Indian Logic Part 03

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 16

VALIDITY OF VEDAS... then a word would be reduced to the status of bodily gesture etc. is rejected on the ground that a word remains a very special means of cognition even if the concerned convention as to word-meaning relationship is to be learnt first just as a probans is a very special means of cognition even if the concerned invariable concomitance is to be learnt first.20 Then it is argued that word-meaning relationship is conventional because the same word often means two things in two languages.21 The supposition that all word is capable of yielding all meaning is rejected as groundless, there being no empirical evidence in its support.22 Similarly is rejected the supposition that a word means what the Aryans - and not Mlecchas - take it to mean, the point being that a word of a Mleccha language is as much capable of yielding a meaning as a word of an Aryan language.23 Lastly it is conceded that the convention as to word-meaning is set up by God at the time of world-creation, it being recalled that the thesis of world-creation on the part of God has already been demonstrated.24 The point is emphasised that the Nyāya and Mimārsā positions on the question practically differ little and as follows: (1) According to the former a word has been yielding a meaning ever since the time of world-creation, according to the latter it has been doing so since ever; (2) according to the former what is involved in.word-meaning relationship is a word and a meaning, according to the latter here there is involved a third element in the form of a capacity inherent in this word in virtue of which it yields this meaning.25 In this connection is answered the objection that even God while setting up a convention as to wordmeaning relationship must require a prior stock of words; the answer consists in contending that it is we ordinary mortals, who require a prior stock of words while explaining a word-meaning
(though we too not always) but that God who is an extra-ordinary • personage capable of even world-creation requires no prior stock of words while setting up a convention as to word-meaning relationship.26 Here again we find a fantastic Mimārsā position pitted against a fantastic Nyāya position. The position that the word-meaning relationship is established through a convention is correct in that different peoples speaking different languages have set up different conventions as to this relationship but the position loses all sense when identified with the contention that God at the time of world-creation has set up convention as to word-meaning