Indologica Taurinensia

Author(s): Colette Caillat, Siegfried Lienhard, Irma Piovano, Saverio Sani
Publisher: Comitato AIT

Page 23

On the Relationship of the Nyāyâvatāra and the Sammati-tarka-prakarāņa
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prima facie position to be refuted:) 'Insight is nothing but sensation, because it designates “[this is) a pot”, [hence it] becomes [the sensuous cognition. Just like (sensation), in the same manner, the difference between both the absolute [cognition and insight] is this much only...;' and in STP 2.23-24 66: [Rejoinder:) 'If you maintain that insight is nothing but [ocular 67] sensation, [or] a qualified cognition, (then), if it were so, it (would) follow that insight is nothing but the sensuous cognition, and such would necessarily be [the case) with the insight derived through the remaining sense organs. But this is not correct. [The opponent argues:) "If in [the case of] these [remaining senses] only cognition is understood , in the very same way in the case of] eyes (only cognition should be understood)” 69'
Avagraha is a well-known technical term and it unequivocally implies the acceptance of the remaining three members of the sen. suous cognition, viz. ihā, apāya and dhāraṇā. Such being the case, the use of the term avagraha not only indicated that Divākara subscribed to the tradition that subdivided the sensuous cognition (mati-jñāna) into the four steps, but he must have classified the sensuous cognition as indirect in view of the indirect, i.e. mental, or conceptual character of the triad: speculation (ihā)- perceptual judgement (apāya) - retention (dhāraņā). This is confirmed also by two rejoinders above (STP 2.21,23). quoting the position of a hypothetical opponent. The oppo
66. STP 2.23-24: jai oggahamettaṁ daṁsanaṁ ti mannasi visesiam nānam /
mai-ņāņam eva daṁsaņam evam sai hoi nipphannaṁ // evaṁ sesiṁdiya-daṁsanammi niyameņa hoi na ya juttaṁ /
aha tattha ņāņamettaṁ gheppai cakkhummi vi taheva // 67. In view of the phrase sesimdiya (sesendriya) in STP 2.24, the sensation here must refer to cakṣur-avagraha (*cakkhuggaha =ālocana).
68. The form gheppai corresponds to *Vghrp / *ghrpsyate, a root paralel to Vgrbh (see: PISCHEL (1981: 8 212, p. 182, $ 534, p. 434 and 8 548, p. 441). I would be inclined, nonetheless; to relate it to Vkhyā / khyāpyate ('to predicate'; cf. NA 19c: khyāpyate yatra drstānte).
69. The idea of the opponent is that if one accepts that there should be only respective sensory cognition, e.g., olfactory cognition (ghrāņa-jñāna), and the idea of an olfactory insight (ghrāņa-darśana) be rejected, the same rule should be applied to the sense of sight: one should accept only ocular cognition (cakṣur-jñāna) and reject the idea of ocular insight (cakşur-darśana). In the preceding section (STP 2.20) Divākara - following tradition - recognises cakşur-darśana as one of four subdivisions of darśana.