Indologica Taurinensia

Author(s): Colette Caillat, Siegfried Lienhard, Irma Piovano, Saverio Sani
Publisher: Comitato AIT

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Piotr Balcerowicz
however, easily argue that yathā was a later modification after a new verse (NA 16) was inserted.
On the other hand, we can see that the three verses follow in a logical sequence: NA 14 defines the subject of the thesis (paksa) and, most importantly, verbalises the necessity to formulate it as a required member in a proof formula; NA 15 is a prasanga-type of argument: without a clear pronouncement of the thesis, the debaters and spectators may come to the conclusion that one's thesis is a fallacy (paksâbhāsa); NA 16 is a typical drstānta to illustrate the idea. So much effort (and space!) just to express the importance of paksa in the proof formula? That appears striking. Clearly, NA 15 and 16 must have been formulated against an opinion of someone who maintained that no pratijñā / pakșa is necessary at all.
In the Pramāņa-vārttika we find the context for this puzzle. Dharmakirti argues that statement of the thesis (pakşa-vacana) is not a necessary member of the proof formula, because it does not possess any capacity to prove anything, PV 4.18-22:
'[18] The assertion of the incapability (to prove anything on the part] of this (statement of the thesis (paksa-vacana, PV.4.16)] is made on the ground that (the statement of the thesis) has (merely) as its contents the object (sc. inferable property) of the logical reason.
[Objection:] "Also this statement of the thesis must] have the capability (to prove), because it facilitates the statement of the logical reason".
[19] [Rejoinder:] [Then,] for a person who wishes to know (the true state of affairs) due to his doubt as regards this (inferable property (sc. whether it is present or not)], there should (also) be a ground for an opportunity (to produce this doubt as a proving member of the proof formula). Also, when one accepts a counter-proposition, this (should be accepted) as equal (member of the proof formula, that proves the thesis). Thus, there would be infinite regress (sc. no limit to the number of efficient members that prove).
[20] However, the intrinsic efficacy (to prove the thesis) lies in three fea-tures (of the logical reason). Only the statement of these (three features] prevails as that which activates the memory as regards these (three features, and thus has the capacity to prove.]
[21] [Objection:] "For when (the logical reason) is established sto have its scope) only on account of the demonstration of the scope - because