contributing to hellish, sub-human, human and celestial existence [Nemicandra, Gommaṭasara (Jiva-kanda), 284]; pride (māna) is unbending like a mountain, bone, wood and cane (Ibid., 285); deceit (maya) is crooked like the bamboo-root, ram-horn, stream of cow, hoof-mark; greed (lobha) is fast like crimsoncolour, wheel-dirt, body-dirt, turmeric colour. (Ibid., 287). All of

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True, kaṣaya is the cause of karmic-bondage and consequent whirling of existence, but this kaṣāya is itself due to nescience or ignorance. Thus the same delusion or ignorance appears in the tripple-process of desire, aversion and delusion. 82 Therefore, one should eradicate these three, 83 Delusion is knowing the real as non-real; inclination toward favourable objects is desire and non-inclination towards unfavourable objects is aversion. 84 Thus I wish to conclude my present discussion about kaşaya with this observation that desire and aversion on the one hand, and delusion on the other, and yet desire, aversion and delusion together, constitute the cause nexus leading to bondage.85
126
While the kaşaya creates bondage of soul with karma, yoga creates karma-particles. Yoga is the functional vibration s set in the soul by the activity of body, speech or minds 6 through which it attracts matter under the influence of past karmas. It is also described as the fourth margana of the
these cause the above four grades of existence (gatis) respectively, cp. Kundakunda. Pañcastikaya-sara, 135-136. "To a Jiva in samsara, desire and aversion will naturally occur on account of these states, karmic-matter clings to the Jiva. The karmic bondage leads the the Jiva through the four states of existence;" cp. Kundakunda, Pravacana sara, II. 95. "As rain water helps in sprouting green vegetation over the earth with the help of existing material conditions, similarly desire and aversion help in creating the eight-fold karmas and consequent bondage," Kundakunda; Pañcastikaya-sāra, 155, "The combination of karma with Jiva is due to yoga, which is created by the Bhavas, which are due to desire, aversion and perverse cognition."
82 Kundakunda, Pravacand-sara, I. 83 (with com. of Amṛtacandra, Jayasena and Hemarāja), pp. 105-6.
83 Kundakunda, Ibid., I. 84.
84 Ibid., I. 85.
85 It would be interesting to study kaşayas from the point of view of different nayas and niksepas, but that requires a separate discussion which cannot be presented here (vide, Gunadhara, Ibid., 14, 21, 22, 130).
86 Umāsvāmi, Tat. Süt., VI. 1.

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fourteen.87 Vibrations (yoga) are of two kinds-(i) subjective (bhāva-yoga), the underlying capacity in virtue of which the matter or mind, speech or body is set in vibration, and (ii) objective ( dravya-yoga), i.e, the actual vibrations of the spatial units of soul. 88 Dravya sangraha divides yoga into three broad kinds of activities of mind, speech and body, 89. while describing the subdivisions of thought-activities causing the the karmic-influx (Bhāvā śrava). However, others works give different classifications and divisions of yoga. 90
Each of the passions and vibrations determine bondage in a specific way, Bondage is the association of the soul with the karmic-matter which it assimilates in virtue of its passions 91 The conscious state by which karma is bound with the soul is called ideal-bondage (bhāva-bandha), while the interpenetration of the pradeśas of karma and the soul is the material-bondage (dravya-bandha ), 9a Pañcădhyāy798 recognises three kinds of bondage i e., it adds one more namely mixed (ubhaya) to the existing list. It takes place when the soul and the karma become identified with each other.94 According to
87 S. C. Ghosal (Eng. trans.) Nemicandra, D. S., 13), pp. 39-41 (notes)
cp. Nemicandra, Gommațasāra, (Jiva-kända), 141-42. 88 J. L. Jaini (Eng. trans. to Nemicandra, Gommațasāra, 216 (Jiva-kānda). 89 Nemicandra, Dravya Sangraha, 30. 90 Tattvārtha-Vrtti on T, Satra, VIII. 1 refers to fifteen sub-divisions
The activities of mind and speech are divided into four classes (true, untrue, mixed, reither true (ror false) and the activities of body into seven kinds. Gommațasāra (Jiva-kānda), describes in detail the functions of each of the kirds of joga and offers further classi
fications (Ibid., 216-270). Truth is described to be of ten kinds of · which suitable illustrutions are given (Ibid., 223-224). 91 Umāsvāmi, Tattvārtha-Sutra, VIII. 1-2; Kundakunda, Pañcāstikāya
Sāra, 154-155; Viranandi, Candra prabhacaritam, XVIII. 96; Hari
scandra Kavi, Dharma-sarmabh yuda yam, XXI. 106. 92 Nemicandra, Dravya-Sangraha, 32; Kundakunda, Pravacana-sara, II.
83-84; Rajamalla, Pañcadhayi, Vardhamana-Purāņa, XVI. 43. . 93 Rajamalla, Pañcādhyayi II. 46 94 Ibid., II. 48.

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97
Karma-grantha 95 and other works, 96 bondage is of four kinds, nature (prakṛti), duration (sthiti), fruition (anubhāga) and mass (pradeśa). Now, nature and mass of bondage are conditioned by vibration but duration and fruition by passion. This shows that passion is the internal and vibration the external cause of bondage. Kundakunda says that the opportunity for combination is created by affective states (bhavas) and as such bhāvas are due to desire, aversion and vitiated outlook (rāga. dveşa and moha) 98 and the eight kinds of karmas are said to be caused by the four external conditions (dravya-pratyayas). which themselves are the result of internal conditions (bhavapratyayas).9 .99 It is to be noted that Umāsvami100 mentions five causes of bondage but Kundakunda101 mentions only four. It might be that omission of carelessness (pramada) might be due to fact that it is already included in the above mentioned four kinds. 102
Astava is the process by which karmic-matter enters into the soul. Yoga is the channel of Asarava. 103 Literally also 'Asrava' means 'influx' or 'flowing' and hence it has no conection with the Buddhistic term asrava (Pali, asava), which means depravity, human passion, sin, etc. The inflow is effect
95 Devendra Suri, Karma-Grantha, I. 2.
96 Umāsvāmi, Tattvartha-Sutra, VIII. 3, Nemicandra, Dravya-Sangraha, 33, Viranandi, Candraprabhacaritam, XVIII. 97; Hariścandra Kavi, Dharmasarmabhyudayam, XXI. 97; Vardhamana-Puranam, QVI. 45.
97 Nemicandra, Dravya-Sangraha, 33; Rajamalla, Adhyatma-ka.-ma., IV. 7. 98 Kundakunda, Pañcastikaya-sara, 155.
99 Ibid., 156.
100 Umäsvami, Tattvartha-Sutra, VIII. 1.
101 Kundakunda, Ibid., 156.
102 Devendra Suri, K.Gr. II (It presents a complicated table of bondage (bandha-yantra) showing the number of karmas according to fourteen gunasthanas, eight karmas, etc.
103 Umāsvāmi, Ibid., VI. 2; Viranandi, Ibid., XVIII., see also S. C. Ghosal, Eng. Trans. Dravya-Samgraha, 82 (he quotes Sthananga-Sutra).

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ed through the instrumentation of mind, body or speech, each being accompanied by deluding (mohonīya) karma. As water enters a pond or boat through various channels or holes, so karma-particles enter a soul through asrava. Broadly, it is divided into bhāva-asrava and dravya-asrava (also known as karma-āsrava). The former works on the thought level, the latter on the material level. 104 There are also further five subdivisions of bhāvāsrava105 into delusion (mithyātra), lack of control (avirati), inadvertence (pramāda), vibrations (yoga) and passions like anger etc. (kasāya). Mithyātva is also of five kinds, namely, cre-sidedress of knowledge (ekānta), a belief that one religion is as good as another (vinaya), adherence to false views (viparita), doubt (samsaya) and ignorance (ajñāna). Avirati is also of five kinds, namely, violence (himsā), falsehood (anţta) stealing (steya), incontinence (abrahma) and desire for worldly-possession (parigraha). Pramāda consist of the following: reprehensible talk (vikathā), passions (kaşāya), senses (indriyas), sleep (nidrā), and attachment (rāga); each of which (of the five kinds of pramāda) is sub-divided respectively into four, four, five, five and two kinds. Vibrations (yoga) are said to consist of 15 sub-divisions. 100
Umāsvāmīlot mentions many sub-divisions of asrava. Kundakunda, to whom äsrava means the fountain source of righteousness or sin, classifies it into righteous (punya) and non-righteous (papa),108 Noble desires and thoughts of charity are the springs of right-conduct (bhāva-pun yāsrava), and this leads to punya-drarya-karma leading to pure karmic-matter
104 Nemicandra, Dravya--Sangraha, 29; Vardhamāna-Purānam, XVI. 40-41. 105 Nemicandra, Drarya--Sangraha, 39; Brahmadeva, Dravya-Sangraha
vetti, p. 36. The five aviratis are called avratas (vowlessness) by
Umāsvāmi (T., Sat., VII. 13-17). 106 Brahmadeva, Dravya Sangraha, Vrtti, p. 36–38. cp. Nemicandra,
Gommaļasāra, (Karma-kända) 786. 107 Umāsvāmi, Ibid., VI. 4-5. 108 Kundakunda, Pañcastikäyız-Sara, 142 & 146.
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into the soul. So äsravas like bandha, have two conditions physical and psychic. The psychic conditions (bhāva) lead to physical conditions (drayya). The inordinate taste for worldly things, impure emotions, hankering after and indulging in sensual pleasures, causing anguish to fellow-beings, and slandering them openly or covertly, constitute the springs of evil.109 So do the different animal-instincts, the different soul-polluting-emotions, the tempting senses, suffering and wrath, undesirable thoughts and corruption of the facilities of perception and will.'10. Souls affected with passions have got mundane in flow causing the cycle of births and rebirths ( samparāyika ) and those without passions have transcient in flow (iryāpatha).111 The mundane-inflow of the thirtynine kinds (i.e., five caused by senses, four by passions, five by vowlessness and rest twentyfive are caused by twentyfive kinds of activity). However, the senses, passions and vowlessness are the causes and the twentyfive kinds of activity are their effects. 112 The differences in inflow in different souls arises from the differences in intensity (tīvra-bhāva), mildness (manda-bhāva), intentional and unintentional conduct (jñāta and ajñāta-bhāva), dependence (adhikarana; and position and power (virya).113 Then there are different causes of the inflow of each of the eight types of karmas causing bondage, which have been dealt with in great details. '14
Karma is the material cause of bondage, while Jīva with passions is the efficient cause. Without karma, there can be no bondage, as there can be no butter without milk. Therefore, we find karma and bondage sometimes referred to as synonyms. This is also corroborated by the fact that the classification of karma are practically the same as those of bondage.
109 Ibid., 146
110 Ibid., 147. 111 Umāsvāmī, T. Sat. VI. 4. 112 Ibid., VI. 5.
113 Ibid., VI. 6. 114 Ibid., VI. 10-27; Nemicandra. Dravya-Sangraha, 31; Gommațasära
(karma-kānda), 787-810.

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As there is two-fold division of karma into material and spiritual,115 there are two kinds of bondage also.116 The Karmagrantha117 gives the same four divisions of both karma and bandha, rather we say that it is classification of karmabondage. All this simply suggest, that the nature, duration, intensity and mass of bondage are determined by those of karma. Therefore, the Karma-Grantha discusses the different kinds of karma accordingly (ie, according to nature, duration, intensity and extent), 118 and it applies the same categories to bondage 119
Apart from the classification of karma according to its nature into eight kinds and their further sub.divisions, 180 karmas have also been classified on the basis of other principles. We have virtuous (śubha) and non-virtuous (aśubha),121 obscuring (ghātin), non-obscuring (aghātin), total-obscuring (sarva-ghātin) and partial-obscuring (deśaghātin),1 22 karmas, etc. But in all cases, karmas are related to bondage. Like water and milk, when being mixed up with each other, they are very much identical with each other. But we may say, there is a fallacy here because milk and water, being material can mix together, but how can the material karma put the spiritual self into the fetters of bondage. Here the Jainas try to save their position by taking recourse to theory of identity-in-difference between the soul and the body. Jiva is consciousness nodoubt but resides in the body
115 Nemicandra, Dravya-sangraha, 8; Gommațasāra (karma-kānda), 2. 116 Nemicandra, Dravya-sangraha, 32; Kundakunda, Pravacana-sara,
11.83. & 84; Rājamalla Pañcadhyāyi, II. 47. Rajamalla, Adhyatma
kamala-mārtanda, IV. 6; Vardhamana-purānam, XVI. 43. 117 Devendra Sūri, K. Gr. I. 2. 118 Ibid., I. 2-61. 119 Ibid., II. 3-12. 120 Ibid., I. 2; Nemicandra, Dravya-sangrahı, 31; Gonnatasara (karma.
kānda), 67; Umāsvāmi, T: Süt., VIII. 4-5; Prasumarati-prakarana, 34. 121 Umāsvāmi, T. Sut., VIII. 25-26; Devendra Sūri, K. Gr. II. 22. 122 Devendra sūri, K. Gr. V. 13, 14; Nemicandra, Gommalasära, (karma
kända) 180-182.

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The famous yoga classification of karma123 into white (sukla), black (krsna), both white and black (śuklakışņa), and neither white nor black (asuklākrsna) corresponds to the Jaina classification into auspicious (śubhu) and inauspicious (aśubha) karmas. 124 Similarly, gati-karmas of the Jainas are comparable to the tripple classification (jāti), age (āyu) and enjoyment (bhoga) according to yoga school.125 The Buddhist126 also bring their classification of consciousness into good, bad and indescribable (sobhana, akušala and avyākata) on its three levels, nimely weak, higher and super-human (paritta-bhāmi, mahaggalabhūmi, and (lokuttara-bhūmi), The four phases of life - misery, desire, form and the formless (apāya, kāmagupti, rūpāvacāra and arūpāvacāra-bhūmis) also point to the causal-nexus between the karma and the results. However, the main difference between the Buddhistc and Jaina position is that while the former believes only in a five-fold psycho-physical integration (pañca-skandha), the Jainas accept permanent soul. Hence there is a wide difference between their conception of liberation if not in so much that of bondage.
Bondage exists only till karmic-flow continues. The process that leads to karma-bandhana, though beginningless, is not in principle endless, because the self is not essentially related to the karman, Vibrations (yoga) bring karmic-particles to soul and the passions (kaşāyas) keep them attached to the soul. The elimination of kasāyas through spiritual practices will terminate vibrations and therefore the karmicparticles will find no foot-hold or sustenance. This is known
123 Patanjali, Yoga-sūtra, IV. 7. (Also see Vyāsa-bhāşya). 124 Kundakunda, Pañcāstikaya-Sāra, 143-147; Nemicandra, Gommatasara,
(karma-kānda) 143-147. 125 Vyasa, Yoga-sutra (Vyasa-bhữ;ya), II. 13. 126 I have utilised Studies in Jaina Philosophy by N. M. Tatiā, ch. IV.
and The Abhidhamma Philosophy by Bh. J. Kasyap, regarding the the Buddhist position.

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as transcient-inflow as compared to mundane inflow. 127 But transcient-inflow cannot occur by itself, for it is enert. It requires some outside energy, which is determined by past dispositions of the soul who has potentially infinite energy temporarily crippled by kaimas. The varying degrees of this (actual) soul-energy determine the differences in vibrations that finally determine various states and processes of karma and thereby bondage. 128
The self can break off the fetters of bondage only if the karma-conjunction is liquidated. But to start with, the karmicflow must be stopped. This stoppage of the inflow of karmicmatter into the soul is known as samvara.129 Samvara' is derived from 'samvriyate' i.e., meaning that which checks the causes of karma. This is the opposite principle of asrava. 130 The volitional suppression of the psychic tendencies (such as the five senses, four passions, four instincts) is bhava-samvara which is antecedent to the physical arrest of the karmic-inflow. To the extent to which there will be this suppression, the gateway for the entrance of evil will be closed. 131 This requires freedom from three-fold vibrational activities of pleasure or pain.' 132 According to Vardhamana purana,133 the bhava
127
Umāsvami, T. Sut., VI. 4.
128 They are classified into eleven kinds : bondage (bandhara), endurance (satta), rise (udaya), premature rise (udircna), increased realisation (udvartana), decreased realisation (apavartana), transformation (samkramana), subsidence (upasamana), incapability of other than two (nidhatti), incapability of all the processes (nikācana), and endurance without effect (abadha).
129 Umāsvāmi, T. Sut, IX. 1.
130 asravaḥ prati pakṣabhūtaḥ samvaraḥ. (See Sthananga-Sutra, Adhyayana I.) 131 Kundakanda, Pañcāstikāya-Sāra, 148.
132 Ibid., 150.
133
Vardhamana-Puranam, XVI. 67-68., cp. Nemicandra, Dravya-Samgrah 34; Rajamalla, Adhyātma-Kamala-martanda, IV. 9-12. Bhava Asrava is of seven varieties-vows (vratas), restraint (guptis), observance (dharma), meditation (anu prekṣa), conquest of suffering (parişaha-jaya) and various kinds of good conduct (charitra)-(See T. Sut., IX.2; Dravya Sangrah, 35) having several varieties (T. Süt., IX. 4-10.)

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samvara needs the stoppage of the experiences with desire and aversion, while dravya-samvara requires total stoppage of influx through vows and concentration. Now, when the karmic-inflow is completely stopped, the only task to be done is the purging out of all karmic-matter stored up from before, through austerities. 1 3 4 So long the entire karmic-matter enveloping the soul is being worked out, neutralised, or dissipated, freedom is not possible. It is easier to stop the fresh karmamaterial than to dissipate the already accumulated karmaparticles, and so great austerities are required. This process is described as destruction of karmas (nirjarā).135 This is of two kinds : bhāva-nirjarā and dravya-nirjarā. That modification of the soul, by which the matter of karma disappears in proper time after the fruits of such karma are exhausted, is called bhāva-nirjarā. The actual destruction is called dravyanirjarā. 186 The soul, in the state of nirjarā or destruction of karmic-matter, shines with purity as a mirror shines when the accumulated dust is removed from its surface. Only when the fruits of action are alreadly enjoyed or liquidated by the efforts of penances, way to liberation is prepared.
Penances are either external or internal, and each is of six kinds,137 each having many divisions and sub-divisions.138
134 Umāsvāmī, T. Sut., IX. 3; Praśamrați-Prakrana, 221. 135 Karma-kaşãyo-nir jarð-Sthānūnga-Tikā. 1. 136 Nemicandra, Dravya-samgraha, 36; Virnandi, Candra prabha-caritam,
XVIII. 109-121; Hariscandra Kavi, Dharmasarmabhyudayam, XXI. 122-123; Vardhamana-Purändin, XVI. 90; Kundakunda, Pañcāstikāya
sara, 151, 137 Uttarādhya yana Sūtra, XXVIII. 34. 138 Umāsvāmi, T. Sut. IX. 19-20 (outer penances are (i) abstaining fromt
food (anaśana); (ii) control of will and senses (avamaudar ya), (iii) curtailment of the number of things of daily use (vịtti-pari-sankh yana), (iv) relinquishing taste (rasa-parit yāga), (v) solitary abode (viviktaśayjāsana) and asceticism (käya-klesa). The inner penances are also six-(i) expiation (prāyaścitta), (ii) humility (vina ya), (iii) service to sages (vai ya-výtt ya), (iv) study (svadhyāya), (v) isolation of self (vyutsarga) and (vi) meditation (dhyana).

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Besides penances and austerities, meditation has also been regarded as a necessary condition of nirjarā 189 which burns out all karmas, beneficial as well as bane ful. When all the conditions are fulfilled, the intrinsic nature of self shines forth in its original purity, and the individual becomes cll-knowing and all-perceiving and attains the state of infinite, urmixed bliss.140 It is through the acquisition of five-fold attainment (labdhis)141 that the potentially free soul (bhavyātmā) attains the three jewels of right-faith, right-knowledge and rightcouduct.142 Svāmi Vidyānanda argues that right-belief, rightknowledge and right-conduct constitute the path of freedom the antithesis of this trinity i.e., wrong-belief, knowledge and action must lead to bondage. Uttaradhyayana143 also points out that faith, knowledge and conduct are interrelated. By knowledge one cognizes things, by faith he believes in them, by conduct he gets freedom from karman and by austerities he attains purity. By means of purity he proceeds to perfection. There is that close relation between knowledge and action. Conduct is the final fulfillment of knowledge. 144 Knowledge gives enlightenment, faith firmness and conduct makes the whole process meaningful. So the Jainas reject doctrine that wrong knowledge alone is the cause of nescience, or that right-knowledge alone is the condition of omniscience and freedom. It is only the modifications of the soul which cause destruction of all the four obstructive karmas (ghātin-karmas) which lead to bhāva-mokşa. The actual termination of karmas is dravyamokşa.145
139 Ibid., IX. 21-44. 140 Kundakunda, Pancāstikā ya-sāra, 157-158. 141 Nemicandra, Labdhi-sára, 3-8, 33. 142 Umāsvāmi, Ibid., I. 1; Kundakunda, Ibid., 39-41. 143 Uttaradh yana-Sutra, XXVIII. 30, 35-36. 144 Viseșävas yaka-bhāşya, 1126, 1158. 15 Nemicandra, Dravya Samgraha, 37; Labdhl-sāra, 644; Umāsvāmi,
Praśama-rati-Prakrana, 221; Kundakunda, Pancastikaāy-sāra, 160; Vīrnandi, Chandra-pratha- charitam, XVIII. 123; and VardhamanaPurānam, XVI. 72, 73.

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We may conclude, therefore, with the remark that know. ledge and conduct are not two watertight compartments in Jainism. The summun-bonum of spiritual life is at once infiniteknowledge, faith, bliss and power. Knowledge here is not only a means as in the case of right knowledge but also as an end in the form of omniscience. The spiritual ideal of the Jainas is an integral one where knowledge, faith, bliss and power are strewn together. This means an integral-idealism. The state is not a vacuity, nor an abstract consciousness; it is a concrete ideal of knowledge and faith, power and happiness. As knowledge without faith is purile, so faith without knowledge is dogmatic. But both of them without power remain an infoten utopia, but power in itself is not a worthy end. Power is desirable only for bliss.

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CHAPTER VI
OMNISCIENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF
JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
I, Metaphysical Foundations of Knowledge
Inspite of the best efforts of the Jaina and Buddhist logi. cians to differentiate logical and epistemological enquiries from religion and metaphysics, with which they were mixed up in the works of Hirdu j hilosophers, it has not been possible to effect the complete separation. Perhaps the presentation of logic or epistemology as entirely independent of metaphysics is a more recent achievement. The reason behind this tendency of mixing up the problems of knowledge with those of reality or morality and spiritual progress is perhaps also rooted in the deeply religious climate of the time. Religion, in India, has been the fountain-spring of all philosophy, art and culture. The Indian mind had a temperamental distaste for pure speculation and abstract logic. It was deeply interested in the problems of practical life. The reason for this practical motive lies in the fact that "every system, pro-vedic or anti-vedic is moved to speculation by a spiritual disquiet... in order to find out some means for completely overcoming life's miseries.”1 So logic has been described by Kautilya not only as the lamp of all sciences but also helpful to ptactical affairs and the sustaining principle of dharma. It is this faith of the Indian mind that Logic, when divorced from life, becomes barren and useless. After all, logic is not an end in itself but a means for this ideal life.
For the Jaina logicians, as followers of a particular religious sect, it was difficult to break off completely from the funda
1 S. C. Chatterjee & D. M. Datta, An Introduction to Ind. Phil., p. 13.
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138: METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE
mental traditional beliefs of Jainism like those in non-absolutism (anekānta-vāda or syâdvāda), soul and non--soul (jiva-ajīva), karma, omniscience (sarvajñatya), etc. They are realists and also dualists. According to them jīva and ajīva are two inde. pendent realities, which cannot be reduced to each other. They do hold that mind and matter both cooperate in producing knowledge but would not agree with Kant, Dinnāga and Dharmakirti that 'understanding maketh nature'. Mind is simply the instrument of discovery like our sense organs. Any respect to reason does not imply the denial of the facts of experience In fact, the infinite number of attributes and modes possessed by reality are discovered ty our experience alone. This experience tells us that the reality is a developing process. It cannot be explained either in terms of being or becoming, identity or difference. The former fails to explain change, the latter the basis of change. Hence, the best way is to regard reality as being-in-becoming, identity-in-difference, reality-in-process. This they explain through the triple process of orgination, decay and permanence.9
They accept both substance, or the principle of being and modes, the principle of becoming as necessary. Attributes exist in substances, depend upon them and are never without them. They cannot be the substratum of another attribute3 although many attributes can co-exist in one and the same substance at one and the same time and place. The change or becoming of substance is called modification, which is a change in the character or its attributes. 4 So, this is not an unreal world but a thoroughly real world with the characteristic of being or is. ness as essential to it.5 Jivas are also substances and the differentium of soul is consciousness (upayoga),? which is also its essance. There cannot be soul without consciousness or vice -versa. The two are coeval with each other. Behind all mental
2 Umāsvāmi, T. Süt. V. 30. 3 Ibid., V. 41.
Ibid., v. 52.
5 Ibid., V. 29. 6 Ibid., V. 3. 7 Ibid., II. 8.

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acts of cognition, affection, conation, memory and imagination - etc., this consciousness is the universal underlying principle. It is the ens unum, et semper-cognitum in omnibus notitis. The soul knows and also knows that it knows. It means that there is no duality of subject and object in the case of knowledge of knowledge. One who knows, the soul is also the nature of knowledge.8 Therefore, though Jainas being realists do accept generally the duality of knower and known, do not regard the knowledge of knowledge as infected with this division. This position of theirs does not produce any inconsistency but rather gives them some advantages because knowledge has to be explained in a different way from that of knowledge of things and properties.
Those who regard that knowledge is distinct from soul and the soul becomes conscious with the association of knowledge, have to accept the soul as basically or originally unconscious which becomes conscious in certain special circumstances. Here the Jainas have to fight against the views of Nyāya -Vaišeşikas, Sānkhya-Yogins, Advaita Vedāntins and even Buddhists. To the Nyāya-Vaiseșika, knowledge is an independent category of which soul is the substratum. Consciousness is not the essential property of the soul; it is created at birth and separated from the soul at the time of death or final salvation. So consciousness is an intermitant quality of the soul.' Self is the instrumental cause of knowledge but itself it is not consciousness (i.e., knowledge). The soul becomes conscious only when conjoined with body and mind, 10 It is queer indeed to suppose that the unconscious soul by mere mechanical juxtaposition with the instruments of mind and body can become conscious. It is not of the nature of a mechanical glow flashing
8 Kundakunda, Pravacana-sära, I. 35. 9 Vātasāyana, Nyaya-bhāșya with Nyāya-vārttika, I. 1.10; cp. Nyaya
bhāsya, III. 2.24. 10 Prasastapada, Padartha-dharm 1-sinzraha (with śrid hara's Nyäyd
kandali, ed. G. N. Jhā). pp. 57, 279.

