Ethical Doctrines in Jainism

Author(s): Kamalchand Sogani
Publisher: Jain Sanskruti Samrakshak Sangh Solapur
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/006955/1

Page #1

Jiyaraja Jaina Granthamala No. 19
ETHICAL DOCTRINES
IN JAINISM
Ву Kamal Chand Sogani, M.A., Ph.D.
Published by : Jaina Samskriti Samrakshaka Sangha Santosh Bhavan, 734, Phaltan Galli, Solapur
Phone No. (0217) 320007
Veera Samvat 2527
A.D. 2001
Price Rs. 120 per copy

Page #2

• जीवराज जैन ग्रंथमाला परिचय *
सोलापुर निवासी श्रीमान् स्व. ब्र. जीवराज गौतमचंद दोशी कई वर्षों से संसारसे उदासीन होकर धर्म कार्यमें अपनी वृत्ति लगाते रहे । सन् १९४० में उनकी यह प्रबल इच्छा हो उठी कि अपनी न्यायोपार्जित सम्पत्तिका उपयोग विशेष रूपसे धर्म तथा समाजकी उन्नतिके कार्यमें करें।
तदनुसार उन्होंने समस्त भारतका परिभ्रमण कर अनेक जैन विद्वानोंसे इस बातकी साक्षात्. और लिखित रूपसे सम्मतियाँ संगृहीत की, कि कौनसे कार्यमें सम्पत्तिका विनियोग किया जाय।
अन्तमें स्फुट मतसंचय कर लेनेके पश्चात् सन् १९४१ के ग्रीष्मकालमें ब्रह्मचारीजीने सिध्दक्षेत्र श्री गजपंथजीकी पवित्र भूमिपर अनेक विद्वानोंको आमंत्रित कर उनके सामने ऊहापोहपूर्वक निर्णय करनेके लिए उक्त विषय प्रस्तुत किया।
विद्वत्सम्मेलनके फलस्वरूप श्रीमान् ब्रम्हचारीजीने जैन संस्कृति तथा जैन साहित्यके समस्त अंगोंके संरक्षण-उध्दार-प्रचारके हेतु 'जैन संस्कृति संरक्षक संघ की स्थापना की। तथा उसके लिये रु. ३०,०००/- का बृहत् दान घोषित कर दिया।
आगे उनकी परिग्रह-निवृत्ति बढती गई। सन १९४४ में उन्होंने लगभग दो लाखकी अपनी सम्पूर्ण सम्पत्ति संघको ट्रस्टरूपसे अर्पण की।
इसी संघके अन्तर्गत 'जीवराज जैन ग्रंथमाला' द्वारा प्राचीन संस्कृत-प्राकृत--हिन्दी तथा मराठी ग्रन्थोंका प्रकाशन कार्य आज तक अखण्ड प्रवाहसे चल रहा है।
आज तक इस ग्रन्थमाला द्वारा हिन्दी विभागमें ४८ ग्रन्थ तथा मराठी विभागमें १०२ ग्रन्थ और धवला विभागमें १६ ग्रन्थ प्रकाशित हो चुके हैं।
- रतनचंद सखाराम शहा मंत्री-जैन संस्कृति संरक्षक संघ, सोलापुर.

Page #3

स्व. ब्र. जीवराज गौतमचंद दोशी

Page #4

Page #5

CONTENTS
GENERAL EDITORIAL AUTHOR'S PREFACE ABBREVIATIONS DEDICATION
vii-x xi-xiv XV-Xvi xvii
CHAPTER 1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF JAINA ETHICS
pp. 1-13 Traditional Antiquity of Jainism, 1-2; Historicity of Pārsva, 2-3; Life and Influence of Pārsva, 3; Religion of Pārsva, 3; Further Elucidation of Mahāvira, 4-5; Mahāvira as the Elucidator of the Faith Already Existing, 5; Life and Influence of Mahāvīra, 6-7; Emergence of Schisms, 7-8; Digambara and Svetāmbara as the Major Divisions of the Jaina Church, 8-9; Sects of the Digambaras, 9-10; Sects of the Svetāmbaras, 10-11; Origin of Jaina Ethics, 11-13.
CHAPTER I METAPHYSICAL Besis of JAINA ETHICS
pp. 13-43 . Dependence of Ethics on Metaphysics, 13-14; General Nature of Reality, 14–15; Meaning of the term 'experience', 15-16; Definition of Substance, 16-17; Substance and Quality, 17; Substance and Modification, 18; Jaina Conception of Persistence and the Distinction between Guna and Paryāya, 18-19; Kinds of Modification, 19-20; Substance and Existence, 20-21; Pramāņa, Naya, and Syādvāda, 21-22; Classification of Substance, 22-23; Materialism and Idealism as the Two Extremes, 23-24; General Nature of Substances, 24; Nature and Fußctions of Pudgala, 24-25; Kinds of Pudgala, 25-28; Ākāśa, 28; Dharma and Adharma, 28-29; Kāla, 29-30; General Nature of Jiva (Self), 30-31; Nature of Empirical Self, 31-32; Kinds of Empirical Self, One-sensed Empirical Selyes, 32; Two-sensed to Five-sensed Empirical Souls, 32-34; Liberation Synchronous with the Destruction of Karmas as the Ethical Ideal, 34; Paramātman as the Summum Bonum, 34-35; Niscaya Naya as the Ethical Ideal: Transcendental Experience Transcends the Conceptual Points of View whether Niscaya or Vyavahāra, 35-37; Svasamaya as the Transcendent Objective, 37; Suddha Upayoga as the Goal, 37-39; Agency of Pure Bhāvas as the Ideal, 39-40; Realisation of Svarūpasattā as the Terminus of Self-development, 40-41; Pandita-Pandita Marana as the Ethical Summum bonum, 41; Ahirhsā as the Goal, 41-42; Knowledge-Consciousness as the End, 42-43; Progressive Realisation of the End, 43.
CHAPTER M SAMYAGDARSANA AND THE SEVEN TATTVAS
pp. 43-71 Short Retrospect, 43; Mithyātva as the Great Obstacle to the Highest Realisation, 44-45; Tattvas as the sine qua non of the Ethical and the Spiritual Life, 45-46; Jiva Tattva, 46; Ajiva Tattva, 46-47; Asrava and Bandha, 47-48; Nature of Yoga, 48-49;
ons of
Kads Of Souls, BAPR
ute of Empiricalharma, 28–20Pudgala, 24
Ideal, 32-2, One.
he Ethic

Page #6

Types of Bondage Yoga Occasions, 49; Types of Bondage Passion Occasions, 50; Yoga with Passions and Without Passions, 50-51; Diverse Expressions of Passion: (A) Passions Enwrapping Auspicious and Inauspicious Psychical States along with Perversion, 52; (B) Passion as Synonymous with the Delusion-producing Karma, 52-53; (C) Leśyās as Passions Issuing in Action, 53; (D) Instinctive Actions as Passionate, 53-54; (E) Other Manifestations of Passion, 54; Causes of Sāmparāyika Āsrava, 55-56; Sāmparāyika Asrava in Particular, 56-57; Asraya and Bandha According to Kundakunda, 57-59; Transcendental View of Sarhvara, Nirjarā and Mokşa, 59; Process of Samvara, Nirjarā and Moksa, 59-60; Samyagdarsana as the Prime Cause of Salvation, 60-61; Rightness in Knowledge and Conduct is possible after Attaining Right Belief or Spiritual Conversion, 61-62; Various Views of Samyagdarsana, 62-63; Characteristics of the Apta, the Scriptures and the Guru, 63; Belief in the Seven Tattvas as the Central of All the Characteristics Mentioned, 63-64; Samyagdarśana from the Transcendental View, 64-65; Kinds of Samyadgarśana, 65; Eight Components of Samyagdarśana from the Empirical Point of View, 65-68; Characteristics Accompanying the Subsistence of Right Belief, 68; Components of Samyagdarsana from Superempirical Perspective, 68-69; Characteristics Accompanying Samyagdarsana from the Superempirical Perspective, 69-70; Samyagdarśana as Forming the Spiritual Background of Jaina Ethics, 70-71.
CHAPTER IV ĀCĀRA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER...
pp. 71-119 Summary of the Previous Chapter, 71-72; Right Conduct as an Internal Necessity of the Spiritually Converted, 72; Vitarāga Caritra and Sarāga Caritra; Inauspicious Activities are in no way the part of Conduct, 72-73; Distinction between the Spiritually Converted and Perverted Souls regarding the Performance of Moral and Evil Actions, 73; Necessity of Partial Conduct 74; Privileged Position of Man, 74; Philosophy of Renunciation, 74-75; Comprehensive Meaning of Himsā, 75; Popular Meaning of Himsā, 76; Purity of External Behaviour too is Necessary, 76-77; Judgement of the Acts of Himsā and Ahimsā, 77; Kinds of Himsā, 77-78; Ahirsāņuvrata, 78-80; Stages of Defilement of a Vow and the Transgressions of the Householder's Vow of Abiṁsā, 80-81; Nature of Asatya (Falsehood), 81-83; Satyāņuvrata, 83; Nature of Steya (Stealing), 83-84; Asteyāņuvrata or Acauryāņuvrata, 84; Nature of Abrahma (unchastity), 84-85; Brahmacaryāņuvrata, 85; Nature of Parigraha (Acquisition), 85-86; Kinds of Parigraha, 86; Parigraha and Hirsā, 86; Parigraha-Parimāņāņuvrata, 86-87; Householder's Life as a Mixture of Virtue and Vice, 87-88; Reflection on and the Repetition of Certain Ideas for the Proper Observance of the Vows, 88; Concept of Mūlaguņas, 88–89; Problem of Eating at Night, 89-90; Avoidance of Eating at Night as the Sixth Aņuvrata, 90-91; Different Conceptions of the Guņavratas and the Sikşāvratas, 91-93; Nature of Digvrata, 93-94; Nature of Deśavrata, 94-96; Nature of Anarthadaņdavrata, 96-97; Forms of Anarthadaņdas, 97-99; Nature of Bhogopabhogaparimāņavrata, 99-100; Two kinds of Abnegation in Bhogopabhogaparimāņavrata, 100-101; Bhogopabhogaparimāņavrata as Gunavrata and Sikşāvrata, 101-102; Nature of Sāmāyika, 102-103; Nature of Prosa

Page #7

dhopavasavrata, 103-104; Procedure of Proşadhopavāsa vrata, 104; Proşadhopavāsavrata and the Five Sins, 104-105; Nature of Atithisarvibhāgavrata, 105-106; Consideration of Five Objectives for the Adequate Observance of this Vow, 106-108; Two Ways of Describing the Householder's Ethical Discipline: Vratas, and Pratimās, 108-109; Reconciliation of the Two Ways, 109-110; The Eleven Pratimās, 110-111; Darsana Pratimă, 111-112; Vrata Pratimā, 112; Sāmāyika and Prosadha Pratimās, 112-113; The Remaining Pratimās, 113-115; The Third Way as the Systematic and All-Inclusive Exposition of the Householder's Ethical Discipline, 115-116; Nature of Sallekhană as. Distinguished from Suicide, 117-118; Process of Sallekhanā, 118-119.
CHAPTER V ĀCĀRA OF THE MUNI
pp. 119-165 Summary of the Previous Chapter, 119; Asceticism is not a Recoil from Actions but from Hiṁsā, 120; Anuprekşās as the Incentives to Spiritual Life and their Importance, 121-122; Account of each Incentive, 122-126; Formal Attainment of Saintly Life, 126127; The Internal and the External proceed side by side, 127-128; Adoption of the Internal and External Emblems, 128; Advancement of the Muni over the Householder, 128-129; Five Great Vows 1), Ahimsa-mahāvrata, 129; 2) Satya-mahāvrata, 129-130; 3) Asteyamahāvrata, 130; 4) Brahmacarya-mahāvrata, 130-131; 5) Aparigraha-mahāvrata, 131-132; Three Guptis and Five Samitis, 132-134; Five Samitis 1) Iryā-samiti, 134; 2) Bhāsāsamiti, 134-135; 3) Eşaņā-samiti, 135; Attitude of the Saint towards Food, 135-136; 4) Adana-Niksepaņa-samiti, 136; 5) Pratisthāpanā-samiti, 136; Control of the Five Senses, 136-137; Pulling out the Hair, 137; Sixfold Essentials, 137-138; 1) Sāmāyika, 138-139; 2) Stuti, 139; 3) Vandanā, 139-140; 4) Pratikramana, 140; 5) Pratyākhyāna, 140; Kāyotsarga, 141; Nakedness, 141; Other Mūlaguņas, 142; Parişahas: their Enumeration and Exposition, 142–145; Distinction Between Parişahas and Austerities, 145; Nature and kinds of Tapa (Austerity), 145-146; External Austerities, 146-148; Internal Austerities, 148-151; General Nature and Types of Dhyāna, 151-153; Aprasasta Dhyana: (A) Arta-Dhyāna, 153-154; (B) Raudra-Dhyāna, 154-155; Pre-requisites of Prasasta Dhyāna, 155-157; Process of Dhyāna, 157-161; Dharma-Dhyāna, 161-162; Sukla-Dhyāna, 162-163; Types of Spiritual Death Pursued by the Saint, 163-165.
CHAPTER VI MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
pp. 165-206 Summary of the Previous Chapter, 165-166; Metaphysics, Ethics and Mysticism, · 166-167; Nature of Mysticism, 167-168; Characteristics of the Three kinds of Self:
(a) Bahirâtman, 168; (b) Antarătman, 169; Three Kinds of Antarātman, 169; (c) Paramåtman, 169-170; Mystic Way, 170; The Metaphysician and the Mystic, 170-172; 1) Dark Period of the Self prior to its Awakening or Mithyātva Gunasthāna, 172-173; Types of Mithyātva, 173-174; Conversion-Moral, Intellectual and Spiritual, 174-176; 2) Origination of Samyagdarsana or Awakening of Self or Aviratasamyagdrști Gunasthāna, 176-177; Arahanta as the Supreme Guru, 177-178; Double Role of Arahanta, 178;

Page #8

Sasādana Gunasthan conversion) and
Requisites of Mystic
Characteristics of the Acarya as Guru in the Technical Sense, 178-179; Characteristics of the Upadhyāya and the Sadhu, 180; Spiritual Conversion or Awakening of Self Presupposes Five Labdhis, 180-181; Types of Samyaktva (Spiritual Conversion) and Possibility of Fall to Lower Stages, Namely, (A) Sāsādana Gunasthāna and (B) Misra Guna sthāna, 181-183; Requisites of Mystic's Journey after Spiritual Conversion, 183-184; 3) Purgation or (A) Viratăvirata Gunasthāna (B) Pramattavirata Gunasthāna, 184-185; Characteristics of a Saint, 185-186; Kinds of Scriptural Study, 186; Types of Scriptures, 186-187; Significance of Scriptural Study, 187-188; Nature of Devotion, 188-190; Types of Devotion, 190-191; Importance and Effects of Devotion, 191-192; Sixteen kinds of reflection as the Embodiment of Jñānayoga, Karmayoga and Bhaktiyoga, 192-194; Certain Process to be completed before Higher Ascension, 194–195; 4) Illumination or (A) Sātisaya Apramatta, (B) Apūrvakarana, (C) Anivstti-karaņa, (D) Sūkņma-Samparāya, (E) Upasānta Kaşāya, (F) Kșiņakaşaya Gunasthānas, 195–196; 5) Dark Night of the Soul Post-illumination, 196-197; 6) Transcendental Life, or (A) Sayogakevali, (B) Ayogakevali Gunasthānas, 197-199; Concept of God, 199-200; Characteristics of Arahanta or the effects of Transcendental Life, 200-203; Arahanta as the Category of “Holy", 203; Samudghāta in Sayoga Kevali Gunasthāna, 203-204; Siddha State or Transcendental Life Par-excellence, 204-205; Characteristics of Siddha State, 205–206.
CHAPTER VII THE JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES
pp. 206–253 Summary of the Previous Chapter, 206,207; Ethics of the Rg-Veda and the Brāhmaņas, 207-208; Evaluation of the Upanişadic Contents, 208-209; Various Expressions of the Moral Ideal, 209-216; Avidyā as the Obstruction, 216-218; Converted and Per. verted Souls, 218-220; Guru Essential for Spiritual Life, 220-221; Incentives to Spiritual Life, 221-224; Importance of Faith, Knowledge and Conduct, 224-226; Negative Side of Conduct-Avoidance of Sins and Passions, 226-228; Negative side of Conduct-Control of Senses and the Mind, 228-229; Positive side of Conduct-Cultivation of Virtues, 229-232; Positive side of Conduct-Meditation, 232-234; Positive side of Conduct-Devotion, 235-236; Physiological and Mystical Effects of Yoga and the Element of Grace, 236; Characteristics of the Perfected Sage, 237-239; Liberation in Different Systems, 239-241; Avidyā in Different Systems, 241-243; Attainment of Liberation, 243-245; Eight-fold Path of Yoga, 245–250; Four Noble Truths of Buddha, 250-253.
CHAPTER VIII THE JAINA AND THE WESTERN TYPES OF ETHICAL DOCTRINES
pp. 254–266 • Summary of the Previous Chapter, 254; Commencement of the Ethical Speculation in the West, 254-255; The Problem and the Approach, 255-256; The Problem of Ethical Summum Bonum: The Sophists, 256-257; Socrates, 257-258; The Socratic Schools, 258-259; Plato and Aristotle, 259-260; Utilitarianism, 261-262; Kant, 262263; Virtues: Sophists, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, 263-265; Classification of Virtues, 265-266; Individual Virtues, 266; Social Virtues, 266; Spiritual Virtues, 266.

Page #9

CHAPTER LX JAINA ETHICS AND THE PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS
pp. 267-273 Individual and Society, 267-268; Concept and Functions of the State, 268,269; Virtues of the State, 269-273.
CHAPTER X.
A RESUME
pp. 273-280
BIBLIOGRAPHY AUTHORS MENTIONED WORKS QUOTED TECHNICAL TERMS AND PROPER NAMES ERRATA
281-284 285 286-288 289-299 299.

Page #10

Page #11

GENERAL EDITORIAL
Ethical Discipline (ācāra-dharma) is an important aspect of Jainism. It has a two-fold objective. First, it brings about spiritual purification, and secondly, makes an individual a worthy social being who can live as a responsible and well-behzved neighbour. The first objective arises out of the Jaina theory of Karman which is an automatically functioning law under the dispensation of which every one must get the fruit, good or bad, of his or her thoughts, words and deeds. In this law of Karman, there is no place for divine intervention. The god as a creator is not admitted there, nor can he bestow favours and mete out punishments to the worldly beings. This is, indeed, a bold approach, basically advocated in Jainism, whereby an individual is really an architect of his own fortune or misfortune. Karman is conceived as subtle matter, or a form of energy, which affects the soul as a result of one's own thoughts, words and acts. As a matter of fact, every soul is already under the influence of Karman from beginningless time. One experiences the fruits of one's past Karmas and contracts fresh Karmas. So the cycle of action and its fruit goes on. It is only through a disciplined life that one can get rid of it either by experiencing its fruits or by exhausting it through penances etc. And when the soul is completely free from Karman, that is spiritual emancipation. The second objective helps one to develop an attitude of equality towards all the beings and cultivate a sanctity for the individual and his possessions.
This ethical discipline is well graded in Jainism to suit the ability and environments of an individual. It is prescribed to him according to his will to carry it out sincerely, without any negligence either in its understanding or in its practice.
The foundation of this ethical discipline is the doctrine of Ahimsā. If we correctly comprehend it, it will be seen that it is the recognition of the inherent right of an individual to live so universally expressed that'. every one wants to live and nobody likes to die. Thus, therefore, no one has any right to destroy or harm any other living being. Viewed as such Ahimsā is the fundamental law of civilised life and rational living; and thus forms the basis of all moral instructions in Jainism. “The

Page #12

viii
laying down of the commandment not to kill and not to damage is one of the greatest events”, as rightly observed by ALBERT, SCHWEITZER (Indian Thought and its Development, London 1951, pp. 82-3), "in the spiritual history of mankind. Starting from its principle, founded on world and life denial, of abstention from action, ancient Indian thoughtand this in a period when in other respects ethics have not progressed very far-reaches the tremendous discovery that ethics know no bounds! So far as we know, this is for the first time clearly expressed in Jainism”.
The Jaina moralistszare quite aware of the practical difficulties a. true and rigorous Ahimsite has to face. They have been far ahead of the times when they arranged the sentient beings in a progressive series according to the biological development of the form of life in them. This is intended to enable one to abstain from killing or harming living beings of higher and higher forms of life, and ultimately, as one spiritually advances, to abstain from the lower forms, too, steadily and gradually. It is not enough that we have reverence for the life of the individual only, but we must also respect the sanctity of his/her personality as well as possessions. This approach is a sum-total of the Jaina vows which are enumerated thus: Ahimsā, Satya, Asteya, Brahmacarya and Aparigraha. These are called Aņu-vratas when prescribed for a house-holder, but Mahā-vratas when rigorously practised by a monk. A study of these shows that "they are", as so well put by BENI PRASAD in his throughtprovoking essay (World Problems and Jaina Ethics, Lahore 1945, pp. 17-18), “interdependent and supplementary. The application of one to human relationships leads logically to that of others and in fact would stultify itself without the others. Only there is primacy belonging to the first of them, i.e., non-violence. It is the foundation of all higher life. In the Jaina as well as Buddhist code, it is wider than humanitarianism, for it embraces the whole of sentient creation. Its comprehensiveness, logically complete, is a further illustration of the ethical being a function of mental attitude and outlook. Like non-violence honesty (asteya) and stoicism (aparigraha) are negative only in appearance and really positive in their application. Together the five anuvratas constitute a single conception of life, ethical and spiritual, a consistent loyalty to the great principle of self-transcendence, a transvaluation of values".
This life of discipline in Jainism is prescribed in two forms: one, more rigorous for a monk who has severed his ties with the world, and the other, for a house-holder who has a number of social responsibilities.

Page #13

A large amount of literature has grown in Jainism to expound the duties of monks and those of house-holders. The details are varied and multipied under the stress and strains suffered in the organisation of monastic life and the social circumstances. The basic prescriptions and punitive restrictions have helped the monk and the householder to tread the path of right conduct. The Dharmāmsta of Āsādhara (1240 A.D.) is perhaps a fine attempt, though late in age, to propound the twofold discipline in one unit. The Jaina literature abounds in treatises dealing with the life of a monk, and for a handy survey of which one can consult the History of Jaina Monachism by S. B. DEO (Deccan College, Poona 1956). A critical and historical study of the discipline prescribed for a householder is found in that excellent monograph, the Jaina Yoga by R. WILLIAMS (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1963). One may, also consult other sources such as the Introductions to the Vasunandi-Srāvakācāra (ed. HIRALAL JAIN, Bharatiya Jñānapitha, Banaras 1952) dhyayana (ed. KAILASHCHANDRA SHASTRI, Banaras 1964), Jaina Acāra by M. MEHTA (Varanasi 1966).
In the present volume Dr. K. C. SOGANI has attempted an admirable survey of the entire range of the ethical doctrines in Jainism. After offering a few observations on the historical back-ground of Jaina ethics (1), he sets forth in details the metaphysical basis on which the edifice of Jaina ethics is elaborately built (II-III). Then follow the Ācāra of the house-holder and that of the Muni in great details (IV-V). The Jaina ethics form a path of spiritual progress; and, as such, they carry a mystical significance with them (VI). Though Jainism has its own specialities, a comparative study of Jaina and non-Jaina ethical doctrines yields quite fruitful results (VIII). The Jaina ethical doctrines have far reaching social implications; and they deserve to be studied in the light of the present-day problems. Three doctrines of Jainism, namely, Ahimsā, Aparigraha and Anekānta, if righly understood and put into practice, make an individual a worthy citizen who is humane in his outlook, detached in his acquisitive instincts and highly rational and tolerant in his mental attitudes. This resumé shows that Dr. SOGANI has given us an exhaustive study of the ethical doctrines in Jainism, presenting his details in an authentic manner. : The present work of Dr. SOGANI is substantially the same as his thesis approved by the University of Rajasthan for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It was extremely kind of him to have placed

Page #14

it at our disposal for publication in the Jīvarāja Jaina Granthamala.
As General Editors we record our sincere thanks to the Members of the Trust Committee and Prabandha Samiti for their zeal for Jainological researches and their generosity in financing such publications. which have limited sale. It is earnestly hoped that an exhaustive exposition of the Jaina ethical doctrines like this will enable earnest students of Indian religious thought to understand Jainism in its proper perspective.
We are extremely sorry to record here the sad demise of Shri GULABCHAND HIRACHANDAJI (on 22-1-67) who was the President of the Trust Committee and showed keen interest in the progress of the Granthamālā. The General Editors have lost in him a fund of pious benevolence and enlightened liberalism which went a long way in shaping the policy of our publications. It is a matter of some relief that he is being succeeded as our President by his brother Shri LALCHAND HIRACHANDAJI. Sheth LALCHANDAJI is well-known for his dynamic drive which, we hope, will infuse fresh vigour in the activities of the Sangha. .
We offer our sincere thanks to Shri WALCHAND DEOCHANDAJI and to Shri MANIK CHAND VIRACHANDAJI who are taking active interest in these publications. But for their co-operation and help it would have been difficult for the General Editors to pilot the various publications from a distance.
Kolhapur Jabalpur
A. N. UPADHYE H. L. JAIN

Page #15

PREFACE
The present work is substantially the same as the thesis which was approved by the University of Rajasthan for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 1961. In this work I have endeavoured, in the first place, to show that the entire Jaina ethics tends towards the translation of the principle of Ahimsă into practice. The realisation of perfect Ahimsă is regarded by the Jaina as the ethical Summum Bonum of human life. In fact Ahimsă is so central in Jainism that it may be incontrovertibly called the beginning and the end of Jaina religion. The statement of Samantabhadra that Ahimsă of all living beings is equivalent to the realisation of Parama Brahma sheds light on the paramount character of Ahimsa. Now, this ideal of Ahimsā is realised progressively. Thus he who is able to realise Ahimsă partially is called a householder, whereas he who is able to realise Ahimsă completely, though not perfectly is called an ascetic or a Muni. It belies the allegation that the ascetic flees from the world of action. Truly speaking, he recoils not from the world of action but from the world of Himsă. No doubt the ascetic life affords full ground for the realization of Ahimsā, but its perfect realization is possible only in the plenitude of mystical experience which is the Arhat state. Thus the householder and the ascetic are the two wheels on which the cart of Jaina ethical discipline moves on quite smoothly. It is to the credit of Jaina Acāryas that they have always kept in mind these two orders while prescribing any discipline to be observed. They were never in favour of confounding the obligations of the one with the other. In consequence, Jainism could develop the Acāra of the householder with as much clarity as it developed the Ācāra of the Muni. Being overwhelmed by the ascetic tendency, it has not neglected the Acāra of the householder. By developing the doctrine of Aņuvratas for the householder it has shown the way in which the householder should direct his course of life. I feel that the doctrine of Aņuvratas is the unique contribution of Jainism to Indian thought.
Secondly, I have tried to point out that the Jaina formulation of ethical theory is grounded in Jaina metaphysics. The metaphysical outlook upheld by the Jaina is known as Anekantavāda or non-absolutism. A true Jaina does not subscribe to the absolutist approach to the unfoldment of the inner nature of reality. The conviction of the Jaina is

Page #16

that absolutism in philosophy is subversive of ethical speculation, since absolutism is always based on a prioristic trend of thought very remote from experience. In this regard the statement of Samantabhadra is significant. According to him, the conception of bondage and liberation, Puṇya (virtue) and Papa (vice) lose all their relevancy, if we exclusively recognise either permanence or momentariness as constituting the natur of substance. A little reflection will make it clear that the concept of Ahimsă belonging to the realm of ethics is a logical c
e of the ontological nature of things.
Thirdly, I have pointed out that Jaina ethics finds its culmination in mysticism. Thus if the fountain-head of ethics is metaphysics, mysticism is its completion. Ethics is the connecting link between the metaphysical speculation and the mystical realization. It will not be amiss to say that Jainism is not merely ethics and metaphysics but spiritualism too. This is manifest from the persistent emphasis laid by all the Jaina Ācāryas on the veritable achievement of Samyagdarśana (spiritual conversion). The whole Jaina Ācāra, whether of the householder or of the Muni, is out and out sterile without having Samyagdarśana as forming its background. Thus spiritualism pervades the entire Jaina Ācāra; hence the charge that the Jaina ethics is incapable of transcending morality and does not land us deep in the ordinarily unfathomable ocean of spiritualism gives way. It may be noted here that owing to its deep adherence to the spiritual way of life Jainism has developed fourteen stages of spiritual evolution, called Guņasthānas. I have subsumed these stages under the following heads, namely, 1) Dark period of the self prior to its awakening (1 st Dark night of the soul); 2) Awakening of the self; 3) Purgation; 4) Illumination; 5) Dark period post-illumination. (2nd Dark night of the soul); and 6) Transcendental life. There is also a state beyond these stages, known as the Siddha state.
Fourthly, I have indicated the theoritical possibility of devotion in Jainism. It is generally recognized that devotion in Jainism is a contradiction in terms, since devotion presupposes the existence of a Being who can actively respond to the aspirations of the devotee, and in Jainism the conception of such a Being is inadmissible. It is true to say that Jainism does not uphold the idea of such a Being known as God, but it undoubtedly recognizes the Arhat and the Siddha as the divinity-realised souls who may be the objects of devotion. Again, it is not inconsistent to aver that the Arhat or the Siddha can in no way be affected by devo

Page #17

xiii
tion, they remain quite indifferent to human weal and woe in spite of human prayers. If such is the case, possibility of sincere devotion in Jainism evaporates and cannot be maintained. But, according to the Jaina, the inspiration to devotion for the Arhat or the Siddha comes from the fact that one's devotion accumulates in the self the Punya of the highest kind, which brings about, as a natural consequence, material and spiritual benefits. By our devotion to the Arhat or the Siddha our thoughts and emotions are purified, which results in the deposition of punya in the self. This sort of Punya cannot accrue from worshiping a mere stone, hence the importance of the worship of Arhat or Siddha in Jainism. On account of this fact Samantabhadra proclaims that the adoration of Arhąt deposits great heap of Punya in the self. He who is devoted to him relishes prosperity and he who casts aspersions sinks to perdition. Thus the aspirant should not breathe in despondency for the aloofness of God (Arhat or Siddha). Those who are devoted to him are automatically elevated.
Finally, I have drawn attention to the fact that not-withstanding the differences in metaphysical conclusions arrived at by the various trends of thought, namely the Vedic, the Jaina and the Buddhist, their exponents have resorted to similar methods and contrivances in order to go beyond the manifest superficialities of objects. Thus they concur remarkably on the psychological, ethical and religious planes of existence. Along with this I have critically examined some of the important western ethical doctrines.
In the footnotes I have acknowledged my debt to the sources utilized in the preparation of this work. I have cared more for the trans
lation of the spirit of the original sources than for the word-to-word · rendering.
At the outset, I express my deep sense of gratitude to late Master MOTILALJI SANGHI of Jaipur (Rajasthan), who turned me to philosophy not by mere words but by his way of living and thinking. I regard him as a mystic of a high order. He reminds me of Socrates owing to his way of turning persons to value spiritual way of life and ofrinculcating interest in the study of spiritual literature without any prejudice of caste. and creed. Pandita CHAINSUKH DAS Nyāyatīrtha, Principal, Jaina Sanskrit College, Jaipur (Rajasthan), a man of deep scholarship, critical thinking and saintly living, has always been a source of light and inspiration to me. It is on account of him that I could pursue the study of original

Page #18

xiv
sources and present them in the form I have done. To me, he is the emblem of persistence, patience, courage and unabating zeal. What I owe to him is beyond expression.
I make a full acknowledgement of my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. V. H: DATE, under whose guidance and loving care the pres was prepared. Here I should not hesitate to mention that it is on account of him that I could complete my post-graduate studies and learn many things in Philosophy which can only be learnt by a long personal contact. I cannot forget his kindness. Words are inadequate to express my gratefulness to Dr. A. N. UPADHYE, the General Editor of this Granthamala, who, in spite of his diverse academic preoccupations, took personal interest in the publication of this work and corrected the proofs 'more than once. I offer my sincere thanks to the Trustees of the Jīvarāja Granthamala who made provision for the publication of this work. I am highly indebted to Shri P. SINHA, Principal, R. R. College, Alwar (Rajasthan) who provided me all sorts of facilities necessary for writing a work of this nature. My thanks are due to my friend Mr. B. R. BHANDARI who devoted much of his time to preparing the Index. On this occasion, I should not forget to express my thanks to my wife Srimati KAMALA DEVI SOGANI who gave me practical encouragement by sacrificing many of her interests and by helping me in Hrawing material from the original sources.
K. C. SOGANI.
Udaipur, 1-3-'67.

Page #19

ABBREVIATIONS
Acara.
...Acårånga Sûtra Amita. Śráva.
Amitagati Sråvakácăra Anagå. Dharmi.
.. Anagära Dharmåmsta A. Ni.
Anguttaranikaya Atmānu.
Atmănusasana B.G.
Bhagavad-Gita Bhaga. Ară.
Bhagavati Aradhana Bhaga. Ará. Comm. Vija.
Bhagavati Aradhană Commentary Vijayodayā Bhaga. Ară. Comm. Mūlā.
Bhagavati Aradhana Commentary Mulārādhanådarpaņa Bhava. På.
Bhāva Pähuda Bo. Pă.
Bodha Pahuda Br. Up.
Bșhadāranyakopanişad Cå. På.
Caritra Pähuda Chå. Up.
Chandogya Upanişad Darsana. På.
Darsana Pāhuda Daśavaikå.
Daśavaikälika Sūtra Dharma. Bi.
Dharma Bindu D. Ni.
Digha Nikāya Dravya.
Dravyasaragraha Gomma. JI.
Gommatasära Jivakānda Gomma. Ka.
Gommatasāra Karmakānda Gomma. Ji. Comm. Candrikā. .. Gommatasara Jivakānda Commentary Candrika H.J.M.
History of Jaina Monachism I.P.
Indian Philosophy 1. Up.
Isa Upanişad Istopa.
Istopadesa Jhână.
Jžānārnava Kårtti.
Kārttikeyanupreksā Ka. Up.
Katha Upanigad Kau. Up.
Kauşitaki Upanisad Ke. Up.
Kena Upanişad Labdhi.
Labdhisåra Labdhi. Comm. Candrika.
Labdhisåra Commentary, Candrikā Mo. Pā.
Mokşa Pahuda Müla.
Mülácara Mu. Up.
Mundaka Upanişad Niyama.
Niyamasāra Niyama. Comm. Padmaprabha. Niyamasāra Commentary Padmaprabhamaladharideva N. Sü.
Nyaya Sutra N. Sú. Bhāşya.
Nyāya Sūtra Bhagya N. Sū. Vårttika.
Nyāya Sūtra Bhăşya Värttika Panica..
Pañcâstikaya Panca. Comm. Amfta.
Pañcâstikaya Commentary Amstacandra Panca. Comm. Jayasena.
Pañcâstikāya Commentary Jayasena PP.
Paramātmaprakasa Pra. Up.
Praśna Upanisad Prava.
Pravacanasára Prava. Comm. Ampta.
Pravacanasära Commentary Amrtacandra Puru.
Puruşarthasiddhyupaya

Page #20

xvi
RajavĀ. Ratna. Srāva. S. B. E. Sågå. Dharmă. Samadhi. Samaya. Samaya. Comm. Amfta. Samaya. Comm. Jayasena. S.K. Sarvārtha. Şat. Vol. I Şat. Vol. II Şat. Vol. XIII Si. Pā. Srāva. Prajna. Sūtra. Ks. Svayambhū. øve. Up. Tai. Up. T. Ślv. Ta. Su. Ta. Sú. Bhā. Uttara. Uvāsaga. Vasu Śrāva. Vişāpahāra. Yas. & Ic. Yo. Să. Y. Sü. Y. Sü. Bhăşya. Y. Sü, Bhojavștti.
Rājavārttika Ratnakaranda Śrävakācåra
Sacred Books of the East .. Sāgåra Dharmamta
Samădhisataka Samayasåra Samayasära Commentary Amrtacandra Samayasāra Commentary Jayasena Samkhya Karika Sarvārthasiddhi Şațkhandägama Volume I Şatkhandägama Volume II Şaşkhandägama Volume XIII Sila Pahuda Śrăvaka Prajñapti Sutrakstänga Svayambhustotra Svetāśvatara Upanigad Taittiriya Upanisad Tattvārthaslokavärttika Tattvārtha Sutra Tattvārthasūtra Bhäşya Uttarādhyayana Sutra Uvăsagadasão Vasunandi Srăvakācāra Visapaharastotra Yasastilaka and Indian Culture Yogasastra of Hemacandra Yoga Sutra Yoga Sūtra Bhagya Yoga Sutra Bhojavrtti

Page #21

ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM

Page #22

Page #23

ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
CHAPTER I
Historical Background of Jaina Ethics
TRADITIONAL ANTIQUITY OF JAINISM; According to tradition, Jainism owes its origin to Rsabha, the first among the twenty-four Tirthamkaras. The rest of the Tirthamkaras are said to have revived and revealed this ancient faith from time to time. The Bhagavata Purana mentions certain facts about Rsabha which agree in a great measure with those mentioned in the Jaina scriptures. Professor RANADE remarks:1 "Rsabhadeva is yet a mystic of a different kind whose utter carelessness of his body is the supreme mark of his God-realization." "It would be interesting to note that the details about Rsabhadeva given in the Bhagavata practically and fundamentally agree with those recorded by Jaina tradition.2" Dr. RADHAKRISHNAN opines:8 "There is evidence to show that so far back as the first century B.C. there were poople who were worshipping Rşabhadeva, the first Tirthamkara. There is no doubt that Jainism prevailed even before Vardhamāna or Pārsvanātha. The Yajurveda mentions the names of three Tirthamkaras: Rşabha, Ajitanātha and Aristanemi. The Bhagavata Purāna endorses the view that Rsabha was the founder of Jainism.” “The Ahimsā doctrine preached by Rsabha is possibly prior in time to the advent of the Aryans in India and the prevalent culture of the period.”
Again as the traditional account goes, Rsabha was born in Kosala. His father was Kulakara Nābhi. and his mother was Marudevī. The names of the rest of the Tirthamkaras are: 2) Ajita, 3) Sambhava, 4) Abhinandana, 5) Sumati, 6) Padmaprabha, 7) Supārsva, 8) Candraprabha, 9) Puşpadanta, 10) Sītala, 11) Sreyān, 12) Vāsupūjya, 13) Vimala, 14) Ananta, 15) Dharma, 16) Santi, 17) Kunthu, 18) Ara, 19) Malli 20) Munisuvrata, 21) Nami, 22) Nemi, 23) Pārsva, and 24) Mahavira.
The Jaina tradition makes all these Tirthamkaras as the product of pure Ksatriya race. Another point regarding them is the difference of
1 Mysticism in Maharashtra, p. 9. 2 Paramåtma Prakāsa, Introduction, p. 39. 3 Indian Philosophy, Vol. I., p. 287. History of Philosophy Eastern and Western, Vol. I, p. 139.

Page #24

2
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
195
opinion about the nineteenth Tirthamkara, Malli, who, according to the Svetambaras, was a woman, to which the Digambaras do not agree.1 Besides, the name of 'Sumati,' the fifth Tirthamkara, has also been referred to in the Bhagavata Purana which tells us that he "will be irreligiously worshipped by some infidels as a divinity."" Another Tirthamkara called Aristanemi (Nemi) is connected with the Kṛṣṇa legend.8
HISTORICITY OF PARSVA: Leaving aside this traditional account, and taking into consideration the standpoint of history, we find that the historicity of the last two Tirthamkaras, namely, Parsva and Mahavira, has now been incontrovertibly recognised. Some of the arguments adduced for the historicity of Parsva are as follows. First, Dr. JACOBI has infallibly proved that Jainism existed even before the times of Mahavira under the leadership of Pārsva, the twenty-third Tirthamkara. It is the Buddhist references which obliged him to adopt this view. To mention one of them, the mistake of the Samañña-phala-sutta of the Dighanikaya that it attributed the fourfold religion, to be dealt with afterwards, preached by Parsva to Nataputta (Mahāvīra) goes to prove the pre-Mahavira existence of Jainism. In the words of Dr. JACOBI, "The Pāli 'Catuyama' is equivalent to the Prākṛta Catujjāma, a wellknown Jaina term which denotes the four vows of Pārsva in contradistinction to the five vows (pañca-mahavvaya) of Mahavira. Here, then, the Buddists, I suppose, have made a mistake in ascribing to Nātaputta Mahavira a doctrine which properly belonged to his predecessor Pārsva. This is a significant mistake, for the Buddhists could not have used the above term as descriptive of the Niggantha creed unless they had heard it from followers of Parśva, and they would not have used it if the reforms of Mahavira had already been generally adopted by the Nigganthas at the time of Buddha. I, therefore, look on this blunder of the Buddhist as a proof for the correctness of the Jaina tradition that followers of Parsva actually existed at the time of Mahavira.*" Secondly, the evidence for the historicity of Parsva is also supplied by the Jaina Agamas themselves. The conversation between Kesi and Goyama mentioned in the Uttaradhyayana is one of them. About which JACOBI remarks: "The followers of Parsva, especially Kesi who seems to have
1 History of Jaina Monachism, p. 59.
2 Wilson, Visnu Purana, p. 164 N. vide H. J. M., p. 59.
3 H. J. M., p. 59.
4 S. B. E., Vol. XLV. p. XXI.
5 Uttara. XXIII.

Page #25

•
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF JAINA ETHICS
been the leader of the sect at the time of Mahāvira, are frequently mentioned in Jaina Sütras in such a matter-of-fact way as to give us no reason for doubting the authenticity of records.” Thirdly, the acceptance of the fivefold Dharma of Mahāvīra by as many as five hundred followers of Parsva at Tumgiyā also endorses the pre-Mahāvira existence of Jainism.
*LIFE AND INFLUENCE OF PĀRÁVA: Notwithstanding the historicity of Pārsva, very few facts about his life are known. His father was Aśvasena, who was the king of Vārānasi, and his mother was Vāmā. He spent 30 years of his life as a householder, and afterwards he led a life of a monk. After following a strenuous life of austerities for eightythree days he attained perfection, and after completing hundred years of his life, he embraced final emancipation on the summit of mount Sammeta in Bihar 250 years before Mahāvira attained Nirvāņa. "Among the chief cities which he is said to have visited were Ahicchattā, Āmalakappi, Hatthiņāpura, Kampillapura, Kosambi, Rāyagiha, Sāgeya, and Savatthi. Erom this it seems that he wandered in the modern provinces of Bihar and U.P.3"
RELIGION OF PĀRÁVA: The religion of Pārsva was called 'Cãujjāma* dhamina', or the fourfold religion which prescribes abstinence from Himsa, falsehood, stealing and acquisition. The followers of Pārsva were allowed to put on clothes, according to this tradition. Other details may be inferred from the practices observed by the parents of Mahavira, who were the worshippers of Pārsya. They practised penances and repented for certain transgressions committed, and on a bed of grass they rejected all food, and their bodies dried up by the last mortification of the flesh, which is to end in death. The question as to why there was the difference in the number of vows enjoined by Pārśva and Mahāvira u four and five respectively is replied by saying that the saints under the first Tirthamkara were simple but slow of understanding, those under the last Tirthamkara were prevaricating and slow of understanding, those between the two were simple and wise, hence there are two forms of the law. Again, the first could with difficulty understand the precepts of the law and the last could only with difficulty observe them, but those between them easily understood and observed them.
1S.B. E. Vol. XLV. p. XXI. 2 Bhagavai, pp. 136 ff. vide H. J. M., pp. 63-64. 3 H. J. M., pp. 60-61. : Uttară., XXIII. 12. Acaränga., p. 194.
Uttard., XXIII. 26. Trans., vide S. B. E. Vol. XLV; cf. Mæla. 534, 535. 7 Uttard., XXIII. 27. Trans., vide S. B. E., Vol. XLV.

Page #26

ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
FURTHER ELUCIDATION OF MAHĀVIRA: The first elucidation made by Mahāyria was the explicit addition of the fifth vow of celibacy to the four vows of Pārsva. In Pārsva's religion it was implicit, while the religion, of Mahāvira made it explicit in view of his disciples who were 'prevaricating and slow of understanding in contradistinction to the followers of Pārsva who were "simple and wise". On account of this inclusion of the vow of celibacy JACOBI remarks: “As the vow of chastity is not explicitly mentioned among Pārsva's four vows but was understood to be implicitly enjoined by them, it follows that only such men as were of an upright disposition and quick understanding would not go astray by observing the four vows literally, i.e., by not abstaining from sexual intercourse, as it was not expressly forbidden. The argumentation in the text presupposes a decay of the morals of the monastic order to have occurred between Pārsva and Mahāvira and this is possible only on the assumption of a sufficient interval of time having elapsed between the last two Tirthamkaras. And this perfectly agrees with the common tradition that Mahāvīra came 250 years after Pārsva.1" Secondly, in view of the Āgamic tradition, Mahāvira introduced the practice of nudity. The Kalpasūtra tells us that the venerable Ascetic Mahāvira for a year and a month wore clothes, after that time he walked about naked and accepted the alms in the hollow of his hand. Mahāvīra's predecessor Pārsva allowed an under and upper garment to his followers. In the Suttapahuda the announcement of Kundakunda that even the Tirthamkara with the use of clothes will remain incapable of achieving enlightenment, is indicative of the fact that none of the Tirthamkaras allowed the use of clothes for the monks. This view suggests that not only Mahavira, but all others have preached nudity. Thirdly, the observance of the practice of Pratikramana (condemnation of a transgression) has been made obligatory by Mahāvira irrespective of the fact that transgression has been committed. This may be either due to the recognition of the fickle-mindedness and forgetful nature of the disciples or due to the belief that even the consciousness of what is meant by sin will deter such disciples from committing it. In the times of the first Tīrthamkara also the same practice continued. But the disciples of Tirthamkaras (2nd to 23rd) performed the practice of
1 Uttara. p. 122., Foot note No. 3. 3 Uttara. XXIII. 13.
2 Kalpasūtra, p. 260. Sutra Pahuda, 23.

Page #27

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF JAINA ETHICS
Pratikramana only on the commitment of certain transgressions, since they have been regarded as subtle and steady. Fourthly, Pūjyapāda in the Caritra-Bhakti points out that Mahāvira has preached thirteen kinds of conduct, namely, five Samitis, three Guptis, and Vows, which have not been preached by other Tirthamkaras in this claborate way.” Fifthly, according to the Mülacara, Rşabha and Mahāvīra have announced the pursuance of Chedopasthāpanā conduct, while others, only one vow of Sāmāyika. The former may mean either thirteen types of conduct as afore-mentioned or five great vows, and the latter implies the avoidance of all sinful tendencies, summarily comprising all types of conduct". MAHĀVIRA AS THE ELUCIDATOR OF THE FAITH ALREADY EXISTING:
all this it follows that Mahavira has improved by clarification upon the religion of his predecessor and has not established an altogether new creed. Professor GHATE remarks: “By the very nature of the case, tradition has preserved only those points of Pārsva's teachings which diifered from the religion of Mahavira, while other common are ignored. The few differences that are known make Mahāvīra definitely a reformer of an existing faith, and the addition of a vow, the importance of nudity and a more systematic arrangement of its philosophical tenets may be credited to his reforming zeal." "Thus, unlike Buddha, Mahāvira was more a reformer of an existing religion and possibly of a Church than the founder of a new faith. He (Mahāvira) is represented as following a well-established creed most probably that of Parsva. Equally significant is Buddha's insistence that his followers should remember well his first sermon suggestive of its novelty. Above an the Pāli canon shows that it regarded Mahāvīra not as a founder of a new sect, but merely as a leader of a religious community already mai existence.?” “Apart from these reforms in ethical teaching it is difficult to ascertain what additions Mahāvira made to the ontological and psychological system of his predecessor. What he did was, in all likelihood, the codification of an unsystematic mass of beliefs into a set d rigid rules of conduct for monks and laymen. A decided inclination towards enumeration and classification may be attributed to him.S” 1 Mala. 624 to 630.
2 Caritra Bhakti, 7. 3 Malá, 533.
4 Acarasära, V. 6, 7; Sarvartha. VII. 1. 5 Sarvartha., VII. 1.
6 The Age of Imperial Unity, p. 412. 7 Ibid.
8 The Age of Imperial Unity, p. 420.

Page #28

ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
LIFE AND INFLUENCE OF MAHAVIRA: To deal with the life of Mahavira in brief, “Vardhamāna Mahāvīra was born at Kundapura or Kundagrāma. His father's name was Siddhārtha who belonged to the Jñāts Ksatriyas. His mother was Trisalā who was the sister* of king Cetaka, the ruler of Vaiśāli and belonging to the Licchavi Ksatriyas. Thus on the father's as well as on the mother's side he belonged to the royal Ksatriya stock.1" “The original name of the prophet was Vardhamāna, while his more popular name Mahāvira is said to have been bestowed on him by gods. The Canon also gives him a number of suggestive epithets like Nāyaputtaa, scion of the Nāya clan, Kāsava on account of gotra, Vesāliya after his place of birth and Videhadinna after his native country. He is most frequently referred to as 'the venerable ascetic Mahāvira.2" Accord ing to the Digambara tradition he led a life of celibacy, while according to the Svetāmbara tradition he married Yasodā and was blessed with a daughter called Priyadarśanā. At the age of thirty he relinquished worldly comforts despite his princely career and became a Nirgrantha. After undergoing a strenuous course of discipline for a period of twelve years, he attained perfection and became a Kevalin. “For full thirty years he visited different parts of the country, and it was his Vihāra or religious tour as well as that of Buddha that gave Magadhan territory the name of Bihar.3" "In view of the all-embracing character of Mahavira's principles, Samantabhadra, as early as 2nd century A.D., called the Tirtha of Mahavira by the name Sarvodaya, which term is so commonly used now-a-days after Gandhiji. At the age of 72. Mahāvira attained Nirvāna at Pāvā in 527 B.C.4” After the acquisition of perfect knowledge he is said to have spent the first rainy season in Asthikāgrāma, three rainy seasons in Campā, twelve in Vaisālī and Vāniyagāma, fourteen in Rāyagiha and the suburb of Nālandā, six in Mithilā, two in Bhaddiyā and one in Alabhiyā, one in Paniyabhūmi, one in Sāvatthi, one in the town of Pāvā.5 “From the identification of a few of these places, it appears that the field of influence of Mahavira roughly formed the modern provinces of Bihar and some parts of Bengal and U.P.6” “They give us a fair idea of the country over which he wandered propagating his faith, but we must bear in mind that the list is neither exhaustive nor
1 History of Jaina Monachism, p. 65.
2 The Age of Imperial Unity, p. 413. 3 Mahāvīra and his philosophy of life, p. 3. 4 Ibid. 5 Kalpasūtra, p. 264.
6H.J. M. p. 69. *Digambara tradition regards her as the daughter of Cetaka.

Page #29

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF JAINA ETHICS
7
chronological, though covering broadly the 42 years of his itinerary.1": According to the Jaina texts number of kings, queens, princes, princesses, ministers and merchants accepted Mahāvira as their teacher. Without going into the details of historical support for this assumption, we now pass on to the development of various sects in Jainism.
EMERGENCE OF SCHISMS: Though Mahavira had a magnetic personality, yet he had to encounter schisms even in his own life-time. Of the eight principal schisms, the first two occurred when Mahāvīra was propagating his doctrine. Most of the schisms could not leave any permanent mark on the Jaina community, and could not stand in the way of its unity, but the last schisms in the two sects of the Svetāmbaras and Digambaras brought about a serious rift in the church. We shall presently dwell upon the schisms.
The first schism known as Bahuraya was initiated by Jamali who was Mahāvira's son-in-law. “Fourteen years after the attainment of Kevala Jñāna by Mahāvīra, Jamāli started this school at Sāvatthi. He maintained that before a particular act is completed its results begin to take
place3".
The second schism known as Jivapaesiya was started by Tissagutta at. Usabhapura, sixteen years after the attainment of omniscience by Mahāvira, and believed that the soul does not pervade all the atoms of the body.
The third schism recognised as Avvattaga originated with Āsādha at Seyaviyā fourteen years after the Nirvāṇa of Mahāvira, and propounded that there was no difference between a monk and a god.
The fourth schism called Samuccheiya had its origin in Mithila and was started by Assamitta two hundred twenty years after the Nirvāṇa of Mahāvīra, and gave credence to the doctrine that the effects of the good or the bad actions are immaterial, since all life comes to an end sometime.
The fifth schism known as Dokiriyā was started by Ganga at Ullugatira two hundred twentyeight years after the Nirvāna of Mahāvira. It held that two opposite feelings like hot and cold could be experienced simultaneously.
1 The Age of Imperial Unity, p. 412. 2 The whole account of schisms is based on ‘History of Jaina Monachism, pp. 78-84.,
and 'Schools and Sects in Jaina Literature, pp. 44-45. 3 H.J. M., p. 79.

Page #30

ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
The sixth schism called Teräsiya or Nojiva arose in Antarañjia and was founded by Rohagutta 544 years after Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa; and it propounded the existence of a third principle known as Nojiva in addition to Jiva and Ajiva.
The seventh schism recognised as Abaddhiya was started by Gutthamāhila at Dasapura 584 years after Mahāvira's Nirvāna. It held that the Karmic atoms simply touch the soul, but do not bind it.
DIGAMBARA AND SVETĀMBARA AS THE MAJOR DIVISIONS OF THE JAINA CHURCH: As we have already mentioned, these seven schisms could not maintain their separate identity and ultimately agreed with their original source; but the Digambara-Svetāmbara schism resulted into a sharp division of the church, and each sect claimed greater authenticity than the other. The traditional accounts regarding this schism evince wide divergence.
The Digambara account attributed the schism to a terrible famine which lasted for twelve years in the country of Magadha during the time of Chandragupta Maurya in the third century B.C. This led some of the monks to migrate to the South India under the leadership of Ācārya Bhadrabāhu, and the rest remained in Magadha with Sthūlabhadra. The latter, pressed by the circumstances, gave up nudity and wore a piece of cloth (Ardhaphālaka) at the time of begging. The conservative element protested against this, and thus these Ardhaphālakas. proved to be the forerunners of the Svetāmbaras. Finally, at the request of Candralekhā, the queen of king Lokapāla of Valabhipura, the saints known as Ardhaphālakas began to put on white clothes and were called Svetapațas.
. The Svetāmbaras record a different view of the Schism. According to them, the emergence of Digambaras is due to a certain Sivabhūti who 609 years after the Nirvāņa of Mahāvira founded a sect called Bodiya in the city of Rathavīrapura, and started nudity. When once he came late at night, his mother refused to open the door. Being frustrated, he happened to enter a monastery, and became a monk. When the king for whom he fought many battles came to know this, he sent him a valuable garment as a gift. The teacher of Sivabhūti tore off that garment. Being excited, he gave up all clothing and became naked. His sister also followed him, but later on she began to wear clothes on account of
1 H.J. M., p. 81.

Page #31

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF JAINA ETHICS
the complaints made by several persons. Thus Sivabhūti's disciples were regarded as Digambaras.
These “traditional accounts of the origin of the split are puerile and the outcome of sectarian hatred. They however agree in assigning it to the end of the first century A.D. which is quite likely. The evidence of the literary writings of the Svetāmbaras and early sculptures go to show that most of the differences between the two sects were of slow growth, and did not arise all at one time.” The fundamental difference between these two sects finds expression in the attitude of the monks towards the use of clothes. The Svetāmbara monks wear white clothes, whereas the Digambara ones go naked. Besides, the Digambaras say that the real Āgamas are now extinct, but the Svetāmbaras recognise the existing Agamas as the original ones. It may be pointed out that the metaphysical, ethical and religious doctrines described in the works of the Digambaras and the Svetāmbaras do not exhibit remarkable differences.
SECTS OF THE DIGAMBARAS: With the lapse of time new sects originated in the Digambaras and the Svetāmbaras. We shall first point out the sects of the Digambaras, and then pass on to the Svetāmbara ones. The different sects of the Digambaras are: 1) Drāvida Samgha, 2) Kāșthā Samgha, 3) Mathura Samgha, 4) Yapaniya Samgha, 5) Terāpantha, 6) Bīsapantha, 7) Samaiyāpantha, and 8) Gumānapantha.
1) The Drāvida Samgha, according to the Darsanasāra," appeared in Vikrama 526 (469 A.D.) in Drāvida country near Madras, and was started by Vajranandi, the disciple of Pūjyapāda. Many great Ācāryas like Jinasena (the author of the Harivamsapurāna), Vādirāja etc. patronised this Samgha, but nothing is known regarding the rules of ascetic discipline prevalent in this Samgha. 2) In Vikrama 753 (696 A.D.) the Kāșthā SamghaS was founded by Kumārasenamuni. His disciples kept a broom consisting of cow's hair. 3) Two hundred years after the origin of Kāsthā Samgha, i.e., in Vikrama 953 (896 A.D.) the Māthura Samgha* was started in Madurā in Southern India by Rāmasena. The saints of this Samgha did not keep any broom. Acārya Amitagati belonged to this Samgha. NATHURAMJI PREMI remarks that Devasena, the author of the Darsanas āra, unnecessarily and without any adequate reasons called these Samghas pseudo-Jaina." 4) We encounter the name
1 The Age of Imperial unity, p. 416. 2 Darsanasära, pp. 38, 41. 3 Ibid. pp. 39, 41. 4 Ibid. pp. 39–41.
5 Ibid. p. 45.

Page #32

10
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
of another Samgha known as Yāpaniya Samgha, which was started by Srikalasa at Kalyāņa after 205 years of Vikrama era (148 A.D.) The saints of the Yāpaniya school practised nudity like the Digambaras and believed in the liberation of women in conformity with the Svetāmbaras. Thus they may be called the reconcilers of the two major sects. Nowa-days the followers of this Samgha are not visible. According to Dr. UPADHYE, they either dwindled into extinction or merged themselves into the Digambara fold. 5-6) In course of time the saints deviated from the prescribed path of ascetic discipline. They started such practices as were having no scriptural support. Such saints began to be called Bhattārakas. These Bhattārakas went astray to such an extent as to endanger the purity of the discipline prescribed by the Digambara tradition. Consequently, in the seventeenth century A.D., Pandita Banārsīdāsa of Agra stood in opposition to the degenerating tendencies of the Bhattārakas, and gave rise to a Pantha called Terāpantha. Those who continued to remain the votaries of the Bhattārakas were called Bisapanthis. How these names of Teräpantha and Bisapantha came into vogue is a puzzling question. The Terapanthis do not regard the Bhattārakas as their Gurus. The rise of this Pantha gave a death blow to the prevalent tendencies of the Bhattārakas. Both the Terāpanthis and the Bisapanthis are idolatrous Digambaras. 7) In the sixteenth century A.D. Tāraņasvāmi* founded Samaiyāpantha. The followers of this Pantha are nonidolatrous Digambaras, and worship the texts of the canon. 8) In the eighteenth century A.D. Gumānirāma, the son of Pt. TODARMAL of Jaipur, founded Gumānapantha with a view to emphasising the importance of the purity of conduct. It may be pointed out here that these sects could not create any sharp social differences, and the adherents of these Panthas live quite harmoniously. In spite of so many movements in the history of Digambara church, the unity of the church could not much be jeopardized.
SECTS OF THE SVETĀMBARAS: We now proceed to deal with the sects of the Svetāmbaras. Though a large number of Gacchas originated in the idolatrous Svetāmbaras, they exhibit only gross differences of discipline and not any fundamental philosophical distinctions. Of the tradi
1 Ibid. p. 38-39. 3 Ibid. 5 Ibid.
2 Jaina Sahitya aura Itihasa, p. 493. 4 H.J. M., p. 448.

Page #33

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF JAINA ETHICS
tional number of eighty four Gacchas, only some are known; and a few of them are alive to this day such as Kharatara-gaccha, Tapa-gaccha, and Añcalika-gaccha. The sect which deeply affected the organisation of the Svetambara church is known as Sthanakavāsi.1 The origin of this sect is as follows. Not finding the practice of idol-worship consistent with the Jaina Agamas, Lonkaśaha in 1474 A.D. represented it as incongruous; and established a sect called Lonka sect. Afterwards, out of the Lonka sect there arose a further split on the basis of the fact that the saint should strictly observe the rules of monastic life. This was effected by one of the saints of the Lonka sect, namely, the saint Viraji of Surat. He founded a sect called Sthanakavasi or Dhumḍiya, and assimilated many of the adherents of the Lonka sect. The Sthanakavāsīs decry idol-worship and temples, and do not believe in pilgrimage. The saints of this sect always tie a piece of cloth to their mouth. They do not differ much from the idolatrous Svetambaras in details of ascetic life. Later on, in the eighteenth century A.D., a new sect known as Terapantha was started by Bhikhanaji, who was one of the Sadhus of the Sthanakavāsi sect.2 This sect is also non-idolatrous. The Terapanthi saints do not live in the houses built for their staying purposes as the Sthanakavāsī saints do, though the former always tie a piece of cloth to their mouth like the latter. This sect is now flourishing under the guidance of Acarya Tulasi.
ORIGIN OF JAINA ETHICS: We shall now end this chapter after dwelling upon the origin of Jaina monachism, inasmuch as it is directly related to the origin of Jaina ethics. JACOBI is of opinion that the Jainas have borrowed the rules of ascetic life from the Brahmaṇas. We may point out here that the unravelment of the problem of the derivation of Jaina monachism from the rules of Brahmanical Samnyasa has to be studied in relation to the antiquity of Samnyasa in Brahmanical fold. "The establishment of the theory of Asramas does not seem to have taken place before the time of the Svetasvatara Upanishad wherein we find the term Atyaśramin.3 "In the oldest Upanisads there is evidence of only the first two or three Asramas, namely that of a student, that of a householder and that of Yati or a Muni. According to the Chandogya Upanisad a man reaches the Summum Bonum even in the stage of a householder." Besides, the idea of Samnyasa does not seem to find
1 H. J. M., p. 440.
3 History of Brahmainical Asceticism, p. 15.

11
2 Bhiksu Vicāra Darsana, p. 3. 4 Ibid.

Page #34

ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
favour with the Satapatha-Brahmana and the Taittirīya Upanisad, inasmuch as the former portrays the life of the householder as ideal by pronouncing that one should offer sacrifice to fire as long as he lives, and the latter instructs not to break the thread of progenyl. Again, the Mahabharata also condemns it. Bhima argues: “Samnyāsa has been started by men who are) devoid of fortune, and paupers and atheists (and it is represented by them) as the teaching of the Vedas, (while as in reality it is) a falsehood looking like truth.” “This suggestion is supported by arguments of Arjuna in the next chapter where he relates a story, that in the days of yore some Brāhmanas had entered Samnyāsa from Brahmacarya. Indra denounced the conduct of these Brāhmaṇas and he made them return to the Gphastha stage.3" These chapters of the Mahābhārata go to prove that the ancient Vedic tradition looked upon asceticism with disfavour. HARDUTTA SHARMA speculates that "the Vātarasanas of the Rgveda who, by the time of the Aranyakas, took the title of Sramana were the earliest dissenters from the orthodox Vedic religion. They are the same as the Yatis who are killed by Indra”.4 Dr. DUTTA comes to the same conclusion. He says: “The Vedic hymns which may be said to constitute the earliest and purest Aryan element in Indian culture do not seem to know of the religious mendicant”.5
In view of these observations we can safely conclude that Jaina monachism does not seem to have originated from the Brahmanical idea of Samnyāsa. “The Institution of Sramaņism grew up among the imperfectly Āryanised communities of the east, spread, flourished and became highly popular, and with the remarkable elasticity which is characteristic of Brahmanism was later affiliated to the Aryan system of life, becoming the fourth Āśrama.” Dr. Upadhye says: “Before the advent of the Aryans in India, we can legitimately imagine that a highly cultivated society existed along the fertile banks of the Ganges and Jamuna and it had its religious teachers. Vedic texts have always looked with some antipathy at the Magadhan country where Jainism and Buddhism flourished, and these religions owe no allegiance to the Vedic authorities. The gap in the philosophical thought at the close of the Brāhmaṇa period has necessitated the postulation of an indigenous stream of thought which must have influenced the Āryan thought at the same time being influenced by the latter I have called this stream of thought by the
1 History of B. Asceticism, p. 16. 2 Ibid. p. 17. 3 Ibid. Ibid. 5 Early Buddhist Monachism, p. 46. Ibid.. p. 56,

Page #35

METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF JAINA ETHICS
name ‘Magadhan religion . We should no more assess the Sāmkhya, Jaina, Buddhistic and Ājīvaka tenets as mere perverted continuations of stray thoughts selected at random from the Upanisadic bed of Aryan thought current. The inherent similarities in these systems as against the essential dissimilarities with Aryan (Vedic and Brahmanic) religion and the gaps that a dispassionate study might detect between the Vedic (including the Brāhmaṇas) and Upanişadic thought currents, really point out to the existence of an indigenous stream of thought?.” Hence we may conclude that Jaina monachism and therefore Jaina ethics is Magadhan in origin.
CHAPTER II
Metaphysical Basis of Jaina Ethics
DEPENDENCE OF ETHICS ON METAPHYSICS: According to Jainism, ontological discussions necessarily determine ethical considerations. The ethical enquiry derives its meaning from the metaphysical speculation. Our conduct and behaviour are conditioned by our metaphysical presuppositions. The incentive to the progress of moral consciousness emerges from a deep and sound metaphysical theory which requires proper application of logic to experience. Samantabhadra argues that the conceptions of bondage and liberation, Punya and Pāpa, heaven and hell, pleasure and pain and the like lose all their relevancy and significance, if we exclusively recognise either permanence or momentariness as constituting the nature of substance. This statement clearly points to the dependence of ethics on metaphysics. Again, the affirmation that the momentary disintegration of all things renders impossible the financial transactions, the fact of memory, and the commonplace relations of the husband and the wife, the teacher and the taught and the like also indicates the subservience of ethical problems to the nature of beings. In the following pages, therefore, it is proposed to dwell, in the first place, upon the general nature of reality; and secondly, upon the mode
1 Brhatkathākoşa, Intro. p. 12; also Pravacanasāra. Pref. pp. 12-13. 2 Apta-mimāṁsā. 40-41.; Yuktyanusāsana. 8-15.; Cf. Syādvddamañjari. 27. ,3 Yuktyanusāsana. 16-17.

Page #36

ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
of its comprehension and representation, as it has a close bearing on our ethical discussions. Thirdly, the classification of substances along with a brief account of each one of them will be dealt with; and lastly, there will be represented the divesse ways of expressing the nature of the ethical ideal.
GENERAL NATURE OF REALITY: According to Jainism, metaphysical reality, objectively considered, embraces within its fold contradictions, but only in an apparent fashion; they point just to the incompetence and inadequateness of human expression in language. It has been considered as existent and non-existent, one and many, permanent and changing* etc. It is this aspect of Jaina philosophy which confounds those philosophers who are habituated to think in an abstract way and apart from experience. Owing to the predilections fostered by a priori logic, they represent the Jaina view of reality as incongruent, and so end either in the formulation of the absolutist doctrine of universal eternalism or universal nihilism. Jainism takes leave of such an inveterate habit of mind and adheres to the testimony of experience for solving metaphysical problems. Thus the Jaina differs from all absolutists in their approach to the unfoldment of the inner nature of reality. Jainism weaves the fabric and structure of reality on the authority of indubitable experience and is not swayed in the least by the fascinations of a priori logic. Owing to this deep-rooted abhorrence of the abstract way of philosophising, the Jaina evaluates what is given in experience, and consequently advocates change to be as much ontologically real as permanence. Both are separable but only in logical thought. Being implies becoming and vice versa. Inconsistent as it may appear at the inception, there is no doubt that experience enforces it and logic confirms it. This conception of reality reminds us of the Greek philosopher Parmenides who regarded 'Being as the sole reality wholly excludent of all becoming, as also of Heraclitus, for whom, permanence being an illusion, 'Becoming' or perpetual change constitutes the very life of the universe. It also makes us reminiscent of the Buddhistic philosophy of universal flux and of the unchanging, static, permanent absolute of Vedānta. But all these point to the one sided evaluation of experience. It may be said that “if the Upanisadic thinkers found the immutable reality behind the world of phenomena and plurality, 1 Yuktyanusasana, 49.
2 Aptamimamsd, 15. 3 Ibid., 34.
Ibid., 56.

Page #37

METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF JAINA ETHICS
15
and the Buddha denounced everything as fleeting and sorrowful and pointed to the futility of all speculation, Mahāvira adhered to the common experience, found no contradiction between permanence and change, and was free from all absolutismo.”
MEANING OF THE TERM 'EXPERIENCE': It will not be out of place to mention the comprehensive meaning of the term 'experience' adopted by the Jaina philosophers. The term 'experience has been construed in its comprehensive denotation as including all the five types of knowledge, namely, Mati (Sensuous), Sruta (Scriptural), Avadhi (Intuition of material objects, or Clairvoyance), Manahparyāya (Intuition of mental modes) and Kevala (Perfect knowledge or Omniscience). The first two come under Paroksa, since they need external sense-organs and mind for their birth and the other three are classified under Pratyaksa, inasmuch as they are born independently of the sense-organs and mind. The last three types of knowledge are the privilege and prerogative of some selected few, namely, Yogis; but Mati and Sruta are given to all. Mati includes inference, memory, recognition etc.; and experience includes Pratyaksa and Paroksa types of knowledge. Thus, Sensuous and Intellectual knowledge are as much a part of experience as the transcendental one. Sensuous and intellectual experience are also real, though they do not possess the clarity of the transcendental one. Intuitive experience does not contradict the intellectual one, but only surpasses it in scope, extension and clarity.
There is another way of understanding the meaning of the term, 'experience'. Experience should not be understood to mean narrow empiricism or sensationalism in the Lockian sense, nor mere rationalism in the Descartian sense, but it should be understood in antagonism to the Kantian sense. To make it more clear, according to Kant, "the understanding has different forms of conceiving or relating or connecting percepts; they are called pure concepts or categories of the understanding, because they are a priori and not derived from experience”.? But, according to the Jaina, the categories or the pure concepts are not only mental phenomena, but are also trans-subjective in character. In other words, they are both subjective and objective. Again, in accordance with Kant, “sensibility furnishes us with objects or percepts, empirical intuitions as he sometimes calls them”.8 and the universal forms are
1 Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 18. 2 History of Philosophy (Indian edition 1949) pp. 364, 365. 3 Ibid. p. 361.

Page #38

16
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
contributed by thought or the understanding. But the Jaina does not accept this view and argues that the universal and the particular are given together in experience. In the words of Prof. SATKARI MOOKERJEE, "experience furnishes unanalysed data with the universal and the parti." cular rolled into one. Reflection only distinguishes the two elements, and this has been misconstrued to be the original contribution of thought?” It is in this extensive meaning that the term "experience should be taken whenever used in the later course of our discussion.
DEFINITION OF SUBSTANCE: In consonance with the perspective adopted by the Jainas in their metaphysical speculation, substance is that which exists or that which is characterised by simultaneous origination, destruction and persistence, or that which is the substratum of attributes and modes. At the outset these definitions of substance may sound as absolutely different from one another, but it may be noted that every one of these difinitions is inclusive of the rest, since existence implies change and permanence from the view point of experience. Permanence signifies persistence of substance along with attributes, and change refers to fluctuating modes along with the emergence of the new modes and the disappearance of the old ones at one and the same time. To illustrate, gold as a substance exists with its modifications and qualities. Now after making an ornament, gold as a substance is existent along with its attributes and what changes is the mode. Thus existence which is inseparably bound up with substance (gold) accompanied by its attributes and modes necessitates the production of a new form, the cessation of the old one, and continuation of gold as such simultaneously. In other words, substance, as inherently and essentially associated with endless qualities and modifications, is out and out inconceivable without at the same time implying existence which in turn is endowed with the trio of simultaneous origination, destruction and persistence. The denial of the different aspects of the Jaina view of substance will lead us either to the Buddhist philosophy of universal change which disregards the underlying permanent being, or to the Vedantic monism which declares the accompanying change as appearance or illusory. Thus “the Jaina conception of reality avoids the Scylla of
1 Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism. p. 3. 2 Paricd. 10.; Prava. II. 3-4.; Tasti. V. 29, 30, 38. 3 Pafică. comm. Ampta. 10. 4 Ibid.

Page #39

METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF JAINA ETHICS
17
fluxism and the Charybdis of illusionism?". Thus nature of substance may now oblige us to think that things both material and mental are everlastingly existent. Such a view of things cannot even pretend to conceive without falling into inconsistency the intervention of any eternal and self-subsistent maker, either personal or impersonal, for bringing into existence the diverse things of the world.
SUBSTANCE AND QUALITY: Substance as different from the general and specific qualities and modifications is not worthy of being so called. Things devoid of attributes and modifications are nothing but abstractions, and are unthinkable. Qualities are incapable of being existent by themselves even for a moment. They necessitate the simultaneous existence of substance, and are denied any isolated character; and they are themselves bereft of qualities. “Qualities do not fly loose as abstract entities, and substance does not exist as an undetermined somewhat, a mere 'that' to which they are afterwards attached. The idea of substance is the idea of qualities as unified and systematised8”. As regards the relation between them, we may say that they are non-separate and non-identical. Non-separateness results owing to their subsistence in the same spatial existense, and non-identity issues because of the fact that one is not the other. The assertion that substance is not quality and that quality is not substance serves only to emphasize the nonidentical character of both substance and quality. It does not mean the absolute negation of substance in quality and vice-versa. Thus the relation between Dravya and Guna (substance and quality) is one of identity-in-difference. The difference between them is only the difference in point of nomenclature, number, characterisation, and purpose and not difference with reference to spatial extense. “Neither being found without the other, they both stand in the relation of invariable concomitance or simultaneity with one another instead of being in relation of antecedence and consequence in time”. In other words, "the relation between substance and quality is one of coeval identity, unity, inseparability, and essential simplicity, the unity of substance and quality is not the result of union or combination?.”
Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism. p. 72. 3 Idea of God. p. 159. Cf. Sarvärtha p. 310. S Aptamimaṁsā. 72. 7 Indian Philosophy. Vol. I. p. 314.
2 Tasi. V. 41.
Prava. II. 16. 6 Epitome of Jainism. p. 24.

Page #40

ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
SUBSTANCE AND MODIFICATION: Having considered the Jaina view of qualities, we now turn to the conception of Paryāya in Jainism. The notion of paryāya is peculiarly Jaina'. In conformity with the nature of substance as permanence in mutability, Paryāya alludes to the variable aspect of a thing which is due to the external and internal inducements. Every quality transmutes its state every moment, and this mode of being is called Paryāya which is incessantly transforming itself into the next, though the quality as such is never abrogated. It is on this account alleged that substance is in a state of perpetual flux. However incessant and infinite the transformations may be, the underlying substantiality and permanency can never part with existence. Substance and Paryāya are not to be distinguished like two different things, for it is substance through qualities which because of its flowing nature attains the qualification of Paryāyi. Substance and modes are neither exclusively identical nor exclusively different, but the relation is one of identity-indifference, which is in perfect harmony with the non-absolutistic attitude upheld by the Jaina. Thus origination and destruction are applicable to Paryāyas, and persistence to qualities along with substance. It may be pointed out here that Paryāya also refers to the mode of the existence of substance. Therefore, mode of existence and mutability constitute the meanings of Paryāya. As a matter of fact, mutability is incapable of transgressing the mode of existence and vice versa. Hence Paryaya refers to both the meanings at one and the same time. Thus there is no substance (Dravya) without modification, and modification is inconceivable without substance. According to Kundakunda, origination, destruction and continuance are in modifications and the latter are in substance. Therefore substance is the basis of these all'.
JAINA CONCEPTION OF PERSISTENCE AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GUNA AND PARYAYA: The Jaina conception of persistence is defined as that which accounts for recognition in the form of the proposition “This is the same. This is consequent on the fact that the essential nature of substance or quality, notwithstanding its mobility, is eternal and unchangeable. Thus the continuously flowing nature of quality does not annihilate the quality itself, which, if admitted, would fail to account for memory and in consequence run counter to all our daily commonplace transactions. Continuance devoid of variability stands 1 Prava. Introduction, p. LXVI.
2 Pañca. 12. 3 Prava. II. 9. Sarvärtha. V-31. 5 Ibid.

Page #41

METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF JAINA ETHICS
in direct antagonism to experience. Hence permanence is not the denial of change, but includes it as its necessary aspect. In the same way, qualities in the absence of modifications are incapable of being conceived. To distinguish Guṇa from Paryaya, in the first place, the infinite attributes of a simple and non-discrete substance are ever simultaneously present, but the inexhaustible modulations do not appear simultaneously, but only in succession. Secondly, qualities render the judgement of sameness possible, while the judgement 'This is not the same' is accountable only by making allusion to modifications. Thirdly, Gunas as such are to be interpreted as immutable in contrast to Paryayas which are regarded as mutable. In other words, attributes of a substance are credited with the nature of perpetuation, while the originative and decaying designations are accorded to Paryayas.
KINDS OF MODIFICATION: Paryayas may be classified into essential modifications and non-essential ones.1 The former imply pure modifications of a substance and the latter are indicative of the impure modifications of a substance. Vasunandi speaks of Paryayas as Arthaparyaya and Vyañjanaparyaya. The former refers to the continuously flowing nature of a substance3, while the latter signifies mode of existence of a substance. Both the implications are quite consistent with the twofold meanings of Paryaya as already mentioned. Each of these two kinds of Paryaya may be essential and non-essential. Thus Dharma, Adharma, Space and time possess only essential Arthaparyaya and essential Vyañjanaparyaya, while Jiva and Pudgala possess all the four types of Paryāyas, namely, essential Arthaparyaya and essential Vyañjanaparyaya, nonessential Arthaparyaya and non-essential Vyañjanaparyaya. The statement of Vasunandi and Devasena that the four substances, namely, Dharma, Adharma, Akāśa and Kala possess only Arthaparyaya and not Vyañjanaparyāya probably implies the presence of essential Arthaparyaya and essential Vyañjanaparyaya and the absence of non-essential Vyañjanaparyāya and non-essential Arthaparyaya in them. To illustrate the Paryayas of Jiva and Pudgala, the non-essential Vyañjanaparyāya of Jiva alludes to its transmigratory existence which is of four kinds: human, hellish, celestial and sub-human. The non-essential Arthaparyaya of Jiva refers to the impure psychical states which are continuous
Niyama. 14.
1 Aläpapaddhati, p. 20.; 3 Ibid.
5 Vasunandi Śrāva, 27.;

2 Vasunandi Śrāva, 25. 4 Vasunandi Śrāva, 25.
19
Aläpapaddhati, p. 27.

Page #42

20
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
ly taking place in the self in mundane form. The essential Vyañjanaparyāya of self is manifested in the disembodied state of existence and the essential Arthaparyāya signifies the flowing nature of pure states of self in the transcendental form. Similarly, Pudgala possesses these four kinds of Paryāya namely Skandha-form and the flowing nature in this form, Anu-form and the flowing nature in this form respectively.
SUBSTANCE AND EXISTENCE: Of the infinite characteristics pertaining to a substance, the most comprehensive is existence. It comprises all other characteristics within its purview. Judged from the standpoint of wholeness, substance, in a summary way, is existential in nature. It is thus obvious that substance is indubitable, self-evident, therefore, existent from all eternity. It is self-supported and complete in itself. Besides, it transcends our imperfect knowledge. In other words, it is unfathomable by our limited conceptions, since it has infinite characteristics. It is of capital importance to note that if the nature of substance is comprehended otherwise, i.e., if existence is not regarded as its essential characteristic, substance will be either non-existing or isolated from existence. In the former case, the conclusion will be the the total extinction of substance, and in the latter case, the ascription of existence as such will be purposeless, inasmuch as substance gets capability of possessing its essential nature independent of, and in isolation from, existence, hence the inevitable result will the annihilation of existence.* Apart from this, the denial of the existential nature of things would lead us to acknowledge the emergence of things either from non-existence or from other sources which in turn require others and so on endlessly.5 Hence substance and existence are indissolubly related like heat and fire, though they differ in nomenclature, number, characterisation etc. In other words, they have Anyatva (non-identity) and not Pţthaktva (separateness). The former implies that neither the nature of substance is identical with the nature of existence, nor the nature of existence is identical with the nature of substance. And the latter means that substance and existence are not separate in respect of Pradesa or space-points, just as two separate things possesss difference of Pradeśa or space-points. They have not difference of Pradesa (Prthaktva) but difference of
1 Pañcādhyāyi. I. 8.; Tasū. 29.; Prava. II. 6, 2 Pañcâdhyāyi. I. 8.; Prava. II. 6. 3 Pascadhyāyi. I. 8. 4 Prava. II. 13 and Comm. Amộta. 5 Pañcādhyāyī. I. 10, 11. 6 Prava. II. 14 and Comm. Amfta.

Page #43

METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF JAINA ETHICS
characterisation. To explain the difference of characterisation1 (Anyatva), existence requires substance as its support, is devoid of other qualities, is itself one adjective out of other infinite adjectival characterisations of substance, is constitutive of substance, and is of the nature of origination, destruction and continuance. On the contrary, substance is bereft of any substratum, is accompanied by other illimitable characteristics, is a substantive with countless adjuncts, and is the subject of origination, destruction and continuance.2 Thus if any legitimate concept is requisite to reveal the relation between the two, it is identity-in-difference. The former refers to Pradeśas and the latter, to characterisations. The relation is unique, primary and underived.
PRAMANA, NAYA, AND SYADVADA: After dwelling upon the ontological nature of reality as expounded by the Jaina philosophers, we now proceed to its source of knowledge and expression in brief. It may be contended that, if the Anekantic reality is indescribable altogether, the path of liberation will be blocked, as nobody will be able to preach and propound3. According to Jainism reality is cognised by Pramāņa and Naya. Pramāņa refers to the grasping of reality in its wholeness, while Naya points to an aspect of infinitely-phased reality illumined by Pramana, thus the latter takes into consideration only a fragment of the totality. A thing embellishes itself with illimitable characteristics." The emphasis on the one and the cancellation of the other would irresistibly lead us to the biased estimation and Ekantic view of reality, which would affect our ethical conclusions as we have elsewhere said.' Pramāņṇa assimilates all the characteristics at once without any contradiction and animosity between one characteristic and the other, for instance, between one and many, existent and non-existent etc. Of the unfathomable characteristics, Naya chooses one at one moment, but keeps in view the other characteristics also. We may point out here that, though corresponding to the countless characteristics, there are countless Nayas, which, if summed together, are incapable of imparting knowledge as is given by Pramana. In other words, the aggregation of all the Nayas for construing the notion of Pramāņa is inadequate. It is, therefore, to be admitted that the acquisition of knowledge by Pramana is an independent function
1 Ibid.
3 Yuktyanusāsana, 43.
5 Sarvärtha. 1-6.; Rājavā. I. 6/33.
7 Ibid. 27.
2A

2 Prava. Comm. Amṛta. II. 14.
4 Ta. su. I. 6.
6 Syādvādamañjarī, 22.
21

Page #44

22
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
of the human mind. We can thus say that both Pramāṇa and Naya are essential for the proper understanding of the nature of reality. Reality being the repository of infinite attributes, the apprehension of it from a particular angle of vision, i.e., Naya, which is objectively given and not subjectively contemplated, does not exhaust the whole of the multiphased reality. So, in order to avoid the possible misunderstanding that reality is exhausted by the employment of a particular Naya, every predication should be preceded by the word syāt in order to make us aware of the possibility of other alternative predications. Hence it is known as the doctrine of Syādvāda. Syādvāda is no doubt the logical outcome of Anekāntavāda, the doctrine of the multiple nature of reality. It is simply the mode of predication or communication envisaged by the Jaina to convey the knowledge of the multiphased reality. Thus Syādvāda is the mode of expression, Anekāntavāda or Nayavāda is the mode of cognition. Syādvāda is the expression of Anekāntavāda in language. We cannot do better than quote Prof. A. N. Upadhye for exposing the relation between Syādvāda and Nayavāda, “Syādvāda is a corollary of Nayavāda: the latter is analytical and primarily conceptual and the former is synthetical and mainly verbal. Syādvāda will certainly look lame in the absence of Naya doctrine. Naya doctrine without Syādvāda has no practical value. Syādvāda in course of the process of assertion curbs down and harmonises the absolute views of individual Nayas.1" Jaina philosophers unanimously hold that in order to apprehend an aspect of a whole in its completeness or to do full justice to it, only seven (neither more nor less) forms of judgement are requisite, hence it is known as the doctrine of Saptabhangi Vāda.
CLASSIFICATION OF SUBSTANCE: Jainism takes experience as its guide and resolves the whole of the universe of being into two everlasting, uncreated, co-existing, but independent categories of Jīva and Ajīva. The Ajīva is further classified into Pudgala (matter), Dharma (principle of motion), Adharma (principle of rest), Ākāśa (space) and Kāla (time). Hence reality is dualistic as well as pluralistic. But, according to the Jaina, plurality, considered from the synthetic and objective point of view of one existence, entails unity also. According to Kundakunda, in spite of the unique characteristics possessed by the different substances, existence has been regarded as an all-comprising characteristic of reality
I Prava. Intro. LXXXV.
2 Saptabhangitarangini, p. 8.

Page #45

METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF JAINA ETHICS
23
which ends all distinctions. The Kārttikeyānupreksā recognises that all substances are one from the stand-point of substance, while they are distinct and separate from their characteristic differences. Samantabhadra also endorses this view by affirming that in view of the conception of one universal existence all are one, but from the point of view of substances distinctions arise. Padmaprabha Maladhārideva pronounces that Mahāsattā pervades all the things in their entirety, but it is always associated with Avāntarasattā which pervades only the particular objects. In a similar vein, Amộtacandra speaks of the two types of Sattā, namely, Svarūpasattā and Sadraśyasattā. The latter is the same as Sāmānyasattā." In his Saptabhangītarangini Vimaladāsa discusses the problem of unity and plurality of existence in detail, and concludes that both the postulation of existential identity and the articulation of differences from the stand-point of different substances are logically necessary and justifiable. Thus Jainism gives credence to the recognition of existential oneness but not exclusively, since it is always bound up with plurality. This is quite consistent with the Anekāntātmaka view of reality propounded by the Jaina philosopher. The sole warrant for the existence of one and many, unity and diversity, is experience which vouches for such a character of reality. Thus, Mahăsattā will be associated with its opposite, namely, Avāntarasattā.? It may again be pointed out that this Mahāsattā is not an independent something as may be conceived, but is invariably accompanied by its opposite. Kundakunda holds the nature of existe one, immanent in the totality of substances constituting the universe, comprehending and summarizing the universe, having infinite modifications, indicative of the triple characteristics of origination, destruction, and persistence and in the last as associated with the characteristics opposite to those mentioned above. Hence unity, duality, and plurality-all are inseparably and inevitably involved in the structure of reality.
MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM AS THE Two EXTREMES: By recognising both Jīva and Pudgala as substances Jainism steers clear of the two extremes of materialism and idealism which are radically opposed to each other. Materialism considers the universe as rooted in matter,
1 Prava. Comm. Ampta. II-5. 3 Aptamina sẽ. 34. 5 Prava. Comm. Ampta. II, 3, 5. 7 Pañica. Comm. Amrta. 8. 9 Panca. 8.
2 Kartti. 236. 4 Niyama. Comm. Padmaprabha. 34. 6 Saptabhangitarangini. P. 78. 8 Pañcâdhyāyi. I. 15.

Page #46

24
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
while idealism imagines the mind or spirit to be fundamental and primary. The former lays stress on the recognition of the reality of matter and considers the mind to be an incident or accompaniment; the latter affirms that mind or spirit is to be reckoned as real and matter just an appearance. But according to Jainism, both matter and spirit are equally true, and either is warrantable if experience is allowed to be robbed of its significance.
GENERAL NATURE OF SUBSTANCES: Notwithstanding the mutual interpenetration of the six Dravyas and the accomodative nature of each, they never part with their original nature.1 This statement is indicative of the fact that these Dravyas are incapable of transgressing their fixed number which is six. Therefore their reducation or multiplication is an impossibility. With the solitary exception of Kāla Dravya, the remaining five are termed Pañcāstikāya for the simple reason of possessing many Pradeśas.3 The word 'Kaya' should be understood only to connote 'many' Pradeśas.* Jīva, Dharma, and Adharma own innumerable Pradeśas; Ākāśa possesses infinite ones; Kāla, one; but Pudgala possesses numerable, innumerable and infinite Pradeśas.5 All the Dravyas except Pudgala are regarded as bereft of material qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour, and only Jīva is said to possess consciousness. Hence Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa and Kāla, are destitute of consciousness, and also of material qualities. Thus they should not be misapprehended as being comprised under the category of matter, but they come under a different category of non-sentiency-cum-non-materiality. As for Dharma, Adharma and Akāśa, each of them is considered to be one, while Jiva and Pudgala are infinite; and Kāla is innumerable. Besides, Dharma, Adharma, Akāśa and Kāla are by nature non-active, and the remaining two are active."
6
NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF PUDGALA: Having discussed the general nature of six substances, we now proceed to deal with their specific nature. We start with Pudgala (matter). Matter, according to Jainism, is not something formless, indefinite, and absolutely featureless as conceived by Anaximander, nor is it to be regarded as non-being in the Platonic
1 Ibid. 7.
2 Sarvartha. V. 4.
3 Pañcă. Comm. Amṛta. 22; Pañcă. 102.; Prava. II. 43.; Niyama. 34. The space occupied by one atom is called a Pradeśa.
4 Sarvärtha. V. 1.
5 Dravya. 25,; Ta.su. V. 8, 9, 10.; Niyama. 35, 36. 7 Sarvartha. V. 7.; Pañcă. 98.
6 Gomma. Ji. 587.; Ta.su. V. 6.

Page #47

METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF JAINA ETHICS
25
sense; i.e., as "a secondary, a dull, irrational, recalcitrant force, the unwilling slave of mind”.Nor does it admit of its being considered to be a sensation-complex, or a collection of ideas as signified by the subjective idealism of Barkeley. Apart from this, it is to be distinguished from the Praksti of Sāmkhya. Jainism propounds matter in the realistic sense, and so its cognizance is based on its characteristic sense-qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour, which are in the realtion of invariable concomitance, i.e., one quality is never found in isolation but always, in a group of four, though in varying degrees of intensity. The conception of matter is so comprehensive as to comprise under it the five substances of earth, water, air, light and Dravya-mind out of the nine substances admitted by the Vaiseșika. Hence these five substances are easily assimilable in Pudgala, since they emerge out of material atoms by varying combinations. The aforementioned four qualities of atom admit of numerable, innumerable and infinite classifications, but the principal kinds are regarded as twenty; namely, eight kinds of touch (soft, hard, heavy, light, hot, cold, viscous, and rough,* five kinds of taste (bitter, pungent, sour, sweet, and astringent); two kinds of smell (fragrance and the reverse);& and five kinds of colour (blue, yellow, white, black and red).? The functions of Pudgala are: the five types of body, the speech, the mind, the Karmic particles, the breathing including exhailing and inhailing, pleasure and pain, life and death, and the five senses.
KINDS OF PUDGALA: The principal forms in which Pudgala (matter) exists, are Aņu (atom) and Skandha (aggregate).10 Binary to infinite aggregates are included in Skandha.11 An atom consists of only one Pradesa, is the terminus of divisibility of matter, is by itself without beginning, end or middle, is destitute of sound and is coupled with the qualiites of taste, touch, smell and colour.12 Besides, it is indestructible and eternal, is responsible for the disruption of Skandhas by virtue of its segregation from them, is also the substantial cause of them and is the measure of time. 13 Again it is devoid of sound, but is the cause of sound; i.e., the combination of atoms may produce sound when they strike against other
1 History of Philosophy (Edition 1949) p. 59. 2 Ta.su. V. 23,; Sarvärtha. V. 5. 3 Sarvārtha. V. 3. 4 Sarvārtha. V. 23. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Five types of body are: audārika (physical), vaikriyika (fluid), ahāraka (assimila
tive), taijasa (electric) and kārmaņa (karmic), see Ta, sū. II. 36. 9 Pañcā. 82,; Sarvārtha. V. 19, 20. 10 Ta. sū. V. 25,; Niyama. 20. 11 Sarvārtha. V. 26. 12 Pañcā. 77. 13 Pañcā. 80.

Page #48

26
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
aggregates of atoms.1 It possesses any one colour, any one taste, any one smell, but a pair of such touches as are not of contradictory nature; namely, cold and viscous, or cold and dry, or hot and viscous, or hot and dry. The remaining touches, namely, soft and hard, light and heavy, are only manifested in the Skandha state of matter, and thus are not present in its atomic state. The qualities of viscousness (snigdhata) and dryness (rūkṣatā) vary in degrees of intensity extending from the lowest limit to the highest, from one point to infinity. The variations in the degrees of intensity may be ordinarily witnessed in the milk of she-goat, cow, buffalo, and she-camel in point of viscousness, and in dust (pamsu), gross-sand (kanikā), and sand (sarkara) in respect of dryness.* Hence atoms are capable of existing with infinite variability in these two characteristics. These are responsible for atomic linking. Thus, for explaining the combination of atoms this assumption excludes God or Adṛṣṭa as recognised by the Nyaya-Vaiseṣika school of thought, as also the primordial motion of atoms as advocated by Democritus. Though, according to the Jaina, atoms are active, activity is not the cause of combination. It will not be amiss to say that those atoms which are at the lowest in the scale of viscousness and dryness are not given to combination either with one another or with other intensifications." Besides, atoms which have equal degrees of viscousness and dryness also refuse to combine with one another. But atoms which hold two degrees of viscousness and dryness in excess are given to interlinking; i. e., atoms with two degress of viscousness and dryness are interlinkable with four degrees of the same in all respects. Similarly, this law holds good for other interlinkings." Besides, atoms which possess four degrees of viscousness or dryness are capable of transforming atoms having two degrees of viscousness or dryness into their own nature. 10 Similarly, this holds good for all those atoms which have a difference of two degrees of viscousness or dryness. This theory thus avoids mere conjunction of atoms, but propounds their synthetic identification.11
We now proceed to Skandha. The aggregates of atoms exist in six different forms; namely, 1) gross-gross 2) gross 3) gross-fine 4) finegross 5) fine and lastly 6) fine-fine. 12 1) The class of matter which, when
1 Pañcă. 78, 79, 81. 3 Sarvārtha. V. 33. 4 Ibid. 33. 6 Pañcă. Comm. Amṛta. 98. 9 Ibid V. 36.
10 Ibid. V. 37.

