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An Epitome of Jainism mysticism which could not stand the glare of reason, both are inadequate representation of the full nature of human personality whose powers are inexhaustible and whose depths are unfathomable. The Jaina doctrine of pramaņas is able to accommodate both, from the lowest to the highest in the order of gradation.
The recognition of the distinction between the pramâņas and pramânabhäsas implies an important philosophical principle--the existence of an obiective reality which is beyond and beside knowledge. Knowledge is not the only form of reality. If that be the case, Jaina philosophy would not be different from Advaita. Its whole philosophical claim as an independent system of thought rests on the admission of the independent existence of the objective universe besides consciousness. The world of objective reality is apprehended by perception or darśana and understood by intellect or jñāna, which two are but the manifestations of chetana, the intrinsic nature of the soul. Nowhere in the Jaina system is it even casually implied that the object of knowledge is in any way modified or interfered with by the process of knowing. In order that darśana may reveal the form and jñāna may discover the nature, there must be an object postulated, an object which is logically prior to the intellectual process. This postulating of an independent object of knowledge should not be interpreted to imply the passivity of the inte continuous activity of the jîva or soul is the central doctrine of Jaina thought. Hence the intellect is an active manifestation of consciousness but this activity has the power of revealing its own nature as well as non-chetana objects beyond. Thus the term jñeya or the object of knowledge includes both the self and the non-self, mental facts as well as physical facts. The example of a light is very often brought in to illustrate the nature of knowledge. Just as light reveals itself as well as other objects which are illuminated, so also jñâna reveals the tattvas—both jîva and ajîva. Hence it would be quite inconsistent to interpret the relation between jñāna and jñeya, knowledge and its object, in any other way that would make both inseparable elements of any higher unity. No doubt as far as jîva or soul is concened the relation between jñana and jñeya is very intimate. The soul is iñāni, the possesser of iñāna or knowledge. There can be no jíva jñāna, for without it he would be achetana and indistinguishable from other ajtva dravyas ; and there could be no knowledge without jîva, for being foundationless and off its moorings from life it will cease to have connection even with consciousness. Thus jñāna and jñāni, knowledge and self, are absolutely inseparable though distinguishable by name. But this very name jñāni may also become jñeya-padārtha, the object of knowledge to his own jñāna. The jñáni, jñana and jñeya—the self, knowledge, and the self as object of knowledge all become different aspects of a single concrete unity.
But knowledge or jñāna is also related to ajîva padârthas, that is physical objects can also be jñeya padarthas. When physical objects are the objects of knowledge, the relation of knowledge to its object is not the same as in
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