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forth from an impact as between iron and flint... Nothing can change its essence, no mechanical impact or juxtaposition nor any quantitative accretion can bring about a qualitative difference in the essence of the reality."11 This fact is supported both by logic and philosophy.
In the Sārkhyala as well as in the Vedānta,13 consciousness constitutes the very nature of the soul. However, this consciousness is not ordinary empirical knowledge but the ultimate, primordial knowledge. Empirical knowledge, on the other hand, belongs to the antahkarang14 i.e., the co-operative function of mind (manas), ego (ahamkāra) and intellect (buddhi) in Vedānta, to the realm of prakrti in the SānkhyaYoga. 15 Knowledge to the Buddhist is a series of psychical states without the psyche, there being no focal centre holding beginningless stream of consciousness. Thus the Nyāya Vaise-șika has to fulfil the hard task of explaining the consciousness which seems to be contradictory, by a soul naturally devoid of it, while the Sārkhya-Yoga and the Advaita-Vedānta, because of their insistence on the soul being only pure consciousness have to declare all emprirical knowledge to be either vitiated or illusory. The Buddhist account of citta as the continuity of consciousness seems to be valueless, when our individuality in the form of a permanent soul is denied. 10
But the Jainas, on the other hand, claims to have avoided all these difficulties because they neither decry empirical know
11 H. M. Bhattācārya, "The Jaina Theory of Knowledge", Jaind
Antiquary (Arrāh, Vol. IV. No. 1, June 1938), p. 25. 12 Vyása, Yoga bhaşya, I. 9. 13 Sankara, Brahma Sūtra (S.B.), II. 3.40. 14 Dharmarāja, Vedanta paribhāṣā, p. 17. 15 Vijñānbhikṣu, Sankhya pravacana bhāsya, I. 87; Yoga bhāşya, I. 9. 16 cp. T. W. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology, p. 8 "consciousness is
only an intermittant series of psychic throbs associated with a living organization, beating out their coming to know through one brief span of life.”

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ledge nor ignore pure, non-empirical consciousness. All knowledge, whether pure or empirical, is the attribute of the soul. That is, the soul is the substratum and holder of knowledge in its entirety. This idea gets maximum emphasis and force in the Jaina concept of the omniscient as the ideal mind.
To the Jainas, soul and consciousness are inseparable They are two different things only because the soul is the substance and consciousness is the attribute. But they are not externally related. Their inseparability follows from the very definition of substance as possessed of attributes and modifications17 and also that attributes depend upon substance because they can exist only by residing in substances. 18 Knowledge is not an attribute separable from its subject, as the Nyāya Vaiśesika holds, nor it is itself a substance as the Vedānta does, nor an immutable fact without any modification as the Sănkhya maintains. It is an attribute and cannot be the attribute of anything else besides the self. The soul is the laksya that of which the consciousness is the laksana (attribute), which may be either separable (anātmabhūta) or inseparable (ātmabhūta). For example, Jīvatva is an inseparable, but the celestial state of existence is a separable, attribute of the soul. The Nyāya-Vaiseșikas, and also the Mimāṁsakas make consciousness a separable attribute of the soul and hence their difficulties. In fact, for Jainism, knowledge without self or self without knowledge is inconceivable.
The Jaina theory of soul, has miny implications for any study of omniscience. Omniscience is an attribute of the soul in its natural condition as well as in the emancipated state. It is not only perfection of knowledge but also of happiness
17 Umāsvāmi, T. Sit., V. 38. 18 Ibid. V. 41. Brahmadeva in his commentary on Dravya samgraha
(Verse-2) of Nemicandra, says that each of the characteristic of the Jira mentioned by Nemicandra has been mentioned in order to differentiate the Jaina conception of self from that of Sankhya, Nyāya, Mimāmsā, Cārvāka, Sadāsiva and Buddha.

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and bliss. The concept of omniscience presents a cognitive as well as an ethical ideal which appeals to imaginative person. The only question is, whether or not, it is possible, The Jainas, no doubt, regard it not only possible, ie., achievable, but as an ideal actually achieved by many prophets. The soul as the substratum of consciousness is the basis of knowledge. When the soul is in pure state. i.e., there are no obstructions, omniscience is inevitable. The soul in the pure state is omniscient. It seems to me that we may question about the achievability of the ideal but we have to accept it to be logically possible. Even a materialist can accept it as an ideal without introducing any contradiction in his materialistic system. The only thing to whom a materialist is com mitted is that consciousness originates from matter, i.e, it is not a basic reality as matter is. But after saying that, the materialist can go on to say that though consciousness is resultant or emergent of matter, yet it can develop to any extent i.e, even to the extent of omniscience. Omniscience has nothing to do with the origin of consciousness; rather it represents what consciousness could ultimately be, i.e., it is the culmination of consciousness and is not logically connected with how consciousness comes into being.
It is true that Jainism is the strongest exponent of the theory of omniscience, it does regard consciousness to be the essential nature of self. But even a system like the NyāyaVaišeşika, which regards consciousness as the adventitious quality of the soul can also accept omniscience as the ideal of all-knowledge. There is no inconsistency in saying that the self acquires consciousness under certain conditions and then develops into omniscience. These two theories i.e., materialism and the theory of consciousness as an adventitious attributes of the self, are not sufficient to refute omniscience.
The Nyāya-Vajśeşikas do accept that there are omniscient yogis who have acquired omniscience through yogic exercises and yogic-perception, though consciousness is, for it, an adventitious attribute. However, the Nyāya could not pro tect

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this ideal, because of a different reason that in the final state of liberation, the soul, according to it, becomes devoid of all cognitions. It should be noted that the Nyāya could have regarded consciousness as indestructible and hence also an attribute of the liberated soul because there is no logical inconsistency in regarding a thing which has a beginning as having no end. 19
The Advaita Vedānta, being a completely idealistic system gives the highest status to self, In so far as according to it, self is the only reality (of course self is identical with Brahman). It is natural, therefore that the concept of omniscience gets a respectable place in Advaitic epistemology. However, it is also natural that the Advaitic omniscience also differs from the Jaina omniscience. For the Jainas, omniscience means the direct and simultaneous knowledge of all substances ard their attributes. But for the Vedāntins, it means knowledge of self simply
19
The Nyaya school tries to illustrate this point like this : "Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced like a pot.” But this is a very crude example which leads to a false conclusion. If we take a mathematical example, we can show that though a series like minus one, minus two, minus three, minus four etc. (-1, -2, -3, -4..) has no beginning but has got an end in plus one (+1). On the contrary a series like plus one, plus two, plus three, plus four etc. (+1, +2, +3, +4..) has a beginning but no end, because there is no limit to any mathematical number. Prof. Freedman thinks that it has been wrongly formulated, inasmuch as the series given here, viz, -1, -2, -3, -4.., the first member of a series leading to infinite negative numbers (nn) just as the positive +1 leads to a similar positive infinite series. In both cases, therefore, the series have a beginning and no end. To indicate the reverse, i.e., having no beginning but an end, it should have been formulated as “nn......-4, -3, -2, -), leading to 0 (zero). The same holds for the positive series. It would be interesting to compare the different standpoints held by Sankara and Rāmānuja with regard to the conception of Maya. To Sarkara, although māyā has got no beginning (anādi) but has got an end. To Rāmānuja, māya has got both a beginning and an end, because he believes that whatever has got a beginning must have an end.

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because there is nothing else besides the self which is ultimately real. The Sārkhya concept of omniscience is also different from the Jaina though it is closer to the latter than the Advaitic conception. For the Sankhya, the omniscient is he who has a discriminative knowledge that the self is not praksti, but in knowing, one has to know what is not prakyti. Therefore, the discriminative knowledge (viveka) of Sārkhya means knowledge of everything that is real, still the differences between the Sārkhya and the Jaina position would not be overlooked. I shall have to add here that these differences between the Jaina, Nyāya and Vedāntic positions are due to the different ontologies of these different systems.
The Buddhist, with a fleeting evanscent stream of consciousDess, an ideal of nirvana-generally signifying nothingness and the basic postulate of non-ego, make the ideal of omniscience very much removed from the reach of the common man, although great efforts have been made by the Buddhists to prove the omniscience of Lord Buddha. This they had to do obviously for religious reasons. Säntarakṣita's famous argument is that nature of citta is to know and when the obstacles of knowledge like kleśa etc. are removed, it shines in its full blaze. This is very much like the Jaina argument for the existence of omniscience in the soul.20 Accordirg to the Buddhist eternal omniscience is attained by the power of will after the removal of obstacles and it leads to the knowledge of non-soul as the highest reality. The Mimāṁsā thinkers distinguish the self from the understanding and senses, 21 so self is present when understanding (buddhi) is absent. So the self is not manifested in all acts of cognition. The facts of memory prove it. Cognition is an activity of soul. 22 According to Prābhākaras, the self is
-
20 "The verse of Haribadra (Yoga-bindu, 431) quoted by Vidyānanda
(Aşta-sahasri, p. 50) and by Akalanka (Nyāya-viniscaya, p. 294) reads like the same from Santarakṣita (Tattva-samgraha, 3338, 3339
3435). 21 Jaimini, Mimamsa-sutra, I. 1.4; I. 1.5. 22 Kumārila, śloka-vārttika, (Atmavāda), 100,

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something non-intelligent which is the substratum of qualities like knowledge, activity, etc. and so it is not the object of recognition but the substrate thereof. According to Kumārila, there is distinction between the soul as consciousness itself and the many selves, whose substratum is the one universal soul. The Mimāṁsakas, in general, accept the Vedāntic theory of self except that they recognise some unconscious element in the soul which is perhaps the internal organ. So it is supposed to be both conscious and unconscious. This makes their position a little dubious. However, the reasons for the rejection of the theory of omniscience is more religious than metaphysical or epistemological. Mimāṁsakas are avowed opponents of the doctrine of omni-science, hence if human omniscience is accepted, this will take away the entire ground of the doctrine of the Vedas.
II. Knowledge of Knowledge Now, since soul is constitutionally a knowing being, it cannot exist without knowledge. It is like a lamp23 which illumines itself as well as objects knop, n. It may look odd to say that objects are knowable but knowledge is not. However, this view of the Jainas is not accepted by the Naiyāyikas and the Bhatļas. To the Mimāṁsakas," knowledge is non-perceptive because intellect itself is known by inference consequent upon the knowledge of objects apprehended by it."'24 The Bhātas are
23 Māņikyanandi, Parikşāmukham, I. 12. In Pramāna-naya-tattvalokalam
kāra, I. 18, the example given is that of the sun instead of a lamp. Siddhasena Divākara also says that Pramāna illumines itself as well as other objects (Nyāyāvatāra, 1). Hemacandra 'also mentions that "as an object reveals itself, so the knowledge reveals itself and consequently a knowledge can know itself"-(Pramāna-mimamsa-bhaşya, I. 1.2.). See also Samantabhadra. Aptā-Mimāṁsa, 101; Svayambhu
stotra, 63; Dharmabhūşaņa, Nyāya-di pikā, I. 13. 24 Sabara-bhasya on Mim. Sūt., I. 1.5., See remarks made by M. K.
Jaina, Siddhi-viniscaya-çika, p. 99 (English Introduction). "But as the buddhi of our selves is as imperceptive as the buddhi of others, so it is impossible to know the objects by our own buddhi in as-much
as we do not know them by the help of buddhi of others." JCO-19

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uñicompromising non-self revelatorists they maintain that knowledge can be known only non-perceptually. Even the Prābhākaras maintain that knowledge is inferred from effect-in-the-form of cognition (phala-samvitti) but this is different from the Bhāțjas theory of cognition as inferred from the effect-in-the-form of manifestedness (prākatya-rūpa-phala).28 The Nyāya-Vaiseșika also holds that knowledge does not reveal itself, just as the finger-tip cannot touch itself. Knowledge is, no doubt, by nature perceptible but not self-perceptible.30 But it is clear that this View, as has been pointed out by many critics, leads to the fallacy of infinite-regress because then every cognition will require another one to be cognised. But if the Naiyāyika says that the manifesting cognition does not require to be cognised by another cognition, one may retort by saying that if it is cognised by itself, then the self-revelatory nature of the same cognition is ipso facto established. Further, the hypothesis of the unknownness of tne revealing cognition will also not do, for it is absurd to say that an unknown knowledge can know another piece of knowledge. Then, if we regard knowledge as imperceptible, our own states of pleasure and pain should not worry us. Instead, we should be able to feel happiness or sorrow at the pleasure and suffering of others. But it is obvious that we cannot have the experience of others. The famous Jaina logician Prabhācandra27 has made a detailed criticism of the Nyāya-Vaišeşika position that a cognition cannot turn on itself to make itself its object. He says that as pleasure, pain and our religious experiences are self-cognised, so every cognition must be self-revelatory. Further there is no proof of a cognition cognising another. If one cognition is perceived by another, the other will never be able to cognise the first since the past is dead and gone and after-recognition is not a fact.
25 Śālikānātha, Prakarana-Pañcika, p. 63. (For comparative account of
the views of the Prābhākaras and the Bhāțțas on this problem). 26 Visvanātha, Karikavali, (Bombay, Nirņayasāgara), 57. 27 Prabhācandra, Prameya-kamala-märtanda, pp. 132-148.

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The argument that, as non-self-revelatory sense-organs do cognise and apprehend their objects, so the imperceptible cognition can cognise other cognitions, cannot hold good, because it must be then accepted that the earlier knowledge of an object knows its object though it is not itself known. But this position has not been accepted by the Nyāya-Vaišeşikas. The argument that God has got two sets of cognitions - one that knows the world and the other knows this knowledge will land us into the fallacy of infinite regress. It would be ridiculous to assign to God the power of omniscience and then take away the power of cognising his own knowledge.
The Jainas, on the basis of above arguments, have accepted the self-revelatory character of cognition. Their purpose is manifold. This view saves their scheme of pluralism and realism. Their fundamental dualism between the jivas and the ajīvas is thereby easily defended. It is worthwhile to note that they use the term revelatory (sva-prakāśa) with regard to knowledge. It means that knowledge only reveals, it does not modify or alter its object. Hence it is free from the fallacy of either Berkeleyan idealism or Kantian phenomenalism. Jainism presents on the other hand pure monistic realism as for it “ the object of knowledge is independent of knowledge relation and there is no dualism between the object known and the object as it is."98 This position may be compared with the epistemological monism of modern western neo realists,
An objection may be raised here. On the Jaina position, it would be difficult to show the existence of self-revealing consciousness in the cases of certain psychological processes like attention. The self-consciousness, lying at the root of all such cognitions seems to be an ultra-psychological conscious. ness called “latent consciousness” by Ferrier 39 To some extent, it might be compared with the transcendental ego of Kant or the accompaniment of Plotinus.
28 Dr. Rajendra Prasad, "A Critical Study of the Jaina Epistemology”.
Jaina Antiquary (Arrah), Vol. XV, No. 2, Jan. 1949), p. 65. 29 J. F. Ferrier, Institutes of Metaphysics (2nd ed.), p. 81.

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. For the Upanişads, the self is self-luminous and so it knows others as well as itself.80 According to the Vedānta, know. ledge is of the nature of ultimate reality; it is itself its own light. For the Buddhists of Yogācāra school, there is nothing other than cognition.31
Among the self-revelatorists, the Jaina occupies a middle position between the Advaitins on the one hand and the Buddhists on the other, the former elevating knowledge to the extent of making it the ultimate transcendental reality, while the latter reducing it to an unbroken series of momentary perceptions.
It would be interesting to note the intimate connection between a system's metaphysics of the soul, and its position about the knowledge of knowledge. Those who accept the reality of things other than the soul, also regard the self as revelatory of those other things, besides being self-revelatory. They generally regard the relation between the soul and its knowledge to be one of either identity or identity-in-difference. The nature of ātman according to the Yogācāra Buddhist, the Jainas, Sānkhyas, Yogins, Sankara, Rāmānuja and other Vedā. ntins, is self-perceptible. Kumărila is the only exception to whom self is self-revelatory inspite of the fact, for him, knowledge is non-perceptible. The Nyāya-Vaiseșikas and the Prābhā. karas, who hold that the self is not self-revelatory also recog. nise knowledge to be distinct from ātman, even when they admit the self-revelatory character of knowledge. 33
The Sānkhya-Yogins would like to substitute the pure consciousness or the essence of puruşa for this unknownness of
30 Kath. Up., V. 15. 31 Dharmakirti, Nya ya-bindu, 1. 10. 32 The purpose of the Mimāṁsakas in advocating the theory of know.
ledge as imperceptible (parokşa) is obvious. They are uncompromising scripturalists. The knowledge of merit, demerit and other super-normal things are derived from the Vedas and Vedas alone. This knowledge is non-sensuous and therefore it must be indirect and imperceptible.

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Illuminating cognition. But this position takes away the very basis of perceptual cognizance which is regarded as a mere modification of the unintelligent buddhi, an evolute of Prakrti. Unlike the Nyāya.Vaiseșikas, Sārkhya-Yogins and the Bhāţtas, the Upanisads, the Vedāntins, Yogācāra Buddhists and the Prābhākaras agree with the Jainas in accepting the self-revelatory character of knowledge, there are of course, some minor differences in their respective positions.
The view that knowledge is self-revelatory has some important bearing on the problem of omniscience. Omniscience designates the cognitive perfection of the soul and hence if it cannot cognise itself, it is not omniscience. When omnisciene is all-knowledge, it would be absurd to deny its own knowledge to the self. By definition, the subject matter of omniscience is "all the substances with all their modifications."33 It means the knowledge of both the subject and the object, the knower and the known. This definition cannot be interpreted in the sense that through the perfect-knowledge (kevala-jñana) one knows only the "modifications of the substances” (it being in the tatpuruşa sixth) and not the “substances". This interpretation will be wrong, because it will render the term 'substance' in the sentence useless. Modifications always belong to the substances and hence even the word 'modifications' would have been enough for conveying the meaning of the said sūtra. In the said tatpurusa-samāsa, the standpoint of the author is clearly indicative of the purpose, Then the sūtra would mean that through perfect-knowledge one will know only the modifications and not the substances. As a matter of fact, these objections suffer from the wrong notion that substances and modifications can exist independently. Substancemodifications (dravya-paryāyas) in the sūtra should be understood as combinative (dvandva-samāsa).34 Now, understood in this light, whether the self-revelatory or other-revelatory know
33 Umāsvāmi, T. Sūt., I. 29. 34 Akalanka, Tattvartha-raja-vārttika, I. 29. 7-8

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ledge, all cognitions belong to the soul, and when all are known they naturally become conscious as well as self-conscious. The property of being self-conscious, is basic to all-knowledge. "He who clearly understands the self as of the nature of knower on the authority of the scriptural knowledge is called Srutakevalin" --says Kundakunda. 35 He further says : "Just as the sun, all by himself is lustrous and warm, and a deity of the sky; so also the liberated soul is endowed with knowledge and happiness, and is a divinity of the world.”86 • Even in the case of ordinary knowledge, whether it knows other things or not, because of the required circumstances, it' always knows itself. Even in the cases of doubt or erroneous knowledge or any other forms of wrong knowledge, cognition reveals itself. Knowledge unlike material objects as jár, cloth, etc., is not produced and then it is known when associated with the mind. In fact it knows itself when it is produced. Knowledge is like the self-lustrous light of a lamp which not only illumines others but also itself and does the two things simultaneously.
It is clear, while accepting the Jaina philosophical perspectives, that if an omniscient is not conscious of his own knowledge, he cannot be conscious of the objects of his knowledge. So he will not be then really omniscient but very much ignorant. So to keep the doctrine of omniscience free from difficulties, the doctrine of the self-revelatory nature of know. ledge seems to be an essential condition,
III. Validity of Knowledge and Omniscience
The problem of validity of knowledge involves many important questions of epistemology, e.g. what is the meaning of valid knowledge ? What is the criterion of validity ? How does validity originate ? What is the means of valid knowledge ? etc,
35 Kundakunda, Pravacana sāra, I.33. 36 Ibid., I. 68.

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Accordig to Jainism, every pramāņa, i.e., every means of pramă (valid knowledge) must be rooted in conscious awareness. Non-conscious instruments like sense-organs (indriyas), contact (sannikarşa), etc., cannot yield knowledge 37 since prama is of the nature of consciousness and is also the real guide of our purposive actions.88
It is interesting to go through the historical development of the definion of pramāņa in Indian philosophical traditions. According to Sukhalālji,89 the Jaina approach may be studied under four broad categories : (1) Samantabhadra 40-Siddhasena1-method of defining pramāņa as "revealing others as well as itself” (2) Akalarika48 -Mānikyanandi 43-method of defi
37 The Jainas reject the view held by Nyaya, Vaiseșika, Sārkhya etc.
that senses, contact etc. can be called pramāna. Vātsăyana admits Sannikarşa (Nyāyabhāşya, I. 1.3), Prasastapāda 'knowledge of its being' or svarī palocana (Prasasta-pada bhāşya, p. 533) and Vijñāna bikṣu 'activities of sense-organs' or Vrtti (Sankhya-pravacana-bhāşya, II. 1) The Prābhākaras, however, enlarge the scope of pramāna by
defining it in terms of our experience or anubhūti (Sabara-bhāşya, II. 1). 38 Mäpikyanandi, Parikşā mukham, I. 2. "Because pramāna enables acquiring beneficial things and leaving non-beneficial objects, this is
hing but knowledge." cp. Prabhācandra, Prameya-kamala-mārtanda, p. 5, Anantavirya, Prame ya-ratna-mālā, p. 4. 39 Sukhalal Sanghavi, Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics
p. 32, cp. Siddhiviniscaya tika, pp. 99-100 (Introduction by M. K. Jaina); Nyāya-di pikā, pp. 12 14 (Introduction); Parikṣā-mukham,
Eng. Tr. & comy. by S. C. Ghosal, I. 1. 40 Samantabhadra, Svayambhū-stotra, 63; Āpta-mimāṁsā, 101. He uses the
words "sav-para-avabhāsaka". Siddhasena Divākara, Nyāyāvatara, 1 (sva-parabhasi). He also adds one more characteristic to the definition of pramāņa, "admitting of no obstruction" (badha-vivar jitam) in order to characterize such kinds
of false knowledge, e.g. images of two moons, etc. (Ibid. 7). 42 Akalanka adds two adjectives, namely, cognition of an object which
was not so far cognised (anadhigatarthaka) and non-discrepancy
(avisamvada)-Asta-sati, 36. 43 Māvikyanandi, Parikșa-mukham, I. 1. "pramāna is valid knowledge
of itself and of things not proved before."
. 41 Siddha

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nir g it as possessing "non-discrepancy combined with uncog. nisedness" (3) Vidyānanda44. 44-Abhayadeva Suri's way of emphasising on its "indubious" and "definite" character and lastly (4) Hemacandra's46 stress on it as "authentic definitive cognition of the knowable". Dharmabhuṣaṇa also accepts this.
47
152
Historically speaking, Umāsvāmi's definition of pramāṇa as that which gives knowledge of five kinds is earlier than the above four but he did not develop his definition in any detail. Therefore, we can start here with Samantabhadra's definition (svaparāvabhāsakam), which forms the foundation for future definition. Siddhasena alomost borrows (?) his three terms, sva, para, avabhāsaka in his own definition and his own addition of badhavivarjitam (admitting of no obstruction) may be taken as an adjective to 'knowledge'. Even Akalarka uses ātmā, ārtha 9, and vyavasayātmaka5° in places of sva, para and avabhāsaka respectively. The terms anadhigata,51 aniścita5 aviscṁvādi 53 and anirnīta may be taken as adjective qualifying the noun 'artha'. Māņikyanandi's attempt at juxtaposi
44 Vidyananda finds no need to admit the characteristics introduced by Akalanka and instead stresses upon it being determinate (vyavasayātmaka)-Tattvārtha-sloka-vārttikam, I. 10.77.
45 He follows Vidyananda but uses different term decisive (nirņita) for determinate (vyavasāyātmaka)-Sanmati-tarka-ṭikā, p. 518. Vädideva also accepts the views of Vidyānanda-Pramāṇa-naya-tattvalokalankara, I. 2.
46 Hemacandra introduces three characteristics: Samyak, also available in T. Sut., I. 1; Bhāsarvajña, Nyaya-sāra, p. 1; Dharmakīrti, Nyayabindu, I. 1. (ii) artha, and nirṇaya. He speaks of 'authentic definitive cognition of an object'-Pramana-mīmāmsa, I. 1. II.
47 Dharmabhūṣava, Nyaya-dipikā, I. 18.
48 Akalanka, Laghiyastraya, 60.
49 Ibid., Asta-sati, 36.
50 Akalanka, Laghiyastraya, 60.
51 Akalanka, Aṣṭa-sati, 36.
52 Ibid., 101.
53 Ibid., 36.
54 Akalanka, Aşṭa-sarī, 101.