2 Ibid. 81., Niyama. 27. Comm. Amṛta.
5 Gomma. Ji. 608.
7 Sarvärtha. V. 34. 11 Ibid. V. 37.
8 Ibid. V. 35. 12 Niyama. 21 to 24.

Page #49

METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF JAINA ETHICS
27
divided, cannot restore its original state without any extraneous help is termed gross-gross. The examples of which are wood, stone, and the like. 2) That which can be reunited on being divided without the intervention of a third something is called gross, for example, water, oil, etc. 3) Shadow, sunshine, etc. which are incapable of disintegration and grasp are subsumed under gross-fine. 4) The objects of touch, taste, smell and hearing are called fine-gross. 5) The Karmic matter etc. which are imperceptible by the senses are included into the category of fine. 6) The binary aggregates and the Skandhas smaller than the Karmic matter come under the next category of fine-fine. As we have said, the generation of sound is effected by the striking of Skandhas against one another. Thus Jainism takes exception to the view of Nyāya-Vaiseșika which calls sound the quality of Akāśa, inasmuch as it is capable of being sensed, which would not have been possible, had it been the quality of Akāśa.
Next comes the reality of Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa and Kāla. None of the philosophical systems originated in the east and the west postulated the independent existence of the principle of motion (Dharma) and the principle of rest (Adharma). Besides, the idealistic thinkers have unhesitatingly brushed aside the reality even of space and time, since they find themselves in the meshes of irreconcilable contradictions. Kant regarded them as the forms of perceptions, which are imposed by sens bility upon things. Hence on account of the glasses of space and time attached to sensibility, the noumenal reality escapes our grip and its attainment becomes a wild goose-chase. But the Jaina who relies upon the findings of experience absolves us from the creations of a priori logic by positing the reality of Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa and Kāla answering to the experienced motion, rest, allowance of room, and change respectively.
We shall now throw some light on the nature of motion. All the idealists are one in rejecting the reality of motion and in designating it as mere appearance, phenomenal, and unworthy of being intelligibly applied to thing-in-itself. The Eleatic philosopher Zeno was the first to raise a voice against the possibility of motion. But Jainism recognises the reality of motion. It is defined as the modification originating from the external and internal inducements, which make possible the traversing from one point of space to another. The substances like Dharma,
1 Sarvārtha. V. 7.; Pañcā. Comm. Amfta. 98.

Page #50

28
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
Adharma, Ākāśa and Kāla are non-active and motionless in this sense, but Jīva and Pudgala are said to be the authors of motion; that is, these two Dravyas are capable of being active to the exclusion of others. Activity is not a different, independent category, but a special modification of these two substances due to the external and internal causes. Besides, it should be distinguished from the Arthaparyāya, which means motionless change possessed by all the six Dravyas, as has already been explained. The activity of Jīva is due to the external causal agency of Karman. Thus Siddhas, who have reached liberation, are non-active on account of the absence of Karman.3 The activity of Pudgala is due to the external agency of Kāla. It will remain perpetual, since unlike Karmic particles Kāla can never be absent at any time. Thus the Pudgala unlike the Siddhas cannot be non-active.
ĀKĀSA: That extent of space which is replete with matter, souls, time, principle of motion, and principle of rest is labelled Lokākāśa or world space. This distinguishes it from Alokākāśa or empty space wherein none of the five substances abides. Thus the former is recognised as being capable of providing accommodation to Jīvas, Pudgala and to the rest of the Dravyas. That space is its own base and support, and does not call for any other substance to accommodate it is evident from the fact that there is no other substance of more vastness than this which may provide room to it. And even if it is conceded, it will implicitly lead us to the fallacy of regress ad infinitum. Besides, it is imperative to note that, considered from the point of view of the thing-in-itself, all substances exist in themselves. It is only said from the commonplace point of view that all substances are subsisting in space.? The principles of motion and rest are immanent in the entire physical space (Lokākāśa) like the permeation of oil in the seed. Despite the omnipresence of Dharma and Adharma in the Lokākāśa and the existence of Jīva, Pudgala, and Kāla therein, they never forfeit their respective specific nature.
DHARMA AND ADHARMA: Dharma and Adharma are the indifferent conditions of movement and rest respectively. Dharmāstikāya is itself incapable of migration and of generating motion in other things, but is
1 Sarvartha. V. 7.;
2 Räjava. V. 7/4, 2. 3 Pañcā. Comm. Amộta. 98.; Rajava V. 7/14 to 16. 4 Pañcā. Comm. Amfta. 98;
5 Dravya. 20.; Sarvärtha. V. 12, Panca 90, 91. 6 Rajavā. V. 12/2 to 4.
7 Rājarā. V. 12/5 to 6. 8 Sarvartha. V. 13.
9 Rājavā. V. 16/10.

Page #51

METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF JAINA ETHICS
29
the sine qua non of the movement of Jīvas and Pudgala by its mere existence, just as water assists in the spontaneous movement of fish by its mere presence and not as the wind which has the capablity to develop activity in certain things. Similarly, Adharmāstikāya does not persuade Jiva and Pudgala in motion to stand still, but becomes the passive condition when they of their own accord discontinue to move, just as the shadow of a tree does not persuade a traveller to take rest under it. Thus neither Dharmāstikāya originates motion, nor Adharmāstikāya stops it. Both of them are non-active conditions. Besides, these two principles are also responsible for the demarcation of Lokākāśa and Alokākāśa, inasmuch as they make possible the existence of Jīva and Pudgala only in Lokākāśa. Besides, the residence of the Siddhas at the summit of the world also proves that space cannot account for motion and rest and the different principles like Dharma and Adharma must needs be assumed.
KĀLA: We have frequently made reference to the underlying assumption of the whole Jaina philosophy that, though reality is incessantly subject to mutation, it sustains its identical character. Thus everyone of the substances without exception is credited with origination, destruction and persistence. In the substances like Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa, liberated soul and an atom of matter, the qualities are continuously changing in themselves. The experience of change, however, in the mundane soul and in the gross matter is omnipresent and this is of necessity to be accounted for and should not be speculatively condemned as mere illusion. In view of this, the Jainas realistically confer an existential status on 'time', and calls it substance to answer for the experienced change, just as Dharma, Adharma and Akāśa are calculated to throw light on what may be called motion, rest and the providing of room.? Kant's statement is worthy to be noted when he affirms that it is impossible to emancipate ourselves from the spatial and temporal ways of thinking and speaking despite our best endeavours; but the Jaina, though honouring his thesis, refuses to acquiesce in the fact that space and time are contributed by sensibility, since according to him they are revealed in experience and are objectively ontologically true. Just as space is its own support, so real time is conceived to be assisting its own change or modification
1 Pañca. 85, 88. and Comm. Amộta. 2 Ibid 86. 3 Pañcā. 87.
4 Ibid. 92, 93 and Comm. Amfta. 5 Prava. Comm. Ampta. II. 1.
6 Niyama. 33. 7 Niyama. 30.

Page #52

30
.
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
along with its being the condition of change in other substances constituting the universe. Kāla may be classified into real time (Parmārtha Kāla) and conditioned time (Vyavahāra Kāla). The former is the substance proper;2 and Samaya, Avalī are conditioned varieties of time. The function of Parmārtha Kāla is Vartanā; i.e., it passively helps the selfchanging substances; and the functions of conditioned time are change, motion and the feeling of one's being young and old.* As has already been pointed out, Kāla Dravya is deprived of the designation, 'Kāya', inasmuch as it has only one Pradeśa in the form of Kāla Aņu. These Kāla aņus are innumerable, and exist separately on each Pradeśa of Lokākāśa without being mixed with one another. The unit of conditioned time is called 'Samaya', which may be defined as the period required by the primary material atom to traverse with slow pace from one Pradeśa of Ākāśa to the immediately next. It is practically inconceivable in life. It should be borne in mind that innumerable 'S lapse in the opening of an eyelid.
GENERAL NATURE OF JIVA (SELF): The problem of self is the most. fundamental problem in the domain of philosophy. Since the dawn of philosophical speculation down to the present time, it has vexed, great philosophers and led them to formulate different conceptions consistent with the metaphysical outlook upheld by them. With Jainism though the probing into the nature of self is not a new enterprise, the special point of the Jaina view consists in substantiating the notion of self without blinking the loftiest mystical heights on the one hand and without condemning the unabstracted experience as sheer illusion on the other. The self, as an ontologically underived fact, is one of the six substances subsisting independently of anything else. The experiedce of knowing?, feeling and willinge immediately proves the existence of self. The Karttikeyānuprekşā recognises that the self is to be regarded as possessing supreme significance among the substances and as having the highest value among the Tattvas. 10 It is the repository of excellent characteristics. 11 It is the internal Tattva. It is to be distinguished from the other substances which are merely external since they are without any knowledge of things to be renounced and accepted. 12 Kundakunda in the Pravacanasara calls it Mahārtha (a great objectivity).18 It is neither merely an immutable prin
1 Sarvärtha. V. 22. 2 Ta.sū. V. 39. 3 Niyama. 31. Sarvärtha. V-22. 5 Dravya 22.; Niyama. 32. Prava. II. 47. Ācārānga. I. 5.5, p. 50. 8 Kürtti. 183. 9 Ibid. 184. 10 Kārtti. 204. 11 Ibid. 12 Kārtti. 205. 13 Prava. II. 100.

Page #53

METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF JAINA ETHICS
31
ciple as advocated by the Vedānta, the Sāmkhya-Yoga, and the NyāyaVaiseșika, nor merely a momentarily transmutable series of psychical states as recognised by the Buddhist. But, according to the Jaina, it is a synthesis of permanence and change. Consciousness, according to him,
essential and distinguishing feature. The Jaina, therefore, differs from the Nyāya-Vaiseșika and the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā which regard consciousness as an adventitious attribute, as also from the Cārvāka system which envisages consciousness as an epiphenomenon of matter, something like the inebriating power emerged from the mixing of certain ingredients. The systems of thought like the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and the Vedānta of Samkara and Ramānuja betray a fair resemblance to the consideration of the Jaina that consciousness is intrinsically associated with the sell
In the Jaina writings we are confronted with the conception of self as variously dealt with. We may comprise these various ways under two objective points of view. First, there is the transcendental view which represents the nature of self in its unadulterated state of existence; and secondly, there is the empirical view which describes the nature of self in its corrupted form. At present, we propose to discuss the nature of self from the empirical stand-point. We postpone the discussion from the transcendental view to a later stage.
NATURE OF EMPIRICAL SELF: First, the empirical self has been in a state of transmigration since an indeterminable past. It is on this account contended that the self originates and decays. But this is valid only from the Paryāyārthika point of view and not from the Dravyārthika one, which lays down indestructibility and unproductivity of the self. Secondly, as we have said, the empirical self is in possession of non-essential Vyañjanaparyāya and non-essential Arthaparyāya. It illumines the whole body by pervading in it, just as the lotus-hued ruby illumines a cup of milk. Thirdly, the empirical self is considered by the Jaina as the doer of evil and good actions. Fourthly, it is also the enjoyer. To sum up, the empirical self is bound by Karmas from an indefinite past, is the enjoyer of the self-performed good and bad actions, is the knower and the seer, and is associated with the triple nature of origination, destruction and continuance. Besides, it possesses the narrowing and dilating characteristics, extends up to the limit of bodily dimensions and owns its specific characteristics of knowledge, bliss etc. It may be noted here that
1 Prava. Il-20, 22.; Pañca. 17, 18. and Comm. Jayasena. 2 Pañcā. 33. 3 Siddha-Bhakti. 2.

Page #54

32
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
Jainism recognises the metaphysical reality of infinite selves. We may point out in passing that the relation between the empirical self and the transcendental one is one of identity-cum-difference; i.e., there is metaphysical identity between the two states (empirical and superempirical) of the same self, but the difference is also undeniable in respect of the Upādhis which have been persisting since an infinite past. The empirical self is potentially transcendental, though this noumenal state of existence is not actualised at present; hence the distinction is incontrovertible.
KINDS OF EMPIRICAL SELF, ONE-SENSED EMPIRICAL SELVES: The empirical self is recognised by the Prāņas which it owns. The minimum number of Prāṇas possessed by the empirical self is four (one sense, one Bala, life-limit and breathing), and the maximum number is ten (five senses, three Balas, life-limit, and breathing). However encumbered with the cruel matter a self may be, it cannot obstruct the manifestation of consciousness to the full, just as even the most dense cloud cannot interrupt the light of the sun to its farthest extreme. The lowest in the grade of existence are the one-sensed Jivas. They possess four Prāṇas. To make. it clear, of the five senses, namely, the sense of touch, taste, smell, colour and sound, the one-sensed Jīvas possess only the sense of touch; and of the three Balas, namely, the Bala of mind, body and speech, they have only the Bala of body, and besides they hold life-limit and breathing. These one-sensed Jīvas admit of five-fold classification; namely, the earth-bodied, water-bodied, fire-bodied, air-bodied and, lastly, vegetablebodied souls. The recognition of these one-sensed souls is fraught with great difficulty, since the four Prāņas are not explicitly manifested, just as the Prāṇas of a man in the state of numbness, or just as the Prāṇas of a growing soul in the egg of a bird or in the embryonic state cannot be recognised owing to the lack of their explicit manifestation.
TWO-SENSED TO FIVE-SENSED EMPIRICAL SOULS: Having pointed out the various forms of existence of the one-sensed Jīvas and the number of Prāņas upheld by them, we now proceed to the higher grades of existence. The two-sensed Jīvas possess six Prāņas, i.e., in addition to the four Prāṇas of one-sensed souls, they have two Prāṇas more; namely, the sense of taste, and the Bala of speech; the three sensed souls have the sense of smell additionally; the four-sensed souls have the sense of
1 Pañca. 30, Prava. II. 54, 55 and Comm. Ampta. 2 Pañcā 110.; Sarvartha. II-13. 3 Panca. 113.

Page #55

11. METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF JAINA ETHICS
33
colour besides the above; and lastly, the five-sensed souls which ar less are endowed with the sense of hearing in addition, and those with mind possess all the ten Prānas. Thus the numbers of Prāṇas possessed by one-sensed to five-sensed souls are four, six, seven, eight, nine and ten respectively. The illustrations of the two-sensed souls are sea-snail, cowrie-shell-fish, conch-shell-fish, earth-worm etc. ;2 of the three-sensed souls are louce, bug, ant, etc.; of the four-sensed souls are gadfly, mosquito, fly, bee, beetle, dragon fly and butter fly;t of the five -sensed souls with ten Prānas are celestial, hellish and human beings and some subhuman souls;5 and of the five-sensed souls with nine Prāņas are only some sub-human souls. All the diverse mundane souls right up to foursensed ones are designated as non-rational or mindless (Asamjñi), whereas the five-sensed sub-human beings may be rational or non-rational, but the celestial, hellish and human beings are necessarily rational.? The rational souls may be recognised by the capability of being preached, of receiving instruction, and of voluntary action.S
Having dealt with the nature and kinds of the empirical self, we now proceed to discuss the nature of the ethical ideal, the Summum Bonum of hurnan life. This will also make clear the nature of the transcendental self. Just as the validity of the existence of self is incapable of being impugned, so the existence of the highest good is unquestionable. The empirical souls from the one-sensed to the four-sensed, as also some subhuman five-sensed ones are impotent to reflect on their own good in that state of existence. They are not endowed with that type of understanding which may assist them in absolving themselves from the thraldom of Karman. Such being the overwhelming effect of Karman, their progress to the higher grades of existence is decided by 'time'. But the human souls, being possessed of mind, can ponder over the objective to be aimed at for their beneficence and can achieve the highest good. The possibility of the realisation of the supreme good is the possibility of a free, sacred, immortal, human life, which ends the transmigratory existence and its attendant evils. The Tīrthamkaras are the concrete examples of such achievement.
1 Sarvārtha. II-14. 2 Pañcā. 114. 3 Ibid. 115. Ibid. 116. 5 Pañca. 117 and Comm. Amrta.
Ibid. (In all these references from 2 to 6 vide Chakravarti's translation of Pañcīsti• kaya.)
7 Pañcā. Comm. Amfta. 117. 8 Gomma. Ji. 660.

Page #56

ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
In the ethico-religio-philosophical works of the Jainas the highest good is diversely formulated. Fed up with the kaleidoscopic transformations of the world, the Jaina Ācāryas have dived deep into the inner hidden regions of the spirit, and have expressed the highest good in different ways. But it may be noted here that all the formulations of the highest good convey identical meaning.
LIBERATION SYNCHRONOUS WITH THE DESTRUCTION OF KARMAS AS THE ETHICAL IDEAL: First, the deliverance of self is deemed to be the highest good. Every human being ought to render strenuous efforts to seek his own salvation from the miseries of the world. All the systems of Indian philosophy with the solitary exception of Cārvāka acquiesce in recognising liberation as the ethical ideal, though they differ in the nature of realisation. From the view point of the Jaina, it is not the identification of self with the Brahman, as contemplated by the Vedāntin, but it is the attainment of Siddhahood, wherein self-individuation is sustained. The Sūtrakrtānga tells us that liberation is the best thing, just as the moon is the best among the stars. The Ācārānga pronounces that liberation is achieved by a man who does not feel disinterested in Self-denial. Just as fire immediately burns the dry sticks, so the self established in itself forthwith annuls the filth of Karmas. In the state of final liberation the empirical self is metamorphosed into transcendental, permanent existence. Again, having totally annihilated the eight types of Karman, and having experienced the supersensuous bliss that passes understanding, the empirical self becomes completely bereft of any collyrium that may again cause bondage, and as such abides at the summit of the world without having abandoned anything to be accomplished."
PARAMĀTMAN AS THE SUMMUM BONUM: Secondly, the ideal is also described as the attainment of Paramātman after one's passing through the state of Antarātman and renouncing the state of Bahirātman. These three states of the same self may very well be compared with the three types of attitudes as recognised by Dr. CAIRD: "Man looks outward before he looks inward, and he looks inward before he looks upward”.?
1 Sūtra. Kr. I. 11, 22. 2 Acarā. 1, 2, 2, p. 17. 3 Acarā, 1, 4, 3, p. 39. 4 Gomma. Ji. 68. 5 Ibid. Mo. Pā. 7. 7 Evolution of Religion, II. 2. (vide, Constructive Survey of Upanişadic Philosophy, p. 247.)

Page #57

II. METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF JAINA ETHICS
The Bahiratman sees outward; when it becomes Antarātman, it sees inward; and when it becomes Paramātman, it is said to see upward. Thus the realisation of the Paramātman amounts to the realisation of the highest good. Kundakunda, Yogindu and Pujyapada, the great proponents of the Jaina thought, converge on this point. They frequently speak of the realisation of Paramātman as the highest good. Here a word of caution is necessary. The words Paramātman and Brahman are synonymously used in the Jaina philosophical texts, but they should not be confused with the Upanisadic Brahman which is the cosmic principle. The Jaina gives credence to the existence of infinite Brahmans, i.e., Paramātmans which are the consummatory stages of spiritual evolution of the individuals existent in their own right. Soul and God, according to Jainism, are identical, inasmuch as they are the two stages of the same entity. Thus every soul is potentially divine, and the manifestation of divinity is called Paramatmanhood. If this connotation implicit in the Jaina view of Paramātman is not conceded, that would constitute a virtual abandonment of the ontological pluralism of selves which it champions. Though Brahman of the Upanisads and Brahman of the Jainas exhibit many resemblances, yet they differ enormously. In laying stress on this conception of Paramatman as the Summum Bonum, the goal of all human pursuance, we are committed to the view that the religious ideal and the ethical ideal coalesce. The spiritual values and the ethical values are identical.

35
NISCAYA NAYA AS THE ETHICAL IDEAL: TRANSCENDENTAL EXPERIENCE TRANSCENDS THE CONCEPTUAL POINTS OF VIEW WHETHER NISCAYA OR VYAVAHARA: Thirdly, we encounter a different mode of expressing the ethical ideal. The Jainas in order to expound this speak in the language of Nayas. Kundakunda, the outstanding ethico-religious philosopher of the first century A.D., is conspicuous for using Niścaya Naya (Transcendental view) and Vyavahāra Naya (Empirical view) as the language of spiritualism to make out the ethical ideal. The Niścaya Naya which grasps the soul in its undefiled state of existence may very well serve as the ethical ideal to be achieved in contradistinction to the Vyavahāra Naya which describes the self as bound, impure, and the like. No doubt, we are in the corrupt form of existence from beginningless past, but the Niścaya Naya reminds us of our spiritual magnificence and glory. It prompts the sullied self to behold its spiritual heritage. It endeavours to infuse and instil into our minds the imperativeness

Page #58

36
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
of Suddha Bhāvas after abundantly showing us the empirical and evanescent character of Subha and Aśubha Bhāvas that bind the soul to mundane existence. It does not assert that the soul is at present perfect but simply affirms that the self ought to attain the height illumined by it. It has the force of 'ought' and not of 'is', but this force is valid for empirical selves. In the opening chapter of the Samayasāra Kundakunda summarises the implication of the aforementioned two Nayas by saying that every self has heard about, observed and experienced the worldly enjoyments and consequential bondage, but the nature of the highest self has never been comprehended. Hence the former is Vyavahāranaya, while the latter is called Niscayanaya, which points to the potentiality of the empirical self to become pure and enjoy its unalloyed status." It is therefore averred that when the self has elevated itself to the domain of spiritual experience, the Vyavahāra Naya becomes false and the Niscaya Naya is seen to be genuine. In other words, we achieve the right to renounce the Vyavahāra Naya only when we have accomplished the loftiest height of mystical experience. If we regard the Vyavahāra Naya as untruthful at a low stage, Punya, Pāpa, bondage, and the necessity to do strenuous effort to achieve liberation would be of no avail. It may be noted here that the falsity of the Vyavahāra Naya affects neither the existence of external objects nor the omniscience of the transcendental self which reflects the differences of the world as they are. In explaining the nature of the ethical ideal in terms of Naya, Kundakunda advances a step further, and affirms that the transcendental experience surpasses all the conceptual points of view whether Niscaya or Vyavahāra. The former represents the self as unbound and untouched by Karmas, while the latter, as bound and touched by them, but he who transcends these verbal points of view is called Samayasāra, the goal to be achieved. The self becomes pure consciousness, bliss and knowledge.
It may be noted here that like the Paramārtha and Vyavahāra Nayas enunciated by Kundakunda, Samkarācārya, the great exponent of the Advaita doctrine, makes use of the Pāramārthika and Vyāvahārika view-points as the corner stones of his philosophy. But the two widely. The Pāramărthika view as advocated by Samkara negates the Pāramārthika existence of other material and non-material objects of the world which, in the view of the Jaina, have their own independent
1 Samaya. 4.
2 Samaya. 144.
3 Ibid. 141, 142.

Page #59

-
II. METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF JAINA ETHICS
37
existence. The Vyavahāra Naya of the Jainas simply points to our slumbering state in the domain of spiritualism, and does not in the least touch the existential aspects of things. The Niscaya or Paramārtha Naya simply serves to awaken the slumbering soul to attain its spiritual heritage. It does not pretend to annual the external things by mere spiritual outlook.
SVASAMAYA AS THE TRANSCENDENT OBJECTIVE: Fourthly, there is witnessed a different expression of the Summum Bonum. 'Svasamaya' is the sublime ideal to be aimed at; it is the transcendent objective to be achieved. That self which is absorbed in the mundane modifications referring to the four kinds of transmigratory existence, and which does not believe that the substance is self-evident and self-existent is 'Parasamaya'; and that which is self-established is 'Svasamaya'.1 The interminable stay of the self in Darsana (Intuition), Jñāna (Knowledge), and Caritra (Conduct) also explains the implication of the term Svasamaya, which may be discriminated from Para-samaya wherein the self identifies itself with the body and the foreign psychical states of attachment and aversion and the like?. In other words, Sva-samaya is the non-conceptual state of existence, the state in which all differentiations caused by the infinite characteristics disappear. It is the Advaita state of existence. The Tattvānusāsana elucidates advaita by pointing out that the recognition of the soul as associated with something other is duality; while non-duality is realised by those who see their own self quite unattached to anything whatsoever. But this Advaita of Jainism should be trenchantly distinguished from the Advaita of Vedānta, wherein everything disappears except the Brahman. The contention of the Jaina is that the existence of other substances is incapable of counteracting the mystical experience of the self; only the self must not experience conceptual duality or the plurality of infinite characteristics inherent in it. The self submerges in itself after transcending all conceptual differences of infinite attributes in the domain of the spirit. It is an experiential, intuitive, mystical state; and so escapes and eludes our conceptual discussions. Thus Jainism has arrived at the conception of Advaita, though not of the Vedāntic type, by proceeding from a different side and acknowledging a different conception of reality.
SUDDHA UPAYOGA AS THE GOAL: Fifthly, the attainment of Suddho· payoga is the goal of human pursuance. Therein the self synchronically
1 Prava. II. 2, 6: 2 Samaya. 2. 3Tattvānušāsana, 177.

Page #60

38
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
realises omniscience and happiness which are its cognitive and affective potencies respectively. We have seen that consciousness is the discriminative characteristic of the soul. It manifests itself in Upayoga, which follows from consciousness as the conclusion from premises. The Upayoga is of three kinds, namely, Subha (auspicious), Aśubha (inauspicious) and Suddha (pure). The self is said to possess auspicious Upayoga when it is absorbed in the performance of meritorious deeds of moral and spiritual nature. Hence the self acquires celestial births which, it may be noted, are also a part and parcel of worldly career. Besides, when the self entangles itself in demeritorious actions of violence, sensual pleasure, and the like, it is said to possess inauspicious Upayoga. Hence the self is led to the sub-human and hellish births. Both these auspicious and inauspicious Upayogas result on account of the Karmic Upādhis, and these Upayogas will again continue to captivate the self in the never-ending wheel of misery. Consequently, the attainment of these two Upayogas can never function as the Summum Bonum of human life. The Jaina, therefore, makes an explicit pronouncement that so long as the self is mated with these two types of Upayoga, it will be unfruitfully dissipating its energies in pursuit of vain mirages; and so the highest good will ever remain shrouded in mystery. But as soon as the self parts company with these auspicious and inauspicious Upayogas, it joins hands with Suddha Upayoga. In other words, the experience of Suddha Upayoga automatically obliges the Aśuddha Upayoga (Subha and Asubha) to disappear, with the consequence that the transmigratory character of the self evaporates in totality. Spiritually considering, we may say that both the impure Upayogas in the form of virtue and vice prevent the soul from attaining to the loftiest mystical heights, hence they should be equally condemned as unwholesome for the healthiest development of the spirit. But if the empirical self finds that it is difficult to rise to mystical heights, it should perform auspicious activities so as to achieve at least heavenly happiness but with the clear knowledge that these performances however intensely and ceaselessly conducted will in no way enable it to relish the pure Upayoga. The inauspicious activities should by all means be disapprobated, inasmuch as they will bring about thousands of heart-rending miseries. The pure consciousness which relinquishes the impure Upayogas associated with the empirical consciousness realises omniscience and such happiness as is transcendental, born of the self, supersensuous, incomparable, infinite

Page #61

II. METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF JAINA ETHICS
and indestructible.1 This transcendental self as the transcendental ideal may also be designated as 'Svayambhu'2 To make it clear, it is a state of self-sufficiency which requires no other foreign assistance to sustain itself. It is itself the subject, the object, the means for its achievement, it achieves for itself, destroys the extraneous elements, and is the support of its infinite potencies. Hence the self manifests its original nature by transforming itself into six cases; it is at once the nominative, the accusative, the instrumental, the dative, the ablative, and the locative case respectively. The whole of our discussion may be summarised by saying that the ideal consists in the full manifestation of the cognitive, affective and conative potencies inherent in the soul. We have so far dwelt upon the former two, and now we shall turn to the last in brief.
AGENCY OF PURE BHAVAS AS THE IDEAL: Sixthly, the ideal may be expressed in terms of activity. Kundakunda, the prominent exponent of Jaina spiritualism, has bequeathed to us the philosophy of the doer and the deed. He proclaims that in whatever deeds the self may get itself engaged in the world, they are not the representatives of the self in its pure, undefiled and transcendental nature. The self in its real nature is not the doer of material-Karmas, it is the doer of its own pure states. Even the empirical self is not the doer of material Karmas; it is simply the doer of impure dispositions (Aśuddha Bhavas), by which the material particles transform themselves into various Karmas. No substance is capable of doing a thing foreign to its nature. And since these impure dispositions do not pertain to the self in its original nature and are the results of Karmic association, the transcendental self is denied the agency even of these impure dispositions. The denial of the authorship of material Karmas, nay, even of auspicious and inauspicious psychical states points to the supermundane, uncontaminated state of the self. There is no denying the fact that the empirical self has been the doer of impure dispositions since an indeterminable past; so it is the author of these dispositions. If this is not granted, it will make the position of the Jaina indistinguishable from the position of the Samkhya which imputes all actions to the material Buddhi, and regards the principle of consciousness as immutable. When the Jaina says that the empirical self is not the agent of impure dispositions, he simply pursuades the
1 Prava. I. 19, 13.; Siddha Bhakti. 7.
2 Prava. I. 16. 3 Prava. Comm. Amṛta. I-16.

39

Page #62

40
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
empirical self to look behind the Karmic veil. Hence here the chief point of reference is the self in its pure nature. The Jaina reads no contradiction in affirming that the enlightened self which has become familiar with its true nature manifests the pure modes and thereby becomes the substantial agent of those modes, and in affirming that the ignorant self because of its erroneous identification with the alien nature develops impure dispositions, and thereby it is called their agent. Just as from gold only golden things can be produced, and from iron only iron things, so the enlightened self produces pure modifications and the ignorant self produces impure ones. When the ignorant self becomes enlightened, it starts generating pure modifications without any discongruity. Thus the self is simply the doer of its own states and not the doer of anything else whatsoever. The empirical self is the author of impure psychic states on account of its association with the Karmas. But if we advance a step further and reflect transcendentally, we arrive at the inevitable conclusion that the pure self cannot be the author of these impure psychical states because they are foreign to its nature. Thus the transcendental self is the doer of transcendental Bhāvas. Besides it is also their enjoyer. Consequently it may be asserted that the manifestation of conative potencies is the manifestation of the genuine nature of self, which is the same as the realisation of the ideal.
REALISATION OF SVARŪPASATTĀ AS THE TERMINUS OF SELF-DEVELOPMENT: Seventhly, the ethical ideal may also be expressed in metaphysical terms. The realisation of the self's Svarūpasattā, or the manifestation of intrinsic characteristics and modifications of the self, or the expression of the self's original origination, destruction and continuance is the ethical ideal. No doubt, the self is existent, but its existence is mundane and corrupt from the beginningless past. The self is not to acquire existence, but what is to be acquired is simply the purity of existence. Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa and Kāla are the pure existents. Pudgala in the Aņu form is pure and in the Skandha form is impure, but the self exists in the defiled state of existence. It is, in the empirical state, characterising itself with impure modifications and qualities, and consequently impure origination, destruction and continuance originate. By its own strenuous efforts transcendental modifications and qualities, and pure origination, destruction and continuance are to be revealed. In this
1 Samaya. 128, 129.
2 Ibid. 130, 131.

Page #63

II. METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF JAINA ETHICS
41
state alone, the self realises its true substantiality. This again is the same as the Siddha state, Paramātmanhood, disembodied liberation, SvaSamaya etc.; hence the metaphysical ideal, the ethical ideal and the religious ideal are perfectly identical. LAPANDITA-PANDITA MARANA AS THE ETHICAL SUMMUM BONUM:
Eighthly, the Jainas also proclaim the ideal in terms of death in order to reveal the nature of the ethical Summum Bonum. According to them the goal of the aspirant's one-pointed endeavour ought to be the attainment of the Pandita-Pandita Marana (sublime death) to the utter exclusion of the Pandita Marana, the Bāla-Pandita Marana, the Bāla Marana and the Bāla-Bäla Marana. These five types of death have been enumerated by keeping in view the different stages of spiritual advancement. The lowest and the most detestable kind of death (Bāla-Bāla Marana) occurs to that man who leads the life of utter perversion. The highest sort of demise (Pandita-Pandita Marana) is exemplified in the consummate lives of embodied omniscient beings when they part with their body. Those souls which have crowned themselves with spiritual conversion, but have remained incapable of observing partial vows in their life-time succumb to Bāla-Marana. This is to be distinguished from the Bāla-Pandita Maranae which is the destiny of those who give themselves to partial vows after being spiritually converted. The saints observing complete vows enjoy Pandita Maraņa.? All these types of death except the Pandita-Pandita Marana are pregnant with the future possibility of birth; hence they may be designated as empirical deaths. And these are required to be distinguished from the death of the transcendent type or the Pandit-Pandita Marana wherein the mundane life is cast aside. Thus this latter type of departure is of the happiest kind, and consequently it requires our paramount devotedness. This sort of soul's release from bodily confinement appears before us as an illustration of challenge to death. Here the inevitability of death has been properly met with.
AHISĀ AS THE GOAL: Ninthly, the ethical highest good also finds its expression in the realisation of perfect Ahimsā. Ahimsā is so central in Jainism that it may be incontrovertibly called the beginning
1 Bhaga. Ārā. 26. 2 We shall deal with the stages of spiritual advancement in the sixth chapter. 3 Ibid. 30. * Bhaga. Arā. 27. 5 Ibid. 30. Ibid. 2078. 7 Ibid. 29.

Page #64

42
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
and the end of Jaina religion. The statement of Samantabhadra that Ahimsa of all living beings is equivalent to the realisation of Parama Brahma sheds light on the paramount character of Ahimsa.1 The whole of the Jaina Acara is a derivation of this principle. All sins are the illustrations of Himsa. The Sutrakṛtānga exhorts us to regard Ahimsa as the quintessence of wisdom. Since Nirvana is not other than Ahimsa, one should cease to injure all living beings. The Acārānga pronounces that one should neither deprive any living being of life, nor rule over him, nor torment him, nor excite him. This is tantamount to saying that Ahimsa is the pure and eternal Dharma.5 All living beings from the one-sensed to the five-sensed are basically like our own self. Hence it is not justifiable to injure them, to rule over them, and to torment them." All this is from the Vyavahāra point of view. The Niścaya view tells us that the Atman which is Apramatta is Ahimsa and the Atman which is Pramatta is Himsā.8 Amṛtacandra holds that the appearance of any sort of passion on the surface of self is Himsā, and the self in its pure form is Ahimsa." The perfect and the absolute Ahimsa is possible only in mystical realisation, which is further identified with the terminus of all ethical endeavours.
7
KNOWLEDGE-CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE END: Lastly, the attainment of knowledge-consciousness (Jñāna Cetana) ought to be the end of aspirant's endeavours in contrast to action-consciousness (Karma. Cetana) and result-consciousness (Karmaphala Cetana).10 The attribution of consciousness to the auspicious and inauspicious psychical states occasioned by Karmas is called action-consciousness; and the confusion of consciousness with enjoyment of the duality of pleasure and pain is termed result-consciousness.11 These two types of consciousness are the results of the misunderstanding regarding the inherent nature of things. Hence they need be abjured in the interest of ascending the supra-ethical plane of life. The five types of onesensed souls are the illustrations of holding result-consciousness; the two-sensed to five-sensed souls exemplify those having predominantly action-consciousness; and the souls devoid of ten Prāņas experience
1 Svayambhu. 117. 2 Sutra. Kr. 1.1.4.10.; 1.11.10. 3 Sutra. Kr. 1.11.11. 4 Acara. 1.4.1. p. 36. 5 Ibid. 6 Daśavaikā. X. 5. 8 Haribhadra, Aṣṭaka. 7 (vide. Muni Nathamal: Ahimsa Tattva Darśana. p. 4.)
7 Acara. 1.5.5. p. 50.
9 Puru. 44.
10 Pañcă. 38.; Prava. II.31. 11 Prava. II.32.

Page #65

III. SAMYAGDARSANA AND THE SEVEN TATTVAS
43
knowledge-consciousness. Thus knowledge-consciousness is the fullfledged and legitimate manifestation of consciousness. The Arhat or Siddha state is the state of knowledge-consciousness, the state of omniscience and bliss.
PROGRESSIVE REALISATION OF THE END: We shall end this chapter by saying that the ideal is realised progressively. The first step consists in the development of the firm conviction as to the distinctness of the self and body. In other words, the resolute belief convinces the
spirant that he is essentially the pure self as absolutely different from the bodily or sensuous vesture and the dual psychical states. In the second step, after the emergence of right belief and right knowledge, he proceeds to wipe out the obstructive elements to the full which hamper the realisation of the pure self. The third step follows as a logical consequence of the second; namely, the pure self is realised and not only believed as different from the not-self. Thus, the achievement of right belief, right knowledge and right conduct is the same as the realisation of thé Ātman, 3 which is regarded summarily as the ethical
um Bonum. The next chapter will be devoted to the exposition of the nature of the first step. The rest of the steps of experience will be dealt with in the fourth, fifth and sixth chapters respectively.
CHAPTER III
Samyagdarsana and the Seven Tattvas
SHORT RETROSPECT: We have devoted our previous chapter, in the first place, to the exposition of the Jaina view of reality in general, and have endeavoured to expound how the ontological nature of beings is in accord with experience. Secondly, we have shown that Pramāņa, Naya and Anekāntavāda are the epistemological counterparts of the Noumenal reality, and that Syādvāda is the vehicle of expression and communication of the ontological nature of things. Thirdly, we have dealt with the nature of the six kinds of substances with special atten- : tion to the nature of the self. Lastly, we have indicated the various expressions of the ethical ideal, and have endeavoured to point out that they convey identical meaning.
1 Pañca. 39. and Comm. Ainta. 2 Pañcā. Comm. Amfta. 38. 3 Dravya. 40.

Page #66

44
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
MITHYĀTVA AS THE GREAT OBSTACLE TO THE HIGHEST REALISATION: We have seen that the ultimate goal of the spiritual aspirant is the achievement of the perfect state of existence. The ideal is not something situated in a distant land, but it consists in the realisation of the transcendental nature of one's own self. It is the self in its veritable, and ontological nature. We may pose a simple question: how can an innate nature of a thing be remote from it? Or how can the original qualities and modifications of a substance exist apart from the substance even for a moment? The answer is that the self has been in a defiled state of existence since beginningless past. Notwithstanding the ideal as the realization of one's own true self, the effort for its revival and actualisation is not so attractive as may be expected. Rather the life of flesh is becoming easier than the life of the Spirit. It is overwhelmingly astonishing, but it is a fact, and undeniably stares us in the face. This convincingly gives one to understand that there is an intermediatory something which compels one to cling to the creature comforts and earthly pleasures, and offers great resistance to the realisation of the sublime end. Confronted with this recognition, we cannot deny that there exists a principle known as Avidyā (nescience), Mithyātva (perversity), and Ajñāna (ignorance) commonly recognised by all the systems of Indian philosophy, though with different interpretations due to their diverse metaphysical outlooks. Thus Mithyātva acts as a barricade to the soul's true life. It is at the root of all evils, the seed of the tree of Samsāra. It poisons all our activities so as to check the realisation of the Summum Bonum of life. Moreover, it is responsible for the perversity of knowledge and conduct alike. The whole outlook, knowledge and conduct are vitiated by its operations. So long as Mithyādarśana is operative, all our efforts to witness the sun of self's glory are bound to fail. It is to be rooted out in the interest of rendering its unwholesome functions null and void. In other words, Samyagdarśana (spiritual conversion) is to be attained, which in turn will make knowledge and conduct right and conducive to the attainment of liberation. It is only after the acquisition of Samyaktva (spiritual conversion) that the soul attains the primary qualification for even marching towards emancipa. tion from the wheel of misery. If Mithyātva is at the root of Samsāra, Samyaktva is at the root of Moksa. But even after the dawn of Samyaktva, i.e., after the knowledge becomes right, the conduct relevant to Moksa cannot be effected all at once owing to the operation of

Page #67

III. SAMYAGDARSANA AND THE SEVEN TATTVAS
45
certain other predispositions and occupations of the soul. Consequently it adopts at the outset partial conduct, keeping in view the ideal of perfect conduct. In the present chapter, we shall deal with the nature of Samyagdarśana (spiritual conversion), since it forms the base for the start of the spiritual journey. We shall then turn to the consideration of partial and complete conduct in the next two chapters, namely, 'Ācāra of the Householder' and 'Acara of the Muni'.
TATTVAS AS THE SINE QUA NON OF THE ETHICAL AND THE SPIRITUAL LIFE: Before we embark upon the study of Samyagdarśana, it will be worth while to begin with the nature, importance and implications of the seven Tattvas, inasmuch as the proper understanding of these will enable us to understand the meaning of Samyagdarśana (spiritual conversion). The insight into the nature of these Tattvas is the sine qua non of the ethical and the spiritual life. The unambiguous and graphic apprehension of the Tattvas is indispensable for the deliverance of the self. The march towards the spiritual goal presupposes the faith in the Tattvas and their clear consciousness. The two lines of thought relating to the Tattvas and the Dravyas need not be confused with each other, but the purport of each is to be borne in mind. The Jaina philosophers have two purposes-metaphysical interpretation of the universe and the salvation of the soul-in view. The six Dravyas, which have been dwelt upon in the previous chapter, are the expressions of the metaphysical curiosity of the human mind, while the seven Tattvas are the manifestation of its ethical and religious inquisitiveness. The latter deal with the spiritual disease and its cause, as also with the means to cure it and the cured state; i.e., they deal with Samsara and its cause, as also with Mokṣa and its cause. Thus the aspirant must know Bandha and its cause; namely, Āsrava, as well as Mokṣa and its causes; namely Samvara and Nirjara. In addition to these five Tattvas it is necessary to have the knowledge of the self which is bound, but which is to be made free. The bound state of existence presupposes the recognition of nonconscious (Ajīva) principle, by which the self is bound from beginningless past. Thus the study of these seven Tattvas: 1) Jīva, 2) Ajīva, 3) Asrava, 4) Bandha, 5) Samvara, 6) Nirjarā and 7) Moksa is of primary importance for a person longing for emancipation. Instead of the seven Tattvas Kundakunda1 speaks of the nine Padarthas, i.e., he appends
1 Samaya. 13.

Page #68

46
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
Punya and Pāpa to the seven Tattvas; but they (Puṇya and Pāpa) can be easily included in Asrava and Bandha. So their separate enumeration has not been considered proper by other Ācāryas like Umāsvāti and Pujyapada. If Kundakunda has done this, it is simply in the interest of elucidation, and not with a view to distorting the number and purport of the Tattvas. Now we propose to dwell upon the Tattvas since they are basal to the aspirant's spiritual career.
Jiva TATTVA: Let us first begin with the Jīva Tattva; for the enunciation of the remaining six Tattvas-Ajīva, Asrava, Bandha, Samvara, Nirjarā and Mokşa-loses all significance, if the Jīva is not enumerated first. To comprehend its nature prior to the consideration of the other Tattvas is necessary, inasmuch as it is the self (jīva) which is bound, and it is the self which seeks freedom from bondage. The reflection on Bandha and Mokșa, and the inquiry into them are inconceivable in the absence of the subject or the self whose nature is to reflect and enquire. Hence it is obvious that the clear and precise nature of the self is to be borne in mind prior to the comprehension of the other Tattvas. The exposition of the remaining six Tattvas is useful for understanding the life history of the soul, which is quite essential to spiritual progress. In our previous enquiry into the nature of Jīva Dravya, we have dealt with the character of the empirical self together with its various forms of subsistence, and in our discussion of the nature of the ethical ideal we have referred to the transcendental nature of self; hence to reiterate them here will be unnecessary.
AJĪVA TATTVA: Let us now turn to the Ajīva Tattva, which should be distinguished from the Ajīva Dravya. In Jainism Ajīva Dravya signifies the existence of five substances with the exception of Jīva. Of these five substances, the four-Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa and Kāla-have no malignant influence on the nature of the soul. Pudgal, the fifth, however, has been excercising its limiting and crippling influence on the empirical conscious principle from all eternity, and thereby has been obstructing the manifestation of its inherent excellences. Thus the Ajīva Tattva in contrast to the Ajīva Dravya should mean simply Pudgala (matter), inasmuch as the Tattvas, as we have already pointed out, possess spiritual significance and so contribute in toto towards the winning of one's own salvation. We have also already looked into the nature, the functions, and the forms of pudgala in the preceding chapter. To repeat them here will be unnecessary. Insight

Page #69

III. SAMYAGDARSANA AND THE SEVEN TATTVAS
into the nature of the Ajīva Tattva will yield insight into the nature of the material binding force, which is to be shaken off if the freedom of the soul is to be sought. The enslavement of the Jīva in the body of matter is caused by the subtle and invisible matter, known as Karma and the accomplishment of freedom from bondage must consequently imply the removal of the Karmic particles of matter from the soul. The remaining five Tattvas arrived at by the reciprocal interaction of self and matter deal with 1) the influx of material Karmas into the soul, 2) their absorption into it, 3) the cessation of their inflow, 4) the elimination of the accumulated filth of material Karmas, and lastly 5) emancipation from them.
ASRAVA AND BANDHA: Of the seven Tattvas the nature of Jīva and Ajīva Tattva having been discussed, we now propose to dwell upon Asrava and Bandha, It is Asrava (the influx of Karmas into the soul) which prepares the ground for Bandha (absorption of the Karmic particles into the soul). The latter derives all its meaning and significance from the former. Bandha is parasitical in character. It owes its life and existence to Asrava. If Asrava is denied, Bandha will ipso facto be denied; and in consequence human anguish and affliction will be too unsubstantial to have room for any spiritual endeavour. Now one is naturally led to enquire into the cause of the inflow of Karmic matter. The fundamental and legitimate cause of Asrava (inflow of Karmic matter into the soul) is the vibratory activity of the soul caused by the action of mind, body and speech, which is technically called 'Yoga'.1 This 'Yoga', it may be noted, is the most comprehensive cause of Asrava, since it embraces both the empirical souls and the Jivan-muktas or the Arahantas within its range. We may point out here that this 'Yoga' is also one of the causes of Bandha. We shall explain this point afterwards. Here it will suffice to say that Yoga alone does not create empirical bondage. The empirical self from the beginningless past is under the malignant influence of passions accruing from the association of Karmic matter. Consequently, Yoga along with passions attracts fresh material particles which get transformed automatically into Karmic particles and engender empirical bondage of the soul. These attach themselves to the soul, just as the hot iron ball, when placed in water, absorbs it from all sides, or just as oiled or wet cloth gets the
1 Tasu. VI. 1, 2.

47

Page #70

48
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
surrounding sand particles into it. In short, Asrava is due to Yoga, while Bandha is due to Yoga on the one hand, and passions on the other. In a different way, Yoga alone and Yoga with passions are the causes of Asrava and Bandha. The example of the former is the embodied superempirical soul, while that of the latter is the empirical soul. But the Asrava and the Bandha in these two souls should be clearly distinguished. We shall endeavour to explain this distinction later on. At present we proceed to point out the nature of Yoga and passions. While dealing with this, we shall indicate the causes of Āsrava and Bandha in a manner which may explain the whole mundane suffering and existence, as also the cause of the sojourn of the transcendental self in the embodied condition, namely, the Arhat state or the Jīvan-mukta state. Such an exposition may inspire the aspirant to wipe out all the conditions thwarting the final achievement of the Siddhahood.
NATURE OF YOGA: The legitimate cause of Asrava is Yoga, as has been mentioned above. Now we have to note that the two, namely, Yoga and Asrava, are identical, inasmuch as the vibrations occurring in the Pradeśas of the soul by reason of the activity of speech, body and mind synchronise with the inflow of Karmic particles. Further, the endeavour to set the speech, body and mind in operation which results in the vibration of the Pradeśas of the soul is called Yoga.? Arahantas and empirical souls possess this sort of endeavour. But the Siddhas are destitute of all endeavour, and hence destitute of Yoga; for they have no activity of speech, body and mind. Now, Yoga as the endeavour is causally related with Yoga as the vibration of the soul, or the operation of mind, body and speech. Therefore, sometimes the endeavour is called Yoga, and sometimes the vibration; so both are correct in view of the definition of 'Yoga'. The maximum possible number of Yogas is three, i. e., it varies with the evolution of Jīvas from the one-sensed to the five-sensed. Such is the general nature of Yoga which inevitably draws the Karmic matter towards the soul. Thus Yoga prepares the ground for empirical bondage on the presence of other conditions, and consequently, for the perpetuation of worldly career. In other words, the whole responsibility and burden for the attraction of Karmic particles towards the soul devolves upon Yoga,
1 Răjava. VI. 27. 4, 5. 2 $at. Vol. I-p. 279. 3 Şaț. Vol. I-p. 140; Gomma. Ji. 215.

Page #71

. M. SAMYAGDARŠANA AND THE SEVEN TATTVAS
49
though their assimilation, which leads to the obscuration and distortion of the divine attributes characteristic of the transcendental self, is incumbent on the presence of other baneful material of passions. So we shall now deal with the bondage by Yoga and the bondage by passions.
TYPES OF BONDAGE YOGA OCCASIONS: We have shown the dependence of Bandha upon Āsrava, which is primarily conditioned by Yoga. The bondage of the soul by the Karmic particles admits of fourfold classifications, namely, 1) Type bondage (Prakrti Bandha), 2) Space bondage (Pradeśa Bandha), 3) Duration bondage (Sthiti Bandha) and lastly, 4) Intensity of fruition bondage (Anubhāga Bandha). Let us deal with them one by one.. (1) The nature of bondage after the transformation of material into Karmic particles owing to the vibratory activity of the soul, has been designated as Type bondage. This type bondage which may safely be said to correspond to the transformation of food into different bodily constituents has been traditionally regarded as eight in number. They are named after the obscuration and distortion of the inherent divine quality of the self. These eight are fundamental, though the sub-types have been regarded as innumerable or as inany as 148. The eight* types of Karmas are: 1) knowledge-covering (jñānāvaraṇīya), 2) Intuition-covering (darsanāvaraṇīya), 3) Feelingproducing (vedaniya), 4) Delusion-producing (mohanīya), 5) Longevitydetermining (āyu), 6) Body-making (nāma), 7) Status-determining (gotra) and lastly, 8) Obstruction-generating (antarāya).* (2) The relation between the Karmic particles and the Pradeśas of the soul along with the volume of matter attracted through the same agency of Yoga has been styled Space-bondage (pradesa-bandha). This bondage itself signifies that none of the pradesas of soul is left without the particles of Karmic matter which are quite subtle. Thus Yoga has been credited with the two functions of Space-bondage (Pradeśa-Bandha) and Type-bondage (Praksti-Bandha).
1 Tasū. VIII. 3, Gomma. Ka. 89. 2 Sarvārtha. VIII-4.; Rājavā-VIII. 4/3. 3 Gomma. Ka. 7. 4 Gomma-Ka. 8; Tasū. VIII-4. 5 Sarvārtha. VIII-3. P. 379. *1-2) That which obscures knowledge and intuition. 3) That which holds up natural bliss and produces pleasure and pain. 4) That which obstructs right belief and right conduct. 5) That which determines the period of stay of self in a particular body. 6) That which is responsible for the construction of a particular body. 7) That which determines status in society. 8) That which causes handicaps in the enjoyment of wealth and power.

Page #72

50
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
TYPES OF BONDAGE PASSION OCCASIONS: The incessant continuation of the Karmic particles in association with the self up to a certain period of time, is called duration bondage (sthiti-bandha), and the effect p potency with which the Karmic particles become impregnated is known as intensity of fruition bondage (anubhāga bandha). The latter refers to the experiential aspect of the individual soul, and is the cause of differences perceptible in the world at large. These two types of Bandha are caused by passions which are, as a matter of fact, responsible for the defiled state of existence including transmigration and metempsychosis. It follows that the Bandha by Yoga in the absence of passions is bondage without any mundane consequence whatsoever. It is possible only when the state of dispassionate activity is arrived at and translated into the life of the individual soul. Action without passion is a matter of self-achievement, and requires arduous penances and stringent selfcontrol, and perpetual life of meditation. Keeping in view our central interest which is in the main ethical, we do not wish to go in details regarding the nature of the four types of Bandha, as is given in the Jaina scriptures.
YOGA WITH PASSIONS AND WITHOUT PASSIONS: Now we may without fear of contradiction vouch for the fact that Yoga may exist with passions or without passions in the life of the individual. Corresponding to these two types of Yoga, there are two types of Āsrava. The one which is called īryāpatha represents the passionless Yoga, and the other, sämparāyika expounds the transmigratory character of the self occasioned by the passioninfected Yoga.The great Ācārya Amrtacandra, while commenting upon the text of the Pravacanasāra written by Kundakunda, speaks of two types of activities as mentioned above, but with different names: viz., 1) Jñapti Kriyā, and 2) Jñeyārthaparīnamana Kriyā. In the first there is simply a supersensuous state of knowledge which simultaneously knows things as they are, as they were, and as they will be, without any distortion and predilection. This activity obviously agrees with the aforementioned dispassionate activity, and is superbly exemplified in the divine life of Arahanta or Jīvan-mukta who is contemplated to be blissfully performing the bodily activities of standing, sitting and moving about, and the activities of sermonizing the nature and function of true religion."
1 Sarvārtha. VIII-3. p. 379. 2 Tasū. VI. 4. 3 Prava. Comm. Amsta. I. 52.
Prava. I. 44.

Page #73

III. SAMYAGDARŠANA AND THE SEVEN TATTVAS
51
These activities are calculated to be the natural consequences of the Karmic fruition, though by all means destitute of attachment, aversion and infatuation. Hence they are as well called, in Karmic terminology, Kṣāyika Kriyās. They are stirred up by the total annulment of the Karmas; therefore they do not absorb and accumulate the fresh Karmas to cause and recommence the mundane career. These activities condition Asrava of the iryāpatha type which is nominal, and which does not keep the potency of prolonging Samsāra indefinitely. Besides, it is on account of the Yoga that the transcendental self stays temporarily in the embodied condition. The second type of activity, namely, Jñeyārthapariņamana Kriyā which is impregnated with attachment, aversion and infatuation is deemed to transmute the inherent meanings of the animate and inanimate objects of the world. It deviates us from the original, ontological significance of the things; hence it occasions Sāmparāyika Āsrava, which so intoxicates the inner life of the soul as to cause perpetual rounds of birth and death. The mundane souls enmeshed in the mire of flesh illustrate this type of activity.
In the following pages we, first, propose to deal with the passions in their multitudinous forms of existence and operation. And secondly, we shall deal with the Sāmparāyika Asrava generated by the passioninfected 'Yoga'. In accordance with the two types of Sāmparāyika Yoga (auspicious and inauspicious), which results from the auspicious and inauspicious psychical states, there ensue auspicious and inauspicious Asravas. These psychical states admit of innumerable distinctions and degrees of existence, and so cause differences of Sãmparāyika Asrava resulting in the various types and forms of mundane souls in various births. It may be mentioned in passing that these auspicious and inauspicious psychical states acquire their designation in congruity with the position they occupy on the scale of passions. From one extreme up to the middle of that scale we may demarcate auspicious psychical states in all their multiple forms of existence and operation, and from the other extreme up to the middle of that scale there are inauspicious Psychical states. There is a difference of kind and not of nature, hence they are required to be wiped out in the interest of arriving at the acme of spiritual realization.
1 Prava. I. 45. 2 Prava. I. 45. 3 Sarvārtha. VI-3. Ibid. VI. 6.

Page #74

ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
DIVERSE EXPRESSIONS OF PASSION: (A) PASSIONS ENWRAPPING AUSPICIOUS AND INAUSPICIOUS PSYCHICAL STATES ALONG WITH PERVERSION: The word, passion, is too abridged and oversimplified an expression to make understand the pollution of self in its fulness. But it is very wide in its extent and very deep in the captivation and seduction of self, so imperious and assiduously operative that it attaches our heart and mind to the transient and unsubstantial pleasures of the world, so exhaustively employing our energies that no room is spared for peeping into the glorious aspects of life. Spiritualism is darkened; dry moralism or sordid sensualism prevails. Perversion obstructs spiritualism. In the presence of perversion auspicious Bhāvas are equivalent to dry moralism, and inauspicious Bhāvas may be equated with sordid sensualism in the wide sense. Here we have explained the word 'passion' in the sense of auspicious and inauspicious psychical states along with the perversion of the self, since they baulk the true life of the spirit.
(B) PASSION AS SYNONYMOUS WITH THE DELUSION-PRODUCING KARMA: Again, the word, passion, may be regarded as synonymous with the delusion-producing Karma, the one amongst the eight types of Karman previously mentioned. This delusion-producing Karma may be subdivided into right-vision-deluding Karma and right-conductdeluding Karma. Thus passion obstructs right vision or spiritual conversion on the one hand and hampers right conduct on the other. To be more clear, the functions of passion may be calculated to debar the self from having spiritual conversion, partial conduct, complete conduct and perfect conduct. Though the passions are four in number, namely, anger (krodha), pride (māna), deceit (māyā), and greed (lobha), yet on account of the functions they are reckoned to perform they are to be regarded as sixteen. So each passion is of the following four kinds: 1) Anantānubandhi passion, i.e., that which obscures spiritual conversion, thereby preparing the ground for endless mundane career; 2) Apratyākhyānāvarana passion, i.e., that which eclipses the proneness to partial conduct; 3) Pratyākhyānāvaraņa passion, i.e., that which arrests the aptitude for complete conduct; and lastly 4) Samjvalana passion, i.e., that which baulks the perfect type of conduct, thus thwarting the attainment of Arhatship. Besides these passions, there are nine quasi-passions which are so called because of their less obstructing nature. They are:
1 Gomma. JI. 282.
2 Sarvārtha. VIII. 9.

Page #75

III. SAMYAGDARSANA AND THE SEVEN TATTVAS
53
1) Laughter (hāsya), 2) Love (rati), 3) Hatred (arati), 4) Grief (soka), 5) Fear (bhaya), 6) Disgust (jugupsā), 7) Hankering after man (strīveda), 8) Hankering after woman (puruṣaveda), and 9) Hankering after both the sexes (napursakaveda).' Jayasena involves anger, pride, deceit, greed and the nine quasi-passions in attachment (rāga) and aversion (dveşa); i.e., the former includes deceit, greed, laughter, love, and hankering after man, woman and both, while the latter enfolds anger, pride, hatred, grief, fear and disgust.
(c) LESYĀS AS PASSIONS ISSUING IN ACTION: In addition to the above functions envisaged to be performed by the passions they own infinitely varying degrees of intensity which issue in action, thereby bearing testimony to the fact that in mundane life Yoga (activity) is inextricably woven together with the passions. The one cannot be divorced from the other. Such an assimilation of one into the other has been styled Leśyā. Activity coloured by passions is Leśyā.3 The emphasis is upon Yoga (activity) and not upon passions so as to include the Arahantas who possess Leśyā of the purest type. To express this view more clearly, that which associates the self with Karmic particles is termed Lesyā.* The six types of Leśyās which correspond to the six types of the intensity of passions—the intensest, very intense, intense; mild, milder and the mildest-are respectively called 1) Krsna, 2) Nīla, 3) Kāpota, 4) Pīta, 5) Padma and 6) Sukla.5 The first three are inauspicious and the last three are auspicious, hence they condition punya and pāpa respectively. The above six types of Leśyās may be respectively illustrated by the attitude of individuals who want to relish fruits 1) by uprooting the tree, 2) by cutting the trunk, 3) by cutting big branches, 4) by cutting small branches, 5) by plucking only the fruits, and lastly 6) by having those fruits that are fallen on the ground.?
(D) INSTINCTIVE ACTIONS AS PASSIONATE: Not only these passions express themselves in the forms of perversion and auspicious and inauspicious Bhāvas and Leśyās, but they acquire different designations on account of their being referred to outward objects. When the passion of greed is aroused by the perception of external objects, it is termed acquisitive instinct (parigraha samjñā). Similarly food (āhāra), fear.
1 Sarvartha. VIII-9. 2Samaya. Comm. Jaya. 282. 3 Gomma. Ji. 489. 4 $ať. Vol. I. p. 386. Sat. Vol. I. p. 388. Gomma. Ji. 488. 7 Ibid. 506, 507. 8 Şaț. Vol. II. p. 413.

Page #76

54
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
(bhaya), and sex (maithuna) instincts are respectively stimulated by food, fearful objects and sex-exciting things. These instincts are nothing more than passions though with different reference and emphasis. This fact is corroborated by the Jaina scripture, the Satkhaṇḍāgama which includes food instinct into love (rati); sex instinct into three types of sex passion; fear instinct into fear; and acquisitive instinct into greed.1
(E) OTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF PASSION: Passions also excite the senses to indulge themselves in sensuous objects. This may prove that knowledge by the senses is liable to be infected by passions. They work to such an extent that when pleasant things depart and unpleasant ones come closer, one is put to severe anxiety. In consequence, one's serenity of mind is destroyed. Again, a sort of pleasure which is experienced in cruelty, in theft, in falsehood, and in devising means for the continuance of sensual pleasures is to be regarded as a treacherous show of passions. The matter does not cease here. The study of scriptures, the devotion towards the Guru, and the like are also the manifestations of passions.
The passions thus assume different names according to the different functions which they are known to perform. The treacherous actor of passion may betray himself and display the drama at the world's stage in varying forms with varying nomenclature and performances. But one should not be fascinated and betrayed by sheer names and forms; on the contrary, one should behold the passions at the bottom and the root,no matter whether they are in the form of kindness, philanthropy, devotion to God, Guru and scriptures, deceit and conceit, i.e., both the virtue and the vice,-by penetrating through the names and forms which the passions assume. With such an attitude of mind, one shall not be gratified with anything less than the true realisation of the spirit. It will not be amiss to point out here that the word 'passion' has not been used in accordance with so extensive a connotation as sketched above at all places in the Jaina scriptures, but sometimes only restricted meaning fits in a particular context. To illustrate, in the Bandha chapter of the Samayasāra, Kundakunda speaks of attachment, aversion, infatuation and passions; the first three represent Anantānubandhi passion, and the last implies Apratyākhyānāvarana passion, Pratyakhyānāvarana passior and Samjvalana passion.2 When the Tattvärthasūtra makes use of the word passion in the seventh chapter, it implies 'Samjvalana' passion.3
1 Sat. Vol. II. p. 414.
2 Samaya. 280. 3 Tasi. VII-1.

Page #77

III. SAMYAGDARSANA AND THE SEVEN. TATTVAS
55
CAUSES OF SAMPARĀYIKA ASRAVA: These passions with their different forms cause Sāmparāyika Asrava. Kundakunda, in brief, describes the conditions of auspicious Sāmparāyika Asrava as 1) noble attachment, 2) compassion, and 3) a state of mind bereft of all evil thoughts. In other words, 1) devotion towards the Deva, the Šāstra and the Guru, 2) rendering help to those who are in distress, and are thirsty and hungry, and lastly 3) composure of mind, are the elaboration of the above causes of auspicious Sāmparāyika Asrava respectively. The inauspicious Sämparāyika Asrava results 1) from the activity mixed with excessive sluggishness, 2) from mental states infected with intense passions, 3) from sensual indulgence, 4) from the belittlement of others and 5) from affiliction and anguish caused to others. Besides, 1) the four instincts 2) the three inauspicious Leśyās, 3) sensual indulgence, 4) Arta Dhyāna, 5) Raudra Dhyāna, 6) the employment of knowledge in unworthy and base objects and 7) Moha in the sense of attachment, aversion and infatuation--all these also constitute the main springs of inauspicious Sāmparāyika Asrava. The Tattvārthasūtra enumerates thirtynine kinds of causes of Sāmparāyika Āsrava; i.e., five passion-infected senses (the senses of touch, taste, smell, colour and sound), five kinds of vowlessness (violence, falsehood, theft, incontinence and acquisition), four passions (anger, pride, deceit and greed), and twentyfive kinds of activities.5 The twentyfive kinds of activities are: 1) right-vision-developing actions, for example, devotion to the Deva, the Sāstra and the Guru, 2) infatuated actions, 3) movement of the body from one place to another 4) tendency to neglect vows after one has accepted them, 5) dispassionate actions, 6) performance of actions out of anger, 7) working with wicked motive, 8) accepting implements of Himsā, 9) actions afflicting others, 10) suicidal and homicidal actions, 11-12) witnessing and touching beautiful and fascinating objects out of sensual pleasure, 13) bringing into light new types of sense-enjoyment, 14) answering the call of nature in a place frequented by men, women or animals, 15) putting things upon the unexamined and unswept ground, 16) performance of actions to be done by others, 17) advice for unrighteous things, 18) proclamation of other man's vicious deeds, 19) misrepresentation of scriptural injunctions on account of not being capable of observing them,
1 Pañcā. 135. 4 Ibid. 140.
2 Pañcā. 136 to 138. 3 Ibid. 139. 5 Tasū. VI. 5. 6 Sarvārtha. VI. 5.

Page #78

56
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
20) disrespectful attitude towards the way mentioned in holy scriptures out of hypocrisy and slothfulness, 21) the perpetration of violent deeds and the commendation of other man's misdeeds, 22) actions to preserve one's own worldly belongings, 23) fraudulent actions in point of knowledge, belief etc., 24) encouragement of the actions of a man engaged in perverted activities, and 2 ) indisposition to renunciation. All these are the causes of Sāmparāyika Asrava in general.
SAMPARĀYIKA ĀSRAVA IN PARTICULAR: The Tattvārthasūtra has also described the causes of the inflow of different types of Karman in particular. The knowledge-and-intuition covering Karman are effected by observing malicious silence when the importance of emancipating knowledge is being announced, by concealing one's own knowledge, by negating, out of envy, to impart knowledge to others in spite of knowing, by obstructing the acquisition of knowledge, by denying the truth enunciated by others and, lastly, by rebutting the spiritual truth. The inflow of the suffering-producing Karmano is caused by the painful mental state, by sorrow and perturbation produced by the disassociation of a person sympathising with oneself, by excitability on accunt of being defamed, by weeping owing to some internal discontent and discomposure, by doing away with one's senses, strength and breathing, and by pathetic moaning to attract the sympathetic attention of others. Charity, universal compassion, soft corner for those who observe vows, self-control with attachment, concentration of mind, body and speech in auspicious deeds, and elimination of anger and greed--all these lead to the inflow of earthly-pleasure-producing Karman.3 The right visiondeluding Karman is occasioned by imputing faults mendaciously to omniscients, scriptures and saints. The influx of right conduct-deluding Karma is caused by intense psychical states produced by the rise of passions and quasi-passions. Continual proneness to violent deeds, appropriation of another man's wealth, great attachment to one's own acquisitions, sensual indulgence, and appearance of Krsna Lesyā and Raudra Dhyāna at the time of death-all these will cause hellish age bondage. The disagreement in mind, body and speech, the preaching of false doctrines, unrestrained living, and the appearance of Nīla and Kāpota Leśyās and of Arta Dhyāna at the time of soul's departure from
1 Tasū. & Sarvārtha. VI. 10. 4 Ibid. VI-13. Ibid. VI-14.
2Tasū. & Sarvārtha. VI. 11.
Tasū. and Sarvārtha. VI-15,
Ibid. VI-12.

Page #79

.IN. SAMYAGDARŠANA AND THE SEVEN TATTVAS
57
the body-all these will oblige us to succumb to sub-human existence. Human life will result from the meekness of disposition, simple nature and behaviour, mild passion and the non-appearance of the ruffled state of mind at the time of last breath. Partial vows, Self-control with attachment, peacefully bearing hunger, thirst and the like under compulsion, and penance without spiritual effect-all these lead to celestial birth. The inauspicious body-making Karman is the result of nonconformity in mind, body and speech. It is again due to the fickle nature of mind, back-biting, dishonesty in weighing and measuring, self-praise and others' censure; and conformity in mind, body and speech, concentrated mind etc. determine the auspicious body. The
v-status-determining Karman is produced by self-praise and others' censure, by veiling the good qualities of others and proclaiming their misdeeds; and submissiveness before persons of high attainments, and modesty in spite of one's being best in learning etc., self's censure and others' praise occasion high-status-determining Karman. The inflow of obstructive Karman is due to the disturbance caused to others in charity, gain, Bhoga and Upabhoga, and in the use of strength and power.
ASRAVA AND BANDHA ACCORDING TO KUNDAKUNDA: We propose to close this topic of āsrava and bandha after dwelling upon the views of Kundakunda regarding them. The dominant note of his writings is spiritual awakening. He summarily sets at naught all other deliberations which do not direct one's mind towards the awakening of the consciousness of divinity potential in oneself. In consequence, he lays so much stress on no other aspect of life as on spiritual conversion. He seems to have been maddened after the propagation of spiritualism; hence his every expression sounds the same note of harmony. Accordingly he represents attachment, aversion and infatuation' as the causes of Asrava, nay, themselves as Āsrava, implying thereby the Anantānubandhi passion and infatuation, which obstructs spiritual conversion. He is not oblivious of the fact that the occurrence of spiritual conversion does not entail liberation then and there, since perfect conduct, i. e.,, non-conceptual meditational submergence, is lacking. His pronounce
1 Tasū. VI-16. 2 Ibid. VI-17, 18. 3 Ibid. VI-20.
Ibid. VI-22. 5 Ibid. VI-23. 6 Tasū. and Sarvartha. VI-27. 7 Samaya. 177, and Samaya. Comm. Amfta. 164, 165.

Page #80

58
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
ment that the individual after the attainment of right vision is bereft of Karmic influx, manifests his strong attitude towards the life of the Spirit. He argues that when the root of nescience is withered, the green leaves of imperfect conduct are incapable of being flourished enduringly; hence they are sure to fade and fall flat on the ground; i.e., perfect conduct after spiritual conversion is inevitable and irresistible, if not in this life, in some other life. The antecedent conditions of Asrava, namely, attachment, aversion and infatuation also are the antecedent conditions of Bandha. With the presence of these impure psychical states which emanate from nescience, the self attracts and absorbs the alien Karmic matter into its substance. To bear in mind that the objects in the external world are not the causes of bondage is abundantly significant, inasmuch as if they are regarded as the causes of bondage, emancipation will be a phantom and a make-believe, as the external objects are incapable of being dispensed with existence. The question why the external objects are denied possession and association, may be answered by saying that the empirical self, i. e., the self which has not yet attained that immaculate state of existence of which man is capable, is unavoidably subject to impure psychical states in their presence. Hence the authentic cause of bondage is assuredly the impure psychical states and not the environmental objects. But the latter in lower stages unwittingly charge the empirical self with profanation. In consequence, we may say in passing that one should be greatly vigilant about one's environment in one's preparatory stages, if spiritual betterment is to be strived after. For explaining the cause of Bandha in a different way, Kundakunda resorts to an expression, namely, adhyavasāna, which implies the confusion between self and not-self. This means the absence of spiritual conversion or right vision. The thought of slaying and being slayed, bestowing life and being bestowed with life, causing pleasure and pain to others and being made happy and miserable by others, briefly, the thought of identification of the self with the inauspicious practices (violence, falsehood, stealing, unchastity and the like) and with the auspicious observances illustrate the nature of Adhyavasāna. Though the self is distinct from all other existing
1 Samaya. Comm. Amfta. 265. 2 Samaya. 262. 3 Samaya. Comm. Amsta. 271. 4 Samaya. 247, 250, 254, 255, 256, 263, 264.

Page #81

• III. SAMYAGDARSANA AND THE SEVEN TATTVAS
59
substances, yet it identifies itself with them by the force of Adhayvasāna, hence it bears the bitter fruit of transmigration. In other words, so long as the self has not abandoned the perverted tendency of identifying itself with auspicious and inauspicious things, emancipation from the turmoils of the world will elude its grip.
TRANSCENDENTAL VIEW OF SAMVARA, NIRJARĀ AND MOKȘA: It is manifest from what has been represented that the whole mundane career results from the association of passions and Yoga with the empirical self. Hence the avoidance of terrestrial comforts and curses, in the first place, means the cessation of Sāmparāyika Asrava so as to ward off the incessant assaults of the subtle Karmic enemies. Secondly, it means the suffocation of the indwelling foes of Karmas till they die. In other words, when the activities of mind, body and speech are set free from the effects of auspicious and inauspicious psychical states, there results the discontinuance of Sāmparāyika Asrava. Again, speaking in a similar vein, we may say that the stoppage of Karmic influx follows necessarily if the passions are undermined in their fullness, and the equanimous state of mind is translated into the life of the spirit. Transcendental belief, knowledge and conduct, which amount to the true realisation of the spirit, is identical with the accomplishment of liberation. This is tantamount to saying that he who has soared to the loftiest heights of spiritual realisation of which man is capable not only stops the influx of the particles of Karman as such into the soul, but also wipes out the impurity associated with the self. The former activity is called Samvara and the latter Nirjarā and Moksa. Thus in the highest state of spiritual submergence, Samvara will necessarily terminate into Moksa through Nirjarā. It is only in the Siddha state of existence (disembodied state of the self for all futurity) that the Sāmparāyika and the īryāpatha Asrava interminably cease to function. Of these two types of Asrava, we are here mỏre concerned with the former one, since it is that type of Asrava that matters much to the soul in contrast to the iryāpatha type which is of nominal value and so fades in due course.
PROCESS OF SAMVARA, NIRJARĀ AND MOKȘA: The aforementioned Samvara, Nirjarā and Moksa from the Suddha or Niscaya or Pāramārthika point of view appear to be easy enough to be actualised, but the
Pañcā. 143.
2 Ibid. 142.

Page #82

60
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
self is so much addicted from beginningless past to oscillating between the auspicious and inauspicious psychical states that to overthrow the relative life of virtue and vice in the interest of absolute higher life seems to be practically impossible, and sometimes a mere stretching of imagination, a dream unrealisable. But saints have exhibited its practicability. Of course, skipping to such a life without any endeavour on the part of the self and also without the guidance of a spiritual teacher will certainly land us in desperateness and despondency. But if the instructions of the Guru are followed with all sincerity and faithfulness, the ostensibly insurmountable difficulties will assuredly vanish. The Jaina Acāryas, being themselves great aspirants, have explicitly pointed out that at the outset of the pilgrimage right belief (samyagdarsana)-the nature of which shall be dealt with presently-is to be made the object of acquisition; for it alone possesses the potentiality of rendering our conduct veracious. Thereafter the inauspicious psychical states should be abandoned, and the life should be occupied with the auspicious psychical states. But the householder cannot completely occupy himself with the auspicious psychical states, hence he pursues partial conduct in contradistinction to the complete conduct which is capable of being followed by the Muni alone. This amounts to saying that Samvara is gradual. Now, it is only from the Vyavahāra point of view that Samvara, Nirjara and Mokṣa are distinguishable. These three are interlinked, one leading to the other. In contrast to Asrava and Bandha, these three Tattvas point to the ennoblement and spiritualisation of human life. As a matter of fact, Samvara is the inauguration of the process of Mokṣa. The first step of the whole process commences with the dawn of spiritual conversion (samyagdarsana); the second points to Samvara and Nirjara; and the third, namely, Mokşa, arrives when the second is operative to the highest pitch. It does not behove us to dwell here upon the causes of Samvara, Nirjara and Mokṣa, as the Acara of the householder and that of the Muni, which will be dealt with later on, are the examples of the realisation of these three Tattvas. SAMYAGDARSANA AS THE PRIME CAUSE OF SALVATION: Let us now proceed to deal with the nature of Samyagdarśana. It is the beginning of the spiritual pilgrimage, and the foundation of the magnificent edifice of liberation. The Yasastilaka tells us that "it is the prime cause of salvation, just as the foundation is the mainstay of a palace, good luck that of beauty, life that of bodily enjoyment, royal power that of victory,

.

Page #83

III. SAMYAGDARSANA AND THE SEVEN TATTVAS
61
culture that of nobility and policy that of Government.”l Rightness in knowledge and conduct is acquired through Samyagdarśana. Thus it forms the root and backbone of what may be called religion in the sense of perpetual contemplation on the intrinsic nature of the transcendental self. The Uttarādhyayana envisages that right knowledge remains unattainable in the absence of right belief, and rightness of conduct is out of the question without right knowledge. 2
RIGHTNESS IN KNOWLEDGE AND CONDUCT IS POSSIBLE AFTER ATTAINING RIGHT BELIEF OR SPIRITUAL CONVERSION: A question is apt to be asked: how is rightness in knowledge acquired through rightness in belief? This may be replied by saying that although in common parlance knowledge precedes belief, yet, genuinely speaking, knowledge becomes the cause of spiritual unfoldment only after right belief is kindled and stirred up. Here the prefix rightness does not possess epistemological significance, but is indicative of spiritual value. Even though the possessor of right belief cognises rope as a snake which is no doubt epistemologically invalid, still his knowledge is considered to be right. On the contrary, the man destitute of right belief even though he knows a thing as it is after dispelling doubt, perversity and indefiniteness, does not deserve to be called spiritually a right knower. Hence epistemological ascertainment has little to do with the rightness of knowledge which originates from spiritual conversion (right belief). In other words, in the context of supermundane experience, right knowledge presupposes right belief. Though they are related as cause and effect, yet they are born simultaneously, just as light comes with the lamp. Simultaneous emergence cannot annul their distinctness. Again, right conduct is preceded by right belief and right knowledge. In their absence conduct even of the highest type will ever remain incapable of transcending morality, hence spiritualism will remain shrouded in mystery. The Darsana Pāhuda tells us that right belief engenders right knowledge by virtue of which the virtuous and vicious paths are cogitated, and that the possessor of right belief in turn blows away vices, and adopts sila; and thereby he enjoys prosperity and emancipation."
But the nature of this resplendent jewel illuminating knowledge and conduct has been construed variously in Jaina scriptures. Its varied
1 Yas & Ic. p. 248. 2 Uttara. 28/30. 3 Puru. 34. + Darsana. Pā. 15, 16; cf. Müla. 903, 904.

Page #84

62
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
nature may be comprehended under the Niścaya and Vyavahāra points of view. So comprehensive are these spiritual Nayas that they are capable of reconciling the apparently divergent nature of Samyagdarśana enunciated by different Acāryas at different times in the history of Jaina thought. We shall now deal with the different views of Samyagdarsana.
VARIOUS VIEWS OF SAMYAGDARŠANA: Kundakunda in the Darsana Pāhuda characterises the nature of Samyagdarśana as the possession of firm belief in the six kinds of Dravyas, the nine Padārthas, the five Astikāyas, and the seven Tattvas. Nemicandrācārya represents the belief in the six Dravyas, the five Astikāyas and the nine Padārthas as indicative of Samyagdarśana.? The Mokşa Pāhuda recognises the belief in the non-violent Dharma, in the Deva bereft of the eighteen kinds of faults and in the sermons of the omniscient as constitutive of Samyagdarśana. Again the Niyamasāra regards the belief in the perfect souls, the scriptures and the six Dravyas as determining the nature of Samyagdarśana.* Besides, according to the Mūlācāra and the Uttarādhyayana, the belief in the nine Padārthas expresses the nature of Samyagdarśana." Vasunandi in his Srāvakācāra describes the nature of right belief as the true and unshakable conviction in the perfect souls, the scriptures and the seven Tattvas. Some great Ācāryas like Umāsvāti,? Amrtacandra8 and the author of the Dravya Samgrahao unanimously depict Samyagdarśana as the belief in the seven Tattvas. In the view of Svāmikārttikeya, 10 in addition to the belief in the nine Padārthas acquired after ascertaining their nature through the epistemological medium of Pramāṇa and Naya, the person desirous of possessing Samyagdarśana must also give credence to the momentous principles of Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda. The apparent diversity does not cease here, but finds expression in the words of an eminent Acārya, Samantabhadra, who acquiesces in regarding the nature of Samyagdarśana as the belief in the Āpta, the scriptures and the Guru after one has eschewed the three kinds of follies," and the eight kinds of pride, 12 and has espoused the eight essentials of right belief.13 We have already explained the nature of six
1 Daršana. Pā. 19. 2 Gomma. Ji 560. 3 Mo. Pa. 90. 4 Niyama. 5. 5 Mülā. 203; Uttarā. 28/14, 15. 6 Vasu. Srāva. 6. 7 Tasū. I. 2. 8 Puru. 22. 9 Dravya. 41. 10 Kärtti. 311, 312. 11 Three follies: Pseudo-Deva, Pseudo-Guru, Pseudo-Scriptures. 12 Eight kinds of pride: Pride of 1) learning, 2) honour, 3) family, 4) caste, 5) power, 6) opulence, 7) penance, and 8) body. 13 Ratna. Srava. 4.

Page #85

m. SAMYAGDARSANA AND THE SEVEN TATTVAS
63
Dravyas, five Astikāyas, seven Tattvas, nine Padārthas, Pramāna, Naya, Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda, which have occurred in the various views of Samyagdarśana. We shall presently explain the eight essentials of right belief. We, first, proceed to dwell-upon the characteristics of the Apta, the scriptures and the Guru.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE APTA, THE SCRIPTURES AND THE GURU: 1) To be free from the eighteen kinds of defects and blemishes; namely, hunger, thirst, fear, anger, attachment, delusion, old age, disease, anxiety, death, conceit, perspiration, surprise, sleep, birth, restlessness, perturbation, and love, 1 to be endowed with omniscience, to be adorable, to be uncontaminated with human infirmities, to be immaculate and outright pure, to be devoid of any desire whatsoever, to be devoid of the beginning, the end, and the middle, and lastly to be uniquely benevolent--all these are the characteristics of the Apta. Besides, without any selfish design, he preaches for the benefit of the unemancipated and suffering beings. 2) That alone is true scripture which flows spontaneously out of the Āpta, is irrefutable, is salutary for the well-being of all kinds of beings, is capable of undermining the perverse path and, lastly, reveals the objective nature of things. 3) He who refrains himself from servility to sensual indulgence, renounces worldly occupations and possessions, and is enormously occupied with the acquisition of spiritual knowledge, and undergoes austerities and meditation deserves to be called Sadguru.
Thus we have surveyed the nature of right belief as expounded by the Jaina Ācāryas of eminence. They seem to have divergent views at the outset. But we may point out here that all the afore-mentioned characteristics of Samyagdarśana are justifiable from the Vyavahāra point of view.
BELIEF IN THE SEVEN TATTVAS AS THE CENTRAL OF ALL THE CHARACTERISTICS MENTIONED: Notwithstanding the validity of all these features of Samyagdarśana from the Vyavahāra point of view, the most salient and central of all these is the belief in the seven Tattvas. This is due to the fact that unflinching conviction in these Tattvas evidently manifests the whole process of the attainment of liberation, which may be understood even by the unsophisticated intellects. Jaina Ācāryas
1 Niyama. 6. 2 Ratna. Śrāva. 7. 3 Ibid. 8. Ratna. Srāva. 9; Niyama. 8. 5 Ratna. Śrūva. 10.

Page #86

64
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
are of opinion that belief in the Āpta, the Guru, the scriptures etc. is valid if it engenders belief in the Tattvas. This implies that sometimes the belief in the Apta etc. does not produce belief in the Tattvas, hence so much weight and insistence has been laid on the belief in the Seven Tattvas. It may be pointed out here that belief should not be confounded with mere intellectual comprehension and clarity, though intellectual enlightenment may possibly, but not necessarily, lead to the arousal of right belief: it is a sort of mental attitude which brings about a kind of undeviating adhesion to spiritual truth. It is not dogmatic coherence but rational adherence. Traditionalism in the sense of irrationalism is to be denounced, but ratiocinative adherence is to be adopted and accepted. It may be considered that only those persons that are well equipped mentally are capable of attaining Samyagdarśana, but we may point out here that the attainment of it has little to do with mental equipments. Nor has it any bearing upon the fact of being born as a Jaina. Spiritualism cannot be monopolised. Wherever it extends, it will undoubtedly clasp within its range the belief in the seven Tattvas irrespective of any acquaintance with their names. Their essence is significant, and not their names, which may be different. 1 possessing Samyagdarśana must recognise his self as his own as well as the causes of his misery, and the means for their elimination. He must recognise passions as his only foes, though he may not know their names, yet he must have the feeling that real happiness requires their extirpation.
SAMYAGDARSANA FROM THE TRANSCENDENTAL VIEW: If we are driven to earnest reflection and are allowed to evaluate things from the vantage-ground, even the belief in the seven Tattvas or the nine Padārthas misrepresents the nature of Samyagdarśana. The true nature of Samyagdarśana consists in having unflinching faith in the transcendental self. Of the seven Tattvas, the self-shining and unevasive principle is the self, and consequently firm conviction in the pristine purity of the self constitutes what is called Samyagdarśana. Kundakunda's Darsana Pāhuda deems the belief in the true self to be expressive of Niscaya (real) Samyagdarśana in contradistinction to the belief in the Tattvas as Vyavahāra.2 Amộtacandra in the commentary on the Samayasāra accords to Niścaya or Suddhanaya the status of
Samaya. Comm. Amfta. 13.
2 Darsana Pā. 20.

Page #87

M. SAMYAGDARŠANA AND THE SEVEN TATTVAS
65
Samyagdarśana." This is due to the fact that Suddhanaya consists in recongnising the self as unbound and untouched by Karmas and as devoid of the possibility of fusion of the accidental psychical states of attachment, aversion and the like. It also regards the self as perdurable, as undifferentiated in spite of the psychic qualities of knowledge, perception etc., and, lastly, as destitute of the distinctions caused by impure modifications of the four grades of existence. Thus Samyagdarśana which amounts to spiritual conversion is to be equated with the belief in Suddhanaya. Hence the two are synonymous. This delineation of Samyagdarśana must not imply the cancellation of the belief in the seven Tattvas, as may be considered, but they should be comprehended and believed from the Paramărthika point of view, which again points to the belief in the paramount principle of self. To sum up, the self must believe in its true nature, which indicates that Samyagdarśana and the true self are identical, the former being the inalienable characteristic of the latter. Thus Vyavahāra Samyagdarśana is valid and successful if it gives rise to Niścaya Samyagdarśana.
KINDS OF SAMYAGDARSANA: In the Jaina literature, different kinds of Samyagdarśana have been enumerated from diverse stand-points. Some passionate and all dispassionate souls possess Samyagdarśana; hence we may speak of Samyagdarśana as Sarāga and Vītarāga respectively. Again, Samyagdarśana is of three kinds:& Ksāyopaśamika, Ksāyika and Aupaśamika, which will be dealt with in the subsequent chapter. Samyagdarśana is again of two types. When it is selfoccasioned, i.e., occasioned without any manifest instruction, it is styled Nisargaja, and when it is evoked on account of the preaching of the Guru, it is entitled Adhigamaja.?
EIGHT COMPONENTS OF SAMYAGDARSANA FROM THE EMPIRICAL POINT OF VIEW: Let us now dwell upon the eight components of Samyagdarśana. They may also be called the organs of Samyagdarśana. Just as the different organs constitute the body, so also these eight organs are the integral constituents of Samyagdarśana. The omission of even one of them will inevitably clip the wings of a man who longs to soar high in the realm of spiritualism with the object of quenching his thirst for undying, unabating and soul-enrapturing happiness. Samantabhadra
1 Samaya. Comm. Amfta. 12. 2 Samaya. Comm. Amộta. 14. 3 Ibid. 4 Puru. 22. 5 Sarvārtha. p. 10. Kärtti. 308, 309.
7 Sarvärtha. I-3.

Page #88

66
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
announces that the pain arising from venom cannot be eliminated by using an incomplete Mantra. Similarly he says that Samyagdarśana with mutilated organs is incapable of undermining the disquietude permeating the enpirical existence. The eight organs of Samyagdarśana are: 1) Nihsankita, 2) Nihkāmkṣita, 3) Nirvicikitsā, 4) Amūdhadşști, 5) Upagūhana, 6) Sthitikaraña, 7) Vātsalya and 8) Prabhāvanā. First, he who possesses the Niḥsankita Anga does not doubt the multiple nature of reality seeking expression from the omniscient Jina. Besides, he adheres to the principle that kindness to all creatures is Dharma and injury to them is Adharma. The nature of this Anga must not point to the throttling of the inquisitive nature possessed by man. Doubt is not reprehensible if it aims at the decision of the nature of things. But if pushed contrariwise, it is suicidal. The initial scepticism may lead to final certitude. Where our crippled intellect cannot penetrate the nature of things, belief in them is the best guide, since the Tīrthankara cannot preach with prejudice. But where logic can stretch its wings, one should pin one's faith on a thing after following the course of rational thinking, so that dogmatism may not creep in. Because of the unshakable faith in the righteous path, the possessor of this Anga eschews seven kinds of fear, which are ordinarily present in the perverted souls. He is not frightened when the things imparting him physical and mental pleasures part company, and when sorrows and agonies associate with him. Nor is he perturbed by the fearful thought concerning the life hereafter. Besides, he has ousted the fear of death, of discomfiture arising from disease, of heavenly and earthly accidental occurrences, of his safety and lastly of losing his affluence or self-restraint. Secondly, the Nihkānkşita Anga implies that the true believer never hankers after the worldly opulence and empyreal pleasures, inasmuch as he is convinced of the fact that these earthly enjoyments are impermanent, fraught with miseries, procreative of sin and evil, and are caused by the filth of Karman.“ Also he does not cling to onesided views.? Thirdly, the Anga known as Nirvicikitsa signifies that there should be no feeling of disgust at the various bodily conditions caused by disease, hunger,
1 Ratna. Śrāva. 21. 2 Caritra. Pā. 7.; Uttară 28/31. 3 Puru. 23. 4 Kārtti. 414. SMülā. 53; Bhāvanā viveka. 41, 43 to 51. Seven kinds of fear: 1) Lokabhaya, 2) Paralokabhaya, 3) Marañabhaya, 4) Vedanābhaya, 5) Akasmikabhaya, 6) Arakṣabhaya, 7) Aguptibhaya.. 6 Ratna. Srāva. 12. 7 Puru. 24.

Page #89

III. SAMYAGDARSANA AND THE SEVEN TATTVAS
67
thirst, cold, heat etc., or at the sight of foul excretion. The body is impure by nature but is rendered venerable by the triple jewels of right belief, right knowledge and right conduct. The Nirvicikitsā Anga, therefore, consists in declining the scornful attitude towards such a dignified body even if it is diseased, unclean etc., and in having devotion to superempirical qualities.1 Fourthly, the Amuḍhadṛṣṭi Anga (nonstupidity) consists in steering clear of the causes of perversity and in dissociating oneself from the person pursuing wrong path.2 According to the Kārttikeyanuprekṣā, being overwhelmed by fear, inferiority and greed for profit, he who does not recognise Himsā as Dharma, is free from stupidity. Also the Amudhadṛṣṭi Anga insists upon the abandonment of pseudo-Guru, pseudo-Deva, pseudo-scriptures, pseudo-conduct and false common conceptions. The fifth Anga has two names: Upabṛmhana and Upaguhana. He who develops in himself spiritual qualities by virtue of dwelling upon pure thoughts is said to practise Upabṛmhana Anga.5 And he who does not lay open his own merits and the demerits of other spiritual pilgrims, but who veils the shortcomings of the spiritual pilgrims so as to save the commonly unpursuable spiritual path from blasphemy, is pronounced to be practising the Upaguhana Anga. Though the two by denominations are different, the practising of one of them inevitably turns our mind to the other; i. e., the cultivation of spiritual qualities ipso facto disposes one to veil the defects of the spiritual initiates. Sixthly, oppressed by the overwhelming intensity of passions like anger, pride, greed and deceit or by other seductive causes, the aspirant may be constrained to deviate from the path of righteousness. At such a juncture, to re-establish him in the path by reminding him of his innate glory and magnificence is called the Sthitikarana Anga. In other words, to strengthen the conviction of those who are faltering in their loyalty to Dharma and also to save himself from lapses-both these constitute the Sthitikaraṇa Anga. The seventh Anga is Vatsalya which implies deep affection for spiritual matters, for the integral principle of non-injury, and for those who are spiritual brethren.o Or he who is devoted to the meritorious persons, follows them with great respect, and speaks to them nobly, is said to have
1 Ratna. Śrāva. 13. 2 Ibid. 14.
3 Kärtti. 417. 4 Puru. 26. 5 Puru. 27.
6 Ratna. Śrāva. 15.; Puru. 27; Kärtti. 418. 7 Ratna Śrāva. 16.; Puru. 28.
8 Kärtti. 419. 9 Puru. 29.; Ratna. Śrāva. 17.

Page #90

68
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
posssessed Vätsalya Anga. Lastly, Prabhāvanā signifies the imperativeness of glorifying one's own self with the ten Dharmas or the triple resplendent jewels. It also implies the dissemination of the religion propounded by the conqueror of passions through the medium of exceptional charity, austerity, devotion, profound learning and other means best suited to time and place.2
CHARACTERISTICS ACCOMPANYING THE SUBSISTENCE OF RIGHT BELIEF: In addition to these eight Angas constitutive of Samyagdarśana, there are certain characteristics which accompany the subsistence of right belief in the being of self. First, there are four characteristics, namely, 1) manifestation of passions in mild forms, 2) turning away from the causes which enhance worldly career, 3) expression of the non-sceptical attitude towards the substances, and lastly 4) manifestation of u compassion. These are respectively called 1) Praśama, 2) Samvega, 3) Āstikya and 4) Anukampās. Somadeva observes that just as the virility of a man, which cannot be perceived with the senses, can be ascertained from his relation with women, or the generation of children, or his fortitude in danger, or the execution of his designs, similarly, the existence of the jewel of right faith, although, extremely subtle owing to its being the condition of the soul may be inferred from the qualities of prasama, sarvega, anukampā and āstikya. Secondly, there are three other characteristics which are also possessed by the true believer, namely, 1) censuring his own sins in his own mind, 2) divulging his own weakness of conduct before the Guru, 3) devotion to Arahantas. These are respectively called nindā, garhā, and bhakti. Thirdly, the true believer is exceedingly scrupulous in not allowing the filth of pride to maculate the self, thus striking out eight kinds of pride; namely, pride of 1) learning, 2) honour, 3) family, 4) caste, 5) power, 6) opulence, 7) penance, 8) and body, from his mind and demeanour.
COMPONENTS OF SAMYAGDARSANA FROM SUPEREMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE: Having explained the nature of Samyagdarsana, its integral constituents and its accompanying characteristics from the empirical point of view, we now proceed to expound their nature from the superempirical viewpoint, except the superempirical nature of Samyagdarsana which has already been dealt with. To begin with the constituent elements of right
1 Kārtti. 420. 2 Puru. 30.; Ratna Śrāva. 18.; Kürtti. 421, 422. 3 Rajavā. I. 2/30. 4 Yaš. & lc. p. 255. 5 Ratna. Srāva. 25.
.

