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184
MÌMĀMSAKAS' OBJECTIONS ANSWERED
following moment. But both of these are ever-lasting, hence there is no absurdity. 40
(c) It is said that the knowledge of both the prior and the posterior non-existence of a thing cannot take place together. For example, simultaneously birth and death of the same person is impossible. A thing is used in one particular sense only; for example, a blue object is treated as blue and not as yellow. It is, therefore, that if an omniscient being treats both the prior non-existence (e.g. past) and posterior non-existence (eg, future) simultaneously, it is wrong because both of them cannot co exist together. 41 To this, the Jainas say that a thing
is jerceivep as b'ue at a particular place and time and not always and everywhere. So birth and death are perceived as phenomena occuring at two places and two particular moments of time.49 4. The Fourth Objection :
It is said, if the omniscient has direct perception of everything then he will also have direct knowledge of such tastes as are unclean things. 43 This would be a very uncomfortable state of affairs, for the omniscient is also considered to be spiritually perfect. But the reply to this is very simple. If the omniscient person had experienced the unclean taste through the contact of his gustatory organ, then alone he could be accused of having an undesirable experience. But whatever is cognised by him is cognised without actual sense-object-contact; it is cognised through the mind whose perceptiveness has been brought about by the impressions of past experiences. 4 4
40 Ibid., 260. 41 Prabhācandra, Nyāya-kumuda-candra, pp. 88-89. 42 lbid., p. 97. 43 Śantarakṣita, Ibid., 3145. 44 Ibid., 3318-19; cp. Anantakīrti, Brhat-sarva jña-siddhi, pp. 178–79;
Anantavīrya, Prameya-ratna-mala, pp. 97-98. (ed. H. L. Jaina).
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