Ethical Doctrines in Jainism

Author(s): Kamalchand Sogani
Publisher: Jain Sanskruti Samrakshak Sangh Solapur

Page 39

METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF JAINA ETHICS
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fluxism and the Charybdis of illusionism?". Thus nature of substance may now oblige us to think that things both material and mental are everlastingly existent. Such a view of things cannot even pretend to conceive without falling into inconsistency the intervention of any eternal and self-subsistent maker, either personal or impersonal, for bringing into existence the diverse things of the world.
SUBSTANCE AND QUALITY: Substance as different from the general and specific qualities and modifications is not worthy of being so called. Things devoid of attributes and modifications are nothing but abstractions, and are unthinkable. Qualities are incapable of being existent by themselves even for a moment. They necessitate the simultaneous existence of substance, and are denied any isolated character; and they are themselves bereft of qualities. “Qualities do not fly loose as abstract entities, and substance does not exist as an undetermined somewhat, a mere 'that' to which they are afterwards attached. The idea of substance is the idea of qualities as unified and systematised8”. As regards the relation between them, we may say that they are non-separate and non-identical. Non-separateness results owing to their subsistence in the same spatial existense, and non-identity issues because of the fact that one is not the other. The assertion that substance is not quality and that quality is not substance serves only to emphasize the nonidentical character of both substance and quality. It does not mean the absolute negation of substance in quality and vice-versa. Thus the relation between Dravya and Guna (substance and quality) is one of identity-in-difference. The difference between them is only the difference in point of nomenclature, number, characterisation, and purpose and not difference with reference to spatial extense. “Neither being found without the other, they both stand in the relation of invariable concomitance or simultaneity with one another instead of being in relation of antecedence and consequence in time”. In other words, "the relation between substance and quality is one of coeval identity, unity, inseparability, and essential simplicity, the unity of substance and quality is not the result of union or combination?.”
Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism. p. 72. 3 Idea of God. p. 159. Cf. Sarvärtha p. 310. S Aptamimaṁsā. 72. 7 Indian Philosophy. Vol. I. p. 314.
2 Tasi. V. 41.
Prava. II. 16. 6 Epitome of Jainism. p. 24.