Indologica Taurinensia

Author(s): Colette Caillat, Siegfried Lienhard, Irma Piovano, Saverio Sani
Publisher: Comitato AIT

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Piotr Balcerowicz
proof formula by indicating that no fallacy is involved. The role of the simile of the skilled archer is not simply to point to some empirical instance of a contest, but to illustrate that in a well-defined context (e.g. when all onlookers see the archer's target) any explicit mention of the target can be easily dispensed with. In this way, not only the verses of NA 14-15 are necessary elements in the argumentative structure, but also NA 16.
10.1. The idea of 'perception for others' is referred to not only in Buddhist sources, but also in later Mimāṁsā literature, i.e. by Sucaritamiśra in his MSVT (III: p., 38.5-8) ad MSV 5.4.53-54: athânumāna-gocari-kṛtârtha-pratipadana-samartha-vacanapārârthyād anumānam parārtham ity upacaryate, tataḥ pratyakṣapratipannam apy artham bodhayad vacaḥ parārtham iti pratyakṣam api parârtham apa-dyeta. Interestingly, the context in which the distinction svârtha-parârtha is mentioned is the critical evaluation of the Buddhist concept of twofold inference. Both Umveka Bhatta and Sucaritamiśra reject the distinction into svârtha- and parârthânumâna in their respective commentaries on MSV 5.4.53-54, viz. ŚVVTT (p. 317.15-318.16, esp.: na tu parârthânu-mānam nama kimcid astîtyuktam) and MSVT (III: p., 37.11-40.21) respectively. Both argue that what the Buddhists call parârthânumāna is, in fact, just a verbal statement which communicates the result of an inference drawn by the speaker to the hearer; the hearer, on the basis of the utterance, subsequently draws his own inference, and there is no room for 'inference for others'. Interestingly, Sucaritamiśra avails himself, in addition, of the Jaina concept of parârtha-pratyakṣa and argues that in the same manner as one were to accept parârthânumāna one would also have to consent to parârtha-pratyakṣa, because both inference and perception can be indirectly triggered by a verbal
statement.
It would be quite natural that anyone who is willing to refute the idea of parârtha-pratyakṣa and is at the same time acquainted with the notion of parâtha-pratyakṣa, would use the latter to disprove the former. However, Umveka Bhatta does not seem to know the idea of parârtha-pratyākṣa at all; he is silent on it in his commentary on the same verses (MSV 5.4.53-54), which are an occasion for Sucarita