Indologica Taurinensia

Author(s): Colette Caillat, Siegfried Lienhard, Irma Piovano, Saverio Sani
Publisher: Comitato AIT

Page 12

40
Piotr Balcerowicz
In the first place, subsequent verses illustrate two main divisions of the indirect cognition, viz. inference (anumāna) and the verbal knowledge (sabda) 30. They are indirect because inference is based on the inferential sign (linga), or the logical reason (hetu), and because the verbal knowledge is derived from a sentence (vākya). Besides, NA 5 and NA 6, while discussing the issue of validity and erroneousness, contrast perception (pratyakṣa) with inference (anumāna) 31. They are also contrasted in a few other passages 32. While providing a definition of the thesis in NA 14 33, we find the statement that 'the thesis is not revoked by perception etc.' (pakṣaḥ pratyakṣady-anirākṛtaḥ), viz. the soundness of the thesis is generally verifiable with ordinary means and common cognitive apparatus: by implication 'perception' has to mean here ordinary, or sensory perception, employed by everyone, and not extra-sensory perception - viz. either clairvoyance (avadhi-jñāna), mind-reading (manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna) or absolute knowledge (kevalajñāna) - not accessible to common people. The phrasing emulates formulations of a validity condition well-known form several other works, just to mention a few, NP 34, NM 35 and PBh 36. Similarly, the
30. NA 8:
drstêṣṭâvyahatad vākyāt paramârthâbhidhayinah/ tattva-grähitayôtpannaṁ mānam sabdam prakirtitam // -
- 'The cognitive criterion - arisen as grasping reality due to a [momentous] sentence, which is accepted as that what is experienced and which is not contradicted [and] which communicates the ultimate truth is declared [to be] the verbal knowledge.
31. NA 5:
sadhyâvina-bhuno lingat sadhya-niścāyakaṁ smṛtam/ anumānam, tad abhrāntam pramāṇatvāt samakṣavat // na pratyakşam api bhrāntam pramāṇatva-viniścayat/ bhrāntam pramāṇam ity etad viruddham vacanam yataḥ //
- 'Inference is regarded traditionally to determine the inferable property on account of the inferential sign, which is inseparably connected with the inferable property. It is non-erroneous because it is a cognitive criterion, just like perception. Neither is perception erroneous, because it is determined to be a cognitive criterion, since [to say:] a cognitive criterion is erroneous is a contradictory utterance."
32. E.g., NA 11ab pratyakṣenânumānena prasiddhartha-prakāśanat/ 33. NA 14: sadhyabhyupagamaḥ pakṣaḥ pratyakṣâdy-anirākṛtaḥ/ tat-prayogo 'tra kartavyo hetor gocara-dipaka // -
"The thesis is the acceptance of the inferable property; [it] is not revoked by perception, etc.; the pronouncement of it has to be made here as showing the domain of the logical reason."
NA 6:
34. NP(1) p. 1.5-7 (= NP(2) 2.1, p. 72): tatra pakṣaḥ prasiddho dharmi prasiddhaviseṣaṇa-visiṣṭataya svayam sadhyatvenêpsitaḥ. pratyakṣâdy-aviruddha iti vākya-seṣaḥ.