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tion of words is obvious for he uses apūrvārtha55 for anadhigata and sva for ātmā. Vidyānandi 56 has also used the terms sva, artha and vyavasāyātmaka in his definition, that speak of the influence of Samantabhadra. However, credit goes to Akalanka 57 to emphasise that only jñāna is pramāņa. Dharmabhūsana 58 says that the two terms jñāna as well is pramāna are derived with the affix 'anat' in the instrumental voice. Prabhācandra, giving the three ways in which pramāna may be derived, says that in the instrumental sense (karana), pramāna means "that by which right knowledge is gained”.59 The reason lies in the fact that the Jainas generally regard knowledge as cognisant irrespective of its being true or false. No knowledge is either totally valid or invalid So the criterion of validity will be complete non-discrepancy and that of invalidity its opposite i e., discrepancy. This point is illustrated with the example of a perfunied substance possessing other characterstics also besides smell, but because of the preponderence of a particular attribute, namely, of being perfumed, it is called a perfumed substance.60
In non-Jaina systems, Nyāya-vaiseșikas present a contrast to the Jainas. According to Kaņā la, right knowledge must be free from all defects.01 Vātsyāyana making an improvement
55 Mänikyanandi. Ibid. . 1. cp. Akalarka, Asta-sati, 36, cp. He seems
to have borrowed purvārtha from Kumārila or Dharmakirti and sya
from Samantabhadra. 56 Vidyānandi, Tattvārtha-śloka-Värttikam, I. 10.77. 57 M. K. Jaina, His Introduction to Siddhi-viniscaya-tikā of Akalanka
with comy. of Anantavirya, pp. 98-99, 58 Dharamabhūşana, Nya ya-di pikā, 1. 10. 59 Prabhācandra, Prame ya-kamala-martanda, pp, 3-4; cp. Akalarka,
Tattvärtha-raja-ārttikam, I. 10; Pramana nirnayah (Pratyaksa), p. 1; vide Jainendra Vyakarana II. 3.112 for grammitical objections and
for replies see Prabhācandra's Prame ya-kamala-martanda, p. 4. 60 Akalanka, Asta-sati (Asta-sahasri), p. 276; Laghiyastraya, 22, Siddhi
viniscaya-ţika, p. 94; Vidyānandi, Ibid., I. 10, 35-40. 61 Kavāda, Vaiseșika-sutras, IX. 2.12. JCO-20

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upon him says: "Prama is right knowledge of objects i.e., it is the awareness of an object in its right form, knowledge
of a thing as it really is."62 The instrument of prama is pramaṇa, which is defined as that which causes pramā." 63 However, this view has been further modified by Vacaspati as "pramāņa is valid cognition of an object", 64 which has also been accepted by Udayana65 in conformity with Gotama's tradition. Gangesa, the exponent of Navya-Nyaya describes the older definition and says that prama is knowledge free from fallacy. This seems to be similar to Hemacandra's definition. The Mīmāmsakas, in their definition of pramā, combine "originating from a non-defective cause" (aduṣṭa-kāraṇa-ārabdha) of the Nyaya-Vaiseṣika and "uncontradictedness" (nirābādha) and "novelty" (apūrvartha) of the Buddhists." Among Buddhists. Dinnaga has included "self-cognition" (sva-samvitti)08 in his definition, and Dharmakirti has introduced the term non-discrepant (avisamvadi).69 Sāntarakṣita has tried to work out a syn. thesis between Dinnaga and Dharmakirti. However, for the Buddhists, "there is no instrumentality of the senses, that there are only images and that there is no distinction between consciousness and its content". They do not accept determination' or 'decisiveness' as an essential characteristic of pramāṇa.
The Jainas refute the views of Nyaya, Sarkhya, Mimāmsā and Yoga by accepting the adjective 'sva' since their defini
62 Vätsyāyana, Nyaya-bhāṣya, I. 1.1 co. Annambhatta, Tarka-samgraha, 35. 63 Vätsyäyana, Ibid., I. 1.3.
64 Vacaspati Misra, Tatparya-ṭikā, p. 21. 65 Udayana, Nyaya-kusumāñjali, IV. 1.5. 66 Hemacandra, Pramāṇa-mimāṁsā, I. 1.3. 67 Kumārila, Śloka-varttika, Aup. 10-11.
68 Dinnaga, Pramana-Samuccaya, I. 10.
69 Dharmakirti, Pramāṇa-värttikam, II. 1.
6
70 Bhattacharya, H. M., "Jaina Critique of the Buddhist Theories of Pramāņa", Jaina Antiquary, Vol. XV, No. 1, June, 1949, p. 7.

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"C
tions do not require for pramana to be at the same time knowledge of itself as well as of the objects known.71 However most of the definitions of pramana, have insisted on right knowledge"; about "newness", there is no unanimity among the Jainas. Roughly speaking, the characteristic feature of the Jaina theory of pramana is that knowledge as pramana is like the sun or lamp, which illumines itself as well as others. The Jainas, therefore, also recognise even memory as a pramāņa since it is true or false like perception. 72 The Mimāmsakas73 reject memory as pramāṇa because it gives no new knowledge. Jayanta gives a new argument against memory. Memory takes place when the object is absent. So he says, "our knowledge born of something which is absent cannot be pramāṇa." 74 Vācaspati75 does not regard memory as pramana because of popular usage, so does Udayana. Buddhist's objections to memory are similar to the Mimamsakas but also they were clearly influenced by their own position with regard to pramaṇa. With regard to whether the continuous knowledge (dharavāhika jñāna) should or should not be treated as pramana, the Jainas are among themselves divided. The Śvetambara-tradition generally recognise it as pramana as do the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāmsakas, while the Digambaras, like the Buddhists, maintain a reserved attitude. A continuous knowledge becomes pramāṇa only when it takes note of specialities like the particular significance of the moments etc., and produces some new knowledge. However, among the Śvetāmbaras. Hemacandra rejects continuous knowledge as pramana on the ground that it gives no new knowledge.
The next question to be discussed is to be: how does a pramāṇa establish its validity and what is the criterion of
71 Anantavirya, Prameya-ratna-mala, p. 3.
72 Vadideva Suri, Syadvada-ratnakara, III. 4. 73 Kumarila, Śloka-vārttika (Anumāna), 160. - 74 Jayanta Bhatta, Nyaya-mañ jari, IV. 1. 75 Vacaspati Misra, Tatparya-jikā, p. 20.
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validity? To take the second point first, we know that the Jainas like the Naiyayikas regard practical utility as the criterion of validity.76 Valid knowledge enables us to acpuire beneficial and avoid non-beneficial objects. Vātsyāyana says, "knowledge is apprehension exciting desire and leading to action" and its criterion depends upon its "capacity to lead to successful action".78 This shows the pragmatic basis of the Jainas and the Naiyayikas. However, the Jainas, do not commit the error of western pragmatists who equate validity with utility. "All valid knowledge is practially useful", may be true but to convert it into "all practically useful knowledge is valid" is a case of wrong conversion of an 'A' proposition into another 'A' proposition. Buddhists commit the same fallacy, when they regard practical utility as the whole of truth. Jainas had introduced determination (niścaya) or decisiveness (nirnīta) and other phrases in their definition of pramaņas, but they only indicate some subjective or internal criterion. Truth, therefore, was described as the direct determination of the object and error as nfusion of the thing cognised with something else. Being realists, the Jainas cannot accept the theory of error propounded by the Yogacara subjectivists known as atmakhyāti, or even that of the Vedāntins known as anirvacaniyakhyāti. According to the former, the existence of the external world is burried into the graveyard of ālaya-vijñāna and according to the latter, in the cosmic illusion or māyā. Here the distinction between truth and falsity is rendered impossible. Similarly, asatkhyātivada of the Buddhist nihilists cannot be accepted since according to the Jainas nothing is asat and also because the Jainas are followers of satkāryavāda. The Sankhya account of akhyātivāda fails to explain how an erroneous awareness manifests itself. Against the Präbhākara theory of vivekakhyāti, the Jainas urge that it presupposes, non-existence of error, but so long as the error survives, it exists and
76 Manikyanandi, Parikṣā-mukham, I. 2.
77 Vätsyāyana, Nyaya-bhāṣya, I. 1.2. 78 Gotama, Nyaya-sutra, I. 1. 17.

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we are also influenced by it, for example, by the rope-snakeillusion. So according to the Jainas, as truth is rooted in immediate cognition of the object by the subject, and "error may be possible owing to failure of proper discrimination due to dosas or defects in the objective environment as well as in the sense-organs." 79
157
As the Jainas accept that pramāṇa is that valid knowledge which illumines itself as well as its knowledge, they refute the views of Yogācāra Buddhists who hold that knowledge only illumines itself and the views of Mimamsakas. Naiyayikas, etc., who maintain that knowledge illumines external object alone, as it cannot illumine itself. The other characteristic of pramāṇa, such as, 'novelty' and/or 'decisiveness' are also important. The first guarantees the growth of knowledge reaching to any height and the second guards it against mere imagination and day-dreaming.
The question of a criterion of validity leads to other questions regarding its origin and knowledge. It has been very hotly debated, whether validity or invalidity is intrinsic or extrinsic, and the following answers may be suggested:
(i) Both validity and invalidity are extrinsic-NyayaVaiseṣika.
(ii) Both validity and invalidity are intrinsic-Sankhya-Yoga. (iii) Validity is intrinsic but invalidity extrinsic-Mīmārsā. (iv) Validity is extrinsic but invalidity is intrinsic-Buddhism. (v) Both the validity and invalidity can be intrinsic in one sense and extrinsic in another senses-Buddhism.
(vi) In case of familiar knowledge, validity and invalidity, are intrinsic, while in case of unfamiliar and new knowledge, validity and invalidity are extrinsic-Jainism.
79 H. M. Bhattacharya, "Jaina Critique of the Buddhist Theories of Pramana", Jaina Antiquary, Vol. XV, No. 2, p. 32.

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All the orthodox systems admit the validity of the Vedic testimony, while the heterodox systems deny it. However, the Mimāṁsakas regarded the Vedas as eternal and impersonal. whereas the Nyāya-Vaiśesikas thought them to be creation of God.80 But the Buddhists and the Jainas do not accept either the authority of the Vedas or God. Of the above theories, the first four have been very greatly discussed and therefore they need not be elaborated here. The fifth presents the position of Buddhists like Śāntarakṣita, who rejects the preceding views because they are influenced by the faith in the authority of the Vedas, while the Buddhist accept no such regulation or authority. 81 For Sāntarakṣita, whether validity or invalidity is intrinsic or extrinsic depends upon certain special circumstances which may differ from case to case. For example, in the case of repeated acquaintance (abhyāsa-daśā), both vality and invalidity are intrinsic, while in the case of first acquaintance (anyabhyāsadašā), both are extrinsic 89 This reminds one of the famous statement of Akalarka when he says that "no knowledge is either totally valid or invalid."'83 This is also asserted by Vādideva Sūri84 and Hemachandra 85 It should be further noted that the Jaina position on this problem is quite in keeping with the non-absolutistic postulate. For example, Māņikyanandi says "the validity of pramānas rises from itself as through another pramāņa.”86 Here the Naiyāyikas agree that the validity of pramānas is known through other source i.e., inference.
According to the Jainas, the validity is neither extrinsic alone as the Naiyāyikas say nor intrinsic alone as the Sārkhya
80 Udayana, Nyāyakusumā, jali, II. 1. 81 śāntarakṣita, Tattva-sangraha, 3123. 82 Ibid., 3123 (Pañ jika of Kamalašīla). 83 Akalanka, Așțo-sati (Aşța-sahasri), p. 277; Laghi yastraya, 22. 84 Vādideva Sūri, Pramāņa-naya-tattvalokālaňkära, I. 21. 85 Hemacandra, Pramāna-mimārsā. I. 1.8. 86 Manikyanaadi, Parikșa-mu'tham, I. 13.

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159
Yogins say. It is both extrinsic and intrinsic. If we ask when it is extrinsic and when intrinsic, their answer is this : in the case of knowledge of familiar objects validity is intrinsic, but in the case of unfamiliar objects, it is extrinsic. Dharmabhūsaņa 87 cites an example of a man who was familiar to one pond and unfamiliar to another. About the latter, he was doubtful whether it contains water or is only a mirage, and than using inferential knowledge that there is a smell of lotuses, cool breeze coming from that side, etc. he comes to the conclusion that it contains water. Hemacandra also supports this view when he says : "we become certain of validity of a pramāņa either by itself or through the help of others.”88 So subsequent confirmatory cognitions, cognition of its prag. matic consequences or cognition of an object invariably related to it, will determine the validity. Vidyānandi has also affirmed the views of Akalarika, Mānikyanandi and Hemacandra by saying that pramāna "establishes itself regarding objects with which we are alredy familiar and takes the help of others in other cases."'89 This is also supported by other Jaina logicians, like Anantavīrya 90 and Vādideva Sūri. 91 However, a critic may raise an objection that if by inference, the validity of a pranāņa is made, it may lead to many difficulties. Firstly, it will mean that an inference which is itself a pramāna is made to confirm another pramāņa, which is a sort of paradoxical position. But in order to avoid this difficulty, if it is said that another inference will validate this, this will be a sort of infinite regress. Hence to avoid all these difficulties,
87 Dharmabhūşana, Nyāya-di pikā, I. 21. 88 Hemacandra, Pramāna-mimāṁsā, I. 1.8. 89 Vidyānandi, Pramāna-parikşā, "Prāmānyam-to-svatah-siddhambhyasat
paratoanyathā". 90 Anantavīrya, Prameya-ratna-mala, p. 6--"Prāmānya arises by itself”. 91 Vadideva Sūri, Prame ya-naya-tattralokalankāra, I. 11. "Prāmānya and
aprāmānya arise through others, but regarding their knowledge, they arise by theinselves."

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we can conclude, that validity depends upon external factor, but in its function, viz., the determination of the objects of knowledge, it is self-contained in the case of familiar objects and needs extraneous help in the case of unfamiliar objects.
The question of validity of knowledge is also closely related to the concept of kevala-jñāna. In keeping with their gercral position on the subject, the Jainas maintain that validity of omniscience is at the same time intrinsic and demonstrable by external factors. As it is a kind of immediate direct-perception (ie., a pramāṇa), its validity must, therefore be intrinsic and immediately knowable. This establishes its infallibility also. Eut if its validity would have been recognised only as intrinsic, the concept of kevala-jñāna would have been installed only as a religious one, just as the Mimamsakas believe in an eternal, infallible, impersonal, allknowing Veda. The Jainas have also admitted the extrinsic validity of all pramāṇas including kevala-jñāna, since it has been included in the list of pramāṇas. 92 This means that those who are familiar with the theory and practice of kevala-jñāna, for them its validity is intrinsic but to an unfamiliar man, its validity is extrinsic. This is in order to convince him of its truth, the help of other factors is necessary. Jaina literature is full of great dialectical skill exhibtited in proving the fact of omniscience. This shows that it is both internally sound and externally defendable. This also explains why the Jainas were so anxious to accord kevala-jñana, a place in the list of sources of knowledge and not to treat it only as mystical and religious dogma. This move was obviously intended to liquidate every ground of scepticism about its validity. Kevalajñāna, being a pramāņa itself, has a dual role to play. It is the essential means of right knowledge (pramāṇa) as well as it is itself right knowledge (pramā). Like all valid knowledge Kevala-jñāna cannot miss newness (apūrvārtha) and definiie
33 Umāsvāmi, T. Sat., I. 9.

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ness (vyavasaya). If it is objected that no new knowledge can be acquired by the omniscient since he will cognise everything in a moment and from the next moment he will not be cognising anything because nothing will be left to be cognised for him, a Jaina can say in reply that one should note that the world of change is eternal and hence every next moment will be a new world of cognition. Similarly, kevalajñana, being an organ of knowledge (pramaṇa) is "the authentic definitive cognition of an object."93 The use of the term 'definitive cognition' serves to negate the character of organ of knowledge of sense-object-contact as it is not a cognition and of doubt, etc. The term 'authentic' (samyak) means what is not contrary to fact and is an indeclinable. The result of this qualification is the exclusion of error. Kevala-jñāna is, therefore, clear beyond measure.
VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE AND OMNISCIENCE
To conclude, the introduction of kevala-jñāna in the list of pramāņas is a distinctive achievement of the Jainas in Indian epistemology. The other Indian systsms have been able to recognise only the six kinds of pramānas ranging from perception to negation. Inspite of the fact that all of these systems are deeply rooted in religion, in the field of logic and epistemology, omniscience, the culmination of religious experience, has seldom been treated as a scientific discipline. The Nyāya-Vaiseṣikas and the Yogins discuss yogic or paranormal perception but it has rarely influenced their logical and epistemological thinking. It seems that the chapter on yogic perception in Nyāya-Vaiseṣika system is a logical misfit and possibly, an after-thought. Yoga as a system of philosophy is different from Yoga as a system of mental and spiritual discipline and hence Yoga has been developed in India more as a practical science or useful art rather than as a speculative system of philosophising. However, this is not so with the kevala-jñāna of Jainas. It is not only a matter of religious faith but also a well-reasoned epistemological and logical sub
93 Hemacandra, Pramana-mīmāmsā, I. 1.2 and also bhāṣya,
JCQ-21

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ject. Whatever might have been the motive in formulating the theory of kavala-jñāna, it is an integral part of Jaina epistemology.
Kevala jñāna has a super-validity of its own. The pure, perfect and absolute knowledge is like a mirror, which shows the purity and exactitude of knowledge, without any distinction or confusion and the absence of any effort, mental or sensorial. In it are reflected distinctly and simultaneously, all permanent and changing aspects, past, present and future of all objects which exist individually or collectively. “Ever free from obstruction, fully absorbed in one's own self, the supreme Soul is effulgent, like the sky, in the highest stage. 9 4
94 Amrtacandra, Puruşārtha-siddhyu pāya, 223.

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CHAPTER VII
SYĀDVĀDA AND SARVAJÑATA
1. Absolutism Vs. Non-absolutism
The Jaina epistemology and logic, in the history of Indian thought, is perhaps more famous for Syādvāda and Anekāntavāda than for anything else. In fact, in technical philosophy, the value of these two doctrines, which are very much interrelated to each other, cannot be overrated. It is also true that they have greatly influenced Indian logic and epistemology in general.
It seems to be a truism that these two Jaina doctrines, which may be given the class-name of relativism, are opposed to any absolutistic position. The controversy between relativism and absolutism is an age-old one. It is very often argued that the two cannot be accepted at the same time. If every. thing is relative, if every knowledge is conditional, then no knowledge should be accepted as possessing absolute truth. Further, if there is any piece of knowledge, which is absolutely true then there seems to be no justification for saying that Jainas have very eloquently emphasised that the reality has many facets and therefore, every asseration about reality is bound to be true only conditionally i.e., in a qualified manner. There are critics, who claim, that relativism itself is a selfdestructive theory. They say that unless something as absolute is accepted, we canuot accept either the relative nature of reality or that of knowledge. According to them, the statement that all knowledge is relative (or all statements are conditional) is in a sense, self-contradictory because this statement itself should not be considered to be relative, otherwise it will undermine the very basis of relativism.

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I do not want to indulge here in this age-old controversy between relativism and absolutism. I, just, only want to point out that though it is very relevant to the subject-matter of the present work, yet it does not pose an insoluble problem connected with Jaina theory of omniscience, with which I am particularly concerned. In fact, the Jaina theory of relativism does not go against the Jaina theory of omniscience because it seems to me that relativism, according to Jaina philosophy, applies to our knowledge of reality in virtue of the fact that we i.e., lay man, approach reality only from this or that point of view. Therefore, if it is made possible to approach reality from all possible points of view i.e., from no-one - particular-point-of-view, then the resulting knowledge will not be vitiated by relativism. It seems to me that Sarvajñatā or omniscience is knowledge of this kind and that is why Sarvajñatā can be reconciled with Syādvāda or Anekāntavāda. This requires a fuller treatment that I have done elsewhere."
1 Please refer to my article "The Nature of Unconditionality in Syād
vada (read before the Indian Philosophical Congress in 1956 at Nagpur). This has subsequently been published in many journals Jaina Antiquary (Arrah, Vol. 22 No. 1, 1965; Malāvīra Smārikā, Jaipur, 1964) etc. I have tried to pose a problem: If non-absolutism is absolute, it is not universal, since there is one real which is absolute, and if non-absolutism is itself non-absolute, it is not an absolute and universal fact. So "tossed between the two horns of the dilemma nonabsolutism simply evaporates" (S. Mookerjee, The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism, p. 169 ). Complete Judgement (sakaladeša) is the object of valid knowledge (pramı?2) and Incomplete Judgement (vikaladeśa) is the object of aspectal knowledge (Naya) --Pujyapāda, Saryārtha Siddhi, IV. 45. Hence the "non-absolute is constituted of the absolute as its elements and as such would not be possible if there were no absolutes (S. Mookerjee, Ibid., p. 171).
Further, the unconditionality in the statement "all statements are conditional” is quite different from the normal meaning of uncondi. tionality. This is like the idea contained in the passages, 'I do not know myself', where there is no contradiction between 'knowledge' and 'ignorance', or in the sentence, 'I am undecided', where there is at least one decision, that is 'I am undecided'. Similarly, the categoricality behind

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Jaina logic of Anekānta is based not on abstract intellectualism but on experience and realism leading to a nonabsolutistic attitude of mind. "Multiplicity and unity, particularity and universality, eternality and non-eternality, defina. bility and non-definability": etc. which apparently seems to be contradictory characterstics of reality, are interpreted from different points of view, to avoid any offence to logic, to be co-existent in the same object. All cognitions, whether of identity or diversity, are after all, valid. “They seem to be contradictory of each other simply because one of them is mistaken to be the whole truth." In fact, “the integrity of truth consists in this very variety of its aspects, within the rational unity of an all comprehensive and ramifying principle”4 Therefore, Prof. S. Mookerjee holds that “the charge of contradition against the co-presence of being and non-being in a real is a figment of apriori logic."5
a disjunctive judgement (A man is either good or bad ) is not like the categoricality of an ordinary categorical judgement, 'the horse is red.' Samantabhadra also says, “Even the doctrine of non-absolutism can be interpreted either as absolute or non-absolute according to the Pramāņa or Naya. This means that even the doctrine of nonabsolutism is not absotute unconditionally". (Samantabhadra, Svyam. bhu Stotra, 103). However, to avoid the fallacy of infinite regress, the Jainas distinguish between valid non-absolutism (Samyak Anekānta) and invalid non-absolutism (Mithya-Anekanta). (Samantabhadra. Apta Mimāṁsā, 108; Vidyānanda, Aştasahasri, p. 290; Dharamabhūsana. Nyaya-di pika, pp. 130-131). Like an invalid absolute judgement, an invalid non-absolute judgement too is invalid. Therefore, to be valid. Anekanta must not be absolute but relative. In short, the doctrine of Anekānta is an opposite theory of Ekānta, which is a one-sided exposition irrespective of other view points." (Haribhadra, AnekantaJaya-Pataka, ed. H. R. Kāpadia, Gaekawāda Oriental Institute,
Barodā, 1940, Vol. I., p. IX (Introduction). 2 Mallişena, Syadvada Mañ jari, 3 S. Sanghavi, Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics, p. 25. 4 M. D. Desai, The Naya Karạikā, p. 25 (Introduction). 5 Mookerjee, Ibid., p. 190. The author deals with the "Logical Back
ground of Jaina Philosophy" in the light of Anekānta logic.

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IS KNOWLEDGE ABSOLUTE ? II. Is Knowledge Absolute ?
Since absoluteness is unknown to Jaina Metaphysics, so it is in its epistemology. The Jaina division of knowledge into immediate and mediate is not only free from the fallacy of overlapping division, but it is also based on common experience and supports the initial non-absolutism.
166
However, the professed non-absolutism becomes more explicit, when knowledge is classified into Pramāņa (knowledge of a thing as it is in itself) and Nyaya (knowledge of a thing in its relation). Pramana is Complete knowledge (Sakladeśa) and Naya is Incomplete Knowledge (Vikladeśa). The controversies between the two traditions of Jainism, Agamic and the Logical, regarding the classification of knowledge have been discussed very ably by Sukhlālji. 8
For clarification, it may be said that the terms "immediacy" and "mediacy" are used here in sense different from that in which they are commonly taken. Jainas deny the immediate the character of the ordinary perceptual knowledge as the western Representationalists also do, but unlike the Realists they hold that "knowledge is direct or indirect according as it is born without or with the help of an external instrument different from the self."9
However, to avoid sophistication also to bring their theory in line with others, a distinction is made between the really immediate and the relatively immediate. 10 The latter is
6 Umasvāmi, T. Sut., I. 11-12; Manikynandi, Parikṣa-Mukham, II. 1; Hemacandra, Pramana-Mimamsa, I. 1.9; Dharmabhusana, Nyayadi pikā, p. 23.
7 Vide Dr. Rajendra Prasad's article "A Critical Study of Jaina Epistemology", Jaina Antiquary, Vol. XV., No. 2, Jan., 1949, pp. 65-67. 8 Sukhalal Sanghavi, Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics Section VIII, pp. 50-54.
9 N. M. Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 28.
10 See Hemacandra, Pramana-Mimämsä, I. 1.15; Ananta Vicya, Prameya -Ratna-Māla, p. 14; Vadideva Suri, Pramana-Naya-Tattvalokalankara with Ratnakarävatārikā commentary by Ratnaprabhācārya (Kasi, Vira Samvat, 2437), II. 45.

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IS KNOWLEDGE ABSOLUTE ? 167 empirically direct knowledge produced by the sense organs and mind. 11
Pramāņa and Naya represent roughly the absolute and the relative characters of knowledge respectively, and taken together they constitute knowledge. So constituted, it becames non-absolutistic knowledge. A closer study of the theory of Praniāna will reveal a relational structure of knowledge. If Pramiņa is defined as the knowledge of an object in all its aspects and since "an object has innumerable characteristics,"18 it implies that if we know one object in all its innumerable characteristics, we know all objects. 13 The universe is an interrelated whole. Hence, right knowledge of even one object will lead to the knowledge of the entire universe. This shows that our knowledge is intrinsically relative in character, This relativism is realistic. "It not only asserts a plurality of determinate truths but also takes each truth to be an indetermination of alternative truths". 14 The so many truths are really alternate truths; so it is a mistake to attempt at finding one absolute truth or even at having one cognition of the plurality of the truths. If knowing is a unity, known is a plurality, the objective category being distinction or togetherness.” If finally, knowledge as the object, refers to the known, the known must present an equivalent of this, of relation or reference, a relation and its content."15 Intellectualistic abstractionism has to be given up and we should try to dehumanise the ideal
11 Manikyanandi, Pariksa-mukham, II. 45; Anantavīrya, Ibid., p. 14;
Hemacandra, Ibid., I. 1. 21; Vädideva Sūri, Ibid., II. 4.5; Dharmabhūşana, Ibid., p. 33; Akalanka, Tattvārtha-Raja-vārttika, I. 14;
Sthananga Sūtra, II. 1.71. 12 cp. Haribhadra, Sad-darśana-sammuccaya (with Guņaratna's cɔmmen.
tary), 55; Siddhasena Divakara, Nyāyāvatāra, 29. 13 Ācārānga Sutra, 1. 2.4; Kundakunda, Pravacana-sāra, I. 48–49. 14 K. C. Bhattācārya, “ The Jaina Theory of Anekantavāda ", Jaina
Antiquary, Vol. IX, No. 1, p. 10, 15 Ibid., pp. 10-11.

