Indian Antiquary Vol 52

Author(s): Richard Carnac Temple, Stephen Meredyth Edwardes, Krishnaswami Aiyangar
Publisher: Swati Publications

Page 215

August 1923 )
BUCKLER'S POLITICAL THEORY OF THE INDIAN MUTINY
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of Akbar. Before referring to the arguments adduced in support of this contention, it may be observed that the author apparently finds corroboration of his theory in the "outstanding fact that between the death of Aurangzeb in 1707 and the outbreak of the year 1857, there was no sign of concerted opposition to the British in India, save the attempts made by Haidar Ali and his son Tipu."
Assuming the correctness of this statement, surely there is nothing very remarkable in the apparent absence of concerted opposition to the Company, at any rate for a considerable portion of the period. In the first place, the only powers which could have led a mass attack upon the British position in India were the Mughal Emperor, and later the Maratha Confederacy. But from 1707 onwards the Mughal Empire fell rapidly into ruin, and the Emperor himself became a mere phantom and roi-fainéant. Aurangzeb's policy fatally weakened Mughal dominion, and one by one the Viceroys and Subahdars of the Empire fell away from their allegiance and began to carve out independent states for themselves. As early as 1715 the English envoys to Delhi were able to remark the rottenness of the Empire--"a Mughal army in open revolt in the streets of the capital and the Emperor himself a mere tool in the hands of unscrupulous ministers." In Bengal the Nawabs became independent; Bombay and Madras witnessed respectively the rise of the Maratha power and of the Nizamu'l-mulk. On all sides the English company watched from its factories an empire sinking into decrepitude, "great nobles carving kingdoms out of the remnants, and the turbulent Maratha hordes growing yearly in strength and devoting all their resources to predatory war." Thus down to 1780 the decadent Mughal Empire was too weak, and the new principalities were far too busy with their scramble for power, to organize combined opposition to the English merohants in India.
Secondly, it is doubtful whether the Company's actions or policy, down to 1750, provided any ground whatever for concerted hostilities on the part of the Indian powers. And if this be true, there is surely nothing very remarkable in the absence of such opposition. In the first half of the eighteenth century the English were still bent only on trading: all they desired was peaceful commerce, and in their capacity as traders they had the sympathy of the Indian trading classes, who profited not a little from their activities. Mr. Roberts in his History of British India has pointed out that the revolution of 1756-57 in Bengal was not primarily the conquest of an Indian province by a European trading settlement, but was rather the overthrow of a foreign (Muhammadan) government by the trading and financial classes, both Hindu and British. Bengal was governed by a Nawab, nominally owning the suzerainty of the Mughal : but for many years the Nawabs had been practically independent. They were men of Mughal, Persian and Afghan race, ruling ever a Hindu people, who owned most of the wealth of the country and were united by a community of trading interests with the English. By 1750 the Hindus were seen to be less tolerant than before of the Muhammadan minority and were seeking a chance to free them. selves from the yoke ; while the English were irritated by arbitrary restrictions upon their trade. Siraju'd-daula's impolitio actions pressed equally hardly upon both European trader and Hindu subject, and directly paved the way for the battle of Plassey in 1757.
It can hardly be contended that up to the date of Plassey any real cause existed for concerted action against the Company, and Mr. Buckler's argument seems scarcely relevant. But thereafter the position changed, in consequence of the political power acquired by the English in Bengal. Haidar Ali, the Marathas and the Nizam were all striving for power, and they alternately courted the Company or combined together to threaten its existence,