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ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
heights. of mystical truth. The perfect souls of Tīrthamkaras who preach for the upliftment of human and other beings should not be regarded as being moved by the mild passions of compassion and benevolence, inasmuch as they speak for the good of all without any selfish desire and without constraint of mild-passion. It follows from what has been described that falsehood, being the expression of intense passions, is a double fall from the loftiest heights of truth. It defiles both the internal soul and the external demeanour, the social living and the spiritual upliftment, hence it should be forsaken in the interest of advancement.
We now define falsehood. It implies the making of wrong statement by one who is overwhelmed by intense passions, such as anger, greed, conceit, deceit and the like. We may point out here that it does not mean merely the pronouncement of the existent as nonexistent, nor can it be said to embrace merely the proclamation of the nonexistent as existent, but it involves also the misrepresentation of the true nature of the existents and the use of speech which arouses intense-passion and causes pain to others. Accordingly, truth must not mean merely the announcement of the existent as existent, but it must mean also the use of words which are soothing, gentle and ennobling. It should be borne in mind that, even if by our most vigilant and gentle speaking, others are somehow perversely and painfully affected, we shall not be considered as transgressing and setting at nought the vow of truth. Ontologically speaking, no word is pleasant or unpleasant in isolation and in itself. It is the spirit that counts. A word, being the modification of Pudgala, has infinite characteristics. Therefore it possesses the potency of affecting others in infinite ways, all of which are incapable of being known by imperfect human beings. In calling a word pleasant or unpleasant, the circumstances, the place and time, the character of the man, the mental and physical effects on himself and others that surround him should all be counted. Thus, according to Amrtacandra, the first kind of falsehood refers to the affirmation of the existent as non-existent;' the second refers to the declaration of the non-existente as existent; the third refers to the representation of the existing nature of things as different from what they really are; and the fourth is indicative of the speech which is 1) condemnable (garhita),
1 Puru. 91.
2 Puru. 92.
3 Ibid. 93.
• Ibid. 94.
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