Jaina Concept of Omniscience

SR No.: 001547
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Ramjee Singh
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1974
Total Pages: 258
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Knowledge
File Size: 17 MB

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· DISTINCTION BETWEEN..
and realise the real. The reality is not a rounded ready-made whole or an abstract unity of many definite or determinate aspects but that “the so-called unity is after all a manifold being only a name for fundamentally different aspects of truth which do not make a unity in any sense of the term."16 So far we know or can know, the making of truth and making of reality is one. Reality like truth is therefore definite-indefinite (anekānta). Its indefiniteness follows from the inexhaustible reserve of objective reality and its definiteness comes from the fact that it grows up into the reality of our own knowing which we make.
So we can conclude that in Jainism, non-absolutism is not only a metaphysical but also an epistemological concept. There is no absolute reality, so there is no absolute truth.
III. Distinction between Syadvada and Sarvanata
Whatever might be the value of Syādvāda or Anekanta. vāda in Jainism, it is not a final truth. In fact, it is recommended in so far as it helps us, in arriving at the ultimate truth. Syādrāda works or can work only in practical life, and it is therefore that the Jainas regard it as a practical truth. But there is also another realm of truth which is not in any way partial or relative but absolute and is the subject matter of omniscience or perfect knowledge (Kevala-jñāna).
Therefore, though it seems to be self-contradictory to accept both Syādvāda and Sarvajñatā, yet the self-contradiction is more apparent than real. As Vyavahāra is not opposed to Parmārtha in Advait Vedānta, so here also Syādvāda and Sarvajñatā are not opposed to each other. As a matter of fact, for the Jainas, truth alone matters (saccham logammi sārabhūyam). But the quest of truth is not an easy one. There are our own likes and dislikes which come in the way of
16
H. M. Bhattācārya, “The Jaina Concept of Truth and Reality”, Philosophical Quarterly, Calcutta, Vol. III, No. 3, October 1927, p. 213.