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DARŠANA AND JNĀNA
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same consciousness is incapable of grasping the general and the particular aspect of things simultaneously, hence it must be known consecutively.50 This view is deeply rooted in the Pre-Umāsvāmi Āgamas51 and is also held by Jinabhandra,59 Siddhasena Gani53 and others. 2. Sahavada :
The advocates of the theory of simultaneity (Sahuvāda) do not accept the above view. They say, “When the obstruction in the way of absolute knowledge is completely removed absolute knowledge springs up as a matter of course. Similarly, when the obstruction in the path of absolute perception is completely removed, absolute perception springs forth as a matter of course. ”54 Thus it is wrong to argue with respect to Kevala jñāna on the analogy of sensuous knowledge Kevala iñana has got beginning but no end, but according to Kramavāda it has both beginning and end, because it is not present at the time of Kevala darśana. So Kramavāda is also against the Scriptures.55 Moreover, Kramavādins cannot answer objection of the Mimāṁsākas that if omniscience is successive knowledge, it cannot really be omniscient, since there is no end of the period of succession.56 Then, if the removal of obstruction is common to both darśana and jñāna, which of the two will spring forth first ?57 There is no reason why Kevala darśana should come first and Kevala jñāna afterwards, or vice versa. They shall have to answer further why there should be succession at all when the removal of obstruction is simultaneous ?
50 Ibid., II. 4 (Tika) • 51 Avaš yaka Niryukti, 973, 979; Bhagavati Sūtra, XVIII. 8; Pra jñā pana
Sutra, 30. 52 Višeşāva'ś yaka-Bhāşya, Gāthā 3090; Viseșandvati, Gāthā, 184. 53 Tattvārtha Sitra Bhāşya Tika, I. 31. 54 Siddhasena Divākara, Sanmati Tark, II. 5. 55 Ibid., II. 6-8. 56 Śântarakṣita, Tattva Sangraha, 3248-49. $7 Şiddhasena, Ibid., II. 9,
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