Page #91

III. SAMYAGDARSANA AND THE SEVEN TATTVAS
belief, first, the follower of the Niḥśańkita Anga frees himself from the inroads of doubt regarding the nature of transcendental self and expels the seven kinds of fear from the being of his self. He kindles the superempirical choice of fixing himself in the real self by belief. The wise man recognises his own self as the real universe which is enduring, and so any other world other than this concerns him not. Hence he thinks that the fears relating to this life and future life are childish and false. Besides, in view of the true self the distinctions expressed by the words 'this life' and 'future life' are unfounded and artificial, as also the fear relating to them.2 The recognition of self as transcending mundane pleasure and pain, as enduringly existent, as naturally possessing the affluence of Darśana and Jñana, as living with the real prāna of knowledge which is incapable of parting with it in its lifehistory, as not capable of giving place to other foreign qualities, dissipates the fear of pain, safety, losing one's belongings, death and accident respectively.3 Such is the adamantine belief that it does away with all obstacles that hamper it. Secondly, he who evinces no yearning for the fruits of Karman is called the author of the Niḥkänkṣita Anga. Thirdly, the Nirvicikitsa Anga implies the non-abhorrence of the natural qualities of things. Fourthly, in following the Amudhadṛṣṭi Anga, the self has developed a sort of insight which prevents it from identifying itself with the auspicious and inauspicious psychical states." Fifthly, the Upabṛmhaṇa Anga signifies the development of the spiritual power which ipso facto veils the other pseudo-characteristics of one's own self. Sixthly, the re-establishment of self in knowledge and conduct constitutes the Sthitikaraṇa Anga. Seventhly, the deep affection for the three jewels or for the self is entitled Vatsalya." Lastly, the Prabhāvanā Anga fosters the self to manifest the eternal light in order to dispel the darkness of ignorance.10
CHARACTERISTICS ACCOMPANYING SAMYAGDARSANA FROM THE SUPEREMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE: As regards the characteristics from the superempirical view-point, we may say that on account of the seed of wisdom, the wise man acquires unswerving conviction in the true self. Consequently, he denies all association with the auspicious and inauspicious activities. He does not consider himself to be their author, thus destroys
1 Samaya. 228. 4 Samaya. 230. 8 Ibid. 234.

5 Ibid. 231. 9 Ibid. 235.
2 Samaya. Comm. Amṛta. 228. 6 Ibid. 232. 10 Ibid. 236.
69
3 Samaya. Comm. Amṛta. 228. 7 Samaya, and Comm. Amṛta. 233.

Page #92

70
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
the foundation of all ignorance. Apart from this, he regards himself as no longer their enjoyer. Whatever he does or enjoys, all is due to the irresistibility of the force of Karman and his weakness, but internally he does not relish them because he has acquired the taste for something noble and excellent.
SAMYAGDARSANA AS FORMING THE SPIRITUAL BACKGROUND OF JAINA ETHICS: We have endeavoured to explain the nature of Samyagdarśana by frequently describing it as the unflinching and sturdy belief in the Tattvas, which eventually leads us to have the belief in the transcendental nature of self. This naturally creates an impression of its momentousness in the domain of spiritualism. Without Samyagdarśana conduct is incapable of surpassing the province of morality. An ascetic who bases his asceticism on the mere moral concepts cannot be said to be superior to a householder whose interior has been illumined with the light of Samyagdarśana, inasmuch as the former is paving the way for the achievement of empyreal pleasures far away from the blissful state of existence, while the latter's face is turned in the right direction, which will in due course yield whatever is worthy of his inherent nature. The auspicious Bhāvas are regarded by the spiritually converted persons as the temporary places of stay, when they find themselves incapable of staying at the pinnacle of truth and realization. These Bhāvas serve as a halting place for them and not as a permanent dwelling. Thus such aspirants absolve themselves even from subconscious egoism in performing auspicious activities. On the contrary, those who are only morally converted regard the acquisition of auspicious mental states and performance of auspicious activities as ends in themselves, hence they are bound to endless mundane existence, which shall deprive them of spiritual bliss for all time before spiritual conversion. Besides, their profound learning and the austere penances performed by them even for thousands of years or more are spiritually unfruitful in the absence of Samyagdarśana.2 Kundakunda undauntedly declares that the wise man even in enjoying the conscious and non-conscious objects by the senses simply sheds off the Karman, and thus avoids fresh bondage. This may at the outset appear paradoxical but it is justifiable, since he undertakes a detached view of things and performs certain actions owing to the inefficiency of counteracting the force of Karman. This is not the case
1 Pañcā. Comm. Amộta. 135, 136.
2 Darsana. Pā. 4, 5.

Page #93

IV. ĀCĀRA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
11
with the ignorant man who adds fresh filth of Karman on account of his attachment to things. All this is to emphasize the importance of Samyagdarśana and not to encourage one's indulgence in the life of flesh. Thus we may say that the whole Jaina Ācāra, whether of the householder or of the Muni, is out and out sterile without having Samyagdarśana as forming its background. In other words, without the assimilation of Samyagdarśana which is nothing but the belief in the superempirical conscious principle, the entire Jaina Ācāra is a labour wholly lost. Thus it is grounded in spiritualism. We can scarce forbear mentioning that Jainism is not merely ethics and metaphysics but spiritualism too which is evidently manifest from the persistent emphasis laid by all the Jaina philosophers without any exception on the veritable achievement of Samyagdarśana before any Ācāra subscribing to the attainment of emancipation is practised and pursued. Thus spiritualism pervades the entire Jaina Ācāra; hence the charge that the Jaina ethics is incapable of transcending morality, and does not land us deep in the ordinarily unfathomable ocean of spiritualism gives way.
CHAPTER IV
Acara of the Householder
SUMMARY OF THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER: In the previous chapter we have discussed the nature of seven Tattvas along with the nature of Samyagdarśana. After dwelling upon the nature of Jīva and Ajīva Tattvas, we have, in the first place, explained the nature of 'Yoga' (vibratory activity of soul) and its effect on the mundane and embodied supermundane souls. Secondly, the nature of passions with their multitudinous forms of existence and operations has been made out. Thirdly, we have unfolded some causes of the auspicious and the inauspicious Sāmparāyika Āsrava, and have concluded the topic of Asrava and Bandha after dwelling upon the views of Kundakunda regarding them. Fourthly, the nature of Samvara, Nirjarā and Mokşa has been briefly dealt with, inasmuch as they are exemplified in the ethical development of the soul to be explained in this and the follow
hapters. Fifthly, we have discussed the nature of Samyagdarśana from the Vyavahāra and Niscaya points of view, and have emphasized

Page #94

ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
its importance for the authenticity of knowledge and conduct. In other words, we have seen how any discipline contributing to the highest spiritual welfare, which is the crowning phase of life, presupposes spiritual conversion, which is itself an evidence for regarding Jaina ethics as spiritual. Thus, in the absence of Samyagdarśana all intellectual knowledge and ethical conduct will deprive the aspirant of superb attainments, of which he is potentially capable.
RIGHT CONDUCT AS AN INTERNAL NECESSITY OF THE SPIRITUALLY CONVERTED: We now proceed to deal with the nature of right conduct which transforms the potential excellences of the self into actuality. With the light of right knowledge which enables the aspirant to look into his infirmities, the pursuit of right conduct sweeps away the elements which thwart the manifestation of uninterrupted happiness and infinite knowledge. Right knowledge illumines the path, and right conduct leads to the goal. In addition to right belief and right knowledge emancipation presupposes right conduct as well. Really speaking, right conduct emanates from the internal necessity which the right believer has developed in him. Thereby, he then expunges the disharmony existent between his present and future conditions, and between his potential conviction and actual living. Thus, the right believer is ardently desirous of manifesting the natural modification of the soul by pursuing the right course of discipline.
VīTARAGA CARITRA AND SARĀGA CĂRITRA; INAUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES ARE IN. NO WAY THE PART OF CONDUCT: So important is the pursuit of right conduct for realising the transcendental nature of self that Kundakunda calls it Dharma. Such conduct as will conduce to the emergence of a state of self which is devoid of infatuation (moha) and perturbation (kşobha) by virtue of the subversion of all kinds of passions in their most comprehensive extent is called Vītarāga Căritra. This should be distinguished from Sarāga Cāritra which results in auspicious activities by virtue of auspicious psychical states, and this amounts to a fall from the pinnacle of truth and normality. In consequence, as the former results in liberation, it is to be pursued; and as the latter brings about auspicious bondage, it is to be forsaken in the interest of arriving at the summit of spiritual perfection. In spite of this bondage the virtuous deeds may, in some measure, be considered to be the part of conduct,
1 Prava. I. 7.
2 Prava. II, 6 and Comm. Amfta,

Page #95

IV. ĀCĀRA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
73
but the inauspicious activities emanating from inauspicious psychical states can in no way be the part of conduct, hence they are to be completely relinquished. Thus, in order to stamp out the inauspicious psychical states from the texture of self, the aspirant must abstain himself root and branch from violence, falsehood, theft, unchastity and acquisition. The engrossment of the self into such vicious deeds is indicative of the expression of the most intense passions, which can be wiped off by negating to perform the vicious deeds. This affirmation does not imply the nullification of the previously mentioned inaus activities which result in inauspicious Asrava, but it simply signifies the grouping of them under different heads. This negative process of purifying the self by weeding out these villainous actions of necessity requires the pursuance of the positive process of non-violence, truthfulness, non-thieving, chastity and non-acquisition. Both of these processes keep pace together.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SPIRITUALLY CONVERTED AND PERVERTED SOULS REGARDING THE PERFORMANCE OF MORAL AND EVIL ACTIONS: We : cannot forbear mentioning in passing that even a right believer may be
occupied with the aforementioned evil deeds; the recognition of which would at the first sight tend to annul the distinction between the wise and the ignorant, or between the spiritually converted and perverted souls. But this assumption is based on a certain misapprehension. Notwithstanding their extrinsic similitude they evince intrinsic disparity; i. e., the wise under some latent constraint unwillingly perpetrate such : evil actions, and the ignorant rejoicingly commit them. From this it is
obvious that right belief is not incompatible with the most intense forms of inauspicious activities. It will not be inconsistent if it is laid down that both the wise and the ignorant are capable of extirpating inauspicious psychical states. But the difference is that while in the former case there is spiritual morality, in the latter, there is only dry morality which is possible without spirituality. Dry morality is socially useful, but spiritually barren; while spiritual morality is fruitful both socially and spiritually. Being subtle and far reaching, the internal distinction between these two types of morality eludes our limited comprehension. We may simply say that, for the spiritually converted, morality is a means; while for the perverted it is an end in itself. It is to be borne in mind that morality, of whatever type, can in no case be useless; hence it deserves our respect wherever it is witnessed.

Page #96

14
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
NECESSITY OF PARTIAL CONDUCT: To revert to our point. It is astonishing that in spite of not being the part of conduct in any way, the aforementioned vicious deeds refuse to be completely relinquished at the start on account of their being ingrained in the mind of man. Hence, there arises the concept of limited morality technically called Vikala Cāritra (partial conduct) in contrast to absolute morality known as Sakala Căritra (complete conduct) wherein these vicious deeds are completely renounced. He who observes the former, being not able to renounce the vices to the full, claims the title of a 'layman'; while he who observes the latter, being able to hold the spirit of renunciation to the brim, is called a 'Muni'. We shall now confine ourselves to the former, deferring the consideration of the latter to the subsequent chapter.
PRIVILEGED POSITION OF MAN: The ethics of the Jaina answers to his metaphysical findings, which point to an infinite number of independent souls and an infinite number of material particles together with the other principles already discussed. Of the infinite number of conscious principles varying from the one-sensed to the five-sensed, man alone is recognised as the terminus of evolution. In other words, only man is capable of unfolding his potential attributes perfectly. To express it differently, though every soul is potentially divine, yet the attainment of freedom is rendered possible only when the soul achieves a human form; hence the importance of human birth.
PHILOSOPHY OF RENUNCIATION: Animate and inanimate objects are not in themselves auspicious and inauspicious. They are called auspicious and inauspicious, when they are considered in relation to the mundane souls. They very often wield influence over, and react upon, the mundane souls to the extent of engendering either mild passions or intense passions in the structure of self. In other words, the mild or intense passions which arise owing to the Karmic accompaniment gratify their subtle persuasion in hankering after particular types of objects. Intense passion is vice, and mild passion is virtue.2 To illustrate, Bhakti is a mild passion, but lustful thought and voluptuousness is an intense passion. Because of this parallelism between the outward objects and the inward psychical states, the renunciation of extraneous objects assists in destroying corresponding intense passions. If the
1 Ratna. Grāva. 50.
2 Kärtti. 90.

Page #97

.
IV. ĀCĀRA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
75
giving up of certain external things does not, for some reason or another, result in the destruction of the internal intense passions and in the development of Bhakti, study and meditation, the discipline so observed would amount to futility. Hence, the giving up of intense passions is of great significance, although, in common parlance, Vairāgya is understood to convey the withdrawal from the external world of wife, children etc., yet the underlying hidden meaning consists in removing the filth of intense passions, which will necessarily lead to the turning of selves from them.
Intense passions manifest themselves in violence, falsehood, theft, unchastity and acquisition, which have been represented to be vices. As we have said, the elimination of these vices requires the cultivation of virtues of non-violence, truthfulness, non-thieving, chastity and non-acquisition. Of these virtues, non-violence is the fundamental. All the rest should be regarded as the means for its proper sustenance, just as the field of corn requires adequate fencing for its protection. The householder can partially acquire these virtues which are then called Partial non-violence (ahiṁsānuvrata), partial truthfulness (satyāņuvrata), partial non-thieving (acauryāņuvrata), partial chastity (bramhacaryāņuvrata) and partial non-acquisition (parigraha-parimāņāņuvrata). We shall now dwell upon the aforementioned vices one by one, and shall derive from them the scope of partial vows of the householder.
COMPREHENSIVE MEANING OF HIŃSĀ: We begin with Himsā. Speaking from the transcendentel point of view, we may say that even the slightest fall from complete self-realization is to be regarded as Hiṁsā. In other words, Himsā commences with the appearance of passions, whether mild or intense, on the surface of self.? Considered from this perspective, the concept of Himsā includes both virtue and vice. But here we are concerned with the meaning of Himsā as vice or intense passion only. From this point of view, therefore, falsehood, theft, unchastity and acquisition are the illustrations of Hiṁsā. Thus Himsā summarises all these vices. In its popular meaning, which shall be dealt with presently, Himsā distinguishes itself from falsehood, theft, unchastity and acquisition. In the former, the Dravya-prāṇas and the Bhāva-prānas are directly injured; whereas in the latter cases, the Prāņas are indirectly afflicted.
1 Sarvartha. VII. 1.
2 Puru. 44.

Page #98

76
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
POPULAR MEANING OF HIMSA: The term Himsa may be defined as the committing of injury to the Dravya-prāṇas and the Bhāva-prāṇas through the operation of intense-passion-infected Yoga1 (activity of mind, body, and speech). Suicide, homicide and killing of any other life whatsoever aptly sum up the nature of Himsā, inasmuch as these villainous actions are rendered conceivable only when the Dravya-prāṇas and the Bhāva-prāṇas pertaining to oneself and to others are injured. The minimum number of Dravya-prāņas has been considered to be four, and the maximum has been known to be ten; and the Bhāva-prāņas are the very attributes of Jīva. The amount of injury will thus be commensurate with the number of Prāņas injured at a particular time and occasion. If the bodily movements etc., are performed with circumspection, nevertheless if any living being is oppressed, it cannot be called Himsā, for the infecting element of intense passion is missing. On the contrary, even if, by careless bodily movements no animate body is oppressed, the actions are not free from Himsa. Here though the soul has not injured others, yet it has injured itself by defiling its own natural constitution.3 We may thus say that both the indulgence in Himsā and the negation of abstinence from Himsă constitute Himsa. In other words, he who has not abandoned Himsa, though he is not factually indulging in it, commits Himsā on account of having the subconscious frame of mind for its perpetration. Again, he who employs his mind, body and speech in injuring others also commits Himsa on account of actually indulging in it. Thus, wherever there is inadvertence of mind, body or speech, Himsā is inevitable."
PURITY OF EXTERNAL BEHAVIOUR TOO IS NECESSARY: It will be the height of folly and impertinence if any man conceitedly argues that it is no use renouncing the performance of certain actions, but that the internal mind alone ought to be uncontaminated. But it is to be borne in mind that in lower stages, which exceedingly fall short of selfrealisation, the external performance of a man has no meaning without his being internally disposed to do so. Hence the external and the internal influence each other; and in most cases the internal precedes the external. Thus, in no case, the outward commission of Himsă, without the presence of internal corruption can be vindicated. He who exclusively emphasizes the internal at the expense of the external forgets
1 Puru. 43; Tasū. VII. 13.
3 Puru. 46, 47. 4 Ibid. 48. 5 Puru. 48.

2 Puru. 45.

Page #99

IV. ACARA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
J
the significance of outward behaviour. He loses sight of the fact that the impiousness of external actions necessarily leads to the pollution of the internal mind, thus disfiguring both the aspects, namely, the internal and the external. In consequence, both the Niscaya and Vyavahāra Nayas, i.e., both the internal and external aspects should occupy their due places.
JUDGEMENT OF THE ACTS OF HIMSĀ AND AHIMSĀ: We may point out here that the Jaina philosophers do not blink the possibility of the disparity between the exterior behaviour and the interior state of mind; and consequently they do not get perplexed in judging the acts of Himsā and Ahimsā, i.e., which act will bear the fruit of Himsā, and which act will be judged as Ahimsā ? An eminent Jaina author Amộtacandra, in his celebrated book, Puruşārthasiddhyupāya, dwells with great clarity upon the above facts. First, he preaches that he who does not explicitly commit Himsā may also reap the fruits of Himsā be his continual mental inclination towards indulging in Himsā; and he who apparently employs himself in the acts of Himsā may not be liable to fruits of Himsā”. Secondly, owing to one's intense passion one may be subjected to grave consequences even by committing trifling Himsā, while, owing to mild passion, the other escapes the sad and serious consequences in spite of perpetrating gross acts of Himsā. Thirdly, it is amazing that, in spite of the two persons following the same course of Himsā, divergence at the time of fruition may be exhibited on account of the differences in their states of mind and intensity of passions. Fourthly, though Himsā may be committed by one, yet consequences may be suffered by many. Similarly, though it may be committed by many, the consequences may be suffered by one. From all these we may conclude that the point of reference in judging the acts of Himsā and Ahimsā is the internal state of mind.
KINDS OF HIMSĀ: Having explained the philosophy of Himsā, we now proceed to enquire into the kinds of Himsā. It is of two kinds, namely, intentional and non-intentional. The latter has been again subdivided into Udyamī, Arambhi and Virodhi.? The intentional perpetrator of Himsā engages himself in the commitment of the acts of Himsā by his own mind, speech and action; provokes others to
Ibid. 53.
5 Puru. 55.
1 Puru. 50. 2 Puru. 51. Jainadarsanasāra, p. 63.
3 Ibid. 52. Ibid. p. 63.

Page #100

78
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
commit them; and endorses such acts of others. Besides, Himsa which is unavoidably committed 1) by reason of one's own profession, 2) by the performance of domestic activities, and 3) by defending oneself, one's neighbour, one's country, one's belongings and the like from one's foes is denominated: 1) Udyami, 2) Ārambhī and 3) Virodhi
respectively.
AHIMSAṆUVRATA: Now the householder, being snared in the meshes of infirmities, is incapable of turning away completely from Himsa; hence he should keep himself away from the deliberate commission of Himsa of the two-sensed to five-sensed beings.1 The commitment of Himsă in being engaged in a certain profession, in performing domestic activities and in adopting defensive contrivances, cannot be counteracted by him. Thus he commits intentional injury to one-sensed Jivas, namely, the vegetable-bodied, the air-bodied, the firebodied etc.; and non-intentional injury in performing Arambha (domestic activities), Udyoga (profession) and Virodha (defence). He can therefore observe the gross form of Ahimsa which is known as Ahimsaṇuvrata. Even in the realm of one-sensed Jīvas and in the realm of non-intentional injury he should so manage to confine his operations as may affect the life and existence of a very limited number of Jīvas. In these two provinces the point to note is that of alleviating the amount of injury that is apt to be caused and not that of total relinquishment which is not possible without jeopardizing the survival of man. Nevertheless, Himsā, even in the realm of one-sensed Jīvas and in the realm of non-intentional injury, is unjustifiable. If we reflect a little, we shall find that man is subject to Himsă by the very condition of his existence. Yet instead of aggravating the natural weight of Himsa by falling foul upon one another and by our cruel treatment with the animal and vegetable kingdoms, we should endeavour to alleviate this general curse, to the extent to which we are capable of doing, by conforming ourselves to the sacred injunctions enjoined by Jaina spiritual teachers.
1 Puru. 75.; Caritra Pähuḍa. 24;
Ratna. Srava. 53; Kärtti. 332;
Sāgā. Dharma. IV. 7,;
Amita. Śrāva. VI. 4.
2 Puru. 77; Vasu. Śravą. 209. Yo. Sã. II. 21.

Page #101

IV. ACARA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
79
For the observance of Ahimsāņuvrata, the householder should avoid the use of 1) wine, 2) meat, 3) honey and five kinds of fruits known as Ūmara, Kathumara, Pākara, Bada, Pīpala. 1) Drinking, first, breeds certain unhealthy and base passions like pride, anger, sexpassion and the like which are nothing but the different aspects of Himsā.2 Secondly, it stupifies the intellect, which sinks virtue and piety, and results in the commitment of the mean and morally depraved deeds of Hiṁsā. Thirdly, being the repository of abundant lives, wine necessarily entails injury to them. 2) As regards meat-eating, first, the procurement of flesh is inconceivable in the absence of the infliction of injury on the sentient beings, and even though it is obtained as a consequence of the natural death of living beings, Himsā is inevitable owing to the crushing of creatures spontaneously born therein.' Secondly, the pieces of flesh which are raw, or cooked, or are in the process of being cooked, are found unceasingly to generate creatures in them, so that he who indulges in meat-eating is incapable of avoiding hurt to them.“ A plausible argument is sometimes adduced in support of meat-eating: beans and pulses too are to be equated with flesh as these are endowed with life like the bodies of camels, sheep and animals. However shrewed the argument may be, it contains the fallacy of undistributed middle. Somadeva observes, 'no doubt flesh may constitute the body of an animate object, but the body of any animate object is not necessarily composed of flesh, just as the Neem is a tree, but any tree is not Neem.” In a similar vein, Aśādhara cogently points out that though flesh and vegetables indubiously possess lives, the latter are proper to be used as food to the exclusion of the former, inasmuch as though both mother and wife possess womanhood, wife alone is justified in gratifying our sex-passion, and not the mother. 8 3) The use of honey is objected to on the ground that it is procured by injuring the lives of bees and of the young eggs in the womb of bees: and even if it is gathered when the honey naturally drops down, it causes destruction to the lives spontaneously born therein. The
1 Puru. 61, 72.; Sāgā. Dharma. II. 2.; Amita. Śrāva. V. 1.; 2 Puru. 64. 3 Puru. 62; Vasu. Śrūva. 70, 77,; Amita. Śrāva. V. 2. Puru. 63; Amita. Śrāva. V. 6; Sāgā. Dharma. II. 4, 5; Yas and Ic. p. 262. Puru. 65, 66; Amita. Śrāva V. 14; Sāgā. Dharma. II. 78. Puru. 67, 68. 7 Yaś and Ic. p. 263. 8 Sāgā. Dharmā. II. 10. Puru. 69, 70.

Page #102

80
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
five kinds of fruits known as Ūmara, Kathumara, Päkara, Bada and Pīpala are the breeding grounds of various living organisms, and their use for dietic and other purposes is also forbidden owing to the injury caused to them.' Again their use after they get dry on account of the passage of time causes hiṁsā, because it is due to our excessive attachment to such odlous things.
Again, the following points should be noted for the observance of Ahimsāņuvrata. First, one should not sacrifice animals for the adoration of gods, being dominated by the perverted notion of receiving benediction in return. It is inconceivable how the gods seek satisfaction and serenity from such inhuman deeds which cause unbearable pain to the animals. Secondly, it must not be obligatory to kill the animals for the entertainment of guests, a pious design by · impious means.* Thirdly, to harbour the notion that the vegetable food necessitates the killing of innumerable lives abiding in it as compared with the slaughter of one living being may be fascinating at the inception, but it is imprudent in view of the facts that the body of an animal possesses countless microscopic lives which will be inevitably injured in its killing; and that the five-sensed Jīva would entail more inauspicious Asrava, i. e., vice owing to the occupation and consequential loss of more Dravya and Bhāva Prāņas than those of one-sensed Jīvas belonging to the vegetable kingdom. Fourthly, snakes, scorpions, lions and the like should not be killed on the ground that by so doing large number of lives will be saved, and that they (snakes, scorpions etc.) will get the opportunity of avoiding the accumulation of more sin by their continued violence. Fifthly, under the weight of misconception that those who are in distress and calamity on being killed will soon obtain relief from anguish and agony, the living beings should never be killed. Lastly, moved by the pangs of other being's hunger, one should not provide one with the flesh of one's own body to appease one's appetite
STAGES OF DEFILEMENT OF A VOW AND THE TRANSGRESSIONS OF THE HOUSEHOLDER'S VOW OF AHIŃSĀ: We have dwelt upon the nature of Ahimsāpuvrata, which is obligatory for every householder to pursue. The vow should be followed with proper understanding and comprehen
1 Puru. 72. 6 Puru. 84.
2 Puru. 73. 7 Ibid. 85.
3 Puru. 79, 80. 8 Ibid. 89.
Ibid. 81.
5 Ibid. 82, 83.

Page #103

IV. ACARA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
sion. Sometimes it so happens that on account of the short understanding or on account of the irresistible force of passion, the purity and enthusiasm diminish and the result is the defilement of 4 vow. This must at once be avoided in order to maintain its sanctity. When such corruption rises in the mind, it is called atikrama; when further development occurs towards its defilement, say, collection of means to overthrow it, vyatikrama is the name given to it; when we have indulged in it, it is said to be aticāra; and lastly, when excessive indulgence is witnessed, anācāra results. These four are the stages of defilement of a vow. To illustrate, to simply think to enter another man's field is Atikrama; to start to jump in the field is Vyatikrama; to enter the field is Aticāra; and to move, sit and lie down in the field is Anācāra. According to Amstacandra that which hampers the purity of the vow is called Aticāra.? Every vow should be observed with great purity, care and zeal, since only such vows can bear desired fruits, and serve as a means to the moral and the spiritual upliftment. In spite of every care the mind may, under the influence of society, ill-health, fear and passion, deviate from the prescribed path. Hence, defects originating in the observance of vows may be of many types, but the Jaina Ācāryas have mentioned only five for each vow, so that we may direct our mind towards them and shun them. Now the five transgressions of the householder's vow of Ahimsā are: 1) tying up living beings, 2) mutilating them, 3) beating them, 4) overloading them, and 5) withholding their food and drink.
NATURE OF ASATYA (FALSEHOOD): We now turn to the exposition of the nature of falsehood and Satyāņuvrata. To begin with falsehood, it concerns itself with the expression of intense passion through the outlet of speech, which expresses itself in language and gestures. Dispassionate speech is synonymous with the mystical realization which is the height of truth man is capable of achieving. Intense-passion-infected speech is complete falsehood. Mild-passion-infected speech, is, to coin a new word, semi-truth, i.e., truth descended in the mundane and embellished form, for example, to speak noble, beneficial and benevolent words; this certainly amounts to the gliding and lapse from the superb
1 Bhāvanāviveka, 192, 193. 2 Puru. 181.
3 Puru. 183,; Ratna. Śrāva., 54. Ta. sū. VII. 25; Uvāsagadasão, I. 45,; Sāgā. Dharma. IV. 15, Amita. Srāva. VII. 3.

Page #104

82
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
heights. of mystical truth. The perfect souls of Tīrthamkaras who preach for the upliftment of human and other beings should not be regarded as being moved by the mild passions of compassion and benevolence, inasmuch as they speak for the good of all without any selfish desire and without constraint of mild-passion. It follows from what has been described that falsehood, being the expression of intense passions, is a double fall from the loftiest heights of truth. It defiles both the internal soul and the external demeanour, the social living and the spiritual upliftment, hence it should be forsaken in the interest of advancement.
We now define falsehood. It implies the making of wrong statement by one who is overwhelmed by intense passions, such as anger, greed, conceit, deceit and the like. We may point out here that it does not mean merely the pronouncement of the existent as nonexistent, nor can it be said to embrace merely the proclamation of the nonexistent as existent, but it involves also the misrepresentation of the true nature of the existents and the use of speech which arouses intense-passion and causes pain to others. Accordingly, truth must not mean merely the announcement of the existent as existent, but it must mean also the use of words which are soothing, gentle and ennobling. It should be borne in mind that, even if by our most vigilant and gentle speaking, others are somehow perversely and painfully affected, we shall not be considered as transgressing and setting at nought the vow of truth. Ontologically speaking, no word is pleasant or unpleasant in isolation and in itself. It is the spirit that counts. A word, being the modification of Pudgala, has infinite characteristics. Therefore it possesses the potency of affecting others in infinite ways, all of which are incapable of being known by imperfect human beings. In calling a word pleasant or unpleasant, the circumstances, the place and time, the character of the man, the mental and physical effects on himself and others that surround him should all be counted. Thus, according to Amrtacandra, the first kind of falsehood refers to the affirmation of the existent as non-existent;' the second refers to the declaration of the non-existente as existent; the third refers to the representation of the existing nature of things as different from what they really are; and the fourth is indicative of the speech which is 1) condemnable (garhita),
1 Puru. 91.
2 Puru. 92.
3 Ibid. 93.
• Ibid. 94.

Page #105

IV. ACARA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
83
2) sinful (sāvadya), and 3) disagreeable (apriya)." To explain the fourth form of falsehood, 1) back-biting, ridiculous speech, harsh language and violent words are comprised under condemnable speech.2 Besides, useless gossiping, language inciting unfounded beliefs, and superstitions should also be grouped under it. 2) Sinful speech comprises the use of language for defence, for running the household and for professional purposes. 3) Disagreeable words are those which arouse uneasiness, engender fear, excite repugnance, inflame dolour, and intoxicate brawl.
SATYAŅUVRATA: Of these forms of falsehood, it is beyond the power of the householder to shun totally the use of words concerning his household affairs, the 'affairs relating to his profession and safety; and these necessarily entail Himsā. The avoidance of sinful (sāvadya) speech is not possible without imperilling his life, and that of his dependents, just as it is not possible for him to abandon the Hiṁsā of one-sensed Jīvas. Thus the householder should abandon all other forms of falsehood except sinful speech. This is the gross form of the vow of truth or Satyāņuvrata. It should be noted that Samantabhadra allows not telling the truth, if it endangers the life of any one in Satyānuvrata." The truthful man should denounce exaggeration, fault-finding and indecent speech; and speak words that are noble, beneficial and balanced. He should be grave, equanimous, noblecharactered personality, philanthropist, kind and sweet-tongued. He should not extol himself, and calumniate others. 10 Nor should he hide the merits of others that are existent, and describe those of himself that are non-existent. In order to maintain the purity of the vow, one should steer clear of the following Aticāras," which are; 1) false preaching, 2) divulging the secrets of a couple, 3) forgery, 4) not to return the deposited articles of a man in full, if he has forgotten the actual number, and 5) disclosing one's secret purposes.
NATURE OF STEYA (STEALING): We now proceed to deal with the nature of stealing (steya) and Acauryāņuvrata. Stealing means the
1 Puru. 95. 2 Ibid. 96. 3 Puru. 96. 4 Ibid. 97. SIbid. 98. 6 Ibid. 101. 7 Ratna. Srāva. 55; Vasu. Śrāva. 210. 8 Kartti. 334,; Yaś. and Ic. p. 266. Yas. and Ic. p. 266. 10 Yas. and Ic. p. 266. 11 Puru. 184; Tasū. VII-26., Uvāsagdasão I. 46., Sägā.
Dharma. IV. 45;. The Aticāras of this vow show wide divergence. We have followed the Tattvärthasūtra and its commentary, the Sarvärthasiddhi.

Page #106

84
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
taking of things without their being given by the owner.1 This necessarily implies the presence of internal intense passions in one's own mind. In this world, transient things constitute the external Prāņas of a man, and he who thieves or plunders them is said to commit theft, inasmuch as this is tantamount to depriving a man of bis Prāņas. This, then, is not other than Himsā.*
ASTEYĀŅUVRATA OR ACAURYāṆUVRATA: Not to take anything without the permission of others is a discipline par-excellence; but it lies beyond the power of the house-holder; so he is required to use such things freely as are of common use without their being given, such as well-water, sand and the like. This is Acauryaṇuvrata or gross form of the vow of non-stealing. According to Samantabhadra the observer of the householder's vow of non-stealing neither takes himself those things which are unoffered, placed, dropped, and forgotten by others nor gives them to anyone else. Kārttikeya includes even the purchasing of costly things at reduced prices under stealing, which is probably due to the fact that one may sell a thing after getting it by improper methods." Somadeva holds that the underground property belongs to the king or the state; so also the property of unknown ownership. To take the possession of property at the death of one's own kinsman is justified, but, when he is alive, his sanction is required to sustain the householder's vow of non-stealing." The householder who gives himself to this vow must abstain himself from the following Aticāras:10 1) adulteration, 2) abetment of theft, 3) receiving stolen property, 4) violating state rules, and 5) the use of false weights and measures.
8
NATURE OF ABRAHMA (UNCHASTITY): We now pass on to dwell upon the nature of unchastity and Brahmacaryāṇuvrata. The copulation arising from sexual passion is Abrahma. This is Himsa in two ways.11 In the first place, many living beings are deprived of their vitalities in the vagina in the sexual act, just as a hot rod of iron, when it is introduced in a tube filled with sesamum seeds, burns them up.11 Secondly, psychical life is affected because of the emergence of sexual
1 Puru. 102.
2 Ibid. 3 Puru. 103. 4 Puru. 104. 5 Puru. 106.
6 Yo. Sa., II. 66; Ratna. Srava. 57; Vasu. Srava. 211; Amita. Srava. VI. 59.
7 Kärtti. 335. 8 Yas. and Ic. p. 265; Sāgā. Dharma. IV. 48.
9 Yas. and Ic. p. 265. 10 Puru. 185, Ratna. Srava. 58; Tasu. VII. 27.; Sāgā. Dharma. IV. 50.; Amita. Srava. VII. 5.; Uvasagadasão. I. 47; Cärjtrasāra. p. 10-11. 11 Puru. 107. 12 Ibid. 108.

Page #107

IV. ĀCĀRA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
85
passion, and so also the material prānas are affected owing to the lethargic condition consequent upon coition.
BRAHMACARYĀNUVRATA: The householder cannot relinquish copulation as such. Hence he should abstain himself from the sexual and lustful contacts with all other women except his nuptial partner.2 This is Brahmacaryānuvrata or gross form of the vow of chastity. According to Vasunandi, the householder following this vow should not succumb to the unnatural ways of sexual satisfaction like masturbation, sodomy and the like and should not copulate even with his own wife on the pious days (Astamī and Caturdaśī) of each fortnight. Samantabhadra defines Brahmacaryāņuvrata as renouncing lustful contacts with another man's wife, and as seeking contentment in one's own wife. Such an observer of vow neither enjoys another man's wife, nor instigates another person to do so. Somadeva enunciates the vow of gross chastity as conceiving all women or concubines as one's mother, sister or daughter with the exception of one's own wife. “Wine, meat, gambling, music with song and dance, personal decoration, intoxication, libertines and aimless wanderings-these ten are the concomitants of sexual passion”.? Besides, "one should be careful not to excite oneself by erotic acts, aphrodisiac potions and erotic literature. The breaches of the vow of gross chastity are:
91) taking interest in match-making, 2) sexual association with married woman, 3) sexual association with unmarried woman, 4) unnatural methods of sexual enjoyment, and 5) inordinate sexual desire. ..NATURE OF PARIGRAHA (ACQUISITION): We now proceed to dwell upon the nature of acquisition and Parigraha-parimāņāņuvrata. The most comprehensive characteristic of Parigraha is attachment, which follows as the modification and operation of Mohakarma.10 The definition of Parigraha as attachment is scientific, since it embodies the entire connotation signified by the term. It believes, in the first place, that those who have the least vestige of a feeling of attachment, notwithstanding the external renunciation of all worldly acquisitions,
1 Puru. 109. 2 Ibid. 110. 3 Vasu. Srāva. 212. 4 Ratna. Srāva. 59. 5 Ibid. 59. 6 Yas. and Ic. p. 267; Kärtti. 338; Amita. Srāva. VI. 64, 65. 7 Yas. and Ic. p. 267. 8 Yaś. and Ic. p. 267. 9 Puru. 186; Dharma Bi. 159.; Tasū. VII. 28.; Uvāsagadasão. I. 48; Srāva. Prajña.
273; Amita. Srāva. VII. 6. We have foHowed Pūjyapāda's meaning of the Aticiras. 10 Puru. 111.

Page #108

ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
are far from non-acquisition. Secondly, it expresses that the possession of external things is not possible without internal attachment. Thus, both the internal attachment and the possession of external things come within the sweep of Parigrahaa. We may now say that if one is disposed to remove the internal attachment, one should correspondingly throw aside external possessions also. In the presence of external possession, if non-attachment is claimed, it will be self-deception and fraudulence, since without psychical proneness, external possession cannot be perforce with us. It may happen that, despite insignificant external possessions, one may have conspicuous internal inclination for possession, just as a poor man may have. But this must not brush aside the difference in internal attachment corresponding to the kind of external possession. In other words, there occurs internal variation in attachment by virtue of the longing one possesses for the kind of external objects. For example, attachment is feeble in a young deer which continues to live on green blades of grass in comparison to a cat which kills a host of mice for procuring its food. Thus, the external and the internal influence each other.
KINDS OF PARIGRAHA: Parigraha is of two kinds: the external, and the internal. The former again admits of two kinds: the living and the non-living; and the latter is recognised to be of fourteen kinds, namely, perverted belief, laughter, indulgence, ennui, sorrow, fear, disgust, anger, pride, deceit, greed and desire for sexual enjoyment with man, with woman and with both.* .
PARIGRAHA AND HIŃSĀ: Parigraha as such can never preclude Hiṁsā; and those who wish to practise Ahimsā should avoid the internal and the external attachment. So Ahiṁsā will be commensurate with the degree of avoidance. Perfect non-attachment, and consequently perfect Ahimsă is rendered possible only in the life of Arahantas, and, below this, only degrees of Aparigraha are possible.
PARIGRAHA-PARIMĀŅĀŅUVRATA: The householder is incapable of renouncing all Parigraha. Hence he should shun perverted belief and Anantānubandhi and Apratyākhyānāvarana kinds of passions; and should accordingly limit the Parigraha of wealth, cattle, corn, servants, buildings, etc., inasmuch as the spirit of renunciation is the right
1 Puru. 112. 2 Puru. 113. 3 Puru. 121. Puru. 115 to 117. 5 We have already dealt with these kinds of passions in the previous chapter.

Page #109

IV. ACARA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
principle. This is Parigraha-parimāṇāṇuvrata or the gross form of the vow of Aparigraha. We may say in passing that the householder's vow of Aparigraha would tend to annul the economic inequality rampant in society and thereby everybody will be able to get things of daily necessities at least. To-day, men and nations are striving for the enhancement of their wealth and territory at the cost of others with the consequence that the individual and national tensions are increasing. Parigraha is detrimental, when it engenders inordinate clinging. An attitude of a philanthropist is essential to the observance of the vow of Parigraha-parimāṇāṇuvrata. In order to sustain the purity of the vow, the violations of the limits regarding 1) house and land, 2) gold and silver, 3) cattle and corn, 4) male and female servants, and 5) clothes and utensils, should be avoided. Samantabhadra has spoken of the other breaches of the vow, namely, 1) the keeping of a larger number of vehicles than required, 2) accumulating necessary articles in large numbers, 3) expressing jealousy at the prosperity of another, 4) excessive greed, and 5) the over-loading of animals.3
HOUSEHOLDER'S LIFE AS A MIXTURE OF VIRTUE AND VICE: We have so far dealt with the nature of the five vices and the five Aṇuvratas. Violence, falsehood, stealing, unchastity, and acquisition are the different vices. They amount to a fall from the heights of mystical experience. The middle way is to lead the life of virtue. It is to be borne in mind that the three types of non-intentional Himsā, the Himsă of one-sensed Jīvas, the use of Savadya or sinful language, the act of sexual intercourse with one's own wife, the use of common things without permission, and the keeping of limited Parigraha-all these are householder's vices, which may be socially justifiable, but cannot be justified spiritually. In other words, looked at with the social eye, they are not regarded as vices, but the eye of spirituality considers them to be so. Thus, in the life of the householder pure virtue in the sense of mild passion is an impossibility; his life is always a mixture of virtue and vice. The condition of that householder who does not strictly follow the partial vows is pitiable. Virtue, in his life,

87
1 Puru. 124 to 128; Ratna. Śrāva. 61; Vasu. Srava. 213; Amita. Srava. VI. 73; Kārtti. 340; Sāgā. Dharmā. IV. 61.
2 Puru. 187; Ta.su. VII. 29; Uvāsagadasão. I-49; Sāgā. Dharmā. IV. 64; Amita. Srava. VII. 7.
3 Ratna. Srava. 62.

Page #110

88
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
will be a mere accident, and sometimes a social compulsion. This, then, will be a pseudo-virtue as distinguished from genuine virtue springing from the inner consciousness of sin. It is only in the latter case that the vows are fruitful and conducive to the moral, social and spiritual ennoblement.
REFLECTION ON AND THE REPETITION OF CERTAIN IDEAS FOR THE PROPER OBSERVANCE OF THE Vows: Now, in order that the vows may be fixed in mind and pursued with great zeal, the author of the Tattvārthasūtra has advised us to reflect on the following ideas and to repeat them in mind very often. First, one should ponder over the troubles that may be faced in one's own life in this world, and over the afflictions that may fall to one's lot in the life hereafter, as a result of indulging in the five types of sins. To illustrate, it should be thought that an untruthful man is never believed by any one. Confinement and disrespect and other inconceivable mental and physical pains are the punishments he has to bear in this life. Besides, he will have to take birth at odious places and in disgraceful forms as a result of falsehood. Similarly for other sins. Secondly, one is required to think that by cultivating the four noble habits, namely, universal friendship with the living beings in general, appreciation for those who are virtuous, active compassion for the distressed, and indifference towards the arrogant and the incorrigible, one is facilitated in the observance of the vows. Thirdly, one should think over the transitoriness of the worldly objects and sensual pleasures, and over the impermanence, the unsubstantantiality, and the foulness of the body.3
CONCEPT OF MŪLAGUŅAS: The five vows together with the total abandonment of wine, meat and honey have been called Mülaguņas (Primary moral characters) by the ethico-logical philosopher, Samantabhadra.* The conception of Mūlagunas has been for the first time proclaimed by this eminent saint-philosopher. The content and the number of the Mūlagunas are dynamic, which is evidenced by the fact that the later Acāryas have modified them in accordance with the time, place and the nature of disciples. In this ever transforming world, new conditions emerge, and consequently new sedatives become indispensable. There can be no sovereign remedy for all times and persons of different age. The Malaguņas which are the stepping stones to higher progress
1 Ta. sū. VII. 9.
2 Ta. sū. VII. 11.
3 Ta. sū. VII. 12.
Ratna. Srāva. 66.

Page #111

IV. ĀCĀRA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
89
are, therefore, to be changed in the light of the conduct and character of persons. Thus the forms may change but not the criterion, i. e., not the fundamental principle of Ahimsă in its comprehensive sense. After Samantabhadra Jinasena substitutes gambling for honey and does not disturb the other Mūlaguņas. A tremendous change which has been effected in the content is due to Somadeva. He substituted five Udambara fruits for five Aņuvratas, and keeps the remaining three, namely, to abstain oneself from wine, meat and honey, as Samantabhadra has done. Amitagati increases the number of Mūlaguņas by appending the avoidance of eating at night to the renunciation of wine, meat, honey and five Udambara fruits. Though this eminent Acārya has mentioned neither the name, 'Mūlaguna', nor their number, a little reflection would suffice to witness both. In the end of the chapter he has mentioned that at the start these pure Guņas should be practised; and regarding number, if five Udambara fruits are considered as one we have five Mūlagunas, and if as five, we have nine Mūlaguņas. The mentioning of the fact by Amţtacandra that even the worthiness of Jaina discipline is acquired by virtue of outright relinquishing the eight kinds of things, namely, meat, wine, honey and five Udambara fruits, is suggestive of eight Mülagunas. It is apparent from Vasunandi's view of the first stage of householder's conduct that he is regarding the abandonment of meat, wine, honey, five Udamber fruits, gambling, hunting, prostitution, adultery, and stealing as the Mūlaguņas. Āsādhara mentions the view of another Acārya who has prescribed somewhat different Mūlagunas, namely, the abandonment of meat, wine, honey, five Udambara fruits and eating at night, as also the devotion to the adorable five (Arahanta, Siddha, Ācārya, Upādhyāya and Sādhu), the use of water strained through a cloth, and the compassionate attitude towards the sentient beings.?
PROBLEM OF EATING AT NIGHT: We shall now dwell upon the problem of eating any kind of food at night. All the Ācāryas agree
1 Vasu. Srāva. Intro. p. 35. 2 Yas. and Ic. p. 262. 3 Amita. Srāva. V. 1. 4 Amita. Śrāva. V. 73.5 Puru. 74. Vasu. Srāva. 57 to 59. ? Sāgā. Dharma. II. 18.
8 Kinds of food—(Amita. Srāva. VI. 96, 97): 1. asana:-"All that is swallowed: grains, and pulses of all kinds, particularly the staple, boiled rice". (Jaina Yoga, p. 39); 2. pāna:-"All that is drunk: Water, milk, the juice of fruits". (Ibid. p. 39); 3. khādima:"All that is chewed or nibbled: fruits and nuts" (Ibid.); 4 svādima:-“All that is tasted or serves as a relish, pepper, cumin seeds 'etc,.

Page #112

90
in saying that the eating of any kind of food at night occasions more Himsa than the eating by day in sunlight. The controversy centres round the question of its avoidance in the life of the householder at a particular stage. Of the eleven stages of the householder, to be dealt with in the sequel, Kundakunda,1 Kārttikeya and Samantabhadra' enjoin the total avoidance of eating at night at the sixth stage of advancement. Somadeva and Asadhara" include this in Ahimsāņuvrata, though the latter has prescribed its partial avoidance in the preparatory stage, i. e., Pākṣika stage, to be dealt with afterwards. Amitagati enumerates the total avoidance of eating at night in the Mulagunas, thus necessitating its observance at the inception of householder's life. Vasunandi prescribes its total abandonment even before commencing the observance of the rules of conduct formulated for the Ist stage of householder's conduct. Thus he is in harmony with Amitagati. Hemacandra prescribes the avoidance of eating at night in the Bhogopabhogaparimāṇavrata.
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
AVOIDANCE OF EATING AT NIGHT AS THE SIXTH AṆUVRATA: Vīranandi and Camuṇḍaraya1o regard the avoidance of eating at night as the sixth Anuvrata. They count it as a separate Aṇuvrata in addition to the five Aṇuvratas already dealt with. The corroboration of the fact of regarding the avoidance of eating at night as the sixth Anuvrata may be made from Pujyapada's11 commentary on the Tattvārthasutra wherein reference has been made to the prevalence of the view that it is the sixth Aṇuvrata. That Amṛtacandra has enunciated the importance of total abstinence from eating at night just after propounding the nature and extent of the five vows of the householder is significant of the view that he implicitly regards it as the sixth Anuvrata.12 Neither has he comprised it in Ahimsaṇuvrata, nor has he included it in the eight requisites which make a man worthy of Jaina discipline, nor has he mentioned its abstinence at any particular stage of householder's Dharma. All these considerations oblige us to infer that he was implicitly in favour of recognising this as the sixth Aṇuvrata. Why has he not explicitly described it to be so may be, on the one hand, owing
1 Caritra Pahuḍa; 22. 4 Yas. and Ic. p. 264.
7 Amita. Srava. V. 1.

2 Kärtti. 382. 3 Ratna. Srava. 142.
5 Sāgā. Dharmā. IV. 24. 6 Sāgā. Dharma. II. 76.
8 Vasu. Śrāva. 314.
10 Acarasära. V. 70; Caritrasära. p. 13.
12 Puru. 129.
9 Yo. Sã, III. 48. 11 Sarvärtha. VII. 1.

Page #113

Iv. ĀCĀRA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
91
to his unreserved faithfulness to the old tradition of recognising Anuvratas as five in number, and on the other, owing to his desire to avoid the aforementioned controversy centred round it.
DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF THE GUŅAVRATAS AND THE ŞĀVRATAS: After dealing with the five vices, the five Anuvratas, the various conceptions of Mūlaguņas, and the avoidance of eating at night, we now propose to dwell upon the nature of Guņavratas and Sikşāvratas, which are recognised as the seven Šīlavratas.1 These Sīlavratas serve the useful purpose of guarding the Aņuvratas. To be more clear, they effect a positive improvement in the observance of the Aņuvratas. The Srāvaka Prajñapti distinguishes between the Gunavratas and the Sikşāvratas by saying that the former are observed for the whole life, but that the latter, for a limited time. Āśādhara also draws a distinction between the two by pointing out that, by the observance of the Guņavratas, the Anuvratas are observed in a better way, and that, by the observance of the Siksāvratas, the individual gets inspiration and training for the life of renunciation. The two seemingly different views do not exclude each other, but the one implies the other. The former view emphasises the time element, whereas the latter one lays stress on the functions performed by the Guņavratas and the Sikṣāvratas. There is perfect unanimity among the Jaina Ācāryas regarding the number of Sīlavratas. All of them agree that there are three Guņavratas and four Sikşāvratas. Of the three Guņavratas, the Digvrata and the Anarthadandavrata have been recognised by all the Ācāryas as the Guņavratas; and of the four Sikşāvratas, the Atithisam vibhāgavrata has been unanimously regarded as the Sikşāvrata; and all the Acāryas except Vasunandi include the Sāmāyikavrata and the Proşadhopavāsavrata in the Sikşāvratas. Vasunandi has not recognised them at all as any of the Vratas. Different schools of Vratas have emerged owing to the controversial nature of Deśavrata, Bhogopabhogaparimāņavrata and Sallekhanā. Kundakunda regards Bhogopabhogaparimānavrata as the Guņavrata and Sallekhanā as the Sikşāvrata without any mention of Deśavrata in the scheme of śīlavratas. Kārttikeya enumerates Deśavrata in the Sikşāvratas, and regards Bhogopabhogaparimāņavrata as the Gunavrata. Umāsvāti? seems to consider Deśavrata to be the
1 Dharma. Bi. 155; Puru. 136, Căritrasdra, p. 13. 2 Puru. 136. 3 Srava. Prajña. 328. 4 Sägā. Dharmā. VI, 24. SCáritra Pāhuda. 25, 26. 6 Kartti. 367, 7 Ta. sü. VII. 21.

Page #114

92
DIGAMBARA TRADITIONS
1. KUNDAKUNDA.
Gunavratas
Sikşávratas 2 3
2
3. Digvrata. Anarthadaņdavrata. Bhogopabhoga. Sāmāyika- Progadhopavasa- Atithisashvi- Sallekhana parimanavrata. vrata. vrata.
bhāgavrata. Digvrata. Desavrata.
Anarthadanda- Sāmāyika- Proşadhopavāsa- Bhogopabhoga- Atithisarvivrata. vrata. vrata.
parimāņavrata. bhāgavrata.
2. UMÄSVÄTI.
Cåmundaraya Amstacandra Somadeva
Amitagati 3. SAMANTABHADRA.
Asadhara 4. KARTTIKEYA.
Vaiyavrttya.
Digvrata. Anarthadandavrata. Bhogopabhoga- Desavrata. Sāmāyikavrata. Prosadhopa. parimāņavrata.
vāsavrata. Digvrata. Anarthadandavrata. Bhogopabhoga- Sāmāyika- Proşadhopavasa- Atithisarhvi- parimāņavrata. vrata. vrata.
bhagavrata. Digvrata. Deśavrata.
Anarthadanda- Bhoga- Paribhoga- Atithisarovi- vrata. virati nivetti.
bhāgavrata.
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
Delavrata.
5. VASUNANDI.
Sallekhaná.
SVETĀMBARA TRADITIONS
1. UMASVATI.
Digvrata. Deśavrata. Anarthadanda- Sāmāyika- Prosadhopavāsa- Bhogopabhoga- Atithisarvi
vrata. vrata. Vrata.
parimaņavrata. bhägavrat. Digvrata. Anarthadaņdavrata. Bhogopabhoga- Sāmāyika- Desavrata. Prosadhopa- Atithisarviparimāņavrata. vrata.
vrata.
bhagavrat.
2. Srävaka Prajnapti.
Upāsakadasd Haribhadra Hemacandra Yasovijaya.

Page #115

IV. ACARA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
Gunavrata and Bhogopabhogaparimāṇavrata to be the Sikṣāvrata Samantabhadra1 and Kättikeya agree in respect of the names of Vratas, but the former slightly varies the order by putting Deśavrata first in the order of Sikṣāvratas. Kārttikeya, Umāṣvāti and Samantabhadra discuss the nature of Sallekhana after the Sīlavratas. Vasunandi2 regards Deśavrata as the Gunavrata and bifurcates Bhogopabhogaparimāṇavrata into Bhogavirati and Paribhoganivṛitti and includes them in the Sikṣāvratas along with Sallekhana. Thus, in the Diagmbara sect of Jainism five traditions are witnessed concerning the Sīlavratas, namely, the traditions of Kundakunda, Kārttikeya, Umāsvāti, Samantabhadra, and Vasunandi. In the Svetambara sect of Jainism two traditions are witnessed, first, the tradition of Umāsvāti and secondly, the tradition of the Upāsakadasā and the Śrāvaka Prajñapti which is followed by Haribhadra, Hemacandra, Yasovijaya etc. The second tradition agrees with Karttikeya and Samantabhadra with slight variation in the order of Vratas. The different traditions, we may point out, are due to the differences of interpretations caused by differences in time, place and trends of thought, and not due to the non-conformity with the fundamental principles of Jainism.
We shall now dwell upon the nature of each of the Śīlavratas. Kundakunda in the Caritra Pāhuḍa3 has simply enumerated their names without explaining their nature according to his own interpretation. So it is very difficult to guess his mind by means of mere names. Though Umāsvāti has not mentioned the names, Gunavrata and Sikṣāvrata, the great commentators like Pujyapada and Vidyānandi have mentioned the first three as the Gunavratas, and the last four as the Sikṣāvratas.
NATURE OF DIGVRATA: We now proceed to deal with the nature of Digvrata. All the traditions recognise this as the Gunavrata. It consists in fixing the limits of one's own movements in the ten directions. For the purpose of demarcation are utilised the well known signs, such as oceans, rivers, forests, mountains, countries and Yojana stones. As regards the time limit, Samantabhadra and Akalanka®
93
1 Ratna. Śrāva. 67, 91.
2 Vasu. Srava. 217, 218, 271 272.
3 Caritra Pähuda. 25, 26.
4 Sarvärtha. VII. 21. 5 Slokavärttika. p. 467.
6 Śrāva. Prajña. 280; Kärtti. 342; Ratna. Śrāva. 68; Subhāṣita. 792; Ta. sū. Bhā, VII. 21; Yo. Sä. III. 1.
7 Ratna. Śrāva. 69; Puru. 137; Caritrasāra. p. 14; Vasu. Śrāva. 214; Sarvārtha. VII. 21; Sāgā. Dharma. V. 2; Rāja. VII. 21. 8 Ratna. Srava. 68. 9 Rāja. VII. 21/20.

Page #116

94
.
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
explicity prescribe its life-long observance, while the other Acāryas implicitly state so. The Śrāvaka Prajñaptitells us that since the householder is like a heated iron ball, his movements, wherever they are made, entail Himsă. If the area of his movements is circumscribed, he will thereby save himself from committing Himsā as such outside that area. Thus by the avoidance of even the subtle sins beyond the determined limits, the Aņuvrati (householder) becomes like a Mahāvrati (ascetic) in respect of the regions lying beyond those limits. Besides, the Kārttikeyānuprekşā tells us that by fixing the limits in all the ten directions the passion of greed is controlled. This may be explained by saying that the Digvratī has automatically renounced the getting of wealth, even if it can be easily got, from the area outside the limits. It will not be idle to point out here that the limitation of movements in the external world tends to reduce the internal passions, thereby fulfilling the purpose for which the Digvrata is enjoined.
The five transgressions of the Digvrata are: Going beyond the fixed limits of space 1) in upward direction, 2) in downward direction, 3) in other directions, 4) extending the field of one's activity by increasing boundaries, and 5) forgetting the limits.
NATURE OF DEŠAVRATA: We now turn to the Dęśavrata. We shall first explain the nature of Deśavrata according to those who have regarded it as one of the Sikşāvratas. Kundakunda has not recognised this vow, but speaks of Sallekhan, in its place. Kārttikeya and Samantabhadra have included Deśavrata in the Siksāvratas, but the latter considers it to be the first and the former, the fourth of the Śikṣāyratas. The Śrāvaka Prajñapti, Haribhadra,? Hemacandra etc., have regarded Deśavrata as the second of the Siksāvratas. It may be pointed out here that Kārttikeya, Samantabhadra and Hemacandra have not considered Sallekhanā to be useless, but have delineated it after the Šīlavratas. The other thinkers have also subscribed to this
1 Srāva. Prajña. 281, cf. Yo. Sa. III. 2. 2 Ratna. Srāva. 70; Puru. 138; Sarvärtha. VII. 21; Amita. Srāva. VI. 77; Sägā.
Dharmā. V. 3. Rāja. VII. 21/19. 3 Kärtti. 341. Sarvārtha. VII. 21; Rāja. VII. 21/18; Yo. Sa. III. 3. 5 Ta.sū. I. 30; Ratna. Srāva. 73.; Puru. 188.; Uvāsaga. I. 50; Amita. Srāva. VII. 8.;
Sāgā. Dharmā. V. 5; Śrāva. Prajña. 283. Dharma. Bi. 161. 6 Śrāva. Prajña. 318. ? Dharma. Bi. 151. & Yo. Sa. III. 84. 9 Ta. sū. VII. 22; Amita. Śrāva. VI. 98; Puru. 175 to 179; Subhāşita. 822-824.

Page #117

IV. ACARA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
95
view of describing Sallekhanā after the delineation of śīlavratas. Of the extensive range of space demarcated in the Digvrata, when further curtailment is made each day with reference to a house, a garden, a village, a field, a river, a forest and a Yojana stone, it is called Deśavrata. As regards the time limit, Samantabhadra says that it may consist vi 2 year, half a year, four months, two months, one month, rind fifteen days. But according to Hemacandra, the time limit consists of 1 day or a night. It is to be borne in mind that, beyond ther ifxcul linit of space, for the determined time the gross and subtle sins are absolutely renounced to such an extent that the observer of Deśavrata may be credited with the designation of Mahāvratī for the time-limit of Deśavrata. In addition to the above view of the Deśavrata, Kārttikeya expounds that sense objects should also be limited like the limitation in the extensive range prescribed by the Digvrata. Perhaps this alludes to the further limitation of the objects of Bhogopabhogaparimāņavrata which is regarded by him as the Guņavrata. In other words, the Deśavrata in the light of Kārttikeya equally narrows the
extent of Digvrata and Bhogopabhogaparimāņavrata, whereas Samanta'bhadra and the Srāvaka Prajñapti subscribe to the limitation of mere Digvrata. This is the exposition of Deśavrata in conformity with those who have recognised this among the Sikṣāvratas. i We now turn to those who have regarded this as one of the Gunavratas. According to Umāsvāti and Vasunandi, the Deśavrata is a Gunavrata. The Tattvārthasūtra Bhāşya? and the Sarvārthasiddhi expound the nature of Desavrata as limiting one's own movements to the region determined by certain villages and as renouncing the rest of the places. Amitagati subscribes to this definition. If this interpretation of Deśavrata which implies its life-long observance is accepted, it cannot be distinguished from the Digvrata. Probably keeping this in view, Akalanka and Cāmundarāya specifically mention that the Digvrata
1 Ratna. Śrāva. 92, 93.; Sāgā. Dharmā. V. 25, 26; Kārtti. 368; Srāva. Prajña. 318.
The Srāvaka-prajñapti and the Kārttikeyānuprekşā do not speak of the signs to be used for curtailments. 2 Ratna. Srāva. 34. Kärtti. Comm. 368. 3 Yo. Sa. III. 84. 4 Ratna. Srāva. 95.; 5 Kärtti. 367. Umāsväti's interpreter Pūjyapāda regards Desavrata as Gunavrata (Sarvärtha.
VII. 21.) .? Ta. sü. Bhā. 8 Sarvärtha. VII. 21. Amita. Śrāva. VI. 78.

Page #118

ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
is observed for the full life, but that the Deśavrata is observed for a limited time. Amrtacandra also prescribes limited time in the Deśavrata. If Akalanka's and Amstacandra's view is kept in mind, we shall have no distinction between Deśavrata as Gunavrata and Deśavrata as Śikṣāvrata. Thus according to one interpretation it is superfluous, since it can be absorbed into the Digvrata, while according to the other it should be regarded as Śikṣāvrata, since it prescribes its observance for a limited time. It is true that Akalanka and Anrtacandra avoid this controversy of Guņavrata and Sikşāvrata by nv. dividing the seven Vratas in Gunavratas and Sikşāvratas as Pūjyapāda has done. But still the tradition of Deśavrata as Śikṣāvrata cannot over-look the interpretation of Akalańka and Amộtacandra as favouring its case. It is likely that after pondering over this confusing nature of the Deśavrata, Vasunandi has explained it by affirming that it implies the abandonment of the habitation of those countries or places where the observance of vows is threatened or rendered difficult. This way of elucidating the Deśavrata is capable of justifying it as one of the Gunavratas. It is very interesting to note that Śrutasāgara, the 16th century commentator of the Tattvārthasūtra has, in addition to the definition of Digvrata, given by the Sarvāthasiddhi, subscribed to the view of Vasunandi by saying that the Deśavrata consists in discarding those places which obstruct the due observance of Vratas and which occasion insalubrity of mind: 2
Though the traditions of Umāsvāti and Samantabhadra differ in respect of the classification of the Deśavratas, they coalesce in point of the indication of its Aticăras. Transgressing the limits by 1) sending an agent, 2) drawing attention by making sounds, 3) ordering for things beyond limits, 4) making gestures and signs, and 5) throwing certain articles, has been announced to constitute the five breaches of the Deśavrata.
NATURE OF ANARTHADANDAVRATA: We now propose to deal with the nature of Anarthadandavrata. All the traditions unanimously acknowledge this as the Guņavrata. Kārttikeya defines Anarthadandavrata as renouncing the commitment of such acts as are not subservient to any useful purpose. Being frivolous, they simply engender
1 Vasu. Srāva. 215. 2 Tattvārtha-Vrtti. VII. 21/10-14. 3 Ratna. Srāva. 96; Uvāsaga. I. 54; Ta. Sū. III. 31; Puru. 189; Amita. Śrāva. VII. 9;
Sāgā. Dharmā. V. 27. 4 Kärtti. 343.

Page #119

IV. ACARA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
97
insalubrity of mind, which results in depravity. Samantabhadra defines Anarthadaņdavrata as refraining from wanton activity, even within determined directional limits, caused by inauspicious physical, mental and vocal operations. Akalanka in his commentary on the Tattvārthasūtra explicitly points out that the purport of placing Anarthadaņdavrata in between Digvrata-Deśavrata and Upabhogaparibhogaparimāņavrata contributes towards the comprehension of the fact that, even within the limits prescribed by the Deśavrata, the Digvrata and the Upabhogaparibhogaparimānavrata, one should neither make purposeless movements, nor enjoy such sensual pleasures as are of no account. The Srāvaka Prajñapti affirms that actions without any purpose bring about more Karmic bondage than the actions with some end in view, inasmuch as the former may be committed at any time even without any necessity, while the latter are performed at some specific time out of some necessity. Thus there is manifest concordance among the Jaina philosophers regarding the nature of Anarthadaņdavrata.
FORMS OF ANARTHADANDAS: We now dwell upon the forms of Anarthadandas. The perpetration of barren and inane actions admits of multitudinous forms, but for the sake of comprehension either four of five forms have been recorded. The Upāsakadasā* and the Śrāvaka Prajñapti” recognise four forms of Anarthadaņdas, whereas Kārttikeya, Samantabhadra, and the commentators of Tattvārthasūtra like Pujyapāda and Akalanka, recognise five forms of Anarthadandas. The four are: 1) Apadhyāna, 2) Pāpopadeśa, 3) Pramādacarita, and 4) Himsādāna; and if Duhśruti is added to this list we get five forms of Anarthadaņdas. The treatment of these Anarthadaņdas is varied in nature, which is quite convincing in view of the extensive field embraced by the Anarthadandas. Though Kārttikeya and Amộtacandra have not mentioned the names of the five forms of Anarthadandas, the above mentioned five denominations very aptly suit the fivefold forms presented by both the Acāryas. Though the life of the householder is at every step a mixture of virtue and vice - since he is pursuing the Aņuvratas - yet these Anarthadandas unnecessarily entrap the perpetrator in such a way as to cause the influx of inauspicious Karmas which bring about unimaginable suffering in this life and the life hereafter.
3 Śrāva. Prajña. 290.
1 Ratna. Śrāva. 74. 2 Rāja. VII. 21/22. 4 Uvāsaga. 43. 5 Srāva. Prajña. 289.

Page #120

98
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
Let us come to the meaning of the five forms of the Anarthadaņdas. First, Apadhyāna implies inauspicious reflections which procreate nothing except a vicious trend of thought. This involves the fact of peeping into another man's faults and infirmities, coveting another man's wealth, seeing another man's wife with an evil eye, witnessing the dissension among persons, mutilating, imprisoning and killing others' and getting interested in hunting, victory, defeat, war, adultery, theft gambling, and the like. Hemacandra* and Āśādhara summarily include Arta Dhyāna and Raudra Dhyāna in Apadhyāna. Secondly, Pāpopadeśa means the giving of evil instructions to persons earning livelihood by service, business, writing documents, cultivating land, and working in the field of art. Samantabhadra, Pūjyapāda, Akalanka and Cāmuṇdarāya include in Pāpopadeśa the following things: the talk of selling slaves and beasts profitably and the giving of direction to hunters, fowlers and the like.? Thus the provocation of vicious tendencies on account of which an individual may indulge in corrupted, passionate, and life-injuring ways may briefly sum up the meaning of Pāpopadeśa. Thirdly, Pramādacarita consists in doing such actions purposelessly as digging the ground, uprooting trees, trampling lawns, sprinkling water burning and quenching fire, plucking leaves, fruits and flowers, wandering etc.8 Fourthly, Himsādāna implies the giving of the instruments of Himsā like knife, poison, fire, sword, bow, chain etc. According to Kārttikeya the rearing of violent animals like cats etc., and the business of weapons like iron, lac etc., come under Himsādāna. 10 Lastly, Duḥśruti, listening to and teaching such stories as are passionexciting. 11 Besides, the study of literature aggravating worldly attachment describing erotic things, and dealing with other intense-passion exciting things has also been included in Duḥśruti."2 Vasunandi does
1 Kārtti. 344; 2 Rama. Śrāva. 78; Sarvartha. VII. 21; Caritrasāra. p. 16. 3 Puru. 141, 146. 4 Yo. Sa. 5 Sāgā. Dharmā. V. 9. Puru. 142. 7 Ratna. Śrāva. IV. 76; Sarvärtha. VII. 21; Räja. VII. 20/20; Caritrasära. pp.
16-17. 8 Kärtti. 346; Ratna. Srāva. 80;. Sarvārtha. VII. 21; Puru. 143; Sagă. Dharma.
VI. 11. Caritra Sāra. p. 17. 9 Ratna. Śrāva. 77; Sravaka. Prajña. Comm. 289. Puru. 144; Sāgā. Dharmā. V.8;
Sarvārtha. VII. 21; Căritrasära. p. 17. 10 Kärtti. 347. 11 Sarvārtha. VII. 21.; Puru. 145.; Caritrasāra. p. 17. 12 Ratna. Śrāva. 79; Kärtti. 348; Såga. Dharmä. V. 9.

Page #121

IV. ACARA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
99
not describe the five forms of Anarthadaņdas, but simply announces that he who is observing Anarthadandavrata should avoid the business of iron, nets etc., the use of false weights and measures, and the rearing of dogs, of violent animals like cats etc.
The five transgressions that lead to defile this vow are: 1) indulging in licentious speech, 2) ridiculously gesticulating and uttering obscene words, 3) prattling in a senseless manner, 4) : becoming engrossed in actions without any consideration of purpose, and 5) unnecessarily accumulating articles of Bhoga and Upabhoga.
NATURE OF BHOGOPABHOGAPARIMĀŅAVRATA: We now proceed to deal with the nature of Bhogopabhogaparimāņavrata. The word ‘Bhoga' pertains to those objects which are capable of being used only once, for instance, betel-leaf, garland etc., and the word 'Upabhoga' covers those objects which are capable of being used again and again, for instance, clothes, ornaments, cots etc. Thus the Bhogopabhogaparimāņavrata implies the limitation in the use of the objects of Bhoga and Upabhoga in order to reduce attachment to the objects. Only Vasunandi bifurcates it into Bhogavirati and Paribhoganivștti by keeping in view the aforementioned nature of Bhoga and Upabhoga." It may be pointed out here that this Vrata includes not only the positive process of limitation, but also the negative process of renunciation. Kārttikeya tells us that the renunciation of those things that are within one's own reach is more commendable than the renunciation of those things that are neither possessed, nor likely to be possessed in future. Samantabhadra points out that Vrata does not consist in giving up things unsuitable to oneself along with those which are not worthy to be used by the exalted persons, but that it consists in
1 Vasu. Srāva. 216. 2 Ratna. Srāva. 81; Tasū. VII. 32; Puru. 190.; Căritrasāra. p. 17. Dharma. Bi. 163;
Amita. Śrāva. VII. 10; Sāgā. Dharmā. V. 12. 3 The Upāsakadašā and the Srāvaka-prajñapti put 'bringing together the parts of implements' in place of the fourth as mentioned above. 4 The other name for this used by the Upāsakadaśā, the Tattvārthasūtra, the Srāvaka Prajñapti, etc. is Upabhoga-Paribhoga-Parimāņavrata. Here Upabhoga is equivalent to 'Bhoga' and Paribhoga is equal to 'Upabhoga'. . 5 Ratna. Śrāva. 83; Amita. Śrāva. VI. 93; Yo. Sā. III. 5. Sāgā. Dharmā. V. 14;
Yaš. and Ic. p. 283. 6 Kärtti. 350; Ratna. Srava. 82; Sarvārtha. VII. 21. Sāgā. Dharmā. V. 13. 7 Vasu. Srāva. 217, 218.

Page #122

100
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
the deliberate renouncement of the suitable objects of senses, since the above two types of things are not even used by commonplace persons. Amộtacandra tells us that the layman should renounce, according to his capacity, the use of objects which are not prohibited.?
Two KINDS OF ABNEGATION IN BHOGOPABHOGAPARIMĀŅAVRATA: In the Bhogopabhogaparimāņavrata abnegation is of two kinds: Yama and Niyama; the former is for the whole duration of life, while the latter is for a limited period. Three types of things, namely, 1) objects causing injury to living beings possessing more than onesense, like meat and honey; 2) objects developing spiritual laziness like wine, opium, seeds of thorn-apple, the intoxicating hemp and the like; and 3) objects causing injury to infinite one-sensed Jīvas forming one body like ginger, raddish, carrot etc., along with butter, flowers of Ketaki etc., should be forsaken for life. Besides, the use of objects like ornaments, conveyance etc., which have been considered as not necessary* and the use of objects detested by the exalted personag like variegated coloured clothes, odd dress and the like, should be forsaken either for life or for a limited periods of time. The renouncement for a limited time, i. e., for an hour, a day, a night, a fortnight, a month, a season or half a year, should be made concerning food, conveyance, couch, bathing unguents, betel-leaf, clothes, ornaments, copulation, music and singing, since the householder cannot dispense with these things altogether. By virtue of pursuing such discipline, Ahimsā is observed owing to not incurring Himsā arising from the use of the articles of Bhoga and Upabhoga, that have been renounced.?
After dealing with the Digambara view of Bhogopabhogavrata, we now proceed to point out the Svetāmbara view. The Upāsakadašā and the Srāvaka Prajñapti tell us that the Bhogopabhogaparimāņavrata concerns itself with the purity of food and that of occupation."
1 Ratna. Śrāva. 86. 2 Puru. 164. 3 Ratna. Śrāva. 87; Sāgā. Dharmā. V. 14. 4 Sarvārtha. VII. 21. 5 Rāja. VII. 21/27; Căritrasāra. p. 25. 6 Ratna. Srāva. 88, 89. 7 Puru. 166. 3 The purity of food means the avoidance of such food as causes Himsă of mobile beeings, for instance, meat, honey etc. 9 The purity of occupation signifies the abandonment of such evil trades as cause a good deal of Himsă for instance, livelihood from charcoal,- trade in animal by-products etc.

Page #123

IV. ĀCĀRA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
101
"Other topics included at least by the Svetāmbaras under the Bhogopabhogaparimānavrata are the renouncement of the Ananta-kāya, the Abhakşyas and Rātrībhojana” Here we observe that the Digambara version of the Vrata irıcludes both the elements of Yama and Niyama under its scope, but that the Svetāmbara version seems to comprise only the element of Yama.
BHOGOPABHOGAPARIMĀNAVRATA AS GUNAVRATA AND SIKŞĀVRATA: Notwithstanding the delineation of the nature of Bhogopabhogaparimāņavrata by the different traditions of the Digambaras without any marked difference, Vasunandi and the commentators of the Tattvārthasūtra,
mely. Pūivapāda and Vidvānandi enumerate this in the Siksāvratas, while Samantabhadra and Kārttikeya count this as Guņavrata. This difference of opinion is on account of the dual nature of the vow itself. It possesses both the elements of Yama and Niyama characteristics of Guņavrata and Sikşāvrata respectively. So it can be interpreted both ways. The difference is of emphasis and not of nature.
The five transgressions of this vow according to Umāsvāti are: eating 1) articles having life, 2) articles in contact with those having life, 3) articles mixed with those having life, 4) articles not well-cooked and 5) fermented and aphrodisiacal articles. These Aticāras are too narrow to include the comprehensive extent of the Bhogopabhoga, so,
eems. Samantabhadra has framed different Aticāras. The five Aticāras according to Samantabhadra are: 1) constant craving for the venom of sensual enjoyment, 2) dwelling upon bygone pleasurable experiences, 3) too much indulgence even after enjoyment, 4) having acute craving for the gratification of senses in future, and 5) too much indulgence during enjoyment.*
After dealing with the nature of Digvrata, Anarthadandavrata, Deśavrata and Bhogopabhogaparimāņavrata, we now turn to the
1 Śrāva. Prajña. Comm. 287, 288. 2 Plants having infinite one sensed Jivas, such as ginger, radish, carrot etc. 3 Things not fit to be eaten such as ice, curds kept for more than two days,
tainted food etc. 4 Jaina Yoga. p. 102. (For the detailed treatment of Anantakāyas and Abhakşyas,
see Jaina Yoga. 110-116). We have already discussed this separately. 5 Tasū. VII. 35; Rāja. VII. 35. Puru. 193; Caritrasära. p. 25; Dharma. Bi. 162;
Amita. Srāva. VII. 13. Sāgā. Dharmā. V. 20; 6 Ratna. Srāva. 90.

Page #124

102
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
remaining three Vratas, namely, Sāmāyika, Proşadhopavāsa and Atithisam vibhāga which are unanimously pronounced as Śikṣāvratas.
NATURE OF SĀMĀYIKA: Sāmāyika is the positive way of submerging the activities of mind, body and speech in the Atman.1 Amrtacandra tells us that the purpose of Sāmāyika is to attain the Atman after espousing the equanimous state of mind produced by renouncing attachment and aversion to the objects of the world. Samantabhadra. defines Sāmāyika as relinquishing the five types of sins to the farthest extreme during the time fixed for the act of Sāmāyika. The Srāvaka Prajñapti tells us that Sāmāyika negatively implies the abandonment of sinful actions and positively, the practice of non-sinful actions. The equinimous state of mind, in the case of the householder, is equivalent to auspicious deliberations, technically called Subhopayoga. This should be distinguished from Suddhopayoga, the ideal to be achieved through strenuous self-denial. Just as Samyagdarśana is at the root of liberation (Mokşa), so Sāmāyika is at the root of the conduct for Moksa. Reflection on the nature of the world as inauspicious, transitory, and full of pain, and reflection on the nature of salvation as auspicious, permanent and blissful - both these constitute what is called the content of auspicious deliberations."
The consideration of seven requisites, namely, 1) place, 2) time, 3) posture, 4) meditation, and threefold purities, namely, 5) mental, 6) bodily, and 7) vocal, is necessary for the successful performance of Sāmāyika. 1) That place which is free from disturbing noise, gathering of persons, and insects like mosquitoes, flies, etc., is the suitable place for Sāmāyika.? In other words, the place of silence and solitude, whether it is a forest, a house, a temple or any other place should be chosen to perform Sāmāyika. 2) Sāmāyika should be performed three times a day, i. e., in the morning, noon and evening." The great Ācārya Amộtacandra says that the householder should consider the act of Sāmāyika as obligatory and perform it at least twice a day, i. e., in the morning and evening.10 He further remarks that its performance at other times will conduce towards the enchancement of the spiritual and moral characteristics, hence it is not
1 Rāja. VII. 21/7; Căritrasāra. p. 19. 2 Puru. 148. 3 Ratna. Srāva. 97. 4 Śrāva. Prajña. 292. 5 Ratna. Srāva. 104. Kärtti. 352. 7 Kärtti. 353. 8 Ratna. Srava. 99. 9 Kärtti. 354. 10 Puru. 149.

Page #125

IV. ĀCĀRA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
103
improper, but beneficial. Samantabhadra says that one should perform Sāmāyika till the time one fixes for it according to one's own mental states.2 After withdrawing oneself from all kinds of worldly activities, and after subduing all mental disturbances, one should increase the duration of Sāmāyika on the fasting and half-fasting days. It should also be gradually enhanced daily, since Sāmāyika serves as a great cause for fulfilling the five vows.* 3) Sitting and standing postures are generally recommended for the performance of Sāmāyika. 4-7) The aspirant should purge the mind of sensual pleasures by concentrating on the sermons of the Jina, adopt submissive and surrendering gestures, and finally, either repeat the devotional hymns mentally or absorb himself in self-meditation. He should bear hardships caused by cold, heat, insect-biting as well as troubles created by enemy without breaking silence, and without disturbing the purity of physical, mental and vocal activities.? By the performance of Sāmāyika he who keeps in view the aforementioned requisites is naturally led to abandon even all the subtle vices which entangle the householder.8 And for the time one fixes for the act of Sāmāyika, one approaches asceticism. . • The five transgressions which should be avoided are: Losing one's control over 1) mind, 2) body and 3) Speech, 4) lacking interest in Sāmāyika, and 5) forgetfulness of Sāmāyika.10
NATURE OF PROSADHOPAVĀSAVRATA: Samantabhadra11 and others"2 enunciate the Prosadhopavāsavrata as renouncing the four kinds of food on the eighth and fourteenth lunar days in each fortnight. Probably keeping in view the infirmness of disciples, Kārttikeya13 also includes the eating of unseasoned food once a day in the Proșadhopavāsavrata, and Amita gati14 and Āsādhara15 also comprise the taking of
1 Puru. 149. 2 Ratna. Srāva. 98. 3 Ratna. Śrāva. 100. 4 Ratna. Śrāva. 101. 5 Kärtti. 355. Kārtti. 355, 356. 7 Ratna. Śrāva. 103, Căritrasāra. p. 19. 8 Ratna. Śrāva. 102: Kārtti. 357: Puru. 150.
Ratna. Śrāva. 102: Kārtti 357; Puru. 150. 10 Ratna. Śrāva. 105. Puru. 191; Ta. sū. VII. 33; Dharma. Bi. 164; Srāva. Prajña.
312-317. 11 Ratna. Śrāva. 106. 12 Puru. 151; Sāgā. Dharmā. V. 34; Amita. Śrāva. VI. 88; Tattvarthavrtti. VIL. 21.
Kartti. 359. Yas. & Ic. p. 282. 13 Kärtti. 359. 14 Amita. Srāva. VI. 90. 15 Sägā. Dharmā. V. 35.

Page #126

104
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
only water in this Vrata. The observance of this Vrata requires the performance of meditation, the study of spiritual literature, and the avoidance of bath, perfumes, bodily embellishment, ornaments, cohabitation and household affairs. The Śrāvaka Prajñapti prescribes that the relinquishment of food, bodily embellishment, cohabitation, household affairs should be effected either partially or completely in the Proșadhopavāsavrata. Here we observe that though the Digambara Ācāryas allow the partial renunciation of food, they prescribe complete relinquishment of cohabitation, bodily embellishment and household affairs in observing the Proşadhopavāsavrata, as we have said above. As regards the place for the performance of this Vrata, a temple, the abode of Sādhus, a Prosadhaśālā, or any holy place should be chosen for one's stay.
PROCEDURE OF PROȘADHOPAVĀSAVRATA: Amộtacandra notably lays down the procedure for observing the Proşadhopavāsavrata. After renouncing all household affairs and all worldly attachment, one should undertake the vow at the middle of the day previous to the Proşadha day. After this, one should repair to a sequestered place, forsake all sinful activities, renounce all sensual pleasures, and observe due restraint of body, speech and mind. After passing the rest of the day in auspicious deliberations, the evening should be occupied with the performance of Sāmāyika. The night should be passed on a pure mat after getting over sleep by being engrossed in the study of spiritual literature. On the next morning, after performing Sāmāyika, one should engage oneself in the worship of Jina with Prāsuka objects. In the same prescribed manner, the day, the second night, and half of the third day should be spent with circumspection. Thus, sixteen Yamas (48 hours) constitute the time of Prosadhopavāsavrata. "The Svetāmbara writers mention a period of twenty-four hours*” and lays down the procedure of the Vrata fundamentally in the same way as above. The difference consists of minor details.5
PROȘADHOPAVĀSAVRATA AND THE FIVE SINS: On account of being free from all sinful activities the observer of Proşadhopavāsavrata approaches the complete vows only pursuable by the saints. He
1 Kārtti. 358. Ratna. Śrāva. 107, 108; Amita. Śrāva. VI. 89. Yas. Ic. p. 282. 2 Śrāva. Prajña. Comm. 322; Sarvārtha. VII. 21; Caritrasāra. p. 22. 3 Puru. 152 to 157. 4 Jaina Yoga, p. 142. 5 Ibid. p. 145.

Page #127

IV. ĀCĀRA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
105
eschews the Himsā of all kinds of Jīvas because of the renunciation of the articles of Bhoga and Upabhoga. He shuns falsehood, stealing, acquisition and unchastity on account of the control of speech, the abstinence from all misappropriation, the absence of the feeling of attachment, and the avoidance of sexual intercourse respectively.
The following five breaches of the Prosadhopavāsavrata should be avoided. They are: 1) Passing excretion on the ground without examining and sweeping, 2) handling of things without properly examining and sweeping, 3) making bed without properly examining and sweeping, 4) showing lack of enthusiasm in the obligatory duties on account of feeling hunger, and 5) forgetting the due observances, or lack of concentration.
NATURE OF ATITHISAMVIBHĀGAVRATA; We now proceed to represent the nature of Atithisa mvibhāgavrata. According to Kārttikeya, he who, after acquiring certain qualifications, offers four kinds of gifts in conformity with the ninefold ways of entertaining the three kinds of deserving recipients is announced to be legitimately pursuing the Atithisam vibhāgavrata. The offering should be made for mutual ennoblement without expecting any return. It will not be amiss to point out that Samantabhadra denominates this vow as Vaiyāvșttya, probably to extend the scope of the vow. It also includes the fact of removing the ailments of those pursuing the path of renunciation, of massaging their feet, as well as of serving them in various other ways. Besides, it is to the credit of Samantabhadra that he renders devotion to Arahantas obligatory for those who follow this vow.? According to the Srāvaka Prajñapti, this vow consists in offering pure food to the saint by keeping in view the following things; Place (desa), time (kāla), faith (Sraddhā), respect (satkāra), and due order (krama). Haribhadra explains these terms in the following way; place signifies the area producing wheat or rice etc.; time means famine or otherwise; purity of mind is faith; the formalities of standing up, offering seat, worshipping, following the saint when he is returning etc., come under
Căritrasāra.
1 Puru. 158, 159. 2 Ratna. Srāva. 110; Puru. 192; Rāja. VII. 34; Dharma. Bi. 166. pp. 22-23. Sāgā. Dharmā. V. 40. 3 We shall presently deal with them. 4 Kārtti. 360, 361. 5 Puru. 167; Ratna. Srāva. 111. Ratna. Śrāva. 112. 7 Ibid. 118. 8 Srāva. Prajña. 325, 326.

Page #128

106
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
respect; due order points to the articles of food to be offered one after the other.1
CONSIDERATION OF FIVE OBJECTIVES FOR THE ADEQUATE OBSERVANCE OF THIS Vow: This vow comprises the consideration of the five objectives for its adequate observance, namely, 1) classes of deserving recipients, 2) qualifications of a donor, 3) things worthy of gift, 4) method of giving and 5) yield of gift. 1) Merit develops with respect to the degree of conduct along with Samyagdarśana. Hence, three kinds of deserving recipients have been recognised. a) The saint who has consecrated his life for the achievement of liberation, and consequently, who has absolutely forsaken all the sins stands at the highest rung of the ladder of merit.3 b) The householder who pursues the twelve vows or observes the discipline prescribed by the eleven stages of advancement (eleven Pratimās) stands at the middle of the ladder of merit. c) He who is endowed with the characteristic of Samyagdarśana but who does not observe the right course of ethical discipline stands at the last rung of the ladder of merit. We shall now describe the nature of i) Kupātras, ii) Apātras, and iii) Karuņāpātras in order to distinguish them from the aforementioned three kinds of Pātras (deserving recipients). i) In the absence of Samyagdarśana he who is adhering to vows, performing austerities, and striving for the betterment of living beings is designated as Kupātra (not entitled to the gift to be offered with religious devotion). In other words, sheer moral purity in the absence of spiritual or religious conversion cannot be the object of devoted offering. We may point out in passing that this aspect of Dāna throws light upon the spiritualisation of Jaina ethical living. ii) He who possesses neither moral conduct nor Samyagdarśana should be regarded as Apātra? (not entitled to the gift as such). Apātra is a curse to society. iii) Children and such persons as are very old, dumb, blind, deaf, foreigner, diseased, and indigent should be given suitable things out of compassion. We cannot
1 Śrāva. Prajña. Comm. 325. 2 Vasu. Srāva. 220. 3 Vasu. Srāva. 221; Puru. 171; Amita. Srāva. X. 4; Sāgā. Dharmā. V. 44. 4 Vasu. Srāva. 222; Puru. 171; Amita. Srāva. X. 27 to 30; Sāgā. Dharmā. V. 44. 5 Vasu. Śrāva. 222. Amita. Sráva. X. 32. Puru. 171; Sāgā. Dharmā. V. 44. 6 Amita. Śrāva. X. 34, 35. Vasu. Śrāva. 223. 7 Amita. Srāva. X. 36, 37, 38. Vasu. Srava. 223. 8 Vasu. Śrāva. 235.

Page #129

IV. ĀCĀRA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
107
forbear mentioning that Bhakti Dāna should be distinguished from social charity (Dāna) inclusive of Karunā Dāna. The three Pātras (deserving recipients) receive gifts out of devotion but Kupātras and Karuṇāpātras should be given from moral or social point of view. It is to the credit of the Jainas that they have not ignored the social aspect of Dāna in emphasizing Bhakti Dāna or Pātra Dāna. 2) As regards the qualifications of a donor concerning the Pātra Dāna, the donor must possess the seven virtues; namely, belief in the result of of Dāna given to the Pātras, affection for the merits of Pātras, pleasure at the time of giving and after giving, knowledge of the suitable gifts proper to the different Pātras, absence of longing for worldly benefits, control over anger even at a critical juncture, showing real enthusiasm in such a manner as may astound even the wealthy persons. All these are respectively called: faith (Sraddhā), devotion (bhakti), joy (samtoșa or tuşti), wisdom (vijñāna), unattachment (alubdhatā, or alaulya), forbearance (kşamā), and enthusiasm (sakti or sattva). The Tattvārthabhāşya enumerates eight characteristics, namely, absence of jealousy towards the recipient (anasuyā), absence of sorrow in giving ävişāda), absence of condescension towards the recipient (aparibhāvitā), joy in giving (prītiyoga), auspicious frame of mind (kusalābhisamdhitā), absence of desire for worldy benefit (drştaphalanapekṣita), straightforwardness (nirupadhatva), and lastly, freedom from desire for other-worldly benefits (anidānatva). 3) To consider the things worthy of gifts, generally four kinds of gifts have been recognised; namely, food, medicine, books and fearlessness. 3 Food, medicine, Upakaraņa" (religious accessories) and the place of shelter is the other list of four objects. All these things should be worthy of the Pātras. Only such things should be given as are useful for the pursuance of studies and for practising austerities of a very high quality, and as do not bring about attachment, aversion, incontinence, pride, sorrow, fear and the
1 Amita. Śrāva. IX. 3-10. Vasu. Śrāva. 224. Cāritrasāra. p. 26. Sāgā. Dharmā. V. 47. 2 Ta. sū. Bhā. VII. 34. (I have practically followed the translation given in the Jaina
Yoga, pp. 153-154.) Amstacandra enumerates almost the same characteristics. (Puru. 169). 3 Kärtti. 352. Amita. Śrāva. IX. 83, 106, 107. Vasu. Śrāva. 233. 4 Ratna. Grāva. 117. Caritrasāra. p. 26. Yaś. and Ic. p. 283. 5 Upakaranas differ for a Svetāmbara and a Digambara monk. We need not mention them here.

Page #130

108
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
like. 4) The gifts should be given according to the ninefold ways of entertaining a Pătra. This process consists of reception, offering a high seat, washing the feet, adoration, salutation, purity of mind, purity of body, purity of speech and purity of food. The saints should be entertained with the above formalities but the other Pātras according to their merits. 5) As regards the yield of gift, greed is overcome by Dāna and consequently Atithidāna amounts to the renunciation of Hiṁsā.8 Besides, just as water washes away blood, so proper gifts to saints would for certain wipe off the sins accumulated on account of the unavoidable household affairs. The paying of obeisance to the holy saints causes noble birth; the giving of Dāna to them entails prosperous living; their servitude promotes high respect; their devotion determines gracious look; and the extolling of their virtues brings about celebrity.5 Vasunandi tells us that the gift to Pātras is just like a seed sown in a fertile land; gift to Kupātras is just like a seed sown in a semi-fertile land; and the gift to Apātras is just like a seed sown in a barren land.
The five Aticāras of this vow are:? 1) placing food on things having life, 2) covering food with things having life, 3) offering food at an improper time, 4) offering some other person's food, and 5) lack of interest or jealousy towards the other giver.
Two WAYS OF DESCRIBING THE HOUSEHOLDER'S ETHICAL DISCIPLINE: VRATAS, AND PRATIMĀS: We have so far endeavoured to expound the characteristic nature of Anuvratas, Gunavratas an last two types of Vratas, which are called Sīlavraťas, are capable of educating the individual for the exalted life of renunciation. They deepen his consciousness of sin, thereby encouraging him to shun totally the causes of subtle Hiṁsā, which prevent the full-fledged performance of the auspicious Dhyānas (Dharma and Sukla). It is evident that
1 Puru. 170. 2 Puru. 168. Vasu. Srāva. 225. Kārtti. 360. Yaś. and Ic. p. 284. Haribhadra includes these processes in Satkāra, while commenting on the definition of the vow given by the Śrūvaka Prajñapti. (Śrāva. Prajña. Comm. 325). 3 Puru. 172. 4 Ratna. Srāva. 114. 5 Ratna. Srāva. 115. 6 Vasu. Śrāva. 240, 241, 242. 7 Sarvārtha. VII. 36. Rāja. VII. 36. The names of these Aticāras are the same in Digambara and Svetāmbara works, but the meaning differs slightly. We have followed Pajyapāda's meaning. 8 We shall deal with these two Dhyānas in the subsequent chapter.

