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KNOWLEDGE OF KNOWLEDGE
147
The argument that, as non-self-revelatory sense-organs do cognise and apprehend their objects, so the imperceptible cognition can cognise other cognitions, cannot hold good, because it must be then accepted that the earlier knowledge of an object knows its object though it is not itself known. But this position has not been accepted by the Nyāya-Vaišeşikas. The argument that God has got two sets of cognitions - one that knows the world and the other knows this knowledge will land us into the fallacy of infinite regress. It would be ridiculous to assign to God the power of omniscience and then take away the power of cognising his own knowledge.
The Jainas, on the basis of above arguments, have accepted the self-revelatory character of cognition. Their purpose is manifold. This view saves their scheme of pluralism and realism. Their fundamental dualism between the jivas and the ajīvas is thereby easily defended. It is worthwhile to note that they use the term revelatory (sva-prakāśa) with regard to knowledge. It means that knowledge only reveals, it does not modify or alter its object. Hence it is free from the fallacy of either Berkeleyan idealism or Kantian phenomenalism. Jainism presents on the other hand pure monistic realism as for it “ the object of knowledge is independent of knowledge relation and there is no dualism between the object known and the object as it is."98 This position may be compared with the epistemological monism of modern western neo realists,
An objection may be raised here. On the Jaina position, it would be difficult to show the existence of self-revealing consciousness in the cases of certain psychological processes like attention. The self-consciousness, lying at the root of all such cognitions seems to be an ultra-psychological conscious. ness called “latent consciousness” by Ferrier 39 To some extent, it might be compared with the transcendental ego of Kant or the accompaniment of Plotinus.
28 Dr. Rajendra Prasad, "A Critical Study of the Jaina Epistemology”.
Jaina Antiquary (Arrah), Vol. XV, No. 2, Jan. 1949), p. 65. 29 J. F. Ferrier, Institutes of Metaphysics (2nd ed.), p. 81.
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