Book Title: Jaina Concept of Omniscience
Author(s): Ramjee Singh
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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Page 223
________________ 210 ARGUMENTS BASED ON.. Now, if I examine the alternative (b) (i.e., relative nonapprehension of a different type other than which is free from the evidence of five pramāņas), it will also not help. This means that one will have to negate the idea of omniscience through other means not mentioned above. Such a negation of omniscience may be either partial or total. It is the former case, i.e., negation of omniscience at a particular place or time (kvacit kadācit kasyacit ), the Jainas will bave no objection to accept this position, since they also do not think that omniscient being is everywhere. But if one wants to prove negation of omniscience in all places and times, it is to admit one's own omniscience.135 There is also a technical difficulty here. In order to establish the absolute non-existence of an object (i.e., the omniscient being), the following processes have to be undergone :138 First, its accredited locus (in all times and places ) is to be seen by the eye. Secondly, the counter-entity (i.e., the omniscient being) which could have been seen if it had been present, is to be remembered. Thirdly, there follows a purely mental process which gives rise to the notion of the non-existence of the omniscient being. Now, if the above analysis of the process of non-apprehension' be accepted as it has been accepted by the Mimāṁsakas, 137 it follows that to disprove the non-existence of the omniscient being, one has to accept the existence of him in the past, without 135 Prabhācandra, Nyāya-kumudacandra, Vol. I. pp. 95-96, Prame ya kamala-martanda, p. 265; Anantavirya, Ibid., p. 98; Vidyānanda, Apta parikṣā, 105-106, Asta-sahasri p. 48; Akalarka, Siddhiviniscaya, 14; Anantakirti, Bịhat-sarvajñasiddhi, p. 152; Ratnakirti, Ibid., 25; V. R. Sūri, Ibid., p. 571. 136 As a matter of fact, Jainas have no right to argue on the basis of 'non-apprehension since they do not recognise it as an independent and valid means of cognition. But for arguments sake, they use it to show inconsistency of this argument. See V. R. Sūri, Abhidhāna Ra jendra, Vol. VII, pp. 569–70. 137 Kumārila, Śloka-vārttika (on Negation), IX. 27. Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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