Page #131

IV. ACARA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
109
whatever sort of Himsā remains in the life of the householder, who pursues the partial vows, is consequent upon the employment of the materials of Bhoga and Upabhoga: Now he whose heart has been illumined, who has developed in him the capacity of discharging the obligations which result from the arduous life of ascesticism proceeds towards the gradual and the systematic renunciation of the articles of Bhoga and Upabhoga, till he arrives at the full life of a saint. To express it differently, the elevated outlook of life negatively depends upon narrowing down the compass of Bhoga and Upabhoga to the irreducible extent, and positively, upon steadily deepening the meditational aspect of life. The negative aspect deserves to be extolled only when it is accompanied by the positive phase of meditational development or auspicious frame and disposition of mind. In our study of the Jaina ethical works, we find the exposition of the Ācāra of the householder on the ground of Anuvratas, Gunavartas and Sikşāvratas as only one of the ways of its presentation. This method of approach to the conduct of the householder is itself capable of effecting moral and spiritual advancement by systematically prescribing the renouncement of the objects of Bhoga and Upabhoga. The outstanding advocates of this sort of presentation are Umāsvāti, Samantabhadra, Somadeva, Amitagati, Amộtacandra and Hemacandra. Of these religio-ethical saints, Umāsvāti, Amrtacandra and Hemacandra have to all intents and purposes subscribed to this view, whereas the rest, in spite of their having represented the householder's ethical discipline on the aforementioned pattern, have also referred to another way which shall be henceforth discussed. The notable champions of another way, i.e. of the way which seeks to represent the Ācāra of the householder on the basis of eleven stages, which are technically called eleven Pratimās, are Kundakunda," Kārttikeya,? Cāmundarāyas and Vasunandi.“
RECONCILIATION OF THE Two Ways: These two ways may, at the first sight, appear to present two divergent outlooks of Jaina ethical discipline, but a little reflection would convince us that the divergence is only superficial. The two are so closely related that if the former way of representation is pushed ahead for spiritual development we are capable of having systematic stages of advancement. To be more clear,
1 Caritra Pāhuda. 22. 3 Caritra sāra, p. 3.
2 Kärtti. 305, 306. Vasu. Śrāva. 4.

Page #132

110
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
the vows of Sāmāyika, Proșadhopavāsa, and Bhogopabhogaparimāņa give us the nine stages of advancement towards the life of ascesticism. Thus there is no unbridgeable gulf between the two ways of delineation. There is continuity and not a chasm between them. Besides, the latter way of exposition on the basis of eleven stages is much older as well as traditional, inasmuch as reference to it has been made in the much older scriptural texts. Though the latter way is chronologically prior, the credit of logical priority comes to the former.
THE ELEVEN PRATIMAS: The eleven Pratimās which have been mentioned by Kundakunda, Samantabhadra, Cāmundarāya, and Vasunandio are denominated 1) Darśana, 2) Vrata, 3). Sāmāyika, 4) Proşadha, 5) Sacittatyāga, 6) Rātribhuktityāga, 7) Brahmacarya, 8) Ārambhatyāga, 9) Parigrahatyāga, 10) Anumatityāga, and 11) Uddistatyāga. The Uvāsagadasāo also speaks of eleven Pratimăs, but does not mention their names. Kārttikeya enumerates twelve Pratimās but it should not be considered as the violation of the traditional number which is elever, since the first stage enumerated by Kārttikeya is indicative of Samyagdarśana, i. e., of spiritual conversion which has not been separately enumerated by other Acāryas but has been included in the 1st stage mentioned by them. The remaining are the names of the eleven Pratimās. Hence, there is no divergence from traditional enumeration. Somadeva, in the first place, effects variation in the order of certain stages and secondly substitutes 'Divā-Maithuna-virati' for 'Rātri-Bhukti-virati. The former deviation from the traditional presentation has received no support at the hands of subsequent thinkers, while the latter one has been assimilated in their ethical discussions. We shall presently dwell upon each of the eleven Pratimās and shall as well endeavour to point out that the aforementioned three
1 Sat. Vol. I-p. 102. Kaşāya Pāhuda. Vol. I. p. 130. 2 Caritra Pāhuda. 22. 3 Ratna. Srāva. 137 to 147. Vasu. Srāva. 4. 5 Uvāsaga. 70. Abhayadeva, the commentator of the Uvāsagadasão, mentions the names of eleven Pratimās in the following way: 1) Darśana, 2) Vrata, 3) Sāmāyika, 4) Proşadha, 5) Kāyotsarga, 6) Abrahma-varjana, 7) Sacitta-tyāga, 8) Arambhatyāga, 9) Preşyatyāga, 10) Uddiştatyāga and 11) Sramaṇabhūta. (Uvāsaga. Comm. pp. 74-77) We observe that the names of Pratimās given by the Svetāmbaras are somewhat different from those given by the Digambaras. But we shall point out afterwards
that the contents do not differ much. 6 Kārtti. 305, 306. Vasu. Srāva. Intro. p. 50.

Page #133

IV. ACARA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
111
Vratas (Sāmāyika, Proșadhopavāsa, and Bhogopabhogaparimāņa) are capable of explaining the nine stages of ethical headway.
DARśANA PRATIMA: · The fist stage is Darśanapratimā. After the attainment of Samyagdarśana the aspirant who should be styled Dārśanika Srāvaka resolutely forsakes the use of odious things such as meat wine and the like, and becomes indifferent to worldly and heavenly pleasures, and nourishes the spirit of detachment. In conformity with the views of Vasunandi, he who has acquired Samyagdarśana and has relinquished the use of five Udambara fruits and refrained himself from gambling, meat, wine, honey, hunting, prostitution, adultery and stealing, should be designated as Dārśanika Śrāvaka.3 In addition to the relinquishment of the above indulgences, Vasunandi very emphatically cries down the practice of taking food at night, and argues that he who indulges in eating at night cannot claim to be practising even the observances of the first stage. If we pause a little to ponde over these delineations of the observances of the first stage, we can very easily conceive that this stage comprises the Mūlagunas in addition to Samyagdarśana. Hence, the various conceptions of Mūlagunas may give us various enunciations of the first stage. It is in all probability due to the recognition of this fact that Somadeva calls the first stage 'Mūlavrata." It will not be out of place to point out that the characterisation of this stage in accordance with Vasunandi is so comprehensive as to comprise under it all the preceding formulations concerning Mūlaguņas. It has not the stringency of Samantabhadra's and Jinasena's conceptions of Mūlaguņas wherein five partial vows have been included and not the excessive mildness of Somadeva's view. The pronouncement of the seven kinds? of addictions to calamitous habits (saptavyasana) tends towards the inclusion of the four types of sins to some extent, namely, Himsā, falsehood, stealing and unchastity. Hence it is that in some measure the view of Samantabhadra and Jinasena is included in it. We need not mention how the Mūlaguņas prescribed by Amitagati, Somadeva are completely comprehended in it.
1 Kārtti. 328, 329. 2 Ratna. Śrāva. 137; Caritrasára. p. 3. 3 Vasu. Srāva. 57 to 59. 4 Ibid. 314. SAbhayadeva mentions under this stage only the attainment of Samyagdarsana. 6 Vasu. Śrāva. 59; Vasu. Srāva. Intro. p. 50. 7 Gambling, meat, wine, hunting, prostitution, adultery and stealing.

Page #134

112
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
Thus Mūlaguņas and Samyagdarśana may depict the 1st stage. Just a the conception of Mūlaguņas is dynamic, so the portrayal of the firs stage will also be dynamic in character. In other words, this stage i capable of involving the abandonment of newly evolved evil tendencie that may mar the spiritual and the moral progress of the individual If we subtract the attainment of Samyagdarsana from this stage we shall get the eleven stages of moral advancement in contradistinction to the eleven stages of spiritual advancement owing to Samyagdarsana It is of capital importance to note that the first stage is the stage of mental preparation accompanied by the initial training of the will by following the short course of ethical discipline. We regard the separate treatment of Mūlaguna as more correct, than the one along with Samyagdarśana, since they are capable of being observed even by the great majority of commonplace persons, by virtue of which the social structure may be morally defended.
VRATA PRATIMĀ: The second stage is called Vrata Pratimā! This second rung of the ladder of the householder's evolution of conduct comprises the scrupulous observance of Aņuvratas, Gunavratas and Sikşāvratas. We have already dwelt upon the nature of these vratas, so need not turn to them again.
SĀMĀYIKA AND PROȘADHA PRATIMĀS: The third and fourth stages bear the designations of Sāmāyika and Proșadha Pratimās respectively. A question may be asked: when Sāmāyika and Proşadhopavāsa have been treated as Sikṣāvratas, why have they been regarded as constituting the third and fourth Pratimās respectively? It is really a question and this becomes all the more puzzling when we find that Samantabhadra and Kārttikeya who recognise Sāmāyika and Proşadha as both Vratas and Pratimās have practically prescribed the same course of discipline to be observed. In Sāmāyika Pratimā, Kārttikeya has prescribed the resoluteness of mind, body and speech despite all perils to life, while Samantabhadra has represented this characteristic in Sāmāyika as Vrata, but has distinguished Sāmāyika as Pratimā by prescribing the
ain.
1 Abhayadeva prescribes only the observance of the Aņuvratas in this stage.
(Uvāsaga. comm. p. 76) 2 Ratna. Śrāva. 318. Vasu. Srāva. 207. 3 Abhayadeva also recognises the performance of Sāmāyika and the observance of
Proşadhopavāsa in these two Pratimās (See Uvāsaga. Comm. p. 76) 4 Kārtti. 371, 372. 5 Ratna.. Srāva. 103.

Page #135

IV. ACARA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
113
necessity of performing Sāmāyika thrice a day, which characteristic has been included in Sāmāyika as Vrata according to Kārttikeya. In Prosadha as Pratimā and Prosadha as Vrata no significant distinction has been made by Kārttikeya and Samantabhadra. We may now say that the distinction which has been made is quite insignificant for being calculated as supplying the adequate warrant for recognising these Vratas as independent Pratimās. The argument of Asādhara that these Sīlas, which were subserving the purpose of guarding the Anuvratas, become in Pratimās independent Vratas, bears little cogency, since though these Sīlas, no doubt serve the purpose of custodian, yet it is unintelligible how they cancel the designation of being called Vratas. The word 'Sīla' prefixed to Vratas evinces simply particularisation and not the cancellation of their being understood as Vratas. May be, on account of this overt duplication, Vasunandi has totally set aside these Vratas from Sīlavratas, and has simply represented them as the two Pratimās. If Kundakunda and Kārttikeya have wedded with this mode of delineation, i. e., have recognised Sāmāyika and Proşadha as both Vratas and Pratimās, it is to point out their paramount importance for marching towards deep spiritual life. As a matter of fact, these sum up the entire spiritual life of the householder. Besides, Sāmāyika and Proşadhopavāsa are closely interrelated and so influence each other. Prosadhopavāsa assists in the due performance of Sāmāyika and sometimes Sāmāyika encourages the performance of the other with purity and zeal. Thus if Vasunandi is theoretically justifiable, Kundakunda and Kārttikeya are practically so. In the science of spirituality theory cannot countervail practice. So, if these two Vratas are elevated to the rank of Pratimās, it is to favour the deepening of spiritual consciousness, and hence it is justifiable.
THE REMAINING PRATIMĀS: Having vindicated the claims of Sāmāyika and Prosadhopavāsa as Pratimās notwithstandi recognition in Vratas, we now proceed to enquire into the nature of the remaining Pratimās. All the subsequent stages rest on the relinquishment of Bhoga and Upabhoga. Sacittatyāga Pratimă consists in renouncing the use of articles having life, namely, roots, fruits, leaves, barks, seeds
1 Ratna. Srāv. 139. 2 Kärtti. 354. 3 Säga. Dharma. VII. 6.

Page #136

114
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
and the like. The observer of the discipline prescribed by this stage does not also feed others with those things which he himself has renounced. This stage refers to the object of Bhoga, predominantly food. The next stage is recognised to be either 'Rātri Bhuktivirati' or ‘Divāmaithunavirati.' Kundakunda,: Kārttikeya* and Samantabhadra subscribe to the former view, while the other authors like Amitagati, Cāmundarāya,? Vasunandi, Somadevao and Āsādhara10 recognise ‘Divāmaithunavirati', i. e., abstinence from sexual intercourse in the day. According to Kārttikeya he who has ascended this stage neither eats food nor feeds others at night. We may reconcile these two traditions by saying that the observer should not copulate in the day and should neither feed others at night nor suggest others to do so. We may now say that this stage refers to the limitations of both Bhoga and Upabhoga. The next stage known as Brahmacarya Pratimā prescribes absolute continence.11 This is indicative of the further limitation in the objects of Upabhoga. The eighth12 stage of householder's advancement which is known as Arambhatyāga signifies the discontinuance of service, cultivation, business, in short, the means of livelihood. Besides, he neither suggests others to do business etc., nor commends those who are doing so.18 The next stage, namely, Parigrahatyāga Pratimă enjoins the abandonment of all kinds of acquisitions except "clothes, and in those too the observer is not attached. 14 The statement of Samantabhadra and Kārttikeya that the observer of this stage should renounce all kinds
1 Kārtti. 380; Ratna. Srāva. 141; Sāgā Dharmā. VI. 8; Vasu. Śrāva. 295. Abhayadeva, regards this Pratimā as the seventh in order and prescribes the same course of discipline as above (Uvāsaga. Comm. p. 76) 2 Kārtti. 380. Abhayadeva calls this Pratimā by the name of Kāyotsarga and regards this as the fifth in order and includes in it the avoidance of cohabitation in the day. He also prescribes the observance of the Gunavratas and the Sikşāvratas in addition to the Aņuvratas in this Pratimā. (Uvāsaga. Comm. p. 76) 3 Caritra Pāhuda. 22. 4 Kārtti. 382. Ratna. Srāva. 142. 6 Amita. Srāva. VII. 72. 7 Caritrasāra. p. 38. 8 Vasu. Srāva. 296. 9 Vasu. Śrāva. Intro. p. 50. 10 Sāgā. Dharmā. VII. 12. 11 Kārtti. 384. Vasu. Srāva. 297. Ratna. Śrāva. 143. Sāgā. Dharmā. VII. 16.
Abhayadeva defines it in the same way, though the order of the Pratimā is the sixth. 12 Ratna. Srāva. 144. Vasun. Srāva. 298. Abhayadeva holds that the aspirant
himself should not indulge in any activity for livelihood. 13 Kārtti. 385. 14 Vasu. Şrāva. 299.

Page #137

IV. ACARA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
115
of Parigraha internal as well as external should mean the renouncement of all Parigraha except clothes. In the tenth stage, the aspirant refuses to give advice or suggestion regarding matters concerning the householder, hence it is called Anumatityāga Pratimā.? Here all the objects of Bhoga and Upabhoga have been renounced except clothes, and proper food cooked for him. The highest point of householder's discipline is arrived at in the eleventh stage when the aspirant renounces home and goes to the forest where ascetics dwell and accepts vows in the presence of a Guru. He performs austerities, lives on food obtained by begging, and wears a piece of loin-cloth. Thus he is designated as excellent Srāvaka and the stage is called Uddistatyāga Pratimā. Vasunandi* gives a twofold classification of this stage, first, the excellent Srāvaka with one cloth, and secondly the same with one loin-cloth. The former applies instruments for cutting of his hair, keeps broom to avoid injury to small living beings, takes meals once a day either in the palm of his hand or in some pot in a sitting posture, and observes fast by renouncing all kinds of food on the four pious days (Astami and Caturdaśī) of the month. This distinguishes him from the latter who pulls out his hair, and takes his meals in the palm of his hand," other things being common to both. In both the cases, food is begged either from one house after the monks have taken their meals and fast is observed if food is not obtained from there, or from different houses in case food is not received at one house.
THE THIRD WAY AS THE SYSTEMATIC AND ALL-INCLUSIVE EXPOSITION OF THE HOUSEHOLDERS ETHICAL DISCIPLINE: We witness a third way of
1 Kārtti. 386. Ratna. Śrāva. 145. Abhayadeva recognises neither the Parigrahatyāga Pratimā nor the Anumatityāga Pratimā. He speaks of Preșyatyāga Pratimā, which implies the refusal to make use of others for livelihood. 2 Kärtti. 388. Ratna. Srāva. 146. Vasu. Srāva. 300. 3 Ratna. Srāva. 147. According to Abhayadeva, in the Uddiştatyāga Pratimā the aspirant does not take food prepared for himself; he either shaves his head or keeps a top-knot. In the Sramaṇabhūta Pratimā he either shaves his head or pulls out his hair. Besides he keeps a broom and a begging bowl (Uvāsaga Comm. pp. 76-77) These two stages almost correspond to the two-fold division made by Vasunandi as mentioned above. 4 Vasu. Srāva. 301. 5 Vasu. Srāva. 302, 303, 311.; Sāgā. Dharmā. VII. 39, 40. Vasu. Srāva. 304 to 309, Sāgā. Dharmā. VII. 41. to 44, 46.

Page #138

116
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
representing the house-holder's ethical discipline. This has emerged on account of the tendency of comprehensive systematisation. Sallekhanā (to be henceforth discussed) which is included by Kundakunda in Vratas is taken out by other Ācāryas from the extent of the Vratas and is given a separate place. Besides, the Mūlaguņas, the Vratas, and the Pratimās appear to be somewhat detached from one another. Though the conception of Pratimās is capable of including Mūlaguņas and Vratas, yet it mingles Mūlaguņas with Samyagdarśana. Thus it detaches Mūlaguņas from their original function for which they have been designed, namely, for preparing commonplace persons morally and for deciding the minimum of morality. Again, though Mūlaguņas and Vratas along with Samyagdarśana are capable of giving rise to Pratimās, yet Sallekhana remains isolated. Thus the conception of Pratimās suffers from two defects; first, of curbing the freedom of Mūlagunas to embrace wide extent, and secondly, of not including Sallekhanā within them; and the conception of Mūlaguņas and Vratas along with Samyagdarśana, from one defect of not comprising Sallekhană within their purview. Probably keeping this in view, Jinasena' has devised an all-comprehensive way for describing the Ācāra of the householder. He has divided the whole of the Acāra into Pakşa, Caryā and Sādhana. The follower of this discipline is called Pākşika, Naişthika, and Sādhaka respectively. Āsādhara has adopted this way as the basis of his Sāgāradharmāmsta. He who has set his face against the intentional injury to all mobile living beings, and who observes Mūlaguņas is called Pākṣika. He is to abstain himself from wine, meat, honey, five kinds of Udambara fruits and seven kinds of bad habits already mentioned, and from eating corn-food at night. He is further to devote himself to worship Arahantas, revere Gurus, offer gifts to the Pātras and try to earn fame by meritorious deeds of charity and the like. Besides, he should practise universal friendship, appreciate meritorious personages, be compassionate towards the miserable and be indifferent towards the perverted. The aspirant who devotes himself to the observance of Pratimās which also include Vratas is styled Naisthika. And lastly, he who practises Sallekhanā is called Sãdhaka. Thus we see that all the previous ways of describing the householder's discipline have been properly harmonised.
su sigurno min. 12 ore Dhome.
1 Adipurāna. 145. 2 Sāgā. Dharmā. I-19, II-2. 3 Sāgā. Dharmā. II. 17, 76. Ibid. II. 23, 86.
S bid. I. 18.
5 Ibid. I. 19.

Page #139

IV. ĀCĀRA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
117
NATURE OF SALLEKHANĀ AS DISTINGUISHED FROM SUICIDE: After reconciling the threefold ways of describing the householder's ethical discipline, we now proceed to explain the conception of Sallekhanā as recognised in Jainism. It implies the enervation of external body and internal passions in a legitimate way by the gradual removal of the causes of their nourishment, so that one may renounce the present body with a view to having a new bodily modification. To be more clear, the abandonment of the bodily frame on being confronted with the uneschewable calamity, famine, senility, and disease for the sustenance of spiritual practices has been regarded as Sallekhanā. This signifies that the process of Sallekhanā is to be adopted either in special circumstances when the religious observances are being endangered on account of unavoidable bodily infirmities and the like, or on the occasion when the time of natural death has been known in all probability.3 No doubt, the body which is the medium of the upliftment of the soul is to be properly nourished and cared for and the diseases are to be seriously met with without any retreat. But if the body refuses to respond to our earnest endeavours, we should not falter to forsake it like a villain in the interest of saving the peace of mind. Thus if one is encountered with the causes of the termination of duration of the present life one should resort to the performance of the process of Sallekhanā, which is not other than the spiritual welcome to death. This is not yielding to death, but a way of meeting the challenge of death undauntedly and adequately. This happy embracement of death has been calculated to carry the spiritual dispositions to the next birth, but it is not very easy to practise. Those who have submitted themselves to vicious deeds throughout their lives cannot easily think to adopt the process of Sallekhanā. Thus it requires an earnest endeavour from the start. Samantabhadra declares that austerities, if they have been truly, deeply, and successfully performed, must bear the fruits of noble death. “Self-restraint, study, austerities, worship, and charity, all become useless if the mind is not pure at the last hour of life. Just as the training of a king who has learnt the use of weapons for twelve years, becomes useless if he faints on the battle field."? It is to be remembered that the mere loss of the strength of the body is of no
1 Sarvārtha. VII. 22. 2 Ratna. Śrāva. 122. 3 Sägā. Dharmā. VIII. 20; Amita. Śräva. VI. 98, yo. Sā. III. 148. 4 Sāgā. Dharmā. VIII. 5, 6, 7. 5 Puru. 175.6 Ratna. Srāva. 123. 7 Yas. and Ic. p. 287.

Page #140

118
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
consequence if it does not lead to the conquest of passions. The flagellation of the body must issue in the denial of passions.1 The resignation of body to death has not been considered to be as difficult as the observing of self-control, and the fixing of one's mind in the Atman, when the vital forces depart from the body. Thus the emphasis is on the rejection of passion, and consequently this noble death serves for the fulfilment of Ahimsā.3 It is on account of this insistence on the abnegation of passions that the process of Sallekhana must needs be distinguished from suicide which is perpetrated by the cruel dominance of passions through the mal-agency of water, fire, poison, inhibition of breath and the like. Suicide is easy when compared with the adequate performance of Sallekhana. The latter is undertaken only when the body fails to answer to the spiritual needs of the individual and when the inevitability of death is a matter of undisputed certainty; while suicide may be committed at any time in the life time under the spell of emotional disturbance or passionate attitude of mind.
PROCESS OF SALLEKHANA: To deal with the process of Sallekhanā,5 the aspirant must attain the purity of mind by renouncing attachment, aversion and infatuation. Afterwards in modest and sweet words he should make his earnest request to the members of his family and others around him to pardon him for the vicious deeds committed by him to afflict them wittingly and unwittingly. He should also forgive them from the bottom of his heart for being troubled by them on certain occasions. He should then practise the five Mahāvratas and engage himself in the study of scriptures with adequate zeal without allowing himself to be seduced by grief, fear, hatred, and the like. Nourishment is to be renounced gradually so that mental disturbance may be avoided. The persistence of equanimous mental state is the prime necessity. The physical renunciation of food to enervate the body must needs be balanced by the enhancement of the strength of the spirit. In other words, the gradual development of spiritual energy must automatically result in the gradual renunciation of the causes of physical nourishment. In the first place, only milk and whey should be continued after having abandoned the solid food, then
1 Sāgā. Dharma VIII. 22. 3 Puru. 179. 4 Puru. 178. 5 Ratna. Srava. 124 to 128,

2 Ibid. VIII. 24.

Page #141

IV. ĀCĀRA OF THE HOUSEHOLDER
119
after giving up even the former, only hot water should be taken. Subsequently fasting should be observed. Then after entirely devoting himself to the meditation on the fivefold holy names of Arahanta, Siddha, Acārya, Upādhyāya and Sadhu, the aspirant should bid farewell to his body.
While practising Sallekhanā, the Sādhaka should avoid the following faults: 1) desire to live, 2) desire to die, 3) remembrance of friends, 4) revival of past pleasures, and 5) expectations for future prosperity. Samantabhadra takes out 'revival of past pleasures and puts 'fear' in its place. According to the Uvāsagadasāo the defects are 1) longing for this world, 2) longing for the next world, 3) longing for life, 4) longing for death, and 5) longing for sensual pleasures.
CHAPTER V
Acāra of the Muni
SUMMARY OF THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER: In the previous chapter we have dealt with the householder's ethical discipline. We have, in the first place, pointed out that the householder is incapable of removing the inauspicious psychical states root and branch. Secondly, we have dwelt upon the nature of violence, falsehood, theft, non-chastity and acquisition and have endeavoured to derive from it the scope of partial vows (aņuvratas) of the house-holder. Thirdly, a survey of the different conceptions of Mūlaguņas together with the various views regarding the problem of eating at night has been made. Fourthly, the nature and the various interpretations of the seven Sīla Vratas have been discussed. Fifthly, the conception of the eleven Pratimās, after reconciling it with the aforementioned Vratas, has been dealt with. Sixthly, we have shown that the representation of the householder's ethical discipline on the basis of Paksa, Caryā, and Sādhana is capable of comprehending in a systematic way the conception of Mūlaguņas, twelve Vratas, eleven Pratimās, and lastly Sallekhanā (spiritual welcome to death). Finally, the nature and process of Sallekhanā after distinguishing it from suicide, have been expounded.
1 Ta. sū. VII: 37. Puru. 195. Amita. Śrāva. VII. 15. Sāgā. Dharmā. VIII. 44. 2 Ratna. Srāva. 129. 3 Uvāsagadasão. I. 57. (Trans. vide N. A. Gore).

Page #142

120
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
ASCETICISM IS NOT TO RECOIL FROM ACTIONS BUT FROM HIMSĀ: The upshot of the householder's discipline, as we have seen, was to alleviate Himsā to a partial extent; but the aim of the ascetic discipline, as we shall see, is to adhere and conform to the standard of negating Himsā to the last degree. The life of complete renunciation makes possible the extirpation of inauspicious Bhāvas, which remains unrealised in the householder's life of partial renunciation. The life of asceticism is not to recoil from the world of action, but from the world of Himsā, which fact lies in consonance with the general tenor of the Jaina religion. As a matter of fact, action as such is not abandoned, but the supramundane character of action displaces its mundane form, which inevitably entails Himsā. Even the high discipline of asceticism associated with auspicious Bhāvas along with Samyagdarśana prevents the complete realisation of Ahimsā on account of the presence of spiritual enemies in the form of mild passions. The ascetic life, no doubt, affords full ground for its realisation, but its perfect realisation is possible only in the plenitude of mystical experience. Now, the aspirant in whom the consciousness of sin has deepened to such an extent as to cause revolt against his own form of lower existence, gradually renounces the articles of Bhoga and Upabhoga to the last resort and thereby fosters the spirit of detachment and gets an opportunity to fix his mind on something higher. In other words, after observing the discipline prescribed in the eleven Pratimās with circumspection and zeal for higher life, the aspirant enters on the life of full renunciation as soon as he crosses the eleventh stage. It is no doubt true that the ascending of each stage is a movement, extrinsic and intrinsic, towards higher discipline; but the full-orbed nature of renunciation manifests itself after the aspirant transcends the discipline enjoined by the last stage. The gradual renunciation of the articles of Bhoga and Upabhoga, or the ascension towards a higher and nobler path results on account of his being motivated by certain incentives to spiritual life. These are traditionally known as the twelve Anupreksās, which shall be presently dealt with. They necessarily lead the house-holder to the saintly life. In consequence, the new life dawns upon the struggling human soul, bringing with it unprecedented obligations which are to be discharged with all seriousness. In the subsequent pages we shall dwell upon the incentives to spiritual life and the consequent spiritual and ethical duties, the consistent and constant observance of which may pave the way for spiritual realisation and quietude.

Page #143

V. ĀCĀRA OF THE MUNI
121
ANUPREKŞĀS AS THE INCENTIVES TO SPIRITUAL LIFE AND THEIR IMPORTANCE: Before we set out to deal with the nature of the spiritual and ethical duties of the saint, we shall deal with the nature and importance of incentives to spiritual life (anupreksās), which prepare the layman and the monk alike for dissipating the metaphysical, the ethical and the spiritual ignorance and for overcoming all those obstacles which impede the advancement, moral and spiritual. If they possess the potency of pushing ahead the layman to peep into the realm of complete renuncia
, they profess to serve as the guides for the monk who leads the life of complete renunciation. They have been regarded as the incentive? 1) of perpetual flux or transitoriness of things (anitya), 2) of inescapability from death (asarana), 3) of transmigration (samsāra), 4) of loneliness (ekatva), 5) of the metaphysical distinction between the self and the nonself (anyatva), 6) of the bodily impurity (asuci), 7) of the constitution of the universe (loka), 8) of the difficulty of attaining the Right path (bodhidurlabha), 9) of the inflow of Karman (āsrava). The next three, namely, 10) the Incentive of the stoppage of the inflow of Karman (samvara), 11) the incentive of the shedding of Karmas (nirjarā), and 12) the incentive of the Dharma preached correctly (dharmasvākhyātatva) are the means of escape from the stress and storm of worldly career. These three provide us with the proper way of canalizing the energies for higher path. In other words, if the first nine Anupreksās are negative incentives, the last three are positives ones, i.e., the former present true picture of man in the world and of his surroundings, while the latter prescribe the practical path for enabling the aspirant to advance morally and spiritually. Anuprekṣā means Anucintana, ? i.e., repeated reflection. According to Pūjyapāda's commentary on the Tattvārthasūtra, Anupreksā means to ponder over the nature of the body etc.3 The Kārttikeyānuprekşā represents it as the reflections on the noble principles leading upward.* The difference in characterisation is due to the difference in emphasis. The former lays stress on the negative incentives, while the latter, on the means of escape from the turmoils of the world, i.e., on the positive incentives. The Anupreksās have been contemplated to subserve the noble cause of spiritual progress, to engender detachment and to lead the aspirant from the domain of passion to that of dispassion. They have also been
3 Sarvārtha. IX-2.
1 Ta.sū. IX. 7. 4 Kārtii. 97.
2 Ta.sū. IX. 7. 5 Jñānā. p. 59.

Page #144

122
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
recommended for the attainment of the purity of thoughts, for the growth of the desire for salvation, for the development of detachment and selfcontrol, and lastly, for the experience of tranquillity as a result of the extinction of passions.1 According to the Mūlācāra these Bhāvanās bring about detachment, and he who identifies himself with them attains liberation as a result of the disruption of Karmic bondage.2 In general, these Bhāvanās lift the mind of the aspirant above profane relations and considerations, and thereby prepare the self for meditation and emancipa
tion.
ACCOUNT OF EACH INCENTIVE: Let us now turn to explain the nature of each incentive. 1) The incentive of perpetual flux or transitoriness of things (anityānuprekṣā): Everything is subject to change and mutation. Birth accompanies death; youth is tied up with senility; wealth and prosperity may disappear at any time; and the body may fall victim to various kinds of ills and diseases. Thus impermanence of the state of things stares us in the face. Whatever form is born must necessarily perish. Attachment to ever transforming modifications leads us astray and clouds the spiritual and veritable aspect of life. Friends, beauty, wife, children, wealth etc.,-all these things which in general captivate man's mind and energy are fraught with transientness, thus are not the eternal associates of the self. Besides, body, fame, pleasures of the senses and other things of Bhoga and Upabhoga are unstable in character like a bubble of water, or lump of ice, or rainbow, or lightening.' Keeping in mind the transient character of the mundane pleasures and objects, the aspirant should part with their fraudulent company and utilize this inherent challenge of the process of the world for his spiritual beneficence so that happiness par excellence may sprout. Kundakunda tells us that body, possessions, pleasure and pain, friends and enemies are not the enduring accompaniments of the self unlike the eternality of the conscious soul itself; and he, whether a householder or a monk, who after deriving inspiration from this meditates upon the supreme Atman destroys the knot of delusion. This expression is indicative of the way of the utilisation of the incentive of transitoriness of things for superb attainments.
1 Jñana. II. 5, 6. 2 Mūlā. 763, 764. 3 Kārtti. 5.; Jñānā. p. 17. 10. 4 Kärtti. 4. 5 Kärtti. 6.; Mūlā. 693, 694. 6 Prava. II. 101.
7 Sarvārtha. IX-7.; Bhaga. Ara. 1727.; Kärtti. 7, 9.
8 Kārtti. 22.
9 Prava. II. 101, 102.

Page #145

V. ACARA OF THE MUNI
123
2) The incentive of inescapability from death (asaraṇānuprekşā): Inevitability of death serves as a potent incentive to spiritual life. One experiences helplessness on the advent of death. Death knows no partiality. It behaves equally and indiscriminately with the young and old, the rich and poor, the brave and coward, and the like. Nothing mundane, whatsoever, is capable of resisting the challenge of death. Neither earthly powers nor heavenly gods can save us from the clutches of death.3 Besides, there is no place where death cannot stretch its wings. Every stratagem and contrivance is impotent in rescuing a living being who is breathing his last. Thus, those who want to evolve an incentive to spiritual life through the consideration of inescapability from death are necessarily prompted to seek a life which will be forever beyond its ordinarily irresistible grip.
3) The incentive of transmigration (samsārānuprekşā): Every creature under the sway of perverted belief and passions falls a victim to births and deaths. The transmigrating soul leaves one body and resorts to another incessently and uninterruptedly.? Under the constraint of Karmic bondage the mundane soul falls an easy prey to repeated birth and death.8 Briefly speaking, four categories of post-existence have been recognised-Human, celestial, hellish and sub-human-where a transmigrating soul is born and is involved in distressing anguish and affliction. The formidable sufferings associated with the hellish and subhuman beings need no dilation.10 The celestial beings may be deemed comparatively happy, but their pleasures of the senses end in ever-increasing hunger for more, which entails mental agony and perturbation, hence they may be considered only ostensibly happy.11 The sufferings of human form of existence are very evident. The pains of womb, parentless childhood, diseased body, destitution, quarrelsome wife, undutiful son and daughter, and the like are so manifest that every man has to undergo and bear incalculable suffering. 12 Thus the suffering consequent upon these four forms of existence afford an incentive to the seeker to transcend these miseries of life enduringly.
1 Jñünā. p. 27-11. 2 Kārtti. 24. 3 Kārtti. 25, 26.; Müla. 697., Jñanā. p. 29-16. 4 Jñānā. p. 30. 18. 5 Ibid. 6 Kartti. 33. 7 Kärtti. 32. 8 Jñānā p. 31. 2. Mülā. 707.; Jñānā. p. 31-1, 17. 10 Kärtti. 34 to 44. 11 Kärtti. 58, 59, 60, 61. 12 Kärtti. 45, 46, 51, 52, 53.

Page #146

124
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
4) The incentive of loneliness (ekatvānuprekşā): The soul is all alone without any companion to suffer the consequences of his own good and evil deeds. Neither the friends nor the relations, howsoever nearest and dearest they might be, are capable of sharing one's sufferings and sorrows, the result of past Karmas, though they may run to enjoy one's wealth. One may feed one's dependents by earning dishonestly, but, at the time of fruition, one alone will suffer. He who constantly reflects thus absolves himself from the trammels of attachment and aversion.
5) The incentive of the metaphysical distinction between the self and the not-self (anyatvānuprekṣā): The self is permanently distinct from the body. Though empirically it is one with the body, yet transcendentally it is totally different from it. The body is sensuous, unconscious, impermanent, and with beginning and end, while the soul is suprasensuous, conscious, permanent, and without beginning and end.* When one is alien even to this body so nearest to the self, the question of its distinction with other objects of the world around does not arise. The realisation of such a basic distinction would naturally tend to withdraw one's mind from the externalities and to fix it in the depths of one's own
self.
6) The incentive of the bodily impurity (asuci-aņuprekşā): The physical body is the centre of all filth and impurities. The impure nature of the body may be justified by several considerations. In the first place, the antecedent conditions of its origination, for example, semen and blood, are themselves abominable, so also the consequent conditions, for instance, flesh, fat, blood etc., which are stored from the transformation of food particles. Secondly, it is the storehouse of all sorts of nasty things like bile, phlegm, perspiration, and filth of ear, nose and throat. Thirdly, it constantly discharges excreta through its several openings. Fourthly, its impurity cannot be removed by bath, perfumes, incense and other means. Thinking like this in all earnestness will encourage one to sever the ties of attachment to the body, which will turn our mind towards crossing this ocean of existence.
1 Mülā. 698, 699.; Kärtti. 74 to 76. 2 Jñänä. p. 34-2, 6.; Bhaga. Ara. 1748; Kārtti. 77. 3 Jñānā. p. 35-5; Bhaga. Arā. 1747. 4 Sarvārtha. IX-7. 5 Mülā; 702; Sarvärtha IX-7. 7 Ta.sū. Bhāsya. IX-7. 8Sarvärtha. p. 415.
Kārtti. 82..

Page #147

V. ĀCẢRA OF THE MUNI
125
7) The incentive of the constitution of the universe (lokānuprekşā): The portion of space which includes the living and non-living substances is termed Loka and the rest of the empty space is called Aloka. This universe is beginningless, self-evident, indestructible, and needs no creator as is assumed by some other systems of philosophy. The nature of the constitutive substances of the universe has been already discussed in the chapter on metaphysics. Besides, the characteristic nature of the self from different standpoints has also been dwelt upon. Such philosophical reflection would enable the aspirant to know his real status which would necessarily yield spiritual inspiration.
8) The incentive of the difficulty of attaining the right path (bodhidurlabhānuprekṣā): The acquisition of the three jewels, which are capable of unfolding the divine potentialities, is very difficult on account of the rarity of adequate qualifications. Man has the privilege of attaining salvation but to be born as a human being is only a chance; it is again a chance to be born with the necessary accompaniments for the practising of austerities and meditation. Somadeva* remarks that "unceasingly wandering on the ocean of transmigration, a sentient creatutre is born as a human being by chance. Even then, birth in a family respected by the world and association with the good are as rare as the coming of a quail within a blind man's grasp." "Released from birth in the plant world, after much sufferings a sentient being is again born in the hells on account of his sins, then in the genus of animals, mutually hostile, and then again among uncouth men resembling animals." "He who wastes his human birth, obtained after cherished desire, with thoughts of disease, sorrows, fear, pleasures, wife and children, might as well consign a heap of jewels to the flames for the sake of ashes; verily his soul is blackened by mighty ignorance.” Even if by a stroke of fortune he is again born as a human being with all the material facilities, he may lack right instruction.5 Even if that be obtained, sensual pleasures may while away his time. Again, even if he gets rid of the sensual enjoyments, the performance of austerities and meditation is met with difficulties. Keeping in view, therefore, these formidable obstacles in the practising of holy asceticism, one should
1 Jñānā. p. 54-1.; Müla. 713. 2 Mūla. 712. Jñānā. p. 54-3, 4. 3 Mülā. 755, 756.; Bhaga. Ara. 1867, 1869. * Yas and Ic. p. 306. 5 Sarvārtha. IX. 7, p. 418. Ibid.

Page #148

126
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
resolve to traverse the path of spiritual realisation and set aside indolence and inaction in this very life, here and now.
9) The incentive of the inflow of Karman (āsravānuprekşā): The influx of the auspicious and inauspicious Asravas is the root cause of mundane existence. We have already discussed the nature and forms of Asrava. To dwell upon the consequences of Asrava would encourage an aspirant to rise above the realm of good and evil.
10-12) We have hitherto expounded the different negative incentives that lead us to the pursuit of spiritual life. We shall now close this topic by dwelling upon the positive incentives which will enable us to transcend the miseries of mundane existence. The refiction on the ways of 10) stoppage (saṁvarānuprekşā) and 11) the shedding (nirjarānuprekşā) of Karmas and on 12) the Dharma preached correctly (dharmasvākhyā. tatvānuprekşā) are the ways of escape from the meshes of terrestrial existence. Samvara results from Gupti, Samiti, Dharma, Anupreksā, Parīsahajaya and Cāritra, whereas Nirjarā is effected by Tapa.? We have dealt with the Anuprekşā. We shall deal with the Gupti, the Samiti, the Parīşahajaya and the Tapa later on. Dharma means compassion. It has also been classified into ten kinds. We shall deal with these kinds in the next chapter. To meditate on the self is Cāritra," or it is that which is practised for spiritual development. The Dharma preached correctly (dharmasvākhyātatva) recognises Ahiṁsā as its veritable characteristic. Again, it tells us that truth is its basis; modesty, its root; forgiveness, its strength; continence, its armour; self-control, its necessity; and nonacquisition, its support.?
FORMAL ATTAINMENT OF SAINTLY LIFE: Now, being prompted by the incentives mentioned above, the aspirant cherishes a negative attitude towards worldly actions and acquisitions, and a positive enlightened, tenacious, and resolute attitude towards the life of the spirit. He bids adieu to all sorts of profane relations including the wife, the children, and the elders. Permeating his mind with the five types of ascetic discipline, namely, Jñānācāra, Darsanācāra, Căritrācāra, Tapācāra and Vīryācāra, he prostrates before a great saint who is adorned with mystic characteristics, who abounds in virtues, who is associated with a family of distinction, who possesses an attractive physical form, who is endowed
1 Ta.sū. IX. 2, 3. Kartti. 96, 102. 5 Kartti. 99. Räjavå. IX. 2. 7.
2 Ibid. 3 Kärtti. 97.
7 Sarvårtha. p. 419.
Ta.sū. IX. 6. 8 Prava. III. 2.

Page #149

V. ÁCĂRA OF THË MUNÍ
127
with mature age, who is bereft of mental insobriety, and who is honoured and extolled by other saints. He then beseeches him to initiate. In consequence the consecrated favour is gained. Detaching himself from all mundane objects whatsoever, subduing the senses and the mind, he adopts a form similar to that in which he is born; i.e., he grows starknaked. To be more clear, “his external emblem consists in possessing a form in which he is born, in pulling out hair and moustache, in being pure, in being free from Himsā etc., and in not attending to the body. 4 Besides, his internal emblem, which is the cause of negation of births consists in being free from infatuation and sins, in being endowed with purity of psychical states and activities, and in having no desire for anything else."S
THE INTERNAL AND THE EXTERNAL PROCEED SIDE BY SIDE: It may be borne in mind that the internal and external emblems proceed side by side and keep pace with each other. Samantabhadra is of opinion that just as in the mundane performances the coming together of extrinsic and intrinsic causes results in the completion of a work, so in the process of liberation there works this eternal law. They are the obverse and the reverse of the same coin; and so neither the external 'nor the internal should be exclusively emphasized. The two are complementary and not contradictory. Those who damn the physical asceticism prescribed by Jainism forget the stress laid by the Jaina Acāryas on the importance of inner askesis. Jainism doubts if there can be inner spiritualisation of the human being without its manifestation in his outward life, and unceremoniously condemns the sheer outward expression of asceticism without its internal spiritual counterpart. Both the internal content without its proper outward manifestation and the external form without its proper origin and source are one-sided. The latter becomes burdensome and is degrading, while the former is unintelligible and inexplicable Believing that the intrinsic purification will seek expression in the outward form of physical austerities for its stability, just as oil is protected from pollution by the outward covering of the seed, or the karnel by the outward peel or skin, the Jaina Ācāryas have laid great stress on the importance of the psychical purity and the control of intense passions.
1 Prava. III, 2, 3 and Comm. Amrta. 2 Ibid. 3 Prava. III. 4. 4 Prava. III. 5 (Trans. vide Upadhye) 5 Prava. III. 6. (Trans. vide Upadhye) Svayambhū. 33, 60.

Page #150

128
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
The Jaina recognises that the spiritually ignorant man, notwithstanding his physical austerities, requires hundred thousand crores of lives for destroying that filth of Karman which may be annulled in an infinitesimal fraction of time by the spiritually endowed. This is sufficient to instruct the ignorant soul steeped in sheer physical austerities to the exclusion of spiritual background. As a matter of fact, the two aspects are interwoven into a complex harmony, hence both of them are valuable and valid. Again, the aim of renouncing the external paraphernalia consists in the inner renunciation of intense passion and desire; without this, the sheer extrinsic relinquishment is irrational and superfluous. Even the slightest internal defilement prevents the soul from the highest ascent, which may be illustrated by the life of the great monks like Bāhubali and Madhupinga. Sivabhūti, whose Bhāva was pure, attained omniscience by simply uttering "tuşa-māşa-bhinna"3, though he was devoid of scriptural knowledge. Thus religious practices and austerities, scriptural study and knowledge are stripped of their legitimate consequences in the absence of Bhāvas or mental askesis; even when they are sometimes highly esteemed, the purity of Bhāvas remains implied in thought, though often not expressly stated in language.
ADOPTION OF THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EMBLEMS: To revert from the digression, after adopting the internal and external emblems, at the sacred hands of an excellent Guru, after paying obeisance to him, and after attending to the course of discipline prescribed, the aspirant wins the supreme credit of being styled Sramana. Since he cannot interminably remain steadfast in the Ātmanic experience at the commencement of his spiritual pilgrimage, he strenuously strives to pursue the conceptual twenty-eight Mūlagupas which are; five great vows, five-fold carefulness, control of five senses, pulling out the hair, six-fold essentials, nakedness, not taking bath, sleeping on the ground, not cleansing the teeth, taking meals in a standing posture and taking only one meal a day."
ADVANCEMENT OF THE MUNI OVER THE HOUSEHOLDER: The partial character of the househoider's vows is disrupted by the potent life of the Muni, hence the Muni observes complete vows. In other words, inauspicious Bhāvas associated with the householder on account of the
Prava. III. 38. 2 Bhäva Pa. 3. 3 Ibid. 53. 4 Prava. III. 7. . 5 Prava. III. 8, 9. Müla. 2, 3, Acarasära. 16, Anagara. Dharma. IX. 84, 85.

Page #151

V. ACARA OF THE MUNI
129
partial character of the vows disappears with the observance of the complete vows. The consequence of this is that vice totally vanishes from the life of a Muni, and there remains virtue which will also be transcended as soon as the flight in the realm of the spirit is made. In a different way, the inauspicious Asrava which occurs on account of the presence of the intense passions is stopped, and the soul for the first time experiences complete cessation of inauspicious Karman. Moreover, the subduing of the Apratyākhyānāvaraņa passion means the advancement of the aspirant over the householder's discipline. Again, the life of asceticism aptly illustrates the existence and operation of Subha Yoga, Subha Dhyāna, and Subha Leśyā, which, in the life of the householder, are never found unmixed with their contraries.
FIVE GREAT Vows 1) AHIŃSĀ-MAHĀVRATA: This first Mahāvrata consists in the due observance, even in dreams, of the principle of noninjury to all living beings—mobile and immobile, gross and subtle—by avoiding three-fold ways of acting, commanding and consenting through the triple agency of mind, body and speech. Broadly speaking, the four fundamental passions, when they are combined with the three stages of action, namely, Saṁrambha, Samārambha and Arambha, committed by dint of mind, body and speech in the three-fold ways of Krta, Kārita and Anumodană, cause hundred and eight kinds of Himsā”. The monk who renounces these, and extend active friendship to all living beings as such for the purpose of purifying one's Bhāvas, and curbing one's passions, is said to observe Ahimsā-mahāvrata.3 In order that this vow may be properly observed, he is required to be cautious regarding his movement, speech, mental thoughts, handling of things, food and drink.
2) SATYA-MAHĀVRATA: This Mahāvarata consists in ever abandoning all forms of falsehood already discussed in the previous chapter, since the allowance of any kind of falsehood points to the presence of intense-passion, which is repugnent to the life of the saint. The false and oppressing words likely to be uttered under the constraint of attachment, aversion, jest, fear, anger, and greed should be renounced along
1 Jñānā. VIII. 8; Niyama. 56; Mülā. 5, 289; Bhaga. Ārā. 776; Ācārā. p. 202. 2 Ācārasāra. 11, 12; Anagă. Dharma. IV. 27; Jņānā. VIII. 10; Ta.sū. VI. 8. 3 Jñānā. VIII. 10, 11. 4 Mülā. 337; Anagā. Dharmā. IV. 34; Ta.sū. VII. 4.; Bhaga. Arā. 1206; Ācārā. pp. 203, 204; Ca.pā. 32.

Page #152

130
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
with the improper pronouncement of scriptural meaning. The five kinds of longings that strengthen the vow of truthfulness are recognised as thoughtfulness in speech and as restraining from anger, greed, fear, and joking.
3) ASTEYA-MAHĀVRATA: This Mahāvrata consists in renouncing all forms of stealing already referred to in the previous chapter. To express it differently, the renouncement of the possession of all “Para Dravyas' lying either in a village or in a town or in a wood without their being offered comes within the purview of Asteya-mahāvrata. The perfection of this vow consists in getting books etc., after one has asked one's superiors, in seeking the permission for certain necessary things from the possessor, in denying all attachment to things taken, in allowing oneself to accept faultless articles, and in handling things of co-religionists according to the prescribed rules. According to the Acārānga, it is brought out by restricting to limited alms, seeking the permission of the superiors before consuming food and drink, taking possession of limited part of a ground for a fixed time, renewing the permission, and begging for a limited ground for one's co-religionist. According to the Tattvārthasūtra, it consists in staying in the deserted places of abode, and secluded places like caves etc., in not denying other persons intending to stay, in maintaining purity of food, and in not developing the habit of quarrelsomeness.
4) BRAHMACARYA-MAHĀVRATA: This fourth great vow prescribes avoidance of sexual intercourse with the four kinds of females?— human, animal, celestial, and artificial-along with the denial of seeking sexual gratification in unnatural ways. The adherent of the Brahmacaryamahāvrata ought to renounce the following also for the purpose of facilitating the observance of the vow: Bodily make up, sense indulgence, use of passion-exciting food articles, taking of excessive food, attending to songs and dance, association with woman, exciting residence, passionate thinking about a woman, seeing the sexual organs, holding
1 Mülā. 6, 290; Acārā. p. 204. 2 Ta.sū. VII. 5; Anagā. Dharmā. IV. 45; Ācārā. pp. 204, 205; Ca. Pā. 33; Bhaga.
Arā. 1207. 3 Müla. 7, 291; Acārā. p. 205; Bhaga. Arā. 953. 4 Mülā. 339. 5 Ācārā. pp. 206, 207. Sarvārtha. VII. 6; Cā. Pā. 34. 7 Mūla. 292; Ācārā. II. 15-IV.

Page #153

V. ACARA OF THE MUNI
131
to their after-effects, reviving the past sexual enjoyments, planning for future sexual enjoyment, and seminal discharge. The accomplishment of this vow consists in refraining from discussing matters concerning females, contemplating the lovely forms of woman, remembering former sexual enjoyment, eating seasoned meals, or eating too much, decorating the body and having a habitation associated with woman.2
5) APARIGRAHA-MAHĀVRATA: This fifth great vow consists in detaching oneself root and branch from the internal and external attachments or from intrinsic impurities and extrinsic sentient and non-sentient Parigraha (paraphernalia). It has been pointed out that the man who performs the activities invigilantly cannot escape internal Himsā, no matter whether a living being is injured or not, while careful performance of actions never binds a man by mere external Himsā.* Consequently, he remains forever uncontaminated like the lotus in water.' Thus, bondage may or may not accrue when the Prāņas of a being depart on account of physical activities, but the thraldom to Karman is inevitable in presence of Parigraha; that is why ascetics give up all Parigrahas. In other words, it is inconceivable that in spite of the association with any kind of Parigraha one does not become the victim of infatuation, of mundane engagements and of unrestraint; and he who is preoccupied with the profane things is incapable of realising his true self.? Considered from the highest perspective, Parigraha includes the slightest attachment even to the body; and those who are desirous of liberation have been preached non-attention and non-attachment to the body. It follows, then, that the other kinds of Parigraha cannot be appreciated even in the least. This is the ideal state and the real Dharma; but till the saint is short of this achievement, he may accept that Parigraha which does not cause bondage, is not longed for by others, and does not engender psychical impurity like infatuation etc. In other words, when the shining summit of spiritual experience is enduringly climbed, any kind of Parigraha has no meaning, but below that a saint may keep that Parigraha which is compatible with
1 Jñānā. XI. 7 to 9; Anagā. Dharmā. IV. 61; Mülā. 996 to 998; Bhaga. Arā. 879,
880; Uttarā. 16-1 to 10. 2 Mülā. 340; Ta.sū. VII. 7; Acārasāra. V. 59, 60. Acārā. pp. 207, 208; Bhaga. Arā.
1210; Cā. Pā. 35. 3 Niyama. 60; Mülā. 293; Acārā. II. 15. V; Bhaga. Arā. 1117. * Prava. III. 17. Prava. III. 18. Prava. III. 19. 7 Prava. III. 21. 8 Prava. III. 23.

Page #154

132
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
Subhopayoga, or which does add to the sustenance and enhancement of Subha Bhāvas. This shows that this kind of Parigraha is indispensable for the maintenance of sainthood. Such Parigraha includes the body with which one is born, the spiritual words of the Guru, the sacred texts capable of unfolding the true nature of self, and devotion and modesty towards the spiritually developed souls. The celebrated book 'Mūlācāra' describes the nature of Aprigraha-mahāvrata by saying that it consists in renouncing the sentient and non-sentient Parigraha, and in adopting an attitude of non-attachment to other unforbidden and sinless Parigraha.? Thus a Muni may possess a book (jñānopadhi), a peacock-feather broom (samyamopadhi), and a pot for water, (saucopadhi). Just as the Subha Bhāvas in the absence of Suddha Bhāvas adorn the life of the saint, so do these paraphernalia without any contradiction. The pot for water is used after answering calls of nature. The peacock-feather broom serves the purpose of avoiding Himsă of living beings. This sort of broom possesses five characteristics. It does not get soiled either with dust or with sweat, it has the qualities of softness, non-injuriousness, tenderness and lightness. In contrast to the Nirgrantha Digambara monk, the Svetāmbara monk has been allowed to keep with him clothes, alms bowl, Kambala, and broom. Besides, he may keep Mukhapati (Mouth cloth) and Gocchaga (cloth for cleaning the alms bowl).' These are not regarded as Parigraha. With the details of these we are not concerned here. This vow is properly followed when the monk adopts an attitude of indifference towards the pleasures of hearing, seeing, smelling, tasting, and feeling.
THREE GUPTIS AND FIVE SAMITIS: We now proceed to dwell upon the five-fold carefulness (samiti). As we have already stated, the influx of the Karman is through 'Yoga'. The ideal thing for the saint is to control totally the physical, mental and vocal activities and to fix himself in the Atmanic experience. Such a sublime and sacred endeavour is called 'Gupti'. The supreme cause by virtue of which the Atman receives enduring shelter from the mundane career as such and manifests the potency of transcending birth and death, is termed 'Gupti'.' It means
1 Prava III. 25. 2 Mülā. 9. 3 Mülā. 14. 4 Bhaga. Arā. 98. Mülā. 910. Acārā. p. 23; p. 55. 6 Uttarā. 26-23. 7 Ibid. 8 Ācārā. pp. 209, 210; Mülā. 341; Ta.sā. VII-8; Cā. Pā. 36; Bhaga. Ārā. 1211. 9 Sarvārtha. IX. 2.

Page #155

V. ĀCĀRA OF THE MUNI
133
that ascension by which man ceases to be occupied with the things, pleasant and unpleasant, and continues to live as a tranquil, eternal spirit. This expresses the implication of the term 'Gupti' from the highest perspective possible. When a Muni finds himself unable to ascend such heights, he acquiesces in taking recourse to the observance of five Samitis (carefulness), namely, 1) Iryā-Samiti, 2) Bhāṣā-Samiti, 3) Eșaņā-Samiti, 4) Adāna-Nikșepaņa-Samiti, and 5) Utsarga or Pratisthāpanā-Samiti.1 The connotation of the term 'Gupti' changes with the change of reference. From the standpoint of the highest ascent, it implies the withdrawal of mind, body and speech from virtue and vice, and from the auspicious and inauspicious activities; but from the standpoint of Subhopayogi Muni, it means the recoiling of the triple agencies merely from the inauspicious deeds. According to Niscaya-naya, turning away from attachment etc., is control of mind; setting one's face against falsehood etc., or obserying silence is control of speech; refraining from bodily actions, nonattachment to body, and keeping from Himsā signify control of body.3 In conformity with Vyavahāra-naya, the renunciation of impure psychical states is the restraint of mind; the renouncernent of gossip concerning women, state, theft, and food, or the renouncement of telling a lie is the restraint of speech; and refraining from bodily actions such as binding, piercing, and beating living beings, is the restraint of body.. In order to relinquish evil tendencies, meditation and scriptural study have been prescribed. It may be pointed out here that 'Gupti' possesses negative force, whereas Samiti fosters positive spirit, i.e., the former negates vicious activities, while the latter affirms virtuous performance of activities. The purpose of Samitis is to avoid all sorts of unpleasantness to the living beings without any exception, while one is moving, speaking, taking food, keeping and receiving things, evacuating bowels etc.? These Samitis have been calculated to keep the Muni away from the commitment of sins like the lotus flower in water or like the armoured man in the battle-field. These three Guptis and five Samitis have been technically called Pravacanamātā, inasmuch as they guard the belief, know
1 Tattvārthasāra. VI. 6. Ta.sū. IX. 5; Mülā. 10, 301. 2 Mülā. 334, 331; Bhaga. Arā. 1189. 3 Niyama. 69, 70. and Comm. Padmaprabha; Müla. 332, 333; Bhaga. Arā. 1187, 1188. 4 Niyama. 66, 67, 68. SMülā. 335,; Bhaga. Arā. 1190. Uttarā. 24/26. 7 Sarvärtha. IX. 2; Cā. Pā. 37. 8 Mülā. 326, 327, 328; Bhaga. Arā. 1201, 1202.

Page #156

134
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
ledge and conduct of the saint in such a way as the mother protects her child.
FIVE SAMITIS 1) IRYA-SAMITI: The saint following the discipline consistent with the Iryā-samiti ought to pay heed to (a) the purity of the way, (b) the adequacy of the sunlight, (c) attention, (d) purpose, and lastly (e) the process of moving. (a) That is the proper way which is bereft of such living beings as are ordinarily put to injury in moving, instance, ants etc., as also seeds, grass, green leaves, mud etc. The path which has been repeatedly trodden by carts and other vehicles, by cattle and horses, by men and women, and which has already been ploughed and scorched by the sun should be regarded as fit to be traversed.* (b) The Sun-light or day time is necessary for touring. The Moon, the stars, and artificial lamps are quite incapable of serving as substitutes for the sun-light. (c) The saint should devote his concentrated attention to the keeping of steps on the ground after abstaining himself from the five types of scriptural study and from the objects of the five senses, so that he may avoid injury to the living beings that may be there. (d) He should move only for the accomplishment of a legitimate purpose, i.e., a purpose which is estimable and is in consonance with his spiritual status and honour, for instance, pilgrimage, visiting the Guru and other saints of great repute, meeting a challenge for religious discussion, the preaching of Dharma etc. (e) As for the process of moving, he should slowly and compassionately move, should carefully observe the ground in front of himself to the extent of four cubits (two yards)10, and should avoid running, jumping, inseriousness, looking in other directions, digging ground, and cutting trees and vegetables. 11
2) BHĀSĀ-SAMITI: The saint who does not take interest in backbiting, in ridiculing others, in self-commendation, and in speaking harsh words, but who speaks what is beneficial to himself and to others is said
1 Mülā. 336; Uttarā. 24/1, 2. 2 Mülā. 302. Bhaga. Arā. 1191.; Uttarā. 24/4. Tattvärthasara. VI-7. 3 Bhaga. Arā. Comm. Vija. and Mülā. 1191. 4 Mülā. 304 to 306. 5 Mülā. 11; Niyama. 61; Uttară. 24/5. 6 Bhaga. Arā. Comm. Vija. 1191. 7 We shall deal with these in thes ubsequent chapter. 8 Bhaga. Arā. Comm. Vija. and Müla. 1191; Uttarā. 24/8. 9 Bhaga. Ară. Comm. Vija. and Müla. 1191. 10 Niyama. 61; Mülā. 11, 103; Acārā. p. 137. 11 Bhaga. Ara. Vija. and Mülā. 1191; Linga Pähuda. 15, 16.

Page #157

V. ĀCĀRA OF THE MUNI
135
be destruction ursues the
needed as ob
to have adhered to the observance of Bhāṣā-samiti. He should use blameless and concise speech, avoiding anger, pride, deceit, greed, laughter, fear, loquacity and gossip.2 Technically speaking, of the fourfold kinds of speech-truth, untruth, truth mixed with untruth, neither truth nor untruth-the saint in the interest of observing Bhāṣā-samiti is required to speak the first and the last kind of speech, inasmuch as these two kinds of speech are not sinful, blamable, rough, stinging, course, and hard. Besides, these do not lead to sins, to discord and faction, to grief and outrage, and to the destruction of living beings. 3
3) EŞAŅĀ-SAMITI: When a saint pursues the discipline laid down for the acceptance of the articles of food, he is regarded as observing Esaņā-samiti.. In other words, he who calmly takes such food as is wholesome, pure, and given by others with devotion, but is not prepared, suggested and approved by himself is said to have observed Eșaņāsamiti. Again, the saint who eats faultless food, rightly handles sinless paraphernalia, and cleanses well the sitting or sleeping place is recognised as pursuing Eşaņā-samiti; carelessness in these observances is degrading.
ATTITUDE OF THE SAINT TOWARDS FOOD: We now turn to the general attitude of the saint towards faultless? food, which will assist us in impressing upon our mind the fact that, notwithstanding his outward taking of food, he continues to be unattached to it. The saint never partakes of food with the profane design of increasing strength, enhancing longevity, gratifying relish, and attaining healthy and bright look, but with the sacred aim of unceasing performance of scriptural study, successful pursuance of self-control, and uninterrupted performance of meditation. He accepts food for satiating his pangs of hunger, for performing consecrated service to other saints, for conserving his prānas and self-control, and for observing the six essentials and the ten Dharmas.' He is scrupulous in food and travels, inasmuch as he is dispassionate, and keeps an attitude of disinterestedness towards this world as well as the next.10 Again, he feeds the body for making the noble effort of realising the true
1 Niyama. 61; Mülā. 12. 2 Uttarā. 24/9, 10. 3 Acārā. pp. 150, 151. Bhaga. Arā. 1192. Mülā. 307. 4 Mülā. 13. 5 Niyama. 63. 6 Mülā. 318, 916. Bhaga. Arū. 1197. Uttarā. 24/11. Tatt värthasara. VI. 9. 7 The faultless food is that which is obtained by begging in the day, is bereft of any Consideration of gust and palate, is destitute of honey, flesh and the like, and is accepted in the form in which it is given (Prava. III. 29 and Comm. Amfta). 8 Müla. 481. Ibid. 479. 10 Prava. III. 26.

Page #158

136
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
self, just as the lamp is supplied with oil for seeing the objects clearly. Thus the ascetics are as good as going without food, even if they accept faultless food, since thereby they do not fall a victim to the thraldom of Karman.
4) ĀDĀNA-NIKȘEPAŅA-SAMITI: The Ādāna-Nikṣepaņa-samiti implies the persistence of careful mental state in lifting and putting articles necessary for religious life. It means wiping a thing and its place after inspecting them with eyes before lifting and putting it.
5) PRATISTHĀPANĀ-SAMITI: The Pratisthāpanā-samiti prescribes that the saint should dispose of excrements, urine etc., in a place which is unobjectionable, bereft of living beings, and unfrequented by man.. To be more clear, excrements, urine, saliva, mucus, uncleanliness of the body, offals of food, badly torn clothes, dead body and any other useless things should be left in a place which is burnt, ploughed, used for cremation, unobjected, spacious, devoid of insects and seeds, not covered with grass or leaves, not perforated by holes, situated at a distance, neither frequented nor seen by other people, and having an inanimate surface layer.*
CONTROL OF THE FIVE SENSES: Having discussed the nature of the five great vows and the five-fold carefulness, we now proceed to discuss the implications of the control of the five senses. It is an evident fact that the attachment to senses and sensuous pleasures unquestionably creates enormous difficulties in the spiritual path, hence it needs unsympathetic extirpation. The control of the senses undertaken by the saint is not a new enterprise, since it was to some extent observed by him when he was the observer of partial vows, though unprecedented entrance into higher life brings about more stern forms of accountabilities. Hence the saint completely controls the five senses, namely, the senses of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and touch from their attachment to colour, sound, smell, taste and touch respectively. The ascetic, thus, refuses to be seduced by the pleasantness and unpleasantness of the sensuous objects. He witnesses all the objects of the senses in their metaphysical perspective, and regards them as different forms of Pudgala, which are ontologically foreign to the nature of the real self. Thus he has attained the inner conviction that none of the objects of the five senses is of any benefit
1 Niyaina. 64. Mūlā. 14. 2 Mülā. 319. Uttară 24/14. 3 Niyama. 65. Mūlā. 15, 321, 322. Uttarā. 24/15, 17, 18.

Page #159

V. ĀCĀRA OF THE MUNI
137
to the self. In order that the senses may be curbed, the saint should observe proper discipline. The sense of sight should neither be attracted by beauty nor repulsed by the ugliness of things; the sense of hearing should not be led away by the tune which originates from the beings and from the non-sentient musical instruments; the sense of smell should be checked from seduction on account of the fragrance of things; the sense of taste should not be overcome by different kinds of juices,
aultless, pleasant and unpleasant food; and lastly, the sense of touch should not be led astray by the different kinds of touch.?
PULLING OUT THE HAIR: The next Mülaguna to be considered is 'Pulling out the hair'. It is manifest that the natural growth of hair cannot be retarded, and if they are allowed unceasing growth, lice and other smaller kinds of insects will develop, and consequently Himsā will become inevitable; and if hair cutting instruments are applied, it will mean reversion to worldly engagements, hence the only alternative left is to pull out the hair on the head, beard and moustache with one's own hands after two months, three months or at the most after four months.3 This should be done in the day time after having observed the complete fast. So doing fosters the spirit of detachment from the body and acquisitions, encourages self-restraint and monastic trend and relieves the saint from solicitousness."
SIXFOLD ESSENTIALS: To deal with the nature of six essentials, they are so called because of their direct bearing upon the spiritual life. The other Mūlaguņas are no doubt inseparably associated with the life of the saint, but they affect his life indirectly. They should not therefore be understood to suggest that they are non-essential in character, but they may safely be considered necessary for the successful performance of these six essentials. All the Mūlaguņas are on par, but it is customary to lay stress on those principles which imply inward reference, inasmuch as in spiritual life inward change is of great significance, hence it counts the most. Thus, the term 'Āvaśyaka' should be calculated to bring to light the capability of these six essentials for converting the life of the saint intrinsically and for reminding him of the goal of his devoted career. The saint who engages himself in materialising the spirit of outright
1 Samādhi. 55. 2 Mülā. 17 to 21. 3 Mūlā. 29; Anagā. Dharmā. IX-86, 97. Bhaga. Arā. 88, 89; Ācārā. p. 189. Acārasāra. · I. 43. 4 Mülā. 29. 5 Bhaga. Arā. 91; Ācārasära. 1-4.

Page #160

138
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
denial of dependence upon vicious and virtuous thought-activities by the realisation of his own self, is believed to have performed Avaśyaka Karma. Such a sublime action is indicative of the absolute freedom of the soul. This is the meaning of the term Āvaśyaka from Niscaya or transcendental standpoint; but, as we have frequently said, when the self finds itself incapable of ascending to such superb heights, it descends to the virtuous performances, and from this angle of vision the Avaśyaka Karma traditionally admits of six kinds, namely, 1) Sāmāyika, 2) Stuti, 3) Vandanā, 4) Pratikramaņa, 5) Pratyākhyāna and 6) Kāyotsarga.? “Kundakunda's enumeration of Āvasyakas is thus: Pratikramana, Pratyākhyāna, Ālocană, Kāyotsarga, Sāmāyika and Paramabhakti, it is slightly different from the traditional enumeration wherein Alocană is absent, being possibly included in Pratikramaņa which it precedes in actual performance and in place of Paramabhakti, we have Stuti and Vandanā. Kundakunda divides Paramabhakti into two types: Nirvṛtti and Yogabhakti, wherein can be smelt the traces of Stuti and Vandanā. Either Kundakunda did not want to stick to the traditional enumeration because he was discussing the subject from Niscaya-naya, or he did not find any material difference between the two enumerations, or he incorporates, in this context, some early tradition.3" We may point out here that the later thinkers have adopted the traditional enumeration of the six essentials.* We shall now dwell upon these six essentials.
1) SĀMĀYIKA: Sāmāyika means the incessant continuation of the placid and unruffled frame of mind in the midst of life and death, loss and gain, pleasant and unpleasant events, friends and foes, pleasure and pain." In the life of the householder such a mental turning is a temporary phase, but in the life of the saint it ought to be permanently present as a persistent disposition of mind. Thus in the act of Sāmāyika the limitation of time evaporates totally in the life of the saint. It is not useful for the saint who is destitute of equanimity to reside in forest, mortify the body, observe various fasts, study the scriptures and keep silence. He who is detached from all vices, who pursues threefold Guptis, who restrains his senses, who is evenly disposed towards all living beings, who refrains from Ārta and Raudra types of Dhyāna, who practises Dharma
1 Niyama. 141 to 147; Mülā. 515. 2 Müla. 516; Uttarā. 29/8 to 13. 3 Intro. Prava. p. XLII. 4 Acarasāra. I-35; Anagā. Dharmă. VIII-17. IX-3. 5 Müla. 23. 6 Niyama. 124.

Page #161

v. ĀCĀRA OF THE MUNI
139
and Sukla types of Dhyāna, who always keeps himself away from joking, indulgence, sorrow, ennui, disgust, fear, sexual-inclinations, is said to have observed stead-fast equanimity? (Sāmāyika).
2) STUTI: Stuti means to devote oneself to the holy contemplation of the divine characteristics revealed by the consecrated twenty-four Tīrthamkaras, and to the sacred meditation on the implications of their names.? Out of devotion the saint very often wishes to be bestowed upon with spiritual knowledge and liberation by the great Jina, but this is merely a devotional language; in fact, being beyond attachment and aversion, Jina cannot be expected to offer anything. The divine souls have graced us with their sermons, which can undermine the bitterness of bondage. Though the perfected souls have transcended the duals, yet devotion to them, nay, mere turning towards them can fulfil our purposes, and annul the accumulated filth of Karman. It is auspicious attachment and not mundane yearning.“
3) VANDANĀ: Vandanā which is the expression of inner modesty signifies the offering of salutation to Arahanta and Siddha Pratimās and to those who excel in righteous and virtuous living, for instance, Tapa Guru, Sruta Guru, Guna Guru, Dīksā Guru, and Rādhikā Guru. In other words, the saint should pay obeisance to those who occupy themselves with study and meditation, practise five great vows, condemn looseness of conduct, observe Darśana, Jñāna, Căritra, and Tapa Vinayas, disseminate the merits of virtuous personalities, and are self controlled and enduring.? The well-disciplined saint should not pay respect to the pseudo-saints, to the parents, to the loosely disciplined Dīksā Guru and Śruta Guru, to the King, to the householder, and to the heavenly gods.8 In place of traditional representation of Stuti and Vandanā Kundakunda speaks of Parama Bhakti, which from the Vyavahāra point of view implies supreme devotion for the various attributes of emancipated souls. Two kinds of Parama Bhakti have been recognised, namely, Nirvrtti Bhakti and Yoga Bhakti. The former implies the devotion for right belief, right knowledge and right conduct, while the latter is concerned with the contemplation upon the Tattvas, which results in
1 Niyama. 125, 226, 129, 131 to 133. Müla. 524, 525, 526, 529. 2 Mülā. 24; Anagā. Dharmā. VIII. 37. 3 Mūlā. 567. 4 Müla. 569-572. 5 Ibid. 572. 6 Ibid. 25. 7 Mula. 595, 596. 8 Mülā. 592. Niyama. 135.

Page #162

140
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
self-absorption after one has renounced attachment etc., foreign thought activities and perversion.
4) PRATIKRAMAŅA: It is likely that the saint under the constraint of subtle passions may deviate from the minutest details of right conduct, hence, in order that such faults of commission and omission may not be piled up into a heap so as to devour the spirit of asceticism, the saint ought to purify them daily without any procrastination and deceit resorting to self-criticism (nindā), to censuring his faults in presence of the Guru (garhā), and lastly to confession by revealing his committed transgression to the Guru (Alocanā)2 This is Bhāva Pratikramana; and the reading of the Pratikramaņa-sūtra is Dravya Pratikramana.3 That saint who pronounces the Pratikramana-sūtras along with this BhāvaPratikramana opens the way to the shedding of the Karmas in profusion. The preceding view concerns itself with the Pratikramaņa from the Vyayahāra point of view. Kundakunda forces us to ascend to the Pāramārthika point of view, which describes Pratikramaņa as the renouncement of all the defects by the highest spiritual meditation." He who meditates upon the self after emancipating himself from all forms of speech, foreign thought-activities, transgression, looseness in right conduct, Ārta and Raudra Dhyānas, wrong belief, wrong knowledge and wrong conduct, is said to have performed real Pratikramana. Till that is accomplished Vyavahāra Pratikramana will serve as an auxiliary cause to Niscaya Pratikramaņa.
5) PRATYĀKHYANA: Pratyākhyāna implies the determination of the saint to renounce in future all that is inconsistent with his consecrated pursuit.? Pratikramaņa has retrospective reference, while Pratyākhyāna has prospective one. Pratyākhyāna is capable of being practised by one who possesses mild passion, puts senses under restraint, and who is courageous, strenuous, apprehensive of transmigration, and is accustomed to discrimination between the self and the not-self.8 Speaking from the transcendental points of view, we may say that he who, having abondoned all forms of speech and having kept himself from all auspicious and inauspicious psychical states, meditates upon his own self is said to have practised Pratyākhyāna.
1 Niyama. 134, 137 to 139. 2 Anaga. Dharmā. VIII. 62 and Comm; Mülā. 620 622, 26. 3 Mülā. 623; Anagā. Dharmă. VIII. 62; Niyama. 94. 4 Mülā. 625. 5 Niyama. 93. Niyama. 83 to 86, 89, 91, 92. 7 Mülā. 27; Acārasāra. I. 40. Niyama. 105, 106. Niyama. 95.

Page #163

v. ACARA OF THE MUNI
141
6) KAYOTSARGA: Kāyotsarga signifies a formal non-attachment to the body for the prescribed period of time. The bodily organs are required to be without any movement at the time of Kāyotsarga. He who desires liberation, who has conquered sleep, who is well-versed in the Sūtras and their meaning, and who possesses pure thoughts, along with physical and spiritual strength, is qualified for Kāyotsarga. This has been calculated to be beneficial to the spiritual path, and to be subversive of Karmas.*
NAKEDNESS: Next comes nudity. The Digambara monk remains stark-naked. He lives like a just born child in outward appearance. The practice of nudity develops certain outstanding characteristics in the saint, for instance, non-acquisition, lightness on account of nonanxiety, fearlessness, and capability of conquering Parīşahas.? Besides, the nude saint commands confidence, originates disrespect for sensual objects, and develops love of freedom. In practically the same manner the Thāņamga gives five advantages of nudity: “1) No trouble of examining the clothes; 2) lightness in movement; 3) naked appearance creates faith in others; 4) thus he can carry into practice the law of the Jina which prescribes less requisites; and 5) he can have complete self-control". "Nudity is prescribed in Svetāmbara texts as well, but the commentators say that it is meant for Jinakalpi monks”10. Despite these constant references regarding nudity in Svetāmbara texts, the rules of clothing are also found in them. Even if the Svetāmbara monks wear clothes they are not required to be very particular about them. To quote Acārānga: To a mendicant who is little clothed and firm in control, it will not occur (to think): my clothes are torn, I shali beg for (new) clothes; I shall beg to thread; I shall beg for a needle; I shall mend (my clothes) I shall darn them; I shall repair them; I shall put them on; I shall wrap myself in them."11
1 Mülā. 28. 2 Müla. 650. 3 Ibid. 651. 4 Ibid. 652. 5 Ibid. 30. 6 Sūtra. Pähuda. 18. Bodha Pähuda. 51. 7 Bhaga. Arā. and Comm. Vija. 83. 8 Ibid. 84. 9 Thānamga. pp. 342 b, 343 a. vide History of Jaina Monachism. p. 162. 10 Prava. Intro. xc vi. 11 Ācārā. 1-6-3, 1. (Trans. Jacobi. p. 57)

Page #164

142
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
OTHER MŪLAGUNAS: Not taking bath, sleeping on the pure ground or on a slab of stone, plank of wood, or dry grass, not cleansing the teeth, taking meals in the standing posture in the palm of one's own hand, and accepting meals once a day after three Gharis of sunrise and the same period before sunset: all these have been considered to be the rest of the Müla gunas. It may be pointed out that the Svatāmbara monk sleeps on a plank and consumes food in the pot.
Thus the saint dedicates his integral energies to the cessation and shedding of Karmas. In consequence he regards the subjugation of parīşahas (afflictions) and practice of Tapas (austerities) as falling within the compass of his obligations. The saint allows no compromise with anything entangling him in the mire of Samsāra. His career is indicative of his complete detachment from mundane life and living. Anything incompatible with, and discordant to, his second birth in a holy world, anything which drags him down to breathe in the suffocating air of the profane world must needs be subdued, strangled and overthrown. If the Parīşahas are not met with the adequate attitude and disposition of mind, they would tend to mar the saintly life; on the contrary, if they are encountered with the inner conviction of truth, and invaded by the non-violent army of fortitude, meditation and devotion, they would confer jubilation, and yield the joy of victory. And if the austerities are spiritedly practised they would bring about the inner rejection of desire, which would let the aspirant experience unalloyed happiness far beyond the joys of this world or of any heaven. The overcoming of the Parīşahas results in stopping the influx of Karmas, whereas the observance of austerities serves two-fold purpose of holding up, in the first instance, the inflow of fresh Karma and wiping off, on the other, the accumulated filth of Karmas. We first proceed to the question of getting over the Parīşahas.
PARISAHAS: THEIR ENUMERATION AND EXPOSITION: Those afflictions that are to be endured for the purpose of not swerving from the path of stopping and dissociating Karmas are termed Parīşahas. The Uttarādhyayana tells us that "a monk must learn and know, bear and conquer, in order not to be vanquished by them (Parīşahas) when he
1 Anagā. Dharma. Comm. LX-91; Bodha Pāhuda. 56. 2 Mülā. 31 to 35, 811. 3 Ta. Su. IX. 2. 4 Ta. Sü. IX. 3. 5 Ta. Sū. 8.

Page #165

V. ACARA OF THE MUNI
143
lives the life of a wandering mendicant.1" The Parīsahas are of twentytwo kinds," namely, 1) hunger (kșudhā), 2) thirst (trşā), 3) cold (sita), 4) heat (uşņa), 5) insect bite (damsa-masaka), 6) nudity (nagnatā), 7) ennui (arati), 8) woman (strī), 9) walking (caryā), 10) sitting (nişadyā), 11) sleeping-place (sayyā), 12) abuse (ākrosa), 13) attack (vadha), 14) begging (yācanā) 15) non-obtainment (alābha), 16) disease (roga), 17) pricking of grass (trņasparsa), 18) dirt (mala), 19) respect (satkārapuraskāra), 20) conceit of knowledge (prajñā), 21) lack of knowledge (ajñāna) and 22) slack belief (adarsana). We now discuss the attitude of the saint towards these Parīşahas. This will also make clear the meaning implied in them. 1-2) The saint accepts faultless food and water. It is just possible that he may not get faultless food and water. Then he, (a) who does not get perturbed by the distress caused by hunger and thirst, (b) who is not inclined to receive food and water in improper country and in improper times, (c) who does not bear even an iota of blemish in the observance of six essentials, (d) who remains occupied with selfstudy and meditation, (e) who prefers non-obtainment of food and water to their obtainment, is deemed to have swum over the affliction originating from hunger and thirst. Not to dwell upon the pangs of hunger and pains of thirst amounts to the surmounting of hunger and thirst Parīşahas. 3-4) It is evident that the saint has renounced resorting to external protection against cold and heat, and he remains undecided regarding his habitation like a bird; and if, by his sojourn in the forests or at the peak of mountains, he is troubled by cold breeze, or by frozen ice, or by blasting hot wind, even then if he does not apply his mind to eschew them, but remains steadfast in his spiritual pursuit, he is called the conqueror of cold and heat Parīşahas. 5) In spite of the embarrassments caused by insects (flies, mosquitoes, scorpians, snakes, bugbears and the like) the saint who does not entertain the idea of their removal but who keeps in mind the fixed determination of spiritual advancement, is said to have got over insect-bite Parişaha. 6) The saint who is stark-naked newly born child, whose heart has transcended the lustful thoughts, and who observes unchallengeable chastity conquers nudity Parīşaha.* Or “my clothes being torn, I shall go naked or I shall get a new suit; such thoughts should not be entertained by a monk. At one time he will have
1 Uttara. 2. 2 Ta. Sü. IX. 9. Uttarā. 2. . 3 Sarvärtha. IX. 9. Uttară. 2. Sarvärtha. IX. 9.

Page #166

144
ËTHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
no clothes at another he will have some; knowing this to be a salutary rule a wise monk should not complain about it?”. 7) The saint who subjugates the feeling of ennui, which may be caused by the control of senses, by certain ills and maladies, by the behaviour of vicious persons, and by other formidable difficulties of ascetic life, is understood to subdue ennui Parīsaha. 8) If the saint is not seduced by the beautiful forms, the smile, charming talks, amorous glances and laughter of women, he is called the conqueror of woman Parīşaha. 9) In leaving one place for another according to the prescribed rules of ascetic discipline, if the saint bears hardships owing to sharp pointed pebbles and thorns lying on the path, he is said to have got over walking Parişaha. 10) The saint who sits down in a burial-ground, or in a deserted house or in a cave, and there who is not frightened even by a roar of lion, and who is accustomed to difficult postures, is believed to have over-come sitting Parīşaha. 11) After getting tired of constant self-study and meditation, the saint resorts to sleep at a place which may be rough. If his mind, in spite of this, is unruffled and is occupied with auspicious Bhāvas, he is said to have conquered sleeping-place Parīşaha. 12) The saint who keeps an attitude of indifference towards reviles and remonstrations, and remains mentally undisturbed by them, overcomes abuse Parīsaha. 13) If the saint does not lose his serene disposition even if his body is being butchered, he is believed to have overcome attack Parīşaha. 14) The saint who does not meanly ask for food, place of stay, medicine etc., even if his Prāņas part with him, has conquered begging Parīşaha. 15) The subjugation of nonobtainment Parīşaha signifies the presence of mental placidity and composure when the saint does not obtain his food from the householder. 16) In spite of being invaded by a number of diseases, the saint who conquers disease Parīşaha endures them with fortitude without the neglect of his daily duties. 17) The saint who remains undisturbed even if his body gets troubled by the pointed pieces of pebbles, thorns etc., whose mind is always engaged in non-injury of living beings in walking, sleeping and sitting, is believed to have conquered pricking of grass Parīşaha. 18) If the accumulation of dirt and dust over the body does not cause the slightest mental disturbance to the saint who is engaged in cleansing the soul from the mire of Karmic impurities by the pure water of right knowledge and conduct, he has got over dirt Parīşaha.
1 Uttarā. 2/12, 13.

Page #167

V. ACARA OF THE MUNI
145
19) If the saint is not disturbed or attracted by the disrespectful or respectful attitude of the persons around him, he has overcome respect Parīşaha. 20) By not allowing himself to be puffed up with pride of knowledge, the saint attains the designation of the conqueror of the conceit of knowledge Parīşaha. 21) The conquest of lack of knowledge Parīşaha points out that the saint does not succumb to despondency, even if he fails to acquire knowledge or inner illumination in spite of his severe austerities. 22) If the saint is not shaken in faith in the doctrine of truth even if years of austerities prove to be of no avail in benefiting him with certain saintly acquisitions, he has overcome slack-belief Parīşaha.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN PARĪŞAHAS AND AUSTERITIES: After dealing with the kinds and characteristic nature of Parīşahas and the attitude of the saint towards them, we now proceed to the exposition of the nature of austerities and their distinction from the Parīşahas. The difference between Parīşahas and austerities consists in the fact that the former occur against the will of the saint, who endures them or rather turns them to good account by contemplating them to be the means for spiritual conquest, while the latter are in concordance with the will of the saint to have the spiritual triumph. Secondly, most of the Parīşahas may be the creations of vicious man, cruel nature and jealous gods, viewed from the common man's point of view, but austerities are the enunciations and resolutions of the aspirant's soul. Again, if Parīşahas have enduring value, austerities have pursuing value. Thirdly, Parīşahas which are obstacles to spiritual life, represent themselves as the passing phase in the career of the aspirant, whereas the austerities form the indispensable part and parcel of the discipline which is enjoined in order to escape from this distressed and sorrowful worldly life. Lastly, we may say that the performance of austerities subscribes to the endurance of Parisahas with equanimity and unruffled state of mind.
NATURE AND KINDS OF TAPA (AUSTERITY): Austerity (tapas) implies the renunciation and rejection of desire, which is the real enemy of the soul. The Șațkandāgama pronounces that the extirpation of desire in order to actualize the triple jewels of right belief, right knowledge and right conduct is regarded as Tapa. Thus, in the Jaina view of Tapa, the idea of expelling all desires, the whole root of evil and suffering in favour of attaining to the freedom of the soul, tranquility and equality of mind,
1 Şať. Vol. XIII-p. 55. Anagā. Dharmā. VII-2.
10

Page #168

146
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
is not only prominent but paramount. It is at the basis as well as at the summit of Jaina preachings. Despite the supremacy of this inward reference, Jainas do not ignore the outer physical austerities. In keeping with this trend of exposition, we may say that Tapas admit of two kinds, namely, the external and the internal. The former is so called because of the preponderance of the physical and perceptible abandonment, while the latter is so called on account of the inner curbing' of mind. Besides, the designation 'external which is applied to a section of Tapas may be justified on the ground that they are capable of being pursued even by those who are not spiritually converted 3 We shall first dwell upon the austerities in their external forms.
EXTERNAL AUSTERITIES: The external austerities are six in kind, namely, 1) Anaśana, 2) Avamaudarya, 3) Vșttiparisa mkhyāna, 4) Rasaparityāga, 5) Viviktaśayyāsana, and 6) Kāyaklesa.* The Uttarādhyayana enumerates the six forms of external austerities thus: Anasana, Unodarī, Bhikṣācari, Rasaparityāga, Kāyakleša, Samlīnatā; i.e., instead of Bhikṣācarī and Samlīnatā there are Vsttiparisamkhyāna and Viviktaśayyāsana. respectively. However, these do not differ in meaning. 1) Anasana implies fasting or abstinence from food either for a limited period of time, or till the separation of the soul from the body. It is performed for the purpose of practising self-control, exterminating attachment, annihilating Karmas, performing meditation and acquiring scriptural knowledge, and not for the purpose of any mundane achievement whatsoever.? It may be noted here that Anasana has been recognised as the simultaneous renunciation of food and the attachment to it. Mere maceration of the body is not fasting. 2) Avamaudarya means not to take full meals; i.e., out of the normal quantity of thirty-two morselso for man, and twenty-eight for woman, the reduction of even one morsel will come within the range of this Tapa.10 The observance of this austerity has
1 Uttară. 30/7; Sarvärtha. p. 439; Sat. Vol. XIII. p. 54; Anagā. Dharmā. VII-6. 2 Sarvartha. p. 439. 3 Şat. Vol. XIII-p. 59; Anagă. Dharmā. VII-6. 4 Ta.sū. IX. 19; Bhaga. Arā. 208; Mülā. 346. 5 Uttarā. 30/8. 6 Mülā. 347,; Uttarā. 30/9,; Bhaga. Arā. 209. 7 Sar vārtha. p. 438. 8 Şat. Vol. VIII-p. 55. 'Morsel consists of 1000 rice grains (Anagā. Dharmā. VII-22.); Sat. Vol. XIII. p. 56. 10 Mula. 350; Bhaga. Arā.. 211 212; Anagā. Dharmā. VII-22,; Uttarā. 30/15,; Sat.
Vol. XIII- p. 56.

Page #169

V. ĀCĀRA OF THE MUNI
147
been calculated to offer control over the senses and sleep, to assist in the practising of Dharmas successfully, to help in the performance of the six essentials, the self-study, and the like. 3) Vrttiparisamkhyāna means the pre-determination of the saint regarding the number of houses to be visited, the particular manner of taking food, the specific type of food, the giver of specific qualification, when he sets out to beg for food. In other words, the saint adheres to his predecided things; if the things literally conform to his predecision he would accept food; otherwise he would go without it for that day. This is to uproot the desire for food. 4) Rasaparityāga indicates the abstinence from the one or more of the following six articles of food, namely, milk, curd, ghee, oil, sugar, and salt; and from one or more of the following kinds of tastes, namely, pacrid, bitter, astringent, sour and sweet. This is performed for the emasculation of the senses, subduing sleep, and the unobstructed pursuance of self-study. 5) Viviktasayyāsana? implies the choice of secluded place which is not frequented by women, eunuchs, she-animals, depraved householders etc., and which may serve the real purpose of meditation, self-study and chastity, and is not the cause of attachment and aversion. 6) Kāyaklesa means the putting of the body to certain discomforts by employing certain uneasy and stern postures and by practising certain other bodily austerities of severe nature, for instance, of remaining in the sun in the summer, and the like. The object of Kāyakleśa is to endure bodily-discomfort, to alleviate attachment to pleasures. 10 . 1 Mülā. 351; Anagā. Dharmă. VII-22. 2 The Uttarādhyayana calls it Bhikṣācari. "It consists of imposing certain
restrictions upon one-self regarding the mode of begging or the nature of the donor, or the quality of food or the way in which food was offered. (History of Jaina Monachism. p. 188). 3 Mülā. 355; Kārtti. 443; Anagā. Dharmā. VII. 26; Bhaga. Arā. 218 to 221; Şat.
Vol. XIIl-p. 57. 4 Sarvārtha. p. 438. 5 Mülā. 352; Uttarā. 30/26; Bhaga. Ara. 215; Sat. Vol. XIJI. p. 57. 6 Sarvārtha p. 438. 7 The Uttarādhyayana calls it Samlinatā. “It implies the choice of lonely place of
stay devoid of women, eunuchs and animals. (Uttarā. 30/28.) 8 Sarvārtha. p. 438, Kārtti. 445. 447; Ācārasāra. VI. 15, 16; Müla. 357, Bhaga.
Ārā. 228,; Şat. Vol. XIII-p. 58. 9 Mülā. 356; Sarvārtha. IX-19; Uttara. 30/27; Acārasāra. VI-19, Kärtti. 448; $aț.
Vol. XIII-p. 58; Bhaga. Arā. 222 to 227. 10 Sarvârtha IX-19.

Page #170

148
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
We have so far explained the nature of external austerities, and have seen that the performance of these austerities does not aim merely at the physical renunciation, but also at the overthrow of the thraldom of the body and senses. In other words, the external asceticism is capab of being justified only when it contributes towards the inner advancement of man; otherwise in the absence of which it amounts to labour which is wholly lost. The Mūlācāra says that the external austerity should not engender mental disquietude, abate the zeal for the performance of
ciplinary practices of ethical and spiritual nature, but it should enhance spiritual convictions. This exposition brings to light the inward tendency of outward asceticism, or physical renunciation, and decries the mere flagellation of the body. The enunciation of Samantabhadra that the external austerity serves for the pursuance of spiritual austerity also clearly shows the emphasis laid by Jainism on the internal aspect of Tapas. After vindicating the claims of the outward ascetic discipline in the ethical set up of Jaina preaching, we set out to discuss the nature of internal austerities.
INTERNAL AUSTERITIES: The internal austerities are also six in kind, namely, 1) Prāyaścitta, 2) Vinaya, 3) Vaiyāvýttya 4) Svādhyāya, 5) Vyutsarga and 6) Dhyāna. 1) The process by virtue of which a saint seeks freedom from the transgressions committed may be termed Prāyascitta.* According to Kārttikeya, that is the real Prāyaścitta wherein the commission of some fault is not repeated even if the body is cut to hundred pieces.5 It is of ten kinds: (a) Ālocanā, (b) Pratikramaņa, (c) Ubhaya, (d) Viveka, (e) Vyutsarga, (f) Tapas, (g) Cheda, (h) Mūla, (i) Parihāra, (j) Sraddhāna. The Tattvārthasūtra' enumerates only nine kinds, eliminating Sraddhāna, and probably substituting the name Upasthāpanā for Mūla. To dwell upon them in succession: (a) Ālocanā implies the expression and confession of transgression before the Guru after the saint has eschewed ten kinds of defects.8 1) To express faults by providing the Guru with certain necessary things, and by serving him in various ways in order to arouse sympathy in his mind so that he might give him less Prāyaścitta is known as Akampita Doșa.
1 Müla. 358; Bhaga. Arā. 236. 2 Svayambhū. 83. 3 Ta.sū. IX-20,; Mülā. 360; Uttara. 30/30, Acārasāra. VI. 21. 4 Sarvārtha. IX. 20; Mülā. 361; Şat. Vol. XIII. p. 59. 5 Kärtti. 452. 6 Mülā. 362; Şat Vol. XIII. p. 60. Acārasära. VI. 23. 24. 7 Ta.sū. IX-22. 8 Sarvartha. IX-22,; Rājavā. IX. 22/2. Bhaga. Ara. 563.

Page #171

V. ACĀRA OF THE MUNI
149
2) To reveal transgressions after expressing one's diseased condition and inferring Guru's attitude for less punishment is Anumānita Dosa. 3-4-5) To manifest only open faults, great faults and minor ones is respectively called Dșsta and Bādara and Sūkşma Dosa. 6) To ask the Guru regarding the Prāyaścitta of certain faults and then to express his own ones come under Channa Doșa.8 7-8) To express faults indistinctly amidst loud voice and to doubt and ask others regarding the authenticity of Prāyaścitta given by the Guru are respectively called Sabdākulita* and Bahujana Pịcchā Doșa. 9-10) To express one's faults before the other person who is devoid of knowledge and conduct and to accept Prāyaścitta from a saint who is likewise a defaulter are respectively called Avyakta, and Tatsevī Doșa.” The monk expresses his transgression to the Guru in a secluded place, whereas the nun expresses it in presence of three persons. (b) Pratikramana is self-condemnation for the transgression. (c) To perform both Ālocanā and Pratikramaņa for certain major faults like bad dreams etc. is Ubhaya.10 (d) To renounce a thing which has been wrongly used is Viveka, or when the Guru prescribes the renunciation of a certain place, time and object, that is also Viveka. 11 (e) To engage oneself in Kāyotsarga is called Vyutsarga.12 ) To engage oneself in external austerities or fasts is called Tapas. 18 (g) When the Guru cuts short the life of sainthood, it is called Cheda." (h) To re-establish one in saintly life is Mūla. 15 (i) To expel a saint from the order of monks is called Parihāra.1(i) To redevelop belief in the true order is Sraddhāna.17
1 Bhaga. Ara 570 to 573. 2 Ibid. 574, 577, 582. 3 Ibid. 586. : 4 Ibid. 591. 5 Ibid. 596.
Ibid. 599. 7 Ibid. 603. 8 Rājavā 9/22. Anagāradharmāmsta,, Acārasāra and Rājavärttika express these
faults in a similar way. 9 Anagā. Dharmā. VII. 47; Acārasära. VI. 41; Sat. Vol. XIII. p. 60. 10 Anaga. Dharmā. VII. 48,; Ācārasära. VI. 42; Sarvārtha. IX-22. Şat Vol. XIII. p. 60. 11 Anagā. Dharmā. VII. 49, 50, Acārasāra. VI. 43, 44,; Şat. Vol. XIII. p. 60. 12 Sarvärtha. IX. 22. 13 Sarvārtha. IX. 22; Acārasāra. VI. 46; Anagā. Dharmā. VII. 52; $at Vol. XIII.
p. 61. 14 Sarpārtha. IX. 22. Acārasāra. VI. 47; Anagi. Dharma. VII. 54; $ať. Vol. XIII.
p. 61. 15 Anaga. Dharmā. VII. 55; Acārasāra. VI. 48; Sat. Vol. XIII. p. 62. 16 Sarvārtha. IX. 22. 17 Anagā. Dharmā. VII. 57,; Acārasära. VI. 65. Şa. Vol. XIII. p. 63.

