Indologica Taurinensia

Author(s): Colette Caillat, Siegfried Lienhard, Irma Piovano, Saverio Sani
Publisher: Comitato AIT

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Piotr Balcerowicz
6. It is well known that the author of NA is innovative in his attitude with respect to Jaina tradition and seems to go against the Canon, e.g. in his new division of the pramāṇas and in his new definition of pramāņa, even though everyone knows what it is' 75. Nowhere in the whole text of NA does Siddhasena Mahāmati takes recourse to tradition or the scriptures to corroborate his statements. He solely relies on the power of logic and argument.
This attitude largely differs from the 'Agamic approach typical of STP, viz. the attempt to remain faithful to the Jaina tradition and to the authority are the Āgamas, even though the 'Agamic tradition' is not always unanimous 76.
A good example of such an 'Agamic' attitude is provided by STP 3.10-12. In the first step, Siddhasena Divākara introduces the pārvapakṣa position: 'As a matter of fact, two viewpoints were distinguished by the Lord (the Jina), viz. substantial viewpoint (dravyarthika) and modal viewpoint (paryāyārthika); but since there is additionally the "quality" particular, [hence] also qualitative view-point (gunārthika) should be adopted 77.' This is rather a logical and consistent conclusion, if one accepts that the main divisions of view-points (naya) are derived from the main ontological aspects: the substance and its modes. Since there is also quality (guna) as the third aspect underlying the being, and it is even more fundamental ontologically, one would expect a separate viewpoint corresponding to it. Siddhasena Divākara's rejoinder to this argument is not based directly on logic or reasoning but takes first of all recourse to the stand of the
75. NA 2-3: prasiddhāni pramāṇāni vyavahāraś ca tat-krtah/
pramāna-laksanasyöktau jñāyate na prayojanam // prasiddhānāṁ pramāṇānām laksanôktau prayojanam/
tad-vyāmoha-nivettih syād vyāmādha-manasām iha // - '[The prima facie position to be refuted:) Cognitive criteria are well-known and everyday practice is accomplished by them; [therefore) no purpose is known for stating the definition of cognitive criterion. [Rejoinder:) The purpose for stating the definition of cognitive criteria, (although they are] well-known, should be the eradication of disorientation concerning that (definition of cognitive criterion) in the case of the disoriented-minded here.
76. For instance comp. above the lack of unanimity as regards the divisions of the cognitive faculties (upayoga). 77. STP 3.10: do una nayā bahavayā davvathiya-pajjavattiyā niyayā /
etto ya guna-visese gunathiya-nao vi jujjasto //