Jaina Concept of Omniscience

Author(s): Ramjee Singh
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 47

THE NON-BELIEVERS IN OMNISCIENCE
The Yogic perception also being based upon memory of preconceived things cannot cognise Dharma, which has never been perceived or thought of and is yet to come.3% On the one hand, the excellences of the source of words only serve to set aside the chances of unauthoritativeness, 94 the absence of an author safeguards the Vedas against all reproach?s and their eternality having been established all other assumptions of an omniscient author and the like become needless
The above account will show Kumārila's zeal to establish the reign of dharma which is universal, eternal and unchangeable. It is only the eternal and infallible Vedas that can be the source of its knowledge. It is significant, however, to find that Kumārila's opposition to the theory of omniscience is apparently partial, i.e. restricted to the sphere of dharma. He does not deny the possibility of omniscience in other matters except dharma. Kumārila asks, “who is denying the possibility of a person knowing other things ? ”26 Thus, if omniscient means a person, who knows all things except dharma and adharma, Kumārila has no objection to it. But this is only Kumārila's strategy in arguments. When the Buddhists expose this generous offer made by Kumārila showing that the possibility of regarding 'all-knowing', the man who knows all things except dharma and adharma is superfluous, he tries to silence them by saying that “in every case, the term 'all' is used in reference to the context, hence if there is a person knowing all things relating to a certain context, what harm does that do to our position ?”97 He then narrates the different meanings of the term 'all', which I have discussed earlier in Chapter I.
23 Ibid., p. III (Introduction). 24 Kumārila, Ibid., II. 65-66. 25 Ibid., II. 68. 26 Šantarakṣita, Ibid., K. 3128. 27 Santarakṣita, Ibid., K. 3129,