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Panchastikayasara affirmative proposition in the case of non-self-relation would both te false. The proposition relating Socrates to his own time is true, the one relating him to any other time is false. To say that he is living now is such a false proposition. We are entitled to say only this, that he is not living now.
Thus we have something like this. A thing in its Svarûpa (self-form), svadravya (matter), svakşetra (place), svakala (time) is the positive fact enabling the truth of an affirmative proposition. The thing in its pararûpa (non-self-form), paradravya, parakşeira, parakala will constitute the negative sact. This will justify the negative proposition. This is offered only by way of suggestion for a possible explanation of what Russel calls "negative fact”. Neither do we propose to develop Russell's theory nor do we want to imply that he was anticipated by Indian logicians of old. Any how the comparison is interesting and suggestive.
This Saptabhangi is a powerful organ in the hands of Syâdvádins who avoided the nihilism of the Buddhists as well as the absolute inonism of the Vedantists, who steered clear of the shallow realism of the Charvákas and the ludicrous idealism of the Nyâyavadins.
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