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Panchastikayasara
the previous case that between knowledge and self as object of knowledge. Jñâna is distinctly alien to ajiva padarthas though these become as jñeya related to jñâna or knowledge. The function of jñāna or knowledge here is to reveal the ajiva padarthas in their true nature as achetana or physical. How could chetana reveal the nature of achetana things? This question is rejected as unreasonable for the simple reason that it is unanswerable. The question means why jñana should have its jñâna nature? That jñana though alien to the nature of physical objects-these latter being achetana--can still be related to them and reveal their nature to jñāni or the knowing self, is taken as the fundamental postulate of Jaina Epistemology.
Thus the close study of the philosophical foundation of Jaina Epistemology reveals the following two facts:
(1) The relation between knowledge and its objects, jñāna and jñeya as far as ajiva padarthas are concerned, is purely one of external relation.
(2) As a corollary of the first, we have the independent existence of jñeya padarthas or objects of knowledge, of course with the exception of self which has an internal relation to jñâna or knowledge.
The distinction between internal relation and external relation requires explanation. The Russell-Bradley controversy as to the nature of relations is an interesting, though an intricate, topic of modern philosophy. But here we cannot deal with it in detail. It is enough to indicate what the terms mean. Bradley-Bosanquet school of modern idealism following the traditions of Hegel assumes that all relations are grounded in the nature of the terms related. That is, the terms apart from the relations and the relation apart from the terms will not be the same. A and B having a relation R cannot be the same A and B if they cease to have that relation R. Change or cessation of a particular relation will lead to change, or the nullification of the terms so related. A blind faith in this metaphysical doctrine has constrained the Hegelian idealist to subscribe to many an absurd doctrine. The terms related to one another, since their nature is tyrannically controlled by this relation, are to be interpreted as members or elements of a higher organic unity. The members of a family therefore are the elements of the unity of family. Society itself is an organic unity, like plant or an animal body, having as its elements the different human personalities who constitute the society. Nay, even the whole universe is conceived as an organic unity or system having as its members both things and persons. The logical result of this doctrine is the complete subordination of human personality to this fetish of a higher unity beside which there is nothing real. Every thing is degraded to the level of appearance and unreality. The political and moral consequences of such a metaphysical doctrine need not be portrayed in detail. It is enough to say that the catastrophe which destroyed the European civilisation is the necessary consequence of the culture and social organisation inspired by the philosophy of the Absolute.
But we have a healthy change introduced into modern thought by the
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