Indologica Taurinensia

Author(s): Colette Caillat, Siegfried Lienhard, Irma Piovano, Saverio Sani
Publisher: Comitato AIT

Page 16

44
Piotr Balcerowicz
STP 2.8 48, but also to introduce the pārva-pakṣa verse of STP 2.22 49 that claims the conditional difference between the absolute cognition (kevala-jñāna) and the absolute insight (kevala-darśana), which is subsequently refuted. This treatment of kevala is entirely with one exception 50 - different from its treatment in NA 27 (vide supra p. 8, n. 41). In NA there is not slightest trait of this highly debatable issue and the kevala knowledge is plainly stated there to be a special kind of pratyakṣa.
Furthermore, there is even an indirect indication as regards the real standpoint of NA. According to NA 7, the representation (pratibhāsa), or the mental 'mirroring' of an object, is a characteristic fea
48. STP 2.8: samtami kevale damsanammi nanassa sambhavo natthi/ kevala-nanammi ya damsanassa tamha sanihanaim // 49. STP 2.22: damsana-puvvam nāņam nāṇa-nimittam tu damsanam natthi/ tena suvinicchiyāmo damsana-ṇāṇāṇa annattam //
[The absolute] cognition is preceded by [the absolute] insight, but [the absolute] insight is not conditioned by [the absolute] cognition; hence we rightly conclude that there is difference between both [the absolute] cognition and [the absolute] insight."
This verse, in my opinion, does refer to the alleged distinction between kevalajñāna and kevala-darśana in view of the second hemistich of STP 2.21 that introduces. it: 'Just like [sensation], in the same manner, the difference between both the absolute [cognition and insight] is this much only...' (jaha ettha kevalāņa vi visesanam ettiyam ceva //).
50. This is the description of the absolute knowledge (kevala) in NA 27 and in STP 2.17. There is indeed some conspicuous similarity as regards the character of kevala (similarities are underlined):
(1) NA 27: sakalâvarana-muktâtma kevalam yat prakāśate/ pratyakşam sakalârthâtma-satata-pratibhasanam //
'That whose essence is freed from all veils, which shines as [something] absolute is perception representing constantly the essences of all objects.'
(2) STP 2.17: tamha cauvvi-bhāgo jujjai na u nāṇa-damsana-jiņāṇam/ sayalam aṇāvaranam anamtam akkhayam kevalam jamhā //
=
- "Therefore it would follow that [cognition would be] four-fold [not five-fold], but there [would be] no [separate] cognition and insight [in case of] Jinas, if the absolute cognition is without veils, eternal, imperishable."
The verse of STP 2.17 is a rejoinder of Siddhasena Divakara's opponent who draws the conclusion from Divakara's thesis about the identity of cognition and insight. It does not express Siddhasena Diväkara's own position! Hence the similarity of expression is only apparent and by no means conclusive since it may be due simply to a general, standard way of describing the nature of the absolute cognition..