Jaina Concept of Omniscience

SR No.: 001547
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Ramjee Singh
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1974
Total Pages: 258
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Knowledge
File Size: 17 MB

Page 178

ABSOLUTISM Vs. NON-ABSOLUTISM
165
Jaina logic of Anekānta is based not on abstract intellectualism but on experience and realism leading to a nonabsolutistic attitude of mind. "Multiplicity and unity, particularity and universality, eternality and non-eternality, defina. bility and non-definability": etc. which apparently seems to be contradictory characterstics of reality, are interpreted from different points of view, to avoid any offence to logic, to be co-existent in the same object. All cognitions, whether of identity or diversity, are after all, valid. “They seem to be contradictory of each other simply because one of them is mistaken to be the whole truth." In fact, “the integrity of truth consists in this very variety of its aspects, within the rational unity of an all comprehensive and ramifying principle”4 Therefore, Prof. S. Mookerjee holds that “the charge of contradition against the co-presence of being and non-being in a real is a figment of apriori logic."5
a disjunctive judgement (A man is either good or bad ) is not like the categoricality of an ordinary categorical judgement, 'the horse is red.' Samantabhadra also says, “Even the doctrine of non-absolutism can be interpreted either as absolute or non-absolute according to the Pramāņa or Naya. This means that even the doctrine of nonabsolutism is not absotute unconditionally". (Samantabhadra, Svyam. bhu Stotra, 103). However, to avoid the fallacy of infinite regress, the Jainas distinguish between valid non-absolutism (Samyak Anekānta) and invalid non-absolutism (Mithya-Anekanta). (Samantabhadra. Apta Mimāṁsā, 108; Vidyānanda, Aştasahasri, p. 290; Dharamabhūsana. Nyaya-di pika, pp. 130-131). Like an invalid absolute judgement, an invalid non-absolute judgement too is invalid. Therefore, to be valid. Anekanta must not be absolute but relative. In short, the doctrine of Anekānta is an opposite theory of Ekānta, which is a one-sided exposition irrespective of other view points." (Haribhadra, AnekantaJaya-Pataka, ed. H. R. Kāpadia, Gaekawāda Oriental Institute,
Barodā, 1940, Vol. I., p. IX (Introduction). 2 Mallişena, Syadvada Mañ jari, 3 S. Sanghavi, Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics, p. 25. 4 M. D. Desai, The Naya Karạikā, p. 25 (Introduction). 5 Mookerjee, Ibid., p. 190. The author deals with the "Logical Back
ground of Jaina Philosophy" in the light of Anekānta logic.