Jaina Concept of Omniscience

SR No.: 001547
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Ramjee Singh
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1974
Total Pages: 258
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Knowledge
File Size: 17 MB

Page 172

VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE AND OMNISCIENCE
159
Yogins say. It is both extrinsic and intrinsic. If we ask when it is extrinsic and when intrinsic, their answer is this : in the case of knowledge of familiar objects validity is intrinsic, but in the case of unfamiliar objects, it is extrinsic. Dharmabhūsaņa 87 cites an example of a man who was familiar to one pond and unfamiliar to another. About the latter, he was doubtful whether it contains water or is only a mirage, and than using inferential knowledge that there is a smell of lotuses, cool breeze coming from that side, etc. he comes to the conclusion that it contains water. Hemacandra also supports this view when he says : "we become certain of validity of a pramāņa either by itself or through the help of others.”88 So subsequent confirmatory cognitions, cognition of its prag. matic consequences or cognition of an object invariably related to it, will determine the validity. Vidyānandi has also affirmed the views of Akalarika, Mānikyanandi and Hemacandra by saying that pramāna "establishes itself regarding objects with which we are alredy familiar and takes the help of others in other cases."'89 This is also supported by other Jaina logicians, like Anantavīrya 90 and Vādideva Sūri. 91 However, a critic may raise an objection that if by inference, the validity of a pranāņa is made, it may lead to many difficulties. Firstly, it will mean that an inference which is itself a pramāna is made to confirm another pramāņa, which is a sort of paradoxical position. But in order to avoid this difficulty, if it is said that another inference will validate this, this will be a sort of infinite regress. Hence to avoid all these difficulties,
87 Dharmabhūşana, Nyāya-di pikā, I. 21. 88 Hemacandra, Pramāna-mimāṁsā, I. 1.8. 89 Vidyānandi, Pramāna-parikşā, "Prāmānyam-to-svatah-siddhambhyasat
paratoanyathā". 90 Anantavīrya, Prameya-ratna-mala, p. 6--"Prāmānya arises by itself”. 91 Vadideva Sūri, Prame ya-naya-tattralokalankāra, I. 11. "Prāmānya and
aprāmānya arise through others, but regarding their knowledge, they arise by theinselves."