Page #172

150
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
2) Vinaya implies either the control of senses and the eradication of passions, or the holding of humbleness towards the triple-jewelled per*sonalities. All scriptural study in the absence of Vinaya goes to the wall.
The outcome of the former should be the latter which in turn entails progress and prosperity. The outward and mundane consequences of Vinaya are wide recognition, friendship, respect, grace of Guru, obedience to the command of Jina, and destruction of ill-will, while the inward and supermundane fruits of Vinaya are easiness in self-restraint, penances, the acquisition of knowledge, the purification of self, the emergence of the feeling of gratitude, simplicity and commendation of other man's qualities, the destruction of conceitedness, and lastly the attainment of emancipation. We have fivefold classification of Vinaya-namely (a) Darśana, (b) Jñāna, (c) Căritra, (d) Tapa and (e) Upacāra. The Tattvārthasūtra speaks of the first four and probably includes Tapa Vinaya into Cāritra Vinaya. We have previously spoken of the five types of Acāra: Darsanācāra, Jñānācāra, Căritrācāra, Tapācāra, and Vīryācāra. The first four seem to be quite same as the first four Vinayas. Really speaking, Vinaya is a disposition, while Ācāra is an activity. The two are related as the inward and the outward, only theoretically distinguishable. (a) The disposition to observe the eight constituents of Samyagdarśana, and to devote oneself to the adorable five souls has been designated as Darśana Vinaya. It is also regarded as the belief in Dravyas and Paryāyas.? (b) He who reflects, preaches and utilises knowledge for higher progress is regarded as having Jñāna Vinaya. (c) To control the senses and passions, and to observe Gupti and Samiti are included in Căritra Vinaya. (d) To be elated in presence of saints performing excellent penances, and not to depreciate others are called Tapa Vinaya. 10 (a) Upacāra Vinaya is worldly modesty. It is the expression of modesty through body, mind and speech. To stand up out of respect for the saint, to bow down, to offer him a seat, to give him send off by
1 Sat. Vol. XIII. p. 63; Acarasära. VI. 69; Anagā. Dharmā. VII. 60. Uttara. 30/32. 2 Mülā. 385,; Bhaga. Arā. 128; Anagā. Dharmā. VII. 62. 3 Mülā 386 to 388; Bhaga. Arā. 129 to 131. 4 Mülā. 364; Bhaga. Arā. 112; Acārasāra. VI. 70; Anaga. Dharmā. VII. 64. 5 Ta.sū. IX. 23. 6 Mülā. 365; Bhaga. Arā. 114. 7 Mülā. 366, 585. 8 Müla. 368; Sarvärtha. IX. 23. 9 Mülā. 369,; Bhaga. Arā. 115. 10 Mülā. 371,; Bhaga. Arā. 117.

Page #173

V. ĀCĀRA OF THE MUNI
151
1
following him a little distance all these are included in bodily modesty." To speak words which are beneficial, balanced, sweet, respectful, and purposeful, is vocal modesty. The controlling of mind from vices and the pursuing of virtues are regarded as mental modesty. The expression of Upacāra Vinaya should not only be limited to Guru, but householders, nuns and other monks are also required to be shown this sort of Vinaya."
3-4) The rendering of service to saints by means of medicine, preaching etc., when they are overwhelmed by disease, Parīşahas and perversities, is called Vaiyāvrttya. This austerity is performed for uprooting the feeling of abhorrence of dirt, disease etc., for spiritual realisation, and for revealing affection for the spiritual path. We shall deal with Svădhyāya in the next chapter; namely, 'Mystical significance of Jaina ethics.'
5) Vyutasarga singifies the relinquishment of the external and the internal Parigraha.? The former comprises living and non-living Parigraha, and the latter, the fourteen kinds of passions, already dealt with. The latter also includes bodily detachment either for a limited period of time or unlimitedly. This is to practise non-acquisition, fearlessness and detachment from life. 10
GENERAL NATURE AND TYPES OF DHYANA: Having discussed the nature of five kinds of internal tapas, we now proceed to dwell upon the nature of Dhyāna. It will not be amiss to point out that all the disciplinary practices form an essential background for the performance of Dhyåna. Just as the storage of water which is meant for irrigating the corn-field, may also be utilised for drinking and other purposes, so the disciplinary practices like Gupti, Samiti etc., which are meant for the cessation of the inflow of the fresh Karman may also be esteemed as forming the background of Dhyāna. 11 In other words, all the disciplinary observances find their culmination in Dhyāna. Thus Dhyāna is the indispensable, integral constituent of right conduct, and consequently, it is directly related to the actualisation of the divine potentialities. It is the clear, and single road by which the aspirant can move straight to the supreme
1 Mülā. 373 to 375, 382,; Bhaga. Arā. 119 to 122. 2 Mülā. 377, 378, 383,; Bhaga. Arā. 123, 124. 3 Mülā. 379, 383; Bhaga. Arā. 125. 4 Müla. 384,; Bhaga, Arā. 127. 5 Mülā. 391, 392,; Sarvārtha. IX. 24. 6 Sarvārtha. IX-24. 7 Mülā. 406,; Saruārtha. IX. 26. 8 Mülā. 407. 9 Sarvārtha. IX. 26. Uttara. 30/35. 10 Sarvārtha. IX. 26. 11 Rājavā. IX-27/26.

Page #174

152
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
good. To define Dhyāna, it represents the concentration of mind on a particular object, which concentration is possible only for an Antarmuhūrta (time below forty-eight minutes to the maximum and that too in the case of such souls as are possessing bodies of the best order. The stability of thoughts on one object is recognised as Dhyāna and the passing of mind from one object to another is deemed to be either Bhāvanā or Anupreksā, or Cintā. Now, the object of concentration may be profane or holy in character. The mind may concentrate either on the debasing and degrading object, or on the object which is uplifting and elevating. The former which causes the inflow of inauspicious Karman is designated as inauspicious concentration (aprasasta), while the latter which is associated with the potency of Karmic annulment is called auspicious concentration (prasasta). To be brief, Dhyāna is capable of endowing us with resplendent jewel, or with the pieces of glass. When both the things can be had which of these will a man of discrimination choose ?5 Subhacandra distinguishes three categories of Dhyāna, good, evil and pure in conformity with the three types of purposes, viz., the auspicious, the inauspicious and the transcendental, which may be owned by a self. At another place he classifies Dhyāna into Praśasta and Aprasasta.? These two modes of classification are not incompatible, but evince difference of perspectives; the former represents the psychical or psychological view, the latter, the practical or ethical view. In a different way, the Praśasta type of Dhyāna may be considered as including good and pure types of Dhyāna within it; and this will again give us the two types of Dhyāna, namely, Prasasta and Apraśasta. The former category is divided into two types, namely, Dharma-dhyāna and Sukla-dhyāna, and the latter, also into two types, naniely, Arta-dhyāna and Raudradhyāna.8 The Praśasta category of Dhyāna has been deemed to be potent enough to make the aspirant realise the emancipated status." On the contrary, the Apraśasta one forces the mundane being to experience worldly sufferings. 10 Thus those who yearn for liberation should abjure Ārta and Raudra Dhyānas and embrace Dharma and Sukla ones. 11 In dealing with Dhyāna as Tapa, we are completely concerned with the
1 Räjava. IX. 27/10 to 15. 2 $ať. Vol. XIII. p. 64. 3 Kārtti. 468. 4 Sarvärtha. IX-28. 5 Istopa. 20. 6 Jñānā. III, 27, 28. 7 Ibid. XXV. 17. 8 Kārtti. 469,: Ta.sū. IX-28. 9 Ta.su. IX-29- 10 Şarvārtha, IX-29, 11 Tattvānusāsana. 34, 220.

Page #175

V. ĀCĀRA OF THE MUNI
153
Prasasta types of Dhyāna, since they are singularly relevant to the auspicious and the transcendental living. But in the previous pages we have frequently referred to the avoidance of Aprašasta types of Dhyāna without revealing their nature. At this stage, we propose, in the first instance, to discuss the nature of Apraśasta types of Dhyāna, the exposition of which would help us to understand clearly the sharp distinction between the two categories of Dhyāna. To speak in a different way, if Prasasta Dhyana is the positive aspect of Tapa, Aprašasta one represents the negative one.
APRAŠASTA DHYANA: (A) ARTA-DHYANA: The word ārta implies anguish and affliction; and the dwelling of the mind on the thoughts resulting from such a distressed state of mind is to be regarded as Ārtadhyāna. In this world of storm and stress, though there are illimitable things which may occasion pain and suffering to the empirical soul, yet all of them cannot be expressed by the limited human understanding. Four kinds of Arta-dhyāna? have been recognised. The first concerns itself with the fact of one's being constantly occupied with the anxiety of overthrowing the associated undesirable objects of varied nature. In a different way, when the discomposure of mind results on account of the baneful association of disagreeable objects which are either heard or perceived or which occur in mind owing to previous impressions, we have the first type of Arta-dhyāna, namely, Anista-samyogaja. The parting with of agreeable objects may also occasion discomposure of mind. To be overwhelmed by anxiety for restoring the loss is called the second type of Arta-dhyāna, namely, Ista-viyogaja. The constant occupation of mind to remove the distressing state of mind resulting from the diseased condition of the body, is called the third type of Arta-dhyāna, namely, Vedanā-janita. To yearn for agreeable pleasures and to contrive to defeat and slander the enemy constitute what is called the fourth type of Ārta-dhyāna, namely, Nidāna-janita.? Again, to make up one's mind for and to dwell upon the way of getting the objects of sensual pleasures are termed the fourth type of Ārta-dhyāna, namely, Nidāna-janita.8 It may be noted here that the Ārta-dhyāna in general is natural to the
1 Sarvârtha. IX. 28. 2 Jñână XXV. 37, Ta.sū. IX. 30 to 33. 3 Ta.sū. IX-30; Kartti. 471; Jñānā. XXV. 28. Jñanā. XXV. 27,; Kārtti. 471. 5 Ta.su. IX. 31; Jņānā. XXV. 31; Kartti. 472. 6 Ta.su. IX. 32; Jñanā. XXV. 32. 7Iñānā. XXV. 36. 8 Sarvārtha. IX. 33.

Page #176

154
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
empirical souls on account of the evil dispositions existing from an infinite past. It discovers itself owing to the presence of inauspicious Leśyās like Krsna, Nīla, and Kāpota in the texture of the worldly self, and brings about sub-human birth where innumerable pain-provoking things inevitably arise.2 The Ārta-dhyāna with its four-fold classification occurs in the perverted, the spiritually converted, and the partially disciplined personalities. Even the saint associated with Pramāda sometimes gets influenced by the above types except the fourth. It will not be amiss to point out that just as the householder cannot escape the Hiṁsā of one-sensed Jīvas, so he cannot avoid Ārta-dhyāna. No doubt, he can reduce it to an irreducible extent, but cannot remove it altogether unlike the saint of a high order.
(B) RAUDRA-DHYANA: We now proceed to explain the Raudra. dhyāna, which also admits of four kinds. To take delight in killing living beings, to be felicitous in hearing, seeing and reviving the oppression caused to sentient beings, to seek ill of others, to be envious of other man's prospertity and merits, to collect the implements of Himsā, to show kindness to cruel persons, to be revengeful, to wish defeat and victory in war--all these come within the purview of the first kind of Raudra-dhyāna, namely, Himsānandi Raudra-dhyāna.* The individual whose mind is permeated by falsehood, who desires to entangle the world in troubles by dint of propagating vicious doctrines, and writing unhealthy literature for the sake of his own pleasure, who amasses wealth by taking recourse to deceit and trickery, who contrives to show faults fraudulently in faultless persons in order that the king may punish them, who takes pride and pleasure in cheating the simple and the ignorant through the fraudulent language, may be considered to be indulging in the second type of Raudra-dhyāna namely, Mșşānandi Raudra-dhyāna.” Dexterity in theft, zeal in the act of thieving, and the education for theft should be regarded as the third type of Raudra-dhyāna, namely, Cauryānandi Raudra-dhyāna. The endeavour a man does to guard paraphernalia and pleasures of the senses is called the fourth type of Raudradhyāna, namely, Visayānandi Raudra-dhyāna.? It deserves our notice
1 Jñānā. XXV. 41. 2 Jñānā. XXV.-40, 42,; Rajavā. IX. 33. 3 Jñānā. XXV-39; Ta.sū. IX. 34. 4 Jñānā. XXVI. 4, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15,; Kärtti. 473. 5 Jñānā. XXVI. 16, 17, 18, 20, 22,; Kārtti. 473. 6Iñānā. XXVI. 24,; Kārtti. 474. 7 Jñānā. XXI. 29,; Kartti. 474.

Page #177

V. ĀCĀRA OF THE MUNI
155
that the undisciplined and partially disciplined persons are the subjects of Raudra-dhyāna. Though the partially disciplined persons are the victims of this Dhyāna on account of their observing partial conduct, i.e., partial Ahimsā, partial truth, partial non-stealing, partial nonacquisition and partial chastity, yet Raudra-dhyāna in their case is incapable of leading them to experience miseries of hellish beings. The life of the saint is exclusive of this Dhyāna, since in its presence conduct degenerates. This Dhyāna also occurs in the self without any education and is the result of the intensest passions, or of the Krsna, Nīla and Kāpota Leśyās.
PRE-REQUISITES OF PRAŠASTA DHYANA: Next in order comes the Praśasta type of Dhyāna which may be called Dhyāna proper. This type of Dhyāna is conducive to Moksa or final release. Before we directly embark upon the study of the types of Praśasta Dhyāna, it is of primary and radical importance to delineate their pre-requisites, which will enforce banishment of all the inimical elements robbing the soul of the legitimate disposition and proper conduct for spiritual advancement. In consequence the self will gain strength to dive deep into the ordinarily unfathomable depths of the mysterious self. Indubiously, in the initial stages the purity of empirical and psychical background is the indispensable condition of Dhyāna. The necessary pre-requisites of Dhyāna, in general, may be enumerated by saying that the subject must have the ardent desire for final liberation, be non-attached to worldly objects, possess unruffled and tranquil mind, and be self-controlled, stable, sensecontrolled, patient and enduring. Besides, one should steer clear of 1) the worldly, 2) the philosophico-ethical, and 3) the mental distractions, and look to the suitability of 4) time, 5) place, 6) posture and 7) to the attainment of mental equilibrium, before one aspires to Dhyāna conducive to liberation. We now deal with them in succession. 1) The life of the householder is fraught with numberless disturbances, which impede the development of his meditational disposition. Subhacandra holds an antagonistic attitude towards the successful performance of Dhyāna in the life of the householder. He says that we may hope for the presence of the flower of the sky, and horn of the donkey at some time and place,
1 Ta.su. IX. 35. 2 Sarvārtha. IX. 35. 3 Ibid. 4 Kartti. 469, Jñānā. XXVI. 43,; Rajavā. IX. 35/4. 5 Jñānā. IV. 6. XXVII-3.

Page #178

156
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
but the adornment of the householder's life with Dhyāna is never possible. All this must not imply that the householder is outright incapable of performing Dhyāna, but it should mean that he cannot perform Dhyāna of the best order, which is possible only in the life of the saint. 2) If the aspirant, despite his saintly garb suffers from the philosophical and ethical delusions, he will likewise lose the opportunity of performing Dhyāna. In other words, right belief and right conduct cannot be dispensed with, if Dhyāna is to be performed. 3) The control of mind which in turn leads to the control of passions and senses is also the essential condition of Dhyāna. Mental distraction like mental perversion hinders meditational progress, and to achieve liberation without mental purity is to drink water from there where it is not, i.e., from the river of mirage: That is Dhyāna, that is supreme knowledge, that is the object of Dhyāna by virtue of which the mind after transcending ignorance submerges in the self's own nature.' A man who talks of Dhyāna without the conquest of mind is ignorant of the nature of Dhyāna. On the reflective plane, the recognition of the potential divinity of the empirical self, and the consciousness of the difference between the empirical self and the transcendental self will unequivocally function as the mental pre-requisite condition of Dhyāna.The practice of the fourfold virtues of maitri (friendship with all creatures), pramoda (appreciation of the merits of others), karunā (compassion and sympathy) and mādhyastha (indifference to the unruly) has also been represented as the mental pre-requisite conditions of Dhyāna. These quadruple virtues, when practised in an earnest spirit, cause to disappear the slumber of perversion, and to set in eternal tranquillity. 4-6) The selection of proper place, posture and time is of no less importance for the performance of Dhyāna. The aspirant should avoid those places which are inhabited by the vicious, hypocrites, and the acutely perverted persons, and by gamblers, drunkkards, harlots etc., and should also avoid those places which may be otherwise disturbing.' He should choose those places which are associaed with the names of holy Tīrthamkaras and saints. A bank of a river, a summit of a mountain, an islnd, and a cave and other places of seclu sion and inspiration, should be chosen for practising spiritual concen tration. As regards the posture for Dhyāna, for the people of this age who
1 Jñānā. IV. 17. 2 Ibid XXII. 19. 3 Ibid. XXII. 20. 4 Ibid. XXII. 24. 5 Ibid. XXVII. 4. Ibid. XXVII. 18. 7 Ibid XXVII-23 to 33. 8 Ibid. XXVIII. 1. Ibid. XXVIII. 2 to 7.

Page #179

V. ÁCARA OF THE MUNI
157
are generally deficient in energy, Paryanka or Padma and Kāyotsarga postures are especially recommended. For him, whose mind is immaculate, stable, enduring, controlled and detached, every posture, every place and every time is fit for meditation.? A place may be secluded or crowded, the saint may be properly or improperly seated, the stability of saint's mind is the proper time for meditation. Subhacandra very beautifully portrays the mental and the physical picture of a saint preparing for meditation. The mind of the saint should be purified by the waves of the ocean of discriminatory enlightenment, be destitute of passions, be like an unfathomable ocean, be undeviating like a mountain, and should be without all sorts of doubts and delusions. Besides, the posture of the saint should be such as to arouse suspicion in the mind of a wise man regarding his being a stone-statue or a painted figure. The Yogi who attains sturdiness and steadfastness in posture does not get perturbed by being confronted with the extremes of cold and heat and by being harassed by furious animals.5 7) The saint who has controlled his mind and purged it of perversion and passions is said to have attained initial mental equipoise by virtue of which he is not seduced by the sentient and non'sentient, the pleasant and unpleasant objects. The consequence of this is that his desires vanish, ignorance disappears, and his mind is calmed. And above all he can sweep away the filth of Karman within a twinkle of an eye.? The great Ācārya Subhacandra is so much overwhelmed by the importance of this sort of mental poise that he esteems this as the Dhyāna of the best order.8 Thus mental equanimity precedes Dhyāna. ... PROCESS OF DHYANA: After dealing with the pre-requisites of Dhyāna, we now propose to discuss the process of Dhyāna. For the control of the mind, and for the successful performance of Dhyāna the process of breath-control (prānāyāma) may be necessary, but it being painful engenders Ārta-dhyāna which consequently deflects the saint from his desired path. Besides, the process of breath-control develops diverse supernormal powers which cause hindrance to the healthiest developments of the spirit. 10. Hence the better method is to withdraw the senses
1 Jñana. XXVIII. 12. 3 Ibid. XXVIII. 22. 5 Ibid. XXVIII. 32. 7 Ibid. XXIV. 11, 12. Ibid. XXX-9.
2 Ibid. XXVIII. 21. 4 Ibid. XXVIII. 38 to 40. 6 Ibid. XXIV. 2. 8 Ibid. XXIV. 13. 10 Ibid. XXX-6.

Page #180

158
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
from the sensual objects and the mind from the senses, and to concentrate the mind on the forehead (lalāta). This process is called Pratyā. hāra. Ten places in the body have been enumerated for mental concentration, namely, the two eyes, the two ears, the foremost point of the nose, the forehead, the mouth, the navel, the head, the heart, the palate, the place between the two eye-brows. The Yogi should think over his original underived potency of the self, and compare his present state with the non-manifested nature of the self. He should regard ignorance and sensual indulgence as the causes of the fall. Then, he should be determined to end the obstructions to the manifestation of the transcendental self by dint of the sword of meditation. He should express his resolution by affirming that he is neither a hellish being, nor an animal, nor a man, nor a celestial being, but a transcendental being devoid of these mundane transformations, which result from the Karmic association. And again, being possessed of infinite power, knowledge, intuition and bliss, he must not go away from his original nature.* Having determined in this manner, the patient, enduring, steadfast, and crystal pure Yogi should meditate upon the material and non-material objects as possessing the triple nature of origination, destruction and continuance, as also upon the omniscient souls, embodied and disembodied. Having meditated upon the six kinds of Dravyas in their true nature, the Yogi should either acquire the spirit of non-attachment or enrapture his mind in the ocean of compassion." Afterwards he should begin to meditate upon the nature of Paramātman who is associated with the number of original and unique characteristics.? The Yogi gets engrossed with these characteristics, and endeavours to enlighten his own self with spiritual illumination. He gets immersed in the nature of Paramātman to such an extent that the consciousness of the distinctions of subject, object, and the process vanishes. This is the state of equality (samarasībhāva) and identification (ekīkarana) where the self submerges in the transcendental self, and becomes non-different from it. This sort of meditation is called Savīrya-dhyāna.10
There is another way of speaking about the process of Dhyāna. Of the three states of self, namely, the external, the internal and the transcendental, the Yogi should renounce the external self, and meditate upon
1 Jñānā. XXX. 3. 5 Ibid. XXXI. 17. 8 Ibid. XXXI. 37.
2 Ibid. XXX. 13. 3 Ibid. XXXI. 12. Ibid. XXXI. 13, 14. 6 Ibid. XXXI. 18, 19. 7 Ibid. XXXI. 20 to 34. Ibid. XXXI. 38. 10 Ibid. XXXI. 42.

Page #181

V. ĀCĀRA OF THE MUNI
159
the transcendental self by means of the internal self. In other words, after abandoning the spirit of false selfhood and after attaining spiritual conversion, the Yogi should ascend higher through the ladder of the latter with the steps of meditation. The ignorant are occupied with the renunciation and possession of external objects, while the wise are occupied with the renunciation and possession of internal ones; but the superwise transcend the thoughts of the external and the internal. Hence, in order to attain this last state, the Yogi after isolating the self from speech and body should fix his mind on his own self, and perform other actions by means of speech and body without mental inclination. The constant meditation upon the fact, “I am that”, “I am that" results in the steadfastness of Ātmanic experience.
The author of the Jñānārņava, in addition, elaborately expounds the process of Dhyāna by classifying Dhyāna into 1) Pindastha, 2) Padastha, 3) Rūpastha and 4) Rūpātīta. Though the credit of their lucid exposition devolves upon Subhacandra, yet the credit of suggestion and enumeration in the history of Jaina literature goes to Yogindu who is believed to have lived in the 6th century A.D. much earlier than Subhacandra. We shall now dwell upon this fourfold classification. 1) The Pindasthadhyāna comprises the five forms of contemplation? (dhāraṇās) which have been explained in the following way. (a) The Yogi should imagine a motionless, noiseless and ice-white ocean in Madhyaloka. In the centre of the ocean he should imagine a finely-constructed, resplendent and enchanting lotus of thousand petals as extensive as Jambūdvīpa. The centre of the lotus should then be imagined as having a pericarp which emanates yellowish radiance in all the ten directions. In the pericarp the Yogi should imagine a raised throne resembling the resplendence of the moon. And therein he should imagine himself seated in a serene frame of mind. He should then firmly believe that his self is potent enough to sweep away all the filth of passions and to demolish all the Karmas. This type of contemplation is called Pārthivi-dhāraṇā.* (b) Afterwards the Yogi is required to imagine a beautiful, well-shaped lotus of sixteen petals in the region of his own naval. He should then imagine that each
1 Jñānā. XXXII. 10. 3 Ibid XXXII. 61. 5 Ibid. XXXVII. 1. 7 Jñana. XXXVII. 2.
2 Ibid. XXXII. 60. 4 Jbid. XXXII. 42. 6 Yogasāra. 98. 8 Ibid. XXXVII. 4 to 9.

Page #182

160
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
petal is inscribed with one of the sixteen vowels, 37, 3, 5, 6, 3, 3, , , , , , , , at, 31, 37: and that the pericarp of this lotus is inscribed with a holy syllable, & Afterwards he should imagine that the smoke is slowly coming out of the upper stroke of the holy syllable
, and that after some-time the smoke turns itself into a flame of fire which burns the lotus of eight petals situated in the region of the heart. After this lotus, which represents the eight kinds of Karms, has been reduced to ashes, the Yogī should imagine a fire sorrounding the body. After the body is reduced to ashes, the fire, in the absence of anything to burn, is automatically extinguished. This type of contemplation is called Āgneyi-dharaņā." (c) The Yogi should then imagine the powerful winds which are capable of blowing away the ashes of the body. After the ashes are imagined to be blown away, he should imagine the steadiness and calmness of the wind. This type of contemplation is called Svasanā. dhāranā.2 (d) The Yogi should then imagine heavily clouded sky alons with lightning, thundering and rainbow. Such imagination should culminate in the constant downpour of big and bright rain drops like pearls. These rain drops are required to be imagined as serving the holy function of washing away the remnants of the ashes of the body. This type of contemplation is called Väruņi-dhāraņā.3 (e) Afterwards the Yogi should think over his own soul as great as an omniscient, as bereft of seven constituent elements of the body, as possessed of radiance which is as imma. culate as the full-orbed moon. He should, then, consider his soul as associated with supernormal features, as seated on the throne, as adored and worshipped by Devas, Devils and the men. After this he should regard his soul as free from all kinds of Karmas, as possessed of all the divine attributes and qualities. This is called Tattvarūpavati-dhāraṇā." With this finishes the practising of the Pindastha-dhyāna which leads to the blissful life, enduring and everlasting.
2-4) The Padastha-dhyāna means contemplation by means of certain Mantric syllables, such as 'Om', 'Arahanta' etc. Subhacandra draws attention to the number of such syllables, which need not be dealt with here. The Rūpastha-dhyāna consists in meditating on the divine qualities and the extraordinary powers of the Arahantas.? The Yogi by virtue
1 Jñānā. XXXVII. 10 to 19. 2 Ibid XXXVII. 20 to 23. 3 Ibid. XXXVII. 24 to 27. 4 Ibid. XXXVII. 28 to 30. 5 Ibid. XXXVII. 31. Ibid. XXXVIII. 1. Ibid. XXXIX. 1 to 8.

Page #183

V. ACARA OF THE MUNI
161
of meditating on the divine qualities imagines his own self as the transcendental self and believes that "I am that omniscient soul and not anything else."1 The Rūpātīta-dhyāna implies the meditation on the attributes of Siddhātman. In other words, the Rupātīta-dhyāna is that wherein the Yogi meditates upon the self as blissful consciousness, pure and formless.
We have thus dwelt upon the various processes of Dhyāna. These different processes, which may be brought under Prasasta-dhyāna, are capable of leading us to the supreme state of transcendental existence. All this was a digression from the traditional enumeration which recognises four kinds of Dharma-dhyāna and four kinds of Sukla-dhyāna: We shall now deal with these kinds of Dhyāna.
DHARMA-DHYANA: The word 'Dharma' implies the veritable nature of things, the ten kinds of Dharma, the triple jewels and the protection of living beings. Four types of Dharma-dhyāna have been recognised namely, 1) Ajñā-vicaya, 2) Apāya-vicaya, 3) Vipāka-vicaya, and lastly 4) Samsthāna-vicaya. 1) When the aspirant finds no one to preach, lacks subtle wit, is obstructed by the rise of Karmas, is encountered with the subtleness of objects and experiences the deficiency of evidence and illustration in upholding and vindicating any doctrine, he adheres to the exposition of the Arahanta after believing that the Arahanta does not misrepresent things. The aspirant is said to have performed Ājñā-vicaya Dharma-dhyāna. Or he who has understood the nature of objects and who therefore makes use of Naya and Pramāņa for justifying certain doctrines is believed to have performed Ajñā-vicaya Dharma-dhyāna. We may here say that the purpose of this Dhyāna is to maintain intellectual clarity regarding the metaphysical nature of objects propounded by the Arahanta. 2) To ponder over the adequate ways and means of emancipating the souls from the worldly suffering caused by the perverted belief, knowledge and conduct,' and to meditate on the means of ascending the ladder of spiritual welfare,& are designated as Apāya-vicaya Dharmadhyāna. Besides, the aspirant should give himself to serious contemplation: 'who am I? Why there are inflow and bondage of Karmas? How
1 Jņānā. XXXIX. 42, 43. 2 Ibid. XL. 16. 3 Kartti. 476. 4 Ta.su. IX. 36.
Sarvartha. IX. 36. Sarvartha. IX. 36. 7. Sarvartha. IX. 36. 8 Mülā. 400.

Page #184

162
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
Karmas can be overthrown? What is liberation ? and what is the manifested nature of soul on being liberated ?1 If Ajñā-vicaya establishes oneself in truth, Apāya-vicaya lays stress on the means of realising the essential nature of truth. 3) Vipāka-vicaya Dharma-dhyāna implies the reflection on the effects which Karmas produce on the diverse empirical souls." 4) The reflection on the nature and form of this universe constitutes what is called Samsthāna-vicaya Dharma-dhyāna. This kind of Dhyāna impresses upon the mind the vastness of the universe and the diversity of its constituents. By this Dhyāna the aspirant realises his own position in the universe. These four types of Dhyāna serve twofold purposes, of auspicicious reflection and self-meditation; i.e., they supply the material for the intellect and offer inspiration to the self for meditation. Though they do not seem to suggest any process of meditation, their subject-matter is such as to evoke active interest for nothing but self-realisation through self-meditation. Thus Dharma-dhyāna is meditation as well as reflection, the latter may pass into the former and the former may lapse into the latter. In other words, the four kinds of Dhyāna are reflective when intellectual thinking is witnessed, and they are meditative when the mind attains stability in respect of them. The best kind of Dharma-dhyāna is to meditate upon the self by fixing one's mind in it after renouncing all other thoughts.
SUKLA-DHYANA: Dharma-dhyāna which has so far been expounded prepares a suitable ground and atmosphere for ascending the loftiest spiritual heights. It claims to have swept away every iota of inauspicious dispositions from the mind of the aspirant. The Yogi has achieved selfmastery to the full, and has developed a unique taste for the accomplishment of that something which is unique. The Yogi, having brushed aside the unsteadiness of his mind, now resorts to Sukla Dhyāna (pure Dhyāna), which is so called because of its origination after the destruction or subsidence of the filth of passions. Not all Yogis are capable of performing this type of Dhyāna. Only those who are possessing bodies of the best order (Vajra Vrsabha Nārāca, etc.), can have all the four types of Sukladhyāna. Of the four types of Sukla-dhyāna, namely, Pșthaktva-vitarkavicāra, Ekatva-vitarka-avicāra, Sūksmakriyāpratipātin, and Vyuparatakriyānivartin, the first two occur up to the twelfth Gunasthāna with the
1 Jņānā. XXXIV. 34/11. 2 Sarvartha. IX. 36; Mülā. 401. 3 Sar vārtha. IX. 36. 4 Kārtti. 480. 5ñānā. XLII. 3, 6. Jñānā. XLII. 5. 7 Ta.su. IX. 39.
8 We shall deal with the Gunasthānas in the next chapter.

Page #185

V. ÅCARA OF THE MUNI
help of conceptual thinking based on scriptural knowledge, and the last two crown the omniscient where conceptual activity of the mind abates to the last. To dwell upon these types, the first type (Pșthaktvavitarkavicāra) is associated with Pșthaktva, Vitarka and Vicāra, i.e., with manyness, scriptural knowledge, and transition from one aspect of entity to another, for example, substance to modifications and vice versa, from one verbal symbol to another, and from one kind of Yoga (activity) to another. In the second type (Ekatva-vitarka-avicāra) Vicāra is absent, and consequently oneness displaces manyness. The mind shortens its field of concentration to the effect that the Yogi meditates upon one substance, an atom, or a modification of substance with the assistance of only one kind of Yoga. Hence the second type of Dhyāna is associated with Vitarka and Ekatva, i.e., with scriptural knowledge and oneness. With the performance of this second type of Dhyāna the Yogi reduces to ashes the four types of obscuring (ghātin) Karmas. In consequence the Yogi experiences infinite intuition, knowledge, bliss and energy. Thus the state of Jīvanmukti is attained. The omniscient occupies himself with the third type of Sukla-dhyāna (Sūkşmakriyāpratipātin) when an Antarmuhūrta remains in final emancipation. After establishing himself in gross bodily activity, he makes the activities of mind and speech subtle. Then after renouncing the bodily activity, he fixes himself in the activities of mind and speech, and makes the gross bodily activity subtle.” Afterwards mental and vocal activities are stopped and only subtle activity of body is left. In the last type of Sukla-dhyāna (Vyuparatakriyānivartin) even the subtle activity of body is stopped. The soul now becomes devoid of mental, vocal and physical vibrations, and immediately after the time taken to pronounce five syllables it attains disembodied liberation.
TYPES OF SPIRITUAL DEATH PURSUED BY THE SAINT: We shall end this chapter after dwelling upon the types of spiritual death pursued by the saint. Of the five types of death already discussed the saint is qualified for Pandita-marana, which admits of threefold classification: 1) Bhaktapratijñā-maraṇa, 2) Ingini-maraṇa, 3) Prāyopagamana-maraņa,o Only that saint who is confronted with incurable disease, intolerable old age, formidable famine, great weakness of hearing and sight, infirmity of legs,
1 Jñānā. XLII. 7,8. 2 jñānā. XLII. 13, 15 to 17. 3 Jhānü. XLII. 27. Ibid. XLII. 29. SIbid. XLII. 41. Ibid. 48. 7 Ibid. 49. 8 Ibid. 50. Ibid. 58, 59. 10 Bhaga. Arā. 29.

Page #186

164
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
and certain inevitable troubles, and others like these has been permitted to adopt any of the above Maranas.! He who is quite capable of pursu. ing his course of conduct well need not turn towards such deaths. According to the Acārānga Sūtrawhen the saint feels that his body does not respond properly to his spiritual practices, he is allowed to put an end to it by reducing the quantity of food gradually. We shall now deal with the Bhaktapratijñā-maraņa. In the circumstances expressed above or when the occuring of natural death has been conceived to be a matter of certainty after a short duration of time (maximum twelve years)* (and minimum six months), the saint takes the guidance of some efficient Ācārya, and resorts to the process of internal and external renunciation The internal renunciation refers to the emasculation of the passions of anger and the like, while the external one, to the enervation of body.' The saint renounces all Parigrahas except broom, and pot for water, attains all sorts of external, and internal purity, and gives himself to the constant reflection on austerity, knowledge, fearlessness, loneliness and endurance.? By abandoning all strengthening juices and accepting only unseasoned and simple meals and practising the six kinds of external austerities, the saint gradually weakens his body, though he takes care that his internal peace is not disturbed. Of all these methods of depriving the body of strength, the practice of two days fast, three days to five days fast and then light meals have been appreciated. Along with this it is imperative for the saint to remove anger by forbearance, pride by modesty, deceit by simplicity, and greed by contentment.10 Similarly minor passions of laughter, indulgence, sorrow, ennui, disgust, fear, and sex inclinations; instinct of food, of acquisition, of fear, and of sex; three inauspicious Leśyās, namely, Krsna, Nīla and Kāpota; and attachment to supernatural powers: all these should be brushed aside."1 This whole process continues till the separation of the soul from the body. The saint is kept under a spiritual atmosphere created by the Ācārya, so that at the time of death the thoughts may not get polluted. Next comes Inginī-marana. It is more difficult to practise. It is capable of being pursued by the saints who possess bodies of the best order. The saint who prepares himself for this type of death resorts to a place devoid of living 1 Bhaga. Ārā. 71 to 74. 2 Ibid. 75.
3 Acā. pp. 71-2. 4 Bhaga. Ārā. 252; Uttarā. 36/250.5 Ibid. 159, 205.
6 Ibid. 206. 7 Ibid. 162 to 167, 187. 8 Bhaga. Ārā. 207, 208, 246 to 248. ' Ibid. 250, 251. 10 Ibid. 260,
11 Ibid. 268.

Page #187

V. ĀCĀRA OF THE MUNI
165
beings, lighted by sunlight, and not perforated by holes. There he lies down, or sits, or remains standing on the bed of straw properly made bereft of living beings. He, then, purges his mind of inimical thoughts, establishes himself in Darsana, Jñāna and Căritra, and sets his face against all sorts of food and Parigraha. He endures all Parīsahas, undauntedly resists all temptations, and does not get disturbed even if his body is thrown at untoward places by furious animals. He engages himself in meditation, avoids sleep, and does not neglect his essential duties. 4 In short, his whole time is devoted to meditation, study, auspicious reflection and the like. He does not require the services of other saints and of the Acārya. In the Bhaktapratijñā-marana the saint serves himself and is served by others, in the Ingini-marana he declines to accept the service rendered by others, but in the Prāyopagamana-marana neither he serves himself, nor does he accept the service of others. In the Prāyopagamana-marana the saint does not feel the necessity of even evacuating his bowels. He keeps his body from beginning to end in the same position in which he first placed it.? He does not use the bed of straw. We may point out here that the Acārānga probably discusses these three types of death without giving their technical names. According to it, in the Bhaktapratijñā-marana, the saint lies down on a bed of straw after giving up all kinds of food. He does not move even if he is touched by mosquitoes, ants etc. He bears them calmly. In the Inginī-marana the saint lies down on the bare ground after renouncing all food. He may move his limbs. In the Prāyopagamanamaraņa, the saint does not stir from his place; and he restrains all the movements of his body.
CHAPTER VI
MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
SUMMARY OF THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER: The previous chapter styled Acāra of the 'Muni' has been devoted to the exposition of the various phases of Muni's conduct, which conforms to the general standard of
1 Bhaga. Arā. 2035. 2036. 2041. 2 Ibid. 2038, 2039. 3 Ibid. 2047 to 2049. 4 Bhaga. Ārā. 2053, 2054, 2055.5 Ibid. 2064. Gomma. ka. 61. 6 Ibid. 2065. 7 Bhaga. Arā. 2068. 8 Doctrines of Jainism p. 290. Acara., 75-7,

Page #188

166
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
negating Himsā to the last degree. We have endeavoured, in the first place, to expound that his way of life which is adopted after he has awakened to transcendental consciousness is indicative of the discipline which eliminates all that stands in the way of his progress towards spiritual illumination. It purges away all those superfluous and detrimental elements that dissipate the precious energies of the self, and baulk the revelation of the divine magnificence and beauty. Secondly, we have unfolded the nature and importance of incentives to spiritual life, have emphasised the necessity of a simultaneous internal and external discipline, and have brought out the significance of the strenuous pursuance of the twenty eight Mūlaguņas. Thirdly, we have explained the nature of Parīşahas and austerities, as also the importance of the subjugation of the former, and the observance of the latter. And lastly, we have dealt with the process of Muni's Sallekhanā (spiritual welcome to death).
METAPHYSICS, ETHICS AND MYSTICISM: We have so far seen how the Jaina formulation of the ethical theory is grounded in metaphysics. The concept of Ahimsă follows as a logical consequence of the ontological nature of things. The entire ethical discipline prescribed for the layman and the monk is meant for translating Ahimsā into practice, the actual realisation of which can only be effected in the plenitude of mystical experience. Thus, if the fountain-head of ethics is metaphysics, mysticism will be its culmination. In other words, if the relationship of ethics to metaphysics is intimate, the relationship of ethics to mysticism is in no way less so. It will not be amiss to point out that ethics is the connecting link between the metaphysical speculation and the mystical realisation. It paves the way from metaphysics to mysticism. The journey from intellect to intuition can only be traversed through the medium of morality. The remark of Prof. Ranade is very enlightening in this respect: "Metaphysics, Morality and Mysticism are as inseparable from each other in the interest of the highest spiritual development of man as intellect, will and emotion are inseparable for his highest psychological development." We have, in the previous chapter, frequently, alluded to the spiritual nature of the Jaina ethics. We shall now endeavour to discuss its relevancy in more detail for the mystical life. In other words, we shall now bring out the significance of Jaina ethics, in view of its potentiality to land us in the domain of spiritualism, by dwelling upon the fourteen stages of
1 Constructive Survey of Upanişadic Philosophy, p. 288.

Page #189

VI. MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
167
spiritual evolution, technically called Guņasthānas, as propounded by the Jaina Acāryas.
NATURE OF MYSTICISM: Before we commence to reckon with the nature of Gunasthānas, we propose to discuss the nature of mysticism, which will enable us to evaluate the Jaina conception of morality. The word 'Mysticism' does not possess any uniform and consistent meaning in spite of a noble history to its credit. It has been variously used and diversely interpreted. To dwell upon these various expressions and interpretations of the word 'Mysticism' is not our objective. We simply note that notwithstanding its manifold meanings the note of concordance found in them is greater than that of discordance. Prof. Ranade rightly says: "the mystics of all ages and countries form an eternal divine society." "There are no racial, no communal, no national prejudices among them. Time and space have nothing to do with the eternal and infinite character of their mystical experience." "They may weave out their mysticism with the threads of any metaphysical structure, but they always try to go behind the words and realize a unity of significance." The equivalent expression in Jainism for the word 'Mysticism' is 'Suddhopayoga'. According to Kundakunda, mysticism consists in realising the transcendental self through the internal self after renouncing the external self;4 i.e., after relinquishing the Bahirātman and by turning to the Antarātman, one should realise the supra-ethical state of the Paramātman. In other words, non-conceptual and perpetual meditation on the supreme self ought to be effected after abandoning the Bahirātman through the intermediation of the Antarātman; i.e., Bahirātman is to be of necessity renounced to attain Antarātman, which will in turn lead us to an unimaginable transformation into Paramātman through the medium of meditation and other practices of moral nature. Following Kundakunda, Yogīndu, s Pūjyapāda, Subhacandra," Kārttikeya etc., have endorsed this very statement. It will not be idle to point out here that in realising the transcendental self, the whole of the existence is intuited on account of the spontaneous efflux of omniscience. The realisation of self and intuition of other substances are synchronal. According to Prof. Ranade,
1 Mysticism in Mahārāştra, Preface, p. 2. 2 Pathway to God in Hindi Literature, p. 2. 3 PP. Intro., p. 26. 4 Mo. Pa. 4, 7.
Samadhi. 4, 27. Jnānā. XXXII. 10. Mysticism in Mahārastra, Preface. p. 1.
5 PP. I. 12. 8 Kärtti. 192.

Page #190

168
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
"Mysticism denotes that attitude of mind which involves a direct, immediate, first-hand, intuitive apprehension of God.” This definition as given by Prof. Ranade is in keeping with the Jaina exposition of mysticism, provided that the word 'God' is understood in the sense of the transcendental self as recognised by Jainism. Thus mysticism is not mere speculation, but action. It is the transition from the life of sense to the life of spirit, which is tantamount to achieving the immortal heritage of man. This amounts to the realisation of the transcendental self. The limited character of the individual self is disrupted and invaded by the absolute self which the individual feels as his own. We may sum up by saying that mysticism culminates in the heightened and completed form of life, which is accomplished by that transcendental belief, knowledge, and conduct which in our life remains ordinarily below the threshold of consciousness.
The definition of mysticism as given above comprises the mystical aim as well as the process of its attainment. This mode of expression of the nature of mysticism may be calculated to summarize the aspirant's spiritual quest. Just as Kundakunda resorts to explain perspicuously the transcendental and the empirical nature of the self by taking recourse to the employment of the two spiritual Nayas, Niscaya and Vyavahāra, so he has announced the three kinds of selves to make possible the discriminative knowledge of the 'Self' and 'Not-self' and to unlock the doors of mystical experience, nay, to identify oneself with that.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THREE KINDS OF SELF: (a) BAHIRĀTMAN: The attitude of the Cārvāka materialist sums up the meaning of the Bahiratman. The characteristic of the Bahirātman may, in the first place, be accounted for by affirming that he identifies himself with the physical body,the wife and children, silver and gold2 etc., with the logical consequence that he is constantly obsessed with the fear of self-annihilation on the annihilation of the body and the like. Secondly, he remains engaged in the transient pleasures of the senses, 4 feels elated in getting the coveted things of the unsubstantial world, and becomes dejected when they depart. Thirdly, he is desirous of getting beautiful body and physical enjoyment in the life here-after as a result of his penances, and is tormented even by the thought of death.
1 Mo. P. 8; Samādhi. 7, 13, 69; Kartti. 193. 2 Mo. Pā. 10; Samadhi.'11, 14; Jnānā XXXII. 17, 21; PP.-I-83. 3 Jnănã. XXXII. 18. 4 Samādhi. 7, 55. PP-I-84. ^ Samādhi. 42. 6 Samādhi. 76.

Page #191

VI. MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
169
(b) ANTARĀTMAN: First, he is the spiritually converted self who has relinquished the eight kinds of pride, and considers his own self as his legitimate and genuine abode, esteeming the outward physical dwelling places as unnatural and artificial. Secondly, he renounces all identification with the animate objects like wife, children etc., and with the inanimate objects like wealth, property etc., and properly weighs them in the balance of his discriminative knowledge. 4 Thirdly, by virtue of the sprouting of profound wisdom in him, he develops a unique attitude towards himself and the world around him. His is the only self that has acquired the right of Moksa, and consequently he adopts such attitude as is necessary to safe-guard his spiritual status and interest. He gets endowed with such type of insight as will enable him to make spiritual invasion resolutely and then sound the bugle of triumph after defeating the trecherous foes of attachment and aversion assaulting him in his Bahirātman state.
THREE KINDS OF ANTARĀTMAN: Keeping in view the stages of spiritual advancement, to be dealt with afterwards, the Kārttikeyānupreksā recognises three kinds of Antarātman: First, he who has attained spiritual conversion, who is devoted to the Jinendra, who possesses the attitude of self-censuring, who is disposed to the adoption of virtues, who is affectionate to the meritorious, but who lacks the pursuance of moral path; i.e., who leads the life of vowlessness, is called an initiate in spiritual life, or Jaghanya Antarātman. Secondly, the householder following partial vows and the Muni with Pramāda, who are loyal to the words of Jina, who possess passions of very mild type, who are highly determined in the spiritual path, are regarded as Madhyama Antarātman.* Thirdly, the saint who overcomes all Pramāda, and who is steadfast in Dharma and Sukla Dhyāna comes under Utkrsta Antarātman.
(c) PARAMĀTMAN: The Paramātman is the supreme-self, the consummation of aspirant's life, the terminus of his spiritual endeavours. The embodied Paramātman is Arhat, while the disembodied one is Siddha.10 The Mokşa Pāhuda proclaims Paramātman to be bereft of collyrium, defects, body and senses, and to be associated with omniscience, and purity.11 He is free from birth, old age and death; he is supreme, pure, and devoid of eight Karmas; he possesses infinite knowledge, intui
1 Mo. Pā. 5. Kārtti. 194. 2 Kürtti 194. For eight kinds of pride--See p. 131.
3 Samadhi 73. Mo. Pa. 17. 5 Ibid. 14, 87. 6 Kärtti. 194. 7 Ibid. 197. • 8 Ibid. 196. Ibid. 195. 10 Kärtti. 198. 11 Mo. Pā. 5, 6; Niyama. 7.

Page #192

170
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
tion, bliss and potency; and he is indivisible, indestructible and inexhaustible.1 Besides, he is supersensuous and unparalleled, is free from obstructions, merit, demerit and rebirth, and is eternal, steady and independent.2
MYSTIC WAY: Thus the Bahirātman which is the perverted self is to be renounced; the Antarātman is the converted self: i.e., it implies the awakening of the consciousness of the transcendental self within and of its outright separation from the body, external world, and psychical states, both auspicious and inauspicious. Paramātman is the true goal of the mystic quest. The journey from the Antarātman to the Paramātman is traversed through the medium of moral and intellectual preparations, which purge everything obstructing the emergence of potential divinity. Before this final accomplishment is made, a stage of vision and fall may intervene. Thus the whole mystic way may be put as follows: 1) Awakening of the transcendental self, 2) Purgation, 3) Illumination, 4) Dark: night of the soul, and 5) Transcendental life. According to Underhill, “Taken all together, they constitute the phases in a single process of growth, involving the movement of consciousness from lower to higher levels of reality, the steady remaking of character in accordance with the 'independent spiritual world'}.” It is to be remembered that the mystical endeavour is incapable of dispensing with any of the constitutive elements of psychical life-intellect, will, and feeling. In Jaina terminology, Right knowledge, Right conduct, which includes will and feeling, and Right belief, which is to be presupposed before the other two-all these are indispensable for mystical endeavour.4
THE METAPHYSICIAN AND THE MYSTIC: In metaphysical terms we may say that mysticism is the realisation of self's capacity for its original origination, destruction and continuance. It is the manifestation of the inherent characteristics and modifications (
Guna and Paryāya) of the self; i.e., it amounts to the realisation of self's Svarūpa-Sattā, which conception has already been dealt with in the previous chapter on metaphysics. Mysticism and metaphysics connote difference of approach to the problem of reality. First, the fundamental aim of the mystic is to penetrate the Karmic veil and lead a superempirical life, which consists in the realisation of the whole of the existence by virtue of the effulgence of omniscience. In this sense, it may be averred that the metaphysician seeks in the end the same goal as the mystic, only that he is so constituted
Niyama. 176. 2 Ibid. 177. 3 Mysticism. p. 169. 4 Puru. 20.

Page #193

VI. MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
171
that he tries to reach it by intellectuat speculation. What the mystic realises and intuits, the metaphysician envisages by intellect. If the qualification of the mystic is realisation and intuition, the qualification of the metaphysician is merely intellection. Mysticism is predominantly practical, while metaphysics is mainly theoritical. Secondly, the mystical attitude towards Vyavahāra Naya is purely negative; it is for the mystic untrue and ultimately unserviceable. The metaphysician, on the contrary, ascertains the nature of reality by dint of Pramāṇa and Naya, and expresses it through the technique of Syādvāda after comprehending every aspect of reality by means of Saptabhaugivāda. Thirdly, the mystic gets sublime satisfaction from immediate contact with the transcendental self and along with it with the whole of the existence through the medium of infinite, intuitive knowledge in contradistinction to the metaphysician who gets merely intellectual satisfaction by mediately comprehending the whole of the existence. In other words, the mystic has Pratyakşa Anubhava, while the metaphysician has only Paroksa Anubhava. Fourthly, the mystic does not contradict intellectual Anubhava, while the mere metaphysician may counteract it. According to the Jaina the intellect is not opposed to intuition, only the analytical character of intellect is transcended in intuition. The impotence of intellect to know the reality in its wholeness and clarity is overcome. The Jaina would not accept that reality at the intellectual and intuitional levels is totally opposed to each other. We may say in passing that intellect is as necessary for the traversing of the spiritual journey as intuition for its termination and culmination. The intellect is sharpened as the mystic advances on the mystic path. It can be affirmed without fear of contradiction that great mystics may also be great metaphysicians. And for this the evidence is that great mystics like Kundakunda, Pūjyapāda, Samantabhadra, Yogīndu Amptacandra, Haribhadra and Hemacandra, have produced works of stupendeous significance.
After dwelling upon the Jaina conception of mysticism and its relation to metaphysics, and after finding out that the mystical and metaphysical approaches to reality are poles asunder, we now proceed to describe the whole of the mystic way under the fourteen stages of spiritual
Gomma. Ji-9, 10. These Gunasthānas are: 1) Mithyātva, 2) Sāsādana, 3) Miśra, 4) Aviratasmyagdrsti, 5) Deśavirata or Viratāvirata, 6) Pramatta virata, 7) Apramattavirata, 8) Apūrvakarana, 9) Anivșttikaraņa, 10) Sūksmasāmparāya, 11) Upaśāntakaṣāya, 12) Kșiņakaṣāya, 13) Sayogakevali, and 14) Ayogakevali.

Page #194

172
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
evolution as propounded by Jaina Ācāryas. We shall try to subsume! these stages of spiritual advancement under the following heads, namely, 1) Dark-period of the self prior to its awakening, 2) Awakening of self and fall from awakening, 3) Purgation, 4) Illumination, 5) Darkperiod post-illumination, and lastly 6) transcendental life.
1) DARK PERIOD OF THE SELF PRIOR TO ITS AWAKENING OR MITHYATVA GUNASTHĀNA: The suffering on account of which the empirical souls remain in a perpetual state of discontent and disquiet is naturally consequent upon the beginningless functioning of Mohanīya (deluding) Karma, which on the psychical side engenders a complex state of 'Moha'. This state of 'Moha' which pollutes self's outlook, and consequently makes its conduct unfruitful for ascending the loftiest heights of mystical experience is a state of Mithyātva and Kasāya. At the outset, we shall confine ourselves to the exposition of the nature and function of Mithyātva, so extending it as to include its various types, since it constitutes the first stage, technically known as Mithyātva Guñasthāna. The consideration of the nature and function of passion will form the subject matter of next stages, to be presently dealt with.
Mithyātva is responsible for turning our perspective to such an illegitimate direction that in effect there ensues perverted belief or nonbelief in ultimate values. This effect of Mithyātva is so dominant that the self does not evince its inclination to the real path, just as the invasion of bile-infected fever does not create liking for sweet juice. In other words, the perverted selves are inclined to the unveracious path.4 Speaking from the metaphysical point of view, we may say that the self which has not imbibed the substantial outlook, but is devoted to impure modifications is called Parasamaya or Mithyādrsti.5
11) Dark-period of the self prior to its awakening-Mithyātva Gunasthāna; 2)
Awakening of the self-Aviratasamyagdīşti Gunasthāna; Fall from awakening(a) Sāsādana Gunasthāna: (b) Miśra Gunasthāna; 3) Purgation-a) Viratăvirata Guņasthāna: (b) Pramattavirata Gunasthāna; 4) Illumination-a) Apramattavirata Gunasthāna, (b) Apūrvakaraņa Gunasthāna, (c) Anivșttikaraņa Guņasthāna, (d) Sūkşmasāmparāya Gunasthāna, (e) Upaśāntakaṣāya Gunasthāna, (f) Ksiņakaņāya Gunasthāna: 5) Dark-period post-illumination-Fall to the first or the fourth Gunasthāna; 6) Transcendental life-(a) Sayogakevali Gumasthāna, (b) Ayogakevali Gunasthāna. 2 Sat. Vol. I., p. 163. Gāthā 107. 3 Gomma. Ji., 17. 4 $at. Vol. I., p. 162, 5 Prava. I. 1, 2.

Page #195

VI. MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
173
We have often shown how this Mithyātva is corruptive of knowledge and conduct as well. In its presence, both knowledge and conduct, however extensive and suffused with morality they may be, are impotent to disintegrate the hostile elements of the soul and to lead us to those superb heights which are called mystical. Consequently, the darkest period in the history of the self will be the one when the self is overwhelmed by Mithyātva. It obstructs all our mystical endeavours. The souls right from the one-sensed to the mindless five-sensed fall a victim to this venom of Mithyātva, till they are born as five-sensed souls endowed with mind. It is astounding that, even in these rational five-sensed beings, some are such as will never triumph over this darkest period, and hence they will never win salvation. They are technically called abhavyas. Thus they will always be subject to the rounds of birth and death in sundry forms, falling an easy prey to interminable afflictions. The physical counterpart of perversion is Darsana-Mohanīya-Karma. The tendency of the perverted self is to engross itself in the modifications.2 Led astray by the perverted attitude, the soul identifies itself with bodily colour, physical frame, sex, caste, creed, family, friends and wealth.3 “Under its influence one accepts the Adharma (wrong religion) as the Dharma (right religion), the Amārga (wrong path) as the Mārga (right path), the Ajīva (non-soul) as the Jīva (soul) the Asādhu (non-saint) as the Sādhu (saint), the Amukta (unemancipated) as the Mukta (emancipated) and vice-versa."4 Besides, if the soul with its vitiated outlook advances on the moral path, it esteems the observance of vows, performance of austerities, study of scriptures, as ends in themselves, and not as aids to the unfoldment of the divine within. Thus Vyavahāra Naya is deemed to be an ideal. We may sum up by saying that the state of perversion is to be recognised as the state of Bahirātman, which conception has already been dealt with.
TYPES OF MITHYĀTVA: To dwell upon the types of Mithyātva, in view of the infinite-fold characteristics of a thing, there are as many Nayas as there are characteristics. Words may not be available to express them, but it is beyond doubt that as many words are available so many are the Nayas; and if any of the Nayas is exclusively given expression without due regard to the other aspects, the same number of perverted
1 Samaya. Comm. Amfta., 275. 2 PP. I. 77. 3 Ibid. 80 to 83. 4 Sthānanga Sūtra X-1-734; (vide Tatia: Studies in Jaina Philosophy. p. 145. 5 Samaya. 272 to 274.

Page #196

174
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
views will be the consequence. Hence to announce that Mithyātva is of five types is only partially correct.2 According to Pūjyapāda, 3 Mithyātva expresses itself in the following five forms; namely, 1) ekānta, 2) viparīta, 3) saṁsaya, 4) vainayika, and 5) ajñāna. One sided emphasis is Ekānta. To believe in things as they are not is styled Viparīta. The possession of sceptical attitude towards the ultimate values of life is Samsaya. To have reverence for both the right and the wrong path is Vainayika.? And lastly, the indiscriminatory attitude towards things leading upward and things leading downward is Ajñāna.8 Another way of classification employed by Pūjyapāda is to divide Mithyātva into inborn (naisargika) and acquired from the instruction of others (paropadesa-pūrvaka). The former is due to the rise of Mithyātva Karma by virtue of which non belief in the Padārthas or Tattvas occurs. 1° The latter is concerned with the acquisition of belief in non-Tattvas due to the assimilation of perverted views delivered by others.11 The difference between the two also lies in the fact that the occurrence of the first type of Mithyātva is also possible in the lower irrational stages of life, while the second type can be witnessed only in rational five-sensed human beings. In other words, the beings with developed reason have the potency to inhale the outward perverted atmosphere, while the undeveloped ones continue to live with the inborn non-belief in Tattvas. According to the Tattvārtha Bhāsyal? these two types correspond to the classification of Mithyātva into anabhigrhīta and abhigrhīta.
CONVERSION-MORAL, INTELLECTUAL AND SPIRITUAL: We have pointed out that the plight of the self in Mithyātva Guņasthāna resembles that of a totally eclipsed moon, or a completely clouded sky. In other words, it is a stage of spiritual slumber with the peculiarity that the self itself is not cognisant of its drowsy state. It is indubiously a dark period, and the self is ignorant of that baffling darkness. The deep attachment to sensual life and unholy things, the identification of the self with the body, with passions, and with externalities, the ignorance of the superempirical state of life which is beyond the realm of good and evil, and the subconscious discomposure of mind on account of its being the victim of the seven kinds of fear and the eight kinds of pride-all these are some of the broad characteristics of the clouded soul. Even if such an ignorant soul, on
1 Sat. Vol. I. p. 162. Gathā 105. 2 Ibid. p. 162. 3 Sarvārtha. VIII-1. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Sarvārtha. VIII-1. Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 T.sū.bhā. VIII-1.

Page #197

VI. MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
175
account of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the knowledge-covering Karman and the occurrence of mild passion, gets endowed with the capacity of intellectual and moral achievements respectively, it cannot be believed to have dispelled the darkness spiritual. In other words, an ignorant man may be an astute intellectualist, a resolute moralist, but he will lack that mystical quality by virtue of which he may be designated as a real saint, a seeker of mystical truth, a person moving Godward. The above delineation may embarrass and astonish one, but the characters portrayed by Jaina Acāryas of Dravya-lingi Muni and some of the Abhayvas.? who have attained to the fair height of intellectual knowledge and moral upliftment, illustrate this sort of life without spiritual conversion. No doubt, intellectual learning and moral conversion, scriptural study and rigid adherence to moral principles may facilitate mystical conversion in certain souls, but they cannot as a rule bring about the latter. Intellectual attainments and moral achievements are unequivocally fraught with social utility, but are incapable of invariably bringing forth sprititual beneficence. Thus spiritual conversion is to be sharply distinguished from moral conversion and intellectual accomplishments. Outward auspicious conduct and effective scholarship can never be an index of a mystically turned mind. On the contrary, a man not strictly pursuing the moral path, and not possessing sophisticated outlook may own mystical conversion. But on this account outward moral conduct and sophisticated learning need not be depreciated, though mystical conversion should not be confounded with them. For ordinary men like us, moral life alone or moral life together with learning is a thing fit to be adored wherever it is witnessed; for the mystic, it is necessary not to confuse moral with mystical conversion. We cannot do better than quote Prof. Date to enlighten us on this point: "The moral life is, therefore, doubly valuable; valuable as a positive asset for the well-being of the society and valuable as the backbone and pointer of spiritual life."3 The flower of mysticism does not blossom by the water of mere morality, but requires spiritual manure along with it. Morality pervaded with spiritualism can alone lead us to the transcendental heights of mystical experience. After this brief digression regarding the conception of difference between the mystical, the moral and the intellectual conversion, let us now proceed
2 Souls incapable of attaining liberation.
Muni without spiritual conversion 3 Yoga of the Saints., p. 76.

Page #198

176
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
to discuss the problem of the transcendental awakening of the meta. physical difference between the self and not-self, which constitutes the subject matter of the fourth stage. We have already dwelt upon the nature of spiritual awakening, and shall now confine our attention to the process of its origination.
2) ORIGINATION OF SAMYAGDARŠANA OR AWAKENING OF SELF OR AVIRATASAMYAGDRSTI GUŅASTHĀNA: The occurrence of Samyagdarśana or spiritual conversion is sometimes consequent upon the instruction of those who have realised the divine within themselves, or are on the path of God-realisation, while at other times, the self is reminded of its spiritual heritage automatically without the help of any outside instruction. In both the cases, spiritual conversion emerges on account of the subsidence or destruction or subsidence-cum-destruction of Darsana Mohaniya Karma. Thus notwithstanding the outward difference which is seen in the taking place of spiritual conversion, the internal transformation in Karma is identical. It may be pointed out that the external distinction in the origination of mystical turning is only apparent, and that the difference exists only in the direct and the 'indirect nature of instruction.2 Hence the importance of instruction is paramount, since the self in whom spiritual conversion has taken place without apparently any direct instruction must have received instructions, if not here, in some previous birth. In other words, he who has not got any instruction since beginningless past is incapable of being converted spiritually; and he who has got such an opportunity in some previous birth may be so coverted without any instruction at present. Thus instruction is unavoidable. This fact may be corroborated by saying that of the five Labdhis, to be presently dealt with, which are indispensable to the dawn of Samyagdarśana, Dešanā Labdhi is one which again points to the impossibility of Samyagdarsana without instruction. The above discussion may lead us to another consideration that instruction alone cannot evoke Samyagdarśana in us. It is only when proper 'Time' comes; i.e., when Ardhapudgalaparāvartana Kāla for the deliverance of the self is left, that instruction, either of the present or of the past, can originate Samyagdarśana in us. Yogīndu points out that insight is attained by the Ātman, when, at an opportune time, delusion is destroyed.3 In the Yogasāra he emphasizes that the soul visits unholy places and commits misdeeds, till he does not recognise
1 Ta.su. I. 3.
2 Foot note of Tattvarthasūtrabhâsya. p. 21.
3 PP. I. 85.

Page #199

VI. MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
177
soul-God by the grace of Guru. Kundakunda advises us to meditate upon the self after knowing it through the holy medium of the Guru.2 Either prosperity or liberation is obtained by meditating on the Atman after receiving instruction from the Guru, says Nāgakumāramuni. It shall not be contradictory to aver that "the secret of knowing God, of realizing Him, is, whether we like it or not, in the hands of mystics."4 "It is through them alone as spiritual teachers or Gurus that we shall have to bring about the spiritual conversion in us." The announcement of Pūjyapāda that the self alone is its own Guru, as it is responsible for its transmigration as well as liberation, is the estimation of the subject from the transcendental point of view, which is expressed by the word paramārthatah. On this account, the importance of Guru for mystical conversion need not be underrated, inasmuch as the significance of empirical point of view (vyavahāra naya) is incontrovertible to lead us to good heights. Before dwelling upon the conception of five Labdhis, which necessarily precede the emergence of Samyagdarśana, we shall deal with the conception of the Sad-Guru as recognised in Jainism.
ARAHANTA AS THE SUPREME GURU: The supreme objects of devotion enumerated by the Jaina are five, namely, Arahanta, Siddha, Acārya, Upadhyāya and Sādhu. The same may be expressed by saying that Deva, Sāstra and Guru deserve our highest reverence. Again, we come across a different expression that the four objects, namely, Arahanta, Siddha, Sadhu and Dharma preached by Arahantas, are most auspicious and unexcelled in the universe. These different ways of expression are essentially one; and each is inclusive of the rest. To make it clear, Arahanta and Siddha are comprised under the category of Deva; Ācārya, Upādhyāya and Sadhu are styled Gurus; and the religion preached by the Arahantas is called Dharma or Sāstra. Considered from the perspective of mystical realisation, Arahanta and Siddha stand at par. But as the former enjoys embodied liberation, and the latter, disembodied one, it is alleged that Siddha occupies a higher status. In view of this it may appear that disrespect is shown to Siddhas, inasmuch as Arahantas are everywhere bowed first, Siddhas, next. But the conviction of the Jaina is that it is through Arahanta that we have been able to recognise the Siddha, and it is through his intervention that Apta, Agama and Padārtha have
1 Yogasāra. 41. 2 Mo. Pā. 63, 64. 3 Tattvānusāsana. 196. 4 Yoga of the Saints. p. 57. 5 Ibid. p. 58. Samādhi. 75.

Page #200

178
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
been made intelligible. Hence this supreme Guru is entitled to receive our preferential obeisance. Thus Arahanta is the perfect Guru owing to the delivering of sermons for general beneficence, and is also called perfect Deva on account of the complete actualisation of the divinity potential in Himself. It is through his medium that mystical life has been possible on earth. Hence he must have our highest gratitude and reverence.
DOUBLE ROLE OF ARAHANTA: The concept of Arahanta in Jainism plays a double role; the role of the perfect Deva, and the role of the perfect Guru. And this is quite consistent with the view-point of spiritual experience, and the consequent upliftment of mankind at large through preaching. Guruhood refers to the outward manifestation of intuitive experience, while Devahood signifies simply the inward spiritual realisation. Thus the concept of Arhat stands for the consistent identification of Devatva and Gurutva, of the inward experience and the outward expression. In the state of the Siddha, there is no outward representation of mystical experience, which, on the other hand, is integrally connected with the life of Arahanta. Because of this double role, Arahanta is bowed first in preference to the Siddha who is simply the Deva on account of his being incapable of preaching Dharma. Prof. A. N. Upadhye rightly remarks: “The magnanimous saint, the Jaina Tīrthankara, who is at the pinnacle of the highest spiritual experience is the greatest and ideal teacher and his words are of the highest authority.” This does not imply the belittlement of the Siddha, but simply the glorification of the Arahanta as the supreme Guru, Gurutva being his additional characteristic. We propose to discuss later on the nature and characteristic of this supreme Guru or ideal Saint.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ACĀRYA AS GURU IN THE TECHNICAL SENSE: In contradistinction to Arahantas, who have become divine beings, Acāryas, Upadhyāyas and Sadhus are those who are on the path of realisation. They are still the pilgrims on the way to that Sublime, though the mystical characteristics which are essential to call them Gurus are present in them. Technically speaking, only Ācāryas enjoy the privilege of initiating persons into mystical life; hence they are the Gurus. The Acārya adorns his life with those moral and spiritual characteristics which have been already referred to in the chapter ‘Ācāra of the Muni'. The outstanding features of his life consist in initiating the souls who are bent
1 Sat. Vol. I. p. 53.

Page #201

VI. MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
179
on having mystical life, in guiding them in their moral and Spiritual conduct, in correcting their errors, and in re-establishing them on the spiritual path. He is responsible for the governance and regulation of the order of monks. It is obligatory for the Acārya to have a thorough knowledge of the Săstras and of contemporary religion. Besides, he should be unshakable like the Meru mountain, enduring like the earth, destitute of seven kinds of fear and pure like the ocean which has purged the filth out of itself. The Bhagavatī Ārādhanā very beautifully portrays the characteristics of the Acārya and proclaims them to be eight in number namely, 1) ācāravān, i.e., one who observes five types of Ācāra and persuades one's disciples to pursue them', 2) ādhāravān, i.e., one who has profound learning and discipline in order to be the back-bone for the advancement of the disciple; 3) vyavahāravān, i.e., one who is expert in the theory and technique of spiritual punishment, 4) prakartā or prakūrvi, i.e., one who helps the disciple physically in his physical troubles without being frustrated in spite of undertaking great pains, 5) āyopāyadarsaka, i.e., one who impresses upon the mind of one's disciple the value of discovering his defects when he hides them on account of fear, shame, and pride, 10 6) Avapīdaka, i.e., one who exhorts penetratingly, but politely in seclusion, when the disciple owing to vanity, fear, reluctance to be punished etc. hides his faults.11 Here the treatment of the Guru (Acārya) may be compared to the mother who feeds the child even if it weeps;12 i.e., the Guru obliges the disciple to unveil his defects for his benefit;137) Aparisrāvi, i.e., one who does not communicate the defects of one's disciple to anybody, just as the hot iron ball does not let the water go out after once soaking it;14 8) Niryāpaka, i.e., one who guards the ship of one's disciple from being sunk in the ocean of Samsāra at the time when the storm of disease, cold, thirst, hunger etc., is at its highest to ruin the ship.15
1 Sat. Vol. I. p. 49. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.; We have already dealt with these fears above. 51) Jnānācāra (Pursuance of five types of scriptural study). 2) Darsanācāra (Belief
in Tattvas); 3) Căritrācāra (Avoidance of five types of Sins, namely, Hiṁsā, stealing etc.); 4) Tapācāra (Performance of external & internal austerities); 5) Viryācāra (Performance of austerities without concealing one's own strength). (Bhaga Arā.
Comm. Vija. and Mulārā-419). 6 Bhaga. Ara. 419. 7 Ibid. 428, 441 to 443. 8 Ibid. 448. ' Ibid. 455 to 457. 10 Ibid. 461, 462. 11 Ibid. 474, 475. 12 Ibid. 479. 13 Ibid. 480. 14 Ibid. 486. 15 Ibid. 503, 504.

Page #202

180
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UPADHYAYA AND THE SĀDHU: The Upā. dhyāya possesses all the characteristics of the Acārya except those of initiation and correction of faults. The distinguishing characteristic of the Upādhyāya consists in discoursing on spiritual matters after he has dived deep into them. He can only discourse, but cannot command like the Ācārya. The saint who observes moral and spiritual rules of conduct prescribed for them, but does not perform any special function like the Ācārya and the Upādhyāya, is designated as Sādhu. Thus, it is evident that the life of the Acārya embodies in itself the life of the Upādhyāya and the Sādhu, since the latter two owe their saintliness, to the Ācārya. In view of this, it will not be wrong to affirm that the Acāryas are next to Arahantas in doing the work of sustenance and perpetuation of spiritual life.
SPIRITUAL CONVERSION OR AWAKENING OF SELF PRESUPPOSES FIVE LABDHIS: Let us now revert to deal with the nature of the five Labdhis, which are presupposed before spiritual conversion (Samyagdarśana) occurs. They are: 1) kşayopasama, 2) visuddhi, 3) desanā, 4) prāyogya, 5) karaņa. 1) Kşayopaśama Labdhi implies the destruction-cum-subsidence of the Karmic matter to a certain extent.* By virtue of this achievement, the self acquires such potency as will enable it to understand the nature of Tattva and Atattva, and to discriminate between the pursuable path and the non-pursuable one. Technically, this amounts to the accomplishment of the ten Prāņas already referred to. 2) As a result of this achievement, the occurrence of auspicious psychical states is Visuddhi Labdhi.“ 3) Dešanā Labdhi signifies either the obtainment of instruction from the Sadguru, or the development of efficacy to treasure up instruction in the form of disposition to be revived in some other birth where itmay not be available. 4) With the above three Labdhis comes in the in cessant purification of the psychical states, and the competence to reduce the duration of all the types of Karman except the Ayus Karman. The acquisition of this sort of efficiency is called Prāyoga Labdhi.? Now even with these four Labdhis the self may not acquire spiritual conversion. This again points to the possibility of moral conversion without one's being spiritually converted. According to the Jaina dogma these four Labdhis are acquired by the self number of times with no spiritual good.
Ibid. 3.
Ibid. 5.
1 Sat. Vol. I. p. 50. 2. Sat. Vol. I. p. 50. 6 Labdhi. Comm. Candrikå. 6. 7 Labdhi. 7.
3 Labdhi. 3.
8 Ibid. 7.

Page #203

VI. MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
181
5) When there is Ardhapudgalaparāvartana Kāla for the deliverance of the self, it prepares itself for the fifth Labdhi, namely, Karaṇa Labdhi, which guarantees for it spiritual conversion. According to the Gommatasāra (Jivakānda), Samyagdarśana is acquired by that self which is in any one of the four conditions of existence, is destined to liberation, is possessing mind, is fully developed, is awake, and is having purity, determinate knowledge and auspicious Leśyā. Karana Labdhi admits of three-fold classification: a) adhahpravrttakarana b) apūrvakarana and c) anivettikaraṇa. Each of these lasts for an antarmuhūrta3 (less than fortyeight minutes). In the process of Adhaḥpravșttakaraṇa the soul reduces the duration and intensity of Karmas to a considerable extent. b) In Apūrvakaraṇa, on the other hand, the soul passes at every instant through such new states as it never experienced before, and reduces the duration and intensity of Karmas still further. c) “The third process of Anivsttikaraṇa leads the soul to the verge of the dawn of the first enlightenment that comes like a flash on account of the absolute subsidence of the Karmic matter of the vision-deluding (Darśana-mohanīya) Karma". Just after the termination of the period of this Karaņa the soul experiences the first dawn of enlightenment or spiritual conversion. "Even as a person born blind can see the world as it is on the sudden acquisition of eyesight, so can a soul having experienced the vision can see the truth as it is. Even as a person suffering from long-drawn disease experiences extreme delight on the sudden disappearance of the disease, so does a soul eternally bound to the wheel of worldly existence feels spiritual joy and bliss on the sudden dawn of enlightenment. This spiritual conversion is called Upasama-samyaktva, because it is due to the subsidence of Darśana Mohanīyas (vision-deluding) Karma that deluded the self, and it is as pure as the pure water in which the filth has settled by the use of Nirmali etc.
TYPES OF SAMYAKTVA (SPIRITUAL CONVERSION) AND POSSIBILITY OF FALL TO LOWER STAGES, NAMELY, (A) SASĀDANA GUŅASTHĀNA AND (B) MIŚRA GUŅASTHĀNA: This conversion which is known as Pratha
1 Gomma. Ji. 651. 2 Labdhi. 33. 3 Ibid. 34. Labdhi. 36, 51. 5 Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 272. 6 Labdhi. 2. 7 Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 273. 8 It may be noted here that Darsana-mohaniya Karma and Anantānubandhi passions
are intertwined with each other. 9 Gomma. Ji. 649.

Page #204

182
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
mopaśama' Samyaktva2 lasts for the duration of only one antarmuhūrta.3" But by virtue of the purity of states owing to this enlightenment, the homogeneous mass of the vision-deluding Karma is divided into three qualitatively different fragments of Mithyātva (impure), Samyakpraksti (pure) and Samyak-Mithyātva (semi-pure). Thus the self, in the fourth Guñasthāna, subsides four Anantānubandhi passions and three pieces of vision-deluding Karma. After completing the period of this sort of conversion, namely, one Antarmuhūrta, the self either falls to the lower stages or remains in the same stage with the emergence of certain subtle defects ordinarily incognisable. In a similar vein, Pūjyapāda opines that the self, in spite of being conscious of the transcendental self and endowed with the discriminatory frame of mind, returns to the state of perversion on account of the persistence of the previous perverted dispositions. When the impure piece comes up, the self descends again to the first Gunasthāna where again darkness overwhelms him;? if the semi-pure piece, the self falls to the third Guņasthāna, namely, ‘Miśra Guṇasthāna' for one Antarmuhūrta; and then it either retrogrades to the first stage or rises up to the fourth stage of Avirata Samyagdssti.S If there is the rise of Anantānubandhi passion the soul sinks to the second stage known as Sāsādana Gunasthāna'. This is the intermediatory stage of the self which has fallen from the peak of the mountain of Samyagdarśana, but has not arrived at, though sure to fall to, the stage known as Mithyātva Guņasthāna, i.e., the first stage of total darkness. Lastly, when the pure peace rises up, it continues to be in the fourth stage, but has lost the purity of Upaśama Samyaktva.10 Still it is powerful enough to lead the soul to higher stages of spiritual advancement. This is called Kṣāyopaśamika Samyaktva or Vedaka Samyaktva. 11 This conversion may last for one Antarmuhūrta to the minimum and sixtysix Sāgaras to the maximum.12 Thus it also possesses the germs of descension. Now when this self with Vedaka Samyaktva comes in contact with the Kevali13 or Sruta Kevalī, it attains such purity of psychical states that the vision
1 Labdhi. 2. 2 Upasama Samyaktva is of two types, namely, 1) Prathamopasama 2) Dvitiyopasama.
We shall deal with the second type later on. (Bhāvanii-viveka, 94.) 3 Bhavanā viveka, 100. 4 Gomma. Ka. 26. 5 Bhāvanāviveka, 93. Labdhi. 102. 6 Samadhi. 45. 7 Labdhi. 108. 8 Ibid. 107. Gomma. Ji. 20. 10 Labdhi. 105. 11 Kärtti. 309. Gomma. Ji. 25, 648. 12 Bhavanāviveka, 109. 13 Kärtti. 308. Gomma. Ji. 647.

Page #205

VI. MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
183
deluding Karma in its entirety is wiped out?: now the self has thrown over all the chances of its fall to the lower stages.2 This is called Kṣāyika Samyaktva.3 It differs from Upaśama Samyaktva not in point of purity but of steadfastness. The former is permanent, while the latter is temporary.* Thus in the fourth Guņasthāna the spiritual conversion is consequent upon the absolute subsidence of the vision-deluding Karma (Upaśama Samyaktva) or it is due to the rise of pure peace (Kṣāyopaśamika Samyaktva). Lastly, it results on account of the total annihilation of the Vision-deluding Karma (Kṣāyika Samyaktva).
REQUISITES OF MYSTIC'S JOURNEY AFTER SPIRITUAL CONVERSION: With the dispelling of the dense and intense darkness caused by the vision-deluding. Karma, a part of the mystic's journey has been traversed. The self is now transformed into an Antarātman; it has become, on probation, a denizen of the new world." Pujyapāda remarks that the self which was under the spell of deep sleep on account of the absence of spiritual consciousness has now become an awakened self owing to the fact of having developed the taste for the spirit. The illusion of body as the self like the illusion of trunk as the man and its consequent evil effects have now come to an end. The external sources which yielded gratification to the dormant self have now succumbed, and instead the internal source of satisfaction has grown. There has come about a total transplantation of interest. The inner significance has displaced the outer one There is, however, yet a long and tiresome journey to be traversed by the self in order to transmute itself into Paramātman, "and to secure a permanent and respectable position among members of the new life.” The conduct-deluding Karma still persists on account of which the aspirant finds himself incapable of supersensual adventure. Now the passionate and ardent longing of the awakened self is to purge all that stands between it and the transcendental self. In other words, its mystical adventure will now consist in eliminating the horrible contrast between the transcendental belief and the transcendental living, between the first enlightenment and the final one. The rest of the mystic's journey will be trodden by the help of the lamp of right knowledge and right will; and all the obstacles that baulk the pursuance of the moral and the spiritual path will be removed. The great Ācārya Amộtacandra says that those who
1 Gomma. Ji. 645. Kārtti. 308. 2 Gomma. Ji. 646. 3 Ibid. 645. Labdhi. 164. 5 Yoga of the Saints, p. 60. Samādhi. 24, 7 [hid. 21, 22. 8 Ibid. 60. 9 Yoga of the Saints, p. 60,

Page #206

184
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
have dispelled spiritual perversion, and who have comprehended the 'Path', and who are always in possession of sturdy will are capable of pursuing the practical path. Again, conduct followed by intellectual ignorance cannot be pronounced to be right. Consequently, the practice of conduct is advisable only after the intellectual comprehension of the 'Path.'2 This should not be understood to mean that intellectual clarification and moral uprightness, though theoretically separable are also practically so. In practical life, the two influence each other, and the one is incapable of being separated from the other. In the Jaina scriptures, we encounter the expression that right belief and right knowledge are related to each other as the cause and the effect, or as a lighted lamp and its light.3 But this signifies only that spiritual conversion possesses the potency of effecting intellectual turning of the mind in the right direction. This should not imply that no further intellectual study and exertion is necessary. But there should be a separate endeavour for the acquisition of knowledge, in spite of the simultaneous emergence of Samyagdarsana and Samyagjñāna, since they differ in characterisation, the characteristic of one being belief and of the other, knowledge Hence even after the aspirant has been converted spiritually, intellectual Upāsanā and moral Arādhanā are incapable of being dispensed with.
3) PURGATION OR (A) VIRATĀVIRATA GUŅASTHĀNA (B) PRAMATTAVIRATA GUNASTHĀNA: The aspirant who, in the fourth stage of journey known as 'Avirata Samyagdrșți Guñasthāna', has been considered, owing to the rise of 'Apratyākhyānāvaraña' passion, as reluctantly engaged in committing Himsā to its full swing, and as totally occupied with the gratification of animal pleasures,s now in the fifth stage of advancement resorts to the observance of self-denial. Not being competent to make himself free from all vices, he gets over a part of his moral restlessness by taking recourse to the adoption of the partial vows along with the Sila Vratas the nature of which has already been explained in the chapter, 'Ācāra of the Householder'. This state of the self's journey has been designated as Viratāvirata or Deśavirata Guņasthāna, since here the aspirant avoids the Himsā of mobile beings having two to five senses, but on account of the rise of Pratyākhyānāvarana passion he has to commit the Himsa of one-sensed souls.? In his Ātmānusāsana Gunabhadra
1 Puru. 37. 6 Ibid. 30.
2 Ibid. 38. 3 Ibid. 34. 7 Gomma. Ji. 31,
4 Puru. 32.
5 Gomma. Ji. 29,

Page #207

VI. MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA „THICS
185
expresses the inadequacy of the householder for spiritual advancement. According to him the actions of the householder are like an intoxicated man, or like an elephant's bath or like the twisting of a rope by a blind man, since even the sagacious persons in the household-stage sometimes perform meritorious acts, sometimes perpetrate villainous actions, and sometimes perform activities of mixed character. Hence, the latter two types of actions tend to obstruct the purgative way pursued by the mystic. Thus the renouncement of the householder's type of living is necessary for higher advancement of the mystic. We have already pointed out that the householder gradually triumphs over the subtle vices to convert himself into a saint, thereby relinquishing his vicious tendencies and acquiring self-restraint. Though Pramāda still exists in the life of the saint,2 yet it is incapable of abrogating self-restraint; it simply engenders some kind of pollution in the life of the saint.2 Hence this stage has been called 'Pramattavirata Guņasthāna', since here Pramāda exists with selfrestraint. In other words, in this stage the self associated with selfrestraint breeds impurity-producing Pramāda owing to the rise of Samjvalana type of passions and nine sub-passions. The self, notwithstanding the observance of the discipline prescribed for the monk, lapses into the conscious and subconscious kinds of Pramāda. Nevertheless this stage may be regarded as the terminus of the purgative way. In the words of Underhill, “the exalted consciousness of Divine perfection which the self acquired in its ‘mystical awakening' was balanced by a depressed and bitter consciousness of its own inherent imperfection and the clash of · these two perfections spurred it to that laborious effort of accommodation which constitutes the 'Purgative way'.6"
CHARACTERISTICS OF A SAINT: The characteristics of a saint have already been described in the previous chapter, Ācāra of the Muni. The Mūlācāra excellently sums up the attitude of a saint. According to it, the saint should get food by begging, stay in a forest, eat only a little food, avoid excessive speech, get over sleep, endure troubles, keep from social life, practise universal friendship, have non-attachment, give himself to undivided meditation, adhere to spiritual upliftment and lastly turn away from passions, acquisitions, associations, and life-injuring activities.? Besides, a saint is required to practise ten-fold Dharma, namely,
1 Atmānu. 41. 5 Gomma. Ji. 33.
2 Şat. Vol. I. p. 176. 6 Mysticism. p. 381.
3 Ibid. p. 175. 4 Gomma. Ji. 32. 7 Müla. 895, 896.8 Kärtti. 394 to 403.

Page #208

186
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
1) Kșamā: to have an attitude of forbearance towards men, gods, and subhuman beings in spite of the fact that the saint is subjected to stupendous torments by them. The saint forgives all, and does not yield to anger. The causes of anger does not perturb him; 2) Mārdava: to be modest despite certain attainments in the field of erudition and austerities. 3) Ārjava: not to be impure, deceitful and inconsistent in mind, body, and speech, and not to hide his own faults; 4) Sauca: to cleanse the filth of craving and greed by the water of equanimity and contentment and to be devoid of all sorts of hankering after food; 5) Satya: to preach in keeping with the scriptures even though the saint himself has not been able to abide by the high conduct prescribed in them; 6) Samyama: to be constantly vigilant in not injuring even the small lives in all the activi.. ties that a saint is supposed to perform; 7) Tapas: to practise austerities without any desire to be fulfilled either in this world or in the next; 8) Tyāga: to renounce tasty food, and such habitation as may engender attachment; 9) Akimcana: to forsake all Parigraha; and 10) Brahmacarya: to abstain himself from the association with women, from looking at their beautiful forms, and from the discussion over female matters.
Before we proceed to consider the nature of the next stages of the mystic's advancement, we propose, first, to dwell upon the view of scriptural study, and secondly, to deal with the conception of devotion in Jainism, both constituting the integral parts of the mystic's moral and spiritual organism. Without the due recognition of the first, the aspirant shall not be able to achieve a remarkable success, and without the proper valuation of the second, he shall have to be disappointed in retaining and stabilizing and inspiring the moral and spiritual attainments.
KINDS OF SCRIPTURAL STUDY: Scriptural study or Svādhyāya, is of five types:
11) Vācanā: To explain words or meanings or both to the person curious to learn; 2) Prcchanā: To ask questions with a view to clearing away doubts or confirming one's view regarding words, meanings or both; 3) Anupreksā: To dwell upon the assimilated meaning constantly; 4) Āmnāya: To memorise and revise the scriptures with unerring pronunciation; and 5) Dharmopadeśa: To preach moral principles with a desire to eradicate the unworthy path, to remove doubts and to illuminate the essential aspects of life.
TYPES OF SCRIPTURES: Four types of scriptures have been recognised 1) Prathamānuyoga, 2) Karaņānuyoga, 3) Caraṇānuyoga and 4) Dra
1 Uttara. 30/34; Sarvärtha. IX. 25; Rõjavä. IX. 25.

Page #209

VI. MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
187
vyānuyoga. Prathamānuyoga depicts one man's character or portrays the characters of sixty three great personalities or is concerned with both. The characters are so portrayed as to illustrate the four objects of human life, the attainment and culmination of the three brilliant jewels, and the accomplishment of Dharma and Sukla Dhyāna2. The Mahāpurāņa, Harivamsapurāņa, Pāđịavapurāņa, Padmacaritra etc., illustrate this Anuyoga. Karaņānuyoga speaks of the universe (loka) and the beyond (aloka), the vicissitudes of time and the four conditions of transmigratory existence. The Trilokasāra, the Tiloyapanņatti etc., are comprised under this Anuyoga. Caraṇānuyoga dwells upon the conduct of the householder and that of the Muni with a view to pointing out its evolution, development and maintenance. The Mülācāra, Bhagavati Arādhanā, Puruşārthasiddhyupāya, Ratnakaranda Srāvakācāra etc., come within the scope of this Anuyoga. Dravyānuyoga investigates the nature of Jīva and Ajīva, Punya and Pāpa, Bandha and Mokşa.The Pravacanasāra, Pañcāstikāya, Samayasāra etc., have been regarded as delineating the subject of this Anuyoga. The Tattvārthasūtra is the embodiment of the latter three Anuyogas.
SIGNIFICANCE OF SCRIPTURAL STUDY: According to the Jaina, that is right knowledge which enlightens the essence of life, fosters self-control, directs the mind from the "abyss of sensuality to the plane of the spirito”, instills the spirit of detachment, encourages the pursuance of noble path, and helps to develop fraternal feelings with all beings.' Scriptural study may very well be equated with this type of knowledge. Besides, it confers on the aspirant the benediction that senses are restrained, three Guptis are observed, mental concentration is obtained, and humbleness is brought about. The man with the knowledge of Sūtras saves himself from being led astray, just as the needle with thread is not lost. Kundakunda emphasizes the importance of scriptural study by pronouncing that it serves to exhaust the heap of delusion. 10 Pūjyapāda points out that the purpose of Svādhyāya is to enrich the intellect, to refine moral and spiritual efforts, to infuse detachment and fear from mundane miseries, to effect an advancement in the practice of austerities, and to purify defects that may occur when one pursues the divine path.11 In addition to these objectives fulfilled by Svādhyāya, Akalanka recognises that it also
1 Ratna. Comm. II. 2. 2 Ibid 43. 3 Ibid. 44. 4 Ibid. 45. 5 Ibid. 46. 6 Yoga of the Saints, p. 66. 7 Müla. 267, 268. 8 Müla. 410, 969. Ibid. 971. 10 Prava. 1-86. 11 Sarvartha. IX-25.

Page #210

188
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
serves to perpetuate the religion preached by the omniscient Tirtham kara, to uproot one's own doubts and those of the co-religionists, and lastly, to defend the basic doctrines against the onslaughts of antagonistic philosophers. For those who are fickle-minded, intellectually unsteady, nothing is so potent to terminate such a state of mind as the pursuance of Svādhyāya or the scriptural study, just as darkness can only be nullified by the light of the sun.2. It brings about mental integration and concentration, inasmuch as the aspirant overcomes the hindrances by ascertaining the nature of things through the study of the scriptures. Without the acquisition of scriptural knowledge, there is always a danger of being led astray from the virtuous path, just as the tree full of flowers and leaves cannot escape its deadening fate for want of the root. Thus, the significance of Svādhyāya is so great that of the twelve kinds of austerities already discussed in the previous chapter, Svādhyāya is unsurpassable. If scriptural study offers an incentive to the householder to lead the life of a saint by consecrating himself completely to meditation and devotion, it serves as a temporary help for the sojourn of the saint when he experiences meditational fatigue. It imparts meditational inspiration and intellectual fund and satisfaction. It is at once a "tonic to the brain and sauce to the heartó.” It bestows upon us philosophical satisfaction about the truths of mystical religion and creates an insatiable desire to have an actual experience of these truths. “It brings home to the mystic's mind the sense of weakness, finitude and helplessness and awakens the Sādhaka to the need of making more efforts, of cultivating the moral virtues and of enhancing his meditations and devotions7"..
NATURE OF DEVOTION: We now proceed to deal with the nature, kinds, and effects of devotion as recognised in Jainism, Devotion implies the sublime affection, circumscribed by the immaculacy of thought and emotion, towards the divinity-realised souls or towards those who are much advanced on the path of divine realisation. The devotee profoundly knows the object of his devotion, namely, Arhat and Siddha Every fiber of his being feels the supremacy and sublimity of the object of his devotion to such an extent that when the devotee finds himself confronted with the omniscient and omnipotent God, (Arhat & Siddha) he abruptly and spontaneously, proclaims himself to be shameless, ignor
1 Rajava-IX. 25. 2 Amita. Sráva. XIII-83. 3 Prava-III. 32. 4 Amita. Srava. XIII. 88. 5 Mülā. 409, 970. 6 Yoga of the Saints, p. 64. 7 Ibid. 65. 8 Sarvärtha VI. 24. 9 Bhaktamara Stotra 15.

