Indologica Taurinensia

Author(s): Colette Caillat, Siegfried Lienhard, Irma Piovano, Saverio Sani
Publisher: Comitato AIT

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Piotr Balcerowicz
to assume that NA, which did follow the pattern of NB 80, is posterior to NBT, which follows the identical structure.
His third and final argument to prove that Siddhasena was posterior to Prajñākaragupta, to which he devotes a few more lines, is based on the rather curious idea of 'perception for others' (parârthapratyakşa), most probably the innovation of Siddhasena Mahāmati himself and clearly modelled on Dinnāga's and Dharmakirti's distinction of two kinds of inference, but later on dropped by most, though not all 81, thinkers of the Jaina tradition. BHATT (2000: 73) maintains that: 'A new variety of pratyaksa, viz. parārtha pratyaksa in Indian logic is introduced by the NV [= Nyāyâvatara - P.B.] (v. 11). This represents a clear influence of Prajñākara who provided the NV-author with an idea of parārtha pratyaksa (cp. yady anumā-notpādanād vacanam anumānam, pratyakşotpādanāt, v. 1.: vacanam api parārthaṁ pratyakşam bhavet. PVB [= Pramāņa-vārttikälankāra P.B.) 3/4.1.1., p. 476; cp. also: NV v. 10cd with this PVB-statement).'
7.2. The first part of the argument about Siddhasena's authorship of the idea of parârtha-pratyaksa is indeed sound 82, however, its latter part is a result of some confusion. When we read the whole passage of Prajñākaragupta from which BHATT extracted just a line (vide infra, bolded), we realise that the quotation referred to by Bhatt is, in fact, an objection against Prajñākaragupta's position (!), which he subsequently refutes. In the excerpt, Prajñākaragupta explains why it is possible that genuine inferential process (svārthānumāna), which has been essentially carried out by the cogniser himself who witnessed the events that are the basis for generalisation, can be demonstrated ver bally to another person and evoke a similar cognition in the hearer; hence, even though the proof formula is, strictly speaking, merely a verbal statement, it is metaphorically called inference for others (parârthânumāna), because it generates the same inferential conclu sion in the hearer as it did in the speaker. Prajñākaragupta insists that
80. See: BALCEROWICZ (2001a: xii ff.).
81. E.g. by Vadideva-sūri in PNTAA 3.26 or by Gunaratna-sūri in TRD, p. 223 ff., see BHATT (2000: 76, nn. 27, 28).
82. See above $ 5.2; cf. also BALCEROWICZ (2001b: 367-368, § 8)..