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· DISTINCTION BETWEEN..
and realise the real. The reality is not a rounded ready-made whole or an abstract unity of many definite or determinate aspects but that “the so-called unity is after all a manifold being only a name for fundamentally different aspects of truth which do not make a unity in any sense of the term."16 So far we know or can know, the making of truth and making of reality is one. Reality like truth is therefore definite-indefinite (anekānta). Its indefiniteness follows from the inexhaustible reserve of objective reality and its definiteness comes from the fact that it grows up into the reality of our own knowing which we make.
So we can conclude that in Jainism, non-absolutism is not only a metaphysical but also an epistemological concept. There is no absolute reality, so there is no absolute truth.
III. Distinction between Syadvada and Sarvanata
Whatever might be the value of Syādvāda or Anekanta. vāda in Jainism, it is not a final truth. In fact, it is recommended in so far as it helps us, in arriving at the ultimate truth. Syādrāda works or can work only in practical life, and it is therefore that the Jainas regard it as a practical truth. But there is also another realm of truth which is not in any way partial or relative but absolute and is the subject matter of omniscience or perfect knowledge (Kevala-jñāna).
Therefore, though it seems to be self-contradictory to accept both Syādvāda and Sarvajñatā, yet the self-contradiction is more apparent than real. As Vyavahāra is not opposed to Parmārtha in Advait Vedānta, so here also Syādvāda and Sarvajñatā are not opposed to each other. As a matter of fact, for the Jainas, truth alone matters (saccham logammi sārabhūyam). But the quest of truth is not an easy one. There are our own likes and dislikes which come in the way of
16
H. M. Bhattācārya, “The Jaina Concept of Truth and Reality”, Philosophical Quarterly, Calcutta, Vol. III, No. 3, October 1927, p. 213.

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impartial investigations of truth. It is, therefore, necessary to acquire a strictly impartial and equanimous state of mind and as long we are unable to have it, we should continue our sincere efforts as an impartial seeker of truth but always aiming at achieving that state of intellectual impartiality and equanimity. It follows from this that on the one hand, we should try to understand others' points of view with almost regard of which we are capable, and on the other hand, we should always subject our own views to serious critical examination. Then and then alone, it is likely to be true. Thus, truth and truth alone, is the foundation of Anekāntavāda. Infact, Anekānta or Syādvāda is the typical Jaina attitude in the quest after truth. The Jainas believe that it is almost impossible to know the real nature of reality without the distinction of past, present and future, since it is possessed of innumerable characters belonging to the three times. Then there are also our own cognitive limitations. Hence it is difficult to know the complete truth and it is much more difficult to express it in language, which is a very feeble vehicle of thought. Hence, the adoption of the Anekānta attitude seems to be very much justified. In fact, Anekāntavāda also aims at attaining the whole and real tru:h and is, therefore, not scepticism. On the contrary, this attitude of the Jainas, gives them the advantage of remaining catholic in their outlook and of avoiding the fallacy of exclusive predication. Unlike the Vedānta, Jainism does not "see intellectual peace in the Absolute by transcending the antinomies of intellect” but "in the fact of the relativity of knowledge and the consequent revelation of the many-sidedness of Reality - the one leading to religious mysticism, the other to intellectual toleration.”'17 The traces of Syādvāda can also be found in the Vedās, Upanişads and some other systems of Indian thought. 18 17 A. B. Dhurva, in his Preface (p. XII) to Mallişena's Syadvada Mañ jari. 18 See Dalsukh Mālvania, Agama Yuga Ka Anekanta, Jaina Cultural
Research Society, Banaras, No. 13; Sukhalala Sangavi, Anekāntavāda:
Vyāraharika Aur Tättvika, No. 20; C. P. Suklā, Jivan Main Syadvada, JCO-22

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Indeed, in Jainism, it has received the most systematic and serious exposition. It is also associated with the great Mahāvīra and, therefore, his every statement is prefixed with a “syāt" (somehow). Hence, it is said "to be flawless as it is neither opposed to the Agamas nor to our experience."19
However, the Jainas, in their great passion for knowledge and truth, have not remained satisfied with Syādvāda. Truth to be truth must te the whole tiuth. As stated earlier, even through the appratus of Sjādrāda, the Jainas have attempted at knowing the whole truth. But there is a vital difference between Syādıāda and Sarvajñaiā. While Syādvāda il lumines the reality indirectly, the Kevala jñana does it directly. 20 But ihen there is no contradiction between the two kinds of knowledge, since by “illumining the whole reality, it means revelation of all the seven categories of self, not-self, etc.”21
As a corollary of the above, we can say that while in the case of Syādyāda, “one knows all the objects of the world in succession, in the case of Kevala Jñāna, the knowledge is simultaneous."22 This characteristic of Kerala Jñāna follows from the very definition of omniscience.28 The omniscient knowledge is regarded as simultaneous rather than successive. 24
There is yet another point of difference between Syādvāda and Sarvajñatā with regard to the effects of vaid knowledge (pramāņa). There are two kinds of effects of a pramāņa-immediate and
No. 27; Sukhalal Sanghavi, Jaina Dharma Ka Prāna, No. 23; Sukhalāla Sanghavi, Jaina Samskriti Ka HỊdaya, No 10 (all numbers refer to JCRS).
Samantabhadra, Svayambhu-Stotra, 138. 20 Samantabhadra, Apta-mimansa, 105. 21 Vidyānanda, Aşta-Sahasri, p. 288. 22 Samantabhadra, Ibid., 101; Vidyānanda, Ibid., pp. 221–282. 23 Vidyānanda, Tattvārtha-śloka-Varttikam, I. 29.33. 24 Prabhācandra, Prameya-kamala-märtanda, p. 254; Nyāya-kumuda
candra, Vol. I, p. 88,

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mediate. The immediate result of pramāna is the removal of ignorance. However, the immediate result of the absolute knowledge (Kevala Jñāna) is bliss and equanimity (sukha, upekşā), while that of practical knowledge (i.e. Syadvāda), is the facility to select or reject what is conducive or not, to self-realisation 35 The development of omniscience is necessarily accompanied by the acquisition or perfect of absolute happiness, 26 and freedom from destructive karmas.37 This happiness is independent of everything, and hence eternal; it is not physical but spiritual.2 8
The most fundamental difference between Syādvāda and Sarvajñatā or Kevala Jñāna is that the former "leeds us to relative and partial truth whereas omniscience to absolute truth."99 After all, Syādyāda is an application of scriptural knowledge 30 which determines the meaning of an object through the employment of one-sided nayas, 31 and the scriptural knowledge is a kind of mediate or indirect knowledge.
True, unlike Naya (knowledge of an aspect of a thing), Syādvāda has in its sweep all the different nayas, but even then it never amounts to be the absolute truth. In fact, Syādvāda is merely an attitude of philosophising which tells us that on account of the infinite complexities of nature and our limited cognitive capacity what is presented is only a relative truth. Now, one may ask if we combine the results of the sevenfold nayas in. to one whole, cannot we get at the absolute truth? Is not the abso. lute truth a sum of relativa truths ? Toe aaswer is in the negatve.
25 Siddhasena Divākara, Nyāyāvatara, 28; cp. Samantabhadra, Ibid., 104. 26 Kundakunda, Pravacanasāra, I. 5); I. 19; I. 68. 27 Ibid., I. 60. 28 Ibid., I. 65. 29 Haribhadra, Anekānta Jaya Pataka, el. H. R. Kapadia, Vol. II,
p. CXX. 30 Akalanka, Lizhi yastrayın, (Akılarkı Grantha Trayam), ed. M. K.
Jaina, (Calcutta), Singhi Jaina Granthamālā, 1939), 62, 31 Siddhasena Divākara, Ibid., 30.

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Firstly, the various items of knowledge arrived at through the alternative nayas do not and cannot take place simultaneously but in succession.32 Secondly, to regard Syādvāda as absolute is to violate its very fundamental character of non-absolutism. Samantabhadra has very explicitly said that "even anekānta (non-absolutism) is non-absolutistic (anekanta) 33 in respect of pramana and naya. Further the distinction is made between Samyak Anekanta and Mithya Anekanta ie. Real and False non-absolutism, and it is held that the real anekanta is never absolute but always relative to something else. 35 However, this is not the case with omniscience. It is the knowledge of the absolute truth.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN..
There is one more minor point of difference between Syadvada and Sarvajñatā. Syādvāda like ordinary knowledge rests on sense perception, i.e., it is limited to our sense organs only. But Kevala Jñana has no dependence on any sense and arises after destruction of obstructions. 36 Ordinary individuals do not have this knowledge but only the Arhats,37 whose deluding (mohaniya), the knowledge and belief obscuring (jñānāvaranīya and darśanavaraniya), and the obstructive (antarayas) Karmas have all been destroyed.3s Knowledge acquired by the soul direct without the intervention or senses of signs. There is a complete absence of dependence upon anything except the soul.
32 Samantabhadra, Ibid., 101.
33 Samantabhadra, Svayambhu Stotra, 102; Siddhasena Divākāra, Sanmati Tarka, III. 27-28.
34 Samantabhadra, Apta-Mimaṁsā, 102,
35 Vidyananda, Aṣṭa Sahasri, p. 290.
36 Manikyananda, Parikṣa-mukham, II. 11.
37 Vadideva Suri, Pramana-naya-tattvālokālankara, II. 14.
38 Umasvāmi, T. Sut., XI; Hemacandra, Pramana-Mimämsä, I. 1.15. 39 Vadideva Suri, Ibid., II. 18.

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CHAPTER VII
ARGUMENTS FOR OMNISCIENCE
1.
Introductory Remarks
Our study of the logical and historical development of the Jaina concept of omniscience yields some important conclusions. First, the problem of omniscience has been as old as Jainism and it is vitally associated with their tirtharkaras, Secondly, it has been perhaps the most fundamental problem of Jainism, so much so that it has been described by the Jaina thinkers as the problem of life and death for their religion and culture. Naturally, vast literature has developed around this subject. Thirdly, the ideal of omniscience seems to have developed because of the inner necessity of the system as well as out of socio-cultural conditions. Fourthly, it has not remained merely a religious dogma or scriptural belief but it has been closely knit into the framework of a full-fledged philosophical theory with far-reaching implications. Lastly, it has encountered opposition from the avowedly heterodox Cārvākas on the one hand and the staunch orthodox Mimāṁsakas on the other. The opposition of the Buddhists have more or less centered round their emphasis upon the knowledge of duty and showing that Buddha was superior to Rsabhadeva? and stands at the head of all philosophers.3
Before we examine the objections of the Mināmsakas, it would be useful to know the background of their approach
1 Dharmakirti, Pra nāņ1-v.irttikam, I. 33; I. 34. 2 śāntarakṣita, Tattva-samgraha, 3348. 3 Ibid., 3340.

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to the problem. First, the avowed object of the Mimāṁsakas has been the consideration of dharma. 4 So it is also known as dharma-mīmāṁsā. Of the three sections of the Veda - the rituals (karma), worship (upāsanā) and knowledge (jñāna), it is the first of these that form the subject matter of the study of Mimāṁsā. It is clear, the ideas treated here are rooted in the Vedas. The Vedas alone, and the Veda is the only authority 5 for it. Sense perception cannot give the knowledge of dharma because that depends upon the contact of the sense organs with the material object and as such can only grasp things existing at the present time. But dharma is not a material object, nor does it exist in time. However, this difficulty does not affect the Veda. The relationship between the word and its significance is natural and also eternal (without being created by conventions, etc.). Hence the Vedic knowledge is absolutely and unconditionally true and permanently and supremely authoritative because of its self-sufficient and self-inanifest nature. The Mināṁsakas devote much of their attention to meeting the objections against the theory of self-sufficiency of verbal cog, nition and the eternal character of the word? and to formulating their own arguments in support of their position. But even if the word and its meaning are eternal, there is always a chance of one's having mistaken notions about both. So there is no independent anthority in human words. The Veda is free from any such defect since it is regarded as authorless, self-sufficient and eternal. Precisely, this is the reason that the Mimāṁsakas have rejected the notion of any human source of knowledge of dharma.
4 Jaimini, Mimāṁsā-sūtra, I. 1.1. 5 Ibid., I. 1.2 6 Ibid., I. 1.6-11; cp. Kumārila's śloka-vārtika (G. N. Jha's trans.),
pp. 409-412. 7 Ibid., I. 1. 12-17; cp. Ibid., pp. 411-420 8 Ibid., I. 1. 18-23; cp. Ibid., pp. 420-433.

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The Jainas do not believe either in the self-sufficiency of verbal cognition or in the eternal character of the Vedas, nor do they regard it as the only authoritative source of knowledge of dharma. They attribute the knowledge of dharma to their tīrtharkaras, who are omniscient, faultless and detached from the world. Hence, they have found a substitute for the Veda. It is this reason that the Mimārsakas oppose tooth and nail the entire doctrine of the omniscient person, as the final and infallible authority of morality, duty, etc. The second reason for their opposition to the idea of omniscience was mainly religious. The Mimārsakas adhered to karmakānda or the Vedic ritualism which treats of many actions but mostly of sacrifices (yajña). (Hence, Mimāmsā is also called yājñamimāṁsā or cdhvara-mīmāṁsā ) Therefore, violence crept slow. ly into the Vedic religion in the name of yajña or sacrifices, which shocked the conscience of the Jainas, because for them, non-violence had always been the supreme dharma. They, there. fore, attacked the cult of vedic ritualism, the main plank of the Mimāṁsā philosophy, However, to the Mimāṁsakas dharma is what is Vedic ard cdharma what is non-vedic. So, they could not accept any other criterion. Hence, to defend their basic position, they had naturally to attack the main basis of the reliability of Jaina-scriptures, namely, the omniscience of Mahāvīra etc. Thirdly, Jainism was a challenge to the Vedic culture in general. It not only challenged the supreme authority of the Vedas, the efficacy of rites and rituals, but also the established superiority of the Brahmins in the then social set up. This led to an ideological warfare between the Vedic and Śramanic cultures of India, with the result that each tried to
ipe out the other. However, the idea of omniscience in Jainism was the most stable factor, Hence the Mimāsakas opposed it so vehemently.
II. Mimamsakas' Objections Answered (A) Objections regarding the nature of Omniscience In order to refute the doctrine of omniscience, the Mim

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āṁsakas start with the analysis of the possible meaning of the 'omniscience and try to show that the concept has no logic and consistency. I shall discuss here the objections raised by the Minārsakas and the answers given by the Jainas and Buddhists side by side, I shall also offer my own comments wherever necessary and possible. 1. The First Objections :
Tne Mimārnsakas ask whether omniscience means the knowledge of everything or merely that of important and essential things of the universe. The Jainas cannot accept the second alternative which is both illogical and against their relativistic metaphysics. Unless one knows all the objects, he cannot distinguish between the essential and the non-essential, because knowledge is an interrelated whole. This is a type of objective relativism, which we also find in Whitehead and Bodin. However, there it has no similarity with Einstein's relativity except in the most general attitudes. The Jaina scriptures often proclaim this theory.9 Gunaratna10 also refers to an oft quoted passage found in numberous Jaina works. It refers to the idea that "he who knows one also knows all”. Every entity is related to all entities in the universe in some relation or other. These relations or paryāya are to be completely known. Hence, it follows that the complete knowledge of one entity involves the complete knowledge of other entities as well.
Since, the Jainas believe that the reality has innumerable characteristics, they cannot subscribe to the doctrine of comparative unimportance of the extent of knowledge. As things have many characters they can be known only when made the objects of all-sided knowledge or omniscience.11 Hence the Jainas re. fute the views of both the Mimāṁsakas and the Buddhists like Dharmakirti, when they try to underrate the importance
9 Ācārānga-sūtra, I. 1.3. 10 Gunaratna's comm. on şad-darśana-samuccaya, p. 222; cp. Kunda
kunda, Pravacana-sära, I. 48. 11 Siddhasena Diväkara, Nyāyavatāra, 29.
Kunda

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of omniscience against the knowledge of dharma. The Mimāmsakas point out that the assumption of omniscience is both futile and false. 12 It is false, since “it is impossible to know the innumerable atoms and hairs even of a single body'18, what to speak of knowing each of the endless number of things, past, present and future. It is futile because it is impossible and does not have any bearing upon dharma and adharma; it can be of no use in fulfilling any purpose of man. Since the dharma is cognisable through scripture only.14 (according to them), the entire attempt is as futile as "counting the crow's teeth ”15 or "humping of husks.”16 It is interesting here to refer to Dhamakirti, who also, in a similar vein, ridiculse the very idea of omniscience consisting of the knowledge of number of insects, etc. of the universe..
But the later Buddhist thinkers do not accept this position. Prajñākaragupta shows that unless we have got pure knowledge, even our words cannot be true and reliable.17 Sāntarakṣita advances many arguments against the position of the Mimāṁsakas. He says that “assertion of the impossibility of any one knowing all bairs and nails, etc., is without any basis and entirely based on ignorance,"18 since the unreality of omniscience has not been proved by any of the pramāṇas. To the charge of futility, śāntaraksita says that it is "with a totally different motive that the wise Buddhists make an attempt to acquire knowledge of all things."19 True, the Buddhists are primarily concerned with proving that Buddha knows the means of attaining heaven and liberation, and their attempt to prove Buddha's omniscience is only incidental. But it does not mean that in matters other than heaven and liberation, the know12 śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3136. 13 Ibid., 3137.
15 Ibid., 3138. 14 Ibid., 3140-41.
16 Ibid., 3142-44. 17 Prajñākaragupta, Värttikalankāra, II. 287-552 18 śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3268-3269. 19 Ibid., 3308. JCO--23

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ledge of Buddha is not hampered by obstacles and is, therefore. all-inclusive. Rather. if he becomes cmniscient, there is nothing to prevent him. So when the Mimāmsakas try to force the supporters of omniscience to accept 'omnisciene' in any of the five senses 30 suggested by the Mimāmsakas on the basis of the knowledge of the epitomised forms of things, the Buddhists tried to keep away. Such an omniscience, according to the Mimāmsakas will be psuedo-cmniscience, because it is knowledge of everything except dharma and adharma. This is why Kumārila says that "he does not reject omniscience of a person knowing other things; what he means is only the denial of omniscience in particular cases, e.g., knowledge of dharma."1
The famous Jaina philosopher Svāmī Vidyānandaa9 also refutes the views of Dharmakirti in restricting the meaning of omniscience only to the knowledge of desirable (upadeya) and non-desirable (heya) objects. Turning to the statement of Dharmakirti ridiculing omniscience by calling it the knowledge of insects etc.,, it is said that one cannot rule out the possibility that the Jivas were previously born as insects. Then the knowledge of insects will be quite important. The nature of reality is not determined by pragmatic consideration, so also is the case with knowledge. As the mirror reflects everything that are presented before it, or as the sun shines alike every where, similarly knowledge illumines all objects of all times and places without any distinction. Therefore, the question of 'desirable' and 'undesirable' things is unnecessary, for what is desirable at one place and time becomes otherwise at another place and time. Thus, only a complete knowledge can enable a person even to determine correctly what is really desirable and what is not. If it is said that omniscience means the knowledge of the epitome of the universe, like "desirable and undesirable" in Buddhism, the "nine categories" in Jainism and so
20 Ibid., 3130-3135.
21 Ibid., 3128., cp. Kumārila, loka-vārttika, II. 110-111 22 Vidyananda, Tattvärtha-gloka-vārttikam, I. 29.6-11.

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on, it may be replied on behalf of the Jainas that this is only an understatement.
The Jainas strictly adhere to the concept of total knowledge as the criterion of omniscience. This has been stated by Yasovijaya that all-inclusive cognition (sarva-viṣayatā) and directness of perception (sākṣātkāratva) are the two characteristics of omniscience. The Mimamsakas accept the former but only with regard to the omniscience of scripture; they also admit the latter but only with regard to the non-universal (asarvaviṣayaka jana) knowledge.23 Yasovijaya's definition of kevala-jñāna as the "knowledge of everything" may apparently look to be crude and simple, but it is not so. The distinguishing feature of kevala-jñāna is also said to be "sarvaviş ayata". Hence the Jainas will not allow one to reduce omniscient knowledge to that of the epitome of the universe, however useful that might be.
4
2. The Second Objection:
The second objection is about the knowledge of attributes and modes. Mimāmsakas argue "even if the person, by his diversified nature, apprehends all things - he cannot apprehend the specific individualities of all things. Under the circumstances, what would be the use of omniscient person who knows the things only in their general form, specially as in no other form is the thing apprehended." The Jainas do not accept the truth either of the premises or that of the conclusion of this argument. To the Jainas, the substance does not exist separate from attributes and modes. Substance is the substratum of attributes and modes, 20 Substance or dravya is not merely a prop, supporting an alien fact. Attributes cannot constitute reality because Jainas do not believe
23 Sukhalal Sangavi, his Introduction to Jñana-bindu-prakarana of Yaso vijaya, p. 45.
24 Yośovijaya, Jñana-bindu-prakaraṇa, section 57.
25 Śantarakṣita, Ibid., 3251-52.
26 Kundakunda, Pañcastikayasara, 10.

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that esse is percipii. What they mean is that an attribute in order to be objective and not merely psychical does require an objective basis and that is dravya. Hence, it seems superfluous for the Jainas to say that the omniscient person knows also the attributes of the objects. In fact, objects cannot be conceived apart from attributes and vice-versa. 3. The Third Objection:
Even if we accept that the somniscient person knows everything with all their attributes," omniscience cannot be true and complete unless it extends over all the places and all the times. The omniscient must know all things in all places and times. Infact, according to Jainism, spatial and temporal limitations are transcended even in imperfect super-normal perception called avadhi, but only with regard to the objects having form.ar Even the highest type of avadhi, though it can perceive all objects having form, it cannot perceive all the modes of all the things.2 8 This is not, therefore, complete omniscience. With respect to anything that was, is, or will be the case, the omni. scient person knows them. But against such a conception of complete omniscience, the Mimāṁsakas ask whether it is successive or simultaneous, and they claim to show that in both the cases, it becomes impossible. If it is successive, it cannot be omniscience, since in that case the endless number of objects with their innumberable attributes can never be exhausted and thus the knowledge so conditioned would never be complete.2 9 The Jainas do not have any difficulty in making this point since they admit that the omniscient knowledge is not successive but simultaneous.30 But then the Mimāṁsakas ask whether
27 Umāsvāmī, T. Süt., I. 28. 28 Jinabhadra, Kşamāśramana, Visesävasyaka-bhaşya, 685. 29 śāntrakṣita, Ibid., 3250, cp. Prabhācandra, Prameya-kamala-martanda
p. 254, Nyāya-kumuda-candra, Vol. I. p. 88; Anantavirya, Ibid., pp.
97-98; Anantakīrti, Brhad-Sarva jña-siddhi, p. 151. 30 Prabhācandra, Nyāya-kumuda-candra, Pt. I, p. 97, Prameya-kamala.
martanda, p. 26.

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such a simultaneous knowledge is apprehended by one cognition or by several cognitions. If the former is the case then it is impossible to perceive contradictory things like pure and impure at once by a single cognition.31 The Jainas retort: why contradictory things cannot be known by a single cognition ? Is it because they are not present at the same time or because by their very nature, they cannot be apprehended by a single cognition though they are present at the same time? If it is the former, it is incorrect since contradictory things like pure and impure do not exist at the same time. The latter position is also untenable since "there is simultaneous apprehension by one and the same cognition of mutually contradictory things like pure and impure and so forth, because they are incompatible with each other”33 Even though there are certain things that are mutually incompatible, they are cognisable by the same cognition. We do have simultaneous perception of darkness and light when there is a flash of lightening in a dark night. Analysing further, it is said that incompatibility is of two kinds-(i) mutual exclusiveness and (ii) non-existence. But by figuring in the same cognition, things do not become either unified or co-existent.33 But it may be said that if there is nothing incompatible in contraries figuring in the same cognition, then it should be possible for pleasure and pain, love and hate also to figure in the same cognition. To this objection, it may be replied that "pleasure and pain are not simultaneously cognised because they do not appear at one and the same time on account of the fact that the causes of both cannot be presented at the same time and not on account of any incompatibility.34 This means that the cause of the nonexistence of the simultaneity of pleasure and pain lies in the non-simultaneity of their causes. For instance, “though mutually incompatible, the various colours, like blue, yellow,
31 śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3248. 32 Ibid., 3632. 34 Ibid., 3625.
33 Ibid., 3623-3624.

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white etc. are actually seen at one and the same time88. if they are located at different places."
However, this reply may lead to a further objection: Being embraced within the orbit of a single cognition, there is nothing outside the limit; and thus the idea being that things are only so many, they cannot be endless, they become limited. It may be replied to this that the mere fact that certain things are apprehended by a single cognition does not deprive the things of their own character, For instance, when various colours like blue, yellow, etc. appearing in a single picture, become apprehended by a single cognition, they do not cease to be many; nor do they become merged into one another; in fact they are apprehended by cognition exactly as they are,not in any other form. Hence it is apprehended as limitless,not as limited. If it is argued that if the apprehension of the entire world is admitted, then, how could there be no appre. hension of its limits ?- one may reply that this cannot happen because there is no relation of universal concomitance between the apprehension of world and that of its limits. All things appear and disappear only in the forms in which they are apprehended by the consciousness of the omniscient person. But then there is another difficulty. If all things are included under a single cognition, then the cognised things must be supposed to have their limits. To this it may be said that there is no actual inclusion of things in the cognition. The extension of space is limitless because there can be no limits to the enumeration of things in it. If cognition is regarded as formless, there can be no apprehension of objects because cognition of one object would be indistinguishable from that of another. But this is not a great objection. In the cognition of the omniscient person, no differentiation of things and their functions is admitted because it covers all things, and not anyone thing only. But if this is the case, then things which are to be acquired (upādeya) cannot be distinguished from those to be
35
Ibid., 3626.

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abandoned (heya). To this one can reply that when the entire world appears in consciousness, these two types of things also appear in it without any incongruity and without losing any of their essential characters, 56
There are some other difficulties also which we shall examine in what follows :
(a) In knowing things existing in all times, one may know the objects of past and future either as they are or as existing in the present. If the omniscient being knows the past and the future which are non-existent, his knowledge would be illusory. If the past and the future are known as existent they are converted into the present. If the past and the future are known by the omniscient as present, his knowledge again would be illusory. Hence in both the cases, omniscience is impossible. 87 But the Jainas turn aside this objection because they hold that past and future are perceived by the omniscient not as present, but as past and future. Hence, there is no question of its being illusory. The past and the future things are as much existent and real in relation to their own time as the present things are in relation to the present. Infact the omniscient knows past objects as existing in the past and future things as existing in the future.3 8
(b) If the omniscient knows all objects at one and the same time he would become unconscious in the next moment because he would have nothing left to cognise.39 But this would be absurd. The Jainas in reply to this objection, say that this objection would have been valid if both the perception of the omniscient and the entire world were annihilated in the
36 Kamalašīla in his comm. on the Tattva-sangraha of śāntarakṣita,
3627 discusses in detail many objections some of which have been
presented here in brief. 37 Prabhācandra, Nyaya-kumud-candra, p. 88, Prameya-kamala-martanda,
p. 254. 38 Ibid., Prameya-kamala-martanda, p. 261. 39 Ibid., Prame ya-kamala-martanda, p. 261.

