Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge

Author(s): Y J Padmarajiah
Publisher: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/001608/1

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166 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE The Late Dr. Y. J. PADMARAJIAH M. A., D. Phil. (Oxon.) with a preface by Dr. E. Frauwallner Indological Institute of the University of Vienna A l le SLSLSLSLSLSLS 151119 JAIN SAHITYA VIKAS MANDAL Bombay 56 Be Jair Education Intemattomal

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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE

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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Thesis submitted for D. Phil. Degree, Oxford University, 1954 1 by The Late Dr. Y. J. PADMARAJIAH M. A., D. Phil. (Oxon.) Mysore, India with a preface by Dr. E. Frauwallner Indological Institute of the University of Vienna, Austria, Europe Published by JAIN SAHITYA VIKAS MANDAL 112, Ghodbunder Road, Vile Parle BOMBAY 56

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Publisher : R. A. Doshi Member Executive Council Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal 112, Ghodbunder Road Vile Parle, Bombay 56 July 1963 Price : Rs. 15/- (Inland) Sh. 20/- (Foreign) Frinter: V. P. Bhagwat Mouj Printing Bureau Khatau Wadi Bombay 4 Jain. Education International

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE The following pages contain a posthumous work of Dr. Y. J. Padmarajiah, M. A., D. Phil. (Oxon.), Mysore, India. He was awarded the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Oxford early in the year 1955 for the thesis entitled A Comparative Study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge which is published herein after purchasing the rights thereof from his widow. Although the work is mainly Jaina Philosophy, it includes treatment of many other schools of Indian Philosophy, as well as consideration of Western Philosophical theories where these have a bearing on the subject of the thesis. It displays a wide competence in all these various branches of Philosophy and it was reported on very favourably by the examiners. His subject is the interpretation of Jaina Logic and Epistemology from the standpoint of modern ideas on these subjects. He is excellently equipped for the task. He has an exceptionally thorough knowledge of Jainism, such as can be acquired only by one brought up in it and a knowledge of Sanskrit and Prakrit which enables him to handle the original texts with ease. The thesis demonstrates that he is a keen and diligent student of Indological subjects. The work has, therefore, been an important contribution to the study of Indian Philosophy.

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vi JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE We approached Dr. E. Frauwallner through Muni Shri Jamboovijayaji to oblige us with a preface to this work. The same is received and is annexed hereto. We take this opportunity to thank Dr. E. Frauwallner. Opinions of some of the renowned men with whom the author came in contact during his life-time are appended herewith. JYOT, 102, Ghodbunder Road, Vile Parle, Bombay 56 A. S. Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal A. K. DOSHI President

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The Late Dr. Y. J. Padmarajiah M. A., D. Phil. (Oxon.) Mysore, India an education International

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VICE-PRESIDENT INDIA VEW DESHI 12 February, 1955 Dear Padmarajiah, I am delighted to know that you have obtained a D. Phil.degree from Oxford. I am also delighted that your examiners recommended the publication of your book. But I may 1 you that books of this cheracter do not gell well and their publication is to he undertaken by a subsidy. There are some Jain publishing houses who might be interested in the project. With best wishes, Yours sincerely, (S.Radhakrishnan). Shri Y.J.Padmarajiah, c/o 28 Cockspur Street, London, S.W.1.

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The late Prof. M. Hiriyanna, the great author of Outlines of Indian Philosophy and other works, reporting on Dr. Y. J. Padmarajiah's earlier research work (of considerable size and produced for the Master of Arts Degree in 66 ...I Philosophy) on The Concept of Time, observed: think the thesis is very good. It is comprehensive, and gives an excellent conspectus of the theories of time held in the West, not excluding the difficult one of Einstein. But the thesis is not a bare account of these theories. It is also critical and comparative. The thesis is written throughout in a simple and lucid style, and it shows that the candidate has studied the subject with care and understanding." OPINIONS Dr. Padmarajiah extended his investigation of the above subject (The Concept of Time), in some measure, into the field of Indian Philosophy (vide his paper on "The Theory of Time in Jainism" to the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1945, published subsequently in the Journal of the Mysore University, Sec. A, 1947). * The late Mr. H. N. Spalding, M. A. (Oxon.), Bar-at-Law, author; the founder of the Spalding Chair of Eastern Religions and Ethics (which was first occupied by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, D.C.L. (Oxon.), D. Litt. (Cantab.), etc.) at Oxford University; and also the founder of a Committee for a World Bible (aimed at comprising the most exalted expressions of the religious yearnings of all the significant religions of the world) of which Dr. Y. J. Padmarajiah was a member.

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viii JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE 9, SOUTH PARKS ROAD OXFORD 9TH JUNE, 1950 "...... I think very highly of Mr. Padmarajiah as a man, and I should suppose as a scholar. The Acting Principal of his College tells me that he is an unusually thoughtful man. Younger men tell me that he explains some of the Sanskrit psalms and music, as well as some of the great works of Indian literature to them in extremely clear and concise terms. They speak of him as a very fine man. Judging from all that I know of him, I share their opinion." sd/- H. N. SPALDING Member of New College and Brasenose College, Oxford; Author of Civilization in East and West; Barrister-at-Law The late Prof. S. N. Dasgupta, M. A., Ph.D. (Calcutta et Cantab), D. Litt. (hon. Rome), F. R. S. L., I. E. S., The King George Professor of Philosophy (Rtd.), Calcutta University; Principal (Rtd.), Sanskrit College, Calcutta; author of the History of Indian Philosophy (4 Vols.) and many other works-who knew Dr. Y. J. Padmarajiah and his work in the early stages of research in England, wrote : August 10, 1950 "He (Y.J. Padmarajiah) is a very intelligent scholar and has acquired a good deal of mastery over the dialectical thought in the sphere of his research. When completed his work will be, I believe, an important performance in the field of comparative philosophy........So far as I know there is no important work in the branch of research as envisaged in the present study of Padmarajiah". Sd/- S. N. DASGUPTA

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OPINIONS Expressing the same opinion in a slightly variant form and with some additions, on other occasion, the same great authority on Indian Philosophy observes : "Padmarajiah has been carrying researches, at Oxford, in an important branch of Comparative Philosophy in association with the allied trends of Indian and Western thought. He was, in the course of his studies, with me for about three months during the summer of 1949 when he read with me some of the most abstruse texts and I devoted no less than three or four hours a day in elucidating the discussing problems of his work. He is a very intelligent student having a full grasp of his materials. ......he will be able to produce a really effective work on a relatively unexplored subject in the field of comparative philosophy under his present Supervisor, Dr. F. W. Thomas." Sd/- S. N. DASGUPTA SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL & AFRICAN STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF LONDON ix * Dr. A. L. Basham, B. A. (Lond.), Ph. D. (Lond.), Reader in Indian History in the University of London, and the author of a well-known work on Ajivikism as well as of the recent one: The Glory that was Ind, sponsoring Dr. Y. J. Padmarajiah's work: A Comparative Study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge (for which Oxford University awarded to the candidate the degree of Doctor of Philosophy) to one of the foremost publishing concerns in England writes : Dear Doctor, The enclosed thesis is a work of major importance in the field of Indian Philosophy and I would strongly recommend LONDON, W. C. 1 31ST MARCH 1955

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x JAINA THEORISS OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE its publication. I have been in contact with the author for the past four years, and can vouch for his scholarship and ability. The subject is one which has hitherto been very little studied and a standard textbook is badly needed. Dr. Padmarajiah's work would admirably meet the need. Yours sincerely, Sd/- A. L. BASHAM Giving further expression to his opinion on Dr. Y. J. Padmarajiah and his work Dr. A. L. Basham again writes : SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL & AFRICAN STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF LONDON LONDON, W. C. 1 31st MARCH 1955 "To whom it may concern" I have known Dr. Y. J. Padmarajiah for the past four years, in the course of which I have followed with great interest his research in Ancient Indian Philosophy. I have read his thesis, and am convinced it is a work of major importance and very sound scholarship. Dr. Padmarajiah is a man of very pleasant and sincere personality and I have no doubt that he will bring honour to any University in which he serves. I unhesitatingly recommend his appointment to an academic post...... to which he is suited. Sd/ - A. L. BASHAM Reader in Indian History

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PREFACE An important point in the external history of Indian Philosophy which still remains unexplained to a great extent is the relationship between the various systems and schools. This may be due in part to the tradition of the texts the insufficiency of which does not allow us to see more clearly. Nevertheless it is striking how often important ideas and even whole systems are not being noticed beyond the limits of the own school. Looking at things in general we may say that we encounter constructive discussion with opponent theories especially when there were different opinions on a certain subject, as for example on the problem of generality (samanyam) as the object of verbal cognition, or on the details of the act of cognition in the case of perception. Yet these are cases where the interest is concerned less with the opponent's theory as such but rather with the elucidation and defence of the own theory by discussing it with the opponent. The discussion moves farther in the opponent's field if the topic is one of the fundamental theories of the other system. Of such kind are in the discussion with the Buddhists, for instance, the argument about the existence or non-existence of a soul, or with the Nyaya the problem of the existence of a supreme god. Very seldom the heterogeneous system is considered in its totality and if it happens the rendering of this system is usually not more than a rough

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xii JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE description and the polemics more often than not repeat the traditional arguments only. An appreciative investigation of another system of thought is almost not to be found and it is the most important and profound philosophical ideas particularly which remain unregarded in these polemics. The same can be said with regard to doxographic works. A glance into the well-known Sarvadarsanasamgrahah of Sayana Madhava sufficiently proves this. It is natural that Sayana Madhava deals scantily with the old Buddhist systems, which at his time had lost their importance long ago. But from his book one does not get an idea of the philosophical importance of an Utpaladeva or even Ramanuja either. Generally we can state that many of the most important philosophers of ancient India would be completely unknown or only very inadequately known if we merely knew them through the records of other schools and systems. This holds good in a high degree in the case of Jinism. During the whole period of Indian philosophy Jinism has not been attended to very much by the other systems. Whatever the causes for this neglection might have been-the history of Jinism during this time is still a potential object of thorough research-the facts are, that schools like the Nyaya or the Mimamsa hardly mention Jinism in their polemics. It is only since the time of Akalanka that the Buddhists pay more attention to Jinism. And it is actually striking when an author like Santaraksita in his Tattvasamgrahah is quoting and refuting the opinions of single Jaina teachers. This is even more astonishing since the literature of the Jainas on the other hand is extensively occupied with other schools and systems.

