Indologica Taurinensia

Author(s): Colette Caillat, Siegfried Lienhard, Irma Piovano, Saverio Sani
Publisher: Comitato AIT

Page 21

On the Relationship of the Nyāyâvatāra and the Sammati-tarka-prakarāņa
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The idea of pratyaksa as the direct cognition occurs in Model II, Model IV, Model V and Model VI 62, it is still absent from Model I, while pratyakṣa in Model III corresponds to sensory perception of other systems.
Excluding Model III as genetically non-Jaina, Jaina divisions of pramāņa in the Agamic tradition could hardly accommodate the panIndian idea of pratyakṣa as sensory perception directly, perhaps with the sole exception of Model V and Model VI. The most frequently recurring point in these models (with the exception of Model I and III) is that avadhi, manah-paryāya and kevala are classified as direct types of cognition (pratyakşa), whereas śruta is catalogued under indirect types of cognition (paroksa). The most controversial - and in our analysis crucial - issue is, therefore, the proper assignment of the sensuous cognition (mati-jñāna). . Clearly, such a diversity of opinions points to the fact that there was no unanimity among Jaina thinkers and the author of STP could have either subscribed to any one of the Canonical models or could have devised his own model.
4.2. Since, as we have seen before, NA follows the general Indian epistemological tradition as regards the nature of pratyaksa as different from more advanced acts of conceptualisation, and the notion of the sensuous cognition (mati-iñāna) - with its four traditio stages, viz. sensation (avagraha), speculation (ihā), perceptual judgement (apāya) and retention (dhāranā) - does not fit into the framework of NA 63. If we analyse all the six models, the idea of the four
62. Kundakunda's standpoint follows the same lines, cf. PSā 1.57-58:
para-davvaṁ te akkhā neva sahāvo tti appano bhanidā / uvalddham tehi kadham paccakkham appaņo hodi // jar parado vinnānam tamṁ tu parokkham ti bhanidam atthesu /
jadi kevalena ņādam havadi hi jīvena paccakkham // - "These perceiving organs are (made) of different substance. Under no circumstances can they be said to be the essential nature of the cognitive subject (soul). How could possibly what has been grasped by them become direct cognition for the cognitive subject (soul)? As regards objects, what is the discernment through other (means (i.e. senses)] is called indirect cognition; for when cognition arises through the living element (soul) completely is direct cognition.' See also PSā 1.54.
63. See Model 2 in BALCEROWICZ (2005, $ 5).