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following moment. But both of these are ever-lasting, hence there is no absurdity. 40
(c) It is said that the knowledge of both the prior and the posterior non-existence of a thing cannot take place together. For example, simultaneously birth and death of the same person is impossible. A thing is used in one particular sense only; for example, a blue object is treated as blue and not as yellow. It is, therefore, that if an omniscient being treats both the prior non-existence (e.g. past) and posterior non-existence (eg, future) simultaneously, it is wrong because both of them cannot co exist together. 41 To this, the Jainas say that a thing
is jerceivep as b'ue at a particular place and time and not always and everywhere. So birth and death are perceived as phenomena occuring at two places and two particular moments of time.49 4. The Fourth Objection :
It is said, if the omniscient has direct perception of everything then he will also have direct knowledge of such tastes as are unclean things. 43 This would be a very uncomfortable state of affairs, for the omniscient is also considered to be spiritually perfect. But the reply to this is very simple. If the omniscient person had experienced the unclean taste through the contact of his gustatory organ, then alone he could be accused of having an undesirable experience. But whatever is cognised by him is cognised without actual sense-object-contact; it is cognised through the mind whose perceptiveness has been brought about by the impressions of past experiences. 4 4
40 Ibid., 260. 41 Prabhācandra, Nyāya-kumuda-candra, pp. 88-89. 42 lbid., p. 97. 43 Śantarakṣita, Ibid., 3145. 44 Ibid., 3318-19; cp. Anantakīrti, Brhat-sarva jña-siddhi, pp. 178–79;
Anantavīrya, Prameya-ratna-mala, pp. 97-98. (ed. H. L. Jaina).

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It is further urged that if the omniscient being cognises everything, he must also have the experience of attachment, aversion, etc. in others, and thetefore will be influenced and contaminated by them. Consequently he would cease to be omniscient because attachment and aversion are obstructions to right cognition.45 The reply to this objection is simple. Mere knowledge of desires, aversions etc. is not sufficient to make a person tainted by them unless the self is transformed into the very mode of attachment, etc. One cannot be affected by those desires and simply by knowing them, for instance, one does not die by simply seeing the poison, or one does not drink wine by hearing the world 'wine'46 or simply because one knows about the ingredients of the drink.47 Besides, desires and aversions are produced by our impure mental states and senses and not by the self which is pure and perfect. Knowledge is different from active participation, 48
At this point, the difference between the Jainas and the Buddhist approaches are worth consideration. The Buddhist position can be interpreted to mean that all such objections arise only if we believe that the external world exists and is the object and cause of attachments. But attchments are the results of ignorance like the illusory perception of the second moon.49 This is the typical Yogācāra view. But the Jainas being realists do not accept this explanation. They think that the omniscient being is above desires and aversions and hence it cannot be tainted by them in any way merely because it knows them. The Buddhists, therefore, according to the Jainas, do not explain the facts of unclean or impure states of things but explain them away by advocating the unreality of the external world. 45 Prabhācandra, Prame ya-kamala-mārtanda, p. 254; Šāntarakṣita, Ibid.,
3315. 46 Prabhācandra, Ibid., 260. 47 M. K. Jaina, Jaina-darśana, p. 313. 48 Ibid., pp. 311-312. 49 Kamalaśīla, Pañ jikā, on Tattva-sangraha, 3318-19, JCO-24

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: (B) Objections Based on the Instruction of Dharma
by the Omniscient Being One of the most important grounds on which the Mīmāṁsakas base their objections against the existence of the omniscient being is his power of imparting instructions regarding suprasensible objects, like dharma and adharma. 1. The First Argument :
The Arhat, they urge, cannot be regarded as omniscient on the ground that he is speaker (vaktā) or instructor (upadesaka) of dharma, 50 which is supersensuous in nature. According to the Mimāmsakas, there could be no instruction by anybody, whether he is an ordinary man, or yogi or even a God, regarding supersensuous objects like dharma, since it cannot be perceived by one. 51 Dharma is one, eternal, immutable and universal. It cannot change from person to person, from place to place, and from time to time. Now, according to the Mimā. ṁsakas, dharma can only be derived from the Vedas, which are impersonal, authorless, eternal and universal. If we regard a particular person like Buddha or Mahāvīra as capable of giving instruction in matters of dharma, we shall be faced with many difficulties. Firstly, these persons do not exist for ever, they do cease to exist after the attainment of final salvation. Secondly, while alive, they fail to be omnipresent to guide all people in matters of dharma. Thirdly, there is also lack of unanimity among those instructors and often they make contradictory statements. Had they teen omniscient beings, they would not have made conflicting statements.52 Lastly, they impart instructions even to the unworthy people like the low
50 Vādībha Simba, Syadvāda-siddhi, p. 29; Vidyānanda, Āpta-parikşa,
99; Așịa-sahasarī, p. Prabhācandra, Nyāya-kumuda-candra, p. 82, Prame ya-kamala-mārtanda, p. 253; Anantavīrya, Prame ya-ratna-mala,
p. 17. (ed. S. C. Ghosal). 51 Kumārila, śloka-vārttika, II. 156. cp. Sabara-bhaşya, I. 1.2. $2 Śānțarakṣita, Ibid., 3148-49.

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caste people or the sūdras.53 The utterences in the Śrutis about the omniscience of gods like Brahmā, etc. should be interpreted either figuratively or in the sense of self-knowledge. 54
These objections raised by the Mimāṁsakas rest on their theory of sole competence of the Vedas in matters of instructions of dharmı. But, on behalf of the Buddhists and Jainas, it might be urged that the Vedas, being mainly occupied with the instructions regarding sacrifices (yajña ) are themselves vitiated by violence etc. They also contain many faulty state. ments, hence they are incapable of imparting correct instructions about dharma.55
To say that “since Buddha or Mahāvīra does not exist for ever, they cannot impart instructions", is wrong. Even if they die, their teachings remain eternally with us like the words of the Vedas. Similarly, while alive, they may not be present everywhere, but their instructions are known to everybody. They say that there are conflicting statements made by diffe. rent persons claiming omniscience, but this can be well applied to the case of Vedas also, where we find different commen. tators offering different interpretations.56 If Buddha and Mahāvīra have imparted instructions to all the people, -rich and poor, high and low, it only reflects their large-heartedness and an abiding sense of compassion-the basis of all dharma, 57 2. The Second Argument :
Kumārila thinks that there is no invariable relation between the fact of being an instructor and that of being preceded by the perception of the objects of instruction.58 Further,
53 Ibid., 3226-27; Kumarila, Tantra-värttika, p. 116. 54 śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3206. 55 Ibid., 3263-64. 56 Dayananda's interpretation strikes at the root of ritualism as prescri
bed by Mimāṁsakas. 57 Śānţarakṣita, Ibid., 3571-3572. 68 Kumärila, Ibid., II. 157.

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there can be no absolute certainty as to what is the real meaning of the instructor, because a man though knowing one thing in one way, may speak of it in another way,59 Therefore, if any person is regarded as an instructor of dharma, the instruction is bound to suffer from such defects of ambiguity, vagueness, etc.
The Jainas see no point in this argument, because, for them, a man will be a better instructor if he is more learned; with the perfection of knowledge, verbal skill is also perfected. Even the Mimāṁsakas admit that Jaimini, the founder of their system was an ideal instructor because of his excellent learning and wisdom in matters of dharma.co 3. The Thrid Argument :
(a) The Mimāṁsakas, further argue, that the Arhat cannot be omniscient since he is a speaker and the speech is the result of desires and aversions and where there are desires and aversions, omniscience is impossible. To this the Jainas reply that if the Mimāmsakas object to the verbal instructions being vitiated by one's desires and aversions, on these very grounds, the validity of their Vedas can also be questioned, However, if they say that the Vedas are eternal, we can point out to them that the Vedas themselves do not speak out their meanings but require an interpreter spoksman to do that.01 Again, as the Vedas have been regarded as free from attachment and aversion, there should be no reason to reject the omniscient's being free from attachment etc.( 2
(6) The Mimāṁsakas further argue that since the speech is connected with desires, the Arhat cannot be a speaker since he is free from all desires.63 To this, it is said that there
59 Ibid., II. 160. 60 Vādībha Simba, Ibid., p. 29, cp. Vidyānanda, Apta-parikṣā, 100. 61. Akalanka, Siddhi-viniscaya, 13, cp. Śānţarakṣita, Ibid., 3602-5. 62 Ibid., 14. 63 Vādfbha, Simba, Ibid., pp. 29-30.

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is no invariable relation between our desires and our speech,6 4 for instance, one speaks even during the state of swoon and sleep, where there is absence of desires. On the other hand, the fools and the idiots cannot be speakers of the scriptures although they might very much desire it.05 Here, we can point out to the Jainas that our desires are burried deep into our unconscious and what we express during our sleep or swɔɔn are the unconscious desires. We see that one who is confused speaks something other than what he wishes to speak; therefore the assertion does not always follow the wish of the speaker.66 We can, then, conclude that the Arhat is an instructor due to his faultless cognition and there is no difficulty in his being a speaker or instructor because he is free from desires, etc. 4. The Fourth Argument :
The Mimāmsakas say that the omniscient being can have no 'desire to speak' since there is no conceptual content in him, due to the disappearance of all obstacles in the shape of affections born out of craving, and desire is invariably concomitant with the conceptual content.c? The Buddhists answer to this is useful. According to them, conceptual content is of two kind;-unhealthy (beset with afflictions) and healthy (favourable to the world's welfare). The former is absent in such a person, while the latter is not incompatible with his nature.c8 The Jaina stand is also similar to it. They also do not admit any incompatiblity between the state of omniscience and that of speakership or instructorship. On the other hand, they think that faultless instruction is impossible without the state of omniscience and desirelessness. The instructions
64 Kumārila, Ibid., II. 158. 65 Vādībha, Simba, Ibid., pp. 29–30. 66 Kumārila, Ibid., II. 161. 67 śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3597... 68 Ibid., 3598. 69 Vidyānanda, Tattvärtha-śloka-vārttikam, I. 29-30.

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of such a person are, however, not motivated by any unhealthy desires, which have been destroyed altogether but by his sense of compassion and universal welfare. But if it is urged that all conceptual content by its nature, appears in the form of the content of a thing as beneficial when it is not beneficial, -hence it is wrong, and mistaken; consequently any appearance of it would be incompatible with the character of the man who has got rid of obscurations. To this it is said that as a matter of fact, the omniscient does not recognise the conceptual content as beneficial; he knows it to be baseless. He is like the the magician who knows the trick he is playing and is not thereby mistaken. 70
5. The Fifth Argument:
The Mimāmsakas deny the validity of the words of Arhat. They say that their words are not reliable being those of a person as the Arhat is a person like Buddha. To this, the Jainas say that only faultly words are unreliable. In fact, faultless instructions are always regarded as reliable, as is done with those of the Vedus by the Mimamsakas themselves. The Arhat speaks out faultless instructions and hence their reliability cannot be doubted. The case with the Buddhists is slightly different. Lord Buddha is said to be always rapt in non-coceptual, indeterminate, abstract, communion and so he does not actually teach anything at all."2 "Teachings issue forth, freely from even the walls and with the help of these, men come to know, all that they want to know and thus they quickly secure all that is good for them." However, such assertions seem to be only dogmatic and hence unacceptable. The Buddhists say that it is purely through His super-vision that Buddha is regarded as the 'composer' of the teachings; hence His speakership need
70 Santarakṣita, Ibid., 3599-3600.
71 Vadideva Simha, Ibid., p. 30.
12 Śantarakṣita, Ibid., 3242 (Panjika)•
73 Ibid., 3241-3243.
74 Kumārila, Ibid., II. 138-139.

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not be associated with any conceptual content.75 If the teachings had not been prompted by the overlordship of the omniscient person, then they might not be accepted as those of the reliable person, 76 In fact, the person is said to have become Buddha or Enlightened only when all that has to be known becomes known, all that has to be abondoned has been abandoned and all that has to be reflected upon has become reflected upon, 6. The Sixth Argument :
The Mimaṁsakas hold speakership (i.e., the property of giving instructions about dharma etc.) as a reason (hetu) for rejecting the reality of the omniscient person. They argue that speakership is a personal characteristic. i.e., a characteristic which can be had only by a person, and as no person can be the final authority in mattters connected with dharma, speakership (being personal) implies lacking in matters of dharma. Therefore, the speaker, being a person and hence not being the source of knowledge of dharma, cannot be omniscient, as the omniscient person must know everything including dharma.
However, the Jainas hold that to regard 'speakership’ as a reason (hetu) for rejecting the reality of the omniscient is not valid reason (samyak-hetu),"in asmuch as there is no ground of conflict between the 'speakership' and 'omniscience'. If the Mimāṁsaka says that a person who is a speaker is not omniscient because of giving instructions of dharma, then this statement contradicts his own earlier statement that Jaimini can give instruction or dharma.78 However, for argument sake, even if it is admitted that 'speakership' is a valid reason to establish the non-existence of the omniscient being, we can ask what sort of speaker is meant here. It can mean one who makes statements not supported by pramānas (pramana
75 śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3606-3610. 76 Ibid., 3611 77 Anantavīrya, Ibid., p. 92. 78 Prabhācandra, Nyāya-kumuda-candra, Vol. I, p. 03.

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virodhi), or statement supported by pramāņas (pramāṇa-sangata) or like an ordinary person who makes all sorts of statements (samanya). If the first alternative is true, then in using it as the hetu, one commits fallacy of unproved reason (asiddha) because it has not been proved that the omniscient makes statements unsupported by the pramanas; rather the opposite is true because there can be no false instructions given by the omniscient. If the second alternative is true, then it will lead to the fallacy of contradictory (viruddha) ketu, since such speaker (who makes only such statement as supported by the pramāņas) must be omniscient being; and if we accept the last alternative, it will lead to the fallacy of irregular middle (anaikantika) because in that case both omniscience and non-omniscience will be established depending upon the statements made by the ordinary speaker.79
192
(b) Prabhācandra's argument against using 'speakership' as the hetu for establishing the non-existence of cmniscience is also very similar to the above. According to him, such a speaker may be either meaningful (arthasya vaktṛtvam) or unmeaningful (artha-rahitasya vaktṛatvam) or ordinary (sāmānya). If the speaker is accepted as meaningful, it becomes against the reason (viruddha) because one who will speak only meaningful things will naturally be an omniscient being; if the second alternative is accepted, it proves the proposition (siddha-sādhana) since the Jainas also do not admit the unmeaningful speaker as omniscient being; if the speaker is regarded as ordinary (sāmānya), the Jainas have no opposition to it. If at all there might be any opposition, it might be either all-time opposition (sahānavasthāna-virodha) like enemity between the serpent and goose or mutually exclusive opposition (paraspara-parihāralakṣaṇa-virodha). It cannot be the first type of opposition, since the omniscient being also imparts instructions e.g. they are speakers. If the second alternative e.g. the opposition be
79 Ibid., cp. Anantavirya, Ibid., pp. 92-93; Prabhācandra, Prameyakamala-martanda, p. 263; V. R. Suri, Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 570,

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tween speaker ship and omniscience is accepted, it can be again of two types : partial or total. In both the cases, there will be the fallacy of circular reasoning and hence non-existence of omniscience can not be established. In short, the Jainas try to show that there is no relation of universal concomitance between non-existence of omniscience and speakership, hence 'speakership' as a hetu cannot establish non existence of omniscience. 8 0 7. The Seventh Argument :
śāntraksita, the Erddhist logicien, also holds that the affirmation of what is not incompatible cannot be rightly regarded as setting aside the other, otherwise the presence of colour might mean the absence of taste. 81 However, the Mimāṁsakas would argue that the character of being a speaker is incompatible with om niscience; they cannot co-exist, the conceptual content being their indirect cause. Since, one cannot speak without previous thinking, conceptual content must be regarded as the cause of speaking. But as all conceptual content is associated with verbal expression it cannot apprehend the forms of things, hence there can be no omniscience. 82. To this objection, it migh be said those who regard that the speakership of the omniscient person follows from cogitation and thinking, do not admit the omniscient person on the ground of his being a 'speaker', nor on the ground of his conceptual knowledge.83 But the opponent says that if it is held that in the conceptual state, the Lord is not omniscient, then His words would be uttered by one who is not omniscient and as such, not reliable. But it is incorrect to say this, since His non-omniscience has been discarded by His cmniscience. 84 Some Buddhists hold that words proceed from the Buddha without conceptual content under the force of the initial momentum in manner of the revolution of the wheel. 85
80 Prabhācandra, Prame ya-kamala-mārtanda, p. 263;. cp. Anantakirti,
Lughu-sarvajña-siddhi, pp. 119-120; Brhat-sarva jña-siddhi, pp. 140-142. 81 śāntarakṣita, Ibid., Ibid., 3358. 82. Ibid., 3358 (Panjikā) 83 Ibid., 3361-3362. .84 Ibid., 3364-65, 85 Ibid., 3368-69.
JCO-25

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(C) Some Other Objections Here I propose to discuss some other objections not in cluded in the previous ones, raised by the Mimāṁsaka: against the theory of omniscience.
The Mimāmsakas argue that, it is being claimed that there are many omniscient persons like Kapila, Kaņāda, Buddha Vardhamāna, etc., but since they impart mutually contradic tory instructions, we cannot single out any one as the only omniscient being because the grounds of reliability are of the same authority in each case. 80 The Buddhists' answer is not very convincing inasmuch as they introduce some metaphy şical considerations, which are disputable. To them, those who do pot believe in the doctrine of no-soul, cannot be omni: scient beings. 8! On this ground the claims of all philosophers other than Buddha are set aside. However, if other philosophers are accepted as holding the said opinion, they become different Buddhas. This does not completely answer the objection of the Mimāṁsakas : “If Buddha is omniscient person, then what is the proof for Kapila not teing so and if both are omniscient beings then how is that there is difference of opinion between them.”88
It might be urged on behalf of the Buddhists that some. times by just using that some words of a particular person are found to be true of facts, that it is inferred that his words relating to all other things also are true. This is incorrect. But the Mimāṁsakas may reply that in some matters like arithmetic, all beings-Jaina, Buddha and others--are found to be truthful; and no distinction is found among them, 89 hence, if they would have been omniscient beings, there would have been complete unanimity with regard to their instructions. Against this objection of the Mimārsakas, it might be urged that it is wrong to think a person who knows the letters of the alphabet only as conversant with the essence of all sciences,
86 Ibid., 3148. 88 Ibid., 3149-3150.
87 89
Ibid., 3325-3338. Ibid., 3150.

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merely on the ground of his possessing the same amount of knowledge about one particular thing like food 90 as possessed by scientists. The essential characterstics of omniscience are present, according to Buddhists only in Lord Buddha, because he, at the very outset, expounded the doctrine of no-soul'1 and also had direct preception free from all 'affliction' and 'obstacles'. 93 However, the Mimāṁsakas might argue that the same reason by which the omniscience of one person is proved, namely the love of Buddhists for their own view of things, can be used also by others.93 For example, the Jainas, like the Buddhists, may also prove the omniscience of Jina in the same way. The Jainas may argue that since the Jina alone knows the doctrine of Syādvāda, he alone is omniscient and not Buddha.
The Buddhists' reply although interesting is not very convincing. According to them, there is a fundamental difference between the Buddhists and the Jaina approaches. They claim that their doctrines are well-knit, practicable and useful and based upon well-established premises while all these things are absent in any other doctrine. 9 4 But this is no argum, nt. Even the Jainas and any other system of philosophy can also claim the said thing.
III. Arguments Based on Classical Pramanas So long omniscience was treated as a religious dogma, logical proof was not considered necessary, but we have seen that in course of time, the problem of omniscience became a bone of contention between the Mimāmsakas on the one hand
90 Ibid., 3349 (see also Panjika) 91 Ibid., 3340 (cf. 3341-3348). 92 Ibid., 3338-3339; cp. Ratnakirti, Sarvajña-siddhi, p. 5. 93 Ibid., 3151. 94 Ibid., 3352-3353. The Buddhists urge some other such psuedo-argu
ments also. They say that their objections against the Jaina theory of omniscience is not rooted in anger but in pity, which, they think, is not the case with others. But this is no argument.

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and the Jainas and the Buddhist logicians on the other. Continuing their objections, it is worthwhile to consider their claim that existence of omniscient person has not been proved by any one of the five means of cognition (pramānas), namely, perception (pratyakşa), inference (anumāna ) verble testimony (sabda), analogy (upamāna) and presumption (arthüpatti). Ard if it fails within the scope of non-cognition (anupalabdhi), one can infer only its non-existence (abhāva). On the other hand, the Jaina and Buddhist logicians have given strong rejoinders to their objections. All this discussion95 constitutes vast logical literature spread in various works, of course, containing of differences of details. I shall examine their arguments and also make my own comments wherever possible.
(A). Arguments Based on Perception (Praiyaksa) Sense-perception refers only to the deinite objects of the senses coningiato contact with sense-organs and xeisting in the present tin 3.90 Aj suci, by itself, it cannot bring about omniscience. One cannot perceive the omniscient person because his perception cannot bring about the cognition of him, as he does not forin an object of such cognition.97
Against the abive objection, the Jainas ask: Does perception annul the idea of omniscience with regard to a parti
95 Kumārila, Ibid. II. 150-158; Prabhācandra, Nyāya-kumuda-candra.
Vol. I, pp. 88-97, Pranaya-ka nala--märtan la, pp. 247-265; Anantavirya, Ibid., pp. 85-99; Anantakirti, BỊhat and Laghu-sarvajña-siddhi, pp. 107-204; Vidyananda, Aşta-sanasri, pp. 4471, Apta-parik şā, pp. 206-239; Tattvartha-śloka-vārtiikam, I. 29. 1-39; Akalanka, Siddhiviniscaya, (ch. VIII); Santarakṣita, Ibid., Ch. XXVI; Ratnakirti, Sarva jña-siddhi, in Ratnakirti-nibandhavali.
96 Kumārila. Ibid., II. 113-15; Prabhāchandra, Nyaya-kumuda-candra.
Vol. I, p. 86. 97 See Anantakirti, Laghu-sarvajña-siddhi, p. 113, BỊhat sarva jñasiddhi,
p. 130; * Anantavirya, Ibid., p. 85; Akalanka, Siddhiviniscaya, VIII. 2; Ratnakirti, Ibid., p. 5; V. R. Sūri, Abhidhana Rajendral, Vol. VIII, p. 568; śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 186 (with comy).

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cular person at a particular time and place, or with regard to all persons at all places and times ? If it is the former, they have no objection since they do not say that omniscience is present in all persons and at all places and times; but if the second is meant, the objector hiineself would become an oanniscient being, inasmuch as, a non-omniscient being cannot say that all persons are non-omniscient; if he can correctly make such a statement, he is no other than omniscient being.
The Mimāṁsakas base their argument on the inapplicability of perception to omniscience. But the inapplicability of perception cannot be proved by perception, because perception cannot prove absence (abhiya) of perception. Further, the in. applicability of perception is not invariably concomitant with non-existence of the thing concerned.
To say that the non-existence of omniscient being is proved not by inapplicability of perception but by perception being inoperative is a more verbal chinge in the statement. Perception is neither the cause of nor it includes the perceived, since objects exist even in the absence of perception. The Jainas further try to corner the Mininsakis by asking a dilem matic question : whether they reject the notion of omniscient on the basis of their own perception or on the basis of the perceptions of all? I they ac:spt the former, it is wrong since objects of distint places and past and future do exist even if they do not perceiv; then; if they choose the second alternitive, it racoils upon them and proves themselves omniscient beings, since they are supposed to know the perception of everyone. As a matter of fact, both existence and non-existence are contradictory terms.98
98 See Prabhācandra, Nyaya-kumuda-candra, Vol. I, pp. 89.90, Prameya.
kamala-mārtanda, p. 255; cp. V. R. Sūri, Ibid., p. 570; Anantakirti, Laghu-sarva jña-siddhi, p. 113, Brhat-sarvajña-siddhi, p. 142. At this point the Mimāmsakas say that perception will require the help of light, sense organs etc. But the Jainas hold that kevala jñāna is a non-sensorial knowledge (Ananțakirti, Laghu-sarvajña-siddhi, p. 113)

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The Mimāmsakas object to the naming of non-sensory knowledge as perception on the basis of common linguistic usage. But this is quite pointless since the word 'akṣa' meaning "to see" in the composition of 'pratyakṣa is not very relevant, as for example, in the derivation of the Sanskrit 'go' (meaning, cow), the root gam' (meaning "to go") is not very relevant.99 Although the word 'aksa' occurs both in sensory-perception (indriya-pratyakṣa) and non-sensory perception (arhat-pratyakṣa), yet the same term means differently at both the places. 100 The important feature of perception is directness of cognition. In arhat-pratyakṣa, the soul knows the object directly without the help of sense-organs and other physical auxiliaries. Akalanka101 also rejects the contention of the Mimamsakas on the basis of astronomical knowledge, etc. However, according to the Buddhists, the " knowledge of the Four Noble Truths is omniscience, which is attained owing to long and steady practice of mind accompanied with an element of faith.102
""
(B) Arguments Based on Inference (Anumanı)
According to the Mimamsakas, the omniscient person cannot also be proved by means of inference.103 In inference, we require a middle term and a relation of universal concomitance between the middle and the major terms, which we cannot have in the case of omniscience. However, if an y
which does not need such help. However, even in the cases of the perception of a cat or other nocturnal animals, these physical auxilaries are not needed (Anantakirti, Bṛhat-sarvajña-siddhi, p. 142.)
99 Anantakirti, Laghu-sarvajña-siddhi, p. 119.
100 Vidyananda, Āptaparikṣā, 267, p. 220.
101 Akalanka, Siddhiviniscaya, VIII. 2; cp. Anantakirti, Bṛhat-sarvajñasiddhi, pp. 146-148.
102 Mimämsakas advance thirteen arguments to refute the contention of the Buddhists, which have been met by Ratnakirti (see Nibandh avali pp. 1-3.
103 Kumārila, Ibid., II. 117; cp. Ratnakirti, Sarvajña-siddhi, p. 5.

