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An Epitome of Jainism not be able to account for a concrete thing. These will be empty abstractions. Again one cannot be derivative from and secondary to the other. The thing is an organic unity of both sâmânya and višeșa-universal and particular. There cea be no universal (sâmânya) apart from the particular and no particular (višeşa) apart from the universal; and there can be no real thing apart from either. This seems to be the fundamental Jaina view of the Real.
The very same view is said to be adopted by the Naiyarikas and the Vaiseșikas. Therefore both the Jainas and the others adopt the Naigama point of view. But wherein the Jainas differ from the others ? It is here. No doubt Naiyâyikas and Vaišeșikas adopt the Naigama view by maintaining that the concrete thing is the complex made up of the universal and the particular (sâmânyas and višeșas). No doubt they maintain that these two are different and therefore distinguishable. No doubt they believe each is in itself primary and not derivative. So far, they agree with the Jainas. But while the Jainas believe that the distinction between sâmânya (universal) and viseșa (particular) is true only in a relative way, the Naiyáyikas and the Vaiseșikas maintain that it is absolutely true. Sâmânya is quite different and distinct from visesa. It is because of this absolute difference between the two that in their hands this Naya becomes Naigamabhâsa. They are kathanchit bhinnah and not atyanta bhinnaḥ.
After explaining thus the Naigama Naya, Sri Deva Suri enumerates three species of this Naigama distinction.
1. Differentiating two qualities one from the other, e.g. existence and thought are in soul sat chaitanyam aimani. Here, thought is differentiated from existence.
2. Differentiating two substances, e.g. Dravya is that which manifests through things and their modes. Vas'u paryâyaya dravyam.
3. Differentiating a thing from its attribute, e.g. a sensual person has only a momentary pleasure. Kshanamekam sukhi visayasaktajîva.
Thus (1) existence is spoken to be separate from thought, (2) a thing from its mode and (3) a person as different from his pleasure. Contrast in all these
le only in a relative way. As we saw above, the very same illustrations are reproduced by H. Jacobi in his translation.
But when we attend to Mallisena, we find evidently both the interpretations given in his Syâdváda Manjari. He begins by explaining Naigama Naya in the same way as Deva Suri or Siddhasena do. He refers the readers to an earlier portion of his book, where there is a discussion of the relation between sâmânya and višesa. Hence he does not want to add anything further under this Naya and ends the passage by mentioning two well-known examples given in pravachana the Divine word. What are the two examples ? He just mentions two names; and they appear to be cryptic. But this need not be altogether helpless. His words are pravachana prasiddha nilayana prastha dristântadvya. Nilayana and prastha--are the words here. In Pujyapâda we have odana and prastha. Instead of food and a measure
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