Page #211

VI. MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
189
ant like a child and an obstinate owl, 3 etc., This is a sort of religious humility, self-depreciation, self-disvaluation and a consciousness of "creaturehood”. This strange and profound mental reaction of calling oneself a creature in the face of that which is transcendent is not a conceptual explanation of the matter but a mode of submergence into nothingness, an attempt to convey the content of the feeling response in the best possible way. Again the object of devotional consciousness is "wholly other" in the sense of its being Anupama, i.e., it is absolutely and intrinsi cally other than every thing that is and can be thought. It is “majestice” in the sense that its infinite characteristics are incapable of being described by us.? Notwithstanding the fact of being possessed by the subjective feeling of the status of a creature and the objective feeling of the devotional object being supreme and "wholly other", the devotee is led to the singing of the praise of God (Arhat & Siddha) on account of being captured by the fire of devotion like the deer which resorts out of love to save its child from the clutches of a lion or like a Cuckoo (koyala) which sings inautumn merely by the presence of small mangoes. This refers to the "element of fascination in the devotional object. Though the object is awe-inspiring on account of its infiniteness, yet it is fascinating and very easily captivates and transports the devotee with strange ravishment. The consequence of which is that his vocal cords automatically begin to function in extolling the deity, though in a limited way. Again the devotee who finds all the objects of the world as quite impotent to bestow upon him spiritual solace surrenders himself to God (Arhat and Siddha) for putting an end to transmigratory existence and to tribulations and fears 10. The devotee is so much attracted by the divine consciousness that he expresses his deep yearning for establishing the holy feet of God in his heart for ever.11 Intoxicated by the devotional juice, the devotee announces that he keeps the God in his heart, and so allows him (God) to cross the ocean of mundane miseries; but after a moment reverses the position by saying that God serves as the air inside the leather bag of his heart for crossing the ocean of world. 12 The spirit of utter consecration is manifested when Samantabhadra proclaims that that is intellect which remembers
1 Bhaklāmara. 15. 2 Svayambhū. 30. 3 Kalyāṇamandira Stotra. 3. 4 Idea of the Holy, p. 21. 5 Yuktyanusāsana. 4.; Şat. Vol. I-1. 6 Idea of the Holy, pp. 19,20. 7 Yuktyanusāsana, 2.; Bhaktānara, 4; Kalyānamandira, 6.
8 Bhaktàmara Stotra, 5,6. Idea of the holy, p. 31. 10 Svayambhu. 80. . 11 Amitagati-sāmāyikapátha, 4. 12 Kalyanamandira Stotra, 10.

Page #212

190
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
im2
God, that is head which bows down to His feet, that is successful life which lives under His pious shelter, that is speech which sings His praise, that is a sacred man who is engrossed in His devotion, that is a learned man who bows down to His feet.1 Consequently He alone is the object of his belief, he exclusively remembers and adores Him, his both hands are only meant for paying Him obeisence, his ears are ever engaged in listening to His noble characteristics, his eyes are always busy beholding His beauty, his deep-rooted habit is to write something in His praise, and his head is for the sole purpose of bowing to Him?.
TYPES OF DEVOTION: We now proceed to deal with the types of Bhakti. It may be mentioned as Arhat Bhakti, Ācārya Bhakti, Upādhyāya Bhakti and Pravacana Bhakti.3 In another way the classification runs as Siddha Bhakti, Sruta Bhakti, Căritra Bhakti, Yogi Bhakti, Acārya Bhakti, Nirvāņa Bhakti, Pañca Guru Bhakti, Tīrthamkara Bhakti, Nandīśvara Bhakti, Sānti Bhakti, Samādhi Bhakti and Caitya Bhakti. Kundak unda's Niyamasāra categorises Bhakti as Nirvritti Bhakti and Yoga-Bhakti. The former comprises devotion to right belief, right knowledge and right conduct and to the emancipated soul, the latter implies absorption in self-meditation after one has renounced attachment etc., and all foreign thought activities. We may mention in our own way the different types of devotion as Stuti, Vandanā, Idol Worship, Nāmasmaraṇa, Bhajana, Kīrtana, Vinaya, Vaiyāvșttya, and Abhiksana-jñānopayoga. We have already dealt with Stuti, Vandanā, Vinaya and Vaiyāvrtya. Idol Worship needs no dilation. Jaina Temples are the illustrations of this sort of Worship. Nāmasmarana implies the devoted repetition of Om, the name of Parameșthins and the like. According to the Dravyasamgraha? the Namokāra Mantra and the other Mantras given by the Guru are to be repeated and meditated upon. Somadeva attaches great importance to the Namokāra Mantra.8 “The counting of the letters is to be done with a rosary composed of lotus seed or golden beeds or sun stones or gems and the counting may also be done with flowers or on the finger-joints. The repeating of the Mantras may be vocal or mental; the latter method being the more efficacious. Great mystic value is attached to this formula.9” Bhajanas also contribute to the development of moral and spiritual life. They may serve as an incentive to spiritual life, indicate the
2 Ibid. 114. 3 Ta. sū. VI-24. 4 Dasabhaktyādi Samgraha pp. 96 to 226.5 Niyama. 134, 137. Ibid. 134, 135, 137. 7 Dravya. 49. 8 Yat. & I.C. p. 272. Ibid.

Page #213

VI. MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
191
necessity of virtuous life, reveal the significance of Deva, Šāstra and Guru, and bring out the effects of God-realisation. These different types of Bhajana may be found out in Banārsi Dăsa, Bhāgacanda, Dyānatarāya, Bhūdhara Dāsa, Ananda Ghana etc. Abhikṣaṇa-Jñānopayoga implies the strenuous pursuance of spiritual knowledge. Though it is predominantly intellectual, it is capable of arousing our devotion towards God (Arhat and Siddha). We have already pointed out the importance of Svādhyāya. To be greatly affected by the importance of Svādhyāya is called Pravacana Bhakti.
IMPORTANCE and EFFECTS OF DEVOTION: Next come the importance and effects of Bhakti. According to Kundakunda, he who bows down with great devotion to the feet of Jina undermines the root of Samsāra.1 Pūjyapāda pronounces that the self by dint of its devotedness towards Arahanta and Siddha can transform itself into the State of Paramātman.2 Vādīrāja Muni represents that notwithstanding deep intellectual attainments and untainted moral accomplishments the doors of the edifice of liberation locked by delusion are incapable of being thrown open by the aspirant without applying the key of profound devotion.3 Again, since God is incomparable and unlike, our devotional outpourings are incapable of unfolding his being, says Vādirājamuni. Despite this disharmony between our words and His Being, our expressions permeated by the nectar of devotion are capable of bestowing upon us the desired fruits.5 All sorts of mundane pleasantness and supermundane results follow as a consequence of God's devotion, nay, perforce accompany the devotee. Thousands of imperilling disturbances and obstructions forthwith disassociate themselves from the devotee. He who has heard God's pious name and has applied his heart and soul to it has escaped the mountain of distresses. He who unwaveringly and with tears of joy and with jubilant voice adores God relieves himself from diverse heart-rending diseases.' Though God has transcended the duality of praise and censure, yet the singing of His glory sweeps away the filth of vices from the mind of devotee.° Again, in spite of the fact that the ocean of God's characteristics cannot be crossed by the ship of words, it is unequivocally certain that
1 Bhāva. Pa-153. 2 Samādhi. 97. 3 Ekibhāva Stotra, 13. 4 Ibid. 21. SIbid. 21. 6 Ekibhāva Stotra, 10-11, Bhaktāmara Stotra; 48 Jinašataka, 81;
śānti Bhakti; 6. 7 Santi Bhakti, 2; Kalyāṇamandira Stotra, 9. 8 Kalyānamandira Stotra, 35,38; Santi Bhakti, 4. Jinašataka, 81; Ekibhāva Stotra, 3 Bhaktāmara Stotra, 45; 10 Svayambhu. 57; Ekibhava. 2; Bhaktamara. 7.

Page #214

192
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
every person by his moment's devotion can purify his soul,' nay, even God's name is capable of purifying him.2 Samantabhadra points out that just as iron is turned into gold by a mere touch of Pārasa stone, so also the devotee is transformed into an effulgent personality and his words are reckoned as pregnant with great momentousness. According to Vādīrāja it is by devotion that the obstacles that might baulk the move. ment of the devotee towards heavenly pleasures and his pilgrimage towards liberation are overthrown; and the devotee gets endowed with such a penetrating intellect that he never encounters any difficulty in memorizing the scriptures. Samantabhadra exhorts that in his case devotion has resulted in fearlessness and in the dissipation of several diseases, and in making him a magnificent, respectable and virtuous personality.s Bhakti, in the view of Dhanañjaya, blesses a devotee with eminence, riches and success. We thus see, on the whole, that the effects of devotion are mundane pleasures (this worldly and heavenly) and supermundane happiness, abrogation of distresses and disturbances, banishment of physical diseases, removal of vices and attainment of virtues, overthrowing of the obstacles, acquisition of penetrating intellect, development of effulgent personality and weighty tongue, wide recognition, achievement of success and riches, and lastly, attainment of fearlessness.
SIXTEEN KINDS OF REFLECTION AS THE EMBODIMENT OF JNANAYOGA, KARMAYOGA AND BHAKTIYOGA: In order that the citizenship of superempirical world may be acquired by the mystic, it is incumbent upon him that he should pay the utmost allegiance to the tricoloured flag of Jñānayoga, Karmayoga and Bhaktiyoga properly propped up by the staff of Samyagdarśana. The triple colours refer, first, to the spiritual knowledge treasured up by Svādhyāya in its most comprehensive sense, secondly, to the conduct including the strenuous pursuance of various vows and austerities, thirdly, to the religious humility emanating from the singleminded devotion to God (Arahanta and Siddha), and the staff refers to the basic support in the form of transcendental awakening. The enunciation of sixteen kinds of reflection is the embodiment of Jñānayoga, Karmayoga and Bhaktiyoga, satisfying at once the intellect, the will and the heart. Because of their integral character, they have been considered as being potent to accumulate the auspiciousness in the constitution of
1 Jinabataka, 59. 2 Svayambhū. 86,87. 3 Jinašataka, 60. 4 Ekibbara. 23. 5 Jinašataka, 47, 114. Visāpahára. 40. ?Tasů. VI. 24.

Page #215

VI. MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
193
the self to such an extent that he may wear the crown of a Tirthamkara either in this very life or in the ensuing birth. Abhikṣaṇajñānopayogal is suggestive of Jñānayoga; Sīlavrateşvanaticāra,2 Samvega, 3 Saktitastapau, Āvasyakāparihāras may be comprised under the personal aspect of Karmayoga; Saktitastyāga, Pravacanavātsalya,7 Mārgaprabhāvanā may refer to the social aspect of Karmayoga; Vinaya-Sampannatā, Sadhu Samādhi, 10 Vaiyāvstya, 11 Arahanta Bhakti,12 Ācārya Bhakti,13 Bahusruta Bhakti, 14 Pravacana Bhaktiis may be regarded as indicative of Bhakti Yoga; and Darśana Visuddhi16 which is at the head of them all is suggestive of the pervasive principle of Jñānayoga, Karmayoga and Bhaktiyoga. This means that without the recognition of Samyagdarśana as the inspiring and backing essence, the activities of intellect, will and heart will be unfructifying for the ascension of the spirit on sublime heights. The above classification simply points to the predominance of intellectual, emotional and volitional elements in different reflections; but, just as the three aspects of psychical life are interwoven into a complex harmony, so also any of these reflections, when deeply understood; represent the interpenetration of one Yoga into the other; i.e., each of them may serve as an independent whole of Jñānayoga, Karmayoga and Bhaktiyoga. It is probably on account of this recognition that the great Acārya Pujyapāda has explicitly pronounced that these reflections sepa
1 To apply oneself constantly to the earning of spiritual knowledge is Abhikṣana
jñānopayoga. 2 To observe vows and to renounce passions for their proper pursuance is Silavrateşva
naticāra. 3 To be apprehensive of worldly miseries is Samvega. 4 Without the concealment of strength, to pursue proper bodily austerities is Tapa. 5 To perform six essential duties is Avaśyaka parihāra. 6 To be charitable in food,
shelter and knowledge is Tyāga. 7 To have an affectionate attitude towards the spiritual brethern, as the cow keeps
towards the calf, is Pravacanavātsalya. 8 To influence society through the medium of knowledge, austerity, charity, Bhakti
or adoration is Mārgaprabhāvanā. 9 To possess reverential attitude towards the Guru and spiritual path is Vinaya Sam
pannatā. 10 To remove obstacles from the path of a Muni is Sadhu Samādhi. 11 To nurse the virtuous souls is Vaiyāvstya. 12-15 To have pure Bhakti in Arahanta, Acārya, Upadhyāya & Pravacana is respectively
called Arahanta, Acārya, Bahuśruta and Pravacana Bhakti. 16 Transcendental awakening is Darsana-visuddhi.

Page #216

194
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
rately or collectively may serve as the cause of Tīrthamkaraship. These reflections are helpful both to the house-holder and the Muni. We may point out in passing that the culmination of Jñānayoga is omniscience, the consummation of Karmayoga is Ātmanic steadfastness, and the perfection of Bhaktiyoga is blissfull experience.
CERTAIN PROCESS TO BE COMPLETED BEFORE HIGHER ASCENSION: After dealing with the process of purgation which is not only negative but also positive, we now turn to higher stages of advancement. When there is rise of Samjvalana and nine sub-types of passion in such a mild form that it cannot generate even Pramāda in the constitution of the self, the self is in the 7th stage styled 'Apramatta Samyata Guņasthāna. This admits of two kinds, namely, Svasthāna Apramatta and Sātiśaya Apramatta. As long as the self which has abrogated Pramāda in its fullness, which is associated with Vrata, Guņa and Sīla, and which is incessantly absorbed in discriminatory knowledge and in Dharma Dhyāna (auspicious meditation), does not turn to ascend to higher stages by dint of either the ladder of subsidence or that of annihilation, it may be regarded as ‘Svasthāna Apramatta' or Niratiśaya Apramatta.* When it turns, it is Sātiśaya Apramatta. But here a certain process is to be completed before climbing up higher stages. The Vedaka Samyagdřsti by undergoing the three aforementioned processes of Adhahpravsttakaraṇa etc., transforms the first type of passions into other types? and sub-types. After the lapse of one Antarmuhūrta he either suppresses?o the three fragments of vision-deluding Karma or destroys' them by resorting to the same process. In the former case he earns the name of Dvitīyopaśama Samyagdrsti12 and in the latter, he is styled Ksāyika Samyagdssti. It is to be noted here that the self oscillates between the 6th and 7th Gunasthānas thousands of times, and when it attains steadiness, he strenuously prepares himself either for supressing or for annihilating the remaining
1 Sarvartha. VI. 24. 2 We have already dealt with these on p. 53. 3 Gomma. Ji. Comm. Candrikā. 45. 4 Gomma Ji. Candrikā. 46. 5 Some Ācāryas hold that the Dvitiyopasama Samyagdssti does Apraśasta Upasama instead of Visamyojana (transformation) of first type of passion i.e., this passion simply refuses to come in rise (Mokşamärgaprakasaka, p. 498). But all are unanimous regarding the transformation of the passion in the case of Kşāyika Samyagdrsti. 6 First type-Anantānubandhi. 7 Second = Apratyākhyanāvarana. Third =Pratyakhyānāvarana. Fourth=Samjvalana. Labdhi. Comm. 205.
Sub-types=We have dealt with these in chapter III. 10 Labdhi. 117. 11 Labdhi. 204. 12 Bhāvanā viveka, 101.

Page #217

VI. MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
195
conduct-deluding Karma of twentyonel kinds.2 Out of the three Karanas, the self commences with the state of Adhahpravrttakarana for the purpose of higher ascension. It will not be amiss to point out here that the Kṣāyika SamyagdȚsti is capable of ascending both the ladder of subsidence and that of annihilation, while Dvitīyopaśama Samyagdssti can only climb up the ladder of subsidence.
4) ILLUMINATION OR (A) SĀTISAYA APRAMATTA, (B) APŪRVAKARAŅA, (C) ANIVRTTIKARAŅA, (D) SŪKŞMA-SĀMPARĀYA, (E) UPAŚĀNTA KAŞAYA, (F) KșĪŅAKAŞĀYA GUŅASTHĀNAS: The second part of the seventh Gunasthāna and the rest higher Gūnasthānas up to the 12th are the meditational stages or the stages of illumination and ecstacy. The ladder steps are ascended by the aid of deep meditation. It is through the medium of contemplation that the mystic pursues the higher path. By this time, he has developed a power of spiritual attention, of self-merging and of gazing into the ground of the soul. He has developed a deep habit of introversion. In the process of Adhahpravsttakaraṇa which is completed with the Sātiśaya Apramatta Guñasthāna, the mystic abundantly experiences the pure states of the self, and, after the expiry of one Antarmuhūrta, he comes to the eighth stage, namely, Apūrvakaraṇa where he realises such states as were unprecedented in the history of the soul. The maximum sojourn of the self in this stage is one Antarmuhūrta. Here the self engages itself either in subsiding or annihilating the residual of conductdeluding Karma according to the ladder it chooses to climb up. After the end of the aforementioned duration, it performs the process of Anivsttikaraṇa where exists the state of profound purity. This is the ninth stage known as Anivșttikaraña Guņasthāna. In the tenth Gunasthāna known as Sūksmasāmparāya, there is only subtle greed of the fourth type that can disturb the soul.? The self which has chosen the ladder of subsidence for its spiritual ascent suppresses even this subtle greed in the eleventh Guņasthāna and absolves itself from the rise of all types of passions. This stage is known as Upaśāntakasāya Gunasthāna. This height has been arrived at by the first type of Sukla Dhyāna. It is the culmination. of the first type of white contemplation (Sukla Dhyāna). Pūjyapāda observes that contemplation produces supreme ecstacy in a mystic who
1 Labdhi. Comm. 205, 217. * 2 Twentyone kinds=The second, third, fourth groups and Sub-types. 3 Gomma Ji. Comm. Candrikā. 47. 4 Gomma. Ji. 49, 50, 51. SIbid. 53. 6 Ibid. 54. Gomma. Ji. 59, 60. 8 Jñānā. LXII. 20.

Page #218

196
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
is firmly established in the self, and who has withdrawn himself from worldly intercourse. Such an ecstatic consciousness is potent enough to burn the Karmic fuel; and then the person remains unaffected by external troubles, and never experiences discomposure. All the stages described above are undoubtedly the stages of illumination. The last stage is the termination of 'first mystic life'. If the ladder of annihilation has been ascended, the self instead of entering the eleventh Guņasthāna from the 10th rises directly to the twelfth one known as Kșīņakaṣāya Guņasthāna. Here the residual of conduct deluding karma is destroyed instead of being suppressed. All other characteristics are identical with the eleventh stage. The soul remains for one Antarmuhūrta in this stage. With the help of the second type of Sukla Dhyāna, the self in the last instant of this stage annuls all the remaining3 destructive Karmas; and the mystic enjoys the transcendental life, which shall be presently dealt with.4
5) DARK NIGHT OF THE SOUL POST-ILLUMINATION: The mystic who possesses the fresh fruits of contemplation may encounter his outright putrefaction, and experience a swing-back into darkness. This "divides the 'first mystic life' or illuminative way, from the 'second mystic life' or transcendental life. It is generally a period of utter blankness and stagnation, so far as mystical activity is concerned. “The self is tossed back from its hardwon point of vantage”.. Technically speaking, the Dviti. yopaśama Samyagdșsti, i.e., one who attains the designation of illuminated consciousness in the eleventh Gunasthāna falls to the lowest stage of Mithyātva step by step after completing the period of stay in each stage.? This may be accounted for by saying that the suppressed passions gain strength after the lapse of one Antarmuhūrta; and the mystic has to suffer unhappy consequences. The ecstatic awareness of the transcendental self, which was the governing characteristic of illumination, gets negated. The illuminated consciousness is perfectly content and tranquil, but after the lapse of the aforementioned period, the state of illumination begins to break up; and an overwhelming sense of darkness and depriva. tion envelops the mystic. “This sense is so deep and strong that it inhibits all consciousness of transcendent and plunges the self into the state of
1 Istopa. 47, 48. 2 Gomma Ji. 62. 31) Knowledge-covering (Jõānāvarana),
2) Intuition-covering (Darsanāvaraña) 3) Obstructive (Antarāya). 4 Labdhi. Comm. 600, 609. 5 Mysticism. p. 381. Ibid.-381. 7 Labdhi.- 344, 345.

Page #219

VI. MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
197
negation and misery which is called the Dark-night.". The dark-night experienced by the Kṣāyika-Samyagdrsti is not so intense as it is experienced by the Dvitīyopaśama Samyagdęsti, inasmuch as the latter may fall to the first Gunasthāna in contradistinction to the former who cannot go beyond the fourth one. Those who are great contemplatives emerge from this period of destitution, but those less heroic succumb to its dangers and pains. It may be noted here that not all the mystics experience this dark-night. Those of them who ascend the ladder of annihilation escape this tragic period, and forthwith succeed in materialising the final accomplishments, in relishing the fruits of transcendental life in comparison with those who ascend the ladder of subsidence. Mystics of the latter type no doubt will also reach the same heights, but they do so only when they climb up the ladder of annihilation either in this life or in some other to come. As a matter of fact, the soul which has once attained spiritual conversion is entitled to be the inhabitant of the holy world. The question is only of time and not of certitude. To sum up, some souls are confronted with darkness of three types in their life: first, before conversion, secondly, after conversion, thirdly, after the ascension of the ladder of subsidence. In the first, though the self is overwhelmed by utter darkness, he is not aware of it; in the second, the fall from spiritual conversion is not consciously recognised; in the third, the self, having touched the sublime heights, falls to the ground; hence the invasion of darkness is naturally most perturbing and painful.
6) TRANSCENDENTAL LIFE, OR (A) SAYOGAKEVALĪ, (B) AYOGAKEVALI GUNASTHANAS: The slumbering and the unawakened soul, after passing through the stages of spiritual conversion, moral and intellectual preparation, now arrives at the sublime destination by dint of ascending the rungs of meditational ladder. The dormant self who is prone to the renouncement and choice of external things, and who, when awakened, is occupied with the rejection of inner evil desires and the acceptance of auspicious psychical states, now by virtue of his metamorphosis into transcendental self neither abandons nor adopts anything, but rests in eternal peace and tranquillity. The self which was swayed by perversion, non-abstinence, spiritual inertia, and the samjvalana types of passion and quasi-passions refuses now to be deflected by them; and possesses the dispassionate vocal and physical activities (yogas) which cannot
1 Mysticism. p. 382.
2 Samādhi. 47,

Page #220

198
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
deprive the soul of mystical experience. Activity is not incompatible with transcendent experience. It is a state of Jīvan-mukta, an example of divine life upon earth. In the transitional stages, the auspicious Bhāvas which were used as temporary structures for taking refuge, have now succumbed, and the Suddha Bhāvas which will now serve as a permanent dwelling have emerged. The Antarātman has been displaced by the Paramātman. Potentiality has been turned into an actuality. The disharmony between belief and living has vanished. This is transcendental life, a supermental state of existence. It is the final triumph of the spirit, the flower of mysticism, the consummation towards which the soul of the mystic strenuously engaged itself from the commencement of the spiritual pilgrimage. Technically it is termed “Sayoga Kavelī Guņasthāna," since it is accompanied by Yoga (activity) and Kevalajñāna (omniscience). The Gommațasāra proclaims that in this Gunasthāna the Ātman is called 'Paramātman'.2 The next stage is called 'Ayoga Kevalī Guņasthāna', as there the soul annuis even the vibratory activities, but preserves omniscience and other characteristics; and afterwards attains disembodied liberation in contradistinction to the two types of embodied liberation enjoyed by the self in the previous Guņasthānas. However, the difference in the state of liberation (embodied and disembodied) does not create the difference in spiritual experience, inasmuch as the four types of obscuring Karmas (Ghāti Karmas), namely, the knowledge-covering, the intuition-covering, the deluding and obstructive, have ceased to exist in the embodied state of emancipation. Even the influx of Karmas, which is due to the presence of ‘Yoga', cannot operate in the polluted manner owing to the absence of passions. When the self lands in the 'Sayoga Kevalī Gunasthāna' he may be credited with the designation of 'Arhat', and it holds good before the attainment of Siddha state.3 To be more clear, the self in the Sayoga Kevalī and the Ayoga Kevali Gunasthānas bears the title of 'Arahanta'.4
Now, there are seven kinds of Arahantas. They do not differ in their nature of spiritual experience, but in certain outward circumst
1 Sat. Vol. I-191. 2 Gomma. Ji. 63, 64. 3 Bhāvanā viveka. 234. 4 Ibid. 234. 5 (i) Pañcakalyāṇadhāri. (ii) Tinakalyāṇadhāri. (iii) Dokalyāṇadhāri.
These three are the types of Tirthamkaras. (iv) Sāmānyakevali. (v) Sātiếaya-kevali. (vi) Upasargakevali. (vii) Antakřtkevali.
These four are ordinary omniscient souls or non-Tirthamkaras. 6 Bhāvanāviveka. 237 to 246.

Page #221

VI. MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
199
ances. All these forms of Arahantas may be comprised under the two categories of Tirthamkara and non-Tīrthamkara or ordinary omniscient soul. The distinction between the two is this that the former is capable of preaching and propagating religious doctrines in order to guide the mundane souls immersed in the life of illusion, and his sermons are properly worded by the Gañadharas; while the latter is not the propounder of religious faith or principles, but silently enjoys simply the sublimity of mystical experience. These two tendencies of the perfected mystics or Arahantas may be compared with the "activistic" and "quietistic" tendencies of the mystics. Thus the word Arahanta should be primarily esteemed as referring to the Tīrthamkara and only secondarily to the ordinary omniscient souls.3 In view of this whenever we have used the word 'Arahanta' and whenever we shall use it, we have meant and would mean thereby the Tīrthamkara. It is only the privilege and prerogative of those rare souls to have the designation of Tīrthamkara Arahanta, who in the past or the present life have accumulated in themselves the potency of revealing truth by the performance of virtuous activities resulting from their dedication to the sixteen kinds of reflections. According to the Jaina dogma the number of Arhats in each cycle of time is limited, i.e., twentyfour. The attainment of Siddhahood without passing through the stage of Arhatship in the sense of Tīrthamkaraship has been conceived to be a possibility.
CONCEPT OF GOD: Arahanta is the ideal saint, the supreme Guru, and the divinity-realised soul; hence he may be designated as Paramāt'man or God. Siddha has also been called God. But "neither Arhat nor Siddha has on him the responsibility of creating, supporting and destroying the world. The aspirant receives no boons, no favours, and no curses from him by way of gifts from the divinity. The aspiring souls pray to him, worship him and meditate on him as an example, as a model, as an ideal that they too might reach the same condition". But it should not be forgotten that unified, singleminded devotion to Arahantas or Siddhas accumulates in the self the Punya of the highest kind, which, as a natural consequence, brings about material and spiritual benefits. Samantabhadra observes that the adoration of Arahanta deposits great heap of
1 Bhāvanāviveka. 237. 2 RANADE: Mysticism in Maharashtra, Preface, p. 28. 3 Mokşamārgaprakāšaka. p. 6.
Sarvärtha. VI. 24. We have already dealt with these in this chapter, 5 Pp. Intro. Upadhye. p. 36. 6 Pp. Intro. Upadhye. p. 36.

Page #222

200
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
Punya.1 He who is devoted to him relishes prosperity, and he who casts aspersions sinks to perdition; in both these Arahanta is astonishingly indifferent.2 The aspirant, therefore, should not breathe in despondency for the aloofness of God. (Arahanta & Siddha). Those who are devoted to him are automatically elevated. The ultimate responsibility of emancipating oneself from the turmoils of the world falls upon one's own un- · divided efforts, upon the integral consecration of energies to the attainment of divine life. Thus every soul has the right to become Paramātman, who has been conceived to be the consummate realisation of the divine potentialities.
CHARACTERISTICS OF ARAHANTA OR THE EFFECTS OF TRANSCENDENTAL LIFE: We shall now dwell upon the characteristics of Arahantas, the effects of transcendental life, the effects which the realisation of Paramāt. man produces upon the perfected mystic. The Acārānga tells us that the Arahanta is established in truth in all directions. He is Ātmasamāhita. He has freed himself from anger, pride, deceit, greed, attachment, hatred, delusion, birth, death, hell, animal existence and pain. Arahantas lead a life of supermoralism but not of a-moralism. It is inconceivable that saint who has attained supremacy on account of the realisation of perfect Ahimsā may in the least pursue an ignoble life of Himsā, a life of vice. He is no doubt beyond the category of virtue and vice, good and evil, Punya and Pāpa, auspicious and inauspicious psychical states, yet he may be pronounced to be the most virtuous soul, though the pursuit of virtuous life is incapable of binding him to the cycle of life and death.3 Technically speaking, Sātāvedanīya Karma in the absence of deluding Karma cannot sow the seeds of mundane career. Samantabhadra ascribes inconceivability to the mental, vocal and physical actions of Arhat, since they are neither impelled by desire nor born of ignorance. Whatever issues from him is potent enough to abrogate the miseries of tormented humanity. Hundreds of souls get spiritually converted by his mere sight, forsaking their sceptical and perverted attitude towards life. His presence is supremely enlightening. Even his body causes amazement to Indra in spite of his beholding that with thousand eyes. As he has transcended human nature and is revered and worshipped even by celestial beings, he is supreme God.' Thus he is the embodiment of mystical virtues,
1 Svayambhū. 58. 4 Svayambhū. 74.
2 Ibid. 69. 5 Ibid. 89.
3 Jñānā. LXII. 33. Ibid. 75.

Page #223

VI. MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
201
and is the spiritual leader of society. He is beyond attachment, aversion and infatuation, and consequently he is absolutely dispassionate.2 By virtue of his intuitively apprehending the nature of reality, as also the implications of the sacred text, all his doubts have been resolved. The perfected mystic has been able to adorn himself with self-control, since he has abandoned all Himsā and has resisted the temptations of senses and mind. He has also subdued anger, lust, greed etc., by performing the internal and external austerities. In mystical language we may say that with the emergence of the Atmanic experience and steadfastness in it, the conquest over the mind, the senses, and the passions becomes natural to him, i.e., a thing flowing from his intrinsic nature. By virtue of his selfrealisation, and of having achieved sublime concentration and owing to his simultaneous establishment in the triune path of right belief, right knowledge and right conduct, he has transcended the dualities of friends and enemies, pleasure and pain, praise and censure, life and death, sand and gold.5. And yet in spite of this transcendence, he embraces reconcilable contradictions; he is self-established yet all pervading, is knowing all things yet detached, is associated with great longevity, yet devoid of senility. The transcendent mystic has manifested pure consciousness, destroyed the destructive Karmas, and attained supersensuous knowledge, infinite potency and unique resplendence. As a consequence of which all his desires for bodily pleasures and pains vanish immediately. The infinite life of the mystic has rendered possible the emergence of omniscience which possesses the potency of completely, simultaneously and intuitively or unassistedly1o apprehending all the substances along with their present and absent modificationsll in contradistinction to the limited life of sensuous knowledge which cognises substances incompletely, successively and intellectually or assistedly,12 In view of the fact of
1 Svayambhů. 35. 2 Prava. I-14 and Comm. Amrta. 3 Prava. I-14, II-105. 4 Prava. Comm. Ampta. I-14.. 5 Prava. I. 14, III-41, 42. 6 Vişāpahāra Stotra, 1. 7 That is called supersensuous knowledge which knows any substance, with or without space points, with or without form and those modifications which have not come
into existence and those which are destroyed. (Prava. 1-41, Trans. Upadhye. p. 6). 8 Prava. I-15, 19. Ibid. I. 20. 10 Unassistedly:-Without the help of senses light, and mind. (Sat. Vol. 1-9. p. 191). 11 Absent modifications:-Those which have never originated and those in fact that
have been and are already destroyed are the absent modifications (Prava. I-38, Upadhye. p. 5) 12 Prava. I-21, 51. Prava. 1-40, 50.

Page #224

202
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
possessing omniscience, it will not be contradictory to say that the omniscient being is all-pervading, and that all the objects are within him, since Arahanta is the embodiment of knowledge and all the objects are the object of knowledge. The omniscient being neither accepts nor abandons, nor transforms the external objectivity, but only witnesses and apprehends the world of objects without entering into them, just as the eyes see the objects of sight.3 Yogīndu, in a similar vein, proclaims that the universe resides in the Paramātman, and he resides in the universe, but he is not the universe. The pure soul, according to him, is all-pervading in the sense that when delivered from the Karmas he comprehends, by his omniscience, physical and superphysical worlds. The knowledge which is independent, perfect, immaculate, intuitive and extended to infinite things of the universe, may be identified with bliss on account of the absence of discomposure arising from the knowledge which is dependent, imperfect. maculate, mediate and extended to limited things. In other words, the consciousness of the perfected mystic is not only omnipotent and intuitive but also blissful. Bliss is naturally consequent upon the destruction of the undesirable and accomplishment of the desirable The consummate mystic experiences unprecedented bliss, which originates from the innermost being of self, and which is supersensuous, unique, infinite, and interminable.? A legitimate question is apt to be asked; what does the culminant mystic who has swept away the dense destructive karmas, who intuits all the entities who does not allow even an infinitisimal fragment of the objects to escape his all-comprehensive knowledge, and who is free from doubts, meditate upon ? This may be replied by saying that the consummate Ātman who is supersensuous, bereft of senses, free from all hindrances, permeated by knowledge and happiness, meditates upon the happiness supreme. According to Kundakunda he is the real contemplator of the Atman who, after removing the filth of delusion, overthrowing attachment and aversion, detaching himself from the objects of pleasure, restraining his mind, and attaining indifference to pleasure and pain, is established in the intrinsic nature of the Atman; he thus attains inexhaustible bliss. 10 The perfected mystic is the exemplary illustration of this sort of living. Thus the mystical or spiritual consciousness is intuitive, blissful and all-powerful. We may conclude by
1 Prava. I-26. 2 Ibid. 1-32. 3 Ibid. 1-29. 4 Pp-1-41. 5 Ibid. 52. 6 Prava. I-59 and Comm. Amfta. 7 Prava. I. 13. 8 Prava. II-105. Ibid. 106. 10 Prava. II. 103, 104.

Page #225

VI. MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
203
saying that the cognitive, conative and affective tendencies of the perfected mystic reveal their original manifestation in his supreme mystical experience, which is ineffable and transcends all the similies of the world.1
ARAHANTA AS THE CATEGORY OF 'HOLY': The element of ineffability indicates that the essence of Arhat cannot be completely exhausted in conceptual and rational terms. It points the luminous aspect of Arhat which transcends or eludes comprehension in rational or ethical terms. We may in other words say that the Arhat is the 'wholly other'.3 By this, "that aspect of Deity, the mysterious overplus surpassing all that can be clearly understood and appraised, is asserted emphatically against any excessive anthropocentric tendency to scale down the sacred and Holy to the measure of our human reason." It is on account of this element that the mind resorts to purely negative expressions. Though the expressions are negative, what they point out is something positive, which can only be within the reach of a direct and living experience. Thus the glory of spiritual life is inexplicable and beyond the reach of the Vedas, the Šāstras and the senses, and can only be experienced through pure meditation or contemplation. "In eternal divinity, there is no devotional control of breath, no object of meditation, no mystical diagram, no miraculous spell, and no charmed circle. It will not be inconsistent if it is averred that the category of Arhat is the category of the holy, a category of interpretation and valuation." In other words, in the religious consciousness of the transcendent mystic there is "intimate interpenetration of the non-rational with the rational elements like the interweaving of warp and woof," ineffability being the non-rational element and the evaporation of bodily urges, the emergence of omniscience, obtainment of infinite power, abolition of all fear, enjoyment of illimitable joy, resolution of all doubts, consummation of virtues etc., being the rational elements.
SAMUDGHĀTA IN SAYOGA KEVALĪ GUŅASTHĀNA: The acme of the ladder, the fourteenth stage of absolute motionlessness, the Ayoga Kevalī Gunasthāna is arrived at when the perfected mystic gets over the vibratory activities of body and speech by resorting to the two types of Sukla Dhyāna when the small duration of longevity-determining Karma remains. Though the self has annulled the four Ghāti Karmas, yet the four Aghāti Karmas, namely, feeling-producing (vedanīya), Longevity deter
1 Jñānā. LXII. 76, 77, 78. 2 Idea of the Holy. pp. 5-7. 3 Idea of the Holy. p. 25. 4 Idea of the Holy, Preface. XVIII. Pp. 23. Pp. Intro. Upadhye. 10.

Page #226

204
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
mining (āyus), body-making (nāma) and the status determining (gotra), exist and function in the structure of the self. When the duration of three Karmas lacks equality with the duration of Ayu Karman, and an Antarmuhūrta remains for the soul to attain disembodied liberation, a certain process of equalization technically known as Samudghāta, takes place in the omniscient being. The term Samudghāta implies the emanation of the Pradeśas of the soul along with Karmic and electric bodies from the gross body without leaving it. Now, the self before taking recourse to the stoppage of vibrational activities undergoes the process of Samudghāta in the thirteenth Gunasthāna for accommodating other three Karmas to Ayuhkarman.
When the equalisation process has come to an end, the omniscient soul in the thirteenth Gunasthāna turns to the cessation of vibrational activities, and just after doing this he enters the fourteenth stage of spiritual evolution called Ayoga Kavalī Gunasthāna where the soul stays for the time required for pronouncing five syllables-a, i, u, ļ, Ir. After this the disembodied liberation results. In this Gunasthāna the Ātman has crowned himself with a great number of mystical virtues, has attained steadiness like the Meru mountain, has stopped the influx of all sorts of Karmic particles, and has become devoid of Yogas4 (activities of body, mind and speech).
SIDDHA STATE OR TRANSCENDENTAL LIFE PAR-EXCELLENCE: This stage is immediately followed by final emancipation, which is the same as disembodied liberation, the last consummation of the spirit, the attainment of Siddhahood, transcendental life par-excellence, and the state of Videha Mukti. This state of self is beyond Gunasthānas. Just after the termination of the last stage of spiritual evolution, the soul in one instant goes to the end of the Loka, since beyond that there is no medium of motion in the Aloka. The upward motion of the self is on account of the fourfold reasons. First, it is due to the persistence of the effects of previous strenuous endeavours for disenthralment, just as the wheel of the potter continues to move even when the force of hand is removed. Secondly, it is on account of the fact of freedom from the Karmic weight, just as there
1 Labdhi. 616. Jñānā. LXII-43. 2 Gomma. Ji. 667. The Jaina recognises the five types of bodies. 1. Audārika-Sarira-(Gross body). 2. Vaikriyika (Transformable body). 3. Ahāraka (Projectable) 4. Taijasa (Electric). 5. Kārmana (Karmic).
Sarvärtha. II. 36. 3 Jñānā. LXII-59. 4 Gomma. Ji. 65. Sat. Vol. I-199. 5 Niyama. 175, 183. 6 Sarvartha. X. 6, 7.

Page #227

VI. MYSTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAINA ETHICS
205
is the upward motion of the Tumadī in water after the dissolution of the burden of clay. Thirdly, it results owing to the destruction of all Karmas, just as there is the upward movement of castor-seed after the bondage of cover is removed. Lastly, it is due to its intrinsic nature which manifests owing to the absence of the aberrant power of Karmas like the upward direction of the lamp flame in the absence of the deflecting wind. In other words, the original dwelling place of the Ātman is the top of the Loka; and it is only due to the Karmic encumbrance that the Ātman has been forced to bear the mundane form; and when he has attained supreme consciousness of his inherent nature, he is quite consistent in resorting to his actual habitation. .
CHARACTERISTICS OF SIDDHA STATE: The Siddha state transcends the realm of cause and effect, inasmuch as the Dravya and Bhāva Karmas and the consequential four types of transmigratory existence have ceased to exist. The category of causality is applicable only to mundane souls and not to the Siddha who is an unconditioned being. Kundakunda announces that the Siddha is neither the product of anything nor produces anything, hence neither effect nor cause. According to the Şatkhandāgama he who has destroyed all the Karmas, who is independent of external objects, who has attained infinite, unique, intrinsic and unalloyed bliss, who is not attached to anything, who has achieved steady nature, who is devoid of all sorts of mal-characteristics, who is the receptacle of all virtues, and who has made the top of the universe his permanent abode, is Siddha.2 The acquisition of Siddhahood is indistinguishable from the accomplishment of Nirvāṇa, where, negatively speaking, there is neither pain, nor pleasure, nor any Karmas nor auspicious and inauspicious Dhyānas, nor anything such as annoyance, obstruction, death, birth, senses, calamity, delusion, wonder, sleep, desire and hunger and, where, positively speaking, there is perfect intuition, knowledge, bliss, potency, immateriality and existence. The Acārānga pronounces: "All sounds recoil thence where speculation has no room, nor does the mind penetrate there." "The liberated is without body, without resurrection, without contact of matter; he is not feminine, nor masculine, nor neuter; he perceives, he knows, but there is no analogy; its essence is without form; there is no condition of the unconditioned. This state of
3 Niyama. 183.
Niyama. 178 to 181.
1 Panca. 36. 2 Sat. Vol. I. p. 200. 5 Acūra. 1-5-6-3-4 (p. 52).

Page #228

206
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
self is the termination of mystic's journey. It is the final destination for which the self was all along struggling. In other words, the history of the Siddha state of self is the history of his mystical trials and tribulations in his march from bondage to freedom. Also, it is the history of the triumphant conclusion of his moral and spiritual exertions.
CHAPTER VII
The Jaina and the non-Jaina Indian Ethical Doctrines
SUMMARY OF THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER: In our previous discussion of the 'Mystical Significance of Jaina Ethics', we have pointed out how the human self emerging from the cave of passions rests in the abode of transcendental consciousness. The Bahirātman accepts every thing as his own, the Antarātman negates all, but the Paramātman neither accepts nor negates but transcends these dualities of acceptance and negation. In the first place, the Jaina conception of mysticism and its relation to metaphysics have been explained. Secondly, the plight of the self steeped in ignorance and the nature and process of emergence of spiritual conversion as distinguished from the ethical and the intellectual conversion have been expounded. Thirdly, we have shown the necessity of purgation and moral preparation with proper emphasis on Svādhyāya and devotion. Fourthly, the conception of illumination, and the possibility of the two types of fall, first, from spiritual conversion and, secondly, from illumination have been dealt with. And, fifthly, the characteristics of transcendental life in the form of embodied and disembodied libera. tion have been portrayed. To sum up, we have delineated all the above States of the self under the fourteen stages of spiritual evolution along with the Siddha state which transcends these stages.
In Indian soil we find the growth of different solutions for the ontological, ethical and religious problems. The Vedic, the Jaina, the Buddhist and the materialistic (Cārvāka) speculations illustrate the enormous divergence of thought current in the domain of philosophy The term "Vedic' needs elucidation. It includes two-fold philosophic literature. First, it comprehends within its sweep the Vedas, the Brāhmaņas, the Upanişads, the Bhagavad-Gītā, the Brahmasūtra along with

Page #229

VII. THE JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES
207
its various interpretations, and the Pūrva-Mīmāmsă. Secondly, the systems like Nyāya-Vaiseșika, Sāmkhya-Yoga which do not challenge the authority of the Vedas are also comprised under its extent. Notwithstanding the differences in metaphysical conclusions arrived at by the various trends of thought, their exponents, confronted with the same sort of transitoriness of things of the world, have resorted to similar methods and contrivances in order to go beyond the manifest superficialities of objects. It is astonishing that they concur remarkably with one another on the psychological, ethical and religious planes of existence. In the present chapter we propose to confine ourselves to the study of the ethical considerations as found in the Rg-Veda, the Brāhmaṇas, the Upanişads, the Bhagvad-Gītā, the Vedānta of Samkara, the PūrvaMīmāṁsā, the Nyāya-Vaiseșika, the Sāņkhya-Yoga and early Buddhism. We set aside the Cārvāka Materialism because it adheres only to the sensuous outlook and smothers all the consciousness of deeper meaning in life. It refuses to rise above the hedonistic level of thinking and living. Naturally, all the systems of Indian philosophy including Jainism depreciate such an unwholesome and superficial perspective.
Before proceeding to the comparative study of the ethical ideal recognised by the various currents of thought, we shall deal with the attitude of the Rg-Veda and the Brāhmaṇas towards the moral issues, inasmuch as they isolate themselves notably from the later developments in the province of philosophy. Besides, we shall trace, in a very brief way, the relation of the Upanişads to the Rg-Veda and the Brāhmaṇas which will enable us to witness a tremendous change in the attitude of the Upanisadic seers, and the advance of the Upanişads on the Rg-Veda and the Brāhmaṇas.
ETHICS OF THE RG-VEDA AND THE BRĀHMAŅAS: The conception of Rta in the Rg-Veda furnishes us with the standard of morality. “It is the Satya or the truth of the things. Disorder or An-ệta is falsehood, the opposition of truth.2 The goal of conduct is held out as prosperity.3 "Right conduct according with one's conscience and understanding seems to be stressed as an independent value." "Malign intention,
1 Outline of Indian Philosophy, p. 194). 2 Rg-Veda, VII-56. 12; IX-115. 4; 11-6. 10; IV-5.5; VIII-6. 2; 12; VII-47. 3. vide
Radhakrishnan: Indian Philosophy, Vol. I. p. 110. 3 Rg-Veda, I-189. 1; VIII-97. 13, vide History of philosophy Eastern & Western, p. 46. * Rg-Veda, X-31. 2. vide Ibid.

Page #230

208
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
swearing, falsehood, imprecation, calumniation, back-biting, dishonesty, sorcery, gambling, debt, egoistic enjoyment, wantonness or adultery, theft and any injury to life are sins, while honesty, rectitude, fellowfeeling, charity, non-violence, truthfulness, salutary and agreeable speech, continence and control of senses, reverential faith and austerity are virtues highly extolled” The five-fold duties of man towards gods. seers, manes, men, and lower creation have been recognised, in the Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa.2
EVALUATION OF THE UPANIŞADIC CONTENTS: After stating briefly the ethical virtues as propounded by the Rg-Veda and the Brāhmanas, we now turn to the evaluation of the Upanisadic contents in the light of the Vedic hymns and the Brāhmaṇas. The transition from the Rg-Vedic hymns to the Upanişads indicates the displacement of the objective side of religion by the subjective one. There is exhibited a transplantation of interest from God to self, from the extrinsic to the intrinsic aspect of life. In the hymns of the Rg-Veda the personified forces of nature engage our attention, but on the contrary in the Upanişads, the exploration of the depths of the soul of man occupies the energies of the seers. The Katha Upanişad recognises that the wise man striving for immortality turns his eyes inward and peeps into the self within.3 This sort of penetration into the profundities of human self banishes the offering of prayers to gods and goddesses for material prosperity, and results into the recognition of the consubstantiality of the spirit in man and the great cosmic power. Brahman which is the ultimate cosmic principle or the source of the whole universe has been identified with the deepest self in each man's heart." It may be pointed out that the identification of Brahman and Ātman pre-eminently pertain to the Upanişadic age. It is here that the cosmological and theological approaches to the problem of ultimate reality were subordinated to the psychological approach. The subservience of world and God to self is specifically Upanişadic. In the words of Professor RANADE, “As we pass from the Vedas to the Upanişads we pass from prayer to philosophy, from hymnology to reflection, from henotheistic polytheism to monotheistic mysticism”.5 As regards the relation of the Upanişads to the Brāhmāṇas, the former represents a sharp antagonism to the rituals and sacrifices as embodied in the latter. The Mundaka
1 History of Philosophy, Eastern & Western, pp. 45-46. 2 Indian Philosophy, vol. I. p. 131. 3 Ka. Up. II-1-1 4 Cha. Up. III-14-4; III-13-7. 5 Constructive Survey of Upanigadic Philosophy, p. 3.

Page #231

VII. THE JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES
209
Upanişad decries the ceremonialism of the Brāhmaṇas by pronouncing that those who hail the sacrifices as the highest good are snared in the meshes of death and decrepitude. But the Brāhmanical idea of sacrifice was modified in the times of the Upanişads which gave rise to a new conception of mental sacrifice.
VARIOUS EXPRESSIONS OF THE MORAL IDEAL: We now proceed to dwell upon the nature of the moral ideal as advocated by the Gitā and the Upanișadic thinkers. They have envisaged and brought it out in manifold ways, which signify simply the diversity of expression and not distinctness of the essential meaning conveyed by them.
First, of the two diverse paths that are open to man, the wise one after distinguishing them properly chooses the path of good in preference to the path of pleasure, by virtue of which the true aim of life is realised. On the contrary, the fool hankering after the path of pleasure is defeated in attaining to real beneficence. The mundane path which many men follow must be distinguished from the supermundane one which relieves man from the transitoriness of worldly objects, and from sorrows and sufferings. In Jaina terminology the path of right belief, right knowledge and right conduct is traversed by the prudent souls, while that of wrong belief, wrong knowledge and wrong conduct is traversed by the ignorant. The former emancipates man from terrestrial curses in contradistinction to the latter which entangles him in the mire of distressing and insatiable sensual desires. According to the Chāndogya Upanişads the forest ascetics adorned with knowledge and faith tread the path of the gods (Devayāna) which consequentially leads to the attainment of the Brahman or deliverance in contrast to the householders who are busy performing sacrifices and who therefore go by the path of fathers (Pitryāna) to be born again in this world. Exactly in the same fashion the Gītā4 also recognizes the two paths, namely the bright and the dark; the former is suggestive of emancipation and the latter, of rebirth. The bright Gati amounts to the termination of transmigration, while the dark Gati, to the wanderings into the wheel of birth and death. Jainism speaks of Siddha Gati and the four Gatis (celestial, human, sub-human and hellish). The former is permanent and immutable, and
1 Mu. Up. 1-2-7.
2 Ka. Up. I-2-1, 2. 3 Chā. Up. V-10-1, 3, 5. 4 B. G. VIII-26. 5 Samaya-1; Gomma. Ii. 145, 151.

Page #232

210
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
it implies the complete cessation of transmigratory existence. The latter indicate the rounds of birth and death in the empirical world.
Secondly, the realisation of Parāgati, the deliverance of one from the mouth of death2 is tantamount to experiencing that Brahman or Ātman which is the dearest of all, the target to be aimed at, the only desirables, singularly discernible, preferentially knowable, is the resting abode of all that is conceivable and perceivable. As viewed by the Gitā, the attainment of Anāmayam padam8 (status beyond misery), Brāhmi Sthitio (divine state), Brahmanirvāṇało (beatitude of God) Parām Gatimi (highest goal), Parām Sāntim12 (supreme tranquillity) Parām Siddhim13 (highest perfection) and the like has been conceived to be the transcendental aim. According to the Kathopanişad, the Brahman or the Parama Puruşa is the highest goal of the aspirant's journey, which, after being known by the mortal man, releases immortality, transcends the senses, the objects of senses, the mind, the intellect, the great self, and the unmanifest.14 The same may be expressed by saying that the senses need be merged into mind, mind into the Jñāna-Ātman, Jñāna-Ātman into Mahat-Ātman and lastly, Mahat-Ātman into Sānta-Ātman 15. Thus Sānta-Ātman which is equivalent to Parama-Purusa or Brahman or Ātman is the terminus of all our endeavours. The Sānta-Ātman or Brahman is bereft of sound, touch, colour, taste, smell, is eternal, indestructible, infinite, Mahat, and higher than stable. 16 According to Jainism also, Paramātman or Brahman is the highest object to be pursued. The aspirant should enquire into, long for, and strive after the eternal light of knowledge which is subversive of ignorance.17 The nature of Paramātman according to the Jainas and Upanisadic thinkers is similar to a great extent. Paramātman is eternal, without any flaw, is devoid of colour, smell, sound, taste, touch, is without birth, death18 etc. The Bhāvapāhuda tells us that the supreme self is devoid of taste, colour, smell, touch and sound; it is characterised by consciousness, not assignable by any mark and lastly indefinable as regards form.19 Notwithstanding a very close similarity in the characteristic nature of Paramātman the
1 Ka. Up. 1-3-11. 2 Ibid. 1-3-15. 3 Br. Up. 1-4-8. 4 Mu. Up. II-2-2. 5 Sve. Up. l-1-12. 6 Chā. Up. VIII-7-1. 7 Pra. Up-IV-7, 8, 9. 8 B. G II-51. 9 Ibid. II-72. 10 Ibid. V-25. 11 Ibid. VI. 45; IX-32. 12 Ibid IV. 39. 13 Ibid. XIV. 1. 14 Ka. Up. I. 3-10-11; II. 3. 7, 8. 15 Ibid. I. 3. 13 16 Ibid-1. 3. 15. 17 Istopa. 49. 18 Pp. I. 17, 19. 19 Bhāva. Pā. 64. cf. Prava. II. 80; Pancā. 127.

Page #233

VII. THE JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES
211
difference is also striking and cannot be ignored. It is already pointed out that, on account of the metaphysical perspective adopted in Jainism, Brahman cannot be the cosmic principle. In view of the metaphysical pluralism of souls advocated by Jainism each soul is potentially Brahman or Paramātman.
Thirdly, the attainment of bliss is the objective to be aimed at. Brahman is the delight of life and mind, the fullness of peace and eternity'. The Taittiriyopanişad compares Brahmanic bliss with other types of physical blisses and after enumerating a number of blisses enjoyed by men, gods etc., concludes that hundred blisses of Prajāpati constitute the bliss of Brahman. Such an Ananda is experienced by the sage who is free from all desires2. It may be pointed out here that the spiritual bliss is a type of its own and no physical bliss can stand comparison with it. Kundakunda recognises that the highest happiness is beyond any Upamā.3 Yogindu affirms that the attainment of highest bliss which is experienced in realising Paramātman in course of meditation is impossible to be had in the mundane life. Even Indra in the company of crores of nymphs is incapable of having such an infinite bliss of the sage in contemplation. In order to emphasize the blissful aspect of life, the Taittirīyopanişads proclaims it in terms of the five sheaths of the soul, the last being the Anandamaya Ātman which includes the other four and transcends them. The first sheath of Ātman is constituted of food essence, the second of vital air, the third of mind, the fourth of intelligence, and the fifth of bliss. The subsequent sheaths include the precedent ones and the last embraces all the four. In the third chapter of the Taittirīyopanişad Varuņa is said as not to have been satisfied with the different answers as food, vital air, mind, intellect, given in succession by Bhrgu to the question of the nature of ultimate reality. He seems to be convinced when eventually he presents the result of his enquiry in terms of 'beatific consciousness' constituting the source of all things whatsoever. “We have different kinds of pleasures answering to the different levels of our existence, the vital pleasure, the sensuous, the mental and the intellectual, but the highest is Ananda”.? With certain reservations we may regard Bahirātman of Jainism as comprising Annarasamaya, Prāṇamaya, Manonaya Atmans; Antarātman may be regarded as Vijñānamaya Atman and
1 Tai. Up. 1-6.2 Ibid. II-8. 3 Prava. I-13. 4 Pp. I-116, 117. Tattvānusâsana. 246. 5 Tai. Up. Il-1 to 5. Constructive Survey of Upanišadic Philosophy. p. 301. 7 Indian Philosophy, Vol. I. p. 208.

Page #234

212
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
Paramātman as Anandamaya Ātman, or the beatific consciousness, though not cosmic consciousness. According to the Gitāl also, the attainment of bliss is the supreme end, the absolute value. The Yogin whose mind is thoroughly quiet, who is passionless, stainless, constantly putting himself into the Ātman, experiences easily and happily the highest bliss of contact with the Brahman. Pūjyapāda2 and all others speak of the Ātman as full of excellent bliss. In the Istopadesa he tells us that a supreme kind of happiness is experienced by the Yogi who is established in his own self. The Yogasära of Yogīndu recognises that those engrossed in great meditation after renouncing all conceptual thinking enjoy ineffable bliss which is equivalent to the happiness of liberation. The author of the Chāndogya Upanişad also lays stress on the pursuance of immortal happiness which consists in seeing, hearing and meditating upon the Ātman to the utter exclusion of the radically different kinds of perishable happiness experienced in seeking things beside the Ātman.5 The experience of great happiness is consequent upon the realisation of the Ātman as above and below, before and behind, to the right and to the left. The author of the Tattvānusāsana proclaims that on account of looking into the self by the self, and on account of the supreme concentration, nothing is seen by the Yogi in spite of the existence of External objects.? According to Pūjyapāda, the Yogi engrossed in meditation transcends the bodily consciousness. Thus the Gitā, the Upanisadic and the Jaina saints exhibit a remarkable concurrence regarding infinite happiness as the only object of pursuit, but the Jaina does not acquiesce in making all other objects of the world as dependent on or identical with the Ātman.
Fourthly, the Mundakopanişad distinguishes between the Pară and Aparā Vidyās and seems to decide in favour of the former as constituting the ethical Summum Bonum, by the realisation of which all else becomes known. The Parā-Vidyā which is the same as the higher knowledge consists in knowing the Brahman which is invisible, unseizable, without connections, without hue, without eye or ear, without hands, or feet, eternal, pervading, impalpable, imperishable, and the womb of creatures.10 This does not amount to the intellectual, but to the intuitional appre.
I B.G. VI. 27, 28. 2 Samādhi. 32. 3 Istopa. 47. 4 Yogasāra. 97. Tattvānusāsana. 170.
5 Cha. Up. VII-22, 23, 24. 6 Ibid. VII-25. 2. Tattvānusāsana. 172. 8 stopa 42. 9 Mu. Up. I. 1.3, 4 & Comm. of Samkara. 10 Ibid. I. 1-5, 6.

Page #235

VIF. THE JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES
213
hension of Brahman. The Aparā Vidyā which may be equated with the lower knowledge comprises within its fold the Rg-Veda, the Yajur-Veda, the Sāma-Veda and the Atharva-Veda, also chanting, ritual, grammar, etymological interpretation, prosody and astronomy. The above recognition of Parā-Vidyā as the highest good may be corroborated by the conversation between Nārada and Sanatkumāra as given in the Chandogya Upanişad.2 Nārada in spite of his vast study comprehending the Vedas, history, mythology, mathematics, logic, ethics, fine arts etc., complains to his spiritual teacher Sanatkumāra that he is invaded by grief on account of not having the knowledge of the self. Thus we learn that the intuitive knowledge of the self alone is capable of making us able to cross the ocean of sorrow and no amount of mere intellectual equipment. Hence the Parā-Vidyā is the crowning experience, the sublime good. It may be pointed out here that intellectual knowledge should not be utterly depreciated on this account, nor should it be overemphasized as the expense of intuition. When the highest is reached the intellectual it displaced by the intuitional. We find striking concordance when Kundakunda announces that 'Suddhanaya is true and Vyavahāra-naya is false'.3 Paramārtha-naya and Niscaya-naya are indistinguishable from Suddhanaya. Suddhanaya is identical with the intuitional experience of the Atman. Vyavahāra-naya creates differentiations in the unitary nature of the Ātman by explaining it through its distinguishing characteristics. Those who have ascended the loftiest heights of mystical experience deserve the knowledge of Suddhanaya, but those of the aspirants who fall short of this sublime ascension should take shelter under Vyavahāranaya without losing sight of the ideal4 Thus the Aparā Vidyā or the Vyavahāra-naya is true to the extent to which it leads a man intellectually on the path, but it is not all. “Just as every house-holder submits himself to Samnyása or renunciation and realizes his spiritual aim, so ultimately Vyavahāra is discarded in favour of Niscaya." There is witnessed another meaning ascribed to Niscaya and Vyavahāra. The former indicates that the self is unbound and untouched by Karmas, while the latter indicates that it is bound and touched by Karmas. The spiritual experience however transcends these intellectual points of view.? . In a similar vein, Amstacandra argues that the proper results of instruction to a disciple 1 Mu. Up. I. 1.5. 2 Chā. Up. VII. 1, 2, 3.
3 Samaya. 11. 4 Ibid. 12.
5 Paramātma Prakāśa, Intro. p. 30. Samaya. 141. 7 Ibid. 142.

Page #236

214
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
can only issue if he, after assimilating the nature of Niscaya-naya and Vyavahāra-naya, adopts the attitude of indifference towards both of these, i.e., if he transcends these intellectual points of view. Thus according to this interpretation the Aparā Vidyā corresponds to these points of view, and the Parā Vidyā, to spiritual experience. In other words, Niscaya-naya may be understood to mean mystical experience as well as the knowledge of the pure self, or both the intuitional and intellectual ideals, and Vyavahāra-naya may be understood to mean a lapse from the superb heights as well as the knowledge of the impure self. Considered from the view-point of spiritual experience or the knowledge of the pure self, Vyavahār-naya includes a lapse from superb heights and the knowledge of the impure self. In the present context of Parā Vidyā and Aparā Vidyā, Suddhanaya in the sense of intuitional experience represents the former, and Vyavahāra-naya in point of inte llectual knowledge of any sort expresses the latter. Hence the ParaVidyā or Suddhanaya may be legitimately said to denote the moral ideal in contrast to the Aparā Vidyā or Vyavahāra-naya.
Fifthly, the consummation of human pursuits has been conceived to be the attainment of a state of life beyond good and bad, virtue and vice. The Mundakopanişad represents that he who has realised the Brahman, the lord and governor of all, has shaken off merit and demerit, and has attained perfect equanimity. In a similar vein, the Kathopanişad points out that Paramātman is beyond duty and non-duty, action and nonaction, past and future. According to the Gitā, the attainment of supreme status exceeds the fruits of meritorious deeds resulting from the study of the Vedas, the performance of sacrifices, pursuance of austerities, and charitable gifts. Again, the realisation of Brahman will liberate one from good and evil results which constitute the bonds of action. This spirit of transcendence is also expressed in the Gitā in another form. When the embodied soul rises above the three Gunas, (sattva, rajas and tamas) which cause the bodily existence, he is freed from the subjection to birth and death, old age and suffering, and thus attains the life eternal. Thus to go beyond the spell of the three Guņas is the ideal. In other words, one is required to be possessed of the self, to be free from the dualities, to be fixed in the true being, to be away from the triple modes,
1 Puru. 8. 4 B. G. VIII. 28.
2 Mu. Up. III. 1. 3. 5 Ibid. IX. 28; II. 50.
3 Ka. Up. I. 2. 14. Ibid. XIV. 20.

Page #237

. VII. THE JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES
215
and gettings and havings, inasmuch as the bondage to these Guņas leads one to the round of births. To be more clear, when the Sattva predominates, the embodied one is born in the spotless worlds of the knowers of the highest principles, when Rajas prevails he appears amidst those who are attached to action, and lastly, when Tamas invades him, he takes births in the wombs of beings involved in nescience.2 The same may be expressed by saying that those in Sattva rise upwards, in Rajas stay in the middle and in Tamas sink downwards.3 Thus the culmination of human achievements consists in transcending the ethical level and rising to the spiritual. The considerations of the Gitā, the Upanisad and the Jaina conform to one another regarding the transcendental plane of life beside and beyond righteousness and unrighteousness. According to Kundakunda, the worldly persons generally recognise inauspicious conduct as bad and auspicious one is taken by them as good. But how can the latter be understood as good, since it makes the entrance of the self into the cycle of birth and death ?4 Just as a shackle, whether of gold or of iron, indiscriminately ties a man, so also the auspicious and inauspicious conduct bind the self to mundane miseries. The wise shun both Subha and Aśubha. Rare are such persons as are disposed to discard even Punya as Pāpa.? Pūjyapāda tells us that vowlessness causes vice and the observance of vows engenders virtues; but deliverance is the destruction of both.8 The aspirant should adhere to vows after renouncing vowlessness and after attaining to the supreme status the former should also be abjured like the latter.' The highest state of the Paramātman transcends both good and evil; and such persons as have realised Him within themselves go beyond the vicious circle of Samsāra or the reach of good and bad.
Sixthly, the ethical ideal may be expressed in terms of action. The Isopanişad tells us that “a man should try to spend his life-span of a hundred years only in the constant performance of actions. It is thus only that he can hope not to be contaminated by actions.10” Prof. RANADE remarks, “The actions that are here implied have no further range than possibly the small circumference of 'Sacrifice', and further, the way in
1 B. G. II. 45. 2 Ibid. XIV. 14, 15. 3 Ibid. XIV. 18. 4 Samaya. 145. 5 Ibid. 146.
6 Yogasāra 72. 7 Ibid. 71. 8 Samadhi. 83,
9 Ibid. 84. 101. Up. 2 (Translation vide Constructive Survey of Upanişadic Philosophy, p. 297).
.

Page #238

216
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
which, even in the midst of a life of action, freedom from contagion with the fruit of action may be secured is not here brought out with sufficient clearness.”! According to the Bhagavad-Gītā, Karma-Yoga or the life of activism constitutes the supreme end to be aimed at. It is no doubt true that we can find passages in the Gītā where Jñāna is superior to Karma, 2 where Karma is superior to Jñāna,3 and where they are at par. But “the law of the body, the law of society and the law of the Universe? indicate and even vindicate activism.”8 The Gītā tells us that the actions should be performed after brushing aside all attachment to and the desire for, the fruit. Besides, their performance is to be effected by dint of wisdom1° and equanimity.11 We may here affirm that the performance of action in the aforementioned spirit is rendered possible only when the ideal of Karma-Yoga which is the same as Ātmanic steadfastness is accomplished. “The Nişkäma Karma is the natural accompaniment or result of a spiritually illumined life; it simply cannot exist, if egoism is not completely annihilated."12 According to Jainism the Tīrthamkara exemplifies the ideal life of activism. He performs all actions dispassionately, therefore, spontaneously. But according to Jainism all the Bhavyasouls are not capable of this life of activism; only those souls which have earned Tirthamkara body-making Karma can lead a life .of benevolent activities, while others remain engrossed in the life of contemplation which indirectly elevates human beings. Thus the life of activism, according to Jainism, cannot be the universal rule of life, though in the case of some souls it accompanies spiritual experience without being incompatible. But this does not negate Punya-engendering activities of saints for the benefit of human beings.
AVIDYĀ AS THE OBSTRUCTION: Having reviewed the various expressions of the ethical ideal as conceived by the Gitā and the Upanişads and having compared them with the deliberations of the Jaina speculators, we now propose to deal with the process of attainment of the excellent heights, as pointed out by the Gītā and the Upanisads. In the first place,
IRANADE, Ibid, p. 298. 2 B. G. IV. 33; II. 49. 3 Ibid. V. 2; V. 6. 4 Ibid-VI. 2; V. 4; V. 5. References no. 3 to 5 are based on 'The Bhagavad-Gītā as a
Philosophy of God Relalisation' pp. 194-195. 5 B. G. III. 8.
Ibid. III. 20. 7 Ibid. III. 16. 8 RANADE, 'The Bhagavadgitā-as a Philosophy of God-realisation' pp. 196-197. 9 B. G. 10 Ibid. II-50. 11 Ibid. II-48. 12 Vedānta explained. Vol. II. P. 527.

Page #239

VII. THE JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES
217
we shall converge our attention to the obstruction which prevents a man from realising the Atman in spite of its being present in his heart.1 The Kathopanişad like the Brhadāranyakopanişad, affirms that he who sees plurality in the world despite the existence of one Brahman here, there, everywhere is continually devoured by the enemy of death.2 In other words, the ignorant man deeming himself very learned dwells in Avidyā with the consequence that he moves helplessly like blind man led by the blind.3 The I sa Upanişad announces that delusion and grief and repulsion are foreign to a man who sees everywhere the Atman in all beings and all beings in the Atman.4 Thus the perverted outlook which is born of Avidyā obliges us to perceive plurality. According to the BhagavadGitā the three modes born of Prakrti bind the imperishable dweller in the body; and so the whole world, being deluded by these threefold Guņas or dualities of desire and hatred, does not recognise the immutable above them. To explain further, the Sattva Guņa enslaves one by producing attachment to happiness and knowledge; the Rajas, by attach
nt to action, and the Tamas, by negligence, indolence and sleep. On account of the identification of the self with these Guņas, one forgets the true nature of the spirit which transcends them, hence becomes the victim of transmigration. When the Yogi refuses to be corrupted and led away by them, he sees the self abiding in all beings and all beings in the self. Oneness remains, plurality goes away. Jainism views the identificaticn of not-self with the self as the main cause of wordly existence. Pūjyapāda points out that the essence of wisdom may be epitomised by 'saying that the self is different from matter, and that matter is different from the self.? All the rest of knowledge is but a dilation of this. Mithyātva is the root of endless transmigration. When the realisation of the transcendental self is achieved, all the objects of the world are reflected in the knowledge of the Yogi; but he does not, according to Jainism, see his own self in the objects of the world. Yogindu points out that the universe is existing in the omniscience of Paramātman and he dwells in the universe but he is not convertible into the form of the universe. The mundane things remain quite distinct from him even at the pinnacle of realisation. This distinguishes the position of the Jainas from the Upanisads and the Bhagavad-Gītā. The Jaina would not speak that the plurality is ostensible,
1 Chā. Up. VIII. 3. 3. 2 Ka. Up. II. 1. 10, 11; Br. Up. IV. 4. 19. . 3 Ka. Up. I. 2. 5.
41. Up. 6, 7. 5B.G. XIV. 5; VII. 13, 27. Ibid. XIV. 6, 7, 8. 7 latopa. 50. 8 Pp. I. 41.

Page #240

218
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
but regards plurality as ontologically certain. Only the self should refuse to be seduced by it. Thus in spite of recognising the beginningless Avidyd as the root cause of Samsāra, the implications differ. For the former plurality constitutes Avidyā, but for the latter it is the confusion of selt and not-self, of Jīva and Pudgala.
CONVERTED AND PERVERTED SOULS: We shall now in brief record the nature of the perverted and converted souls. According to the Katho panişad, the ignorant soul looks outward by his senses created as they are by God with a tendency to move externally, but the wise desiring immu. tability turns them inwards and sees the self within him. Again, the fools indulging in the pleasures of the senses walk into the snare of death, but the calm souls having learned of immortality do not hanker after ephemeral pleasures.2 The Samādhisataka recognises that the Bahirātman engaging itself in the external objects through the sense doors confounds the self with the body, but the Antarātman repents for this indulging tendency of senses and determines to see the self within.3 The Istopadesa points out that the wise man will not strive for, and rejoice in, the pleasures which are painful in their acquisition, unsatisfying after attainment, and difficult to be renounced, but the stupid relishes them on account of ingnorance.4
The Mundakopanişad recognises that the perverted souls who regard sacrifices and works of merit as most important and do not know any other highest good, are born in this world or even in lower regions after enjoying the fruits of heaven.5 The Knot of ignorance is broken of that man who knows the supreme Brahman hidden in the secret heart. The Kathopanişad says that we ought to separate patiently the Atman from our own body, as one isolates a blade of grass from its sheath.7 The Kausitaki Upanisad declares, "Just as a razor is laid in a razor case or a bird is pent up in its nest, even so is this conscious Being placed in the body up to the very nails, up to the very hair of the body."8 The Samayasāra tells us that those who, without turning towards Paramartha perform austerities and observe vows, have a yearning for Punya without knowing that it is also the cause of transmigration in Samsāra. Hence all their austerities and vows are childish. According to the Yogasāra of
1 Ka. Up. II. 1. 1. + Istopa. 17. Samadhi. 55. 7 Ka. Up. II. 3. 17.
2 Ibid. II. 1. 2.
3 Samādhi. 7, 16. 5 Mu. Up. I. 2. 10. Ibid. II. 1. 10. 8 Kau. Up. IV. 20 (Trans. Constructive Survey of Upanipadic Philosophy p. 342. Samaya. 152, 154.

Page #241

VII. THE JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES
219
Yogindu rare are such wise persons who are convinced of the fact that Jina-deva is inside the body and that he is neither in the holy places nor in the temples.1 Amitagati tells us that we ought to be capable of sundering the Ātman from the body just like the separation of sword from its cover, 2 and in the words of Kārttikeya the body is like an outward covering 3
According to the Bhagavad-Gītā, in the first place, the wise man is not disturbed by the change of body but simply regards it as equivalent to the physical changes in the form of childhood, youth and old age; he further thinks that just as a person changes worn-out garments for new, so the embodied soul casts away old bodies and takes up new ones. Again, both of them are ignorant who consider this soul as a slayer and that it can be slain. The wise man estimates that this soul is unborn, eternal, permanent, all-pervading, not slain with the slaying of the body. It is uncleavable, incombustible, can neither be drenched nor dried. The Samādhisataka points out that since the Antarātman has detached itself from the body, it does not regard the bodily strength, enervation and destruction as belonging to itself. The separation of body from the soul is considered by the internal self as the putting on of another cloth by taking off the previous one. According to the Samayasāra the imprudent esteems "I kill other beings or I am killed by other beings.” The soul is not all-pervading according to Jainism.
. Secondly, the converted soul is of resolute intelligence, but many branching and multitudinous is the understanding of the irresolute or • perverted. The latter rejoices in the letter of the Veda, contends that there is nothing else, is intent on heaven, and lays down various specialized rites for the attainment of enjoyment and power. In other words, the converted soul owns Sättvika intelligence, while the perverted one possesses Rājasika and Tāmasika understandings. 10 In consonance with the views of Pūjyapāda, the man whose intelligence has become steady due to its internal turning towards the Ātman thinks this world as nonbelievable, 11 derives satisfaction from internal fixity in self, 12 regards the Atman as the real dwelling place, 13 aspires to renounce the attachment
1 Yogasára. 42, 45. 4 B. G. II. 13, 22. 7 Samaya. 247. 10 Ibid. XVIII. 30, 31, 32. 13 Ibid 73.
2 Amitagati Samāyika Patha. 2. 5 Ibid. II. 19, 20, 25. 8 B. G. II. 41. 11 Samadhi. 49.
3 Kärtti. 316. 6 Samādhi. 63, 64, 77. 9 Ibid. II. 42, 43. 12 Ibid. 60.

Page #242

220
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
to body and the pleasures as a result of his penances, and attains emancipation;2 but, on the contrary, he whose mind is disturbed and not fixed in the self regards this world as believable and beautiful, the external objects as satisfying, 4 the village and forest as habitations, desires a handsome body and pleasures as a reward of his austerities, and fails to achieve liberation.?
Thirdly, in spite of the fact that all actions are born of the modes of Prakrti, the ignoramus believes himself to be their agent. The prudent sees contrariwise. He witnesses himself to be the non-agent of and untouched by actions.10 He regards the supreme Being as abiding equally in all beings and as never perishing even when they are destroyed;11 he distinguishes, in other words, between Purusa and Praksti.12 According to Jainism the self from the transcendental point of view is the doer of pure Bhāvas and is not affected by the operations of Pudgala Karmas; empirically it is the doer of auspicious and inauspicious Bhāvas born of Pudgala karmas. Yogīndu's Paramātmaprakāśa brings out that in the eye of Niścaya-naya bondage and liberation, pleasure and pain, are the consequences of karmas leaving the self intact, but, on the contrary the designation of the self as virtuous and otherwise on account of the Karmic association is warranted from Vyavahāra standpoint.13 The statement of the Gitā regarding the self as the non-agent of actions, is, according to Jainism, only superempirically valid. But the Gitā conceives the self established in Prakrti as the enjoyer of joy and sorrow.14 Here the Gitā and the Jaina agree with each other. The wise regards the self as constituted of knowledge and faith, and as being supersensuous, a great objectivity, eternal, stable, independent and pure. By knowing this he destroys the knot of delusion.is He is not perturbed by the vicissitudes and destructions of the worldly objects; but, according to Jainism, he never sees the self as dwelling in all things.
GURU ESSENTIAL FOR SPIRITUAL LIFE; We shall now dwell upon the importance of a Guru for imparting spiritual wisdom and guidance on the path of self-realisation. The Mundakopanişad points out that in order to seek the knowledge of the Brahman, the aspirant should approach the
1 Samādhi 42. 2 Ibid. 71. 5 Ibid. 73. 6 Ibid. 42. 9 Ibid. III. 28; XIII. 29. 12 Ibid. XIII. 23. 14 B.G. XIII. 20. 21.
3 Ibid. 49. 7 Ibid. 71. 10 Ibid. XIII. 31, 32. 13 Pp. I. 60, 64, 65. 15 Prava, II, 100, 101,
4 Ibid. 60. 8 B. G. III. 27; XVIII. 16 11 Ibid. XIII. 27.

Page #243

- VII. THE JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES
221
Guru who has realised the self. The Katha Upanişad opines that the path of realisation is as difficult to traverse as the edge of a razor, consequently one should learn it from those who are on the lofty pedestal of unitive experience.2 It need not be asserted that the Bhagavad-Gitā illustrates the significance of the Guru who may lead the aspirant from the state of delusion to that of dispassion. Jainism also has not blinked the imperativeness of Guru for moving on the path of mystical realisation. The Ācārya is the Guru in the veritable sense. We have already reckoned with the characteristics of the Acārya, so they need not be repeated here. The Bhāyapāhuda says that the Ātman should be meditated upon after knowing it from the Guru.3
INCENTIVES TO SPIRITUAL LIFE; In the Upanisads and the BhagavadGitā we may discern certain incentives which prompt man to strive for immortality. First, the incentive of being struck by the impermanence of worldly opulences may be seen when Naciketas rejects the offer of mundane things and pleasures-cattle and elephants, gold and horses, sons and grandsons with long life, wealth, kingdom and all sorts of pleasureson being asked by the god of death. He declares that these transitory things wear away the glory of the senses and even a long life is insufficient to make something out of them with the consequence that dissatisfaction prevails. Again, he disapproves the desire for a lengthy duration of life of sensual pleasures when he has come into the presence of ageless immortals. In the Brhadāranyakopanişad Maitreyī prefers immortality to the possession of the whole earth full of wealth, since riches are incapable of bestowing eternal life upon her. The Maitri Upanişad portryas the mutable nature of the world. According to it, the gnats and mosquitoes, the grass and the trees grow and decay. There is the drying up of great oceans, the falling away of mountain peaks, the deviation of the fixed pole-star, the submergence of the earth, the departure of the gods from their station. In such a world as this, what is the good of enjoyment of desires ? In a similar spirit the Gitā tells us that sensual pleasures are the sources of sorrow; they have a beginning and an end and do not last for ever; hence the wise man
1 Mu. Up. I. 2. 12. 2 Ka. Up. I. 3. 14. 3 Bhāva. Pa. 64. 4 Ka. Up. I. 1. 23 to 27. 5 Ibid. I. 1. 28. 6 Br. Up. II. 4. 2. ? Mai. Up. I. 4. (Translation vide 'The Principal Upanişads”).

Page #244

222
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
does not take delight in them. This incentive may be compared with the incentive of transitoriness of things as presented by Jainism. The Uttarādhyayana2 instructs us not to be careless even for a moment, since man's life is not permanent. It comes to a close with the passage of time like a dew drop or a leaf of a tree falling to the ground. Besides, sense pleasures, being impermanent, desert a man just as a bird flies away from a tree void of fruit.} The Bhagavati Ārādhanā tells us that all the objects of Bhoga and Upabhoga vanish like a lump of ice and worldly fame and recognition take no time in disappearing. Just as water of the flowing river cannot return, so also youth cannot reappear after once it has passed away. The Kārttikeyānuprekşā points out that the body in spite of its due nourishment is sure to decay like an unbaked earthen pot which crumbles when filled with water.6 Friends, beauty, wife, children, wealth, and domestic animals are unstable in character like a newly shaped mass of clouds or like a rain-bow or flash of lightning.? The Atmānusāsana says, what purpose is capable of being served with wealth which, like fuel, inflames the fire of desire ?8 The fortunes of the rulers of the earth vanish in no time like the extinction of a flame of a lamp. What gust is there in sense-gratifications which are well-known as bitter like poison, terrible like serpents, incapable of quenching the thirst like salt water, and fraught with impermanence ?10
Secondly, the incentive of suffering and transmigration may be exhibited when we are required to realise the self while the body endures, failing which we will have to wander for a very long duration in different kinds of existence.11 The Kenopanişad declares that great is the perdition which comes to the lot of a man who falls short of selfknowledge while this body lasts. 12 The Gitā accordingly tells us that the cycle of birth and death entangles a man who is not devoted to sovereign knowledge, king-secret, and supreme-sanctity.13 Those great souls who have realised the Atman do not come to this transient and painful birth.14 Hence having entered this impermanent, unhappy
1 B.G. II-14, V-22.
2 Uttarā. X; 1, 2. 3 Ibid. XIII-31.
4 Bhaga. Ara. 1727. 5 Ibid 1789.
6 Kärtti. 9. 7 Kārtti. 6, 7.
8 Atmānu. 61. 10 Āmānu. 38, 51, 87.
11 Ka. Up. II. 3. 4. 12 Ke. Up. II. 5, cf. Br. Up. IV-4–14. 13 B.G. IX. 2, 3.
14 Ibid. VIII. 15.
9 Ibid. 62.

Page #245

VII. -JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES
223
world, one should endeavour to capture spiritual truth. This incentive may be compared with the incentive of transmigration as aleady delineated by Jainism. The Acārānga tells us that “those who acquiesce and indulge in worldly pleasures are born again and again,"2 and again, "those who, not freeing themselves from ignorance, talk about final liberation, turn round and round in the whirlpool of births".3 In the Uttarādhyayana, when the parents of Msgāputra triy to discourage his entrance into ascetic life, by pointing to the difficulties of Scamanic life',4 Mrgāputra says, “In the Samsāra which is a mine of dangers and a wilderness of old age and death, I have undergone dreadful births and deaths." The Paramātmaprakāsa points out that he who has not amassed religious merit and practised austerities will have to descend into hell after being gnawed by the rats of senility. Again, it is selfdeception if the human birth has not been utilized for perform penances after having purified the mind. The self is snared in the millions of births bearing affliction and is deluded by sons and wives till the supreme knowledge does not dawn upon it. : Thirdly, the Maitri Upanişad presents an incentive of bodily nature and impurity. It tells us that in this foul smelling, unsubstantial body a conglomerate of bone, skin, muscle, marrow, flesh, semen, blood, mucus, tears, rheum, faeces, urine, wind, bile and phlegm. what is the good of the enjoyment of desires ?8 The Gītā does not speak in terms of bodily impurity. Guņabhadra in the Atmānusāsana urges not to love this body, inasmuch as it is a prison house built of a number of thick bones as stone pillars, fastened by nerves and muscles, covered over with skin, plastered with wet flesh, well protected by its wicked enemies, the karmas, and closed by strong barriers of age-karmas. The body is the root cause of the tradition of evils. After the formation of the body the senses make impetuous movement towards the seizure of their respective objects, which in turn engender loss of self-respect, anguish, apprehension, vice, and take us to untoward places of birth.10 The accompaniments of this body are birth, death, mental and physical
1 B. G. IX. 33.
2 Acārā. I. 4. 1. P. 36. 3 Ibid: 1. 5. 1-P. 43. 4 Uttarā. XIX. 24-42.
5 Ibid. 46. 6 Pp. II. 133, 135.
7 Ibid. II. 123. 8 Mai. Up. 1, 3. (Translation vide 'The Principal Upanişads'.) 9 Atmānu. 59. (Trans. vide J.L. Jaini translations).
10 Ibid. 195.

Page #246

224
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
sufferings and decreptitude, which have been called as the mother, the father, the brothers and the friend of the body respectively. The Paramātmaprakāsa tells us that this body is replete with foul things, its washing, oiling, decoration and its nourishment with palatable food-all these are of no avail like the favour shown to a Vile.2 The Svayambhūstotra points out that the body is dependent on self for its actions; it is detestable, foul-smelling, perishable and cause of sorrows, hence to set one's affections for it is of no purpose.3
IMPORTANCE OF FAITH, KNOWLEDGE AND CONDUCT: After dwelling upon certain incentives which actuate a human being to tread on the path of self-realisation, and to ascend the heights ordinarily inaccessible, we shall now pass on to the consideration of the way by the pursuance of which the challenge implicit in the incentives may be adequately encountered. In other words, the question we have is: in what sort of life an aspirant should engage himself, so that the obstacles to the moral and the spiritual betterment may be surmounted. To start with, faith is the first necessity for any progress in spiritual life. The Katha Upanişad tells us that Brahman or Purusa is incapable of being attained by mind, speech, and eyes. He cannot be achieved unless one says “He is" Again, when he has been grasped with the certainty of His existence, only then the essential nature of God dawns upon a man. The Prasna Upanişad says that the Ātman is to be discovered through faith, knowledge, austerity and chastity. Hence, not only faith, but knowledge and conduct along with it constitute the pathway to emancipation. The Gita recognises that men who have no faith in the sovereign truth wander in the wheel of birth and death. Those who have full faith and are free from cavil are released from the bondage of work, while the Ignorant, the faithless and the sceptic go to perdition. The offerings of gift, the penance, and any other rite or work when performed without faith is 'Asat' and, is nought here or hereafter. Only he who has faith, who is absorbed in wisdom, and who has subdued his senses gains wisdom, and having gained it, he quickly attains the supreme peace.10 In Jainism,
1 Atmānu. 201. 2 Pp. II. 148. 149. 4 Ka. Up. II. 3. 12. 6 Pra. Up. I. 10. 8 Ibid. III. 31; IV. 40. 10 Ibid. IV. 39.
3 Svayambhū. 32. 5 Ibid. II. 3. 13. 7 B. G. IX. 3. 9 B. G. XVII. 28.

Page #247

VII. JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES
225
the attainment of liberation is dependent on the acquisition of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. We may point out here that in the Upanisads and the Gitā the faith in the supreme Atman, the cosmic principle as identical with the self within, has been advocated; but with Jainism, transcendentally speaking, faith in the super-empirical conscious principle imprisoned in the body constitutes right faith. Yogīndu says that solitarily Ātman is Samaygdarśana.2 Notwithstanding this distinction they believe in something divine to be mystically realised. Transcendental awakening is acceptable to all the three.
After the faith has been imbibed, knowledge and conduct are to be made the objects of one's own pursuit. According to the Mundaka Upanişad, the Ātman which is inside the body and which is radiant and pure, is capable of being invariably accomplished by right knowledge, truth, austerity and chastity. Besides, it may be seen by those who have destroyed all blemishes, and all desires.4 Mere intellectual knowledge leads nowhere. The Katha Upanişad recognises that the self can be reached neither by eloquent discourse nor by subtle intellect, nor by much learning. He who has not ceased from doing evil, and whose mind is not calm and equipoised cannot hope to attain the self in spite of his being equipped with the intellect of deep penetration. The Mundaka Upanişad points out that the self cannot be realised by a man without potency, or with inertia or errors in the seeking, or by improper austerity. In accordance with the Gītā those who have the eye of wisdom see the indwelling soul.8 Three types of knowledge have been recognised. The Sāttvika knowledge witnesses one immutable being in all existence to distinguish it from the Rājasa one which sees multiplicity of beings and from the Tāmasa one which clings to one single effect as if it were the whole. The foremost one is right knowledge according to the Gītā. Sublime height cannot be attained by the undisciplined.1 The evil doers who are robbed by illusion, and who partake of the nature of demons, cannot reach the supreme; while tranquillity is realised by
1 Ta. si. I. 1.
2 PP. I. 96. 3 Mu. Up. III. 1, 5.
4 Mu. Up. III. 1, 5. Ka. Up. II. 3. 14. 5 Ka. Up. I. 2. 23. cf. Mu. Up. III. 2. 3. 6 Ka. Up. I. 2. 24.
7 Mu. Up. III. 2. 4. 8 B. G. XV. 10.
9-B.G. XVIII. 20 to 22. 10 Ibid. XV. 11.

Page #248

226
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
those who have renounced all desires, and who are free from attachment, pride and selfishness. Desire breeds wrath and envelops wisdom; consequently it is the eternal enemy of the soul.2 In contrast to the Gītā and the Upanişads, the Mokşapāhuda pronounces that the cognition of the distinction between sentiency and non-sentiency constitutes right knowledge. This divergence is in tune with the metaphysical assertion of the Jaina. Exclusively neither knowledge nor austerity is fruitful, but the fusion of the two brings about emancipation. To explain it clearly, Sīla and knowledge are not opposed to each other; rather, right faith, knowledge, austerity, self-control, truth, non-stealing, chastity, contentment and compassion for living beings form the family of the former. The Ātman can be realised only by the Yogi who is detached from the animal pleasures, and has abandoned all conceivable flaws. He with the sword of conduct dismembers the pillars of sins. It may be pointed out here that Sīla has been preferred to the knowledge of grammar, metre and Nyāya. Again, without relinquishing the foreign psychical states, the knowledge of the scriptures is of no avail.10 The Mülācāra observes that the scriptural knowledge without detachment is unfruitful and acts like a lamp in the hand of a blind man.11 Neither intellectual study, nor the keeping of books and peacock feather, nor dwelling in a religious habitation, nor pulling out the hair can be equated with Dharma.12 He who abandoning attachment and aversion, resides in the Ātman moves towards the eternal Gati.13 Again, he who is free from pride, deceit, anger, greed, possession, infatuation, worldly sinful engagements, who has conquered passions, and endured hardships, is established in the path of liberation, and attains supreme happiness.14 Hence the importance of conduct is evident. . NEGATIVE SIDE OF CONDUCT-AVOIDANCE OF SINS AND PASSIONS: The negative side of conduct consists in purging away sins, passions, in subduing the senses, and in restraining the mind, while the positive side embraces several virtues along with devotion and meditation. To proceed with the negative one, the Chandogya Upanişad mentions stealing of gold, drinking of wine, polluting the bed of one's teacher, killing a
1 B.G. VII. 15.; II. 71. 3 Mo. Pā. 41. 6 Mo. På. 66. 9 Šī. Pā. 16. 12 Yogasära. 47.
4 Ibid. 59. 7 Bhāva. Pā. 85. 10 Yogasára. 96. 13 Ibid. 48.
2 Ibid. III. 37, 38, 39. s si. Pā. 2, 19. 8 Ibid. 159. 11 Mülā. 894, 933.. 14 Mo. På. 45. 80.

Page #249

VII. THE JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES 227
Brahmin, and keeping company with the perpetrators as the five kinds of great sins and therefore considers them derogatory. The Prasna Upanişad opines that pure Brahman is realised by those in whom there is neither lying nor deceit nor crookedness.2 Thus the thief, the drunkard, the adulterer, the Brahmocide, the liar, the deceitful and the man who associates with them all go to ruin. According to Jainism, a pilgrim on the path of self-realisation must avoid wine, meat, honey, violence, falsehood, stealing, incontinence and acquisition. He should neither commit these sins nor incite others to commit them nor extol those perpetrating these sins. According to the Gitā, demoniac qualities cause thraldom. Ostentation, arrogance, excessive pride, anger, harshness, and ignorance—all these are demoniac qualities. To refuse to distinguish between action and renunciation, to be possessed of nonpurity, non-truth and non-conduct, to give oneself to insatiable desires, to hold wrong views through delusion, to act with impure resolves, and to be hedonistic: all these are Āsurī characteristics. 5 Again, to be covetous, to be violent, to be snared in hundreds of vain hopes, to be entangled in anger and lust, to be engaged in amassing wealth by unjust means for the gratification of desires, to regard oneself as accomplished, as lord and king of man, and as happy and strong, and to be puffed up with riches and birth-all these also come under the sweep of demoniac nature. Moreover, persons having such inclination regard the world as unreal, without basis and without God. They despise the Supreme Being which is hidden in themselves and others. The above mentioned base and sordid dispositions must needs be relinquished in the interest of higher progress. According to Jainism, all that is responsible for inauspicious Asrava is demoniac in character. Four kinds of instincts, 8 three inauspicious Leśyās, sensual indulgence, Arta and Raudra Dhyānas, improper use of knowledge, delusion and thirteen kinds of passions
1 Cha. Up. V. 10. 9. 2 Pra. Up. I. 1. 16. 3 Ratna. Srāva. 66. 4 B.G. XVI. 4. (Trans. vide RADHAKRISHNAN: The Bhagavad Gita). 5 B.G. XVI. 7, 10, 11. 6 Ibid. XVI. 12 to 15.
7 Ibid. XVI. 8, 18. 8 Ahāra (Food), Bhaya (fear), Maithuna (Sex) and Parigraha (acquisition). 9 Panca. 40. 10 Sarvātha. VII. 9. Anger (Krodha), Pride (Māna), Deceit (Māya), Greed (Lobha) Laughter, (Hasya), Love (Rati), Hatred (Arati), Grief (Soka), Fear (Bhaya), Disgust (Jugupsā), Hankering after woman (Puruşaveda), Hankering after man (Striveda) and Hankering after both the sexes (Napuņsakaveda).
2016: XVI. 4. (Trans. vb Ibid. XVI. 12 tSex) and Parigrah

Page #250

228
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
along with violence, falsehood, stealing, incontinence and acquisitionall these entail inauspicious Asrava. We shall now dwell upon the characterisations of three Leśyās, inasmuch as they bear great resemblance to the demoniac endowments of the Bhagavad-Gītā. Of the six Leśyāsı-Krsna, Nīla, Kāpota, Tejas, Padma and Sukla-the first three are inauspicious and the last three are auspicious. One who does not give up enmity and who is wrathful, pugnacious, villain and bereft of piety and compassion is possessed by Kțşņa Leśyā. One who is slow, conceited, deceitful, indolent, mysterious, covetous, expert in swindling, extremely sleepy, without commonsense and sagacity, and extremely eager for sense objects is controlled by Nīla Leśyā. To be angry with others, to be full of sorrow and fear, to be envious and slanderous, to belittle and tease others, to be pleased with implorers, to be ignorant of one's own loss and gain, to extol one-self, to give wealth to flatterers, not to trust others and not to recognize duty and non-duty-all these are the characterisations of man possessed by Kāpota Leśyā. Then, there are eight kinds of pride to be comprised under .suri characteristics. They are pride of knowledge, respect, prestige, community, family, wealth, austerity and body. All these should be renounced. In spite of the great concordance, Jainism would not recognise God in the world in the sense of the Bhagavad-Gītā, though every soul, according to Jainism, is divine.
NEGATIVE SIDE OF CONDUCT_CONTROL OF SENSES AND THE MIND: Next comes the controlling of senses and the mind. He who is without understanding and who is of uncontrolled mind fails to restrain the senses like the vicious horses of a charioteer, says the Kathopanişad. The self is the master of the bodily chariot with intelligence as the charioteer, mind as the reins, senses as the horses, objects as the roads to move, and the self, together with the mind and the senses as the enjoyer.? Now the man equipped with understanding and strong mind succeeds in controlling the senses, which are like the noble steeds of a charioteer.8 He, therefore, terminates the round of birth, and acquires the immortal state whence there is no return. The Brhadāranyaka the Kena, and the Taittirīya Upanişads also prescribe self-restraint and self-conquest.10 According to the Gitā, desire resides in the senses, the
1 Gomma. Ji. 493. 2 Ibid. 509. 3 Ibid. 510, 511. Ibid. 512-14. 5 Ratna. Srāva. 25.6Ka. Up. I. 3. 5. 7 Ibid. I. 3. 3, 4. 8 Ka. Up. I. 3. 6, 8, 9. 9 Br. Up. V. 2. 1; Ke. Up. IV. 4. 8.; Tai. Up. I. 9.