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one insists that there is such a middle term (hetu), it would have to be either based on non-apprehension (anupalambha), or on causal concomitance (kārya-kāraņa-avinābhāva) or on the nature of things (srabhāra ).104 It cannot be the first since what is needed here is a positive reason; it also cannot be the secord, sirce causal relationship is always based on previous perception, but no perception is possible of omniscience; the third reason is also out of question, since an omniscient person himself being imperceptible, his nature, which must be inseprarable from himself cannot also be perceived.
The reason (hetu) can be supplied only by perception or inference. If it is the first, it is absurd since the relation of universal concomitance cannot be established on the basis of perception and without this relation no inference can be valid. If it is said to be established by another inference, it will lead to circular reasoning and also to infinite regress. 105
Further, the reason that would be employed to establish the existence of the omniscient being would be vitiated by the fallacies of being inadmissible (asiddha), contradictory (viruddha) and inconclusive (anaikāntika).106 For example, when a reason is given, it is adduced as a property belonging either to a positive-entity (bhāra-dharma), or a negative-entily (abhāvadharma), or both (ubhaya-dharma). If it is the first, t'ie reason would be inadmissible (asiddha) because unless the existence of omniscience is not established, there can be no reason regarding his positive attribute (bhāva dharma); if the second alternative be accepted, there will be the fallacy of contradicted (viruddha), since instead of establishing the existence of omniscience, his non-existence becomes established through the reason of negative-attribute (abhāva-dharma-hetu); and if the
104 Prabhacandra (Nyaya-kumudacandra, Vol. I. pp 86-87) mentions
only the last two. Kamalašila mentions all the three (Tattvasangraha
3186); Vidyānanda, Aşțasahasri, p. 45, Apta parikṣā, 88. 105 Prabhācandra, Prameya-kamala-martanda, pp. 247-248. 106 Ibid., p. 248, cp. Śantarakṣita, Ibid., 3286; Anantavīrya, Ibid., p. 86,

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Jast alternative be accepted, it would lead to the fallacy of incarclusive reasoning (anaikāntika), since the reason would apply both positively and negatively.
The Mīmāṁsakas also raise another querry whether omniscient being sought to be proved is a particular being or being in general. If what is meant is a particular omniscient being, then, since we cannot get any other example either for (paksa) or against (vipak şa) the claim, the reason (hetu) would be inconclusive and extraordinary (asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika). On the other hand, what ts meant is a being in general, then the scripture created by the Arhat will not be valid. However, if the Arhat is sought to be proved as omniscient through a particular reason, then by the same logic, Buddha would also become omniscient. 107
Finally, the Mimārsakas also try to show the difficulties in the famous Jaina argument advanced by Samantabhadra : “the existence of an omniscient being is established from the fact that to some beings invisible ihings like atoms, things or persons remote in time or place become known as objects of direct perception like the existence of fire in a bill is also the subject of perception."108 The Mimāṁsakas ask : Are these things the objects of one or of more than cre reception? If the first alternative te admitted, it is contradictory (viruddha) since the three kinds of perceptional objects, namely, the subtle (:ūkşama), obscure (antarita) and distant (dūra) cannot be the objects of one perception; if they be the object of various kinds of perception or cognition, it amounts to prove what is an obvious fact”. 109 "If there really existed a person knowing all things, through the six means of knowledge, how could such a person be denied ? "110
107 Prabhācandra, Prameya-kamala-mārtanda, p. 248. 108 Samantabhadra, Apta-mũimānsa, 5. 109 Prabhācandra, Ibid., p. 248. 110 Kumārila, Ibid., II, 111-112.

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To get rid of these difficulties, the Jainas use "knowability', 'cognisability' ard the 'property of existence''11 as the reason (hetu) for proving the existence of omniscience. But the Mimāmsakas urge, as we have shown earlier, that this reason could be taken to prove omniscience either in general or in particular, or both. If it is taken in the first sense, it becomes absurd (ayuktah) since the matter is still under dispute; if it is in the second sense, the reason becomes inadmissible (asiddha), since the particular knowledge being limited, the extent of knowability also becomes restricted, If we choose the last alternative, the reason would become inconclusive (anaikāntika).'13 Even if the existence of omniscient person in general were established, it would not have any effect on the practical activity of man because this is a general assertion and there can be no influence of the words of such a person until he is really found to exist. 113 Similarly, omniscience proved in particular person is also very vague statement, which does not refer to a particular person but to 'someone'. 114
The Jaina and the Buddhist logicians have tried to show that inference cannot prove the non-existence of the omniscient being, since all the three reasons (hetu), namely, non-apprehen sion (anupalambha), contradictory (viruddha) and instructorship (vaktstva) are said to be faulty. 115 Taking one by one, the non-existence of omniscient being cannot be proved by the absence of one's own (sva-sambandhi) apprehension of the
1 śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3235-37; cp. Prabhācandra, ibid., p. 249.
Samantabhadra (Apta-mimamsā, 105) uses anume yatva hetu, it was Akalanka who introduced Prame yatva hetu (Aşta-sati on Apta-mimāṁsā,.
105. 112 Prabhācandra, Ibid. p. 249. 113 Santaraksita, Ibid., 3230-31 (Pan jika). 114 Ibid., 3232. 115 Prabhācandra, Ibid., p. 263, Nyāya-kumudacandra, Vol, I. p. 91;
V. R. Suri, Ibid., Vol. VII, 570; Akalarka, Siddhi-viniscaya, VIII. 5; Anantavirya, Ibid., no. 92-94; Anantakirti, Brhat-sarva jña-siddhi,
pp. 154-169. ICO-26 :

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omniscient being, since if it calims to prove non-existence of the omniscient unconditionally (nirvisesana), it is inconclusive (anaikāntika) because one cannot be sure if nobody else has the cognition of its existence. On the other hand, if it claims to prove it only in a qualified sense (savisesaņa), i.e., subject to certain conditions, then the proof has no status. Further, it cannot also be proved by the non-apprehension of all men (sarva-sambandhī) because such non-apprehension it. self cannot be proved. If someone knows the nature of all men then he himself becomes omniscient.
Non-apprehension cannot be valid reason as it is neither the cause (kāraņa), nor the effect (kārya), nor the pervader (vyāpaka) of 'omniscient being'. 116 When 'non-apprehension' cannot be either the 'cause' or the 'pervader', the absence of it cannot mean the absence of omniscience. Similarly, 'nonapprehension cannot be the 'effect' since there are scriptures containing instructions about many supra-sensible phenomena like dharma etc. In short, “non-apprehension ” with regard to the above cases will not be operative because at the moment the non-apprehension of the omniscient is inevitable because at this moment there is none who is omniscient. So any attempt to deny the omniscient person on the ground of mere nonapprehension' is like denying the marriage of one's mother because mother's marriage 117 is inevitably non-cognisable or naming one's father. If it is said that the cause is known from its effect and hence there is no need of denying the marriage of one's mother, this would not be a valid argument since a wicked woman might bringforth a son even without marriage. It might be urged against this, what is cognised is not non-existence but existence, and the non-existence of
116 Prabhācandra, Nyāya-kumudacandra, p. 91; Sāntaraksita, Ibid.,
3270. 117 śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3282. It may be pointed out that a child can see
the marriage of his mother with other man who becomes his stepfather, but it is a case of remarriage.

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the marriage of one's mother is not cognised because it is known by other people. But it may be said that one cannot know what the knowledge of the other people is. Besides, if the assertion regarding the marriage of one's mother is accepted as reliable, then why should one not regard another man's assertion that the omniscient person does not exist as reliable ?118
The second reason 'contradiction' (viruddha) also cannot prove the non-existence of the omniscient being. The contradictory reason is of two kinds : direct (sāksāt) and indirect (paramparā). Now, the former may prove the non-existence of the omniscient being either at a particular place and time or at all places and all times. If it be the former, the nonexistence of the omniscient being is not really proved; however if we accept the second alternative, we ourselves become omniscient, since, we make our asseration as true of all places and all times.
The indirect coniradictory reason is also not admissible. It has three kinds, relating to the cause (kāraņa), the effect (karya) and pervader (vyāpaka). Now, if they are contradictory with regard to a particular place and time, they cannot prove the non-existence of the omniscient being, but if they refer to all places and times, they indirectly prove its existence, since the man who possesses such a knowledge must be an omniscient being.
The third reason of 'speakership’ (vakt satva) has already been dealt with earlier.
(C) Arguments Based on Postulation (Arthāpatti)
Where the perception of an object cannot be explained without the assumption of another thing, the existence of that thing is known as postulation ( arthā patti ). Those who claim to establish the existence of omniscient being on the ground of postulation try to show that there could be no
118
Prabhācandra, Ibid., Vol. I, p. 92.

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instructions with regard to supersensuous objects if the instructor had not known them. Hence the omniscient being must be postulated or assumed, as there are such instructions. This argument may be interpreted also as an inferential reasoning both affirmatively (e.g. He who is an instructor is one who knows the supersensuous objects... ) and negatively (e.g. He who does not know them is not an instructor...), showing a relation of invariable concomitance between the fact of being an instructor and being preceded by the perception of the object of instruction."119
The Mimămsakas argue that instructions may be either due to dreams, delusion and even for duping the disciples, or due to the acceptance of the teachings of the Veda. Now, if the former is the case, they are not worthwhile and reliable, but if the latter, then it amounts to accepting the Mimāmsakas position that Veda alone is the means of knowing dharma. But as regards Buddha, Mahāvira and others, who are said to be ignorant of the Vedas since they unlike Manuinparted their teachings to the low-caste people (śūdras), their preachings might have proceeded from delusion only. 120
In reply to the above charges, the Jainas and the Buddhists join their hands together, According to the Jaina logicians, arthāpatti is not capable of proving the non-existence of omniscient since it fails to establish the relation of universal concomitance between the conclusion and the reason. 121 Arthāpatti works only where other means of knowledge, such as perception, are available, but no other source of knowledge establish non-existence of omniscients. Rather, even the validity of the Vedas can be proved by postulating some omniscient being. 122
119 Kumārila, Sloka-värttika, II. 156-158. 120 śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3222--3229; Šabara-bhāşya, I. 1.2; Kumärila,
Ibid., II. 159. 121 Vidyānanda, Apta-parikṣā, 102. 122 See Prabhācandra, Nyäya-kumudacandra, Vol. I, p. 94, Prame ya
kamala-martanda, p. 265.

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The Buddhist logicians mainly concentrate on their replies to the changes of the Mimāmsakas against the omniscience of Buddha. They point out that "the flawless exposition of the path of heaven and nirvāṇa cannot have its source in delusion."135 It is sheer delusion to think him deluded who has attained the highest state of spiritual elevation free from all afflictions of the mind.134
(D) Argument based on Analogy (upamāna) Analogy (upamāna) is the means of knowing a thing based upon its similarity to another thing already known. When an object has nothing similar to it, it cannot be proved by analogical argument. Any person like the omniscient being is not perceptible; hence the existence of the omniscient cannot be proved on the basis of analogy. On the contrary, it would be correct for all men to deduce, from Analogy, the nonexistence of any omniscient being, finding that nobody existing at present is omniscient. 135 If anyone is similar to the omniscient being, he will be himself omniscient.
in reply to the above objection of the Mināmsakas, the Jainas simply rebut their argument by pointing out that since analogy works only in the field of resemblances and since we do not find the non-existence of anyone similar to the omniscient being the non-existence of the omniscient being cannot be proved. 196
It may also be noted that any search after physical simi. larity of the omniscient being is useless, since the attribute
123 śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3665 along with 3217. 124 Ibid., 3256 along with 3225; 3567 along with 3226. See also Ratna
kirti, Sarva jña-siddhi, p. 25. 125 Santaraksita, Ibid., 3215 3216, Prabhācandra, Nyāya-kumu dacandra,
Vol. I, p. 87, Prame yakamala-martanda, p. 249; Anantavīrya, Ibid.,
p. 17; V. R. Sūri, Ibid., p. 570. 126 Prabhācandra, Nyāya-kumuachandra, Vol. I, p. 94; Prame yakamala
martanda, p. 264; Vidyananda, Apta- pariksā, 101.

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of omniscience is spiritual and not bodily.187 The Buddhists do not accept Analogy as a valid means of cognition. But for the Jainas, even if it were reliable, it would be of no use in proving the existence of the omniscient being because it requires similarity of the object cow (gavaya ) to something well-known (go'). In the present case the omniscient being is not an well-known object, nor there is anything similar to it.138
Then the other argument that after having found that no man is omniscient one can conclude that no man is omniscient simply recoils upon the Mināṁsakas thewselves, since if all men are seen by anybody he is himself an omniscient be ing. If non-omniscience of all proves one's own omniscience, the argument is incongruous.
(E) Argument based on the Scriptures (Agamas)
According to the Mimāṁsakas, “the existence of the omniscient cannot be proved by scriptures; for in that case there would be circular reasoning,"189 i.e. the scripture will depend for it validity upon the omniscience of the author and the omniscience of the author will depend upon the scriptures for its confirmation. Scriptures muy be either eternal or non-eternal. In the eternal scripture, which is no other than the Veda, there is no proof of omniscience of anybody. Such sentences occuring in the Veda- 'He is omniscient and the like are only eulogistic and should not be taken as descriptive.180
127 Prabhācandra, Nyāya-kumudacandra, Vol. I. p. 94; cp. Śäntarakṣita
Ibid., 3558-3561. 128 Prabhācandra, Ibid., p. 94; Ratnakīrti, Ibid., p; 25. 129 Kumārila, Ibid., II. 118. Also see II. 119-120. cp. Śäntaraksita.
Ibid., 3188-3189; Prabhācandra, Ibid., p. 87, Prameya-kamala-mār.
tanda, p. 249. 130 Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttikam of Vidyananda, p. 65; Sanmati-Tarka of
Siddhasena Divakara (Tikā), p. 46; Syadvada-Ratnakara of Deva Suri, p. 364.

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However, the eternal scripture (nitya-agama) may be either without beginning (anādi) or with beginning (ādi). Now if the eternal scripture without begnning is the reason (hetu) for the existence of the omniscient being, it will be wrong since it is impossible to prove the existence of an omniscient being which has a beginning on the basis of a beginningless scripture. But the eternal scripture cannot be treated as having a beginning because that would involve self-contradiction.
Similarly, non-eternal scriptures (anitya-agama) cannot prove the existence of the omniscient being. Non-eternal scriptures may be the work either of an omniscient or of a nonomniscient being. If the former is accepted, it leads to the fallacy of circular reasoning; if the latter alternative is accepted, the scriptural assertions will have no authority.
207.
One cannot prove the existence of an omniscient even on the ground of an unbroken tradition because every tradition is disputable and also it would entail the assumption of several omniscient beings forming an endless series, which it is more difficult to prove.
131
The Jainas point out that the Agamas, proving the nonexistence of the omniscient being are bound to be either personal (pauruşeya) or impersonal (apauruşeya). If they are the former they are again classed under two categories, i e either they are created by an omniscient being (sarvajña-praṇita) or by a non omniscient being (asarvajña-praṇita). If the former is true, it will lead to circular reasoning and if the latter is true, the agamas become invalid and unreliabe. Now, if they be supposed to be impersonal, they may be said to prove the non-existence of omniscience for all times and place or for a particular time and places. The second alternative is acceptable to the Jainas and if the opponents means to assert "that there is non-existence of the omniscient being at all times and places"-this assertion itself is self contradictory. 131

See Prabhācandra, Ibid., p. 95, Prameya-kamala-märtaṇḍa, p. 264; Anantavirya, Ibid., p 94; Vidyananda, Aṣṭa-sahasri, pp. 58-59; Ratna

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The Buddhist hold that so long as inferential knowledge is available, there is no need to affirm the existence of the omniscient person on the basis of scriptures (āgamas). This is because the Buddhists accept only two forms of cognition 188 perception and inference. However, for arguments sake, they point out that there are Vedic passage called 'nimitta' which speak of the eternal omniscience of Lord Buddha. As a matter of fact, the eternality of the Vedas has been totally rejected by the Buddhists but they have simply tried to show that even if the Vedic scripture is regarded as eternal omniscience of Buddha is not disproved. 188
(F) Argument based on Non-apprehension (abhāva)
Non-apprehension (abhāva) has also been accepted as a standard means of cognition by some Indian systems. Whats
others call onupalabdhi, Jainas call abhāva. The Mimāṁsaka have tried to show the inefficiency of the five means of cognition to prove the existence of the omniscient being; hence one might hope that remaining source of cognition, namely non-apprehension (abhāva) to be of help here. But what falls within the scope of non-apprehension is the non-existent. 184 non apprehension, as a means of cognition, can only prove the non-existance of the omniscient being. As we do not cognise the omniscient, the argument runs, we must accept its nonexistence as a fact.
kirti, Ibid., pp. 26-27; Anantakirti, Laghu-sarva jña-siddhi, pp. 114115, Bịhat-sarva jña-siddhi, pp. 203-204; Aklanka, Siddhi-viniscaya,
10 & 11. 132 Dharmakirti, Nyāyabindu, I. 3. 133 Säntaraksita, Ibid., 3511 3514. Jaina scholars like Joyoti Prasad Jaina
(Jainism-the oldest Living Religion, p. 22.) holds that there are specific mention of their Tīrthankara Ariştanemi in the Vedas (Rg Veda, VIII. 8. 24; X 178.1; Yajurveda, XXV. 19; IX. 25; Samaveda, XX.
143.10.). ! 134 Prabhācandra, Nyaya kumudacandra, Vol. I, p. 88; Prame ya-kamala
mārtanda, p. 46; Akalanka, Siddhi-viniscaya, VIII. 4; Vidyānanda, Aşta-sahasri, p. 46; Apta- pariksā, p. 207: Anantakirti, Brahat-sarva jña. siddhi, p. 133; Ratnakīti, Ibid., p. 6.

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The attempt of the Mimāṁsakas to prove the non-existence of the omniscient suffers from the defects of over-simplification and self contradiction. This is explained as follows: non-apprehension (abhāva) is either absoulte (prasajya-pratişedha) or relative (paryudāsa). If it is absolute, i.e., complete absence of the cognition it cannot become either the cognition or the means of cognition anything at all, and hence it cannot prove the non-existence of the omniscient being. Absolute nonapprehension will imply absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva) of the omniscience like sky-lotus. But the Mimaṁsakas cannot afford to accept this position since they do posit omniscience in the Vedas. Hence any attempt to prove the non-existence of omniscience through absolute non-apprehension will quite upset and also contradict the position of the Mimāṁsakas.
But if it is relative, standing for the negation of the entity in the shape of the means of cognition - even so it would be quite unreliable because wha1 it declares non-existent, may be shown to be existent by another means of cognition. In relative non-existence if one is denied, its counter-correlative has to be asserted. This way, by proving the non-existence of omniscience, one has to assert the existence of omniscience by disproving it.
Then the relative non-apprehension may be either (a) free from the evidence of five pramāņas ( pramāņa-pancaka-rahita) or (b) of a different type. If it be the former, it can be again of two types : (i) totally free from the evidence of five pramānas and (ii) negating the evidence of five pramāņas. If the formel is the case, it cannot prove the object of knowledge (prameya) since it is totally free from the evidence of any of the five pramānas. Without pramānas, there cannot be proof of the object of knowledge. But if the latter is the case (ie. negating the evidence of five pramāņas), it can be either one's personal cognition or universal. If it be the former (i.e., personal), it cannot say anything about the mind or knowledge of other people. But if it concerns universality, it will be the cognition of omniscience.
JCO-27

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Now, if I examine the alternative (b) (i.e., relative nonapprehension of a different type other than which is free from the evidence of five pramāņas), it will also not help. This means that one will have to negate the idea of omniscience through other means not mentioned above. Such a negation of omniscience may be either partial or total. It is the former case, i.e., negation of omniscience at a particular place or time (kvacit kadācit kasyacit ), the Jainas will bave no objection to accept this position, since they also do not think that omniscient being is everywhere. But if one wants to prove negation of omniscience in all places and times, it is to admit one's own omniscience.135
There is also a technical difficulty here. In order to establish the absolute non-existence of an object (i.e., the omniscient being), the following processes have to be undergone :138 First, its accredited locus (in all times and places ) is to be seen by the eye. Secondly, the counter-entity (i.e., the omniscient being) which could have been seen if it had been present, is to be remembered. Thirdly, there follows a purely mental process which gives rise to the notion of the non-existence of the omniscient being. Now, if the above analysis of the process of non-apprehension' be accepted as it has been accepted by the Mimāṁsakas, 137 it follows that to disprove the non-existence of the omniscient being, one has to accept the existence of him in the past, without
135 Prabhācandra, Nyāya-kumudacandra, Vol. I. pp. 95-96, Prame ya
kamala-martanda, p. 265; Anantavirya, Ibid., p. 98; Vidyānanda, Apta parikṣā, 105-106, Asta-sahasri p. 48; Akalarka, Siddhiviniscaya, 14; Anantakirti, Bịhat-sarvajñasiddhi, p. 152; Ratnakirti, Ibid., 25;
V. R. Sūri, Ibid., p. 571. 136 As a matter of fact, Jainas have no right to argue on the basis of
'non-apprehension since they do not recognise it as an independent and valid means of cognition. But for arguments sake, they use it to show inconsistency of this argument. See V. R. Sūri, Abhidhāna
Ra jendra, Vol. VII, pp. 569–70. 137 Kumārila, Śloka-vārttika (on Negation), IX. 27.

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which no rememberance would be possible. This means that unless a person has got previous knowledge of the omniscient being, he cannot prove his non-existence. Then the countercorelative of the non-existence of the omniscient being is his own existence. Then to deny its accredited locus in all times and places will imply omniscience at least of the said perceiver.
IV. Some Positive Jaina Arguments for the Existence of
the Omniscient Being
Besides the foregoing arguments intended to disprove the non-existence of the omniscient being via meeting the objections of the Mimāṁsakas, the Jainas have formulated certain important arguments of their own for the existence of the omniscient being. In the Agamas, the existence of omniscience was a matter of religious faith and hence therein we find no systematic aad logical argument. But when this faith was challenged, particularly, by the Mimāṁsakas, the Jaina thinkers had to advance positive reasons besides making attempts to meet their objections.
(A) Argument from the Nature of Soul as Consciousness
Consciousness being the nature of the soul, the two are not different things which can be separated from each other, nor they are related together by some external relation like, samavāya. They argue as follows: the soul is either conscious or unconscious before it is being related to cosciousness through external relation. Now, if the soul is conscious from the beginning, being related to consciousness by inherence, it is absurd; but if it is as unconscious, it may be so either due to its relation of inherence with unconsciousness, or due to its being with unconsciousness. If the former is the case, the second inherence is again useless, since the soul is already accepted as unconscious; but if it is one with unconsciousness, it is similar to the case in which the soul is accepted to be one with consciousness. In short, there cannot be any objec.

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tion to accepting consciousness as the nature of the soul. Kundakunda, therefore, says that the soul and knowledge are not separable from each other like fire and heat but, are coextensive with each other.188 But this essential knowing abi. lity of the soul, as has already been said, is crippled by its long association with the karmic matter, and comes back to its original glory when the obstacles are removed.139
The logic working here is very simple : when the nature of the soul is to know and when there are no obstacles in between the knower and the known, knowledge naturally becomes all perfect. Various analogies have been used to explain this point. Vīrasena'40 and Vidyānanda 141 both refer to a popular analogy employed by Haribhadra.149 As the fire burns fuel when there is no obstacle, similarly the knowing-self will know everything, when all obstructions are removed. A negative analogy is also used : just as a diamond covered with dust does not reflect its usual lusture, so the self covered with knowledge-obscuring karmas, etc., does not know everything, 143
The basic idea behind this argument has been made clear by Akalanka144 when he says that the soul is capable of knowing everything (sarvārtha-grahan2-samarthya ) and hence when its cover is removed, nothing remaias unknown. Samantabhadra145 has already prescribed the path of penances for the total and final liquidation of the karmic-fetters.
It is true that both the Buddhists and Jainas admit of certain obstructions or covers to our knowledge. However, the Buddhist attitude is influenced by other considerations; so that
138 Kundakunda, Pravacana-sara, I. 23-25. 139 Ibid., 1. 43, I. 53, I. 55-58. 140 Virasena, Jayadhavala Tika, p. 66. 141 Vidyānanda, Aşta-sahasri, p. 50. 142 Haribhadra, Yoga-bindu, 431. 143 Akalanka, Nyāya.viniscaya, 23, 465, 466. 144 Ibid., 361-362, 410, 414. 145 Samantabhadra, Apta-mimān sẵ, 5, 6.

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this omniscience is proved as belonging to Buddha and not to others, only because Buddha alone has propounded the doctrine of soullessness.146
(B) Argument from Inferability (anumeyatva) It was perhaps Samantabhadra, who for the first time, tried to prove the existence of omniscience on the basis of an argument based on inferability (anumeyatva). In formulating this argument Samantabhadra perhaps had in mind the criticisms of the doctrine of omniscience made by the famous commentator of Mimāṁsā, Śibara Svāmi. While explaining the significance of codanā sūtra (i.e., dharma's purpose is injunction for its sole authority)147, Śabara Svāmi says : “Vedic injunction alone, and nothing else, is authoritative in matters of past, present and future, subtie, remote and intervenient objects."148 Thus, he closes the door of inferability with regard to such matters as knowledge of dharma.
Samantabhadra does not accept this and he says : "the existence of an omniscient being is established from the fact that to some beings, invisible things liku atons, things or per - sons remote in time and place become known as objects of direct perception."149 This knowledge could not have been derived through the senses because there is no sense-object contact. This leads to the inference that the things must have been known in some non-sensuous way.
Kumārila, however, tries to refute the above contention of Samantabhadra by showing that no pramāņa can prove the existence of omniscience; on the contrary, his non-existence
146 śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3337-3340. The Buddhists think that omni
science is nothing other than the clearest cognition of the 'soul-lessness' of all things, for which they think that 'cover of afflictions'
should be removed. 147 Jaimini, Mimāṁsā-sūtra, I. 1.2. 148 Sabara-bhasya, I. 1.2. 149 Samantabhadra, Apta-mimāṁsā, 5.

