Indologica Taurinensia

Author(s): Colette Caillat, Siegfried Lienhard, Irma Piovano, Saverio Sani
Publisher: Comitato AIT

Page 29

On the Relationship of the Nyāyâvatāra and the Sammati-tarka-prakarāņa
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this metaphorical transference, does not, however, apply to perception. The complete passage of PVA, p. 467.15-26, reads as follows:
“However, the comprehension of the inferable property which has become the subject of the debate (is possible) by means of the demonstration of the triple-formed inferential sign, therefore [its) statement (sc. verbal demonstration of a proof formula) (which is inference for others (parârthânumāna)] is not pointless. Because inference is produced on the account of this (verbal statement], also it is inference due to metaphorical transference of the genuinely inferential character of the inference for oneself (svârthânumāna)].
[Objection:) “If the statement, (which is called the inference for others, is) inference because it produces inference, then (a verbal statement] is also perception for others, because it produces perception". No such quadruplet (is possible, viz. inference for oneself (svârthânumāna), inference for others (parârthânumāna), perception for oneself (svârtha-pratyaksa) and perception for others (parârtha-pratyakşa)].
[2] Perception never arises with respect to anything in the same way (sc. on account of the statement) as inference is produced: when one remembers the relation (sc. invariable concomitance) on account of the statement (of the logical reason).
[3] When one remembers the triple-formed inferential sign, there necessarily arises inference. However, when a statement (is formulated by one person which describes) only an object that one has cognised oneself, no one (else except for the speaker) cognises (this object] through perception (on account of the statement).
[In other words,] no perception arises on account of merely a statement.
[Objection:] “[When one person exclaims:] «Look! A deer is running!», (the other person) looks [in that direction), (and in this way, there arises perception (in that person)”.
No, also in this case (on account of the statement) there immediately arises inference (and not perception). For it is as follows:
[4] [A person) is enjoined to direct one's sight towards this object as follows: "Look!" (in the sense that:] "[This object which] I have (just) cognised (myself), has been demonstrated in the context”.
(So,] this is a statement of injunction (formulated by the speaker): "Direct your sight there!" in the sense of taking a look at the deer. And [further): "Just as I have directed my sight (towards this deer), so you, too, (look there]”. Then, when [the other person) is directing (one's) sight towards (that deer) in this way, there (takes place) the operation of logical reasons: remem