Page #251

VII. THE JAINA AND THE NON-JALNA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES 229
mind and the intelligence, and by curtaining knowledge through these it deludes the embodied soul. The senses and the attachment and aversion to the objects of the senses are the enemies of the soul.2 The mental dwelling upon the objects of the senses brings about attachment to them which in turn engenders desires producing anger on their being obstructed. The consequential effect of anger is infatuation giving rise to the loss of memory by which intelligence declines and as a consequeuce, ruin follows. Thus the mind which is fickle, passionate, strong and obstinate, and which is not easily controllable like wind, should be curbed by incessant practice and non-attachment;s the senses are required to be kept under control and the desires need be extirpated. Mere withdrawing of the senses from the external performance without subduing the desires will be mere hypocrisy. According to Jainism also, the control of the mind, along with the senses and the desires is necessary for higher progress. He who restrains the monkey of mind wandering through the objects of the senses gets the desired fruit. In case one fails, the scriptural study, the performance of austerity, and the observance of vows and bodily penance-all these become useless. Thus the camels, in the form of the five senses, should not be let loose; after grazing the whole pasture of pleasures they again hunt the soul into the ground of rebirth.10 Hence by capturing the leader, viz., the mind, all others (senses) are captured; the roots being pulled out, the leaves necessarily wither. 11 Desire acts like wine in exciting the senses. 12 Again, the desire for the objects of the senses produces passions like anger etc.13. These passions which appear in the form of attachment and aversion delude the mind and snatch away its stability.14 The bird of mind fails to fly when the feathers of attachment and aversion are cut.15 The seed of attachment and aversion is delusion, which eclipses knowledge, with the consequence that the real nature of things remains hidden.16
POSITIVE SIDE OF CONDUCT-CULTIVATION OF VIRTUES: We now turn to the consideration of the positive side of conduct. According to
1 B.G. III. 4a. 2 Ibid. III. 34. 3 Ibid. II. 62. • 4 Ibid. II. 63. 5 Ibid. VI. 34, 35. Ibid. III. 41. 7 Ibid. III. 6. 8 Jñanā. XXII. 23. 9 Ibid. XXII. 28. 10 Pp. II. 136. 11 Ibid. II. 140. (Translation vide-UPADHYE Intro. p. 19). 12 Jñānā. XVII. 7. 13 Ibid. XX. 2. 14 Ibid XXIII. 7. 15 Ibid. XXIII. 27. 16 Jñānā. XXIII. 30; Istopa. 7.

Page #252

230
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
the Brhadāraṇyaka Upanişad, charity and compassion are to be practised, in addition to self-control. The observance of austerity, charity, simplicity of behaviour, non-violence and truthfulness have been enjoined by the Chāndogya.2 Some Upanişads speak of celibacy also.3 The Taittiriya Upanişad enunciates a number of practices but finally decides in favour of the study of the sacred scriptures, as constituting penance and the highest virtue. When the pupil takes leave of his teacher after the studies, he is advised to speak the truth, to respect the law, not to be negligent of the study of the sacred scriptures, and not to deflect from welfare, from the means of thriving, and from duties to gods and fathers. He is further advised to offer to the teacher the wealth the latter desires, and then, marry and procreate. He should regard his mother, father, teacher and guest as gods, perform faultless actions, and imitate only the noble conduct of his teacher. He is required to show respect to highly disciplined Brahmins, and to offer gifts to them with faith, magnanimity, meekness, awe and proper understanding. Again, if doubt creeps in as to the pursuance of any course of action, the best way is to follow the conduct of those Brahmins who are devout, compassionate, careful thinkers and lovers of virtues.
The virtues or the divine endowments mentioned in the Gitā may be put into different categories in order to facilitate comparison with the Jaina enumeration. The first group may comprise the turning away from the objects of the senses, and the controlling of speech, body, mind and understanding. The second may include charity, sacrifice, tranquillity, universal compassion, pure devotion, and the Acārya Upāsanā. The third may be taken to embrace non-violence, truthfulness, non-acquisition, renunciation and absence of fault-finding. It may also include freedom from lust, anger, pride, greed, fear, enmity and force. The fourth may include forgiveness, gentleness, purity, austerity, modesty, scriptural study, spiritual knowledge, simplicity of behaviour and wise apportionment of knowledge. The fifth may be taken to embrace insight into the evils of birth, death, old age and sickness. It may also involve meditation, resplendence, abstemiousness, endurance, steadfast
1 Br Up. V. 2, 3. 2 Cha. Up. III. 17, 4. 3 Ka. Up. I. 2. 15; Pra. Up. I. 1, 15. 4 Tai, up. I. 9. Tai. Up. 1, 11. Ibid. 1, 11. 7 BG. XIII–7 to 11.; XVII-1, 2, 3.; XVIII-51 to 53. (At various places we have followed RADHAKRISHNAN'S Translation of the Gitā.)

Page #253

Vn. THE JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES 231
ness, non-attachment, spiritual experience, liking for solitude, disliking for crowd, absence of fickleness, purity of mind, freedom from attachment and aversion and equal-mindedness to all happenings, desirable and undesirable.
Further, three types of austerities namely Sättvika, Rājasa and Tāmasa, have been recognized by the Gitā. 1) The Sättvika austerity is again of three kinds, namely, the bodily, the vocal2 and the mental.3 2) The austerity which is performed for the sake of ostentation or with a view to capturing respect, honour and reverence is Rājas. 3) That which is pursued under delusion, and to torture one's ownself or to harm others is Tāmasa.Next come three types of charity. 1) That which is given out of duty, with proper consideration of place, time and recipient and without any expectation of return is Sāttvika gift.6 2) The Rājasa is that which is given unwillingly or by hurting oneself, with the hope of return or with selfish designs.? 3) The offering which is made with despise, without proper respect and without any regard for time, place and recipient is Tāmasa in kind.8 Likewise renunciation admits of a threefold classification. 1) The performance of the acts of sacrifice, charity and austerity, and other prescribed actions after one has renounced attachment to, and yearning for, their fruits has been regarded as Sättvika renunciation.o 2-3) The abandonment of prescribed actions out of ignorance and sheer fear of pain is called the Tāmasa and Rājasa types of renunciation respectively.10
Comparing with the Upanişads, we find that Jainism too recognises scriptural study as the best of the austerities. 11 The householder who observes Brahmacaryānuvrata, Satāyanuvrata and Atithisaṁvibhāgaviata roughly follows all the duties that the Upanişadic teacher instructs his desciple. To compare with the Gitā, the groups first to four may be compared with the various virtues prescribed in Jainism; namely, the
1 bodily: purity, continence, non-violence, simplicity of behaviour and adoration
to the gods, the Brahminas, the wise and the spiritual guide. 2 vocal: scriptural study and the utterance of unoffensive, bereficial and true
• words. 3 mental: serenity, silence, self-control, evenness of mind, and purity of thoughts.
B.G. XVII-14 to 17. 4 B.G. 17-18. 5 Ibid. 17-5, 6, 19.
6 Ibid. 17-20. 7 Ibid. 17-21.
8 Ibid. 17-22. 9 B.G. 18-6. 10 Ibid. 18-7. 8.
11 Mală. 409,

Page #254

232
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
three Guptis (control of mind, body and speech), the control of five senses, the causes of the auspicious Asrava, the sixteen kinds of reflections (already discussed elsewhere, freedom from passions, the five vows of Ahimsā, Asteya, Brahmacarya, Aparigraha and Satya along with their various reflections to strengthen them, and the ten Dharmas of forbearance, modesty, simplicity of behaviour, contentment, truth, self-restraint, austerity, renunciation, non-attachment and celibacy. The fifth group may be compared with some of the incentives to spiritual lifel and with the importance of knowledge, conduct, study, meditation and austerity, and also with solitude, endurance, observance of evenness in pleasure and pain, and conquest of attachment, aversion and infatuation. The Sättvika austerity may be compared roughly with the internal austerity as propounded by Jainism. The extent of austerity in the Gitā does not correspond totally to the external and the internal austerity of Jainism. The sole purpose of austerity is to unfold the divinity within. Hence Rājasa and Tāmasa austerities have no meaning in the view of the Jaina. The vow of Atithisam vibhāga Vrata4 answers to the Sāttvika charity of the Gitā. It is important to note that all the auspicious observances should be made without deceit (māyā), perversity (mithyā) and desire for worldly benefits (nidāna). Though the yearning for worldly fruits has been condemned, the desire for spiritual betterment has been appreciated. It is to be borne in mind that in contrast to the Upanişads and the Gitā, Jainism regards Ahimsă as the guiding principle from which all the virtues can be derived. The Upanişads speak more in favour of truth than anything
else.
POSITIVE SIDE OF CONDUCT-MEDITATION: Next to be considered is Yoga or meditation and devotion. The importance of Dhyāna (meditation) is seen when the Mundaka Upanişad pronounces that the immaculate nature of God can be realised neither by sight, nor by speech, nor by any other sense, nor by austerity, nor by any actions, but only through meditation after the purification of inner being. The great
1(1) Incentive of transitoriness of things (Anityānuprekņā); (2) Incentive of inescapability from death (Asravnānuprekşā). (3) Incentive of transmigration
(Saṁsarānuprekşā); (4) Incentive of bodily impurity (Asuci-anuprekņā). 2 Milā. 968. 3 Ibid. 950, 816, 880.
4 Sarvātha. VII. 21, 38, 39. 5 Ibid. VII. 18. 6 Amitagati Sráva. 20, 21, 22. 7 Mu. Up. III, 1, 8.
Sarvard

Page #255

VI. THE AINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES 233
world-illusion passes away only through meditation upon God and by entering into His being, says the Svetāsvatara Upanişad. According to the Bhagavad-Gītā, in order to ascend the sublime heights the Yogi has to banish all desires and all longing for possessions; he has to curb the mind and the senses, and then in solitude has to meditate on the supreme self by fixing the mind on the Ātman without allowing anything to distract it.2 The Mokşapāhuda says that he who is desirous of crossing the formidable ocean of Saṁsāra meditates upon the pure self after renouncing all passions, detaching himself from all worldly engagements, and observing silence. The tree of worldly existence cannot be eradicated by the Dravyaśramaņa who is occupied with the pleasures of the senses, but it is capable of being rooted out by the Bhāvaśramaņa with the axe of meditation. Just as a lamp which is unobstructed by wind continues to glow in a well-surrounded house, so the lamp of meditation in the absence of the wind of attachment keeps illuminating in the heart of the Bhāvaśramana. The Paramātmaprakāsa tells us that the Ātman which is incapable of being known by the Vedas, the Šāstras and the senses is accessible only to pure meditation. Notwithstanding the observance of moral discipline, the performance of austere penances and extensive scriptural study, the success in spiritual life is incapable of being achieved without the pursuance of meditation.7 Then there are certain pre-requisites of Yoga or meditation enunciated. The place is required to be pleasing to the mind and free from sounds; watery resorts should not be aching to the eyes. The ground need be even, clean and free from pebbles, fire and sand. One should select for practice a place in the still recesses of a cave. According to the Gitā, the Yogi should set his firm seat in a clean place, neither too high nor too low, covered with sacred grass, a deer-skin and a cloth, one over the other, for practising Yoga. The Jñānārņava supplies a long list of places which are to be avoided, and which are to be preferred for the practice of Dhyāna.10 For our purpose it will suffice to say that those places which are disturbing, captivating, unpleasant; and those which are noisyon account of crows, owls, asses, dogs, and the like, and those which are vitiated by thorns, uneven stones, bones, blood, etc., as well as those
1 Sve. Up. I, 1, 10. 2B.G. VI-10, 23, 24, 25, 26. 3 Mo. Pā. 26 to 28. 4 Bhāva. Pā. 122. 5 Ibid. 123.
6 Pp. I. 23. 7 Amita. Srāva. 96. 8 Šve. Up. II, 2, 10.
9 BG. VI. 11. 10 Jñrānā. XXVII 23 to 29; XXVIII 1 to 7.

Page #256

234
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
that might counteract meditational efforts should be rejected; and mountains, caves and other solitary places should be chosen. The Yogi should fix his seat on a wooden plank, Silā, ground or sandy place. We may point out here that a deer skin will be used neither by a householder nor by a Muni according to the Jaina tradition. Regarding the posture and the process of meditation, one should keep the three parts of the body in equilibrium and control the senses so as to enable one to concentrate on Brahman.3 The important thing is that the mind should be adequately restrained. The supreme Symbol 'Om' has been prescribed for meditation. The bow of 'Om' and the arrow of soul sharpened by devotion set on it should be directed by concentrated attention to pierce the mark of Brahman. As regards posture, the Gitā tells us that having practised the vow of celibacy, and attained fearlessness, serenity, and control of the mind, the Yogi should hold the body, head and neck erect and motionless, and by looking fixedly at the tip of his nose without being distracted in any way he should turn to the supreme self.? Only those who are moderate in tourings and in taking food, restrained in actions, and regulated in sleep and waking succeed in Yoga.8 Though the efficacy of 'Om' has been recognised, it has not been enjoined as a means of meditation as in the Upanişads. The Jñānārņava tells us that any convenient posture subscribing to mental control should be adopted. 10 After turning away the senses from their objects, casting aside attachment and aversion, and acquiring an equipoised state of mind, the Yogi should fix his mind on the forehead.11 Besides, the nine other places have been enjoined for practising meditation, viz., the two eyes, the two ears, the tip of the nose, the mouth, the navel, the head, the heart, the palate, and the place between the two eyebrows.12 Symbols have been suggested for meditational purposes. The Dravyasamgraha declares that the Namokāra Mantra and the other imparted by the Guru should be utilised for the practice of meditation.13 The Moksapāhuda proclaims that meditation should be instituted after restraining food, posture and sleep. 14
4 Ibid. II 2, 9.
1 Jñanā. XXVII. 21 to 34., $at. Vol XIII. p. 66. 2 Jñanā. XXVIII. 9. 3 Sve. Up. II. 2, 8. 5 Mu. Up. II. 2, 6.
6 Ibid. II. 2, 3-4. 7 B.G. VI 13, 14.
8 Ibid. VI. 17. 10 Jñana. XXVIII. 11. 11 Ibid. XXX 12. 13 Dravyā. 49.
14 Mo. Pa. 63.
Ibid. VIII-13., XVII-24. 12 Ibid. XXX. 13.

Page #257

VII. THE JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES
235
POSITIVE SIDE OF CONDUCT-DEVOTION: As regards devotion, the Svetāśvatara Upanişad mentions Upāsanā and Bhakti to God and the Guru as necessary for realisation. We may summarise Professor RANADE'S version regarding devotion in the Upanişads, "It is only in the BhagavadGītā that the dry intellectualism and speculative construction of the Upanişads disappear."i In the Gitā Saguna devotion, as differentiated from Nirguna one which is difficult for the mundane souls, has been envisaged as a means for the realisation of the supreme which is incapable of being attained either by the Vedas or by austerities, or by gifts, or by sacrifices.2 One-pointed and unswerving devotion is indispensable to the transcending of the three Guņas. But of the four types of Bhaktas, namely, the sufferer, the seeker for knowledge, the person who is eager for wealth and the wise, the last is the best of all because of his impersonal and absolute devotion. Again, the Gitā says that even of the Yogis, as distinguished from those engrossed in mere external asceticism; intellectual knowledge and rituals, the greatest is the devotee. 5 Hence, devotion cannot be dispensed with for higher ascension. The recognition of Bhakti as an integral constituent of the sixteen kinds of reflection, its inclusion in the six essentials of the Muni, in the daily life of the householder in the form of Jinapūjā, Sāmāyika, Vaiyāvșttya etc., are the illustrations of the emphasis laid by Jainism on devotion as indispensable to spiritual advancement. The Mokşapāhuda tells us that divested of the Ātman, externalism, extraneous penances, scriptural learning, observance of the manifold rules of conduct all these are preposterous and puerile. He who is devoted to the Deva and the Guru, and who is devoted to ascetics following right conduct and pursuing meditation is established in the path of liberation. Saguņa Bhakti may be equated with the aforementioned types of devotion and Nirguņa one, with the supreme meditation, which is not only difficult, but also not possible in the initial stages of Yoga. The distinguished Yogi's devotion will be free from the three Salyas, namely, Māyā (deceit), Mithyā (perversity), and Nidāna (desire for worldly benefits).
Constructive Survey of Upanişadic Philosophy, p. 198. 2 BG. XII-2, 5., XI-53, 54. 3 Ibid. XIV-26. 4 Ibid. VII-16, 17. 5 Ibid. VI-46, 47.
6 We have already enumerated these. 7 We have dealt with these in the previous chapter. 8 Mo. På. 99, 100.
' Ibid. 52, 82.

Page #258

236
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
The three lower types of devotees of the Gitā may be said to possess Nidāna Šalya according to Jainism.
PHYSIOLOGICAL AND MYSTICAL EFFECTS OF YOGA AND THE ELEMENT OF GRACE: Clear complexion, sweet voice, the emission of good smell, extraordinary decrease in excretions, the possession of light and healthy body and freedom from sensual indulgence—all these are the physiological effects of Yoga or deep meditation. The spiritual effect consists in the disintegration of all sorrows and bonds, which results in the realisation of the Brahman, the universal self. But before this attainment may ensue, divine grace is essential. The Mundakopanişad tells us that the Ātman manifests itself only to him whom it chooses.3 “It implies that man's endeavours after a full-fledged realisation of God may always fall short of the ideal, unless grace comes from above." The Gitā does not speak of the physiological effects of Yoga. Those who succeed in the practice of Yoga attain to the mystical effect of realising supreme peace. And, those who fail, on account of the imperfect practice of Yoga, are born in heaven, then in the house of prosperous persons or in the family of Yogins, and ultimately seek salvation by means of fresh endeavours and the revival of previous impressions. It is necessary to seek God's grace before one hopes to reach the highest. The Mokşapāhuda pronounces that meditation on the Svadravya, i.e., on the unique, eternal and pure Ātman, as distinguished from the Paradravya, i.e., from the things other than the Atman, leads to emancipation, the path of the Tīrthamkara.? If deliverance is not attained owing to certain imperfections, heaven is indubitably attained. Then after returning from there and again after pursuing right belief, right knowledge and right conduct, one will attain liberation. Such a person in this world gets endowed with knowledge, endurance, prosperity, health, contentment, strength, and handsome body. The theory of grace from Divinity is foreign to Jainism.10 As there is no God over and above the Tirthamkaras, and they too have gone beyond attachment and aversion, divine grace, in view of the Jaina, is a contradiction in terms. It is only meditational efforts that eventually lead one to Nirvāṇa.
1 Sve. Up. II, 2, 13. 2 Ibid. II, 2, 14, 15. 3 Mu. Up. III, 2, 3. Ka. Up. 1, 2, 23. 4 Constructive survey of Upanišadic Philosophy. p. 345. 5 BG. VI-15, 41 to 45. Ibid. XVIII-56, 58, 62. 7 Mo. Pa. 17 to 19. . 8 Ibid. 20, 77., Jñana. LXI 26, 27. 9 Tattvänusasana, 198. 10 Mala. 567.

Page #259

VII. THE JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES
237
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PERFECTED SAGE: After portraying the comparison and the contrast between the Jaina view and the views of the Gitā and the Upanişads concerning the pursuance of right conduct in its various aspects, we now propose to represent the similarities and dissimilarities in the conception of perfected mystic or the ideal sage as propounded by Jainism, the Gitā and the Upanisads. We are concerned with the characteristics which a mystic has evolved in his person by virtue of his strenuous striving after the spiritual path. First, he has banished and brushed aside all the desires from theʻtexture of his own self because of his exclusive occupation with the accomplishment of the supreme desire, namely, the realisation of the Atman, thus seeking consummate satisfaction in the self by the self. His undertakings exhibit destitution from desire. On account of his self-control, renunciation of all Parigraha and desires, and conquest of all the senses, he escapes and eludes the bondage despite his performance of actions, 3 for the benefit and guidance of mankind. In other words, he remains uncontaminated by the fruits of actions like the leaf of lotus which does not get polluted by water. In short, the perfect Yogi sees action in inaction and inaction in action. We find concordance on this point when Jainism announces that the consummate mystic has extirpated the inimical passions depriving the self of highest attainments along with the conceptual transformations of the mind and rests satisfied with the Atmanic experience. His mental, vocal and physical actions are neither impelled by desire nor born of ignorance. The activities of .standing, sitting, walking and preaching, knowing and seeing are not the results of desire, and consequently they are incapable of enmeshing the self in bondage. Just as a mother educates her child for its benefit and a kind physician cures diseased orphans, so also the perfected mystic instructs humanity for its upliftment and dispenses spiritual pills to suffering humanity.10 He is the leader of man-kind.11 Secondly, the crowning experience of the mystic has made possible the termination of all sorrows, since the mystic experiences the self
1 Ka. Up. II. 3. 14.; Mu. Up. III. 2. 2.; B.G. II. 55. 2 B.G. IV. 19.
3 Ibid. IV, 21; V. 7. Ibid. III. 25. 5 Chā. Up. IV. 14-3. 6 B.G. IV. 18.
7 Svayambhū. 67. Bo. Pă. 40. 8 Svayambhū. 74.
Svayambhu. 73. Niyama. 173 to 175. . 10 Svayambha. 11, 35. 11 Ibid. 35.

Page #260

238
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
everywhere. According to Jainism, he has put an end to all sorrows because he has destroyed all attachment to the objects of the world. Thirdly, Jainism, the Gitā, and the Upanişads concur with one another regarding the fact that by virtue of self-realisation or establishment in Brahmanic experience, the perfect mystic has transcended the dualities of friends and foes, pleasure and pain, praise and censure, life and death, sand and gold, attachment and aversion.2 Fourthly, in view of the Kathopanişad and the Mundakopanişad the tangles of the heart of the perfected mystic are unravelled. In other words, on account of his arriving at the acme of realisation, the mystic is freed from all doubts whatsoever. According to Jainism, the mystic has intuitively known all the objects of the world, owing to the outright removal of all the filth of karman;t consequently the invasion of any doubt is out of question.5 Fifthly, he who has ascended the mystical heights has necessarily identified himself with evenness and equanimity and kept himself away from the accumulation of the detrimental elements of Punya and Pāpa. The Bodhapāhuda opines that the Arahanta has transcended Punya and Pāpa etc., and equanimity follows from this by implication. Sixthly, the Kathopanişad and the Gitā recognise that the excellent mystic experiences illimitable bliss. The Mokşapāhuda pronounces that the Yogi after making conceit, deceit, anger and pride extinct, and after attaining pure nature realises happiness par-excellence. Seventhly, the state of the saint who has achieved culmination in Yoga, is totally opposed to the persons pursuing ordinary life. What is night for all beings is the time of waking for the perfected soul; and what is waking time for all beings is the night for the sage who has attained perfection. 10 According to Kundakunda, the true Yogi sleeps in Vyavahāra, while he is awake in his own work of self realisation.11 The Acārāṇga tells us that the unwise sleep, the sages always awake.12 Samantabhadra speaks that being impelled by the desire to live and enjoy, the commonplace persons work hard in the day, and getting
1 B.G. II. 65; V. 26. 1. Up. 7.; Mu. Up. III. 1. 2. 2 Prava. III. 41.; Svayambhū. 10.; Ka. Up. I. 2. 12.; B.G. VI. 7, 8, 9.; II. 56, 57. 3 Ka. Up. II. 3, 15., Mu. Up. II. 2, 8.
4 Prava. I. 15. 5 Prava. Il-105. 6 B.G. II. 50.; V-19.; Mu. Up. III. 1, 3. 7 Bo. Pā. 30. 8 Ka. Up. I. 2, 13.; B. G. VI. 28. 9 Mo. Pā. 45. 10 B.G. II. 69. 11 Mo. Pā. 31.
12 Acārā. I. 3, 1. (P 28).

Page #261

VII. THE JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES 239
tired, they resort to sleep at night; but the mystic keeps awake day and night in the process of self-purification and self-realisation without being overwhelmed by indolence, inertia and looseness. In spite of all this happy concurrence, the fundamental difference that remains is that the mystic according to Jainism, though having full experience of the Ātman, does not experience it everywhere like the mystic of the Upanişad and the Gītā. Eighthly, the saint who has ascended the sublime heights is like an impenetrable rock. Anything dashing itself against it shatters itself. In a similar vein, he who persecutes such a holy personage causes ruin to himself.2 Samantabhadra says that desolation and perdition stare one in the face who caluminate such lofty spirits.3 Ninthly, the Mundakopanişad tells us that a man who wishes to be prosperous should adore the mystic who has realised the self.4 Jainism affirms that the pious name of the mystic serves as an aid for the accomplishment of auspicious and desired purposes. Tenthly, there exists nothing which is required to be achieved by that mystic who takes delight in the self and who is content and satisfied with the self. He does not need any of the things of the world for any interest of his. In view of Jainism the saint has done what ought to have been done by resorting to pure meditation.7
LIBERATION IN DIFFERENT SYSTEMS: We now turn to the ethical concepts of the systems like. Nyāya-Vaiseșika, Sāņkhya-Yoga, PūrvaMīmāmsā, Vedānta of Samkara and lastly early Buddhism. Though these systems except the early Pūrva-Mīmāmsā conceive liberation as the Summum Bonum of human life, they differ widely in expounding its nature. Some schools of thought describe it negatively as freedom from sorrows and sufferings, as an escape from the trammels of Saṁsāra, while the others describe it as a positive attainment of happiness or bliss. The champions of the former view are the Vaiseșikas, the early Naiyāyikas, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and some among the later Mīmāṁsakas, and the early Buddhists. Of the latter view are the Jainas, the later Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṁsakas, and the Advaita-Vedāntins. Not only these systems differ in the nature of deliverance, but also they show
3 Svayambhü. 69.
1 Svayambhū. 48. 2 Cha. Up. I. 2, 8. 4 Mu. Up. 3, 1, 10.5 Svayambhu. 7. 6B. G. III. 17, 18.; Sve. Up. II. 2. 14. 7 Svayambhi. 110.

Page #262

240
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
divergence in the possibility of its attainment here or elsewhere, in this world or hereafter. The former is styled Jivanmukti, while the later is Videhamukti. Jainism, Advaita Vedānta, Samkhya-Yoga and Buddhism subscribe to both the above mentioned views, while the Nyāya-Vaiseșika' and the Mīmāṁsā recognise the latter view to the exclusion of the former. According to the Nyāya-Vaišeșika, the self is an independent principle having for its qualities desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition. These qualities are not the eternal associates of the self but emerge when the self acquires bodily form. Thus consciousness or knowledge etc., are adventitious qualities of the self,2 consequently disappearing when it attains liberation. Since pleasure is incapable of being experienced without being tainted with pain, the emancipated condition implies the absolute cessation of both. Uddyotakara puts forth that for the experience of everlasting pleasure in the redeemed state, everlasting body is requisite, since experience is not possible without bodily mechanism.3 From the enunciation of Uddyotakara it follows that release while living in this body is out of question. But both Uddyotakara, and Vātsyāyana give credence to a stage corresponding to Jīvanmukti, "such a person will not be divorced from his physical or mental adjuncts; but narrow love and hate will have disappeared from him altogether with the selfish activity that proceeds from them."4 We may add here that the negative concept of liberation was soon rejected by the later Naiyāyikas like Bhāsarvajña and others and the positive idea of freedom as blissful state superseded the former one. The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsaka thinkers like Jaimini and Sabara were not concerned with the problem of ultimate release, but regarded heaven as the highest end of man. But the later Mīmāṁsakas like Kumārila and Prabhākara occupied themselves with liberation as the ideal of life. Like the Nyāya-Vaiseșika, consciousness and other mental states are not regarded as inherent in the soul by the Mīmāmsakas. Hence liberation is devoid of pleasure and pain. Some other Mīmāmsakas hold that emancipation is not merely a state free from pain, but it is also one of eternal bliss.7 These conceptions of liberation correspond to the two aforementioned
1 N. Sū. I. !. 10. 2N. Sů. Bhāşya. I. 1, 10. 3 Ibid. J. 1, 1. JV. 1. 58. 4 Outlines of Indian Philosophy. p. 266. 5 Nyāyasára. pp. 39-41.; cf. N. Sü. Bhäsya.. I. 1, 22. Šāstradīpika. p. 188: 7 Sastradipikā, pp. 126-127. Mänameyodaya. Pp. 87 to 89.

Page #263

VII.-THE JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES 241
views advocated by the Naiyāyikas. The Sāņkhya-Yoga represents the negative conception of liberation, but consciousness has been conceived
re as the essence of individual self and not a separable quality as in the Nyāya-Vaiseșika and the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. Mukti is not the manifestation of bliss, since the Puruşa is free from all attributes.? When discrimination arises, Praksti does not forth-with free the Puruşa, for, on account of the momentum of past habits, its work continues for some little time. This is jīvanmukti. At death the Jīvanmukta attains disembodied liberation which is a state of absolute and complete freedom from suffering.3 According to the Advaita-Vedānta of Samkara, Mokşa consists in the identification of individual self with the Brahman, the universal reality, the essence of the universe. It is not merely the absence of misery, but a positive state of bliss. This state is capable of being achieved even in this world while one is having the body. We shall deal with the Buddhist conception of Nirvāṇa subsequently while dealing with the four noble truths of Buddha. Jainism views the attainment of infinite knowledge, infinite bliss etc., as necessary correlates of emancipation. The concept of Tirthamkara illustrates the possibility of attaining divine status even when the physical frame continues. We have already dwelt upon this conception in a previous chapter. The state of Videhamukti is to attain Siddhahood.
AVIDYĀ IN DIFFERENT SYSTEMS: Before dwelling upon the process of ascending the sublime heights, we first propose to reckon with the principle responsible for the ills and maladies of the mundane career. Such a principle is styled Avidyā recognised by all the systems of Indian philosophy except the materialists. It keeps the self moving in the cycle of rebirths and eclipses the happy aspects of life. Though the function of Avidyā has been unanimously recognised as casting a veil over the true nature of things, yet the nature has been diversely conceived in conformity with the metaphysical position upheld by them. To begin with the Nyāya school, Moha which is not other than Mithyājñāna is the sole cause of worldly career. It engenders Rāga (attachment) and Dveșa (aversion) which occasion the threefold action of mind, body and speech.s This Pravștti (volitional activity) entails merit (Dharma) and demerit
1 Samkhyapravacana Sūtra. V. 74. (vide RADHAKRISHNAN, I.P. Vol. II. p. 313). 2 S.K. 67 (Trans. RADHAKRISHNAN, I.P. Vol. II p. 313.) 3 Ibid. 68. 4N. Sü. Bhâsya. IV. 1.3. 5 Ibid. IV. 1. 6.

Page #264

242
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
(Adharma) which accumulate in the self to act as the condition for the creation of new body in the next birth out of the material elements. This birth is accompanied with suffering. Regarding the nature of Mithyā. jñāna Vātsyāyana says: delusion (moha) consists in upholding the notself for the self. It is the erroneous knowledge that 'I am the Body'. Under its influence the self identifies itself with the body, the sense organs, the mind, the feelings and the cognitions. The Vaiseșika has not developed any independent theory of nescience and follows the Nyāya school of thought. According to the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, the performance of Nişiddha and Kāmya Karmas and non-performance of Nitya and Naimittika Karmas are the causes of bondage.3 In view of the SāņkhyaYoga the non-discrimination between Purusa and Praksti is the root cause of all our anguish and afflictions. The confusion between the two is due to nescience (Avidyā) on account of which one apprehends noneternal as eternal, impure as pure, sorrow as pleasure, and non-soul as soul. According to the Yogadarśana, Avidyā is a Kleśa and is the root of other four Kleśas, namely, Asmitā (egoism), Rāga (attachment), Dvesa (aversion) and Abhinivesa (desire for life). To identify falsely the Puruşa and Buddhi is Asmitā (egoism), or to believe Purusa as the doer and the enjoyer is egoism.? Rāga (attachment) is indulgence in pleasure after the revival of the previous one.8 Devșa (aversion) is anger in the previous pain. The apprehension of losing the body and the objects of pleasure on account of death is Adhiniveśa.10 Thus Klešas perpetuate the world process and its sorrows and sufferings. We may point out here that these five Klesas correspond to the five Viparvāsas (perversions) of the Sāņkhya Kārikā namely Avidyā-Tama, AsmitaMoha, Rāga-Mahāmoha, Dvesa-Tamisra, Abhiniveśa-Andhatamisra.11 According to Samkara, Avidyā implies the superimposition of the objects upon the self-illuminating subject and the superimposition of subject upon the object, as 'I am this' and this is mine. "It is due to this mutual superimposition of the Ātman and the un-Ātman that there arises all
IN. Sü. Bhāsya. III. 2. 60. 2 N. Sū. IV. 2. 1.; N. Sú. Bhāsya. IV. 2. 1. Introduction. p. 762-763. 3 RADHAKRISHNAN, I. P. Vol. II. p. 418.
4 Y. Sū. II. 5, 24. 5 Ibid. II. 3, 4.
6 Y. Su. & Bhäsya. II. 6. 7 Y. Sū. and Bhoja Vrtii. II. 6. 7.
8 Y. Sū. II. 7. 9 Y. Sú & Bhäsya. II. 8.
10 Y. Sú. and Bhoja Vștti. II. 9. 11 S. K. 48.; Y. Sū. & Bhasya. I. 8.

Page #265

. VII. JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES
243
the practical distinctions of ordinary and Vedic life, pertaining to knowledge and its objects, prohibitions and injunctions, as also pertaining to Mokşa."1 We postpone the treatment of the Buddhistic conception of Avidyā to a later stage, while we shall deal with the four noble truths of Buddha. Here we may simply point out that Avidyā, according to Buddhism, consists in regarding suffering as happiness, a series of states of self as an abiding self, momentariness as permanence. In accordance with Jainism, the worldly existence is conditioned by Mithyādarśana, Mithyājñāna, and Mithyācāritra. These three are responsible for the perpetuation of the worldly career. Mithyādarśana is wrong attitude or belief, Mithyājñāna is wrong knowledge and Mithyācāritra is wrong conduct. It is not Mithyājñāna that is at the root of Sasmāra but Mithyadarśana, i.e., non-belief in the eternal principle of self as different from the body etc. Due to this non-belief knowledge and conduct become unauthentic i.e., in the absence of spiritual orientation, even profound knowledge and disciplined conduct are incapable of leading to superb heights. In the systems referred to, Avidyā is synonymous with perverted knowledge, hence the latter exclusively causes mundane existence. But this is unacceptable to the Jaina in view of his aforementioned threefold conditions of bondage.
ATTAINMENT OF LIBERATION: We now turn to deal with the process of attainment of Moksa, the veritable end of life. All the systems are one in assuming right knowledge as an authentic condition for the accomplishment of liberation, though the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā adds the performance of certain Karmas (actions) to it. With the Nyāya-Vaiseșika the true knowledge of the sixteen Padārthas2 is indispensable for emancipation. This may be reduced to the recognition of the fact that by the employment of the means of knowledge of the self as distinguished from the non-self precedes the state devoid of pleasures and pain. In the Sāmkhya-Yoga it is the discrimination between the
1 Vedānta Explained. Vol. I. p. 4. 2 The sixteen Padārthas are:(1) Pramāņa (Pratyakşa, Anumāna, Upamāna, and Sabda), (2) Prameya (Atmā, Sarīra, Indriya, Artha, Buddhi, Manas, Pravștti, Doğa, Pretyābhāva, Phala Duḥkha, and Apavarga), (3) Sambaya, (4) Prayojana (5) Drstānta (6) Siddhanta (7) Avayava (8) Tarka (9) Nirnaya (10) Vāda (11) Jalpa (12) Vitandā (13) Hetvābhāsa (14) Chala (15) Jāti (16) Nigrahasthāna. See N. Sü. I. 1. 1.; N. Sü. I. 1. 3.; N. Sü. I. 1.9.

Page #266

244
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
Purusa and the actions of Praksti that leads one to salvation. The Sāmkhya Kārikā says "the knowledge that "I am not" (nāsmi) that "naught is mine” (na me) and that “the ego exists not" (nāham) leads to release. This is simply the expression of the result of discrimination. The School of Pūrva-Mīmāmsā lays stress on the abstention from Kāmya (optional) and the Pratişiddha (Prohibited) Karmas and the performance of Nitya (obligatory) and Naimittika (conditional) Karmas to avoid becoming entangled in the miseries of Samsāra. But the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṁsā explicitly gives acceptance to the need for Jñāna as a means of release. According to Samkara, deliverance is effected by true knowledge of one's own identity with the Brahman. The self is really Brahman, but owing to Avidyā it is oblivious of its innate glory and magnificence which can be restored by veritable knowledge of the fact that 'I am Brahman. In the view of the Buddhist the knowledge of the four noble truths propounded by Buddha is essential for achieving Nirvāņa.4 The right knowledge we have referred to should not be confounded with theoretical knowledge. It should be elevated to the level of intuition by resorting to a certain process called Yoga. The Nyāya-Vaiseșika and the Vedānta prescribe the threefolds way for securing intuitive knowledge namely, 1) scriptural study and the guidance of a competent Guru (sravaņa), 2) reflection on what has been read and taught to attain firm conviction of truth (manana), 3) meditation upon the real nature of self (nididhyāsana). The nature of truth realised is different in the two systems. In addition to this the Nyāya-Vaiseșika6 refers to the eight-fold path enjoined by the Sāmkhya-Yoga to know the truth. The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā also endorses this. The Advaita Vedānta prescribes four pre-requisites conditions of Brahma-Jñāna, namely, 1) the discrimination between what is abiding and what is not abiding, 2) Nonattachment to the mundane and extra-mundane objects of pleasure and pain, 3) possession of tranquility, restraint, dispassion, endurance, alertness and faith, 4) the desire for final liberation. In the words of Dr. Date, “The spark of Caitanya in man cannot be kindled into the flame of spiritual life and felt to be continuous with Brahmanic life,
1 Y. ST. & Bhäsya & Bhoja Vịtti. II. 25, 26. 2 S. K.-64. (Trans. vide Radhakrishnan I. pp. 309. Vol. II.) 3 Prakarana Panjikā. p. 157.
4 Ani-III. 61-6. 5 N. Sü. IV. 2. 38.; 47 to 49.
6 N. Su. IV. 2. 46. 7 Prakarana Pañjika. pp. 154 to 157. 8 Vedanta Explained, Vol. I. p. 8.

Page #267

-VII. JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES
245
unless sincere moral efforts and devotional meditations are resorted to".1 Devotion in Samkara, as has been pointed out by Dr. Date, in the newly published volume, for the first time in the history of Vedāntic interpretations, refers to the living mystic "who has himself realised the Brahman and who, therefore, can be called a concrete, personified, Saguņa incarnation or Avatāra of Brahman.” To compare the above systems with the views adduced by the Jaina, it is not right knowledge alone that is responsible for emancipating the self from worldly existence as such, but right belief and right conduct should also be added to the cause of Moksa. Jainism says that the other systems also recognise that just after the dawn of enlightenment the soul does not renounce the body on account of the persistence of Prārabdha Karmas. Hence a separate effort is requisite to dispel them and that effort is Cāritra in the form of two types of Sukla Dhyāna. Thus in addition to right knowledge and right belief, right conduct should also be admitted as the direct to salvation.. In view of this the recognition of Vidyānandi that the existence of enlightened personages in the world will be inexplicable if right knowledge alone is regarded as the cause of emancipation is justifiable. We may point out here that by Dr. Date's interpretation of Devotion, Samkara's view has come very close to Jainism, though not metaphysically yet spiritually. Jainism subscribes to the view of Ācārya Bhakti which is devotion to a living Guru. The Bhāvapāhuậa tells us that the Ātman should be meditated upon after knowing it from the Guru.5 The Dravyasamgraha points out that meditation should be ..conducted on the syllables imparted by the Guru... We need not go into the details of the ethics of Nyāya-Vaiseșika, Vedānta, Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, inasmuch as, in the first place, they have not developed an independent theory of ethics, and secondly, they remained dependent on the Upanişads, the Gita and the Yoga system for ethical process. The ethics of the former two have already been dealt with. We shall now dwell upon the eight-fold path of Yoga and the four noble truths of Buddha, since they are closely comparable with the Jaina Acāra.
EIGHT-FOLD PATH OF YOGA: To begin with the Yoga, the term Yoga does not signify any sort of conjunction or union of the self with the other reality like God or the Absolute, but implies the arrest and
1 Vedānta Explained, Vol. II. p. 535. 41. Śly. p. 72.
2 Ibid. Vol. II. p. 524. 5 Bkāva Pā. 64.
31. Álv. p. 66. 6 Dravya. 49.

Page #268

246
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
negation of mental modifications, the practical discrimination between the Puruşa and Praksti,2 and the attainment of, and establishment in, the original nature of Puruşa 3 These three implications are not separate from one another. One leads to the other without being incompatible. Another meaning ascribed to the word Yoga by Patañjali is indicative of the process to achieve the above ideal.4 The equivalent expression in Jainism for the term "Yoga" in the sense of the highest state is Suddhopayoga, Samādhi and Dhyāna, wherein the conceptual transformations of the mind occurring in the form of auspicious and inauspicious deliberations are stopped and negated in their entirety on account of the fact that the self has established itself exclusively in its own intrinsic purity and excellence. The practical discipline to be adopted for this highest ascent is styled Căritra (conduct) as compared with the other meaning attributed to 'Yoga' as has been shown above. The actualisation of such a state is not a bed of roses, as may perhaps be conceived, but necessitates an arduous and persistent effort on the part of the Sādhaka. The most general and fundamental discipline required to ascend the sublime heights consists in developing detachment (vairāgya) and in adhering to incessant practice (abhyāsa). The former comprises the spirit of denial from indulging in the attractions of the world or the pleasures of the heaven;6 the latter signifies the endeavour to proceed on the Yogic path for curbing the unstable nature of mind and that too for a long time without any break. Vairāgya is negative in character, while Abhyāsa is positive. The former includes wholesale turning from the objects of the transitory world, whereas the latter induces the self to pursue the Yogic path. The twelve reflections (anuprekşās): enunciated by the Jaina Acāryas are potent enough to engender the spirit of detachment from the sordid ways of the world and to give impetus for the constant application of one's own energies to higher life. Thus Vairāgya, and Abhyāsa summarise the whole Yogic movement. Patañjali enjoins eight-fold means of Yogic process, the constant and single minded devotedness to which bears the fruit in the form of emancipation after the filth of nescience is wiped out. They are 1) Yama, 2) Niyama, 3) Āsana, 4) Prāņāyāma, 5) Pratyāhāra, 6) Dhāraṇā, 7) Dhyāna and 8) Samādhi.10
1 Y. Sū. I. 2. 2 Ibid. II. 25, 26. 3 Ibid. I. 3.; IV. 34. 4 Y. Sū. & Vrtti-II. 1. 5 Y. Sú. I. 12. 6 Y. Sü. Bhoja Vrtti. I. 15.
7 Y. Su. I. 13, 14. 8T. Sū. IX. 7. 9 Y. Sū. Bhāsya & Vrtti. II. 28.
10 Y. Sū. II. 28.

Page #269

- VII. JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES
247
1) Yama is of five kinds. (a) Ahimsă (non-injury) (b) Satya (truthfulness) (C) Asteya (non-stealing) (d) Brahmacarya (celibacy) (e) Aparigraha (non-acquisition)." The pronouncement of Patañjali that these Yamas may bear the credit of Mahāvratas2 when they transcend the limitations of kind, space, time, and purpose indicate the possibility of the limited or partial Vratas. Besides, we may derive by implication that Patañjali is in favour of ascetic life, inasmuch as the life of the householder inevitably presents certain stumbling blocks in the way of observing Mahāvratas. Hence the life of asceticism constitutes an indispensable discipline of the yogic process. The Vyāsa-Bhāşya pronounces Ahimsā to be at the root of both Yama and Niyama and further tells us that Yama and Niyama are pursued to observe Ahimsā in its pure and unadulterated form.3 These Mahāvratas are in perfect agreement with the Mahāvratas4 prescribed for a Jaina monk along with Ahiṁsā as the basiss which we have already dealt with. The Aņuvratas are for the householder. It is not possible to guess the mind of Patañjali regarding the limited character of vows from his Sūtras, but Vyāsa seems to have included the killing of animals etc., for some purpose or the other under partial vows, which spirit is quite repugnant to Jainism.. Jainism observes that the householder should refrain from the Himsă of mobile beings.7
2) Niyama. It is also of five kinds8 (a) Sauca (purity). (b) Samtoșa (contentment). (c) Tapa (austerities), (d) Svādhyāya (scriptural study) (e) Isvaraprasidhāna (devotion to God). The Sādhaka who has purged his mind of sins cultivates the above mentioned positive virtues. The Jaina Ācāryas prescribe a number of virtues to be assimilated by the aspirant, namely, forbearance, modesty, straightforwardness, purity from greed, truth, self-restraint, austerity, renunciation, non-attachment, and celibacy. Svādhyāya has been included in internal austerity, while devotion, in Stuti and Vandanā. We have already explained the number of practices observed by a saint, hence they need no reiteration. The statement of Patañjaliio that when the aspirant finds himself under the sway of sinful thoughts he should throw them aside by reflecting on their evil consequences in order to regain firmness in the virtuous path, may be compared with the pronouncement of the Tattvārthasūtrall that for
1 Y. Sú. II. 30. 4 Ca. Pā. 30, 31.; Ācāra. II. 15. 7 Ca. Pā. 24. 10 Y. Sū. II. 33, 34.
2 Ibid. II. 31. 5 Sarvārtha. VII. 1. 8 Y. Sū. II. 32. 11 Ta. Sů. VII. 9.
3 Y. Sú. & Bhasya. II. 30. 6 Y. Sü. & Bhäşya. II. 31. 9 Ta. Su. IX. 6.

Page #270

248
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
the proper maintenance of the vows one should reflect on the afflictions that may befall here and hereafter as a result of not observing them properly or violating them.
3) Āsana and 4) Prāņayāma. Steady and comfortable posture is Asana. Rythmical and Regulated breathing is Prāņāyāma. The importance of posture has also been recognised in Jainism. The Mülācāra tells us that the saint engaged in study and meditation is not subjected to sleep and passes his night in some caves after having seated himself in the postures of Padmāsana, or Vīrāsana and the like.3 The Kārttikeyānuprekşā and the Jñānārņava prescribe certain postures to practise meditation. We have already dealt with these. Prāņāyāma has not found favour with Jainism. This recognition may be corroborated by the enunciation of Subhacandra that Prāņayāma acts as a barricade to the saint aspiring to emancipation, on account of the acquisition of supernormal powers by it, though he recognises its importance for the development of concentration.
5) Pratyāhāra. It implies the withdrawal of the senses from their natural objects of attractions. This may be compared with the control of five senses as one of the Mūlaguņas of the Jaina monk.8
These five constitute the moral and the intellectual preparation of the saints who move higher on the spiritual path. The external and internal distractions at this stage lose all their potency to seduce the aspirant. Nevertheless, certain obstacles may intervene and imperil his advancement. They are: 1) Vyādhi (sickness)-disturbance of physical equilibrium, 2) Styāna (languor)—the lack of mental disposition for work, 3) Samśaya (Indecision)—thought debating between the two sides of a problem, 4) Pramāda (heedlessness)—the lack of reflection on the means of samādhi, 5) Ālasya (Indolence)-inertia of mind and body owing to heaviness, 6) Avirati (sensuality)—the desire aroused when sensory objects possess the mind, 7) Bhrānti darśana (false, invalid notion)-false knowledge, 8) Alabdhabhūmikatva (inability to see reality because of psychomental mobility), 9) Anavasthititva (Instability which hampers the stability of mind, in spite of achieving Yoga Bhūmi). This
1 Y. Sū. II. 46.
2 Ibid. II. 49, 50. 3 Müla. 794, 795. 4 Kärtti. 355; Jñānā. XXVIII. 10. 5 Jñānā. XXX. 6, 11. 6 Ibid. XXIX. 1. 7 Y. Sū. II. 54, 55.
8 Mülā. 16. 9 Y. Sū. & Bhäsya. I. 30. (Trans. partly from 'Yoga, Immortality and Freedom' by Micrcea Eliade. p. 381.)

Page #271

VII. JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES
249
concept of obstacles may be compared with the twentytwo Parīşahas in Jainism but the details do not correspond to each other. The cultivation of friendship with the prosperous, compassion towards the unhappy, commendation for the meritorious and indifference towards the vicious have been recognised as aids to mental purification. The Tattvārthasūtra also prescribes universal friendship with the living beings in general, commendation for the virtuous, compassion for the distressed, and indifference towards the immodest, in order to facilitate the pi observance of the vows.2
6) Dhāraṇā, 7) Dhyāna and 8) Samādhi. These are the "three stages of one and the same process of concentration on an object."3 “They are so much alike that the Yogin who attempts one of them (Dhāraņā) cannot easily remain in it and sometimes finds himself quite against his will slipping over into Dhyāna or Samādhi. It is for this reason that these last three yogic exercises have a common nameSamyama.”'4 Dhāraṇā is fixation of mind on a particular object. Dhyāna implies the continuous flow of thought on that object. When Dhyāna becomes free from the distinctions of subject, object and the process of meditation we have Samadhi.? This Samādhi admits of two-fold classification, Samprajñāta and Asamprajñāta, or Sabīja and Nirbīja or Sālambana and Nirālambana. Jainism does not distinguish between Dhyāna and Samādhi; rather it includes these under Sukla Dhyāna which is of four types. Samprajñāta Samādhi may be compared with the Pộthaktva-Vitarka and Ekatva-Vitarka types of Sukla-Dhyāna and Asamprajñāta Samādhi, with the consummation of Ekatva Vitarka type of Sukla Dhyāna. Here the soul, according to Jainism, attains omniscience; this is embodied liberation. The disembodied liberation is arrived at by the last two types of Sukla Dhyāna, Sūksmakriya Pratipāti and Vyupäratakriyā-Nivștti.
In spite of these certain resemblances, there are fundamental differences with the mystical way adopted by the Jaina monk. Yoga system has not recognised the imperativeness of mystical conversion, probably confuses moral with mystical conversion, the importance of initiation by a Guru, and the necessity of seeking his guidance at every step, the possibility of fall from certain heights, i.e., dark-nights of the soul, the
1 Y. Sü. & Bhasya. I. 33. 2 Ta. Sū. VII. 11. 3 Yoga of the Saints. p. 87. 4 Y. Sū. III. 4. (Trans. vide Yoga, Immortality and Freedom. p. 70). 5 Y. Sú. III. 1.
6 Ibid. III. 2.
7 Y. ST. & Bhasya. III. 3.

Page #272

250
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
significance of Pratikramana, and Pratyākhyāna. All these factors are of enormous importance for mystical advancement.
FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS OF BUDDHA: We now proceed to early Buddhism. The attitude of Buddha towards life may be judged by the statement; "One who indulges in theoretical speculation on the soul and the world while he is writhing in pain, behaves like the foolish man with a poisonous arrow plunged into his flank, whiling away time on idle speculation regarding the origin, the maker and the thrower of the arrow, instead of trying to pull it out immediately."1 Hence Dr. RADHAKRISHNAN rightly remarks: "We find in the early teaching of Buddhism three marked characteristics, an ethical earnestness, an absence of any theological tendency and an aversion to metaphysical speculation? His promulgation of the four noble: truths which concerns suffering. (duḥkha) and its cause (duḥkha-samudaya), its removal (duḥkha-nirodha) and the way to remove it (duḥkhanirodha-mārga) sums up his entire ethical outlook." Out of the seven Tattvas in Jainism the five Tattvas, which are designated as Asrava, Bandha, Samvara, Nirjarā and Mokşa may be compared with these four noble truths proclaimed by Buddha. Bandha Tattva corresponds to suffering; Asrava to its origin; Moksa answers to its removal, and Samvara and Nirjară, to the way to remove suffering.
The First noble truth is concerned with the experience of universal suffering. Birth, old age, disease, death, bewailings, association with the unpleasant, any craving that is unsatisfied, separation from the pleasantall are painful and fraught with misery. In short, the five aggregatesRūpa, Vijñāna, Vedanā, Samjñā and Samsakāra-are painful.4 According to Jainism Karmic bondage may be equated with suffering.
Buddha's Second noble truth, the cause of suffering may be explained by taking recourse to his doctrine of dependent origination which signifies that the existence of everything is conditional. The existence of suffering (jarā-maraṇa) is on account of birth (jāti) which is due to the will-to-be born (bhava) which is again due to clinging (upādāna) which again is due to craving (trsņā) which again is due to feeling or sense experience (vedanā), which again is due to sense-object-contact (sparsa), which again is due to the six-organs-of-cognition (şaļāyatana) which is 1 Majjhima-Nikāya-Sutta, 63. (WARREN. p. 120. vide An Introduction to Indian Philosophy.)
2 Indian Philosophy. Vol. I. p. 358.. 3 Ani. III. 61. 6.; D.Ni. XXII. 4. 5. D. Ni. XXII. 4. 5.

Page #273

VII. JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES
251
due to name and form (nāma and rūpa), which is due to consciousness (vijñāna) which is due to predispositions (saṁskāras) and which are lastly due to ignorance (avidyā). Thus the root of the whole world process is beginningless Avidyā. “This process of origination is beginningless and Avidyā (ignorance) and Trsņā (craving) are the parents of this process. Trşņā (craving) is the mother, and Avidyā (ignorance) is the father."i "One under the sway of Avidyā mistakes the impermanent for the permanent because of one's delusion about truth.”2 Dr. RADHAKRISHNAN Says "To be ignorant of the true nature of “I” and of the four noble truths” constitutes Avidyā.3 According to Jainism, Sāmparāyika Asrava which is due to Mithyādarśana (wrong belief) Mithyājñāna (wrong knowledge) and Mithyācāritra (wrong conduct) is at the root of the world-process.
The Third noble truth is concerned with the cessation of suffering or the attainment of Nirvana. With the elimination of the cause, the effect must pass away. The word Nirvāṇa literally implies 'blowing out or cooling. The former suggests annihilation, while the latter, only the dying out of hot passion. The recognition of the fact that Buddha got enlightenment and that he preached for the upliftment of humanity goes to prove that Nirvāṇa cannot be extinction. It is simply the destruction of passions. The reason for the uncertainty of the nature of Nirvāṇa in early Buddhism is that the answer to the question was not regarded as ethically important.4 "Buddha's silence might just mean that the state of liberation cannot be described in terms of ordinary experience". When not inclined to commit himself to any definite view on the subject Buddha used to say (e.g. in the Brahmajāla and Potthapāda Suttas) that Nirvāṇa connoted neither existence nor non-existence separately nor did it mean both or neither of them at once. It was indescribable in language." "But being opposed to annihilationism, he taught also in negative terms, that Nirvāṇa was putting an end to the ills of life and that it was equivalent to escape from a world enveloped in the flame of desire, i.e., the extinction of all desires of attachment, aversion and delu
1 Larkāvatāra Sūtra p. 138. (vide TATIA, Studies in Jaina Philosophy. p. 127). 2 Madhyānta-Vibhāga. Sütra-Bāsya. p. 35. (vide Tatia. Op. cit. p. 127.) 3 RADHAKRISHNAN I. p. vol. I. p. 416. 4 Potthapāda Sutta. IX. 3. 5 RADHAKRISHNAN Article "the teaching of Buddha by speech and silence" Hibbert Journal April, 1934 (vide DUTTA & CHATTERJEE, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy. p. 128.)
6 History of Philosophy: Eastern and Western p. 166.

Page #274

252
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
sion.” It is not only negative but positive also. “It is a state of serenity, equanimity and passionless self-possession. It cannot be described in terms of ordinary experiences; the best way of understanding it in the light of our imperfect experience is to think of it as a relief from all painful experience from which we suffer." The later Buddhist teacher Nāgasena tried to convey to the Greek king (Milinda) the idea of the blissful character of Nirvāṇa with a series of metaphors. According to Jainism, Moksa is the attainment of infinite knowledge, infinite bliss, infinite power, etc. Jainism definitely describes the nature of Moksa without any ambiguity as the cessation of all mundane misery and the attainment of positive bliss. There is thus little difference between the Jaina and the Buddhist views. The Yogin of Brahmanism, the Tīrthamkara of Jainism, and the Arhat of Buddhism, all these sail in the same boat. In spite of all these resemblances the denial of self in Buddhism is the major difference that remains between Jainism and Buddhism.
The Fourth noble truth is concerned with the way to remove suffering. Eight-fold path4 has been prescribed by Buddha namely, 1) Right view (sammadițțhi), 2) Right resolve (sammasamkappa), :3) Right speech (sammavāca), 4) Right conduct (sammakammanta), 5) Right livelihood (samma-ājiva), 6) Right effort (sammavāyāma), 7) Right. mindfulness (sammasati), 8) Right concentration (sammasamādhi). The Right view consists in the acquisition of the knowledge of four noble truths.5 The Jaina conduct also commences from the cultivation of right belief or right attitude but the content differs. 2) Right resolve embraces renunciation of attachment or ill-feeling towards others and of committing any injury to them. 3) Right speech is the relinquishment of falsehood, backbiting, harsh-language, and frivolous talk? 4) Right conduct consists in renouncing injury, stealing and sensual gratification.8 5) Right livelihood implies the earning by honest means. 6) Right effort signifies four sorts of endeavour: (a) not to allow fresh evils, (b) to strive to efface existing evils, (c) to make effort to develop new good ideas, (d) to adhere to the maintenance and the development of existing good ideas or virtues, 10 Right mindflulness implies the constant remembrance or contemplation of the nature of body, mind, harmful mental states like sensuality, doubt,
1 His. of Phil.: E. and W. p. 167. 2 Introduction to Indian Philosophy. p. 128. 3 Milinda-Pañha (vide Introduction to Indian Philosophy. p. 128.) 4 D. Ni. XXII. 5. Trans. Introduction to Indian Philosophy, pp. 129 to 132. 5 D. Ni. XXII. 4. 5. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. Ibid. 10 Ibid.

Page #275

VII. JAINA AND THE NON-JAINA INDIAN ETHICAL DOCTRINES
253
malice, indolence of mind and body, agitation of mind and body, and sensation of pleasure and pain. This helps the aspirant to remain detached from all the objects of the world and to avoid bondage to the mundane existence. 8) Right concentration: Four stages of concentration have been recognised. In the first stage, the aspirant having detached himself from lust and from evil dispositions, concentrates on reasoning and investigation and experiences joy and peace born of detachment. In the second stage he suppresses all reasoning and investigation and abides in a State of joy and ease born of concentration. In the third stage, he renounces the joy and peace born of concentration and abides in the consciousness of the bliss of equanimity. In the fourth stage he enters into a State of pure self-possession and equanimity without pain and without ease. This is a stage of absolute cessation of all suffering. Besides all these, the Brahmajāla Sutta and Sāmaññaphala Sutta give a number of virtues to be practised by saints. All these may be included under 1) Ahimsā 2) non-stealing;, 3) continence; 4) truthfulness with all its details of avoiding back-biting, harsh speech, useless gossip, and of speaking sweet, faultless, useful, precise and benevolent words; 5) taking meals once a day before noon; 6) abstinence from gold and silver, uncooked corn, cattle, women, servants, decorated bedding, and the like; 7) nondecoration of body; 8) non-engagement in useless fables of kings, thieves etc.; 9) non-indulgence in the mundane science of palmistry, astrology, astronomy, and miraculous feats. 10) complete control of five senses; 11) carefulness in walking, eating evacuating bowels, etc.; 12) contentment in clothing and begging. Adoring himself with these characteristics the saint sits for meditation in a secluded place. These virtues are practically similar to those pursued by Jaina monks. Three stages of right concentration may be compared with the two types of Sukla Dhyāna, namely, Přthaktva-vitarka and Ekatva-vitarka.. The consummation of the second Sukla Dhyāna may be compared with the fourth stage of concentration. This is Arhat state or embodied state of liberation. The disembodied state is the result of the other two types of Sukla Dhyāna.

Page #276

CHAPTER VIII
The Jaina and the Western Types of Ethical Doctrines
SUMMARY OF THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER: In the previous chapter we have, in the first place, dwelt upon the ethical views as propounded by the Rg-veda and the Brāhmaṇas, and evaluated the Upanişadic contents in the light of the Vedic hymns. Secondly, we have dealt with the nature of the moral ideal as advocated by the Gītā and the Upanişads. Thirdly, we have pointed out the nature of the obstacle preventing a man from realising the ideal, and have dealt with the distinctions between the converted and perverted souls, and the importance of Guru for imparting spiritual wisdom. Fourthly, after dealing with the incentives to spiritual life we have explained the importance of faith, knowledge, and conduct for surmounting the obstacles to the moral and the spiritual betterment. Fifthly, the negative side of conduct consisting in sweeping away sins and passions, in subduing the senses, in restraining the mind; and the positive aspect comprising the cultivation of virtues along with devotion and meditation, have been dealt with. Sixthly, the characteristics of the ideal sage have been expounded. Seventhly, the nature of the ethical ideal according to the important schools of Indian philosophy, the nature of the causes responsible for the ills and maladies of the worldly existence, and the process of the attainment of the mystical end have been explained. And lastly, we have dwelt upon the eightfold path of Yoga and the four noble truths of Buddha.
COMMENCEMENT OF THE ETHICAL SPECULATION IN THE WEST: Before the appearance of the Sophists, the Greek philosophers engaged themselves in cosmological enquiries. The pre-sophistic philosophy merely encountered ontological problems. The Sophists who flourished in the fifth century B.C. diverted their attention towards human conduct. Thereby they shifted the interest from the nature to man. This made the Sophistic teaching exclusively humanistic. But this sort of turn was not abrupt. “The naive and fragmentary utterances of sage precepts for conduct, in which nascent moral reflection everywhere first manifests itself, supply a noteworthy element of Greek literature in the "gnomic” poetry of the 7th and 6th centuries before Christ; their importance in the development of Greek civilisation is strikingly characterised by the traditional enumeration of the "seven sages" of the 6th century; and their influence on

Page #277

VIII. THE JAINA AND THE WESTERN TYPES OF ETHICAL DOCTRINES
255
ethical thought is sufficiently shown in the references that Plato and Aristotle make to the definitions and maxims of poets and sages."1 But the transition from such utterances to moral philosophy is quite as late as the origination of the Sophistic speculation. Thus the Sophists may be regarded as the pioneers in ethical science. The ethical speculation of the Jainas can be easily traced to a divine personality of the 23rd prophet, Pārsvanātha, who is believed to have lived in the 8th century B.C., though the Jaina tradition claims a remote antiquity for the commencement of its philosophy.
THE PROBLEM AND THE APPROACH: The normative science of ethics investigates the ultimate end of human conduct or what is known as the Summum Bonum or the supreme good of human life. In the words of Prof. SIDGWICK, "According to Aristotelian view, the primary subject of ethical investigation is all that is included under the notion of what is ultimately good or desirable for man; all that is reasonably chosen or sought by him, not as a means to some ulterior end, but for itself.”2 Thus ethics is required to be distinguished from positive sciences, inasmuch as it does not describe but evaluates. It estimates human conduct in terms of rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness and the like. The term conduct is another name for voluntary and habitual actions. It signifies deliberate actions. These deliberate actions presuppose persons performing them in accordance with some end in view. The actions may be right or wrong, the persons may be virtuous or vicious and lastly the end may be good or bad. "Moral virtue may be defined generally as the habitual tendency to pursue, always and with consciousness, the best attainable ends.": Again, the performance of deliberate actions entails, either directly or indirectly or in the both ways, the satisfaction of one or more human interests. But the science of ethics might lose all significance, if the mere existence of such interests in human nature would yield warrant for their gratification. At the outset, it may appear that ethical inquiry is unnecessary and frivolous, but this view must needs be abandoned in view of the following considerations. First, the satisfaction of all interests of the individual is impossible.. Hence preference must be given to some interests by keeping in view some principle of ethical selection. Secondly, the transgression of a
1 Outlines of the History of Ethics, p. 12. 3 Short History of Ethics, p. 18.
2 Outlines of the History of Ethics, pp. 1-2. * Short History of Ethics, pp. 5-6.

Page #278

256
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
certain limit in case of some interests not only proves to be subversive of their own satisfaction but also hampers the gratification of other interests. For example, too much indulgence in bodily appetites leads to bodily and mental ill-health and thereby interferes with other interests also. Thirdly, the interests of the different members of a society may be incompatible with one another; hence this necessitates the application of some ethical principle to arrive at practical harmony. The first two causes bring to lime light the need for an Individual ethics, and the third, for the Social ethics. The problems that present themselves before us are therefore: 1) the problem of the ethical Summum Bonum and 2) the problem of virtues.
Since the dawn of ethical consciousness in the West, diverse approaches have been made in the field of moral investigation. We shall confine our attention however to the solutions given by the Sophists, Socrates, the Socratic schools, Plato, Aristotle, Utilitarians, and Kant; and then we shall compare their views with the Jaina view.
THE PROBLEM OF ETHICAL SUMMUM BONUM: THE SOPHISTS: It is said that, “The Sophists brought philosophy down from heaven to the dwellings of men, and turned the attention from external nature to man himself; for them the proper study of mankind was man."! Hitherto the chief concern of the Greek philosophers was to ascertain the origin of the world. The Sophists not only evinced a negative attitude towards current ontological speculation, but also protested against the enigmatic conclusions of their predecessors, and consequently propounded subjectivity in knowledge by affirming that 'Man is the measure of all things' and that truth is relative to the subjective make up of the individual enunciating the statement.22 Epistemological subjectivism and relativism ended in ethical subjectivism and relativism. The good is entirely subjective and relative to the individual who achieves it. There are as many ethical ends as there are individuals. This reflects a state of moral anarchy And yet notwithstanding the subjectivistic trend of Protagoras in the field of knowledge and morals, the contribution made by him to the entire philosophy should not be underestimated. Man as such was considered to be of supreme importance. The realization of ethical good was made personal, which is tantamount to saying that morality, in its historical beginning, assumed an egoistic form. Now not egoism in
1 History of Philosophy, p. 61.
2 Ibid. p. 57.

Page #279

vin. THE JAINA AND THE WESTERN TYPES OF ETHICAL DOCTRINES 257
general but only exclusive egoism is detrimental. Besides, the great value of the entire Sophistic movement consisted in this: it awakened thought and challenged philosophy, religion, customs, morals and the institutions based on them, to justify themselves to reason. Now the age in which Mahāvīra was born resembled that of the Sophists in a great measure. In contrast to Protagoras, Mahāvīra did not depreciate metaphysical speculation, but denounced absolutism. He reconstructed metaphysics with epistemological objectivism as its basis, and thus became an exponent of the multiple nature of reality, technically known as Anekāntavāda. This attitude exercised its influence on ethical enquiry too. The good is not subjective but objective, though it is realised by individuals. Thus according to Jainism, Ahimsā is the objective good, the complete realization of which is possible in the plenitude of mystical experience. This is the moral and the spiritual egoism which distinguishes itself from the narrow and the selfish egoism of Protagoras. The former gives an impétus to the formulation of an ethical theory, while the latter leads us only to a chaos.
SOCRATES: Socrates combated the intellectual and moral chaos of the age, and protested against the subjectivity and relativity of the Sophists who reduced all morality to a matter of private caprice. Socrates conformed with the view of Protagoras that the good we seek is human well-being, but differed from him by saying that it is independent of the fluctuating choice of the individuals. It is not subjective, but objective, because it is capable of being made intelligible by means of general conceptions, which are the products of reason, the universal element in man. Thus according to Socrates knowledge is the highest good, and it is further identified with goodness. The corollary of this view is that no one is voluntarily bad. "By this knowledge' he did not mean of course a purely theoretical knowledge which needed only to be learnt, but an unshakable conviction based on the deepest insight into and realization of what is really valuable in life, a conviction such as he himself possessed."3 Besides, the knowledge with which true goodness is to be identified is knowledge of what is good for the human soul.4 "The only real harm is spiritual and produced only by one's own wrong doing.”5
1 Short History of Ethics, p. 34. 2 History of Philosophy, pp. 61-62. 3 Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, p. 102. 4 Greek Philosophy, p. 176. 5 Outlines of History of Greek Philosophy, p. 102.

Page #280

258
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
Jainism would subscribe to the view of Socrates that right knowledge and true belief are essential to right action, but denies that they necessarily issue in goodness. The irrational parts of the soul, namely, passions, cannot be lost sight of and very often these passions prevent a man from doing that which contributes to the well-being of the soul. The Socratic axiom of knowledge as goodness can only be justified by one who has ascended the mystical heights, but we have little evidence to show that Socrates meant this. That the real good is the good of the human soul is in conformity with the Jaina view. The highest good is spiritual and wrong actions obstruct spiritual progress.
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS: The manysidedness of the Socratic ethics gave rise to diametrically opposed schools of ethical thought, namely, those of the Cynics and the Cyrenaics founded by Antisthenes, and Aristippus respectively. These two founders endeavoured in their own way to represent the chief constituents of a life of well-being. Both agreed regarding human well-being as the highest good, but they differed enormously in point of the content which the life of well-being must include. The ideal of life advocated by the Cynics consists in the eradication of all desires, in the freedom from all wants, and in being completely independent of all possessions. It enjoins absolute asceticism and rigorous self-mortification. In contrast to the above-mentioned negative content as constituting the inner core of the life of well-being, the Cyrenaics laid stress on the positive attainment of the greatest amount of pleasure. They no doubt extolled bodily pleasures, but they escaped sensuality and bestiality, inasmuch as the need of prudence in the pursuit of pleasures was emphasized and advocated. The prudent cultivates self-control, postpones a more urgent to a less urgent desire in order to get more pleasure and less pain. "The Cyrenaic and Cynic doctrines tend towards exclusive egoism, whether as a pursuit of self-dependence or of pleasurable feeling.". In the view of the Jaina, the Cynic ideal will remain unrealisable so long as the Atmanic steadfastness is not arrived at. Mere negation will lead us nowhere. The internal and the external Aparigraha is incapable of being practised without spiritual possession. The Cynic failed to reconcile individual goodness with the social one. In conformity with the views of the Jaina, the life of the householder and that of the Muni can properly attune the individual with social uplift
Short History of Ethics, p. 41.

Page #281

VII. THE JAINA AND THE WESTERN TYPES OF ETHICAL DOCTRINES 259
ment. Exclusive egoism is suicidal, but spiritual egoism exemplified in the life of Ācāryas and Arahantas is compatible with social goodness. The Cynics could not bring forth the concept of social Aparigraha but went to the other extreme of mere individual Aparigraha and thus destroyed the social foundation and imperilled social living. The Aņuvratas prescribed for the layman strike a balance between asceticism and sensualism, and between absolute independence and complete dependence. The life of Mahāvratas, though individualistic in trend, is not incompatible with social goodness. The Cyrenaics moved in the direction of egoistic hedonism which is totally unacceptable to the Jaina. Egoistic hedonism does not go beyond bodily consciousness, it tends towards narrow selfishness and looks upon with contempt the philanthrophists sacrificing their lives for social good. "Crude hedonism contains within itself the germ of pessimism: the attainment of a preponderance of pleasure over pain seems impossible, and the exclusive pursuit of pleasures leads to boredom and frustration."1 The most common argument that may be advanced against egoistic hedonism is that we desire objects and not pleasure; pleasurable state is simply an accompaniment. That is why Jainism has laid stress on the pursuance of noble ends so that lasting pleasures may displace transitory ones.
· PLATO AND ARISTOTLE: As advocated by Plato, the transcendental world of ideas constitutes reality, and reason is the most characteristic aspect of the soul. The empirical objects of the world are but fleeting shadows of the enduring and immutable ideas, and consequently like the objects, the body and the senses are foreign to the soul's innate nature. The true life of the individual, therefore, consists in the freedom of the soul from the body and in contemplating the world of ideas. The veritable end of life finds expression in bringing into clear consciousness the latent memories of the past when the soul possessed the knowledge of the ideas. “The true art of living is really an "art of dying" as far as possible to mere sense, in order more fully to exist in intimate union with absolute goodness and beauty.”2 “This ascetic tendency of the Platonic philosophy culminates in mysticism."3 We are confronted with another view of the ethical ideal which emerged on account of the ascription of some value to the world of sense by virtue of the fact that the objects of the world
1 History of Philosophy, p. 72. 3 History of Philosophy, p. 91.
2 Outlines of the History of Ethics, p. 41.

Page #282

260
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
participate in ideas. The imprisonment of soul into body. meant the mingling of the rational part with the irrational parts known as the spirited part and the appetites. In view of this, the ethical ideal consists in the achievement of the harmony among the various parts of the soul. The irrational parts are not wiped off but subordinated under reason. This is what goes to form justice. "Such a man would not repudiate a deposit, commit sacrilege or theft, be false to friends, a traitor to his country or commit similar misdeeds."! Happiness results from such a life. By virtue of this trend Plato escapes narrow asceticism and makes room for social goodness. In view however of the fact that Aristotle rejected the transcendentalism of Plato and expounded the immanence of forms into things, the ethical Summum Bonum according to him, consists in the realisation of the form as inherent in man, namely, a rational life. It is the life of 'theoria' which means a life spent in the unimpeded apprehension and discovery of the truth. The irrational parts which are organically related to the soul need be harnessed to the service of reason. For when properly controlled by reason they may be directed towards the social well-being. Thus individual good and social well-being are not incompatible. The ethical speculation of the Jaina and that of Plato and Aristotle resemble each other to a great extent. The life of reason can be compared with the life of Suddhopayoga as explained by Jainism, with this difference that the irrational parts which are retained in some form or the other by Aristotle, must be removed in view of the Jaina. The difficulty is due to the fact that Aristotle could not reconcile the life of pure reason with that of social well-being. In view of Jainism the greatest mystics are as well the greatest social reformers. Though asceticism which flows from the observance of Mahāvratas is the ideal of life, though it can only be attained by a selected few, the concept of Aņuvratas is capable enough to bring harmony between the rational and irrational parts of the soul. Platonic asceticism is inconsistent with social goodness; hence it is insalubrious, but the Jaina asceticism embraces social goodness within its fold along with individual goodness. The Jaina concept of Aņuvratas is a mean between asceticism and sensualism. It completely makes possible the achievement of social goodness but it imperfectly brings about individual goodness, since the irrational parts cannot be completely subduded in the life of Aņuvratas. Their extirpation is essential for complete individual goodness. 1 History of Philosophy, p. 90. 2 Short History of Ethics, p. 80. 3 Short History
of Ethics, n. 80.

Page #283

VII. THE JAINA AND THE WESTERN TYPES OF ETHICAL DOCTRINES 261
UTILITARIANISM: The chief exponents of this School are Bentham, J. S. Mill, and Henry Sidgwick. According to them the Summum Bonum or the ultimate ethical standard consists in the "greatest happiness of the greatest number.” These three thinkers claim to have made a transition from mere egoism to universalism. Their claim is warrantable to a great extent, but they could not deliver themselves from the snares of egoism. Besides, they exhibited divergence on the grounds of transition from egoism to Altruism. Bentham's utilitarianism derives its validity from purely egoistic considerations and evinces strong leanings towards sensualism by formulating quantity as the measure of the value of pleaures. For him, “Push-pin is as good as poetry.” The following quotastion shows his egoistic trend: "Dream not that men will move their finger to serve you, unless their own advantage in so doing be obvious to them. Men never did so and never will, while human nature is made of the present materials. But they will desire to serve, when by so doing they can serve themselves, and the occasions on which they can serve themselves by serving you are multitudinous."1 Thus we may call his utilitarianism as "Egoistic utilitarianism,” since self-interest is the ground of his utilitarianism. The Jaina would think that this should not be overemphasized. On many occasions in life one can serve others at the cost of conspicuous losses. Besides, a psychological fact should not be elevated to the rank of ethical design. Jaina ethics gives approbation only to those altruistic actions which are performed without any Nidāna
(future mundane expectation). Actions constituting other man's good : 'ness need not be done with any hope of return or personal benefit. Again,
all pleasures cannot be on par. The life of sensualism cannot find favour with Jainism. The pleasures of the senses are of the worst sort and should be gradually overcome by self-control. Bentham's view seems to denounce the value of self-control. The pleasure of drinking cannot be abandoned by Bentham. Mill's utilitarianism is called "Sympathetic utilitarianism", since, according to him, man is induced to altruistic conduct by internal feeling of the happiness of mankind, by the consciousness possessed by every one that he is an integral part of society. By regarding that pleasures are intrinsically heterogeneous, Mill abandons hedonism. The distinction between higher and lower pleasures may be brought by the native sense of dignity" which a man possesses. Jainism
:
Deontology, II. p. 133.

Page #284

262
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
agrees with Mill as regards the heterogeneity of pleasures, but introduces the principle of internal and external Ahimsā for differentiating different pleasures. This principle is far more comprehensive than that of "native sense of dignity.” The man who performs a good act out of social feeling shall not be able to do it at the risk of his own pleasure. The principle of Ahimsā which is more in tune with the man's inner nature pre-eminently possesses altruistic note, and is in conformity with self-sacrifice for the good of others. Sidgwick's utilitarianism is called "Intuitional utilitarianism”, inasmuch as his theory is based on certain principles known intuitively by practical reason. The pleasures of others are to be regarded as of equal weight with our own. Sidgwick could not reconcile rational self-love with benevolence, and he is confronted with a difficulty known as dualism of the Practical Reason. Above all, we may say that the ethical ideal "greatest happiness of the greatest number”, will be modified by Jainism as the greatest happiness of all. Jainism speaks with the vulgar in pronouncing the highest good in terms of happiness or pleasure, but in fact the highest good is the realization of Ahimsā or self, and happiness is an accompaniment. Thus Jainism thinks with the learned. Utilitarian writers on the other hand think with the vulgar exclusively, and emphasize feeling as against the cognitive and conative aspects of life. Mere feeling is an abstraction. “Feeling is a quality of a mental state which cannot exist apart from other elements any more than colour or shape can exist without matter." "Our ends are our happiness, not merely means to happiness.”
KANT: The highest good, according to Kant, consists in the performance of actions out of respect for the moral law which commands categorically or unconditionally, and irrespective of circumstances, consequences and inclinations. “There is nothing in the world or even out of it” says he, "that can be called good without qualification except a good will.” The good will is a rational will willing in obedience to moral imperative which is the expression of man's real self, of the very principle of his being.' The categorical imperative inherent in reason itself lays down 'Act only on the maxim which thou canst at the same time will to become a universal law,' and entails a society of rational beings, a kingdom of ends. There is no quarrel of Jainism with Kantian formulations,
1 Short History of Ethics, p. 251. 3 History of Philosophy, p. 443.
2 Fundamentals of Ethics, p. 90.

Page #285

VIII. THE JAINA AND THE WESTERN TYPES OF ETHICAL DOCTRINES 263
so far as the highest good is concerned, inasmuch as the perfected mystic or a Tirthakara presents himself to be a member of the kingdom of ends. His actions are not limited by circumstances, consequences, ends, and selfish and sympathetic feelings. He is, according to Jainism, the only being acting in accordance with the commands of his inner being. The conviction of the Jaina is that the actions of such a being will always result in happiness. The mistake of Kant according to the Jaina is that he confounds supermoralism with moralism and, that from his a priori philosophy, he deduces a principle which cannot be applied to special circumstances and to positive rules, for instance, continence, charity to the poor etc. The principle according to Jainism should be at once universal and particular, i.e., universal in nature and particular in practice. The principle of Ahimsā, e.g., in its comprehensive meaning satisfies the universal demands of reason and the particular demands of society. Ahimsā with the Jaina doctrine of nayavāda can very well serve as the supreme principle of morality. Hence there is nothing in the world or even out of it that can be called good without qualification except a good will willing the principle of Ahimsă of all beings. It is a form and can be validly applied to all the particular cases. Besides, the absence of auspicious and inauspicious Bhāvas has relevancy in the life of supermoralism, but the life of morality presupposes will combined with auspicious Bhāvas. Along with the inauspicious Bhāvas or intense passions, Kant overthrew auspicious Bhāvas as well without thinking about the loss to moral life. The transcendental will is capable of dispensing with all types of Bhāvas, but the empirical will, particularly moral will cannot be against auspicious Bhāvas of sympathy, compassion and the like.
VIRTUES: SOPHISTS, SOCRATES, PLATO AND ARISTOTLE: The Sophists, identified virtue with self-interest. The Socratic view finds expression in the formula: "Knowledge is virtue." "Knowledge is both the necessary and the sufficient condition of virtue: without knowledge virtue is impossible and its possession ensures virtuous action.”! This conception led Socrates to regard that virtue is teachable and that it is one. The different virtues like temperance, benevolence emanate from the supreme virtue, namely, wisdom. The systematic approach to, and the exposition of virtues may be ascribed to Plato and Aristotle.. Their theory of virtues is based on their psychology of soul. In the Platonic system, the
1 History of Philosophy, p. 70

Page #286

264
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
soul occupies a position between the two worlds, namely, world of ideas and world of becoming. Consequently it must possess the traits of both the worlds, rational and irrational, the latter comprises within its fold spirited and appetitive parts. Desire for pleasure, desire for wealth, desire for food, shelter and other bodily satisfactions are included in the appetitive part, while the spirited part includes anger, love of honour, shame, aversion to disgrace;2 and gentleness, humility and reverence are the traits of rational part. "The moral rank of these two elements is very different; the spirited element is the natural ally of reason in the conflicts of the soul, and under due training is capable of manifesting a special excellence of its own; the appetitive element is naturally baser and capable of no virtue except submission to reason."3 This triple division of soul led Plato to recognise four cardinal virtues. The virute of reason is wisdom, of the spirited part, courage, of the appetitive part, temperance, and the fourth virtue is called justice which is the presence of all these virtues in the soul and consists in the free harmonious exercise of intellect, emotion and desire under the guidance of reason. Thus justice is the highest virtue. Aristotle regarded man as an epitome of the different levels in the development of living beings. Thus man possesses three different souls, a vegetative, an animal and a rational soul. Corresponding to the rational and irrational (passions and appetites parts of the soul, there are two kinds of virtues, namely, the intellectual (dianoetic) and the moral. The dianoetic virtues represent the life of pure reason. Moral virtues spring from the subordination of irrational elements to reason. They are not naturally implanted in man but denote a developed and settled habit formed by taking recourse to the mean between two extremes and thus avoid the vicious excess and defect. The middle path or the happy mean is not given by mechanical or a priori rule as in Arithmetic, it is known by the reasoning and judgement of man of practical wisdom, “Moral virtues are not ends in themselves; they are only means adopted by reason to acquire its freedom."' Aristotle illustrates the doctrine of mean by giving certain examples. Courage, for example, is a mean between rashness and cowardice, temperance between licentiousness and apathy; generosity between extravagance and miserliness. He does not apply this theory to certain vices like adultery, murder, theft,
1 History of Philosophy, p. 70. 2 Ibid. p. 86. 3 Outlines of the History of Ethics, p. 44. 4 Short History of Ethics, p. 47. SIbid. p. 80.

Page #287

VIII. THE JAINA AND THE WESTERN TYPES OF ETHICAL DOCTRINES 265
etc., inasmuch as, according to him, these are bad in themselves. Jainism also forms its theory of ethics on the ground of its psychological analysis of the soul. The intrinsic excellence of the self is obstructed by the passions in their most comprehensive extent including virtues and vices. Intense passion is vice and mild passion is virtue. Aristotle's mean from the Jaina point of view may be recognised as the expression of mild passion. Jainism analyses passions more deeply and recognises six degrees of passions, bringing the first three under vices and the last three under virtues. Spiritually speaking, virtues and vices differ in degree and not in kind. But this difference should not be regarded as insignificant. The movement towards virtuous living is a movement towards a life of reason in Aristotelian sense and a life of supermoralism in the Jainistic sense. By leading the life of supermoralism the virtuous life is not annihilated, but it reconciles the life of the spirit with the life of virtues, as also the individual consummation with the social goodness. The divine man is the measure of virtuous living. Thus the guidance of Arahantas, Ācāryas, Upādhyāyas and Sadhus will determine those acts which are virtuous, the expression of mild passions. Aristotle stops at the verdict of wise man, but Jainism gives a practical criterion of internal and external Ahiṁsā for judging the rightness of actions. The conviction of the Jaina is that the Platonic virtues like courage, temperance, wisdom, can only be completely manifested in the life of the saint. The householder can only partially observe these virtues. In other words,
though the Aņuvratas are potent enough to evolve perfect social order, · they are incapable of bringing about individual salvation or his culminant
progress. In view of the Jaina, Aristotle's life of Theoria, the Platonic contemplation of Ideas cannot be translated into action without the life of Mahāvratas. Absolute social and individual goodness emanate from the observance of Mahāvratas, but it can be achieved only by a few.
CLASSIFICATION OF VIRTUES: The cardinal virtues, according to Jainism, may be enumerated as follows: 1) Spiritual conversion, 2) Spiritual study, 3) Ahimsā, 4) Satya, 5) Asteya, 6) Brahmacarya, 7) Aparigraha, 8) Meditation and 9) Devotion. We now propose to give a detailed classification of virtues after following the scheme which Professor RANADE has adopted in his 'Pathway to God in Hindi literature, '2
1 These are called Leśyās. We have already dealt with these earlier. 2 Pathway to God in Hindi literature, p. 88.

Page #288

266
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
namely, the Scheme of classifying Virtues into the Individual, the Social and the Spiritual.
INDIVIDUAL VIRTUES: 1. Self-control (Sarāga-Samyama)); 2. Greedlessness (Sauca)2; 3. Humility (Mārdava)3; 4. Straightforwardness (Ārjava)*; 5. Truthfulness (Satya)s; 6. Non-stealing (Asteya)6; 7. Continence (Brahmacarya)?; 8. Doubtlessness (Nihsankā)8; 9. Desirelessness (Nihkānksā):; 10. Non-stupidity (Amudhatā)10; 11. Abandonment of frivolous actions (Anarthadandatyāga)11; and 12. Avoidance of eight kinds of pride. 12
SOCIAL VIRTUES: 1. Universal compassion and friendship (Bhūta Anukampai3 and Maitri); 2. Charity (Dāna)14; 3. Non-hatred towards the diseased (Nirvicikitsā)15; 4. Commendation of the meritorious (Pramoda)16; and 5. Active compassion for the distressed (Karuņā)17 or helping those who are miserable, thirsty and hungry.18 6. Indifference towards the arrogant (Madhyastha)19; 7. Non-acquisition (Aparigraha)20; 8. Non-injury (Ahimsā)21; 9. Forgiveness (Kşamā)22; and 10. Propagation of moral and Spiritual values through23 adequate means (Prabhāvanā).
SPIRITUAL VIRTUES: 1. Penance (Bodily Tapas)24; 2. Endurance of Parīşahas or suffering (Parīsahajaya)25; 3. Spiritual study (Svadhyāya)26; 4. Meditation (Dhyāna)27: 5. Devotion to Deva. Šāstra, and Guru28; 6. Avoidance of seven kinds of fear29; 7. Pessimism (Vairāgya)30; 8. Service of Saints (Vaiyāvsttya)31; 9. Spiritual conversion (Samyagdarśana)32; 10. Unattachment to body (Akiñcana)33; 11. Self-condemnation (PrāyaŚcitta)34; 12. Affection towards spiritual brethren (Vātsalya)35; 13. Con. quest of sleep, posture, and the desire for food36; 14. Purity of food 37: 15. Spiritual welcome to death (Sallekhana)38: 16. Re-establishment of the aspirants on the right path39 (Sthitikaraṇa).
1 Sarvartha. VI. 12. 2 Ibid. IX-6. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid.
6 Ibid. VII. 1. 7 Ibid. 8 Bhāva. Pā. 7. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Sarıārtha. VII. 21.
12 Mūla. 53. 13 Sarrārtha. VI. 12.; VII. 11.
14 Ibid. 15 Bhāva. Pā. 7. 16 Sarvartha. VII. 11. 17 Ibid.
18 Pañca. 137. 19 Sarvārtha. VII. 11. 20 Sarvārtha. VII. 1. 21 Ibid.
22 Sarvartha. IX. 6. 23 Bhāva. Pā. 7 24 Sarvārtha. IX. 19. 25 Sarvārtha. IX. 9. 26 Ibid. 20. 27 Ibid. 28 Sarvärtha. VI. 24. 29 Müla. 53.
30 Sarvärtha. VII. 12. IX-7. 31 Ibid. IX. 20.
32 Ibid. IX-24. 33 Ibid. IX-6. 34 Ibid. IX-20. 35 Bhāva. Pā. 7. 36 Mo. P. 63, 37 Milā. 421. 38 Sarvārtha. VII.-22 39 Bhāva. Pā. 7.

Page #289

CHAPTER IX
Jaina Ethics and the Present-day Problems
At the outset we have to acknowledge that the man of today is living in a world which is much more complex than that of an ancient or mediaeval man. Interdependence among nations has increased; and this has brought an ever widening and deepening impact on the economic, intellectual and social conditions of our existence. The scientific advancement has made countries one another's neighbours. Divergent races, divergent cultures, and divergent out-looks have come in close relations. In the present chapter we shall endeavour to put forth a view of state and society emanating from the ethical considerations of the Jaina and shall strive to solve the problems of the social, national and international importance which encounter the present man.
INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY: It is generally alleged that Jaina ethics aims merely at self-purification and self-evolution. Professor MAITRA remarks, "the Jaina list does not include the other-regarding virtues of Benevolence, succour, and social service. This shows that the Jain virtues aim more at self-culture than at social service."1 But in the light of our previous classification and enumeration of virtues the above statement is untenable, and we can say that Jaina ethics has both the eyes of the individual as well as the social betterment. It envisages individual as a social being, inasmuch as the individual's dependence upon society for his intellectual, moral and material gains is incontrovertible and cannot be gainsaid. Even an ascetic is incapable of transgressing this basic assumption of social dependence, although the concept of dependence in case of an ascetic undergoes radical change. True asceticism is not an act of ingratitude but an act of highest gratitude, returning golden coins for silver pieces to society. The ascetic by virtue of his practices accumulates Punya which in some form or the other is a social debt. This social debt is responsible for his repeated births till its full payment. This proves his dignified dependence upon society. The Tirthakara or the divine man who has transcended social dependence also pays the social debt in the form of preaching and spiritual guidance to the suffering humanity and in such a fashion as will not produce
.
1 The Ethics of the Hindus, p. 203.