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PREFACE xiii One is almost inclined to think of a continuation of this traditional fact finding Jinism likewise inadequately dealt with in modern descriptions of Indian philosophy. As an example I only refer to the extensive history of Indian philosophy by S. Dasgupta. And even in more detailed descriptions of Jinism like the well-known book by H. V. Glasenapp the philosophical import is of no account. Under these circumstances it is to be feared that Jinism is not being adequately considered in the present-day endeavours of establishing a relationship between Indian and Western philosophy. From this point of view efforts like the present book are desirable and welcome. As the object of his investigation the author has aptly chosen those theories, which are of fundamental importance for the philosophical thought of Jinism. He arranges them according to clear aspects, comparing them with other Indian systems and similar phenomena of Western philosophy and thereby trying to clarify the connections. Thus his book offers plenty of suggestions and it is to be wished that it might help to introduce the valuable ideas contained in Jinism to the philosophical discussion of to-day. Indologisches Institut der Universitat Wien Wien 1, Reitschulgasse 2 E. FRAUWALLNER

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CONTENTS PAGE PUBLISHER'S NOTE OPINIONS vii PREFACE 11 29 INTRODUCTION .. ABSTRACT PART 1 : ONTOLOGY (The Nature of Reality) CHAPTER I : A Preliminary Statement of an Im portant Vedantic and Buddhistic Objection against the Jaina View of Reality, leading to the Formulation of Five Types of Approach to the Problem of Reality .. ~ CHAPTER II : A Study in Contrasts : A. The Philosophy of Identity (or Being); B. The Philosophy of Difference (Becoming or Change) .. .. .. .. CHAPTER III : The Schools of Philosophy in which Identity Subordinates Difference : A. The Sankhya System; B. The Bhedabheda Systems of (i) Bhartsprapanca, (ii) Bhaskara and Yadavaprakasa, (iii) Nimbarka, (iv) Ramanuja ; C. Hegelianism .. .. CHAPTER IV : The Schools of Philosophy in which Difference Subordinates Identity : A. The Vaisesika System; B. The Dvaita System (of Madhva) .. .. .. ... V CHAPTER V : The Jaina Philosophy of Identity-in Difference in which Identity is Co-ordinate with Difference 59 105 121 .

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xvi JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE 183 203 247 CHAPTER VI : The Externalistic Doctrine of Iden tity-in-Difference (Ubhayavada) versus the Doctrine of a Unique and Integral Synthesis of Identity-in-Difference (Jatyantaravada) CHAPTER VII : Is Relation an Entity, or a Mental Construction, or a Structural Manifestation of Identity-in-Difference in Reality ? .. CHAPTER VIII : A Consideration of Two Contro versies Concerning Dravya and Guna (and/or Paryaya) with a view to Clarifying the Nature of Both : (1) How far could a Dravya be treated as a Concrete Universal ? (2) Are Gunas the Same as, or Different froin, Paryayas ? .. .. .. PART II : EPISTEMOLOGY : A. ANEKANTA VADA, the Theory of Manifoldness, the Most Consistent Theory of Realism; B. NAYAVADA, the Theory of Standpoints; C. SYADVADA, or Saptabhangi, the Dialectic of Conditional or Sevenfold Predication .. CHAPTER IX : Anekantavada or the Theory of Manifoldness .. CHAPTER X : Nayavada or the Theory of Standpoints CHAPTER XI : Syadvada or the Dialectic Conditional Predication CONCLUSION . BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEXES I (A) : Index to Works Mentioned in the Bibliography (in abbreviated) form I (B) : Index to Other Works .. .. II : Index to Names of Authors, &c. .. .. III : Index to the Philosophical Sects and Tenets &c. .. .. .. IV : Index to Sanskrit and Prakrit Words 269 271 301 331 379 383 393 393 396 400 406 409

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INTRODUCTION Constructive thinking thrives on vigorous criticism. The most formidable critical force ever directed against the schools of Brahminism and Jainism was Buddhism. After the disappearance of Buddhism from the scene of India, metaphysical thinking in the Brahminical and the Jaina schools became stagnant. In the last few decades, however, a new life has stirred in the philosophical circles of India-thanks to the impact of Western ideas, philosophical and scientific, on the traditional patterns of thinking and study. One of the forms this life has taken is the desire to understand where the Indian and the Western trends of philosophical thought meet, and where they part. Concurrently the interrelations of ideas among the Indian schools themselves have been subjected to intensive investigation. In other words, the method of comparative study which springs from the extended bounds of our philosophical knowledge, is gradually gaining ground, often unwittingly, as an important organ of investigation. A closer investigation of problems on comparative lines may reveal deeper affinities as well as sharper divergences, in these fields of study, than hitherto suspected. In pursuing the comparative method of investigation it is necessary to be on one's guard against superficial and misleading resemblances among ideas. One should bear in mind .

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2 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE that the ideas nurtured in one mental soil do not easily lend themselves to comparison with the ideas springing from a different mental soil. But this thought should not deter the seeker from his efforts. He should remember that despite their alien circumstances Sankara and Hegel (or more particularly F. H. Bradley) have, between them, more in common than Sankara and Kumarila on the one hand and Hegel (or Bradley) and Bertrand Russell on the other. The present comparative study has been undertaken with the awareness of these difficulties. The problems selected for study are of a fundamental character and have not been treated, at any rate in recent times, by the same methods as are adopted here, nor have they been discussed in such detail. Except in the course of a brief lecture by an Indian scholar, the important problem of relation (sambandha) has not as yet been treated by any writer. A similar neglect is shown in the case of the central problem of identity-in-difference which occupies the major portion of the first part of this study. Topics such as causal efficiency (arthakriyakaritvam), the concept of uniqueness (jatyantaratva), the dialectical implications of the doctrine of manifoldness (anekantavada), and the interrelatedness of anekantavada, nayavada and syadvada have not received the attention they deserve from the exponents of Indian philosophy. All this can be traced to the fact that Jainism in general and the Jaina philosophy in particular have been a neglected branch of the Indian studies. The present work has been undertaken to fill, in some measure, the gap created by prolonged neglect.

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INTRODUCTION The scope of the subject-matter of the present study has been given in the text itself. A few remarks may, however, be made here about its nature and limitations : This work presupposes a broad familiarity with the philosophical position of Jainism as given, for instance, in J. L. Jaini's Outlines of Jainism, or in A. Chakravarti's introduction to his edition of Kundakunda's Pancastikayasara, or in any of the historical works on Indian philosophy. No references have been made, except incidentally, to the Jaina canonical works. This is mainly due to the fact that many of the well-developed metaphysical ideas are a product of the post-canonical period although some basic ideas such as that reality is of the nature of permanence and change are found in an embryonic form in the canonical texts. Moreover, some scholars have already brought out a few works on the canonical section of Jaina literature. Amongst these the most notable are: W. Schubring's Die Lehre der Jainas, A. Weber's Sacred Literature of the Jainas (E. T. by H. W. Smith in Indian Antiquary, 1888-1892), and N. Tatia's Studies in Jaina Philosophy, and, above all, Vijayarajendra's Abhidhanarajendra, a massive canonical lexicon (in Jaina Prakrit, 7 vols.), and Ratnacandra's Ardha-Magadhi Dictionary (5 vols.). The epistemological part of this study has confined itself mainly to the treatment of the methods of knowledge. Further epistemological problems, such as the ways of knowing' (pramanas) and the various issues connected with them, could not be discussed within the limits of this work.

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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Owing to the nature of the subject-matter no strict adherence to chronology has been possible. The sequence in which the names of the various thinkers and their ideas occur has been governed by logical considerations. Discussions on Buddhistic ideas have been restricted, mainly, to the development of Buddhism in India. The system of diacritical marks adopted in the course of this work is that of the Royal Asiatic Society. A few footnotes have been rather lengthy because they deal with some basic notions (e. g., continuity, relativity and divisibility) which call for a somewhat elaborate treatment. The inclusion of this matter in the body of the main text would have introduced needless complication into the discussion of the main arguments in the text. Moreover any serious curtailment in their length would, it was felt, affect the requirements of clarity and proper documentation of the text. In presenting the ideas of some karikas and the gathas a compromise has been adopted between a too literal translation and very free rendering into English. In conclusion, the writer wishes to express his gratitude to Prof. T. Burrow, Prof. S. Radhakrishnan and Dr. F. W. Thomas, for the able guidance and constant encouragement he received from them while preparing this work. He is also grateful for the help accorded him by the authorities of the following libraries : The Old Bodleian, Oxford; The Library of the Indian Institute, Oxford; The Library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London; The Library of the Commonwealth Relations Office, London; and The British Museum Library, London.

