________________
KNOWLEDGE OF KNOWLEDGE
5145
something non-intelligent which is the substratum of qualities like knowledge, activity, etc. and so it is not the object of recognition but the substrate thereof. According to Kumārila, there is distinction between the soul as consciousness itself and the many selves, whose substratum is the one universal soul. The Mimāṁsakas, in general, accept the Vedāntic theory of self except that they recognise some unconscious element in the soul which is perhaps the internal organ. So it is supposed to be both conscious and unconscious. This makes their position a little dubious. However, the reasons for the rejection of the theory of omniscience is more religious than metaphysical or epistemological. Mimāṁsakas are avowed opponents of the doctrine of omni-science, hence if human omniscience is accepted, this will take away the entire ground of the doctrine of the Vedas.
II. Knowledge of Knowledge Now, since soul is constitutionally a knowing being, it cannot exist without knowledge. It is like a lamp23 which illumines itself as well as objects knop, n. It may look odd to say that objects are knowable but knowledge is not. However, this view of the Jainas is not accepted by the Naiyāyikas and the Bhatļas. To the Mimāṁsakas," knowledge is non-perceptive because intellect itself is known by inference consequent upon the knowledge of objects apprehended by it."'24 The Bhātas are
23 Māņikyanandi, Parikşāmukham, I. 12. In Pramāna-naya-tattvalokalam
kāra, I. 18, the example given is that of the sun instead of a lamp. Siddhasena Divākara also says that Pramāna illumines itself as well as other objects (Nyāyāvatāra, 1). Hemacandra 'also mentions that "as an object reveals itself, so the knowledge reveals itself and consequently a knowledge can know itself"-(Pramāna-mimamsa-bhaşya, I. 1.2.). See also Samantabhadra. Aptā-Mimāṁsa, 101; Svayambhu
stotra, 63; Dharmabhūşaņa, Nyāya-di pikā, I. 13. 24 Sabara-bhasya on Mim. Sūt., I. 1.5., See remarks made by M. K.
Jaina, Siddhi-viniscaya-çika, p. 99 (English Introduction). "But as the buddhi of our selves is as imperceptive as the buddhi of others, so it is impossible to know the objects by our own buddhi in as-much
as we do not know them by the help of buddhi of others." JCO-19
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
