Jaina Concept of Omniscience

SR No.: 001547
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Ramjee Singh
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1974
Total Pages: 258
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Knowledge
File Size: 17 MB

Page 111

98
:
PROOFS FOR THE SOUL BEING..
states are the functions of the self and all these are quite evident in our everyday experiences. This is the knowledge of ahampratyaya111 ('I sense') or the 'Cogito' of Descartes and unity of apperception of Kant. This is not realised through the external senses but through the internal sense.
But we can say that this argument contains a jump from the psychological to the ontological No one denies the occurrence of our mental states but to posit a reality behind them is to stretch the idea too far. The Behaviourists, who explain everything in terms of behaviour, will not agree to it, nor will it be acceptable to Hume or James. [ii] Argument for the Existeitce of soul based on Inference
(Anumāna):
Anumāna is a knowledge which comes after perception. (tat pūrvakam anumānam). Now, since no one has perceived the soul in the past, it cannot become the subject-matter of inference. Further, inference, to be valid, requires a relation of universal concomitance ( vyāpti ) between the major term (sādhya) and middle term (hetu). Here, as pointed out earlier, there is no relation between the soul (major term) and its recollection based on past perception (middle term), hence it can be inferred that there is no soul 112
But it is said, as has been shown earlier, the existence of soul is self-evident and is proved by such uncontradicted experience as 'I feel pain' etc. The soul is supposed to be the substratum of consciousness, which is self-evident. Now, as substance cannot exist without attributes, so there can be no soul without consciousness. Now, we can say that since we realise the attributes (i.e., consciousness), we cannot avoid realising its substance (i.e., soul).113 However, it may be pointed out that this assertion is based on the commonsense view of the relation between substance and attributes, the myth of which has been exploded by Berkeley, Bradley; Sankara and
111 Ibid., 1554. 112 Ibid., 1550 113 Ibid., 1558