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ABSTRACT The ontological section (Pt. I) of this study begins with a search for a balanced view of reality in which the elements of identity (abheda) and difference (bheda) would find their due place. The search results in the formulation of a scheme involving five possible approaches to the problem of reality. Four of them, viz., reality is (i) mere identity, (ii) mere difference, (iii) identity-in-difference in which identity predominates, and (iv) identity-in-difference in which difference predominates, are examined with various illustrations and found wanting as adequate explanations of our total ontological experience. The last approach, (v) a coordinate view of identity-in-difference, put forward by the Jaina thinkers, is found to meet the requirements of a satisfactory explanation. This view is, then, further examined and the validity of its approach confirmed from the philosophical views of Kumarila Bhatta, Immanuel Kant, and A. N. Whitehead. Next, certain flaws (dosas), alleged to exist in the Jaina view, are enumerated, analysed and refuted individually. The critics' unfamiliarity with, or misapprehension of, the nature and significance of negation in the Jaina view of reality is shown to be at the back of their objections. Another misapprehension on the part of certain critics takes, it is pointed out, the form of confusing the Jaina view with a 'mixed' theory (misravada) in which identity and difference remain extrane

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6 ous to each other. In the course of clearing up this confusion the integral and the unique (jatyantara) features of the coordinate synthesis of identity-in-difference are brought out. JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE There follows a discussion of two aspects of reality, viz., the relational structure and causal efficiency (arthakriyakaritvam). It is shown that these, like other aspects of reality, can exist and function only within the ontological framework of a co-ordinate identity-in-difference. An attempt (i) to determine the meaning and content of the notion of dravya' (substance) and (ii) to distinguish between the two concepts of guna (intrinsic attribute) and paryaya (extrinsic attribute) concludes Part One of this work. It should be added that several notions such as relativity or interrelatedness, continuity (and the allied notions of compactness and cons ecutiveness), divisibility and negation (apoha) have been touched upon, in appropriate places, in the course of this part. The epistemological section (Pt. II) endeavours to present an analytical account and a critical estimation of the methods of knowledge, recognised by the Jaina thinkers, under the characteristic doctrines of standpoints and of conditional predications (nayavada and syadvada). The presentation of these methods is, however, preceded by an investigation into the nature and the logical evolution of the theory of manifoldness (anekantavada) because this theory is the basis of the methods just referred to. The analysis reveals that the principle of distinction inherent in the logic of any realistic school of philosophy, has been given full play in the

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ABSTRACT development of this theory of manifoldness. Hence the claim that it represents the most consistent form of realism in Indian metaphysics. It is sought to justify this claim through the postulation of the various logical steps, the last one of which, it is maintained, represents the climax of the realistic procedure. 7 Finally the analytical method of standpoints (nayavada) and the synthetical method of conditional or seven-fold predication (syadvada or saptabhangi) have been dealt with at some length. They are shown to constitute a comprehensive scheme of complementary methods designed to help the mind in grasping the indeterminate nature of reality in its unity as well as in its diversity. Each method has been individually treated under the scheme of these cognitive instruments and a critical evaluation of the two doctrines has been offered at the end of the chapters concerned. The essential implications of some of the more important notions such as syat (a conditional particle) and avaktavyam (the inexpressible) have also been touched upon in their appropriate contexts. The work has aimed throughout at a comparative treatment of the problems. Effort has been made to avoid strained and far-fetched comparisons and contrasts and to treat criticisms and controversies in a constructive spirit.

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P A R T I ONTOLOGY (The Nature of Reality)

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CHAPTER I A Preliminary Statement of an Important Vedantic and Buddhistic Objection against the Jaina View of Reality, leading to the Formulation of Five Types of Approach to the Problem of Reality

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CHAPTER I An Objection Stated, and a Scheme of Five Types of Approach to the Problem of the Nature of Reality Formulated. The present study aims at a critical and comparative exposition of certain ontological and epistemological problems centering round the most fundamental metaphysical presupposition of identity-in-difference in Jaina philosophy. It will be divided into two parts: Ontology (Part I) and Epistemology (Part II). The first part will comprise eight chapters in the course of which a critical examination will be undertaken, of the various non-Jaina schools-not excluding a few striking trends of Western schools-of philosophy, as well as of the Jaina school, from the point of view of the problem of the nature of reality as identity-in-difference. The latter part will include three chapters which contain, essentially, a treatment of some topics which have a bearing on the modes or methods of valid knowledge in Jaina philosophy. These topics are the doctrines of manifoldness (anekantavada), standpoints (nayavada), and the dialectic of conditional predications (syadvada). A firm grasp of the Jaina view of reality as identityin-difference can follow only when it is distinguished from the other views. We see among these other views several types : one of these types recognises mere identity as the

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14 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE ultimate nature of reality; another accords this status to difference; the third type treats identity-in-difference as the ultimate reality but considers identity as more primary than difference, while the fourth one adopts the converse viewpoint; and, lastly, the fifth type, represented by the Jaina view, considers identity and difference as being necessarily co-ordinate, or equal, elements in reality. Together, these types, each of which represents a basically distinctive viewpoint, give rise to a scheme of five-fold classification which will be referred to towards the end of this chapter. Starting with an important objection made against the Jaina view of identity-in-difference by the Vedantic and Buddhist thinkers, we shall, in the course of the present chapter, be led to a preliminary review of the basic metaphysical viewpoints of the two schools, and, eventually, to a formulation of the five-fold classification just referred to. A somewhat elaborate examination of these two schools as well as of several others-all of which come within the range of the five-fold classification-will then be attempted in the course of the following five chapters. In the course of this procedure a number of issues, connected with the development of the main problem of reality, will inevitably arise. They will also be touched upon according to their degree of relevance and importance in the present study. Granting, for the moment, the validity of the Jaina conception of identity-in-difference, and equating this conception to that of being-cum-non-being-these and similar other equivalent concepts and epithets will be fully explained in their appropriate places-, we may begin with the statement of the Vedantic objection.

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CHAPTER I The objection' runs as follows: "On account of the impossibility (of contradictory attributes) in one thing, (the Jaina doctrine is) not (to be accepted)" (naikasminnasambhavat). Commenting on this aphorism of Badarayana, Sankara maintains that it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing; just as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold at the same moment."" This charge of contradiction is made from the point of view of the philosopher of being or identity which has reached its logical perfection-or rather its extreme-in the metaphysics of Sankara. The monistic foreshadowings" of the Upanisadic real have been forged with "L 15 1. SBE, Vol. XXXIV, p. 428. See also BBSB, p. 127, the Vartikam and the Pradipah in BSB, p. 597 f., as well as the Bhasyabhavaprakasika (by Citsukhamunim), printed at the end in the same work, p. 61, Prakatarthavivaranam (author unknown, ed. T. R. Chintamani, Madras University, 1935), Vol. I, p. 447 f., Bhamati (by Vacaspati Misra, Kashi Sam. Series, 1935), p. 291 f., and Ratnaprabha (by Govindananda in the Aphorisms of the Vedanta, ed. R. N. Vidyaratna, Bib. Ind., 1863), Vol. I, pp. 583-84. 2. SBE, Vol. XXXIV, p. 429. 3. Cf: eko devoh sarvabhutesu gudhah sarvavyapi sarvabhutantaratma / Svetasvatara, VI. 11. (The Twelve Principal Upanisads, TPH, Madras, 1931, Vol. I, p. 308.) tatra ko mohah kah soka ekatvam anupasyatah/ Isa, 7, ibid., p. 8. isa vasyam idam sarvam / Ibid., 1, p. 5. Although such utterances signify the primary reality of a unitary principle they are not to be understood as signifying the unreality or illusoriness of the world as was done by Sankara and his followers. See also the following f.n.

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16 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE a radical transformation into an identity-ridden (sattadvaita) ontological and logical scheme at the hands of Sankara and his followers, who have reinforced the dialectical strength of their master. It is difficult to maintain that the Upanisads 2 The transformation relates, among other things, to two important issues, viz., (a) imposing on the earlier Vedanta a twoplane reality (nirgunabrahman, indeterminate absolute, and sagunabrahman, determinate absolute, or isvara), and a corresponding two-plane truth (paravidya or "higher knowledge' and aparavidya or 'lower knowledge'). Thibaut says, in this connection: "If we have not to discriminate between a lower and a higher knowledge of Brahman, it follows that the distinction of a lower and higher Brahman is likewise not valid". SBE, Vol. XXXIV, p. XCI); and (b) substituting vivartavada (the theory of illusory world), in which the effect is unreal and the cause alone is real, for the earlier parinamavada in which both the cause and the effect are real. (Cf: "Is there anything in the early Upanisads to show that the authors believed in the objective world being an illusion? Nothing at all." E. W. Hopkins, JAOS, Vol. XXII, second half, p. 385 ff.) "The Upanisads do not call upon us to look upon the whole world as a baseless illusion to be destroyed by knowledge, the great error which they admonish us to relinquish is rather that things have a separate individual existence, and are not tied together by the bond of being all of them effects of Brahman, or Brahman itself. They do not say that true knowledge sublates this false world, as Sankara says, but that it enables the sage to extricate himself from the world--the inferior murta rupa of Brahman, to use an expression of the Bshadaranyaka-and to become one with Brahman in its highest form. We are trying to see everything in Brahman, and Brahman in everything; the natural meaning of this is 'we look upon the whole world as a true manifestation of Brahman, as springing from it and animated by it." He adds further that Mayavada also uses this saying but by "perverting its manifest sense". Thibaut, SBE, Vol. XXXIV, Intro. p. CXIX f. See also the following f.n. R. G. Bhandarkar confirms this fact when he observes : " The opinion expressed by some eminent scholars that the burden of upanisad teaching is the