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can be proved.150 This, I have earlier discussed. To meet the difficulties raised in the above position, Akalarka brought in a significant change in the argument. He changed the argument of inferablity (anume yatva) into the object of cognisability, knowability and the property of being an entity (prameyatva). 151 There is nothing which is not the object of some knowledge; every object must be knowable by someone, by anyone of the means of cognition. This means there must be someone who could hold to ther everything as an object of his knowledge. This person cannot be less than omniscient. (C) Argument from the Progressive Development of Knowledge
An important proof 152 of omniscience is based on the “necessity of final consummation of the progressive development of knowledge."153 Knowledge is said to admit of degrees and omniscience is the perfection of knowledge. The realisation of degrees of excellence, of knowledge must reach its consummation somewhere, since this is the way of all progression. As an imperceptible atom through progression of magnitude reaches
150 Kumārila, Ibid., II. 117. 151 Vidyānanda, Asta-sahasri, p. 58, and Apia-parikṣā, pp. 112-13. 152 According to Sukhalálji, the origin of this argument may be traced
to the Yoga-sūtra (I. 24) of Patañjali (tatra niratiśayam sarva jñabijam)-See his Introduction to Jñana-bindu-prukarana of Yasovijaya, p. 43. This states that the progressive development of knowledge is the basis of existence of the omniscient being. This arguments seems to have been discovered by Yoga-system and later on it was also adopted by the Nyāya-Vai esikas. (vide Prasasta pāda-bhāşya with Vyomavati Comy. by Vyomašiva, p. 560), Buddhists (vide Sāntaraksita, Tattva-sämgraha, 3160). However, credit goes to Mallavādi for having introduced this type of argument for the existence of omniscience, in Jaina literature. (Vide Mallavādi, Naya-cakra (MSS) Rāmaghāt Jaina Mandir, Käsi, p. 123). It has been very popular argument with the Jainas. Yasovijaya (vide Jñana-bindu - prakarana,
19) has employed only this argument to establish the notion of
omniscience. 153 Hemacandra, Pramāna-mimāṁsā, ed. Sukhalāla Sanghavi (Eng. trans.
S. Mookerjee & N. M. Tatia), I. 1.16.

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to the great bulk of mountain, etc., so our “imperfect knowledge is capable of gr (y h in the direction of perfection and the bighest point 10 which it can be carried, will be omniscience.” 154 We can also approach this problem in a different way. We should always remember the nature of soul and its consciousness-infinite' (ananta-jñāna). Potentially the soul is omniscient hence the moment its veils are removed, the soul knows everything.
The Mīmāṁsakas have strongly attacked this position on the following two grounds : firstly, there is a limit to the development of our cognitive powers. If omniscience is said to be the final culmination of cognition, it could be so reached, either through sense-perception or through mental-perception. Now, it cannot be through sense-perception because sense-perception cannot transcend its limitations. Through practice and other things our powers develop but no one has been found to become capable of perceiving things beyond the reach of senses, however rich his practice may be.
The Mimāṁsakas put this matter in a very sarcastic way : “The man, who can jump into the sky to the height of fifteen feet can never jump to the height of eight miles, however hard he may practice jumping."165 Similarly, the development of knowledge cannot be taken the form of omniscience. Further, even mental-perception cannot apprehend all things because it cannot operate independently of senses; if it could, then no person would be deaf or blind.
The second objection of the Mīmāṁsakas is more severe. Granting, they say, all intelligence to be made better by practice and exercise, it cannot be said that this proves no inherent limitations. For example, "in the matter of auditory perception, some men are superior to other in apprehending distant and
154 Mallisena, Syādvāda-mañ jari (with Anyayoga-vyavachheda-dvātrimsikā
of Hemacandra, ed. A. B. Dhruva, XVIII, p. 121). 155 śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3168. See 3157–3174,

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subtle sounds, but not in apprehending colour and other things.” 156 To say that this is possible would be to commit category-mistake. Similarly, when one has learnt Grammar, his intelligence may go very far in that field but not in the field of astronomy. 157
In reply to these criticisms of the Mimāṁsakas, the Jainas point out that some of the instances given, however, are very much crude, though they are suggestive. Anantakirti'88 exemplifying the cases of extraordinary development in sense perception says that a vulture, a boar and an ant have got tremendously superior power of visual, auditory and olfactory perceptions. This is also not impossible for human beings. Replying to the charge of the Mimāṁsakas that there is a limit to the progressive development of our knowledge, Akalarka159 says that this is also based on faise experience. For instance, we cannot jump even eight miles in the sky but there are birds, namely garuda which can fly hundreds of miles high in the sky. Therefore, knowledge and power can be increased in proportion to the removal of obstructions, and that of its obstructive veils in case of the soul. Vidyānanda 160 also gives many instances of this type.
The argument of the Mimāṁsakas that one can never comprehend things beyond the senses is wrong, because the statement "sense-perception is limited ” could be made only by him who had the direct apprehension of the sense-capacity of all beings. If one declares it on the basis of his own in.
156 śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3162–3163. 157 Ibid., 3164-3167. 158 Anantakirti, Brhat-sarva jña-siddhi, p. 131. 159 Akalarka, Siddhi-viniscaya, VIII. 12. 160 Vidyānanda, Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttikam, I. 29, 36-38. He mentions
many instances : a type of serpent which can jump very high; the flames of fire which goes high up to the sky; heavy stones if pelted can reach downwards, millions and millions of miles; the wind does blow throughout the length and breadth of the universe.

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capacity, the argument would be inconclusive. 161 Even the examples of jumping, etc. have not been properly understood by the Mimāṁsakas. Jumping as a matter of fact depends upon strength and power, it has. There can be no rigid limit to it. “Through cocentration of mind and use of spiritual power, if one acquires mind-force (manojaya), jumping can reach the highest degree of perfection. 1.69 Similarly, there can be do limit to mental cognition.168 The nature of things depends upon different factors and they vary with the variation of those factors. 104
To the other charge of the Mimāṁsakas that our knowledge suffers from inherent limitations, i.e., we cannot see through ears or hear through the eyes and so on, the Jainas maintain that this objection is again based on imperfect understanding of the reality. Even the cat and bat do see in the night without the help of light. Then the snake perceives sound not through the ears but through the eyes as it has no ears. There are many creatures which do not get sense-percep. tion through the recognised channels of perception. 188 If this can happen in case of these creatures, there is no reason why it should not happen in that of human beings.
It seems to me that the difficulty of the Mimāṁsakas in properly understanding the position of the Jainas is due to certain gross mistakes.
161 śāntarakṣita, Ibid., 3462-3466. 162 For Mjmamsakas' objections and the Buddhists' replies regarding
limitation of sense-perception, see Tattva-sangraha of Santaraksita,
3168, 3421 and 3425. 163 Santaraksita, Ibid., 3164-67 (objections); 3381-89 (replies). 164 Sāntaraksita mentions the case of a fruit known as 'Amalaki' which
is very small, when grown in desert but not outside. Even through eyes, one can see all things if they are improved by the practice of Yoga (Ibid., 3397-3401). He mentions a science of thought-reading (Ikşanika) which if properly practised, brings about telepathie knowledge." (Ibid., 3397-3401). Anantakirti, Laghu-sarva jña -siddhi, p. 117, Prabhācaodra, Pramepa
kamala-martanda, p. 259, JCO-28

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Firstly, the Mimāmsakas have failed to understand the truly non-sensuous character of omniscience. It is direct, distinct and immediate like sense-perception but is not dependent upon the sense-object-contact. Hence, much of the so-called difficulties and restrictions imposed by the Mimamsakas are irrelevant.
Secondly, the Jaina conception of omniscience follows from the Jaina theory of the nature of soul as inherently capable of infinite knowledge. It is no wonder that the Mimāmsakas, to whom, the nature of the soul is inherently unconscious could not appreciate this point.
Lastly, the Mimāmsakas do not adequately, take into consideration the contributions of Yoga to the problem of the development of cognitive powers through the practice leading to super-normal cognition.
(D) Argument Based on the Truth of Astronomical Predictions
Akalanka points out that the science of astronomy makes correct predictions about the date and time of future eclipses. This proves the possibility of supersensuous knowledge. There is mention of such ancient occult sciences like Ikṣaṇikale or Praśna-vidya, which give information about supersensible things. The astronomical predictions of authoritative writers, he urges, may well be taken as indications of the possibility of the great teachers being omniscient.167
All this proves at least that sense-object-contact is not necessary for all knowledge. If the knowledge of absolutely imperceptible or supersensuous things be not possible for a person, how the verification of astronomical knowledge be accounted for ?168
166 Santarakṣita, Ibid., 3397-3401. cp. Akalanka, Nyaya-viniścaya, 407. He uses the term 'Vijnanaman jasa.
167 Akalanka, Siddhi-viniscaya, VIII. 2, Nyaya-viniscaya, 414; Hemacandra, Pramana-mimāṁsā (bhāṣ ya. 1. 1.16, Syadvada-mañ jari on Anyayoga-vyavaccheda-dvatrimśika, XVIII.
168 Hemacandra, Pramana-mimāṁsā (bhāṣya), I. 1.16.

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NTS..
219
It may be said here that astronomy is a mathematical science based on strict methods of calculation and observation of physical phenomena. It is an empirical science, although it indicates certain things about future events, it does not mean the existence of an omniscient being.
(E) Argumeru based on the Absolute Non-existence of any
Obstructive Pramānas 169 This argument has also been given by Akalanka. It points to the lack of evidences to contrary. We have earlier discussed elaborately that none of the six pramanas prove the nonexistence of the omniscient person, hence there is no contradictory proof against the existence of the omniscient person.170 Perception cannot do it since it can prove only existence This was also admitted by Kurnārila. Inference can also not prove the non-existence of the omniscient being because there can be no inference without a middle term, as has already been shown. Scripture, postulation, analogy and non-apprehension also fail here due to variety of reasons.
This argument is not a new argument as it is only a collection of the arguments based on the six pramāņas. But we can appreciate the additional force contained in it since it refers to all the six pramānus, in a collective way. It should also be noted that it is after all a negative argument171 as it only shows ihat there is no disproof, but it does not say any. thing positive. Therefore, it cannot be considered decisive.
169 Akalaika, Nyāya-viniscaya, 414; Siddhi-viniscaya, VIII. 6; Hema
candra, Ibid.; Vidyananda, Apta-pariksä, 93; Säntarakṣita, Ibid.,
3268-3269. 170 Vidyananda, Asta-sahasrī, pp. 44-76, Apta-parīkņā, 206-240; Ananta
kirti, Ibid., V. R. Sūri, Ibid., pp. 566-85; Prabhācandra, Prame ya
kamala-martanda, pp. 247-256; Nyāya-kumudacandra, Vol. I. pp. 86.97. 171 In formulating this argument, I think, Akalanka might have in his
mind the formidable objection raised by Kumārila that the existence of omniscient being cannot be established on the basis of any of the six pramanas. Therefore, Kumärila says quite confidently that if it

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(F) Argument from the Natural Tendency of Thought to go from part to whole
It is a tendency of human thought to transcend its limits. If we analyse our thought, we find that knowledge in parts does not remain knowledge of parts but is unified into a system, According to Jainism every soul possesses in its natural state only the pure knowledge or omniscience.179 This is exhibited in five different forms depending upon the extent and penetration of knowledge-obscuring karmas. So, in perceptual knowledge (mati-jñāna), there is a partial glimpse of pure knowledge (kevala jñāna). According to Virasena Svāmi178, who is supposed to be the chief-architect of this particular argument, we can 'infer about the soul's pure-knowledge on the basis of our partial knowledge like mati, śruta, avadhi and manaḥparyaya as we make inferences about the whole mountain by perceiving only parts of it.
The above argument makes use of the gestaltan in us to complete the incomplete and make a whole out of parts. But I do not think that this can conclusively prove the existence of omniscience. Knowledge is composed of the subject as well as objcet of knowledge. So even if we infer that on the objective side, everything can be comprehended, we cannot say that there is such a subject also and unless there is one, omniscience cannot be claimed to be a fact.
can be proved by any of the six means of cognition, how could it be not accepted. This means that it cannot be proved by any of the pramanas. Therefore, Akalanka shows that there is not a single pramana which goes against it.
172 Virasena, Dhavala Comy. on satkhandagama of Puspadanta Bhutabali, ed. H. L. Jaina, etc., Vol. XIII; V. 81-83.
173 Ibid., cp. Akalanka, Aṣṭa-sati, 3, Nyaya-viniścaya-vivaraṇa, ed. M. K. Jaina, p. 465; Vidyananda, Aṣṭa-sahasri, p. 50.

*
and

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CONCLUSION
A historical, analytic and con parative study of the Jajna concept of omniscience in the perspective of Jaina metaphy. sics has been made in the preceding chapters. But still I do not claim to have made the concept, all clear or completely defensible. Infact, it seems to me that this concept, borrowing Prof. Feigel's terms, can at most admit of vindication ( justifi. catio actionis ), and not validation ( justificatio cognitionis ).'
Although, Jaina logicians have exhibited great dialectical skill in enunciating the concept of omniscience and arguing for its exemplification in reality, it remains ultimately a matter of faith. The denial of omniscience is simply a denial of their scriptures, and their fundamental religious and spiri. tual faith. Omniscience in Jainism is not only the perfection of the cognitive faculty of the self but also its ultimate end. It is the spiritual state of eternal bliss and also the culmination of religious aspiration. This state can be compared with
1
H. Feigal in his essay “Validation and Vindication : An analysis of the nature and the limits of Ethical Argument" included in Readings in Ethical Theory, ed. W. Sellars and J. Hospers (New York, Appleton Century-croft, 1952), which is a revision of an earlier essay “De Principii Non Disputandam....?': included in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Max Black (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1950), discusses the problem of justification as discussed not only with reference to ethical principles but also in regard to the more fundamental principles of deduction, induction and the criterion of factual meaningfulness. For an important analysis of closely related issues, see also W. Sellars' "Language, Rules and Beh iviour", John D2w2y, Philosopher of Science and Freedom, ed. S. Hook (New York, The Dial Press 1950.).

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the Jivan-mukti of Sārkhya and Vedānta, with the Turiyāvasthā or, Brahmananda.
Now, it is also perhaps true to a great extent that we cannot validate any fundamental principle or ideal like this without being involved into what Feigal calls “vicious circularity.'', J. S. Mill also holds that “questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof.”3 It is necessary always to distinguish between “questions within a presupposed frame" and "questions concerning the frame" itself, as Carnap would say.4 In order to grasp this situation, a fundamental distinction, often neglected and blurred, must be made between the two types of justifying principles or knowledge-claims, namely, validation and vindication.5 Validation generally means a rigorous logical proof or "legitimising of knowledge-claims”. Vindication on the other hand, means the justification of an
2
Feigal claims that we cannot without “vicious circularity" disclose any more ultimate grounds of validation in the field of deductive logic or in the rules of inference. Similarly, the rules of maximal probability in inductive inference form the ultimate validating basis of all empirical reasoning..... Rational argument presupposes reference to a set of such principles at least implicitly agreed upon. Disagreement with respect to basic principles can thus only be removed if the very frame of validation is changed. This can occur either through disclosure and explication of a hitherto unrecognised common set of standards, i.e., still more fundamental validating principles to which implicit appeal is made in the argument, of it can be achieved thro. ugh the pragmatic justification of the adoption of an alternative frame, or finally, through sheer persuation by means of emotive appeals”. Sellars and Hospers, Ibid., p. 675. J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government, ed. A. D. Lindsay (London, J. M. Dent & Sons, Everymans Library, 1960), p. 4. R. Carnap. “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” Revue Internationale 11, Jan. 1950.
3
4
5 Without agreeing with Feigal on all the points that he has made ir
his article under reference, I have borrowed his above two terms which are extremely suitable for my present purpose.

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action." Now vindication, though weaker than validation, is an equally respectable method. Its value is all the more enhanced when we know that validation is impossible in matters of fundamental principles.
223
It is difficult to prove omniscience, but nonetheless we can vindicate it and the best way to vindicate it is to get the support of the expert judges (authority). It is not necessary to define who is an expert judge because the pre-philosophic notion of an expert is quite helpful here (the pre-philosophical notion is the untutored notion of the human race). The intellectual programme of mankind is effected not by ignoring but by utilising, the past and one way to profit by the past and the existing achievements of the race is to take advantage of the experience and expert opinion of the leaders of the society. Therefore, if it is suggested that in making the decision whether a certain being is omniscient or not, one should depend upon the verdict of the expert judges, it is not at all to suggest any fantastic or unworkable procedure. The reference to expert judges becomes inevitable where a decision of fundamentals have to be made. This was the reason why J. S. Mill' suggested this method for distinguishing between good and bad pleasures. It is wrong to say that a great logician became dogmatic in accepting the authority of the judges of the community. Rather, if we look sympathetically at the whole thing, we shall find that he was adopting perhaps the only available method of distinguishing between the pleasures of different qualities because belief in the qualitative differences of pleasures is one of the fundamental principles of Mill's system. As a matter of fact, the expert advise does not kill the initiative of the intellect.
6 H. Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction (Chicago, 1938), Sees, 38-39 has formulated the theory of vindication for the principle of induction also.

7 J. S. Mills, lbid., p. 10. He says "from this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal."

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The conception of expert is not a closely definable one That is why it is, in a sense, vague. It offers a lot of freedom. Further, if two experts differ and they go to a third expert, it does not in practice produce any regresses. And, even if all the experts available differ, this procedure is not proved to be unworkable, because the intellect is sure to become more powerful and efficient after knowing the opinions of the experts. We can say at the most that the intellect may be overawed but it will surely continue functioning It is the nature of intellect to be more active when confronted with such situations.
It is true that omniscience technically called kevala-jñāna finds an important place in Jaina epistemology. Whether it is the five-fold division of knowledge of the agamas or the two-fold division proposed later on, it has its own place. It is characterised as 'pure' (kevala), because it is independent of the services of any sense-organs and is also cognisant of all objects, and thus stands apart in a category of its own, having nothing in common with other modes of cognition. 10 The perfect knowledge (kevala-jñāna) arises only after total annihilation of all obstructive veils.11 This is nothing other than the state of liberation, as liberation also is freedom from
8 The five-fold division of knowledge into mati, śruta, avadhi, manaḥparyaya and kevala is generally accepted by the agamas. See, Rayapaseniya-sutta. 165; Bhagavati-sutra, 88 2.317; T. Sut., I. 9.
9 Knowledge is divided into immediate (pratayakşa) and mediate (parokṣa) (T. Sūt., I. 11-12; Nyāya-dīpikā, II. 1; Pramana-mīmāṁsā, I. 1.9; Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālankāra, II. 1.; Parikṣā-mukham, II. 1; Nyāyāvatāra, 1. etc. The immediate (pratyakṣa) is sub-divided into empirical (sāṁvyavahārika) and transcendental (pārmārihika or mukhya). Kevala jñāna is the absolute variety (sakala) of the latter. See, Nyāyāvatāra, 25-26; Parikṣa-mukham & Pramāṇa-nāya-tattvalokalankara, II. 11, 12; Nyaya-dipikā, II. 11; Pramāṇa-mimāmsā, etc.).

10 Hemacandra, Pramāṇa-mīmāṁsa-bhāṣya, I. 1.15.
11 Hemacandra, Pramana-mimämsä, I. 1. 15, cp. Manikyanandi, Parikşamukham, II.11; Umāsvāmi, Tattvartha-sutra, X. 1,
I. 1.15

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all karmic-matter. 18 As a matter of fact, the attribute of omniscience is an important feature of the state of liberation, other features being omnibliss, omnipower and omnifaith. So, we can conclude that omniscience follows from the state of liberation. This is also corroborated by the statement that "only the liberated souls are said to possess omniscience”, 13 We can also say that the state of supreme salvation or selfrealisation is also the state of supreme-knowledge or omniscience. Infact, the two are indistinguishable. Freedom and knowledge are coeval and coexistent.
Omniscience is, therefore, not only the culmination of our cognitive faculties, it is also the final consummation of our moral, religious and spiritual life. Hence, we find an intimate relation between the state of salvation and omniscience. In Buddhism, the state of liberation (nirvāņa) is also the state of enlightenment (bodhi-sattva) or wisdom (prajñā). The perfect being (tathāgata) is, therefore, the owner of perfect wisdom (prajñā-pārmitā). This state is reached through the progressive development of our thought concentration (bhāvanā) which leads to the annihilation of the various handicaps to knowledge (iñeyāvarana). In Sānkhya-Yoga, the state of omniscience is achieved during the absolute and absording concentration (asaṁprajñāta somödhi or dharma-meghc-samādhi) as a result of the removal of the veil of knowledge. In Nyāya-Vaišesika also omniscience is the result of adrsta born out of the highest yogic concentration. In Vedānta, omniscience follows from the state of realisation of the oneness of self and Brahman In short, almost all the systems of Indian philosophy try to link the concept of omniscience with the highest state of religious and spiritual life.
As God's omniscience follows from the perfection, 14 simi.
12 Umāsvāmi, Ibid., X-2: See Yogindu, Paramātma- prakāśa, II. 63, etc. 13 Vadideva Sūri, Pramāna-noya-tattvalokālankāru, II. 14; cp. Yogindu,
Ibid., II. 6, 46, etc. 14 According to Christianity, God is absolutely omniscient because He JCO-29

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larly, human omniscience should be understood as a logical corollary to human perfection. Human beings not only have animality and materiality, but also intellectuality and spirituality. Hence it is a meaningful ideal for the human soul whether through his own spiritual and moral efforts or as a gratuitous gift of God, to aspire after perfect knowledge. “The soul is potentially a spiritual essence, seeking to fulfill itself through the body and the bodily channels of apprehension until its essence may become perfect actually, and so be a pure spiritual essence, apprehending without any bodily instruments. 15
As a matter of fact, Jaina epistemology is based on nonnaturalistic or spiritualistic faith. They strongly believe that all knowledge that we get from any source is already in the prior possession of the soul. Knowledge is an essential quality of the soul. “Knowledge is not mere knowing but the self as knowing” or “knowledge is the self-functioning of the self”. 16 This is also true with omniscience. Omniscience is innately possessed by every soul. What is needed for actualisation of this potentiality is to remove the veil by destroying the karmicmatter completely, matter which has penetrated into the soul owing to his past ethical decisions or volitions So kevala jnana ceases to be a naturalistic or purely positivistic phenomenon, since it is neither derived from sense organs or mind, nor from logic or inference, nor even from authority or scriptures:17
is the maximum being, hence most perfect also. Idea of perfection would be incomplete without the attribute of infinite or perfect know. ledge. See Old Testament, Zacharie. 9:'; 10:1; 4:3; P. S., 33:15; 94:9 139:13-16; Judith; 23:23-24 cte. According to the thuistic systems also like Nyāya-Vaiseșikas, God possesses six-fold perfections i.c.,
infinite knowledge. power etc. (Udyanācārya, Nya ya-kusuman jali, 5) 15 Macdonald, Religious Attitude and Life in Islam (quoted by C. R
Jaina, Omniscience, DJP., Bijnore, 1935), p. 23. 16 H. M. Bhattācārya, " The Jaina Theory of Knowledge", Philosophi
cal Quarterly, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Jan. 1939, p. 122. 17 Vide, J. N. Sinha, Indian Psychology ( Kegan Paul, London, 1954 ),
p. 364 (Jaina Doctrine of Omniscience).

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CONCLUSION
227
It is already in our possession, we have only to fulfil its conditions. It is like intuition (aparoksanubhūli) of the highest state that we find in Indian or in western philosophy. 19
According to the early Păil sources, 19 Buddha offered a qualified support for the doctrine of omniscience even with regard to himself, and he orien criticised Niganha Nātaputta? 0 claiming omniscience in ihe sense of knowing and seeing, all objects of all times, past, present and even future.21 His reluctance in claiming unqualified omniscience is mainly concerned with knowledge pertaining to the future, possibly because it will lead to som sort of determinism in metaphysics and morals. "To speak of vinniscience in relation to future is to maintain an impossible position"22 because the course of future events is partly determined by the past and present and partely undetermined. I think, Buddha's hesitation in claiming unqualifjed omniscience was influenced mainly by moral considerations. If he knew the future acts of human beings, there was no meaning in voluntary action or freedom of will which form the basis of ethics and morality.
18 Prof. Dale Ricpe in his The Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought.
University of Washington, Seattle, 1961) tries to compare the Jaina doctrine of omniscience with the Pythagorean Platonic doctrine of reminscence (pp. 84-85), quoting "The Dialogues of Plaio : Meno, (Eng. irans. Benjamin Jowett), Vol. I. Sec. 81, p. 360. But I am
not sure, if such a comparison can be made. 19 cp. Those who sav that the recluse Gotana is onniscieat and all
seein..........constantly and at all times....... are not reporting me crrectiy Majjhima-nitaya, I. 482. See, Digha-niko va, 1. 78-84; II. 82-83, 111. 99 101: Sain yutla-nikava, (. 191; Majjhima-nikāya,
II. 127. 20 Vide. Majjhi :?a-nikiya, I. 372-378; II. 214-223. 21 Vide, Digha-nikuya, III. 134 The recluse Gotama speaks of an in
finite knowledge with regard to the past but not to the future". Dr. K. N. Upadhyāya in his thesis "A critical and conparative study of the Bhagavadgita and Carly Buddhism." (His thesis for the Ph.D. degree, University of Ceylon, 1964) pp. 340-347 has dealt with this
problem. 22 K. N. Upadhyāya, Ibid., pp. 343-344.

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228
CONCLUSION
This kind of objection against unqualified omniscience is also found in Christian theology dealing with divine omnis, science. 38 If God is omniscient, no human action is free. St. Augustine says “ If you say, God foreknows that a man will sin, he must necessarily sin. But if there is necessity there is no voluntary choice of sinning but rather fixed and unavoidable necessity"34 So also Locke says: “If God exists and is (essentially) omniscient, no human action is voluntary."95
Now, one may say, if we apply the concept of omniscience to human beings, the results will be all the more devastating. But it may be pointed out that "God compels no man to sin, though he sees beforehand those who are going to sin by their own will.”20 Hence, God's omniscience cannot entail determinism. For instance, an intimate friend can have foreknowledge of another's voluntary actions, but it does not in any way affect his moral freedom.
But this does not seem to be a very good argument. A person's knowledge about the future action, of an intimate
23 Vide, Old Testainent. It speaks of God's knowledge of future acts, so
"God knows the course of action which would be pursued in any given contingency". See, I Samuel, 23. 27-28: 23. 9-13; Jeremie, 38. 17-23; 42.1.22; cp. John Calvin's statement : " when God created man, He foresaw what would happen concerning bim"-Institutes of Christian Religion, Book II, Ch. XX ; St. Augustine's remarks: "For to confess that God exists and the sam: tin: io deny that He has foreknowledge of future things is the most manifest folly...one who is not perscieat of all future things is not God." (City of God, Bk. V,
Sec. 9); See also W. Paley's Natural Theology, Ch. XXIV. 24 St. Augustine, The City of God, Book V. Sec. 9. 25 John Locke, Essays Concerning Hunan Understanding, Book IV, Chap.
XXI, Sec. 8-11; cp. Boethius' statement : "If God is omniscient, no human action is voluntary " - Consolatio Philosophiae, Part V. Sec. III).
26
St. Augustine, "De Liber) Arbitrio". co. Fiedrich Schleiermacher. The Christian Faith, Part I, Sec. 2, para. 55.

