Indologica Taurinensia

Author(s): Colette Caillat, Siegfried Lienhard, Irma Piovano, Saverio Sani
Publisher: Comitato AIT

Page 36

Piotr Balcerowicz
the chapter called Pramāna-siddhi of PV is formally a commentary on the idea of the Buddha's pramāna-bhātvatva. Therefore there should be nothing extraordinary if we come across any soteriological discus
on in NA. And precisely such is ultimately the relevance of NA 27 (n. 41), as I shall try to demonstrate in subsequent lines.
The verse NA 27 introduces the idea of perfect perception (kevala), after all 'mundane' varieties of cognition, direct and indirect, have been discussed in the preceding. Thus, the placement of the verse after the parârthânumāna section does not seem illogical or unjustified. On the other hand, it is hardly conceivable that NA could do without even mentioning the notion of kevala-jñāna, because it has always played paramount role in Jaina epistemology, ontology and soteriology. And the most suitable place to mention perfect perception, which is the consummation of all cognitive processes, is in the concluding portion on epistemological issues.
The emphasis on perfect cognition (kevala) was understood, for it fulfilled at least three cardinal functions in Jainism: ontological, epistemological and soteriological. According to Jaina ontology, the structure of the world was highly complex, in which all elements were related to the rest; consequently, the proper description of the reality, of its multiplex character (anekānta), would have to take into consideration all these intricate relations. A complete account of the multiplexity is possible on the level of perfect cognition, which can grasp all complexities. In such a way, only absolute perception (kevala) which perfectly reflects all relations in the world is the warrant for the idea of ontological premise of anekānta.
Besides, being staunch realists, the Jainas maintained that one of the proofs of the multiplexity of reality is the multiplex representation of the world as it is reflected in cognition. A typical argument ran as follows: since any piece of knowledge has a multiplex character, so must be also the world reflected through it 95. Absolute cognition was
95. See e.g. (1) SVIV 1.27 (p. 115.11 ff.): ata evânekānta-siddhiḥ. ... tad evas paramârthataḥ siddhih anekāntāt. - 'Precisely on the basis (of this act of grasping] the multiplexity sof data) is established. ... Thus, in exactly such a way, [we arrive at] a proof (of multiplex reality] on the level of the ultimate truth, because of multiplexity [of appearance)'; (2) NAV 29.1: iha yat pramānam tat parasparavinirlurhitânekadharma-parikarita-vastuno grāhakam, tasyaiva tatra pratibhāsamanatvād; iha yad