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CHAPTER I or even the Brahmasutras' consistently advocated the Sankara view of nirgun abrahman (pure, attributeless, or relationless identity) coupled with the unreality (maya) of the world of difference and plurality if only for the reason that they are claimed, at least with equal, if not greater, validity, as the main source of the Brahminical schools such as the earlier Bhedabheda or the later Visistadvaita metaphysics. The weight of evidence seems, on the contrary, to tilt the balance in favour of an integral view in which both identity and difference, being and becoming, the one and the many, are real or rather stand in a relationship of real cause to real effect. Several scholars suggest, and others definitely maintain, that Sankara revolutionised, or even-in so far as he evolved the phenomenalist illusive character of the world and the reality of the one soul only, is manifestly wrong and I may even say, is indicative of an uncritical judgement." Vaisnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems (Strassburg, 1913), p. 2, f.n. 2. 2 17 " 1. Cf. "That the Maya doctrine was not present to the mind of the Sutrakara further appears from the latter part of the fourth pada of the first adhyaya, where it is shown that Brahman is not only the operative but also the material cause of the world. If anywhere, there would have been the place to indicate, had such been the author's view, that Brahman is the material cause of the world through Maya only, and that the world is unreal, but the Sutras do not contain a single word to that effect. Sutra 26 on the other hand exhibits the significant term 'parinamat'. Brahman produces the world by means of a modification of itself." Thibaut, op. cit., p. XCIV f. 2. The revolution consists in the superaddition of phenomenalism (mayavada) derived perhaps from the Madhyamika Buddhism (See Jacobi in JAOS, Vol. XXXIII, p. 54 and Sukthankar in the Vienna Oriental Journal, Vol. XXII, pp. 137-8), through Gaudapada, to the principle of identity derived from certain Upanisadic utterances. Cf. HIP, Vol. I, pp. 493-4.

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18 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE view (mayavada) of the world--made a break with the prevailing realistic or evolutionary viewpoint according to which the unitary Brahman transforms itself into the manifold of the physical and vital universe without losing' its primordial nature of perfection or fullness". The view maintained by Sankara is appropriately characterised as brahmavivartavada in contrast to its predecessor brahmaparinamavada. Brahman, according to Sankara, is the sole reality which does not admit of any difference whatsoever. Ontologically, his view is, therefore, one of pure and undifferentiated being. Advaitism then, affords the best example, in Indian metaphysics, of the philosophy of identity or permanence which is the exact antithesis to Buddhism which adheres, with equal tenacity, to the doctrine of total impermanence and the consequent idea of flux". Except With respect to the reality of one being, Bhartphari also seems to have influenced sankara. See S. N. Dasgupta's Indian Idealism (Cambridge, 1933), p. 196. 1. Cf. The schools of Bhartpprapanca, Bhaskara, Yadava and Ramanuja in the sequel. 2. Cf. Om purnam adah purnam idam parnat purnam udacyate / purnasya purnam adaya purnam evavasisyate // -The Twelve Principal Upanisads (TPH), isa, p. 5. 3. Referring to the "two contrary philosophical systems" in: regard to the problem of flux Stcherbatsky writes: "We are faced in India by two quite different theories of a Universal Flux. The motion representing the world-process is either a continuous motion or it is a discontinuous, although compact (sandratara), one. The latter consists of an infinity of discrete moments following one another almost without intervals. In the first case the phenomena are nothing but waves or fluctua

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CHAPTER I 19 for the early sect of the Vatsiputriyas' the ultimacy of tions (vrtti) standing out upon a background of an eternal, allpervading, undifferentiated matter (pradhana) with which they are identical. The Universe represents a Legato movement (parinamavada). In the second case there is no matter at all, flashes of energy (samskaravada= sanghatavada) follow one another and produce the illusion of stabilized phenomena. The Universe is then a Staccato movement. The first view is maintained in the Sankhya system of philosophy, the second prevails in Buddhism". (Bud. Log., Vol. I, p. 83. The Sanskrit equivalents within brackets have been given in footnotes in the book.) For a contrast between the Buddhist view and the views of the Vaisesika and the Naiyayika on the nature of motion or change, see ibid., pp. 99-107. For a further comparison with Bergson's view in the matter, see ibid., p. 107, f.n. 9, and pp. 115-118. In spite of the overwhelming similarity between the Bergsonian and the Buddhistic view of change, in general, we should not fail to see an important difference between the two on the point of duration and moments : duration for the Buddhist is a mental construction and moments alone are real, whereas, for Bergson, the moments are "artificial cuts" in duration which alone is real. (Cf. ibid., p. 115 and p. 118.) The "running reality" of Heraclitus of ancient Greece is another ontology which has a close resemblance to the Buddhistic view of momentary change. Here again a fundamental point of divergence, which is not often patent to a superficial observation, centers round the law of opposites or of contradiction. Buddhism roundly repudiates this law. (Cf. its famous universal dictum : yo viruddhadharmadhyasavan nasau ekah, i. e., that (entity) of which two or more opposed characteristics are predicated cannot be one. Another expression of the same truth is : viruddhadharmasamsargat anyadvastu, i. e., 'a thing is "other" if united to incompatible properties'. See infra, p. 23 and f.n. 3 thereon, and NBTD, p. 5.) Heraclitus, on the contrary, bases his theory on the "harmony of opposites". (Cf. Bud. Log., Vol. I, pp. 425-7.) The most admirable exposition of this school is found in Stcherbatsky's "The Soul Theory of the Buddhists" which forms "a special index" to the last chapter of Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosa. The other works which give a statement

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20 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE and criticism of this school are the same author's Bud. Log., Vol. I, p. 343 ff., Vol. II, p. 25, f.n. 2, p. 115, etc. and The Central Conception of Buddhism, pp. 70-71. See also TSS, karikas 336-49. and S. Mookerji's Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux (Calcutta, 1935), pp. 185-192. Even this school which is referred to as "the only important departure from the original scheme" of Buddhism, "dared not readmit" the substance soul, nor was it "reluctant" to deny unity or "personality" (pudgala) among the separate elements of the aggregates (sanghata). Hence it is said to have resorted to a "dialectical" device and argued that the "personality was neither identical with the elements nor different from them". (Cf. Bud. Log., Vol. I, p. 110.) Stcherbatsky's characterization of this hesitant or "feeble" attitude of the Vatsiputriyas as a case of contradiction is right. But his comparison of this school with that of the Jainas is not well-founded : "This course of admitting dialectical reality', he writes, "and neglecting the law of contradiction reminds us of the dialectical method very popular among the Jainas and consisting in assuming everywhere a double and contradictory essence." (Ibid.). The Jaina theory of reality does not predicate contradictory attributes of the same subject at the same time and from the same point of view, although it admits the manifold (anekanta) nature of everything. Nor does it anywhere assume "a double and contradictory essence" in the nature of things. Mookerjee states the Jaina position as follows: "The Vedantist starts with the premise that reality is one universal existence; the Buddhist fluxist believes in atomic particulars, each absolutely different from the rest and having nothing underlying them to bind them together.... The Jaina differs from them and maintains that the universal and the particular are only distinguishable traits in a real." (JPN, p. 13.) Referring to the law of contradiction in relation to Jainism he further observes, "The Jaina also believes in the truth of the law of contradiction, but he insists that the law should be sought not in a priori thought but in concrete experience of the behaviour of a thing." (Ibid., p. 14). Moreover, it emphatically affirms substantiality or identity as a co-ordinate (not contradictory) factor with that of difference in the real so that such a positive attitude becomes, in comparison with that of the hesitant Vatsiputriyas, not a matter of difference in degree but one of kind.

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CHAPTER I change' or becoming has been the unchanging bedrock of the great and complex development of Buddhistic thought from its beginnings : Like Badarayana and Sankara, Santaraksita and his commentator Kamalasila direct, from the Buddhist point of view, the charge of self-contradictoriness (viruddhadharmadhyasa) against the Jaina synthetic view of the co-ordinate existence of the substance" (dravya) and its modes or states (paryayas): "If the oneness between the substance and the states is real" (not figurative or agauna), observes Kamalasila, "then the substance also becomes diversified (vyavrttimat) like the states. If (on the contrary) the states become pervasive (anugatatmakah) in their character, then they become identical (aikatmata) with the substance".4 21 1. "All things change....Change is the stuff of reality. There is neither permanence nor identity with regard to the world." IP, Vol. I, p. 368. Change, in Buddhism, does not mean a transformation occurring in an enduring medium. It is, so to say, a "revolution" rather than an "evolution", and, constitutes the sole reality. The thing must either remain or go, it cannot do both at once, changing and remaining. If it has changed, it is not the same (na hi sa eva anyatha bhavati or naikasya anyathatvam asti). The example of melted brass proves nothing. Melted brass and solid brass are "other" objects. (Bud. Log., Vol. I, p. 98.) Therefore change is both total and perpetual. 2. "The becoming of all that is, is the central fact of Buddhism : Identity of objects is an unreality." IP, Vol. I, pp. 368-369 ff. "In his (Buddhist's) view there is no Being at all, and the only reality is Becoming". OIP, p. 211. 3. A real, according to Jainism, consists of substance and its modes (dravyaparyayatmakam vastu). 4. TSS, karikas 317-18, E. T. mine. See also the next three karikas and the PK. on all the five. In ka. 321 (given below) Santaraksita clinches the argument against the Jaina thesis.

