Indologica Taurinensia

Author(s): Colette Caillat, Siegfried Lienhard, Irma Piovano, Saverio Sani
Publisher: Comitato AIT

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Piotr Balcerowicz
stages of the sensuous cognition (avagraha-ihā-apāya-dhāranā) occurs in all of them, with the exception of Model III. What these models have in common is their treatment of the four stages (avagraha-ihā-apāya-dhāraṇā) as indirect (parokşa). And it is not surprising, since only the first stage of sensation (avagraha) could correspond to the perception (pratyakşa) of other philosophical systems. The remaining stages – speculation (ihā), perceptual judgement (apāya) and retention (dhāranā) - involve the process of conceptualisation, rationalising, memorising, etc. Even if one admits that the notion of pratyakșa does not necessarily have to be taken strictly in the Dinnāgian-Dharmakirtian sense of being free of conceptualisation (kalpanâpodha) but it may allow, as the Jainas would have it, for pronounced conceptual component (savikalpaka), beside the non-conceptual variety (nirvikalpaka), nevertheless the set ihā-apāya-dhāraņā entails deep and extensive involvement of exclusively mental activities. Furthermore, a clear indication of the truly indirect, i.e. conceptual character of the sensuous cognition is a series of expressions synonymous to mati-jñāna from TS 1.13: matiḥ smrtiḥ samjñā cintâbhinibodha ity anarthantaram. Similar lists of synonyms can be found in other Jaina works 64.
4.3. In STP, Siddhasena Divākara clearly admitted of the sensuous cognition (mati-jñāna, ābhinibodhika-jñāna) himself, since he speaks of it explicitly, mentioning its name four times (STP 2.6, 23, 27, 32). Was this mati-jñāna for Divākara just the same kind of cognition as it was to the Jaina tradition prior to him only nominally, whereas in reality he took it to correspond to the sensory perception (pratyakşa) of non-Jaina traditions and considered mati-jñāna to be in fact 'direct' in the sense of direct sensory grasp? I am convinced that such a supposition would neglect the available internal textual evidence.
In fact, Divākara definitely subscribed to the notion of the four stages of the sensuous cognition (avagraha-ihā-apāya-dhāranā), since he refers to the first stage avagraha twice, namely in STP 2.21 65: [The
64. E.g. VABh 396: ābhinibohiya, ihā, apoha, vimaṁsā, maggaņā, gavesanā, saữna, sai, mai, paññã. 65. STP 2.21: damsaņam oggahametta 'ghado'tti ņivvannaņā havai ņāņa /
jaha ettha kevalāna vi visesanam ettiyam ceva //