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CONCLUSION
229
friend of his is at most good guess and not definite knowledge.ar Locke's argument that there may be man who chooses to do some thing which without knowing that it is within his power to do otherwise (e.g., "if a man chooses to stay in the room without knowing that the room is locked) 28 seems to reconcile necessity with freedom but in fact it is a reconciliation of ignorance and knowledge and hence it cannot work in the context. Lufact, what is forseen (i.e., known conclusively) is necessarya, and what is necessary is outside the scope of ethics.
If it is said that it is not because God foreknows what he foreknows that men act as they do: it is because men act as they do that God foreknows what He foreknows,”30 it will create a very awkward situation in which man's actions would determine God's knowledge. We can also apply this to human omniscience. There it will create greater complications. It will mean that knowledge of the omniscient being is not unfettered but determined by the actions of other men. Different people perform different actions, often quite contrary to that of their fellows. This will create a difficult situation for the cognising mind if it is to be so determined.
To say that the omniscient being is one who is justified in believing an infinitely large number of true synthetic pro. positions is not only vague but also self-contradictory. For example, it all dependas upon the belief in one proposition at least : "Nothing is uuknown to him”. But this is to admit
27 See, Fred Newman's article “Omniscience is possible", Australisian
Journnl of Philosophy, Sydney, Vol, 42, No. 1, May 1964. 28 See, Nelson Pike's article "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action”
The Philosophical Quarterly, Cornell, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1, Jan. 1965,
p. 32 29 cf. Leibnitz, Theodici, part I, Sec. 27. 30 Luis de Molina, Concordia Liberi Arbitri, quoted from Nelson Pike's
article, Ibid., p. 38, cf. Boethius, Consolatio Philosophiae, Bk. V, Sec. 3, para. 2.).

Page #243

230
CONCLUSION
his omniscience and hence it is the like arguing in a circle, Thus the concept of omniscience, whether logical or aciual1 does involve difficulties
31 F. Newman, (bid, makes a listinction between tw.) senses of omui
science. 'necesar' and actua!', which has been criticise. by R. Puccetti: (Mr. Newman's view of omniscience"; a discussion ) in Journal of Australasian Philosophy, Vol. 12, No. 2, August, !964. p. 261. A rough comparison may be made with Buddha's Jistinction between dispositional and unquali fied omniscience. (cp. K. N. Upā. dhyāya, ibid., pp. 342-313).

Page #244

INDEX

Page #245

Page #246

NAME INDEX
Abhidharma Koşa-Vyakhya, 96 . Abhidhana Rajendra, 4, 5, 196, 210 Acaranga Sutra, 49, 52, 60, 67, 68,
69, 97, 176 A Comparative Study of the Jaina
Theories of Reality and Know
ledge, 168 Adhyatma-Kamalu-Martanda, 89, 133 Advanced Studies in Logic & Meta
physics, 150, 165 A History of Jaina Literature, 68 Agrawal, V. S., 44 Agama yuga kā Anekanta, 169 Akalanka, 61, 69, 70, 72, 101, 141,
153, 158, 170, 172, 186, 210 A Latin Dictionary, 2 Amara Simha, 1 Amara-Koşa, 1 Amstacandra, 71, 73, 80, 162 Anantakirti, 193, 196, 199, 216,
217-219 Anantavīrya, 153, 154, 159, 191,
192, 196, 210 Anekanta-Jaya-Pataka, 165, 171 Anekantavada : Tattvika Aur Vyavaha
rika, 169 Anekārtha-Sangraha, 1 An Epitome of Jainism, 121 Annambhatta, 151 A New Dictionary of Spanish & Eng
lish Languages, 3 A New English Dictionary, 2 A New German Dictionary, 2 Āpta-Mimāṁsā, 49, 61, 69, 101, 151,
191, 198. 200 Apta-Parikṣā, 188, 196, 198, 199, 210,
219
Apte's Practical Sanskrt Dictionary, 4 Ardhamāgadhi-koşa, 4 Aryan Path, 121 A Sanskt English Dictionary, 4 Aștadhyayi, 3, 9, 44 Aşta-pähuda, 51, 69 Asta-sahasri, 49, 61, 64, 70, 71, 101.
144, 153, 158, 165, 170, 172, 186,
199, 210 Așța-sati, 61, 144, 152, 153, 170, 172 Ašvaghoşa, 105 Atmakhyati, 55, 73 Atmānusasana, 71 Atharve-veda, 105 Augustine, 228 Australasion Journal of Philosophy,
.229, 230 Avaš yaka-Niryukti, 49, 63, 112 Ayoga-vyavacchedika, 71, 76, 218 Barua, B. M., 31 Basham, A. L., 31 Bastow, Irene, 121 Belvalkar, S. K., 31 Benseley, E. R., 2 Bhagavati-sūtra, 49, 52, 61, 63, 105 Bhatta, Jayanta, 154 Bhatta, Jayarāśi, 32 Bhattacarya, H. M., 1 Bhattacarya, R., 22 Bhattacarya, T., 3 Bhutabali, 69 Black, Max, 121 Boetius, 229 Bose, D.N., 41 . Boulle, J., 2 . Bradley, F. H., 76 .
2
4, IL

Page #247

234
Name Index
Dharmaśarmabhyudayam, 71, 145,
153, 159 Dhavala, 220, 69 Dhananjaya, 1 Dharmakirti. 40, 42, 138, 145, :53,
154, 268 Dhruva, A. B., 26 Dictionary of the English & Italian, 2 Diñnāga, 138, 154 Digha-nikaya, 31, 93, 105, 227 Dravya-Sangraha, 62, 75, 80, 81, 82,
83, 85, 86, U1, 112, 113, 115, 120, 121, 127-131, 133, 134,
135, 141 Durgā, 3. 4
Brahmadeva, 61, 62, 113, 129 Brahma-Sutra, 97, 106, 110 Brahma-jala-Sutra, 105 BȚhad- Aranyaka-Up., 26, 38, SI Bihat-Dravya-Sangraha, 82, 83 Bịhat-Panca-Namaskara-Sūtra, 70
Brhat-Sarva jña-Siddhi, 70, 193, 196, B . 197, 201, 210. · Buddha, the Gospel of Buddhism, 93
Buddha, 4, 21, 23, 58 Buddha-carita, 105 Buddha-gbosa, 26 Buddhist India, 140 Buddhist Psychology, 14 Calvin, J., 228 Candra-prabha-caritam, 50, 134, 135 Carnap. 221, 222 Central Philosophy of Buddhism, 96 Chakravarti, C., 57 Chandog ya Upanişad, 38, 51, 105 Chatterjee, C. D., 44. Chatterjee, S.C., 136 Chattopadhyaya, D. P., 30 Christian Faith, 228 City of God, 228 Concordia Liberi Arbitri, 229 Consolatio Philosophiae, 228 Dalsukh Malvania, 43 Darsana Aur Chintana, 32, 59, 100 Darsanika-Traimäsika, 22, 57 Datta, D. H., 96, 137, Datta, N., 32 Dayanand Sarasvati, 187 Desmukh, C. D., 21 Deussen, P., 55 Deva, R. K., 3 Devanandi, 4 Devendra Sūri, 111
Dharmabhūşana, 72 • Dharmarāga, 140
Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,
7, 168 Early Monastic Buddhism, 83 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2 Encyclopaedia of Religion & Ethics,
3, 56 Essays Concerning Human Understand
ing, 228 Experience & Prediction, 223
Ferrier, J. F., 147
Ganesa, 38 Gaina-Sutra, 31 Ghosal, S. C., 127 Gode, P. K., 1 Godwin, W. F., 26 Gommatasara, 81, 83-86, 92, 93, 112,
114, 119, 121, 129, 130, 131 Gotama, 105, 113 Gudanandi, 4 Gunaratna, 99, 176
Haima, 4 Haribhadra. 45, 59, 60, 61, 100, 101
144, 171, 212' Haricandra Kavi, 50 Hemacandra, 151, 154, 158, 159,
172, 214, 218, 224 Hook, S., 221 Hosper, J., 221

Page #248

Name Index
235 -
Kātantra Rū pamalā, 4 Katha Upani şad, 20, 54, 148 Katha vatthu, 8 Kothiā, D, L., 47 Kosambi, D.D., 105 Kumārila, 144. 145, 153-155, 186,
187, 189, 190, 192, 206, 209, 210 Kundakunda, 49-53, 60. 62, 73, 80,
84, 82, 90-92, 106, 112, 120, 129, 138, 150, 179
India--As Known to Panini, 44 .. Indian Psychology, 226 .
. Indian philosophical Congress, 169 Institute of Christian Religion, 221 Jśvara Krsna, 26, 120
. . Jacobi, H. 31 Jaimini, 144, 213 Jainendra, 4 Jainendra Prakriya, 4 Jainendra Mahavsati, 4 Janendra Vyakaraṇa, 153 Jaina-Darsana, 121, 184 Jaina, C. R., 12, 74 Jaina, Jyoti Prasad, 67 Jaina, M. K., 145, 153 Jaina, H. L., 122 Jaina Antiquary, 140, 154, 167 Jaina Samskriti.ka Hşdaya, 170 Jaina-Tarka-Bhaşā, 60 Jaina, The Oldest Living Religion, 67 Jaini, J. L., 84, 120 Jainism & World Problems, 74 Jha Com. Volume, 22 Jha, G. N., 139 Jinabhadra, 70 Jina-sahasra-Nūma, I Jivana Main Syadvada, 69 Jivan Mukti, 222 Jayadhavala Tikā, 212 Jayasena, 55
Labdhisāra, 135 Laghiyastrya, 153, 171 Laghu-Sarva jña-Siddhi, 70 Leibnitz, 229 Lewis, C. T., 1 Locke, J., 228 Lokāyata, 30
Macdonald, 226 Madhyamika-Karikā, 94-95 · Madhavācārya, 28. 105, 151 Mahāvīra, 35, 57 Mahānidana Sutta, 110 Mahabharata, 42, 105 Mahadevan, T. M. P., 107 Mahā parinirvana Sutta, 94 Maheśvara, 35 Majjhima-Nikaya, 94-95, 227 Mallisena, 25 Mangala-Namokāra-Ek Anucintan, 82 Manikyanandi, 59, 172, 224 Mann, 44 Manusmrti, 106 Matharavrtti, 105 Mehta, R. N., 31, 44 Mill, J. S., 222-223 Mimāṁsā Sūtra, 28, 43, 144, 174 Misra, P. S., 25 Moksa-Pahuda, 91 Mookerjee, S., 164-165 Mundaka Upani şad, 26, 38, 51 in
.
Kamalasila, 1, 7, 34, 185 Kanāda, 110, 153 Kapadia, H. R., 171 Kapila, 101 Karma-grantha, 131 Karma Philosophy, 100 Karikavali, 146 Karve, C. G., 4 Kasāya-Pahuda-sutta, 123 Kashyapa, J., 4

Page #249

236
Nanse Index
Murry, J., 2 Murti, T: R. V., 95 Mysticism of the Hinduism, 41 . Nāgärjuna, 94 Nama-Lingānušāsona, 1 Namamāla, 1 Nandi-Sūtra, 118 Nānārtha-Man jari, 1 Nāñārtha-Ratna-Māla, 1 Naturalistic Trends in Indian thought
. 227 Naya-Karnika, 9, 165 Nemicandra, 42, 82, 111-112, 120 New Complete English-Russian Dic
tionary, 2 Newman F., 229-230 Niyama-Sara, 39, 53-55, 60, 192; Nya ya-bhāşya, 26, 105, 139, 154 Njaya-Bindu, 148, 208 Nyāya-Dipikā, 71, 154, 152, 158-159;
224 Njūja-Kandali, 24, 41, 139 Nyāya-Kumuda-candra, 71, 80, 183,
186, 191, 194, 199, 202,
205-206, 208, 210, 219 Njaya-Kusumāñjali, 154, 158 Nyāya-Māñjari, 76, 158 Nyaya-Sāra 152 Nyaya-Sutra, 24, 105-106 Nyāya-Varttika, 139 Nyāyāvatāra, 71, 151, 171; 224 Nyāya-viniscaya, 144, 212, 218, 219
220 Old Testament, 226; 229
Pañcüstikaya-Sära, 50-51, 75; 81; 24;
88; III-112, 120, 126, 129-13 135-136; 179 Pali-Engl sh Dictionary, 4 Pali Mahāvyākarana, 4 Pāņini; 3, 44 Parikşamukham; 141-152, 158; 172,
189, 224 Paramātma-Prakāśa, 23, 25; 54, 55.
88, 89, 91, 222 Pārtha Sarăthi Misra; 79; 106 Patanjali, 27, 49 Pațisambhidamagga, 8 Pātrakeśari-stotra, 38 Payey Payne, De. V., 2. Payp, G. R., 2 Philosophical Quarterly; 21; 27; 226, 229 Pike, N. 226 Prabhacandra, 151, 193, 196-197, 199;
200, 203-208 Pramana-Mīmāṁsā, 119, 154, 161, 166,
172, 212, 214, 218, 224 Pramāņa-Mīmāmsa-bhāşya: 145..
154, 158-159 Prajnakara Gupta, 40, 42, 58, 59 Pra jñā panā-Sutra, 63, 69 Pragmatism, 109 Pramāno pa plavavāda, 38 Pramāna-Vārtika-Bhāșya: 40, 42, 49,
58, 59 Prakarana-Pañcikā, 25, 110, 146 Pramāna-Nirnayah, 153 Rramāna-naya-tattvalokālankara, 145, 151,
151, 167, 161, 172, 224, 225 Pramana-Samnuccaya; 154 Prame ya-kamala-Mārtanda, 145, 157;
153,155, 153, 110, 193, 115, 116, 193, 119, 167, 161, 199, 200, 210, 219
Padamarajiah, Y. J., 9 Padartha-dharma-Sangraha, 139 Pancadh yā yi, 74, 80, 127

Page #250

Name Index
237
Prameja-Ratna-Mala, 151, 155, 159,
184, 186 Prasasta pada-bhasya, 41, 151 Prasad, R., 147, 166 Prasamarati-Prakarana, 71, 135 Pravacana-sära, 23, 39, 49, 51, 54, 55,
60, 61, 80, 88, 126, 127, 139,
150, 167, 171, 176, 212 Pre-Buddhist India, 31, 44 Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy, 31 Proceedings of Ind. Phil. Congress, 22 Puruşarth-Siddh yu pāya, 80, 162 Pūjyapada, 53-56, 61, 69, 90 Puspadanta, 69 Radhakrishnan, S., 49, 112 Raghava, 1 Rājamalla, 127 Rāja praśniya, 69 Ramacandran, N., 22 Ratnacandra, 4 Ratnakirti, 195 Rgveda, 106 Readings in Ethical Theory, 221 Reichenbach, H., 223 Religious Attitude and Life in Islam,
226 Review Internationale, 222 Rhys Davids, T. W., 4 Riepe, Dale, 227 Sabara-Bhas ya, 112, 186 Sabda-Kalpa-drumaḥ, 3 sad-darsana-Samuccaya, 45, 59, 115, .. 123, 167, 176 Śälikanātha, 25 Samantabhadra, 46, 81, 151, 170, 200 Śamasāstri, R., 22 Samadhi-Tantra 54, 56, 89, 152 Samaveda, 8, 37 Samaya-Sāra, 39, 54, 55, 73, 75, 80,
86, 88 Šamkara, 57 Samkhya-kärikā, 26, 75, 120 Samkhya-pravacan-bhaşya, 140
Samkhya-Tattva-Kaumudi, 99 Sāmkhyas, 44 Samyutta-Nikaya, 93, 106, 227 śāntarakṣita, 25, 34, 35, 40, 63, 72,
177, 178, 181, 184, 186, 189,
190, 191, 199, 204, 205 Sanghavi, Sukhalāl, 32, 50, 51, 52, 58,
59, 151 Sanmati-Tarka, 63-67 Santyana, 43 Sarkar, M. N., 4 Sarmā, S., 4 Sarva-darśana-Sangraha, 30, 105 Sarya jña-Siddhi, 195, 198,205 Sardiyākhyānāma-malā, 1 Sastra-di pika, 25, 79 Śästri, H. G. 1 Šāstri, S. S., 26 Şatkhandagama, 40, 62, 63, 69, 220 Satya-Sasana-Pariksā, 30 Science of Thought, 12, 159, 213 Segal, L., 2 Sena, Bhava, 4 Short, C., 1 Siddhasena Divākara, 12, 43, 62-67,
80, 99, 151, 170-172 Siddhasenagani, 118 Siddhiviniscaya-ţikā, 154, 198, 208,210 Sinha, J. N., 226 Sircar, M. N., 41 Śiva-sahasra-nāma-stotra, 38 Śloka-vāritika, 28, 33, 35, 144, 151;
155, 178, 186, 204, 210 Sridhara, 24, 39 Stevenson, S. S., 106 Sthanānga-sutra, 39, 128, 167, 169 Studies in Jaina Philosophy, 133, 166 Stede, W., 4 Suali, Luigi, 45 Sūri, V. R., 4 Sūri, S. S., 1 Sūtra-Krtanga, 31

Page #251

238
Name Index
Svayambhi-stotra, 39, 151, 172 Syādvada mañjari, 26, 52, 76, 215, 219 Syädvada. Ratnakara, 155 Syadavada-Siddhi, 102, 181
Tantras, 41 Tantras : Their Philosophy and
Occult Sciences, 41 Tantra-vārtika, 187 Tarka-Rahasya-Di pika, 45 Tatia, N. M., 9, 60 Tāt par yațīkā, 155 Tattvārtha-Rajavarttika, 5 Tattvārtha-śloka-Vārttika. 85. 153.
178, 216 Tattvarthasitra, 5, 50, 60, 61, 63,
74, 111, 112, 125-128, 160, 224 Tattārtha-Vrtti, 5 Tattva Sangraha, 6, 24, 28, 63, 78,9 3,
102, 144 Tattvo pa plavasimha, 33 The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 3 The Jaina Philosophy & Non-absolutism'
164, 165, 166 The Oxford Universal Dictionary, 1 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2 Theodici, 229 Udayanācārya, 226 Umāswāmi, 50, 74, 111, 112, 126, 127,
128, 133, 137, 141, 160, 173, 225 Upadhyāya, K. N., 227 Upadhye, A, N., 23, 55, 56 Uvāsaga-Dasão, 105 Utilitarianism, 222 Uttaradhyayana-Sutra, 73, 79, 135, 141
Vacas patyam, 3 Vācaspati Miśra, 99, 159 Vädideva, 155, 159, 186, 188-190, 225, Vardhamana-Purāna, 133, 135 Värtikalamkāra, 177 Vātsyāyana, 26, 139, 154, 155 Vedānta-Paribhāṣā, 77, 140 Vedānta-Sara, 54, 89 Vedas, 46 Vidyabhusana, S. C., 24 Vidyānanda, 30, 152, 159, 188, 189 Viranandi, 135 Virasena, 62 Vijñänbhikṣu, 140 Višeşāvašyuka-bhāşya, 63, 86, 97, 100,
135, 136, 180 Vişnu, 25 Visnu-sahasra-nama, 38 Visuddhimagga, 26 Vyāsa, 140
Warren, H., 8 Webster's New International Dictionary, 2 Wessely, J. E., 2
Yasomitra, 96 Yasovijaya, 66, 67, 180 Yoga-bhāsya, 77 Yoga-bindu, 144 Yoga-dụsti-Samuccaya, 61 Yoga-sutra, 26, 49, 97 Yogindu, 23, 53 Yuktyanušāsana, 82

Page #252

SUBJECT INDEX
Absolutism, 163 Absolutism vs. Non-absolutism,
163-165 Agnosticism, 45
,
--Yogic, 40-42 -Faith, 42-43
Reason; 43-44 -Chief Senses, 50-61 -Darsana & Jñāna, 61-67 -Chronology, 67-72 -Soul-Psychology, 73-79 --Stages of, 79-81 ---Par-excellence, 88-93 --Ground of, 93-103 --Karma, 104-111
.
Epistemology, 137 Fortuitism, 105 God, 3, 228 Hedonism, 46 Jesus Christ, 3 Materialism; 45 Nescience, 111 Omniscient, 1, 2 Omniscient Being, 18-27 Omniscience; 45, 88-90
-as knowledge of reality; 15 -., , „ duty, 16
„ „ reality, 14 --and personality, 19-20
-Meaning, 1-5 --Human, 20 -Misconceptions, 5-8 -and Mokşa, 21-27 -Non-belivers, 28-35
Believers, 35-36 -Classification
categorisation; 47-50 -Devotional, 36-38 -Self-knowledge, 38-39 -Practical utility, 39-40,
-Nescience, 122-136 - Validity of Knowledge, 150-162 -Syādivāda, 163-165, 168-172 -Arguments for, 173-175 -Mimāṁsakas objections reg,
nature of, 175-185 --Mimässakas Objections based
on Dharma, 186-194 --Classical Proofs, 195-96
--Pratyaksa, 196-92 -Anumāna; 198-203 -_Artha patti, 203-205
Upamāna, 205-208 -Agamas, 206-208 -Abhūva, 208–211 -Positive Arguments, 211-220

Page #253

240
Subject Index
— Nature of Soul, 211-213 Soul, 73-78 --- Anumeyatva, 213-214
--Proofs, 93-97 – Progressive Development of
--Perception, 97-78 Kn., 214-18 -Astronomical Predictions, 218-19
---Inference, 98-101 --Obstructive Pramānas, 219
--Authority, 101-102 - Natural Tendency of Thought, 220
-Analogy, 102 -Determination, 228, 229
--Implication, 102 - Mimāṁsakas, 33-35
--Non-cognition, 102-3. - Mokşa, 21-27
Validity of Knowledge, 150-152
157-159 Self-Knowledge, 35, 54

Page #254

SANSKRIT, PALI & PRAKRIT WORDS
Abhāva, 102 Abhedavāda, 65-67 Acāryas, 82
Adharma, 7
Adṛṣṭa, 106
Adhyāsa, 55
Advaitins, 44, 45, 57 Āgamas, 43, 59, 61, 101 Ahimsā, 40, 59. Ajñānavāda, 30, 106 Akhyāti, 150
Alaukika Pratyakşa, 41 Alaya Vijñāna, 56, 78 Āmalaki, 217
Anākāra, 61
Anālambana yoga, 42 Ananta-catuṣṭaya, 74 Anekānta, 40, 59, 70, 165,
169-72
Anekāntavāda, 138, 163, 164, 169-72
Anirvacaniya Khyāti, 156 Antaḥkarana, 77, 140 Antarāya, 74 Apurvārtha, 153
Arhat, 21, 83,
Arthāpatti, 102 Asamprajñāta, 42 Asarvajñavādins, 28 Asatkāryavādins, 27

Asatkhyātivāda, 156
Asrava, 128, 121, 130, 133 Astika, 44, 45
Atman, 12, 38, 39, 53, 89, 90, 93
Atmajñatā, 38-39 Atmakhyāti, 156
Audarika, 122 Avirati, 129
Bhakti, 36, 37 Bhautikavāda, 105
Bodhisattva, 225
Brahman, 19, 38, 77 Brahmā, 35
Brahmajñatā, 38 Buddhi, 43
Cārvāka, 23, 29, 30, 35, 44, 45.
Darsana, 61, 72
Darsana & Jñana, 61-72. Dharma, 7, 19, 29, 33, 36, 46 Dharmajñatā, 21, 40, 42 Dravya, 52
Evambhūta, 9
Gati, 83-84 Ghati karma, 74 Gotra-nama-karma. 84 - Guṇasthāna, 42, 86-88, 128
Heyopadeya, 7 İśvara, 19, 57

Page #255

242
Sanskrit...... Words
Issarakāranavādi, 44 Jivana-mukti, 222 Jivasamudghāta, 121 Jñāna-yoga, 36 Karma, 36, 104, 11 Karma & Rebirth, 104-6 Karmaphala, 46 Karmic idealism. 104 Karma-Śarira 120 Karma & Soul, 117-22 Karma-vāda, 62-64 Kaşāya, 122, 123, 124, 125,
126 Kevala-Jñāna, 60, 62, 63,
64, 65, 159-60, 168, 197 Kevala-Darsana, 62, 63, 64 Kundalini, 4 Liriga-Śarira, 129 Mārgajñatā, 39 Mārgaņās, 84 Māyā, 64 Mimāṁsakas, 175, 174 Mokșa, 21-27, 45, 49, 56 Naigama, 9 Naigamābhāsa, 12 Naya, 8 Nayavāda 812 Pañca-Parameșthi, 82 Pañca-Skandha, 45 46, 74 Paramārtha Satya, 56 Paryudāsa, 209 Paśyati, 37 Pratipaśyati, 37
Pravrtti Vijñāna, 78 Prasajya-pratişedha, 209 Pramāņa-Pancaka-rahita,
209 Rjusūtranaya, 11 Rjusūtrābhāsa, 11 Rtambharā, 21 Sahasrākṣa, 34 Sahavāda, 42, 43 64 Samgraha naya, 12 Samgrahābhāsa, 12 Samabhirūdha naya, 10 Samabhirūdhābhāsa, 10 Samādhi, 41 Sarvavit, 37 Sarvajña, 37 Sarvajñatā, 5, 9, 18, 39, 18
14, 18, 143-71, 138, 169-72 Sayoga Kevalin, 87 Siddha, 82, 83 Stotra, 37 Syādvāda, 163-172, 138 Tattvo paplavavāda, 33 Tirthařkaras, 47, 49, 57 Turiyāvasthā, 222 Upayoga, 79, 138 Viśvacarsane, 37 Visvataḥ cakṣuḥ, 37 Viśvavedas, 37 Viśvavit, 37 Vyavahārābhāsa, 11 Vyavahāranaya, 11 Yogaja, 114

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1
1
3
4
7
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Incorrect
F. N. Shastri H. G.,
29
"
9
33

31
3
12
F. N.
2432 28-322
20 Upahisads
Divakara
F. N.
دو
74 17
74 28
26
95 146 1
156
12
177 193 20
Śruta Sagar, Sūri
Benarsidas
'ñā'
Kamsila
Nirbija
Makṣa
Infallabe
ERRATA
Ramchandran,
1ge
lge
Jāna
Soul Jiva
none-soul
on other
Mahaniya
Expicabh revelatorists
acpuise Ridiculse
Migh
Correct
Shastri, H. G., Śruta Sagar Sūri
Banarsidas
'ā'
Kamalasila
Nirbija
Mokṣa
Infallible
Ramachandran,
Upanisads
Divākara,
Ege
Ege
Jñāna
Soul or Jiva
non-soul
on the other
Mohaniya
Explicable
revelatorists;
acquire
Ridicules
Might

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