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22 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Jitari, another great Buddhist logician, adds his powerful voice to the attack in his Anekantavada-Nirasah.' The gist of his rather lengthy, but closely argued, polemic' against the anekantavadin's theory of identity-in-difference may be stated as follows: When the anekantavadin maintains that dravya and paryaya are identical, owing to the identity of their nature, it means that he affirms nothing short of their total identity (ekarupataiva). Difference, based on (the by the following criticism : Therefore, it must be admitted that either there is destruction of all, or that all is permanent: exclusiveness (vyavrtti) and inclusiveness anugama) cannot subsist in any single entity. (tato niranvayo dhvarsah sthiran va sarvamisyatam/ ekatmani tu naiva sto vyavstyanugamavimau/l). The spirit of this criticism is that either the substance (identity, dravya, or anugama) perishes with the everperishing states (paryayas, difference or vyavrtti), or the everpersisting states become imperishable like the substance which supports them. This criticism is, of course, made against the Jaina theory of the real as a combination of the unity of a substance with the diversity of the states. It implies that the only two possibilities logically warranted by the Jaina position are either that substance should be pluralised like the inherent states, or the states should be integrated into a unity, the co-existence of unity and plurality being, according to the Buddhist, logically absurd. The adoption of either course knocks the bottom out of the Jaina metaphysics, driving it into the arms of either the eternalist Vedantin or the fluxist Bauddha. 1. Printed as the last section in the Tarkabhasa and Vadasthana of Moksakaragupta and Jitaripada, edited by H. R. Ranga swami Iyengar, Mysore, 1944. 2. Its length forbids its full citation here. The gist of the argument stated above, however, gives the main issue raised. The whole account in the text is but an amplification of the issue and refers to the several finer shades of the argument. The issue is dealt with, in considerable detail, in the sequel from the Jaina point of view. See infra, Ch. V.

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CHAPTER I 23 secondary consideration) number etc. (sankhyadi), will then be fictitious (kalpanamatrakalpitah syat). For, real difference (paramarthiko bhedah) between the two cannot proceed from the identity of their nature.' Or conversely, when the anekantavadin pleads that dravya and paryaya are different, it means that he affirms their unqualified difference. Identity will then be fictitious. For real identity (svabhavabhedah) cannot proceed from the difference which is their basic and total nature. The truth about the whole position, according to Jitari, is that one cannot have identity as well as difference by the same nature. The entire argument, from the Buddhist side, may be said to have been grounded on the basic truth of the fundamental Buddhistic dictum: "It cannot be right to affirm and deny a thing at once, affirmation and denial being mutually contradictory": Thus we have seen that the same objection is raised by the two diametrically opposed systems of ontology, viz., the 1. na hi yayoh svabhavabhedah tayoh anyatha paramarthiko bhedah sambhavati / Ibid., p. 112. 2. na ca tenaiva svabhavena bhedas cabhedasca / Ibid. 3. nahyekasya ekada vidhipratisedhau parasparaviruddhau yuktau / Again : anyananyayoh anyonyapariharasthitalaksanatvat / Kamalasila in PK. on karikas 316 and 1795, respectively, in TSS. The implications of this argument are again set forth, in considerable detail, with particular reference to the syadvadin's view of the universal (samanya) and the particular (visesa) in the section on "The Examination of Syadvada" (karikas 1709-1785 and the PK. thereon). The karikas 1726-1735, together with the comm., specifically elucidate and refute the "mutually contradictory" position of the Jainas touching, incidentally, upon the idea of diversity as conceived by the anekantavadin.

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24 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Vedanta and Buddhism, against the anekanta theory of reality. The full significance, the necessity and the value of the Jaina defence, accompanied by a critical consideration of its opponents' fundamental assumptions governing their philosophical structure, can be fully appreciated only when the Jaina approach is viewed against the full background of Indian philosophy. Already a partial statement of the two principal opponent schools, viz., the Vedanta (Advaitism) and Buddhism, has been made mainly from the point of view of their criticism of the Jaina theory of reality. The identityview of Advaita is, in this context, a comparatively straightforward and unequivocal position, despite an immense range of internal developinents within the framework of its adherence to this fundamental viewpoint. Hence, except for a further brief review, no elaborate treatment of this school is called for. A somewhat fuller glimpse into the basic ideas of Buddhism is necessary in view of the great impact, ranging over several centuries,' of this system, on the development of anekantavada. In between these two extremes of Vedanta and Buddhism, either of which leads to a lop-sided view, there are several schools which endeavour, with varying degrees of success, a compromise or a synthesis between the identity or substance view and the difference or modal view. These Cf. "The principal actors on the Scene of The Indian Mediaeval School of Indian Logic' (460 A. D.-1200 A. D.) were, as is wellknown, the Jainas and the Buddhists." Vide, HIL, pp. 157-158. These are characterised, in the Jaina terminology, as dravyarthikanaya and paryayarthikanaya, respectively.

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CHAPTER I schools also will have to be treated severally for two important reasons, viz., (a) that in common with the Vedantin and the Buddhist, they (e. g., Visistadvaita of Ramanuja or Dvaita of Madhva) impute the charge of self-contradiction against Jainism; and (b) that they also afford rich material for a fruitful comparative study of the problem.1 25 In surveying the field of Indian philosophy from the point of view of the problem of the nature of reality we may adopt, as our guiding principle, the following five-fold classification which includes, within its scope, the different schools of philosophical thought in terms of their adherence to "identity" alone, or to "difference" alone, or to both in unequal or equal proportions. The five types of philosophy embodied in this classification are intended to include almost any school, whether or not specifically to be mentioned in the course of our comparative study, in so far as such a school comes within the purview of our inquiry into the nature of reality. 1. The Philosophy of Being or Identity. 2. The Philosophy of Becoming (Change) or Difference. 1. The Sankhya, for instance, postulates the ultimate principles of prakrti and purusa and yet swings, in the ultimate analysis, to the side of the Vedantin by virtue of his predominant emphasis on identity as a satkaryavadin. Conversely, the logical end of the Vaisesika's exclusive emphasis on the postulate of visesa or particularity leads him to import ab extra the element of samavaya (the necessary relation, see Ch. VII), the untenability of which (the samavaya) is proved by the tremendous polemical storm that has been raised, in Indian Logic, over it. Vide the sections on the Sankhya and the Vaisesika in the sequel.

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26 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE 3. The Philosophy subordinating Difference to Identity. 4. The Philosophy subordinating Identity to Difference. 5. The Philosophy co-ordinating both Identity and Difference. The Vedanta (Advaitism) as the school of Identity par excellence and Buddhism as the school of Difference par excellence are respectively brought under the first and the second categories in the above classification. The Sankhya, the Bhedabhedavada (of Bhart;prapanca, Bhaskara, Yadava and Nimbarka) and the Visistadvaitavada (of Ramanuja) figure under the third category. The Vaisesika and the Dvaita (of Madhva) systems come under the fourth type and Jainism under the last. Hegelianism, though a school of Western philosophy, will also be brought into this scheme owing to its being frequently cited as a close Western analogue or parallel of Jainism. On examination it will be found to align itself with the third category despite its agreement with Jainism in certain vital points. Incidentally the Suddhadvaita of Vallabha (distinguished from the Kevaladvaita of Sankara) will be referred to in a small footnote under Advaitism because of its exclusive emphasis on identity (Brahman) as in Advaitism. Where it differs from the latter is in being a brahmaparinamavada and, therefore, in recognising the reality of the jiva (the finite self) and the jada (physical world) as identical with Brahman (brahmatmaka). After the necessarily brief treatment, separate or incidental, of the various schools coming under the five categories of the classification, the Jaina theory of reality as a case of the meeting of extremes, and its answer to the common charge of self-contradiction and other errors believed

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CHAPTER I to issue therefrom, will be outlined in its appropriate context. The other topics which more or less form corollaries of the theory will then be dealt with reserving, as already indicated, an inquiry into some epistemological problems for the second part of this study. 27 We may now proceed to consider the school or schools which have been first assigned to each of the five classes of approach indicated in the classification just formulated. Among these schools the Vedantic absolutism and Buddhism which come under the first and the second categories respectively have already been dealt with. But the treatment has been very sketchy, at any rate of the latter system (Buddhism). Owing to the great importance of the issues involved a few additional remarks on the former system and a somewhat elaborate treatment of the latter one, will greatly help us in evolving a proper perspective in which the Jaina contribution to the effort of solving the ontological and the epistemological questions can be viewed.

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CHAPTER II A Study in Contrasts : A. The Philosophy of Identity (or Being); B. The Philosophy of Difference (Becoming or Change).

