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An Epitome of Jainism is the characteristic of this system. A similar mistake is found in its western counterpart of Hegelian idealism. Both agree in condemning the differences as appearances and in accepting the ultimate absolute as the one reality.
But Jaina thinkers noticed very early both the utility as well as the danger of this Samgraha Naya. This class point of view is quite useful and rational in its own way. It contributes to economy of thought by enabling us to deal with a number of things as one.
This is not merely justified by practical convenience but also by the philosophical principle of the common nature. The common nature by itself is but an abstraction. Hence to set it up as the reality and the only reality is doubly erroneous. So long as its relative nature is remembered, the naya has its own uses. But in the hands of the Sankhyas and Mimânsikas, it becomes absolute and thus a nayabhasa.
This Samgraha Naya is of two kinds Para Samgraha or the ultimate class view and Apara Samgraha or the inferior class-view. Every existing things partakes of the nature of Reality. Hence we may speak of all things as one in the ultimate Reality or Existence. But the different classes of things living and non-living included in this ultimate Reality may themselves be spoken of as different classes. This is Apara Samgraha or the inferior class view.
(iii) Vyavahâra Naya
Vyavahâra Naya means the popular and conventional point of view, which rests on sense-perception of the concrete present. This is the basis of the ancient materialistic systems of the Chârvâkas and Brahaspatyas. The whole criterion of Reality is the concrete present. The forgotten past and the far off future are unwarranted myths not justified by the only pramâna of sense-perception. Looking back into the past through memory and peeping into the future through ideal forecast are philosophical uncertainties. The same applies to the categories obtained by intellectual analysis such as sâmânya and višeşa-universal and particular.
Sense-perception reveals to us a tree or a stone or a pot or a cloth. These are the real things supported by the pramânas and sanctioned by vyavahâra or convention. Whoever has perceived at any time either sâmânya or višeşa ? Why should philosophers trouble themselves about these metaphysical abstractions. The concrete reality of things is sufficient for our practical life and what is justified by this pragmatic criterion is so far theoretically true.
Here again the Jaina thinker recognises the partial truth of the principle. The tree in the compound, the stone on the path-way, the pot with water and the cloth you wear are all real things. They are not appearances or illusions of naya. Their reality is corroborated by our concrete experience. To say this much is certainly acceptable and true. But to go beyond, to condemn everything that is not included in the concrete present, to deny the past and the future and to reject the philosophical categories in toto, to surrender reason to sense-perception, is the apotheosis of convention. Hence
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