Page #290

268
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
fresh Karmas necessitating future birth. This sort of payment of social debt is unique, without any parallel. Thus we see that social dependence gradually decreases and ends in absolute independence. It is only at this stage that we are capable of saying that individuality or the individual stands completely aloof from the social debt. As a consequence of this fact, Jainism alleges that the individual is not like an organ absolutely dependent for its sustenance on social organism. Social dependence cannot rob the individual of his freedom to achieve his spiritual individuality. An individual is not a mere cog in the social machine. Jainism no doubt declines to accept the unrestricted individualism that ignores social obligation. Thus the true view recognises that the individual and society influence each other. The individual moulds and is moulded by society.
CONCEPT AND FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE: The strict observance of the Aņuvratas and the Sīlavratas by the human beings at large will result in the evolution of stateless society. The political power will be needless on account of the emergence of such individuals as have a selfregulated life. The householder's vows of Aparigraha, Satya, Asteya; and Digvrata, Deśavrata, Bhogopabhoga-parimāņavrata are pregnant with the capability of unravelling all the economic problems; the householder's vows of Brahmacarya, Sāmāyika and Proşadhopavāsa are sufficient for educating the individual in the art of self-control on its positive side, and Anarthadandatyāga-vrata, on its negative side; the spirit of social service is capable of being nourished by the vow of Vaiyāvstya; and lastly, the householder's vow of Ahimsā will serve as the guiding and pervasive principle throughout. The State as the outward garb of society must needs be abandoned and renounced when the society as a whole moulds its life in consonance with the prescription of vows. The existence of an enlightened social order can dispense with the state altogether. But this is an ideal condition and we feel that it cannot be materialised. Probably there will come no time when all the individuals will be self-regulating. Hence state in some form or the other will exist.
Thus human imperfection will necessitate the continuation of state control and authority. The state is no doubt an evil but a necessary evil. It should contrive to manage its affairs in a way which will assist the development of perfect social order. Its national and international activities should be guided by the principle of non-violence and Anekānta. In order that the state may function properly without encroaching upon

Page #291

IX. JAINA ETHICS AND THE PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS
269
the inherent spiritual nature of man, it must identify itself with Samyagdarśana, Samyagjñāna, Samyakcāritra. The policy of the state must exhibit unflinching faith in, and tenacious adherence to the principle of non-violence. This will crown the state with Samyagdarśana which will ipso facto bring enlightenment to it, and the result will be the emergence of Samyagjñāna. In other words, the adoption and the assimilation of Anekānta is Samyagjñāna. The resolute and astute application of the policy of non-violence and Anekānta in the national and international spheres for solving all sorts of problems will credit the state with Samyakcāritra. The passions of fear, hatred towards any class of man and towards any other state, the passions of deception, greed to expand its territory and to usurp other-state's wealth and freedom, the passions of pride of wealth, power, achievement and heritage-all these should be banished from the state, because they are corruptive of the veritable spirit of progress. On the positive side, the state should pursue the discipline which flows from Samyagdarśana, Samyagjñāna and Samyakcāritra. The eight virtues emanate from Samyagdarśana, the one from Samyagjñāna, and the five from Samyakcăritra. We shall dwell upon them one by one along with their implications.
VIRTUES OF THE STATE: As regards the virtues issuing from Samyagdarśana, first, the state not only one, but all states should not have any iota of doubt in the efficacy of non-violence for solving the problems which arise in the national and international fields. Fear which obstructs the germination of the living faith in, and rational adherence to, the principle of Ahimsā must be brushed aside. It will not be amiss to point out here that non-violence should not be counted as a virtue of necessity and a cloak of cowardice. To use it as a weapon of expediency is to defile the Nihsankita virtue of the state. Consequently, an unshakable conviction in regarding it as a life-principle will infuse the state with a type of immutability even in testing situations. Secondly, the State in no circumstance should exhibit tendency to dominate other countries notwithstanding its multifarious achievements. Even help should not end in domination. This is Niḥkāńkșita virtue of the state. Thirdly, the virtue of Nirvicikitsā which is required to be associated with the state prescribes not to condemn the poor. Fourthly, the virtue styled Amudhadrști obliges the state to refuse to join any military pact on account of its being overwhelmed by fear, inferiority and greed for profit. Fifthly, when the state engages itself in enhancing its productive capacity along

Page #292

270
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
with proper distribution, it may be said to have possessed UpabŢmhaņa characteristic. Sixthly, when other states, being oppressed by the passions of fear, greed and the like, seem to go astray from the path of righteousness and peace, to try for their re-establishment by reminding them of their humanitarian purpose may be called Sthitikaraņa virtue. Seventhly, to have affection for all the members of the state irrespective of caste, colour, creed and sex is to adhere to the prescription of the virtue known as Vātsalya. Eighthly, it is imperative for the state to strive to educate its members in a way which may bring about the progress of the state. It is required as well to attain its ends by non-violent means, so that other states may be influenced by its policy. This will bring about the dessimination and propagation of its principles and policies among other states. This is known as Prabhāvanā virtue of the state.
The virtue which springs from Samyagjñāna is Anekānta, which aims at comprehending the multiple approaches and diverse outlooks with a view to reconciling their claims. When the state imbibes the spirit of Anekānta, it is sure to become tolerant in spirit, and to attend to its various aspects. The principle of Anekānta strives to cut the roots of onesidedness in theory and practice. On account of the absolutistic approach the state is obliged to take a negative attitude towards other states which follow a different pattern of living. But Anekānta broadens the outlook and curbs down the absoluteness of one view. Consequently it helps in fostering international feelings, and in presenting humanitarian solution: of the various problems arising from the lack of sympathetic understanding of other-state's views and considerations. It will not be insignificant to point out here that a war is the outcome of onesided clinging, while peace results from the manysided outlook. The latter should not make the state irresolute; on the contrary it should give credence to a synthetic approach, and properly attune the demands of different perspectives.
Lastly, Samyakcăritra credits the state with five other virtues known as non-violence, truthfulness, non-stealing, continence and non-acquisition. We shall now deal with them one by one. First, consummation of non-violence in a state as in the case of a householder is a contradiction in terms. So long as the state exists violence in some form or the other is inevitable. Just as a householder is incapable of eschewing Himsā to an ascetic level, so also the state cannot dissociate itself from violence to

Page #293

IX. JAINA ETHICS AND THE PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS
271
an absolute degree, inasmuch as anti-state and anti-social tendencies may continue; and in order to resist the disturbances, the presence of extraneous control is indispensable. Violence will not be intentional but it will be a defensive weapon. Notwithstanding the compelled use of force, it is an imperative function of the state to create an atmosphere of nonviolence. We may mention here that the application of this virtue should not be merely confined to human beings, but the sub-human existence is also required to be brought under its purview. Consequently, hunting and slaughtering of animals for any purpose whatsoever should be announced as unlawful. It is against the spirit of non-violence, and sounds as inhuman. Besides, the use of intoxicants, specially wine, should be banned, and a social consciousness is to be developed against the use of these derogatory things. The deeper significance of non-violence consists in the elimination of war, which has harassed mankind since the dawn of civilization. War need not be considered a necessity just as Nietzsche, Mussolini and others had thought. Nietzsche says: "For nations that are growing week and contemptible, war may be prescribed as remedy, if indeed they really want to go on living." He declares: "Man shall be trained for war and woman for the recreation of the warrior, all else is folly.” “War alone,” Mussolini affirms “brings up to the highest tension all human energy, and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it2.” The two world wars have caused huge devastations and are sufficient evidences to prove that the international problems are incapable of being solved by the institution of war. The establishment of international organisation and the tendency towards disarmament are the symptoms of the inefficacy of force, war and violence to act as arbiters among international disputes. The easing of tensions and cessations of conflicts among states, the maintenance of universal peace, and the promotion of human welfare can only be effected by suffusing world's atmosphere with the spirit of nonviolence. "Thus the principle of non-violence really implies that life should be elevated altogether from the plane of force to that of reason, persuasion, accommodation, tolerance, and mutual service3." Secondly. the inter-relations among states should be nourished upon truthfulness. Fraud or deceptoin defiles the spirit of co-existence. The use of slander
1 Religion and Society, p. 199. 2 Ibid. p. 200. 3 World problems and Jaina ethics, p. 9.
:

Page #294

272
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
ing and ridiculous speech, and of words which arouse uneasiness, engender fear, excite repugnance and hostility, inflame dolour and intoxicate brawl, should be banished from the conduct of the state. Thirdly, the respect shown by the state for the rights of others constitutes its nonstealing. Colonisation is stealing; hence it should be condemned as unwholesome. Aggression and domination are robbery. Hence they must stop. Fourthly, Brahmacarya or continence implies that the state should not dissipate its energies for military organisations and in the manufacturing of nuclear weapons. The wealth and labour of the state should be directed for the upliftment of mankind at large. Fifthly, the virtue of Aparigraha declines to hanker after other state's wealth and territory. The surplus production should be left for the use of other states without any ill-motive. Imperialistic tendencies should be regarded as baneful by the state. The virtue of Aparigraha is a mean between capitalism and communism.
The above treatment of the virtues as applied to the state will oblige us to admit that the state is required for the development of human personality. The individual contributes its share to the state and the latter in turn reciprocates with manifold energy and strength, and affords opportunities for the material and spiritual development of man: Just as material backwardness hampers the progress of the individual, so also the state becomes impotent without material possessions. But the reins of the horses of materialism should be in the hands of spiritualism. The above mentioned virtues suffice to evolve a balanced outlook in the state. The virtues of non-violence and Aparigraha are capable of establishing universal peace. Non-violence cannot be materialised in the life of the state without extirpating the passion of greed. The root cause of violence is material goods. If the importance of the virtue of Aparigraha is understood at the international level, the attitude of non-violence will synchronise.
After dwelling upon the Jaina conception of the individual and society, the possibility of stateless society, and the virtues of the state which are capable of affording solution to the problems of national and international importance, we now propose to deal with the attitude of Jainism towards casteism. Jainism looks at casteism with an eye of contempt. The superiority of one caste over the other is foreign to Jaina ethics. Casteism is an evil and is based on the passions of hatred and pride. These two are intense passions, hence they bring about sin to

Page #295

•
IX. JAINA ETHICS AND THE PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS
273
their victims. We find references in the Jaina scriptures which go to prove that merit and not mere birth should be regarded as the real judge of castes. The caste has nothing to do with the realisation of spirit. The Uttarādhyayana says that Harikeśa who was born in a family of untouchables attained saintly character owing to the performance of austerities. Good conduct and not caste is the object of reverence. Casteism is grounded in falsity and is purely imaginary. Acārya Amitagati expresses that mere caste is incapable of leading us to any meritorious attainment. Merit accrues from the pursuance of the virtues of truth, purity, austerity, Sīla, meditation and spiritual study. Differences in conduct have resulted in the distinctions of caste. There is only one caste, namely, manhood. Merit is the basis of caste and the pride of caste destroys right living. If the modern democratic set up is to be made successful, casteism must go. Casteism and democracy are a contradiction in terms.
CHAPTER X
A Resume
The commencement of Jaina philosophy, and consequently of Jaina ethical speculation, in the present state of our knowledge can be historically traced to the divine personality of Pārsvanātha, although the Jaina tradition corroborated by the Vedic tradition of the Yajurveda and the Bhāgavata ascribes its origin to Rşabha, the first among the twenty-four Tirthakaras. Mahāvīra who succeeded Pārsvanātha reinterpreted the religion of his precursor and acted more as a reformer of religion already in existence than the founder of a new faith. Though Mahāvīra had a magnetic personality, yet he had to encounter schism in his own life time. Some schisms originated after his Nirvāņa. But most of the schisms ultimately agreed with their original source. Only Digambara-Svetāmbara schism resulted in a sharp division of the church, each sect claiming greater authenticity than the other. The Yāpanīyas may be regarded as the reconcilers of these two major sects. The origin of Jaina monachism, and therefore of Jaina ethics, should not be attributed to the Brahmanical idea of samnyāsa. It grew up among the imperfectly Aryanised communities of the east. It is Magadhan in origin.
18

Page #296

274
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
Jaina ethics is grounded in Jaina metaphysics. The recognition of the nature of reality either as mere permanence or as mere change has been regarded by Jainism as subversive of ethical speculation, and as based on a prioristic and absolutistic tendency of thought. In consonance with the speculation of the Jaina, permanence is as much ontologically real as change on the verdict of experience'. This metaphysical perspective reconciles the threefold definitions of substance as that which exists, or that which is characterised by simultaneous origination, destruction and continuance, or that which is the substratum of attributes and modes. In other words, substance as inherently and essentially associated with endless qualities and modifications, is out and out inconceivable without at the same time implying existence which in turn is endowed with the trio of simultaneous origination, destruction and continuance. Every quality transmutes its state every moment, though the quality as such is never abrogated. Substance along with qualities possesses mode of existence. Mutability and mode of existence constitute the meanings of Paryāya. Existence is an all-embracing characteristic. The relation between substance and quality, between substance and modis fication, and between substance and existence is one of identity-indifference.
Pramāna and Naya are the sources of cognising the Anekāntātmaka reality. The former grasps the reality in its wholeness, while the latter takes into consideration only a fragment of the totality, and keeps in view the proper regard for the other aspects. In order that the Anekāntic reality may be rendered fit for communication without any distortion, Jainism invented the doctrine of Syādvāda which instructs to affix the word syāt as a prefix to every predicate in order to allow room for the predication of other attributes inherent in the object. The word syāt should not be calculated to evince the sceptical outlook of the Jaina but to serve as a beacon light to enlighten the other persisting attributes which have not been expressed by the proposition in question.
Jainism traces the whole universe of being to two everlasting, uncreated, co-existing but independent categories of Jīva and Ajīva. The latter is further classified into Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma, Akāśa and Kāla. Hence reality is dualistic as well as pluralistic. Plurality though, an ontological fact entails unity also, considered especially from the synthetic objective point of view of one existence. The six substances never part with their original eternal nature. Pudgala from the atomic

Page #297

X. A RESUME
275
to the Skandha state possesses the sense qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour. Though an atom is devoid of sound, yet the combination of atoms can produce sound when they come in contact with other aggregates of atoms. Thus sound is material. The distinguishing feature of Ākāśa is to provide accommodation to all the Dravyas. Dharma and Adharma are the indifferent conditions of movement and rest respectively. These two principles of Dharma and Adharma are also responsible for the demarcation of Lokākāśa and Alokākāśa. Kāla expresses the condition of change in substances. The self which possesses consciousness as its essence has been regarded as having supreme significance among the substances and as having the highest value among the Tattvas. The empirical selves which vary from the one-sensed to the five sensed are bound by Karmas from an indefinite past. They are conceived to be the enjoyers of self-performed good and bad actions, and to be the knowers and seers. They extend up to the limit of bodily dimensions, possess the narrowing and dilating characteristics, are associated with the triple nature of origination, destruction and continuance and own the specific characteristic of consciousness. The transcendental self is free from all Karmas and manifests infinite knowledge, bliss and the like.
We encounter various expressions of the ethical ideal. They converge and culminate in identical implication. The ethical Summum Bonum may be regarded as the deliverance of self, the attainment of Paramātman state, the achievement of Sva-samaya or Svayambhū state of
existence, the realisation of self's Svarūpasattā, the achievement of know·ledge-consciousness, the realisation of Ahimsā, the accomplishment of
pure Bhāvas transcending auspicious and inauspicious Bhāvas, the realisation of self's true agency and enjoyability and the attainment of super emperical death. These culminate in the one objective of the fullest realisation of the cognitive, conative and affective potencies of self.
The question how the self got into defilement and corruption is avoided by the Jaina by affirming and admitting it to be a beginningless process. The principle of Mithyātva which vitiates our outlook, knowledge and conduct offers a great resistence to the realisation of the sublime end. Consequently, Samyagdarśana is to be attained which in turn will make knowledge and conduct conducive to liberation. Unflinching faith in the pristine purity of the self constitutes Niscaya Samyagdarśana,
while the belief in seven Tattvas is styled Vyavahāra Samyagdarśana. · Without Samyagdarśana conduct is incapable of surpassing the province

Page #298

276
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
of morality, and spiritualism gets shrouded in mystery. The emphasis on Samyagdarśana or spiritual conversion proves that the Jaina ethics is grounded in spiritualism.
With the light of right knowledge which enables the aspirant to look into his infirmities, the pursuit of right conduct sweeps away the obstructing elements which thwart the manifestation of uninterrupted happiness, infinite knowledge etc. In addition to right belief and right knowledge emancipation presupposes right conduct as well. He who observes partial conduct being not able to renounce the commitment of sins to the full claims the title of 'layman'. The minimum of conduct for the householder consists in the observance of five Anuvratas, and in the abandonment of meat, wine and honey. The Sīlavratas educate the individual for the exalted life of renunciation. The Pratimās are the systematic stages of advancement towards the life of asceticism. The exposition of the householder's ethical discipline on the basis of Pakşa, Cary, and Sadhanā is the all-inclusive way of describing the conduct of the householder. If one is encountered with the causes which terminate the present life, one should resort to the performance of Sallekhanā which is not other than the spiritual welcome to death. This is not yielding to death but a way of meeting the challenge of death undauntedly and adequately. Hence it should be distinguished from suicide.
The life of complete renunciation makes possible the extirpation of inauspicious Bhāva which remains unrealised in the householder's life of partial renunciation. The life of asceticism is not to recoil from the world of action but from the world of Himsā. The ascension towards a higher and nobler path results on account of being motivated by certain incentives to spiritual life traditionally known as twelve Anuprekşās. If they possess the potency of pushing ahead the layman into the realm of complete renunciation, they profess to serve as the guides for the monk who is pursuing the path of complete renunciation. The aspirant being actuated by these incentives comes to have a negative attitude towards worldly actions and acquisitions, and an enlightened positive, tenacious and resolute attitude towards the life of the spirit. After adopting the internal and external emblems at the sacred hands of an excellent Guru and after paying obeisance to him and after going through the course of discipline which is prescribed, he wins the credit of being styled Sramana.
The Saint adheres to the observance of five great vows (Ahimsā,

Page #299

X. A RESUME
277
Satya, Asteya, Aparigraha, and Brahmacarya), of five-fold Samitis (Iryā, Bhāṣā, Esaņā, Ādāna-Nikşepana, and Utsarga), of three guptis (Manas, Vacana and Kāya); of six-fold essentials (Sāmāyika, Stuti, Vandanā, Pratikramaņa, Pratyākhyāna, and Kāyotsarga). Besides, he controls the five senses, and pulls out the hair, takes only one meal a day, does not take bath, and does not cleanse his teeth. So much is common between a Svetāmbara and a Digambara saint. Nudity, to sleep on the ground, to take meals in a standing posture in the palm of one's own hand-all these are peculiar to Digambara monks.
The saint whose life is an example of the dedication of his integral energies to the cessation and shedding of Karmas regards the subjugation of twenty-two kinds of Parīşahas and the practice of twelve kinds of austerities as falling within the compass of his obligations. The former occurs against the will of the saint who has to endure them or rather who turns them to good account by compelling them to become the means for spiritual conquest, while the latter are in consonance with the aspirant's will to spiritual triumph. The performance of external austerities does not merely aim at the physical renunciation but also at the overthrow of the attachment to the body and senses. Of the six kinds of internal austerities, Dhyāna is of supreme importance. All the disciplinary practices form an essential background for the performance of Dhyāna. It is the indispensable, integral constituant of right conduct, and is directly related to the actualisation of the divine potentialities.
Broadly speaking, Dhyāna is of two types namely 1) Praśasta and 2) Aprasasta. The former category is divided into two types, namely, 1) Dharmadhyāna, and 2) Sukladhyāna; and the latter, also into two types namely 1) Ārtadhyāna and 2) Raudradhyāna. The above-mentioned description refers to the former category. In other words, in dealing with Dhyāna as Tapas, we are completely concerned with the Praśasta types of Dhyāna, since they are singularly relevant to the auspicious and transcendental living. On the contrary the Aprašasta types of Dhyāna bring about worldly sufferings.
The saint who is confronted with incurable disease, intolerable 'old age, formidable famine, great weakness of hearing and sight, infirmity of legs, violent animals in the forests, etc. adopts Sallekhanā (spiritual welcome to death). The whole of the ethical discipline prescribed for the ayman and the monk has been deemed as a way for translating Ahiṁsā in practice, the actual realisation of which can only be effected in the

Page #300

278
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
plenitude of mystical experience. Thus if the fountain-head of ethics is metaphysics, mysticism will be its culmination. The equivalent expression in Jainism for the word 'Mysticism' is 'Suddhopayoga'. Mysticism consists in realising the transcendental self through the internal self by renouncing the external self. The journey from the internal self to the transcendental self is traversed through the medium of moral and intellectual preparations which purge everything obstructing the emergence of potential divinity. Before the final accomplishment is made, a stage of vision and fall may intervene.
In metaphysical terms we may say that mysticism is the realisation of self's capacity for original origination, destruction, and continuance. It amounts to the realisation of self's Svarūpa-sattā. Mysticism and metaphysics connote differences of approach to the problem of reality. If the qualification of the mystic is realisation and intuition, the qualification of metaphysician is merely intellection.
The fourteen stages of spiritual evolution, technically known as Gunasthānas, may be subsumed under the following heads, namely, 1) Dark period of the self prior to its awakening (1st Dark night of the soul), 2) Awakening of the self, 3) Purgation, 4) Illumination, 5) Dark period post-illumination (2nd Dark night of the soul), and 6) Transcendental life. There is also a state beyond these stages, known as Siddha State.
1) The darkest period in the history of the self is one when the self is beset with Mithyātva. The plight of the self in the first stage namely, Mithyātva Guņasthāna resembles that of a totally eclipsed moon or a completely clouded sky. It is a stage of spiritual slumber and the self itself is not cognisant of this drowsy state of spirit. Such an ignorant man may be an astute intellectualist, or a resolute moralist, but he will lack that mystical quality by virtue of which he may be designated as a real saint. Thus the spiritual conversion is to be sharply distinguished from the moral conversion and from the intellectual accomplishments.
2) The occurrence of conversion spiritual is consequent upon the instructions-either in the present birth or in some previous birth-of those who have realised the divine within themselves or are on the path of divine realisation. The Arahanta is the supreme Guru. Ācāryas, Upadhyāyas, and Sadhus are on the path of divine realisation. Only Ācāryas enjoy the privilege of initiating persons in the mystical life, hence they are the Gurus in the technical sense. The five Labdhis are

Page #301

X. A RESUMB
279
presupposed before spiritual conversion may be deemed to occur. The self is now in the fourth Gunasthāna. The second and third stages are the stages of fall from spiritual conversion.
3) The self has now been metamorphosed into an awakened self. Mystical adventure will now consist in eliminating the horrible contrast between the first enlightenment and the final one. The aspirant will now dedicate himself to the study of spiritual literature and to the observance of self-denial. In short, he adheres to the purgative way which is not merely a negative process but comprises positive attainments also. Scriptural study and devotion constitute the integral parts of the mystic's moral and spiritual discipline. The self, according to its moral level, occupies the fifth, or the sixth or the 1st part of the seventh Guņasthāna.
4) By this time, the self has developed a deep habit of introversion, a power of spiritual attention, of self-merging, and of gazing into the ground of the soul. Through deep meditation, the mystic advances upon the second part of seventh Guņasthāna, and the rest higher Guñasthānas upto the twelfth are purely meditational stages or the stages of illumination and ecstacy.
5) The self which arrives at the eleventh Guñasthāna falls down either in the first stage or in the fourth one on account of the rise of suppressed passions, and thus experiences the Dark-night of the soul. All the mystics do not experience this dark-night. Those mystics who ascend the ladder of annihilation escapes this tragic period and forthwith succeed in materialising final accomplishments in comparison to those who ascend the ladder of subsidence. The latter type of mystics no doubt will also reach the same heights but only when they climb up the ladder of annihilation. Souls, though not every one, are confronted with the darkness of three types in their life career, firstly, before conversion, secondly, after conversion, and thirdly, after the ascension of the ladder of subsidence.
6) Slumbering and unawakened soul after passing through the stages of spiritual conversion, moral and intellectual preparation now arrives at the sublime destination by means of ascending the rungs of meditational ladder. This is transcendental life, a supramental state of existence. It is the final triumph of the spirit, the flower of mysticism. The soul is now 'Arahanta' and is staying in the thirteenth and fourteenth Gunasthānas.

Page #302

280
ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
The fourteenth Gunasthāna is immediately followed by disembodied liberation, which is a state of self beyond Guñasthānas. This state of self is the termination of mystic's journey.
The Vedic, the Jaina and the Buddhist speculations concur remarkably with one another on the psychological, ethical and religious planes of existence. The cardinal virtues according to Jainism are: 1) Spiritual conversion, 2) Spiritual study, 3) Ahimsā, 4) Satya, 5) Asteya, 6) Brahmacarya, 7) Aparigraha, 8) Meditation, and 9) Devotion. Jaina Ethics is capable of bringing about the individual, the social, the national and the international progress.

Page #303

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acārānga-Sūtra (Sacred Books of the East., Vol. XXII). Ācārasära of Viranandi (Santisägara Digambara Jaina Granthamälā). Adipurāņa of Jinasena (Bhāratiya Jñāna Pitha, Kāsi). Age of Imperial Unity (Bharatiya Vidyā Bhavan, Bombay). Ahimsa Tattva Darsana by Muni Nathamala (Adarsha Sahitya Sangha, Chaūru (Raja). Alāpapaddhati of Devasena (Sakala Digambara Jaina Pañcāna, Sholapur). Amitagati Srávakācāra of Amitagati (Anantakirti Digambra Jaina Granthamālā, Bombay). Anagäradharmāmsta of Āsādhara (Khuśālacanda Pānācanda Gandhi, Sholapur). Anguttaranikāya (Mahābodhi Sabha, Saranath, Banaras). Apta-mimāṁsa of Samantabhadra (Muni-Anantakirti Granthamālā, Bombay). Atmānusāsana of Gunabhadra (Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. VII). Bhagavad-Gītā (Gitā Press, Gorakhapur). Bhagavad-Gītā (English Translation by Radhakrishnan, George Allen and Unwin, London) Bhagavad-Gītā as the Philosophy of God-realisation by R. D. Ranade (Nagpur University,
Nagpur). Bhāgavata Purāņa (Gitā Press, Gorakhapur). Bhagavati-Aradhana with commentaries, Vijayodayā and Mulārādhanādarpana. (Sakha
rāma Nemacanda Digambara Jaina Granthamälā, Sholapur). Bhaktamara Stotra (Jaina-Grantharatnākara Kāryalaya, Bombay). Bhāvanā Viveka by Chainasukhadas (Sadbodha Granthamālā, Jaipur). Bhāya Pāhuda of Kundakunda (Pātani Digambara Jaina Granthamālā Mārotha, under
the title 'Asta Pāhuda'). Bhikṣu Vicāra Daršana by Muni Nathamala (Jaina Svetāmbara Terapanthi Mahāsabhā, 3,
Portugese Church Street, Calcutta). Bodha Pāhuda of Kundakunda (Pātani Digambara Jaina Granthamālā under the title ... 'Asta Pāhuda'). Bịhadāranyaka Upanişad (Gitā Press, Gorakhapur). Căritra Bhakti of Pūjyapādà (Akhila Visva Jaina Miśana, Salāla, under the title 'Dasa
Bhaktyādi Sangraha'). Cāritra Pāhuda of Kundakunda (Pātani Digambara Jaina Granthamālā under the title
'Asta Pāhuda'). Căritrasāra of Cāmundarāya (Mānikachandra D. J. Granthamālā). Chandogya-Upanişad (Gita Press, Gorakhapur). Constructive Survey of Upanişadic Philosophy by R. D. Ranade (Oriental Book Agency,
Poona-2). Darsana Pāhuda of Kundakunda (Pātani Digambara Jaina Granthamälä Märoţha under
the title 'Aşta Pāhuda'). Darsanasāra of Devasena (Jaina Grantharatnākara Kāryālaya, Bombay). Daśavaikälika Sūtra (Jaina Šāstramālā Kāryālaya, Jaina Street, Lahore). Dharma Bindu of Haribhadra (Chandubhāi Lakhubhāi Pārikha, Ahemadabad). Digha-nikāya (Mahābodhi Sabha Saranath, Banaras).

Page #304

282
Ethical Doctrines in Jainism
Doctrines of Jainism by Schubring (Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi). Dravya-Sangraha (Sarala Jaina Grantha Bhandāra, Jabalapur). Dravya-Samgraha (Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. 1). Early Buddhist Monachism by Dr. Dutta (London). Ekibhāva Stotra of Vădirāja (Mulacanda Kisanadāsa kāpadiya, Surat, under the title
'Pañca-stotra-samgraha'). Epitome of Jainism by Nahar and Ghosh (Indian Mirror Street, Calcutta). Ethics of the Hindus by S. K. Maitra (University of Calcutta, Calcutta). Fundamentals of Ethics by Urban (George Allen and Unwin, London). Gommațasāra Jivakāņda of Nemicandra (Rāyacandra Jaina Šāstramālā, Bombay). Gommatasära Karmakāņda of Nemicandra (Rāyacandra Jaina Sāstramālā, Bombay). Greek Philosophy by Burnet (MacMillan and Co.). History of Brahmanical Asceticism by Har Dutt Sharma (Oriental Book Agency, Poona). History of Philosophy by Thilly (Central Book Depot, Allahabad). History of Philosophy Eastern and Western, Vol. I (George Allen and Unwin, London). History of Jaina Monachism by S. B. Deo (Deccan College, Poona). Idea of God by Pringle Pattison (Oxford University Press, London). Idea of the Holy by Rudolf Otto (Oxford University Press, London). Indian Philosophy, Vol. I & II Radhakrishnan (George Allen & Unwin, London). Introduction to Indian Philosophy by Datta and Chatterjee (University of Calcutta,
Calcutta). Işa-Upanisad (Gita Press, Gorakhapur). Istupadesa of Pūjyapāda (Rāyacandra Jaina Šāstramālā, Bombay). Jainadarśanasāra by Chainsukhdas (Sadbodha Granthamālā, Jaipur). Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism by Satkari Mookerjee (Bhārat Jaina Parisat, Calcutta). Jaina Sāhitya Aura Itihāsa by Nathuramji Premi (Jaina Grantharatnākara, Kāryālaya,
Bombay). Jaina Yoga by R. Williams (Oxford University Press, London). Jinašataka of Samantabhadra (Syādvāda Ratnākara Kāryālaya, Kasi). Jnānārņava of Subhacandra (Rāyacandra Jaina Šāstramālā, Bombay). Kalpa Sūtra (Sacred Books of the East Vol. XXII). Kalyāṇamandirastotra (Mūlacanda Kišanadāsa Kāpadiyā, Sürat under the title 'Pañca
stotra Sangraha'). Kárttikeyānuprekņā (Rāyacandra Jaina Sāstramālā, Bombay). Kaşāya Pāhuda of Gunabhadrācārya (Digambara Jaina Sangha, Chaurāsi Mathurā). Katha-Upanişad (Gitā Press, Gorakhapur). Kausitaki-Upanişad (George Allen & Unwin, London, under the title 'Principal Upa
nişads'). Kena Upanişad (Gita Press, Gorakhapur). Labdhisāra by Nemicandra (Rāyacandra Jaina Šāstramālā, Bombay). Labdhisāra Commentary Candrikā by Todaramalaji (Gandhi-Haribhāi Devakaraṇa Jaina
Granthamālā, Calcutta). Linga Pāhuda of Kundakunda (Pātani Digambara Jaina Granthamālā under the title
'Aşta Pāhuda').

Page #305

Bibliography
283
Mahavira and his Philosophy of Life by Dr. A. N. Upadhye (The Indian Institute of
· Culture, Bangalore-4.) Maitri Upanişad (George Allen & Unwin, London, under the title 'Principal Upanişads"). Mokşamärgaprakāśaka by Pandita Todaramala (Digambara Jaina Sangha, Chaurasi,
Mathurā). Mokşa Pāhuda of Kundakunda (Pātani Digambara Jaina Granthamālā Mārotha, under
the title 'Asta Pāhuda'). Mülācāra of Vattakera (Anantakirti Digambara Jaina Granthamālā, Bombay). Mundaka-Upanişad (Gita Press, Gorakhapur). Mysticism by Underhill (Methuen, London). Mysticism in Mahārāştra by R. D. Ranade (University of Bombay, Bombay). Niyamasāra of Kundakunda (Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. IX). Niyamasāra Commentary by Padmaprabhamaladhārideva (Jaina Grantharatnākara
Kāryālaya, Bombay). Nyāya-draśana Comprising Sūtras of Gautama and Bhāşya of Vātsyāyana (Caukhamba,
Banaras). Nyāyasūtra-Bhāsya-Vārttika of Uddyotakara (Caukhamba, Banaras). Outlines of the History of Ethics by Henry Sidgwick (MacMillan and Co., London). Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy by Zeller (Routledge and Kegan, London). Outlines of Indian Philosophy by M. Hiriyanna (George Allen & Unwin, London). Pancadhyāyi (Malika, Granthaprakāśa Kāryālaya, Indore). Pañcâstikāya of Kundakunda with the Commentaries by Amftacandra and Jayasena
(Rāyacandra Jaina Sastramālā, Bombay). Paramātmaprakāśa of Yogindu (Rāyacandra Jaina Sastramālā, Bombay). Pathway to God-realization in Hindi Literature by H. D. Ranade (Adhyātma Vidyā
Mandira, Sāngli).. Pottapada Sutta (Mahābodhi Sabhā, Sārnātha, under the title 'Dighanikāya'). Prasna Upanişad (Gitā Press, Gorakhapur). Pravacanasāra of Kundakunda with the Commentaries of Amộtacandra and Jayasena
(Rāyacandra Jaina Šāstramälā, Bombay). Principal Upanişads (George Allen & Unwin, London). Puruşārtha-Siddhi-Upāya of Amstacandra (Rāyacandra Jaina Šāstramālā, Bombay). Rājavārttika, Vol. I & II by Akalanka (Bhāratiya Jñāna Pitha, Kāsi). Ratnakaranda Śrāvakācāra of Samantabhadra (Vira Sevā Mandira, Dariyāganja, Delhi). Religion and Society by Dr. Radhakrishnan (George Allen & Unwin, London). Sacred Books of the East Series, Vol. XLV (Moti Lal Banarasidas, Delhi). Sāgāradharmāmsta of Āsādhara (Mūlacanda Kišanadāsa Kāpadiyā, Surata). Samadhisataka of Pūjyapāda (Vira Sevā Mandira, Daryaganja, Delhi). Samayasära of Kundakunda with the Commentaries of Amstacandra and Jayasena
(Rāyacandra Šāstramālā, Bombay). Sänkhya Kärika of Isvara Krşņa (Caukhamba, Banaras). Santi Bhakti of Pūjyapada (Akhila Visva Jaina Misana, Salāla, under the title 'Dasa
Bhaktyadi Sangraha'). Saptabhangitarangini of Vimala Dása (Rayacandra Jaina Šāstramālā, Bombay).

Page #306

284
Ethical Doctrines in Jainism
tna-Sandoha of All the East Series, Vol. XL): cranthamālā, Marotha,
Sarvärthasiddhi of Pūjyapāda (Bhāratiya Jñana Pitha, Kāti). Şatkhandāgama, Vol. I of Puşpadanta and Bhūtabali with the commentary Dhavala of
Virasena (Jaina Sahitya Uddhāraka Fund Kāryālaya, Amraoti). Satkhandāgama, Vol. II (Jaina Sähitya Uddhāraka Fund Kāryālaya, Amraoti). Satkhandāgama, Vol. XIII (Jaina Sāhitya Uddhāraka Fund Kāryalaya, Amraoti). Sāstradipikā by Parthasārathi Misra (Oriental Institute, Baroda). Schools and Sects in Jaina Literature by Amülyacandra Sen (Visva-Bhārati, Calcutta). Short History of Ethics by R. A. P. Rogers (MacMillan & Co., London). Siddha Bhakti of Pujyapāda (Akhila Visva Jaina Misana, Salāla, under the title 'Dasa
Bhaktyádi Sangraha'). Sila Pāhuda of Kundakunda (Pātani Digambara Jaina Granthamālā, Marotha, under the
title 'Aşta Pāhuda'). Srāvaka Prajñapti of Umāsvāti (Jaina Jñāna Prakāšaka, Mandala, Shroff Bazar, Bombay): Studies in Jaina Philosophy by Nathmal Tatia (Jaina Cultural Research Society, Banaras). Subhāśitaratna-Sandoha of Amitagati (Hindi Grantharatnākara Kāryālaya, Bombay). Sūtrakstānga (Sacred Books of the East Series, Vol. XLV). Sūtra Pāhuda of Kundakunda (Pātni Digambara Jaina Granthamālā, Marotha, under
the title 'Aşta Pāhuda'). Svayambhūstotra of Samantabhadra (Virasevā Mandira, Daryaganj, Delhi). Svetāśvatara Upanişad (Gita Press, Gorakhapur). Syādvādamañjari of Mallişeņa (Rāyacandra Jaina Šāstramālā, Bombay). Taittiriya-Upanişad (Gita Press, Gorakhapur). Tattvārthaílokavārttika of Vidyānandi (Gandhi Nathārangji Jaina Granthamálā, Bombay). Tattvärthasūtra of Umāsvāti under the title Sarvārthasiddhi (Bhāratiya Jñāna Pītha, Kāsi). Tattvārthādhigamasūtra Bhāşya of Umāsvāti (Rāyacandra Jaina Šāstramālā, Bombay). Tattvārthasara of Amrtacandra (Bhāratiya Jaina Siddhanta Prakasini Sannsthā, Calcutta). Tattvārthavrtti of Srutasāgarasūri (Bhāratiya Jñānapitha, Kāsi). Tattvānušāsana of Nāgakumāra Muni (Virasevā Mandira, Daryaganj, Delhi). Uttaradhyayana (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XLV). Uvāsagadasāo (Oriental Book Agency, Poona). Vasunandi Srāvakācāra of Vasunandi (Bhāratiya Jñāna Pitha, Kāsi). Vedānta Explained Vol. I & II by Dr. V. H. Date (D. M. Tilak Mehendale Building,
V. P. Road, Bombay-4). . Vişāpahāra Stotra of Dhananjaya (Mülacanda Kišanadāsa, Kapadiyā, Surata, under the
title 'Pañcastotra'). World Problems and Jaina Ethics by Beni Prasad (Jaina Cultural Society, Banaras). Yasastilaka and Indian Culture by Handiqui (Jivarāja Granthamālā, Sholapur) Yoga, Immortality and Freedom by Micrcea Eliade (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London). Yoga of the Saints by Dr. V. H. Date (Popular Book Depot, Bombay-7). Yogaśāstra of Hemacandra (Rşabhachandra Tauhari, Delhi). Yogasāra of Yogindu (Rāyacandra Jaina Šāstramālā, Bombay). Yogadarśana of Patañjali (Gita Press, Gorakhapur.). Yogadarsana Bhāşya and Bhojavrtti (Sankara Datta Sharma, Muradābād). Yuktyanušāsana of Samantabhadra (Vira Sevā Mandira, Daryaganj, Delhi).

Page #307

AUTHORS MENTIONED
Akalanka 93, 95, 96, 97, 98, 187 Amitagati 90, 92, 95, 103, 109, 111, 114, 219, 273 Amptacandra 23, 42, 50, 62, 64, 77, 81, 82, 84,
90, 92, 96, 97, 100, 102, 104, 109, 171, 183,
213 Anandaghana 191 Anaximander 24 Antisthenes 258 Aristippus 258 Aristotle 256, 260, 263, 264, 265 A sadhara 79, 89, 90, 91, 92, 98, 103, 113, 114, 116 Banarasidasa 191 - Bentham 261 Berkeley 25 Bhagacanda 191 Bhåsarvajña 240 Bhūdharadāsa 191 Caird 34 Cámundarāya 90, 92, 95, 98, 109, 110, 114 Date (V. H.). 175, 244, 245 Democritus 26 Devasena 9, 19 Dhanafjaya 192 Dutta (Sukumar) 12 Dyanataraya 191 Gunabhadra 184, 223. Ghate 5: Hardutta Sharma 12 Haribhadra 42, 92, 93, 94, 105, 171 Hemacandra 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 109, 171 Jacobi 2, 4, 11 Jaimini 240 Jinasena 9, 89, 111, 116 Kant 15, 27, 29, 256, 262, 263 Kárttikeya (Svåmi) 62, 84, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95,
96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 103, 105, 109, 110, 112,
113, 114, 148, 167 Kumarasenamuni 9 Kumarila 240 Kundakunda 4, 18, 22, 23, 30, 35, 36, 39, 46, so,
54, 55, 57, 58, 62, 64, 70, 71, 72, 90, 92, 93, 94, 109, 110, 113, 114, 116, 122, 138, 139, 140, 167, 168, 171, 177, 187, 191, 202, 205, 211,
213, 215, 238 Maitra (S. K.) 267 Mill 261, 262
Nägakumaramuni 177 Någasena 252 Nathurama Premi 9 Nemicandra 62 Nietzsche 271 Padmaprabha Maladharideva 23 Parmenides 14 Patañjali 246, 247 Plato 256, 259, 260, 263, 264 Prabhakara 240, 244 Protagoras 256, 257 Pujyapada 5, 9, 35, 46, 90, 93, 96, 97, 98, 101,
121, 167, 171, 174, 177, 182, 183, 187, 191,
193, 195, 212, 215, 217, 219 Radhakrishnan 1, 250, 251 . Ranade (R.D.) 1,166, 167, 168, 208, 215, 235, 265 Rämánuja 31 Rāmasena 9 Sabara 240 Šamkara or Šamkarācărya 31, 36, 207, 239, 241,
244, 245 Samantabhadra 6, 13, 23, 42, 62, 65, 83, 84, 85,
87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 105, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 117, 119, 127, 148, 171, 189, 192, 199,
200, 239 Satkari Mookerjee 16 Sidgwick (Henery) 255, 261, 262 Somadeva 68, 79, 84, 85, 89, 90, 92, 109, 111,
114, 125, 190 Śrutaságara 96 Subhacandra 152, 155, 157, 159, 160, 167, 248 Uddyotakara 240 Umåsväti 46, 62, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 101, 109 Upadhye (A.N.) 10, 12, 22, 178 Vadiraja 9, 191, 192 Vasunandi 19, 85, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 98,
108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 115 Vätsyåyana 240, 242 Vidyānandi 93, 101, 245 Vimaladása 23 Viranandi 90 Vyāsa 247 Yogindu 35, 159, 167, 171, 176, 202, 211, 212,
217, 219, 220, 225 Yabovijaya 92, 93

Page #308

WORKS QUOTED
Acărānga 3F, 30F, 34, 34F, 42, 42F, 129F, 130,
130F, 131F, 132F, 134F, 135F, 137F, 141, 141F, 164, 164F, 165, 200, 205, 205F, 223, 223F,
238, 238F, 247F Acārasāra 5F, 90F, 128F, 131F, 137F, 138F,
140F, 147F, 148F, 149F, 150F, 165F Adipurāņa 116F Age of Imperial Unity 5F, 6F, 7F, 9F Ahimsā Tattva Darsana 42F Alăpapaddhati 19F Amitagati Samāyikapätha 188F, 219F Amitagati Srāvakācára 78F, 79F, 81F, 84F, 85F,
87F, 89F, 90F, 94F, 95F, 96F, 99F, 101F, 103F, 104F, 106F, 107F, 114F, 117F, 119F,
188F, 232F, 233F Anagåradharmāmsta 128F, 129F, 130F, 131F, 137F, 138F, 139F, 140F, 142F, 145F, 146F, 147F,
149F, 150F Anguttaranikaya 244F, 250F Aptamĩmbasă 135, 14F, 10F, 23F Astaka 42F Atharvaveda 213F Ātmānušāsana 184, 185F, 222, 222F, 223, 223F,
224F Bhagavadgitá 206, 207, 209, 209F, 210, 210F, 212,
212F, 214, 214F, 215, 215F, 216, 216F, 217, 217F, 219, 219F, 220, 220F, 221, 222, 222F, 223, 223F, 224, 224F, 225, 225F, 226, 226F, 227, 227F, 228, 229, 229F, 230, 231, 231F, 232, 233, 233F, 234, 234F, 235, 235F, 236, 236F, 237, 237F, 238, 238F, 239, 239F, 245, 254 Bhagavadgita as the Philosophy of God-realisa
tion 216F Bhagavata Purana 1, 2, 273 Bhagavati-Aradhanā 22, 22F, 41F, 122F, 124F,
129F, 130F, 131F, 132F, 133F, 134F, 135F, 137F, 141F, 146F, 147F, 148F, 149F, 150F,
151F, 163F, 164F, 165F, 179, 179F, 187 Bhaktāmarastotra 188F, 189F, 191F Bhavan@yiveka 66F, 88F, 183F, 1947, 1985, 199F. Bhava-pähuda 128F, 191F, 210, 210F, 221, 221F,
226F, 233F, 245, 245F, 266F. Bhiksu vicāra darsana 11F Bodha-pähuda 141F, 142, 237F, 238, 238F Brahmajāla sutta 251, 253 Brahmasutra 206 Běhadāranyaka Upanişad 210F, 217, 217F, 221,
221F, 222F, 228, 228F, 230, 230F
Bșhatkathākoşa 13F Caritra Bhakti 5, 5F Caritra Pāhuda 66F, 78F, 90F, 91F, 93, 109F
110F, 114F, 129F, 130F, 131F, 132F, 247F Cäritrasāra 84F, 90F, 91F, 93F, 98F, 99F, 110F, 101F, 102F, 103F, 104F, 105F, 107F, 109F,
111F, 114F Chandogya Upanişad 11, 208F, 209, 209F, 210F,
212, 213, 213F, 217F, 226, 227F, 230, 230F,
237F, 239F Constructive Survey of Upanişadic Philosophy
34F, 166F, 208F, 211F, 215F, 216F, 218F,
235F, 236F Darsana Pāhuda 61, 61F, 62, 62F, 64, 64F,:
70 Darsanasära 9, 9F, 10F Dasabhaktyádi-sangraha 190F Dasavaikälikasūtra 42F Deontology 261F Dharma Bindu 85F, 91F, 94F, 99F, 101F, 103F,
105F Digha Nikāya 250F, 252F Doctrines of Jainism 165F. Dravyasaṁgraha 24F, 28F, 30F, 43F, 62, 62F,
190F, 191, 234, 234F, 245, 245F. Early Buddhist Monachism 12F Ekibhāvastotra 191F, 192F Epitome of Jainism 17F Ethics of the Hindus 267F Fundamentals of Ethics 262F Gommațasāra Jivakāņda 24F, 26F, 33F, 34F,
48F, 52F, 53F, 62F, 171F, 172F, 181, 181F, 182F, 183F, 184F, 185F, 194F, 195F, 196F,
198F, 204F, 209F, 228F Gommatasära Karmakāņda 49F, 165F, 182F Greek philosophy 257 Harivamsa-purāņa 9, 187 History of Brahmanical Asceticism 11F, 12F History of Jaina Monachism 2F, 3F, 6F, 7F,
8F, 10F, 11F, 141F, 147F History of Philosophy 15F, 25F, 256F, 257F,
259F, 262F, 263F, 264F, 280F History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western 1F,
207F, 208F, 251F, 252F. Idea of God 17F Idea of the Holy 189F, 203F Indian Philosophy IF, 17F, 207, 208F, 211F,
242F, 250F, 251F

Page #309

Works Quoted
287
Introduction to Indian Philosophy 251F, 252F Isopanişad 215, 215F, 217, 217F, 238F Istopadesa 152F, 196F, 210F, 212, 212F, 217F,
218, 218F, 229F Jainadarśanasāra 77F Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism 16F, 17F Jaina Sahitya Aura Itihasa 10F Jaina Yoga 101 F, 104F, 107F Jaina Sataka 190F, 191F, 192F Jhånårnava 121F, 122F, 123F, 124F, 125F.
129F, 131F, 152F, 153F, 154F, 155F, 156F, 157F, 158, 158F, 159F, 160F, 161F, 162F, 163F, 167F, 168F, 195F, 200F, 203F, 204F, 223, 229, 233F, 234, 234F, 236F, 248,
248F Kalpasūtra 4, 4F, 6F - Kalyanamandirastotra 189F, 191F Kärttikeyanuprekşā 23, 23F, 30, 30F, 62F, 65F,
66F, 67, 67F, 68F, 74F, 78F, 83F, 84F, 85F, 87F, 90F, 93F, 94, 94F, 95F, 96F, 98F, 99F, 102F, 103F, 104F, 105F, 107F, 108F, 109F, 110F, 111F, 112F, 113F, 114F, 115F, 121, 121F, 122F, 123F, 124F, 126F, 147F, 148F, 152F,
153F, 154F, 155F, 161F, 163F, 167F, 168F, | 169F, 182F, 183F, 185F, 219F, 222, 222F, 248,
248F Kaşayapähuda 110F Katha Upanigad 208, 208F. 209F. 210, 210F.
214, 214F, 217, 217F, 218, 218F, 221, 221F, 222F, 224, 224F, 225, 225F, 228, 228F, 230F,
236F, 237F, 238, 238F Kausitaki upanigad 218, 218F Kena upanişad 222, 222F, 228, 228F Labdhisära 180F, 181F, 182F, 183F, 194F, 195F, · 196F, 204F. Lankavatāra-sutra 251F Linga Pahuda 134F Mahabharata 12 Mahapurāņa 187 Mahavira and his philosophy of life 6F Maitri upanişad 221, 223, 223F Majjhma Nikāya sutta 250F Mänameyodaya 240F Mokşamărgaprakasaka 194F, 199F Mokņa Pāhuda 34F, 62, 62F, 167F, 168F, 169,
169F, 177F, 226, 226F, 232, 233F, 234, 234F,
235, 235F, 236, 236F, 238, 238F, 266F Mülācāra 3F, SF, 5, 61F, 62, 62F, 66F, 122,
122F, 123F, 124F, 125F, 128F, 129F, 130F, 131F, 132, 132F, 133F, 134F, 135F, 136F, 137F, 138F, 139F, 140F, 141F, 142F, 146F, 147F, 148, 148F, 150F, 178F, 185, 187, 187F,
188F, 226, 226F, 231F, 232F, 236F, 248, 248F,
266F Mundaka Upanişad 208, 209F, 210F, 212, 212F,
213, 214, 214F, 218, 218F, 220, 221F, 225, 225F, 232, 232F, 234F, 236, 236F, 237F, 238.
238F, 239, 239F Mysticism 170F, 185F, 196F, 197F Mysticism in Maharashtra 1F, 167F, 199F Niyamasăra 19F, 23F, 24F, 25F, 26F, 297, 30F.
62, 62F, 63F, 129F, 131F, 133F, 134F, 135F, 136F, 138F, 139F, 140F, 169F, 170F, 190,
190F, 204F, 205F, 237F Nyāyasåra 240F Nyāya sūtra 240F, 242F, 243F, 244F Outline of Indian Philosophy 207F, 240F Outline of the History of Ethics 255F, 259F, 264F Outline of the History of Greek Philosophy 257F Padmacaritra 187 Pāņdavapurăņa 187 Pancadhyāyi 20F, 23F Pañcâstikäyasāra 16F, 18F, 23F, 24F, 25F, 26F,
27F, 28F, 29F, 315, 32F, 33F, 42F, 43F, 55F,
59F, 70F, 187, 205F, 210F, 227F, 266 Paramātmaprakāśa 1F, 167F, 173F, 176F, 199F,
202F, 203F, 210F, 211F, 213F. 217F, 220,
220F, 223, 224, 224F, 225F, 233, 233F Pathway to God in Hindi Literature 167F, 265F Potthapāda sutta 251, 251F Prakarana Pañjika 244F Prasna upanigad 210F, 224, 224F, 227, 227F,
230F Pravacanasāra 13F, 16F, 17F, 18F, 20F, 21F.
22F, 23F, 24F, 30, 30F, 31F, 32F, 37F, 39F, 42F, 50, 50F, 51F, 72F, 122F, 126F, 127F, 128F, 131F, 132F, 135F, 138F, 173F, 187, 187F, 188F, 201F, 202F, 210F, 211F, 220F,
238F
Principal Upanişads Thirteen 221F, 223F Purusårthasiddhi-upāya 42F, 61F, 62F, 65F, 66F,
67F, 68F, 75F, 76F, 77, 77F, 78F, 79F, 80F, 81F, 82F, 83, 84F, 85F, 86F, 87F, 89F, 90F, 91F, 93F, 94F, 96F, 98F, 99F, 100F, 101F, 102F, 103F, 104F, 105F, 108F, 117F, 118F,
119F, 170F, 184F, 187, 214F Rajavarttika 21F, 28F, 48F, 49F, 68F, 93F, 94F,
97F, 98F, 100F, 101F, 102F, 105F, 108F, 126F,
149F, 151F, 152F, 154F, 155F, 186F, 188 Ratnakaranda Srävakācāra 62F, 63F, 66F, 67F,
68F, 74F, 78F, 81F, 83F, 84F, 85F, 87F, 88F, 90F, 93F, 94F, 95F, 96F, 97F, 98F, 99F, 100F, 102F, 103F, 104F, 105F, 107F, 108F, 110F, 111F, 112F, 113F, 114F, 115F, 117F, 118F, 119F, 187, 227F, 228F

Page #310

288
Ethical Doctrines in Jainism
Religion & Society 217F Rgveda 12, 207, 207F, 208, 213, 254 Sacred Books of the East Vol. XLV 2F, 3F Sāgāra Dharmāmsta 78F, 79F, 81F, 83F, 84F,
87F, 89F90F, 91F, 93F, 94F, 95F, 96F, 98F, 99F, 101F, 103F, 105F, 106F, 107F, 113F,
114F, 115F, 116, 117F, 118F, 119F Samadhisataka 137F, 167F, 168F, 169F, 177F,
183F, 191F, 197F, 212F, 215F, 218, 218F,
219F, 220F Samañña Phala Sutta 2, 253 Samayasāra 36, 36F, 37F, 40F, 45F, 53F, 54,
54F, 57F, 58F, 64, 64F, 65F, 69F, 173F, 187,
209F, 213F, 215F, 218, 218F, 219, 219F Samkhya Kärikä 241F, 242, 242F, 244, 244F Sárkhya Pravacana Sutra 241F Sāmaveda 213 śānti Bhakti 191F Saptabhangitarangini 22F, 23, 23F Sarvărthasiddhi SF, 175, 18F, 21F, 24F, 25F.
26F, 275, 28F, 30F, 32F, 33F, 49F, 50F, 51F, 52F, 53F, 55F, 56F, 57F, 65F, 75F, 83F, 90F, 93F, 94F, 95, 95F, 96, 98F, 99F, 100F, 104F, 108F, 117F, 121F, 122F, 124F, 125F, 126F, 127F, 130F, 132F, 133F, 143F, 146F, 147F, 148F, 149F, 150F, 151F, 152F, 153F, 155F, 161F, 162F, 174F, 186F, 187F, 188F, 194F,
199F, 204F, 227F, 232F, 247F, 266F Şațkhandāgama Vol. I, 48F, 53F, 110F, 172F,
174F, 178F, 179F, 180F, 185F, 189F, 198F,
204F, 205, 205F Satkhandāgama Vol. II. 53F, 54F Satkhandāgama Vol. XIII. 145, 145F, 146F,
147F, 148F, 149F, 150F, 151F, 234F Sastradipika 240F Satapatha Brahmana 208 School & Sects in Jaina Literature 7F Short History of Ethics 255F, 257F, 258F, 260F,
262F, 264F Siddha Bhakti 31F, 39F Sila Pāhuda 226F Slokavårttika 93F Śravaka Prajñapti 85F, 91F, 92, 92F, 93, 93F,
94, 94F, 95, 95F, 97, 97F, 98F, S9F, 101F, 102, 102F, 103F, 104, 104F, 105, 105F, 106F,
108F Sthānăngasútra 173F Studies in Jaina Philosophy 15F, 173F, 181F,
251F Subhāşitaratnasandoha 93F, 94F Sūtrakstanga 34, 34F, 42, 42F Suttapāhuda 4, 4F, 141F
Svayambhūstotra 42F, 148F, 189F, 191F, 192F,
200F, 201F, 224, 224F, 237F, 238F, 239F Svetāśvatara upanişad 11, 210F, 223F, 233, 234F
235, 236F, 239F Syādvādamañjari 13F, 21F Taittiriya Upanişad 12, 211F, 228F, 229, 230,
230F Tattvārtha slokavārttika 93F, 245F Tattvārtha Sūtra 16F, 17F, 20F, 21F, 24F, 25F,
30F, 47F, 49F, 50F, 54, 54F, 55, 55F, 56, 56F, 57F, 62F, 76F, 81F, 83F, 84F, 85F, 87F, 88, 88F, 90, 91F, 94F, 95, 96, 96F, 97, 99F, 101, 101F, 103F, 117F, 119F, 121, 121F, 126F, 129F, 130, 130F, 131F, 132F, 133F, 142F. 146F, 148, 148F, 150, 150F, 152F, 153F, 154F, 155F, 161F, 162F, 176F, 190F, 192F, 225F,
246F, 247, 247F, 249, 249F Tattvārtha Sūtra Bhāşya 10F, 93F, 95F, 107,
124F, 174 Tattvārthasara 133F, 134F, 135F Tattvārthavrtti 96F, 103F Tattvānuśāsana 37F, 152F, 177F, 211F, 212,
212F, 236F Thāņāmga 141 Tiloyapannatti 187 Trilokasára 187 Uttarādhyayana 2, 2F, 3F, 4F, 61, 61F, 62, 62F, 66F, 131F, 132, 133F, 134F, 135F, 136F, 138F, 142, 143F, 144F, 146, 146F, 147F, 148F, 150F,
151F, 164F, 186F, 222, 222F, 223, 223F, 273F Uvāsagadasão or Upāsakadasa 81F, 83F, 84F,
85F, 87F, 92, 93, 94F, 96F, 97, 97F, 99F, 100,
110, 110F, 112F, 114F, 115F, 119, 119F Vasunandi Sråvakacára 19F, 62, 62F, 78F, 79F,
83F, 84F, 85F, 87F, 89F, 90F, 93F,96F, 99F, 106F, 107F, 108F, 109F, 110F, 111F, 112F,
114F, 115F Vedanta Explained 216F, 243F, 244F, 245F Vişāpahāra Stotra 192F, 210F World Problems and Jaina Ethics 27F Yajurveda 1, 213, 273F Yaśastilaka & Indian Culture 60, 61F, 68F, 79F, 83F, 84F, 85F, 89F, 90F, 103F, 104F, 107F,
108F, 117F, 125F, 190F Yoga Immortality and Freedom 248F Yoga of the Saints 175F, 177F, 183F, 187F, 188F,
249F Yogaśāstra (Hemacandra) 78F, 84F, 90F, 94F,
95F, 98F, 99F, 117F Yogasāra (Yogindu) 159F, 176, 176F, 212, 212F,
215F, 218, 219F, 226F Yogasutra 242F, 244F, 246F, 247F, 248F Yuktyanusasana 13F, 14F, 21F, 189F
F, 39F

Page #311

TECHNICAL TERMS AND NAMES OF PLACES AND PERSONS
OTHER THAN AUTHORS
Abaddhiya, 8 Abhakayas, 101 Abhavyas, 173, 175 Abhigphita, 174 Abhikana-Jhanopayoga, 190, 191, 193 Abhinandana, Abhinivesa, 242 Abhiniveśa-Andhatamisra, 242 Abhyasa, 246 Abrahma, 84 Acāra, 42, 45, 71, 109, 116, 119, 131, 150, 178,
184, 245 Acaravān 179 Acārya, 8, 9, 34, 46, 60, 62, 63, 81, 88, 89, 91,
94, 97, 102, 104, 110, 116, 119, 157, 164, 165, 167, 172, 177, 178, 180, 183, 221, 230, 245,
246, 247, 259, 265, 273, 278 Acårya-Bhakti, 190, 193 Acauryāņuvrata, 75, 81, 83 Adana-Nikpepana-Samiti, 133, 136, 277 Adarsana, 143 Adhaḥpravsttakarana, 181, 194, 195 Adhāravăn, 179 Adharma, 19, 22, 24, 28, 29, 40, 46, 274, 275
(Sin)-66, (wrong religion)-173-(demerit)-241 Adhigamaja Samyagdarsana 65 Adhyavasána, 58, 59 Adreta, 26 Advaita, 36, 37 Advaita-Vedanta, 239, 240, 241, 244 Agama, 9, 11, 177 Aghati-Karmas, 203 Agneyi-dhårana, 160 Ahåra, 53 Ahicchatta, 3 Ahimså, 1, 41, 42, 77, 80, 81, 86, 89, 100, 118,
120, 126, 155, 166, 200, 232, 247, 253, 257, 262, 263, 265, 266, 268, 269, 275, 276, 277, 280 Ahimså-Mahåvrata, 129 Ahicsāņuvrata, 75, 78, 79, 80, 90 Ajita, 1 Ajiva, 8, 22, 45, 47, 71, 173, 187, 274 Ajivakas, 13 Ajtana, 44, 143, 174 Ajna-Vicaya, 161, 162 Akába, 19, 22, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 40, 46, 274, 275 Akampita-Dosa, 148
Akimcana, 186 Akrosa, 143 Alabdhabhumikatva, 248 Aläbha, 143 Alabhiya, 6 Alasya, 248 Alaulya, 107 Alocană, 140, 148, 149 Alokakaga, or Aloka, 28, 29, 125, 187, 204, 275 Alubdhată, 107 Amalakappa, 3 Amárga, 173 Amnāya, 186 Amudhadrati, 66, 67, 69, 269 Amudhată, 266 Amukta, 173 Anabhigphita, 174 Anåcåra, 81 Anåmayam Padam, 210 Ananda, 211 Anandamaya Atman, 211, 212 Ananta, 1 Anantakåya, 101 Anantånubandhi, 52, 57, 86, 182 Anarthadandavrata, 91, 92, 96, 97, 98, 101, 266,
268 Anasana, 146 Anasuyā, 107 Antarātman, 34, 35, 167, 169, 170, 183, 198, 218,
219, 256 Apavasthititva, 248 Ancalikā gaccha, 11 Anekānta, 268, 269, 270 Anekantavāda, 22, 43, 62, 63, 257 Anga, 66, 67, 68 Anidänatva, 107 Anitya, 121 Anista-Saryogaja, 153 Anityånupreka, 122 Anivrttikarana, 181 Anivyttikarana, Gunasthåna. 195 Annarasamaya, 211. Ansta, 207 Antarmuhurta, 25, 152, 163, 181, 182, 194, 195,
196, 204 Antarajia 8 Antariya, 49

Page #312

290
Ethical Doctrines in Jainism
Anu, 20, 25, 30, 40 Anubhāga Bandha, 49, 50 Anubhava, 171 Anucintana, 121 Anukampá, 68 Anumanita Dosa, 149 Anumatityāga, 110 Anumatityāga Pratima, 115 Anumodana, 129 Anupama, 189 Anuprekşā, 120, 121, 126, 152, 186, 246, 276 Aņuvrata, 87, 89, 90, 91, 94, 97, 108, 109, 112,
113, 119, 247, 259, 260, 265, 268, 276 Anuyoga, 187 Anyatva, 20, 21, 121 Anyatvānuprekså, 124 Apadhyāna, 97, 98 Aparā Vidya, 212, 213, 214 Aparibhävita, 107 Aparigraha, 85, 87, 232 247, 258, 259, 265, 266,
268, 272, 277, 280 Aparigraha-Mahāvrata, 131, 132 Apariţrāvi, 179 Apätras, 106, 108 Apāya-Vicaya, 161 Apramatta, 42 Apramatta Sarnyata Gunasthāna, 194 Aprasasta, 152, 153, 277 Apratyākhyānåvarana, 52, 54, 86, 129, 184 Apriya, 83 Apta, 62, 63, 64, 177 Apūrvakarana, 181, 195 Ara, 1 Arahantas, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53, 68, 86, 89, 105,
116, 119, 139, 160, 161, 177, 178, 180, 191, 192,
198, 199, 200, 202, 203, 238, 259, 265, 278, 279 Arhat Bhakti, 190, 193 Arambha, 77, 78, 129 Arambhatyāga, 110, 114 Aranyakas, 12 Arati, 53, 143 Ardhaphālaka, 8 Ardhapudgalaparāvartanakala, 176, 181 Arhat, 43, 48, 169, 178, 188, 189, 191, 199, 200,
203, 252, 253 Aristanemi, 1, 2 Arjava, 186, 266 Arjuna, 12 Arta, 98, 138, 140, 152, 153, 154, 227 Artadhyāna, 55, 56, 152, 153, 157, 277 Arthaparyāya, 19, 20, 28, 31 Aryans, 1, 12, 13 Åşādha, 7
Asadhu, 173 Asamjñi, 33 Asamprajñāta, 249 Asana, 246, 248 Asarana, 121, 123, 126 Asatya, 81 Asmita, 242 Asmita Moba, 242 Aśramas, 11, 12 Asrava, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 57, 58,
59, 60, 71, 73, 80, 121, 126, 129, 227, 228, 232,
250 Assamitta, 7 Astami, 85, 115 Asteya, 232, 247, 265, 266, 268, 277, 280 Asteya Mahāvratas, 130 Asteyāņuvrata, 84 Astikāyas, 62, 63, 68 Asubha, 38, 215 Abubha Bhåvas, 36 Asuci, 121 Asuci-anuprekga, 121 Abuddha, 38 Abuddha Bhavas, 39 Asurf, 227, 228 Asvasena, 3 Atattva, 180 Aticara, 81, 83, 84, 96 Atikrama, 81 Atithidāna, 108 Atithisamvibhagavrata, 91, 92, 102, 105, 231, 232 Atman, 42, 43, 102, 118, 122, 132, 198, 202, 204,
205, 208, 210, 211, 212, 213, 217, 218, 219, 222, 224, 225, 226, 233, 235, 236, 237, 239, 242,
245 Atmasamáhita, 200 Atyáśramin, 11 Aupasamika, 65 Avadhi, 15 Avali, 30 Avamaudarya, 146 Aväntarasatta, 23 Avapidaka, 179 Avasyaka, 137, 138 Avasyakaparihara, 193 Avatāra, 245 Avidya, 44, 216, 217, 218, 241, 242, 243, 244, 251 Avidya Tama, 242 Avirata-Samyagdreti, 182 Aviratasamyagdrsti-Gunasthāna, 176, 184 Avişāda 107 Avvattaga, 7 Avyakta, 149

Page #313

Technical Terms etc.
291
Ayopāyadarsaka, 179 Ayogakevali, 197 Ayogakevali-Gunasthäna, 203, 204 Ayu, 49, 204 Āyus Karman, 180, 204 Bada, 79, 80 Bādara, 149 Bahirātman, 34, 35, 167, 168, 170, 173, 206, 211,
218 Bāhubali, 128 Bahujana Procha Doga, 149
. . Bahuraya, 7 Bahusruta Bhakti, 193 Bala 32, 41 Banārsidäsa, 10 Bandha, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 54, 57, 58, 60, 71,
187, 250 Bengal, 6 . Bhaddiyā, 6 Bhadrabahu, 8 Bhajana, 190, 191 Bhakta, 235 Bhaktapratijñā-marana, 163, 164, 165 Bhakti, 68, 74, 75, 107, 190, 191, 192, 235, 245,
248 Bhaktiyoga, 193, 194 Bhasă, 277 Bhaga-Samiti, 133, 134, 135 Bhattarakas, 10 Bhāva, 75, 76, 80, 120, 128, 129, 144, 198, 220,
250, 263, 275, 276 Bhāvakarmas, 205 Bhavanās, 122, 152 Bhāvapratikramana, 140 Bhavasramana, 233 Bhaya, 53, 54 Bhikhanaji, 11 Bhiksăcari, 146 Bhima, 12 Bhoga, 57, 99, 100, 105, 109, 113, 114, 115, 120,
122 Bhogavirati, 92, 93, 99 Bhogopabhogavrata, 100 Bhogopabhogaparimāņa, 91, 92, 93, 95, 99, 100, · 101, 110, 111 Bhrgu, 24 Bhūta Anukarhpå, 266 Bihar, 6 Bisapantha, 9, 10 Bodhidurlabha, 121, 125 Bodiya, 8 Brahmanas, 11 Brahmacarya, 12, 110, 114, 186, 232, 247, 265,
266, 268, 272, 277, 280 - Brahamcaryåņuvrata, 84, 85, 231 Brahmacarya-Mahāvrata, 130 Brahma-Jñana, 244 Brahman, 34, 35, 37, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212,
213, 217, 218, 220, 224, 227, 234, 236, 241,
244, 245 Brāhmaṇa, 12, 13, 206, 208, 209, 254 Brahmanirvana, 210 Bråhmi Sthiti, 210 Buddha, 2, 5, 6, 15, 241, 243, 244, 245, 250, 251
252, 254 Buddhi, 39, 242 Buddhism, 12, 207, 243, 250, 251 Buddhist, 13, 14, 16, 31, 206, 239, 241, 243, 244,
252, 280 Caitanya, 244 Caitya Bhakti, 190 Campā, 6 Candralekha, 8 Candraprabha, 1 Caraņānuyoga, 186, 187 Cäritra, 37, 72, 74, 126, 139, 150, 165, 246 Caritrācára, 126, 150 Cårvāka, 31, 34, 168, 206, 207 Carya, 116, 119, 143 Catuijäma, 2, 3 Caturdasi, 85, 115 Cauryanandi-Raudra-dhyâna, 154 Cetaka, 6 Cetapa, 42 Chandragupta Maurya, 8 Channa Doßa, 149 - Cheda, 148, 149 Chedopasthāpanā, 5 Cintā, 152 Darhkamasaka, 143 Dāna, 106, 107, 108, 266 Darsana, 37, 69, 110, 111, 139, 150, 165, 248 Darsanācāra, 126, 150 Darsanapratima, 111 Darsanavaraniya, 49 Darsanamohaniyakarma, 173, 176 Darsanavisuddhi, 193 Dårsanika, 111 Dasapura, 8 Deba, 105 Degană, 108 Desapalabdhi, 176 Desavirata-Gumasthāna, 184 Desavrata, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 101, 268 Deva, 55, 62, 67, 160, 177, 178, 191, 235, 266 Devasāstra, 177

Page #314

292
Ethical Doctrines in Jainism
Devayana, 209 Dhamma, 3 Dharma, 1, 3, 19, 22, 24, 27, 28, 29, 40, 42, 46,
62, 66, 67, 68, 72, 90, 108, 121, 126, 131, 134,.. 135, 138, 147, 152, 161, 173, 177, 178, 185,
187, 226, 232, 241, 274, 275 Dharma-dhyāna, 152, 161, 162, 194, 277 Dharmastikaya, 28, 29 Dharmasvākhyātatva, 121, 126 Dharmopadesa, 186 Dhåraņas, 159, 246, 249 Dhumdiyā, 11 Dhyāna, 98, 108, 138, 139, 148, 151, 152, 153,
155, 156, 159, 161, 162, 163, 205, 232, 233,
246, 249, 266, 277 Digambara 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 93, 100, 101, 104, 132,
141, 273, 277 Digvrata, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 101, 268 Diksă-Guru, 139 Diva-Maithuna-virati, 110, 114 Dokriya, 7 Dravida, 9 Dravida Samgha, 9 Dravya, 17, 18, 24, 25, 28, 30, 45, 46, 62, 63,
75, 76, 80, 150, 158, 205, 275 Dravya-Lingi Muni, 175 Dravyānuyoga, 187 Dravya-Pratikramana, 140 Dravyarthika, 31 Dravyasramana, 233 Dreta, 149 Drstaphalānapekşita, 107 Duḥkhanirodha, 250 Duhkhanirodhamårga, 250 Duhkha-Samudaya, 250 Duhsruti, 97, 98 Dveßa, 53, 241, 242 Dvesa-Tamisra, 242 Dvitiyopasama-Samyagdrəti, 194, 195, 196 Ekänta, 174 Ekântic, 21 Ekikarana, 158 Ekatva, 212, 163 Ekatvānupreksă, 124 Ekatva-Vitarka, 249, 253 Ekatva-Vitarka-avicåra, 162, 163 Esaná, 277 Esana-Samiti, 133, 135 Gacchas, 10, 11 Ganadharas, 199 Gandhiji, 6 Canga, 7, 12 Garha, 68, 140
Garhita, 82 Gatis, 209, 226 Gharis, 142 Ghätikarmas, 198, 203 Ghātin, 163 Goochaga, 132 Gotra, 6, 49, 204 · Goyama, 2 Greek, 252, 254, 256 Gphastha, 12 Gumänirama, 10 Gumanapantha, 9, 10 Gúna, 17, 18, 19, 21, 89, 170, 194, 214, 215, 217,
235 Guna Guru, 139 Gunasthana, 162, 167, 182, 183, 191, 194, 195,
196, 197, 198, 204, 278, 279, 280 Gunavratas, 91, 93, 95, 96, 101, 108, 109, 112 Guptis, 5, 126, 132, 133, 138, 150, 151, 187, 232 Guru, 54, 55, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 115, 116,
128, 132, 134, 139, 140, 148, 149, 150, 151, 177, 178, 179, 190, 191, 194, 220, 221, 234, 235, 244,
245, 254, 266, 276, 278 Gutthamāhila, 8 Heraclitus, 14 Harikesa, 273 Håsya, 53 Hatthinåpura, 3 Himså, 3, 42, 55, 67, 71, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 83,
84, 86, 87, 90, 94, 98, 100, 105, 108, 109, 111, 120, 127, 129, 131, 132, 133, 137, 166, 184,
200, 201, 247, 270, 276 Hidasádāna, 97, 98 Himsanandi-Raudra-dhyana, 154 Indra, 12, 200, 211 Ingini-marana, 163, 164, 165 Irya, 277 Iryāpatha, 50, 51, 59 Iry-Samiti, 133, 134 Ista-viyogaja, 153 Isvarapranidhana, 247 Jaghanya-Aptarătman, 169 Jainåcåryas, 127, 175 Jainism, 1, 7, 12, 13, 14, 18, 21, 24, 32, 37, 71,
93, 110, 127, 128, 168, 186, 188, 207, 209, 210, 211, 216, 217, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 227, 228, 229, 231, 232, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 243, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 258, 259, 260, 261, 263,
265, 268, 272, 274, 278, 280 Jamāli 7 Jambūdvipa, 159 Jamună, 12
dra-dhyâng 1
51 59
.

Page #315

Technical Terms etc.
293
Jaramarana, 250 Jāti, 250 Jina, 103, 104, 139, 141, 150, 169, 178, 191 Jinadeva, 219 Jinakalpi, 141 Jinapūjā, 235 Jiva, 8. 19, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 32, 45, 46, 47, 48, 71, 76, 78, 80, 83, 87, 100, 105, 154, 173,
187, 218, 274 Jivan Muktas, 47, 48, 50, 163, 198, 240, 241 Jivapaesiya, 7 Jñaptikriyā, 50 Jñana, 37, 42, 69, 139, 150, 165, 216, 244 Jñāna-Atman, 210 Jhânācāra, 126, 150 Jñānāvaraniya, 49 Jñanopadhi, 132 Jñanayoga, 192, 193, 194. Jñeyārthaparinamanakriyā, 50, 51 Jugupsă, 53 Kāla, 19, 22, 24, 28, 29, 30, 40, 46, 105, 274,
275 Kalyāna, 10 Kambala, 132 Kampillapura, 3 Kämya, 242, 244 Kanika, 26 Kāpota, 53, 56, 154, 155, 164, 228 Karana-Labdhi, 181 Karanānuyoga, 186, 187 Kårita, 129 Karman, 180 Karmaphalacetană, 42 Karmayoga, 216 Karuņā, 107, 156, 195, 266 Karuņāpātras, 106, 107 Kasava, 6. Kasaya, 172 Kastha Sangha, 9
cha o Kathumara, 79, 80 Kāya, 24, 146, 147, 277 Kāyotsarga, 138, 141, 149, 157, 193, 194, 277 Kesi, 2 Ketaki, 100 Kevala, 15, 182 Kevalajñana, 7, 198 Kharatargaccha, 11 Kirtana, 190 Klesa, 242 Kosala, 1 Kosambi, 3 Koyala, 189 Krodha, 52
Krana, 2, 53, 154, 155, 164, 228 Kfta, 129 Kşamă, 107, 186, 266 Ksatriya, 1,6 Ksãyika, 65 Kṣāyika Kriyās, 51 Krāyika-Samyagdrsti, 194, 195, 197 Ksãyika-Samyaktva, 183 Kşayopasama, 180 Kṣāyopaśamika Samyaktva, 65, 182, 183 Kşinakaşaya Gunasthāna, 195, 196 Ksobha, 72 Kşudhā, 143 Kulakara, 1 Kundagrāma, 6 Kundapura, 6 Kunthu, 1 Kupātras, 106, 108 Kušalábhisamdhita 107 Labdhis, 176, 180, 181, 221, 278 Lalāta, 158 Leśyās, 55, 154, 155, 164, 181, 223, 228 Licchavi, 6 Lobha, 52 . Loka, 121, 125, 187, 204, 205 Lokākāśa, 28, 29, 30, 275 Lokānuprekšā, 125 Lokapāla, 8 Lonkāśaha, 11 Madhupinga, 128 Madhyaloka, 159 Madhyama-antarătman, 169 Madhyastha, 156, 266 Madras, 9 Madura, 9 Magadha, 6, 8, 12, 13, 273 Mahärtha, 30 Mahasattå, 23 Mahat, 210 Mahat-Atman, 210 Mahăvira, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 257, 273 Mahāvrata, 118, 129, 247, 259, 260, 265 Mahăvrati, 94, 95 Maithuna, 54 Maitreyi, 221 Maitri, 156, 266 Mala, 143 Malli, 1, 2 Mäna, 52, 277 Manahparyaya, 15 Manana, 244 Manomaya-Atman, 211 Mantra, 190

Page #316

294
Ethical Doctrines in Jainism
Marana, 41, 164 Mārdava, 186, 266 Mārga, 173 Märgaprabhāvanā, 193 Mrgāputra, 233 Marudevi, 1 Mathura-Saragha, 9 Mati, 15 Mayā, 52, 232, 235 Meru, 179, 204 Milinda, 252 • Mimärsakas, 239, 240 Misra-Gunasthāna, 181, 182 Mithilā, 6, 7 Mithyā, 232, 234 Mithya Caritra, 243, 251 Mithyādarsana, 44, 243, 251 Mithyadrsti, 172 Mithyājñāna, 241, 242, 243, 251 Mithyatva, 44, 172, 173, 174, 182, 196, 217, 275,
278 Mithyātva-Guņasthāna, 172, 174, 278 Mithyātva-Karma, 174 Moha, 72, 172, 241, 242 Mohakarma, 85 Mohaniya, 49, 172 Moksa, 44, 45, 46, 59, 60, 71, 102, 155, 169, 187,
241, 243, 245, 250, 252 Mşşānandi-Raudra-Dhyāna, 154 Mukhapati, 132 Mukta, 173 Müla, 148, 149 Mulagunas, 88, 89, 90, 91, 111, 112, 116, 119,
128, 137, 142, 166, 248 Mülavrata, 111 Muni, 45, 60, 71, 74, 119, 128, 129, 131, 132, 133,
165, 166, 169, 178, 185, 187, 194, 234, 235 Munisuvrata, 1 Mussolini, 271 Naçiketas, 221 Nagnatā, 143 Nāham, 244 Naimittika, 242, 244 , Naisargika, 174 Naisthika, 116 Naiyāyikas, 239, 240, 241 Nalanda, 6 Năma, 49, 204, 251 Na me, 244 Namasmarana, 190 Nami, 1 Namokāra Mantra, 190, 234 Nandiévara Bhakti, 190
Napurissakaveda, 53 Närada, 213 Nāsmi, 244 Nātaputta, 2 Naya, 6, 21, 22, 35, 36, 43, 62, 63, 77, 161, 168,
171, 173, 226, 241, 274 Nāyaputta, 6 Nayavāda, 22, 263 Neem, 79 Nemi, 1, 2 : Nidāna, 232, 235, 236, 261 Nidäna-Janita, 153 Nididhyasana, 244 Niggantha, Nihkāraksita, 66, 69, 266 Niḥsankita, 66, 69 Nila, 53, 56, 154, 155, 164, 288 Nindā, 68, 140 Niratisaya-Apramatta, 194 Nirbija, 249 Nirgrantha, 132 Nirguna, 235 Nirjară, 45, 46, 59, 60, 71, 121, 126, 250 Nirjarānupreksā, 126 Nirmali, 181 Niruāpdhitva, 107 Nirvana, 3, 6, 7, 8, 42, 205, 236, 241, 244, 251,
252, 273 Nirvana Bhakti, 190 Nirvicikitsă, 66, 67, 69, 266, 269 Nirvptti, 138 Nirvytti Bhakti, 139, 190 Niryāpaka, 179 Nişadyā, 143 Nisargaja, 65 Niscaya Naya, 35, 36, 37, 42, 59, 62, 64, 65, 71,
77, 133, 138, 168, 213, 214, 222 Njścaya-Pratikramana, 140 Niscaya-Samyagdarśana, 275 Nisiddha, 242 Niskāma-karma, 216 Nitya, 242, 244 Niyama 100, 101, 246, 247 Nojiva, 8 Nyāya-Vaiseşika, 26, 27, 31, 207, 240, 241, 243,
244, 245 Padārthas, 45, 62, 63, 64, 174, 177, 243 Padastha, 159 Padma, 53, 157, 228 Padmaprabha, 1 Padmasana, 248 Pākara, 79, 80 Pakşa, 116, 119, 276

Page #317

Technical Terms etc.
295
Pākşika, 90, 116 Påli, 2,5 Pärasu, 26 Paniyabhūmi, 6 Paribhoganivștti, 99 Parişahas, 249 Pancaguru Bhakti, 190 Panca-Mahvvaya, 2 Pandita-marana, 163 Pandita-Pandita-Marana, 41 Pantha, 10 Papa, 13, 36, 46, 53, 187, 200, 215, 238 Papopadesa, 97, 98 Para, 212 Paradravya, 130, 236 Parāgati, 210 Paramabhakti, 138, 139 Parama Brahma, 42 Paramartha, 36, 173, 218 Parama Purusa, 210 Paramartha Naya, 37, 213 Paramarthika, 36, 59, 65, 140 Paramātman, 34, 35, 158, 167, 169, 170, 183,
191, 198, 199, 200, 202, 206, 210, 211, 212,
214, 215, 217, 275 Parameşthins, 190 Param Gatim, 210 Parasamaya, 37, 172 Pará vidya, 212, 213, 214 Paribhoganivștti, 92, 93 Parigraha, 85, 86, 87, 115, 131, 132, 151, 164,
165, 186, 237 Parigraha-Parimāņāņuvrata, 75, 85, 86, 87 Parigraha Sarajná, 53 Parigrahatyaga, 114 Parihara, 148, 149 Parişahas, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 151, 165, 266,
277 Parişahajaya, 126, 266Paramartha, 30 Paramårthakāla, 30 Parokşa, 15 Parokşa-Anubhava, 171 Paropadesa-Purvaka, 174 Pårávanátha, 1, 2, 3, 4, 255, 273 Parthivi-dhäranä, 159 Paryāya, 18, 19, 20, 150, 170, 274 Paryanka, 157 Paryāyarthika, 31 Pátras, 106, 107, 108, 116 Pāvā, 6 Pindasthadhyána, 159, 160 Pipala, 79, 80
Pita, 53 Pitryana, 209 Prabhāvana, 66, 68, 69, 266, 270 Pradeśa, 20, 21, 24, 25, 30, 48, 49 Pradeśa Bandha, 49 Prajapati, 211 Prajna, 143 Prakartā, 179 Prāksta, 2 Praksti, 25, 217, 220, 241, 242, 244, 246 Praksti Bandha, 49 Prakurvi, 179 Pramada, 154, 169, 185, 194, 248 Pramadacarita, 97, 98 Pramāna, 21, 22, 43, 62, 63, 161, 171, 274 Pramatta, 42 Pramatta Virata-Gunasthåna, 184 Pramoda, 156, 266 Prāņas, 32, 33, 42, 69, 75, 76, 80, 84, 85, 131,
135, 180 Prāņāyāma, 157, 211, 246, 248 Prärabdha, 245 Prasama, 68 Prasasta, 152, 153, 277 Prasastadhyāna, 155, 161 Prāsuka, 104 Prathamanuyoga, 186, 187 Prathamopasama-Samyaktva, 182 Pratikramana, 4, 5, 138, 140, 148, 149 Pratimă, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114,
116, 119, 120, 139, 276 Pratisiddha, 244 Pratişthāpanā-Samiti, 133, 136 Pratyābāra, 158, 246, 248 Pratyakhyāna, 140, 277 Pratyākhyānāvarana, 52, 54, 184 Pratyaksa, 15, 171 Pravacana Bhakti, 190, 191 Pravacanamätă, 133 Pravacanavatsalya, 193 Pravștti, 241 Prayascitta, 148, 149, 266 Prayoga-Labdhi, 180 Prayopagamana-marana, 163, 165 Prcchana, 186 Pritiyoga, 107 Priyadarsanā, 6 Proşadha, 104, 110, 112, 113 Prosadhaśälä, 104 Proşadhopavāsavrata, 91, 92, 102, 103, 104, 105,
110, 111, 112, 113, 268 Pfthaktva, 20, 163 Pfthaktva-Vitarka, 249, 253

Page #318

296
Ethical Doctrines in Jainism
Pfthaktva-Vitarka-Vicára, 162, 163 Pudgala, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 46, 48,
82, 136, 218, 220, 274 Punya, 13, 36, 46, 53, 187, 199, 200, 215, 216,
218, 238, 267 Puruşa, 220, 224, 241, 242, 244, 246 Purugaveda, 53 Purva-Mimärksa, 31, 207, 239, 240, 241, 242,
243, 244, 245 Puşpadanta, 1 Rādhika-Guru, 139 Räga, 53, 143, 241, 242 Rajas, 213, 214, 215, 217, 225, 231, 232 Rājasika, 219 Rasaparityāga, 146, 147 Rathavirapura, 8 Rati, 53, 54 Rätribhojana, 101 Rätri Bhuktityāga, 110, 114 Raudra, 98, 138, 152 Räudra Dhyāna, 55, 56, 140, 152, 154, 155, 227,
277
Råyagiha, 3 Rohagutta, 8 Rşabha, 1, 5, 273 Rta, 207 Rükşatā, 26 Rupa, 250, 251 Rūpastha, 159 Rūpasthadhyāna, 160 Rūpātīta, 159 Rūpātītadhyāna, 160 Sabdákulita, 149 Sabija, 249 Sacittatyāga, 110, 113 Şadāyatana, 250 Sadguru, 63, 177 180. Sadhaka, 116, 119, 188, 246, 247 Sadhanā, 116, 119, 276 Sadhu, 11, 89, 104, 119, 173, 177, 178, 180, 265,
278 Sådhu Samadhi, 193 Sadraśyasattă, 23 Sagaras, 182 Sägeya, 3 Saguna, 235, 245 Sakala, 74 Sakti, 107 Saktitastapa, 193 Saktitastyåga, 193 Sallekhana, 91, 93, 94, 95, 116, 117, 118, 119,
166, 266, 276, 277 Salya, 235, 236
Samadhi, 246, 248, 249 Samadhi-Bhakti, 190 Samaiyapantha, 9, 10 Sämänyasattă, 23 Samāramabha, 129 Samarasibhåva, 158 Samaya, 30 Samayasära, 36 Sāmāyika, 5, 102, 103, 104, 110, 111, 112, 113,
138, 235, 268, 277 Sämáyikavrata, 91, 92 Sarabhava, 1 Saragha, 9, 10 Sararambha, 129 Samiti, 5, 126, 132, 133, 134, 150, 151, 277 Samijñā, 250 Samajvalana, 52, 54, 184, 194, 197 Särakhya, 13, 25, 39 Sārakhya-Yoga, 31, 207, 239, 241, 242, 243, 244 Samlinatā 146 Samma-ājiva, 252 Sammadithi, 252 Sammakammanta, 252 Sammasamadhi, 252 Sammasamkappa, 252 Sammasati, 252 Sammavāca, 252 Sammavāyāma, 252 Samnyāsa, 11, 12, 213, 273 Sämparāyika, 50, 55, 56, 71 Sämpardyika Asrava, 51, 59, 251 Saraprajñāta, 249 Sarprajñāta-Samādhi, 249 . Samsāra, 44, 45, 51, 121, 142, 179, 191, 215, 218,
223, 233, 239, 244 Sarasărānupreksă, 123 Sarasaya, 174, 248 Saraskāra, 250, 251 Sarnsthåna-Vicaya, 161 Sarasthanavicaya-Dharma-dhyāna, 162 Samuccheiya, 7 Samudghāta, 203, 204 Sarkvara, 45, 46, 59, 60, 71, 121, 126, 250 Samvarānuprekşă, 126 Samvega, 68, 193 Samyagdargana, 44, 45, 55, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 102, 106, 110, N1, 112, 116, 120, 150, 176, 177, 180, 181, 182, 184, 192,
193, 266, 268, 275 Samyagjñāna, 184, 269, 270 Samyak-Mithyātva, 182 Samyakpraksti, 182 Samyaktva, 44, 181

Page #319

Technical Terms etc.
297
Sanayama, 186, 249 Sadayamopādhi, 132 Santa-Atman, 210 Sanatkumāra, 213 Santibhakti, 190 Saptabhangivāda, 22, 171 Saptavyasana, 111 Sarāga, 65, 72 Sarāga-Sarayama, 266 Sarkarā, 26 Sarvodaya, 6 Sāsādana-Gunasthāna, 181, 182 Śāstra, 55, 179, 191, 203, 266 Sätāvedaniya-karma, 200 Sātisaya-Apramatta, 194, 195 Satkāra, 105 Satkarapuraskāra, 143 Sattă, 23 Sattva, 107, 214, 215 Sattva-Guna, 217 Sättvika, 219, 231, 232 Satya, 207, 232, 247, 265, 266, 268, 277, 280 Satya-Mahāvrata, 139 Satyāņuvrata, 75, 81, 83, 231 Sauca, 186, 247, 266 Saucopdhi, 132 Sāvadya, 83, 87 Såvatthi, 3, 6, 7 Savirya-dhyāna, 158 Sayogakevali, 197 Sayogakevaligunasthāna, 198, 203 Sayya, 143 Seyaviya, 7
Siddha, 28, 29, 41, 43, 48, 59, 89, 119, 139, 169, . ' 177, 178, 188, 189, 191, 192, 198, 199, 200, 204,
205, 206 Siddha-Bhakti, 190 Siddha-Gati, 209 Siddhātman, 161 Siddhartha, 6 Sikşávratas, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 101, 108, 109,
112 śrla, 61, 113, 194, 226, 234, 273 śrlavrata, 91, 93, 94, 95, 108, 113, 119, 184, 268,
276 stlavrateávanaticăra, 193 Sita, 143 Šttala, 1 Sivabhūti, 8, 9, 128 Skandha, 20, 25, 26, 27, 40, 275 Snigdhată, 26 Socrates, 256, 257, 258, 263 šoka, 53
Sparsa 250 Sraddha, 105, 107, 148, 149 Śramana, 12, 128, 276 Śrävaka, 111, 115 Sravana, 244 Śreyan, 1 Śrikalasa, 10 Śruta, 15 Śruta Bhakti, 190 Śruta Guru, 139 Śruta kevali, 182 Steya, 83 Sthapakavāsi, 11 Sthiti Bandha, 49, 50 Sthitikarana, 66, 67, 69, 266, 270. Sthulabhadra, 8 Stri, 143 Striveda, 53 Stuti, 138, 139, 190, 247, 277 Styāna, 248 śubha, 36, 38, 215 subha-Bhāvas, 132 Subha Dhyana, 129 Subha Lesya, 129 Subhopayoga, 102, 129, 132 Suddha, 38, 59 Śuddha Bhāvas, 36, 132, 198 Suddhanaya, 64, 65, 213, 214 Suddhopayoga, 37, 102, 167, 246, 260, 278 Sukla, 53, 108, 139, 152, 228 Sükşma Dosa, 149 Sukladhyāna, 152, 161, 162, 163, 169, 195, 196,
203, 245, 249, 253, 277 Sūkşmakriyāpratipātin, 162, 163, 249 Sükşma-Sämparāya, 195 Sumati, 1, 2 Supārsva, 1 Svādhyāya, 148, 151, 186, 187, 188, 191, 192, 206,
247, 266 Svarūpasatta, 23, 40, 170, 275, 278 Svasamaya, 37, 41, 275 Śvasana-dhāraņā, 160 Svasthana-Apramatta, 194 Svayambhū, 39, 275 Śvetambaras, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 100, 101,
104, 132, 141, 142, 273, 277 Svetapatas, 8 Syadvāda, 21, 22, 43, 62, 63, 274 Syāt, 22, 274 Tamas, 214, 215, 217, 225, 231, 232 Taranasvámi, 10 Tapa, 126, 139, 142, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 152,
186, 247, 266, 277

Page #320

298
Ethical Doctrines in Jainism
Utkrata-Antarätman, 169 Utsarga, 133, 277 Vacană, 186, 277 Vadha, 143 Vainayika, 174 Vairāgya, 75, 246, 266 Vaisali, 6 Vaibeşika, 25, 239, 242 Vaiyävyttya, 92, 105, 148, 151, 190, 193, 235, 266,
268
Tapacira, 126, 150 Tapăgaccha, 11 Tapa-Vinaya, 150 Tatsevi-Doga, 149 Tattvarūpavati-dhåranå, 160 Tattvas, 30, 45, 46, 47, 55, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 70,
71, 139, 174, 250, 275 Tejas, 228 Teräpantha, 9, 10, 11 Terasiya, 8 Tirthampkaras, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 33, 66, 82, 139, 156,
178, 188, 193, 199, 216, 236, 241, 252, 263, 267, 273 Tirthampkara-Bhakti, 190 Tissagutta, 7 Todaramala Trisla, 6 Trņasparśa, 143 Trså, 143 Troņš, 250, 251 Tulasi (Acărya), 11 Tumadi, 205 Turpgiya, 3 Tugamaşabhinna, 128 Tuşti, 107 Tyaga, 186 Ubhaya, 148, 149 Udambara, 89, 11, 116 Uddişgatyaga, 110 Uddiştatyāgapratimă, 115 Udyami, 78 Ullugatira, 7 Umara, 79, 80 Unodari, 146 Upabhoga, 57, 99, 100, 105, 109, 113, 114, 115,
120, 122 Upabhogaparibhogaparimāņa-Vrata, 97 Upabprabana, 67, 69, 270 Upacara, 150 Upacara-vinaya, 151 Upādāna, 250 Upadhis, 32, 38 Upadhyāya, 89, 119, 177, 178, 180, 265, 278 Upadhyâya-Bhakti, 190 Upagühana, 66, 67 Upakarana, 107 Upašāma-samyaktva, 181, 182, 183 Upasana, 184, 230, 235 Upaśānta-kaşāya, 195 Upasantakaşāya-Gunasthåna, 195 Upayoga, 37, 38 Uşabhapura, 7 Uşņa, 143
Vajranandi, 9 Vajra-Vrsabha-Náraca, 162 Valabhipura, 8 Váma, 3 Vandana. 138, 139, 190, 247, 277 Våniyagama, 6 Vardhamana, 6 Vartana, 30 Varuna, 211 Väruni-dharanå, 160 Vasupujya, 1 Våtarasanas, 12 Vatsalya, 66, 67, 68, 69, 266, 270 Vedaka Samyagdreti, 194 Vedaka-Samyaktva, 182 Vedanā, 250 Vedana-Janita, 153 Vedaniya, 49, 203 Vedānta, 14, 31, 37, 207, 239, 244 Videhadinna, 6 Videhamukti, 204, 240, 241 Vijñana, 107, 250, 251 Vijñānamaya-Atman, 211 Vikala, 74 Vinaya, 139, 148, 150, 151, 190 Vinaya-Sampannată, 193 Vipäka-Vicaya, 161Vipäka-Vicaya-Dharma-dhyana, 162 Vikrama, 9, 10 Vimala, 1 Viraji, 11 Virāsana, 248 Viratävirata-Gunasthäna, 184 Virodhi, 77, 78 Viryācāra, 126, 150 Visuddhi, 180 Vigayānandi-Raudra-Dhyāna, 154 Vitarăga, 65, 72 Vitarka, 163, Viveka, 149 Viviktaśayyâsana, 146, 147 Vratas, 91, 93, 96, 99, 101, 102, 104, 108, 110,
111, 112, 113, 116, 194, 247

Page #321

Technical Terms etc.
299
Vrttiparisarakhyāna, 146, 147 Vyañjana paryāya, 19, 20, 31 Vyatikrama, 81 Vyavahära, 35, 36, 42, 60, 62, 63, 65, 71, 77, 139,
140, 168, 213, 220, 238 Vyavahårakāla, 30 Vyavahăranaya, 36, 37, 133, 171, 173, 177, 213,
214 Vyavahara-Pratikramana, 140 Vyavahåra Samyagdarsana, 275 Vyavahåravån 179 Vyuparatakriyanivartin, 162, 163 Vyuparatakriya-Nivptti, 249 Vyutsarga, 148, 149, 151
Yåcană, 143 Yama, 100, 101, 246, 247 Yapaniya, 10 Yapaniyas, 273 Yapaniya Sangha, 9, 10 Yati, 11, 12 Yoga, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 59, 71, 76, 132, 163,
197, 198, 204, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 238, 244,
245, 246, 249, 254 Yoga-Bhakti, 139, 190 Yoga-Bhūmi, 248 Yogi, 15, 212, 217, 226, 233, 234, 235, 237, 238 Yojana, 93, 95
ERRATA
20
Line 22
Incorrect will Possesss Barkeley experiedce ascesticism Peace luminous
Correct will be Possess Berkeley experience asceticism Piece "Numinous"
1095 182 24 203

Page #322