Book Title: Indologica Taurinensia
Author(s): Colette Caillat, Siegfried Lienhard, Irma Piovano, Saverio Sani
Publisher: Comitato AIT

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Page 38
________________ 66 Piotr Balcerowicz Accordingly, a reference to this most important notion from the Jaina point of view finds its most adequate place in the structure of the Nyāyâvatāra: NA 27 concludes the discussion of pramānas, whereas the subsequent verse (NA 28 97) discusses their practical relevance and results (phala). After strictly epistemological issues have been dealt with, NA 29 describes the nature of the object of coghitions, NA 30 relates ontological concerns to epistemology and establishes the rela etc., hence Pise purification t with the alkalihich the me for [his) purification exists. In this world, whatever is such the means for the purification (of which] exists is (also) such the complete purification of which is possibly existent, like a particular gem for the purification of which the means exists, (namely] prolonged calcination in a clay furnace with the alkali, etc. And indeed the cognitive subject is such for whose purification the means exists, (namely] repeated practice of cognition, etc., hence (the cognitive subject is such whose complete purification is possibly existent.' (NAV 27.4; sambhavat-samasta-śuddhika ātmā, vidyamānaśuddhy-upāyatvād; iha yo yo vidyamāna-śuddhy-upāyaḥ sa sa sambhavat-samastaśuddhiko; yathā vidyamāna-kşāra-mrt-puța-pākâdi-buddhy-upāyo ratna-viseșas, tathā ca vidyamāna-jñānâdy-abhyāsa-śuddhy-upāya ātmātaḥ sambhavat-samasta-buddhika iti.) This first stage of the argument only proves that purification of the soul is possible, but it still does not prove that supernatural perception or omniscience is possible. In the second stage, the following equation is established: cogniser = cognition (because of the same nature): 'And the cognitive subject, (when) completely purified, is called the absolute, because there is no difference at all between cognition and cogniser.' (NAV 27.4: samastya-suddhaś câtmā jñāna-jñāninoh kathañcid abhedāt. kevalam abhidhīyata iti.) Both stages of this argument was formulated as early as in Kundakunda's works; SSa 278 recounts simile of a transparent crystal (= the knower) which is in its nature unaffected by colours (= passions) but is seemingly changing, the implication of the simile is that the crystal can be cleansed from colours that affect it. The idea that the soul can be omniscient by nature and the soul's knowledge can embrace everything is found e.g. in PSā 1.20, 28. The proof is formulated also by Hemacandra, who instead of the precious stone, speaks of clouds veiling the sun and the moon: 'The veiling of the self] of knowing essence is possible through cognitionveiling and other types of karman just like the moon and the sun (can be covered] by dust, fog, cloud, veil etc.; and like a blow of wind strong enough can remove [the veils obscuring) the moon and the sun, so can meditation and contemplation (remove veils obscuring the knowing self].' (PMIV 1.15 $ 50 (p. 12.20-22): prakāśa-svabhāvasyâpi candrârkâder iva rajo-nīhāhārâbhra-patalâdibhir iva jñānâvaranīyādikarmabhir āvaraṇasya sambhavāt, candrârkâder iva prabala-pavamāna-prāyair dhyana-bhavanadibhir vilayasy-ti.). 97. NA 28: pramānasya phalam sāksād ajñāna-vinivartanam / kevalasya sukhôpekṣe seşasyâdāna-hāna-dhih // - 'The direct result of cognitive criterion is the cessation (sc. removal of nescience; [the result] of the absolute [cognition) is [both) happiness and indifference; [the result] of the remaining (ones) is the faculty of appropriation and avoidance'.

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