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ETHICAL DOCTRINES IN JAINISM
divergence in the possibility of its attainment here or elsewhere, in this world or hereafter. The former is styled Jivanmukti, while the later is Videhamukti. Jainism, Advaita Vedānta, Samkhya-Yoga and Buddhism subscribe to both the above mentioned views, while the Nyāya-Vaiseșika' and the Mīmāṁsā recognise the latter view to the exclusion of the former. According to the Nyāya-Vaišeșika, the self is an independent principle having for its qualities desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition. These qualities are not the eternal associates of the self but emerge when the self acquires bodily form. Thus consciousness or knowledge etc., are adventitious qualities of the self,2 consequently disappearing when it attains liberation. Since pleasure is incapable of being experienced without being tainted with pain, the emancipated condition implies the absolute cessation of both. Uddyotakara puts forth that for the experience of everlasting pleasure in the redeemed state, everlasting body is requisite, since experience is not possible without bodily mechanism.3 From the enunciation of Uddyotakara it follows that release while living in this body is out of question. But both Uddyotakara, and Vātsyāyana give credence to a stage corresponding to Jīvanmukti, "such a person will not be divorced from his physical or mental adjuncts; but narrow love and hate will have disappeared from him altogether with the selfish activity that proceeds from them."4 We may add here that the negative concept of liberation was soon rejected by the later Naiyāyikas like Bhāsarvajña and others and the positive idea of freedom as blissful state superseded the former one. The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsaka thinkers like Jaimini and Sabara were not concerned with the problem of ultimate release, but regarded heaven as the highest end of man. But the later Mīmāṁsakas like Kumārila and Prabhākara occupied themselves with liberation as the ideal of life. Like the Nyāya-Vaiseșika, consciousness and other mental states are not regarded as inherent in the soul by the Mīmāmsakas. Hence liberation is devoid of pleasure and pain. Some other Mīmāmsakas hold that emancipation is not merely a state free from pain, but it is also one of eternal bliss.7 These conceptions of liberation correspond to the two aforementioned
1 N. Sū. I. !. 10. 2N. Sů. Bhāşya. I. 1, 10. 3 Ibid. J. 1, 1. JV. 1. 58. 4 Outlines of Indian Philosophy. p. 266. 5 Nyāyasára. pp. 39-41.; cf. N. Sü. Bhäsya.. I. 1, 22. Šāstradīpika. p. 188: 7 Sastradipikā, pp. 126-127. Mänameyodaya. Pp. 87 to 89.
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