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Parikshamukham
20 may not have regarded the example as the illustration of a general rule, later Nyāya looks upon it as the statement of an invariable concomitance between the mark and the character inferred (Vyapti-prati-pâdakam Vákyam). The conclusion re-states the proposition as grounded. Nāgārjuna is given the credit for dispensing with the last two members of the syllogism as superfluous.
Universal propositions are reached through enumeration, intuition and indirect proof. Uninterrupted agreement (Niyata Sāhacharya) reinforced by absence of exceptions (Avinābhāva-rūpasambandha) leads to unconditional concomitances. Nature does not always supply us with positive and negative instances of the necessary type. In such cases indirect proof (Tarka) may be used. By pointing out the absurdities in which we are landed, if we deny a suggested hypothesis, we indirectly prove its validity. Even when we observe all possible cases and strengthen our conclusion by indirect proof we cannot reach absolute certainty. Experience of sensible particulars, however thorough and exhaustive, cannot give rise to universal relations. Gangesa recognises the non-sensuous (Alaukika) activity involved in the apprehension of universals (Samanyalaksaņā)."*
Pramāņa is the main theme of all Nyāya philosophies. Different systems admit different number of Pramāṇas. In Tärkika-rakşâ (11th century) we find : "The Chārvākas accept only one Pramāņa viz. Pratyakşa; Kaņāda and Buddha accept two Pramāņas, Pratyakşa and Anumāna; the Sāņkhya system and some sects of Nyāya philosophy acknowledge three Pramāņas viz. Pratyakşa, Anumāna and Sabda; some followers of the Nyāya philosophy accept four Pramāṇas--Pratyaksa, Anumāna, Sabda and Upumāna; Prabhākara (one school of Mimāmsā philosophy) accepts five Pramāņas --Pratyakşa, Anumāna, Upumāna, Sabda and Arthāpatti; the Bhättas (followers of Kumārila Bhatta, another school of Mimāṁsā philosophy) as well as the followers of the Vedänta philosophy accept six Pramāņas viz. Pratyakşa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Sabda, Arthāpatti and Abhāva.”+
The earliest detailed reference to the subject of Pramāņa in Jain Nyāya is found in the Tattvarthâdhigama Sutra of Umāsvāmi. The twelve Angas of the Jains prevalent at the time of Sri Mahāvira only give a hint of Anekāntavāda but no specific reference of Pramāņa, Naya or Sapta-bhangi is found in the same. Kundakunda in his Pravachanasara has mentioned the two kinds of Pramāņa viz Pratyakșa and Parokșa and the Sapta-bhangi. But these references give only the barest outlines without any definite details. For example, Kundakunda says:
* S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy in Encyclopaedia Brittamica, Vol. 12. Page 250. + प्रत्यक्षमेकं चार्वाकाः कणादसुगतौ पुनः ।
प्रत्यक्षमनुमानञ्च सांख्याः शब्दश्च ते अपि ।। न्यायकदेशिनोऽप्येवमुपमानं च केचन । अर्थापत्त्या सहैतानि चत्वार्याह प्रभाकरः ।। अभावषष्ठान्येतानि भाट्टा वेदान्तिनस्तथा ।
-Tarkika-raksa by Varadaraja.
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