Book Title: Indologica Taurinensia
Author(s): Colette Caillat, Siegfried Lienhard, Irma Piovano, Saverio Sani
Publisher: Comitato AIT
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On the Relationship of the Nyāyâvatāra and the Sammati-tarka-prakarāņa
53
[29] Since entities not [directly) touched [by senses) become direct[ly cognisable] for the cognition through telaesthesia, therefore the word “insight” is (correctly] employed with regard to the cognition through telaesthesia.'
Of course, the verses explicate in the first place the three - out of four – subdivisions of darśana (insight / conation) as a subtype of the cognitive faculties (upayoga), viz. caksur-darśana, acaksur-darśana and avadhi-darśana. The issue of the proper interpretation of the term daṁsana in these contexts would, however, require a separate detailed analysis.
5.2. What concerns me here is the peculiarity of expression in STP 2.28 and its comparison with even more peculiar statement of NA 12 73: 'And such an utterance that demonstrates an object recognised through perception is called perception, because it is the external factor for the representation. This startling statement of Siddhasena Mahāmati should be viewed in the context of his thesis of parârthapratyaksa and his attempt to prove that the idea of efficacy for others (pārārthya) and efficacy for oneself (svārthya) is applicable both to perception (pratyakşa) and to inference (paroksa). What is important, NA explicitly accepts the idea that perception can be directly generated in other people also through verbal communication 74. In other words, objects are amenable to direct comprehension also on the verbal level and verbal statements can be classified as perception under special conditions.
This stands in contradiction with the statement of STP 2.28 quoted above that 'objects cognised through testimony are not amenable to grasping [them] directly' (paccakkha-ggahaņań na inti suyanāna-sammiyā atthā). And it is STP 2.16ab (pannavanijjā bhāvā samatta-suya-nana-damsanā-visao /) that links 'communicable entities' (prajñāpanīyā bhāvāḥ) with testimony (śruta).
73. NA 12: pratyakşa-pratipannârtha-pratipādi ca yad vacaḥ/
pratyakşam pratibhāsasya nimittatvāt tad ucyate // 74. Cf. NAV ad loc: pratibhäsasya nimittatvāt pratipādya-pratyakşa-prakāśa-hetutvād upacāreņôcyata ity arthah. - "because it is the external factor for the representation", which means that can utterance) is called metaphorically [perception] because it is the cause of revealing (an object] through perception to a person] to be taught.'
