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66
An Epitome of Jainism
dravyártha view and different from paryártha view. They are different and yet identical. But for this dual nature there can be no predication at all.*
The primary modes of predication are three-Syâdasti, spánnasti and spadavaktavyah. The other four are obtained by combining these three. Now according to Sankhya philosophy everything is real and therefore exists. According to Buddhism everything is momentary and unreal. Both these views are rejected by the Jainas as extremes. The former is true according to dravyârthika point of view; the latter is true according to paryarthika point of view. Hence each is true in its own way and is not true absolutely. Again reality is idescribable according to the Vedantins who emphasise the nirvachaniya aspect of reality. Even this is only partially true, for otherwise even this predication "that Reality is indescribable" will be impossible.
The same seven modes of predication may be obtained in the case of following pairs of attributes: eternal and changing, one and many, universal and particular, etc. These pairs of opposites can very well be predicated of reality and these may yield the other derivative modes of predication. Thus practically every attribute, by being affirmed and denied according to different aspects, may bring about seven fundamental propositions true of real subject.
It may be said that after all, this principle of Saptabhangi is a wanton indulgence in meaningless self-contradiction. This objection has been sufficiently answered above. This is not a case of wanton paradox or purposeless pun. If the words are wantonly misinterpreted or understood in an unwarranted sense, then it may be charged with wanton quibbling; for example in the statement that this person has a new woollen shawl (nava kambala) the term nava may be taken to mean also nine. Though the word is capable of such an interpretation, still in this statement it does not mean that. In spite of the context, if a person retorts that assertion by saying "this person cannot have nine shawls as he is very poor", it would be wanton quibbling. There is no such wanton quibbling underlying Saptabhangi.
If it is not wanton quibbling, it must merely be an expression of doubt. To say, a thing may be as well as may not be, is to exhibit one's own doubt and ignorance. At the best, therefore, the doctrine is a mode of scepticism. This charge of scepticism is certainly unfounded. Doubt expresses absence of determinate knowledge. If the prima facie appearance of a thing leads you to two different interpretations, of which alternatives we cannot choose the right one, then there is doubt as to its nature. Since its exact nature is unknown, scepticism may be the result. But in the case of the contradictory propositions forming the basis of Saptabhangi we have two different aspects each serving as the basis of one of the propositions. Hence there is neither doubt nor confusion in this case. Each assertion is definite and clear.
Two passages are quoted from the two great Hindu commentators of *This discussion from Saptabhangitarangini reminds us of Bralley's discussion of the theory of predication-in apearance and reality.
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