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CHAPTER II A. The Philosophy of Being or Identity The Upanisads taught that Brahman is the ultimate reality' although they are not definitely committed to the vivartavada of Sankara according to which the world is empirical or phenomenal (maya or vivarta). Both the Vedic and the Upanisadic seers did not see any incompatibility between conceiving Brahman with and without form (rupa and arupa), the whole and its parts and both unity and diversity. The difference (bheda), between Brahman and the world was considered to be internal (svagata) or homogeneous (sajatiya) rather than external or heterogeneous (vijatiya). As a matter 1. The following Upanisadic utterances declare unity but do so without perhaps repudiating difference as maya which is not unreasonably believed to have been foisted on them by Sankara: mrtyoh sa mrtyum gacchati ya iha naneva pasyati (Katha IV. 11, Twelve Principal Upanisads, TPH. Edn., Vol. I, p. 80). vacarambhanam vikaro namadheyam mrttiketyeva satyam (Chandogya, VI. 1.4, ibid., Vol. III, p. 189). ekamevadvitiyam (Ibid., VI. 2.1, pp. 190-1). 2. See supra, pp. 15-18 and the footnotes thereon, for the views of Thibaut and Bhandarkar as well as for the references to the views of Jacobi and Sukthankar. 3. See Thibaut's remarks, supra, p. 16, f.n. 1 and 2. 4. The notion of difference has been conceived in three forms, viz., sajatiya, or the difference which exists between something and something else of the same class; vijatiya, or the difference which exists between something belonging to one class and another thing belonging to another class; and,

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32 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE of fact it was conceived to be the nature of Brahman alternately to become the manifest world, i. e., to transform itself into the world, and to re-absorb the world into itself. We can, therefore, safely say that pre-sankara Vedanta was not a vivartavada with its inevitable two-plane reality--the one real and the other phenomenal--but a kind of evolutionary monism (ekatvavada) or brahmaparinamavada admitting, not altogether unconsciously, the dual reality of the transforming ultimate and its transformed manifestation of the world. While Vedic-Upanisadic monism admitted of duality or difference and, therefore, characterised it (difference) in relatively positive terms, sankara Advaitism, employing a negativistic method, perhaps under the influence of the Madhyamika dialectic, attempted firmly to reject it. Consequently the former conceived brahman as the basic reality svagata, or the difference which exists between the parts within a single body. The following stanza from Pancadasi (20) illustrates these forms : vsksasya svagato bhedah patrapuspaphaladibhih / vsksantarat sajatiyo vijatiyah sitaditah // 1. Cf. dve satye samupas?tya buddhanar dharmadesana / lokasamortisatyam ca satyam ca paramarthatah // ye 'nayorna vijananti vibhagam satyayordvayoh / te tattvam na vijananti gambhiram buddhasasane // Madhyamika Sutra, XXIV. 8 f. See also Sukthankar's remarks in this connection, in the journal already referred to: supra p. 17, f.n. 2. 2. In framing his celebrated four-fold (catuskoti) dialectic the Madhyamika is guided by the principle that every view (ditti) is self-contradictory and is, therefore, self-convicted. The four moments of the dialectic are sat ('is'), asat ("is not'), sadasat (both 'is' and 'is not') and na sat naivasat (neither 'is' nor'is not'). Assertion of any of these possibilities necessarily, implies, according to him, its opposite counterpart and, thereby

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CHAPTER II 33 whereas the latter came to conceive it as the sole reality although both hold it to be permanent, homogeneous and universal. This divergence of views is traceable, mainly, to the distinction between the earlier concept of vikara, or parinama, or modification, and the later one of vivarta or illusoriness. Sadananda clearly describes this distinction. He observes that "(When a thing) actually appears as another, it is called vikara, when (it) falsely appears as another, it is called vivarta." 'Or, to express the same idea somewhat technically : when an effect is a 'real transformation of its material cause (which is its essence), it is called vikara or parinama, but when it is a false or 'apparent transformation', it is called vivarta. This doctrine of vivarta is a bold innovation of Sankara. ....... .... exhibits the fissure or contradiction at the heart of any view. He is protected against any criticism since he does not claim to take any definite attitude with regard to any question (catuskoti vinirmuktam). sankara must have been influenced by this dialectical technique. He does not, however, extend this to brahman. His application of this destructive method is confined to the phenomenal world alone. The mode and the extent of his application of the above method are, of course, determined by various other circumstances like his adherence to the Upanisads, etc. sriharsa, the greatest post-sankara dialectician, wields in his Khandanakhandakhadya this weapon with a devastating force against the opponents of Advaitism and serves his master in the same way as Zeno did Barmenides (See for instance the reference to sriharsa's "Negative criticism against the notion of difference" in HIP, Vol. I, pp. 401-40). satattvato'nyathapratha vikara ityudiritah / atattvato'nyathapratha vivarta ityudiritah // Vedantasara, by Sadananda, ed. with Intro. and E. T. by M. Hiriyanna, Poona, 1929, p. 8 (text), p. 54 (translation). 2. Cf. upadanasamasattakah parinamah / upadanavisamasattako vivartah // Quoted, ibid., Notes, p. 36.

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34 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE It is on this bold innovation of the vivarta doctrine that Sankara builds up his conception of the universe. The universe, which is either empirical (vyavaharika) or phenomenal (pratibhasika), is intrinsically unreal (mithya or avastu) from the point of view of the absolute which is the only true reality (paramarthika-sat). It is the acknowledgement of the absolute as the only true reality (ekamevadvitiyam), which is identity (abheda) par excellence, that makes Advaitism the exemplar of the identity-view' in Indian philosophy. 1. Vallabha's suddhadvaitavada and Bhartphari's sabdabrahma vada (or sabdadvaitavada) come closest to Sankara's Advaitism. Suddhadvaitavada has, or at any rate claims to have, a flavour of brahmaparinamavada although its rigour as an identity-view is not thereby affected. Sabdadvaitavada develops its identity-view from the angle of the philosophy of language. Reserving for a later occasion a brief reference to this linguistic trend of Advaitism a few relevant remarks regarding how Vallabha's doctrine tends to become an identity-view, may be made here : Vallabha's doctrine is referred to, as just noticed, as suddhadvaitavada or pure non-dualism in distinction from Sankara's doctrine described as kevaladvaitavada, or absolute nondualism, or, more familiarly, Advaitism. Unlike the latter the former maintains the reality of the individual world (jiva) or souls, and the insentient world (jada) and at the same time, it regards them, viz., the souls and the insentient world, as a real manifestation of brahman with which they are, therefore, said to be identical in essence (brahmatmaka). To express the same idea somewhat more specifically, their appearance and disappearance are attributed to the manifestation (avirbhava) and withdrawal (tirobhava) of the will of brahman. The living and the non-living worlds are thus ultimately regarded, by Vallabha, as at one with brahman. Here we see the rift in the structure of the doctrine. The firm affirmation, in this doctrine, of the identity of essence between brahman, on the one hand, and the living and the non-living worlds, on

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CHAPTER II 35 Giving wide berth to the modal principle (bhedatattva) is, of course, a necessary deduction from the logic of vivartavada. But even Sankara finds it hard summarily to dismiss this massive and obstinate principle. He constructs, after the manner of the Madhyamika dialectic, an explanation by which he hopes to achieve the denial of this principle. But the explanation is more in the nature of a dialectical mystification than a genuine solution to the problem : it maintains that the universe, or the modal existence which is inherent in the universe, neither 'is" (sat or bhavarupa), nor 'is not'? (asat, abhava, or tuccha), but is something other than both 'is' and 'is not' (sadasadvilaksana). This unique something is also said to be inexpressible or the other, is incompatible with the initial acceptance of the reality, which should mean the independent existence of the living and the non-living worlds. Hence suddhadvaitavada may be taken to affirm the ultimacy or reality of identity in the same measure as it eventually repudiates the intrinsic reality of the living and the non-living worlds. But since the repudiation of the intrinsic reality of the living and non-living worlds is, in the ultimate analysis, complete, the doctrine may be taken to be almost as strong an identity-view as Sankara's Advaitism. This is so in spite of the professed inclination of Vallabha's doctrine towards brahmaparinamavada, and the consequent denial of maya as the source of the limitations such as indiffer ence (bheda) and finitude. 1. See below f.n. 3. * 2. See the following f.n. 3. Cf. "If it (i. e., the world arising from avidya, or ajnana or maya), were real (sat), it would never be sublated; if unreal (asat), it would never appear (saccenna badhyeta / asaccenna pratiyeta /). So it must be other than both (vilaksana)." See Vedantasara (Hiriyanna's edn.), Notes, p. 24. The words within the first brackets as well as the text quoted within the last brackets are of my inclusion.

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36 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE anirvacaniya'. Being neither sat nor asat it is further suggested to be midway between the two, a 'twilight', a 'real-unreal', or a 'true lie's It evidently indicates a 'third position' which aims at doing away with the contradiction with which sat and asat are supposed to be riddled. But one doubts if this explanation offered in the form of a 'third position' is a real solution at all to the problem. It looks like an evasive device which, when shorn of its dialectical embellishments, harbours the very contradiction which it aims at banishing from its scheme. It is not, therefore, surprising if this position invokes against itself the charge which Kumarila makes in a similar context: he affirms that "that which does not exist, does not exist; and that which really exists is real, while all else is unreal; and, therefore, there can be no assumption of two kinds of reality". 1. That is, anirvacaniya is that which cannot be said to be either is' or is not': sadasadbhyam anirvacaniyam / Ibid., p. 2 (text) and Notes, p. 24. Also : pratyekam sadasattvabhyam vicara-padavim na yad / gahate tad anirvacaniyam ahur vedanta-vedinah // See HIP, Vol. II, p. 155, f.n. 2 (quoted from Citsukhi). This aspect of anirvacaniya will, again, be dealt with in its relation to the Jaina notion of avaktavya, in the ch. on Syadvada. 2. Referring to the middle category' of sadasadvilaksana, A. Bhattacharya writes in his Studies in Post-Sankara Dialectics (Univ. of Calcutta, 1936), p. 240: "It is a new category which shares in the characteristics of both position and negation and therefore a middle category between the two, positivenegative in its character." The words quoted in this and the next sentences are from Aspects of Advaita (by P. N. Srinivasachari, Madras, 1949), p. 41. tasmadyannasti nastyeva yattvasti paramarthatah / tatsatyam anyanmithyeti na satyadvayakalpana // MSV, Niralambavada, ka. 10, E. T., S. V. Jha, p. 120.

