Book Title: Indologica Taurinensia
Author(s): Colette Caillat, Siegfried Lienhard, Irma Piovano, Saverio Sani
Publisher: Comitato AIT
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Piotr Balcerowicz
understood in such systems as Nyāya, Vaišeșika or in Buddhist tradition, that it is thoroughly unfeasible to interpret it differently, in agreement with the Jaina Agamic tradition. The only exception to the sensory interpretation of pratyakṣa is provided in NA 2741.
The exceptional case of perception is thus the absolute cognition (kevala). But such a standpoint does not contradict the thesis of th general Indian epistemological-logical tradition as the background for NA; in fact, it corresponds to the idea of mystic insight (yogipratyakşa) as an additional, supra-sensory kind of perception, wellknown not only from the Buddhist tradition 42. Thus, in NA we find two subdivisions of pramāņa: (1) perception (pratyakşa), divided into sensory an supra-sensory (kevala), 43 and (2) indirect cognition (parokşa) that comprises inference (anumāna) and verbal testimony (śābda).
3.2. We find an entirely different world of epistemic ideas and notions in STP. In the first place, not only are the terms pramāna, pramiti, māna, pramā, or any equivalent, entirely absent from STP, but even the idea of cognitive criterion (pramāna) and the concept of validity (prāmānya) nowhere occur in STP. It is even more surprising in view of the fact that not only these questions are crucial in NA, but
41. NA 27: sakalâvarana-muktâtma kevalam yat prakāśate /
pratyakşam sakalârthâtma-satata-pratibhāsanam // - - 'That whose essence is freed from all veils, which shines as [something) absolute is perception representing constantly the essences of all objects.'
42. See, e.g., NB.1.11: bhūtârtha-bhāvanā-prakarsa-paryanta-jam yogi-jñanam cêti; or VS.9.13: ātmany ātma-manaso-samyoga-višesād ātma-pratyaksam.
43. Siddharşi-ganin confirms this in NAV 1: tataś ca sarva-jñānānām yat svarūpa-samvedanaṁ tad api pratyakşam ity uktam bhavati, tatrâpi svarāpasya grāhyasya sākṣāt-karana-sadbhāvād iti. aksebhyah parato vartata iti parokşam. aksavyāpāra-nirapeksam mano-vyāpārenâsākṣād-artha-paricchedakam yaj jñānam tat parokşam iti bhāvaḥ. - 'And, therefore, what it amounts to is the following: that which is a sensation of the intrinsic nature (of an object in case of acts of omniscience is perception, as well, because direct perception of the intrinsic nature (of an object] which is to-be-grasped is present also in (case) of these [acts of omniscience). That which operates aloof from the perceiving organs, [i.e., the senses), is indirect cognition. The intent is as follows: the cognition which determines an object indirectly by the operation of the mind, independent of the operation of the perceiving organs (sc. the senses) is the indirect cognition.'