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CHAPTER II The 'third position' is thus logically invalid although it is posited to exist somehow. Instead of bifurcating the entire course of reality into two compartments, viz., brahman, and the illusory universe which is sadasadvilaksana, and then investing brahman with the character of 'identity' (abheda, advaita) and relegating 'difference' (bheda) to an intrinsically illusory universe, it would perhaps be a more straightforward course to treat 'identity' and 'difference' as two complementary aspects of the entire concrete nature of reality. This procedure saves also the needlessly involved and paradoxical dialectic which initially treats the notions of sat and asat as contradictory and eventually combines them in a 'third position' which cannot but be contradictory but yet is believed to be somehow existent. As if these surprises are not enough Sankara springs upon us yet another surprise by asserting that the difference-ridden illusory universe is mysteriously grounded in the identity-ridden real absolute. 37 These incongruities, however, do not deter Sankara from converting the entire drama of reality into a grand monologue of the lonely absolute. B. The Philosophy of Becoming (Change) or Difference So far an attempt has been made to survey Advaitism as the most thorough-going instance of the philosophy of being or identity, the first among the five ontological approaches indicated in the previous chapter. A further attempt may now be made to review Buddhism as the unparalleled instance of

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38. JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE the philosophy of becoming (change) or difference', the second typical ontological approach forming an antithesis to the first one. Buddhism is, as already noticed, a philosophy of total change' or difference which divorces from the true or ultimate reality all notions like permanence (nityatva), identity (tadatmya), generality (jati or samanya) and the subject-object relation, assigning them to the subjective 1. See supra, pp. 19 ff. 2. The sole and ultimately real (paramartha-sat) in Buddhism, is the 'point-instant' or 'the moment' (ksana). Each moment is different from or 'other' than the rest in the series (santana): "Whatsoever exists separately (sarvam prthak) from 'other' existing things. To exist means to exist separately..... The notion of "apartness' belongs to the essential feature of the notion of existence (Bhavalaksanaprthaktvat)". Bud. Log., Vol. I, p. 103. The words quoted within the brackets are from the footnotes in the same work. Again : "Thus every reality is another reality. What is identical or similar is not ultimately real". Ibid., p. 105. See also STBS, p. 939. Stcherbatsky adds, in this connection, that "a difference in space-time is a difference in substance". Bud. Log., Vol. II, p. 282f. 3. The moment which is the unique thing-in-itself (svalaksana) is the true or ultimate reality (paramartha-sat). (See NBD, p. 103.) It is directly inaccessible to our understanding (jnanena prapayitum asakyam). What we apprehend as 'real' is only the constructed (parikalpita) or imagined reality which, though empirically real (samvsti-sat) is an 'illusion' from the ultimate view-point (paramarthatah). Cp. Bud. Log., Vol. I, p. 70 f. Cf. "Everything past is unreal, everything future is unreal, everything imagined, absent, mental, notional, general: every Universal, whether a concrete Universal or abstract one, is unreal. All arrangements and all relations, if considered apart from the terms related, are unreal, Ultimately real is only the present moment of physical efficiency." Ibid., p. 70 f., and p. 542. 5. Cf. CCBS, p. 58.

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39 CHAPTER II realm of 'mental construction'' (vikalpa, or kalpana). This emphasis on change is evidenced by the complex and varied history of the evolution of Buddhistic thought which took its rise from the three-fold truth of the Pali Canons that everything (savvam) is impermanent (anicca), 1. Vikalpa or Kalpana is an ideation, or an ideal construction, conceived by the mind. It does not originate from (arthat notpadyate), or have any reference to the objective reality. Being thus independent of the objective reality (arthanirapeksam) and, therefore, purely mental or conceptual, both with respect to its form and its genesis, it is considered to "be unauthenticated and unreliable as evidence of objective reality". Cf. anapeksam ca pratibhasaniyamahetorabhavat aniyatapratibhasam / NBTD, p. 11. The two phrases quoted above, in this passage, are also from the same work, p. 10 and p. 11 respectively. Cf. The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux (S. Mookerjee, Univ. of Calcutta, 1935), pp. 283 and 345. Stcherbatsky suggests that vikalpa or kalpana "covers, directly or indirectly, the whole range of thought, the active element in cognition". The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana (Leningrad, 1927), p. 147, f.n. 2. When considered in relation to what has been pointed out in the above paragraph, this comes to mean that the lack of objective reference and, consequently, of reliable evidence' with regard to the objective world, affect almost 'the entire range of thought'. For an exhaustive account of vikalpa or kalpana, see TSS, karikas 1214-1311. A brief but lucid discussion is found in NBTD, pp. 9-11; Nyayapravesavrtti p. 35f., and the Panjika (p.75) thereon, both being commentaries on Nyayapravesa (attributed to Dinnaga), Pt. I, ed. A. B. Dhruv Baroda, 1930. In his Notes (pp. 89-94) to this work the editor draws our attention to (a) the critical references to the notion of kalpana, made by some non-Buddhist thinkers such as Uddyotakara and Vacaspatimisra; and (b) the different shades of meaning attached to the notion of kalpana by the different schools of Buddhism. The distinction pointed out by Stcherbatsky, between vitarka or vikalpa and vicara, though not of material importance, also deserves our attention, in this context. See CCBS, pp. 104-105.

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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE soulless or substanceless (anatta) and the cause of pain (dukkha) as against the Upanisadic view of an atman (soul) which is eternal (nitya) and pure bliss (ananda). Philosophically the anicca and the anatta elements of the early Buddhistic thought resulted in the great and daring metaphysics of nairatmyavada' (the doctrine of 'soullessness'' or 1. The central point of nairatmyavada consists in the repudiation of an 'ego', or an enduring entity behind the so-called phenomenal changes in the world. The most effective disproof of an Sego' is contained in the dialogue-not reproduced here for fear of length-between King Milinda and the monk Nagasena as to the nature of Nagasena and of the chariot. At the conclusion Nagasena, in the sense of an 'ego', is discovered to be "a mere empty sound" and the chariot to be "but a way of counting, term, appellation, convenient designation, and name for pole, axle, wheels, chariot-body, and banner-staff". There is said to be nothing beyond the five aggregates (skandhas) constituting the phenomena in the world. Nagasena quotes the following lines from Vajira in proof of this thesis: "Even as the word 'chariot' means that members join to frame a whole; so when the Groups appear to view, we use the phrase, 'A living being'." Buddhism in Translations (H. C. Warren, Cambridge, Mass., 1915), pp. 128-133. The other instances cited from the Visuddhimagga (Chap. XVIII) are of a "house", a "fist", a "lute", an "army", a "city", and a "tree". Ibid., p. 133 ff. The following verse from Visuddhimagga (Chap. XVI) gives an effective expression of the Nairatmya truth: "Misery only doth exist, none miserable No doer is there; naught save the deed is found. Nirvana is, but not the man who seeks it. The path exists, but not the traveller in it." Ibid., p. 146. Cf. also in this connection T. W. Rhys David's reflections on this subject in Pottapada Sutta, the Dialogues of the Buddha (Sacred Books of the Buddhists, Vol. II, Pt. I, Intro., p. 242, especially para 3). 2. This and the next term are as translated by Stcherbatsky in STBS. La Vallee Poussin, however, prefers translating nairatmya into 'selflessness' to 'soullessness'. See The Way to Nirvana (Cambridge, 1917), p. 34.

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CHAPTER II 'no-substance' or substancelessness) which is in diametrical opposition to the atmavada (substance-view or identity-view) of the Upanisads and the other schools', and runs through all schools of Buddhism'-from the Abhidharmika (Vaibhasika) stage to that of Yogacara (Vijnanavada)-their internal differences notwithstanding. The quintessence of the nairatmya" attitude consists in the denial of the satkayadrsti 41 1. See the following f.n. 2. Except the school of Vatsiputriyas (or Sammatiyas) whose view has already been referred to, see supra, p. 19 f., f.n. 1. Yasomitra cites a line which claims the unique right to Buddha for the teaching of nairatmyavada: anyah sasta jagati ca yato nasti nairatmyavadat. Yasomitra's Abhidhammakosavyakhya (ed. Unrai Wogihara, Tokyo, 1932-1936), Pt. II, p. 697. Deriding Vardhamana, Kapila and others who, like the Upanisadic thinkers, are held "in the clutches of the crocodile of the false doctrine of the 'soul' (or substance)" Santaraksita says: idam ca vardhamanadernairatmyajnanamidrsam / na samastyatmadrstau hi vinastah sarvatirthikah // TSS, ka. 3325. We notice, in the second line, that the heretical philosophers (tirthikah) are said to be 'lost' (vinastah) in the heresy of a soul (atmadrstau). La Vallee Poussin points out, in this connection, an interesting distinction between 'a heresy' or drsti and a sin in his The Way to Nirvana, p. 46, f.n. 1. This is the central point in which Buddhism differs from many other schools which believe in the substance of a soul. This is why Udayana significantly entitles his refutation of Buddhism as Atmatattvaviveka (an inquiry into the reality of the self). 3. Literally the word means 'the state of being devoid of Atman' Vidushekhara Bhattacharya has drawn our attention to the meaning of 'atman' as svabhava or nature which never under goes any change'. He also refers to the two-fold distinction of nairatmya, viz., pudgalnairatmya and dharmanairatmya. Vide, The Basic Conception of Buddhism, Vidushekhara Bhattacharya, University of Calcutta, 1934, p. 73. 4. For the various derivations of Satkayadrsti (Pali-Sakkayaditthi) see ibid., p. 77 f., f.n. 30.

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42 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE which signifies an enduring entity, the "something I know not what", as Locke puts it, behind the dynamic and discrete moments. Perhaps the varied developments of Buddhism are a continual series of approximations to the spirit of the * enlightenment' (bodhi) which dawned upon the Buddha who must have felt that this mischievous or dangerous idea of an enduring something behind the goings-on of our life and the world breeds a craving for possession and the consequent ills' of despair and suffering at loss. In the words of Stcherbatsky the history of Buddhism is "a series of attempts to penetrate more deeply into the original intuition of Buddha, what he himself believed to be his great discovery". The same writer refers to "a sense of opposition or even animosity" as being "clearly felt" in the words of Buddha whenever he (Buddha) talked about satkayadrsti or the doctrines of a permanent self or substance. Mrs. Caroline Rhys Davids also remarks "how carefully and conscientiously this antisubstantialist position had been cherished and upheld" as the "central point of the whole bulk of Buddhist teaching". Thus the original character of soullessness or substancelessness remains the fundamental attitude of Buddhism in spite of the fact that we find several different shades of idealism and realism within the range of its philosophical 1. atma-dTstau ca satyam atma-snehadayah klesah pravartante / STBD, Abhidharmakosavyakhya, p. 697. Ibid., p. 824. 3. Quoted: ibid., pp. 824-5.

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1. Cf. OIP, pp. 197-8. 2. CHAPTER II evolution'. Impermanence (anicca) and soullessness (anatta) are, according to this view, the 'pitiless' laws of all existence so that existence becomes a cinematograph show, the discrete moments of which flash themselves into being serially 43 Stcherbatsky rightly compares this to Bergson's view: "Bergson compares our cognitive apparatus with a cinematograph which reconstitutes a movement of momentary stabilized snapshots. This is exactly the Buddhist view". Bud. Log., Vol. I, p. 117. But comparing this Buddhistic viewpoint with that of Russell, who also illustrates it with the analogy of a 'cinematograph' would be even more appropriate in view of the fact that Bergson's real is an unbroken flow of duration, while that of Russell is one of atomistic, or discrete, ultimate particulars. Russell, illustrating his point, observes that ". the cinema is a better metaphysician than common-sense physics or philosophy". "My meaning in regard to the impermanence of physical entities may perhaps be more clear by the use of Bergson's favourite illustration of the cinematograph. Where, in a picture palace, we see a man rolling down a hill.... we know that there is not really one man moving, but a succession of films each with a different momentary man." Russell's statements, quoted in course of this f.n. are from his Mysticism and Logic, London, 1950, pp. 128-9. It is curious how such contrasting viewpoints as Bergson's and Russell's can use the same analogy of the cinematograph with equal effect. Bergson is a durationist and Russell is a logical atomist although both agree with Buddhism in conceiving the real as flux or a group of impermanent physical entities. For a further treatment of the relation between Buddhism, on the one hand, and some important notions of Russell's logical atomism and Bergson's durationism (especially of the former) on the other, see the rather lengthy f.n. 2 on p. 44 ff. below. 3. The doctrine of discrete moments, or of momentariness, is the logical outcome, or 'the furthest extreme', of the doctrine of impermanence which, according to Vidushekhara Bhattacharya, antidated Buddhism. Vide, The Basic Conception of Buddhism, p. 83. After suggesting the general distinction between impermanence and momentariness Bhattacharya rightly adds: "In dealing with the Buddhist position by impermanence we are

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44 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE as it were and vanish without a trace (niranvaya ksanika). Whatever story is imposed upon them is the colourful imposition of our fancy. The flow or the passage of these momentary flashings is all that there is in reality. This metaphysics of process or becoming of the discrete and unique particulars is considered to be midway between the two extreme views, viz., "everything is" (nityavada or eternalism) and "everything is not" (tucchavada or nihilism). The main purpose of bringing in Buddhism here is to show that it concerns itself with what may be designated as the modal view of reality by its exclusive emphasis on the unique, momentary and absolute particulars which constitute reality which is becoming or flux. The particulars are absolutely unique, not sharing their essence with anything? else and, therefore, differ? totally one from another (trailo to understand this momentariness." Ibid. Hiriyanna, however, assumes a slightly hesitant position on this issue. See OIP, R. 144. 2. Each such particular is something which has "not the slightest bit of otherness" in it (aniyasapi na amsena aparatmakam). See Bud. Log., Vol. I, p. 557. The moments are emphatically asserted to be unique and, therefore, different from one another in a series (santana). But they are also said to have some affinity or 'correlation' with their immediately antecedent moments, and hence, to arise in a uniform succession as, for instance, a moment of flame being succeeded by a 'similar' moment of flame. This implication of 'similarity' or 'continuity' (or "continuation') is based on the Buddhistic causal theory of pratitya samutpada, i.e. 'dependent origination' or 'functional dependence' in contrast with that of adhityasamutpada, i. e., the theory of production at random and is supposed to permit uniformity without the need of the much-abhorred enduring entity underlying the fieeting phenomena. (For a statement of the several implications of

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CHAPTER II pratityasamutpada, and of the relation between pratityasamutpada and adhityasamutpada, see Stcherbatsky's The Conception of Nirvana, p. 39, f.n. 2, p. 123, f.n. 4, p. 124 and p. 240.) But admission of similarity or continuity seems to be an unsafe compromise if not a self-contradiction which is in direct proportion to the need of this element of continuity or co-ordination. Moreover, admitting something which transcends the solely real moment or point-instant (ksana) also leads, to that extent, to compromising the exclusive reality of the moment. While considering the paradoxical admission of continuity in Buddhism the parallel instance of Bertrand Russell's acceptance of the same idea (continuity) in his "logical atomism" suggests itself inevitably. Besides offering a classic parallel to Buddhism, in the twentieth century, it reiterates the lesson that an essential principle surreptitiously comes back through the back door, if it is thrust away from the front. The following passage looks like the Buddhist argument in a modern garb: "The world may be conceived as consisting of a multitude of entities arranged in a certain pattern. The entities which are arranged I shall call 'particulars'; the arrangement of pattern results from relations among particulars. Classes or series of particulars, collected together on account of some property which makes it convenient to be able to speak of them as wholes, are what I call logical constructions or symbolic fictions. The particulars are to be conceived, not on the analogy of bricks in a building, but rather on the analogy of notes in a symphony. The ultimate constituents of a symphony (apart from relations) are the notes, each of which lasts only for a very short time. We may collect together all the notes played by one instrument; these may be regarded as the analogues of the successive particulars which common-sense would regard as successive states of one "thing". But the "thing" ought to be regarded as no more 'real' or 'substantial'than, for example, the role of the trombone. As soon as 'things' are conceived in this manner it will be found that the difficulties in the way of regarding immediate objects of sense as physical have largely disappeared." Mysticism and Logic, pp. 129-30. For a further demonstration of continuity, vide Russell's three famous physiological, psychological and logical arguments in OKEW, pp. 145-158. (The main thesis is summarily stated in the last paragraph on p. 158.)

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46 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Important as it is, the agreement between Russell and Buddhism, as regards continuity, is not complete. As a matter of fact his "logical atomism" and Buddhism differ more than they agree on the issue of continuity. Russell's scathing attack on the Bergsonian La Duree undoubtedly bears comparison with the age-long battle Buddhism has waged against eternalism (sasvatavada) although the latter has been more thorough and many-sided. As for the interpretation of continuity Russell's approach is mathematical and complex, whereas Buddhists' approach is dialetical and relatively simple : Buddhism understands by continuity a mere "consecutiveness" or a uniform "uninterrupted succession of similar events". For Russell even "the lowest degree of continuity", which is described as "compactness", is more complex than the Buddhist ideas. Russell writes : "Mathematicians have distinguished different degrees of continuity and have confined the word 'continuous' for technical purposes, to series having a certain high degree of continuity. But for philosophical purposes, all that is important in continuity is introduced by the lowest degree of continuity which is called 'compactness'". Ibid., p. 138. This difference between the simple consecutiveness which is signified by the idea of succession and the more complex "compactness"_not to mention the kinds of "high degree of continuity"-becomes clear when we understand the definition of "compactness". "A series is called 'compact'," Russell writes, "when no two terms are consecutive, but between any two there are others." (Ibid.) The number of such terms coming between them may be (according to him) "infinite". He illustrates this point as follows: "Given any two fractions, however near together, there are other fractions greater than the one and smaller than the other, and therefore no two fractions are consecutive. There is no fraction, for example, which is next after 1/2; if we choose some fraction which is very little greater than 1/2, say 51/100, we can find others, such as 101/200, which are nearer to 1/2. Thus between any two fractions, however little they differ, there are infinite numbers of other fractions." (Ibid.) Critics (e. g. Stcherbatsky in Bud. Log., Vol. I, pp. 142-4 etc., S. Mookerjee in the Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, p. 17f., f.n. 1) are more ready in noticing the "striking" coincidence of Russell's position with that of Buddhism, in this connection--it is, indeed "striking" as a matter of broad comparison-than in delving into the subtle but importar

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CHAPTER II 47 kyavyavarta). They are sole' objects of perception and differences between the two positions. But the existence of such differences does not affect the general tone of agreement between the two positions, on the solutions offered to the problem of continuity. Finally, it should be said that in spite of the extraordinary ingenuity shown in his solution of continuity by his method of "logical construction" we cannot help feeling that Bertrand Russell has not succeeded in convincing us that "compactness" or even the highest degree of discrete "continuity" can offer a genuine substitute for identity or permanence. Buddhism fares no better in this respect. The strength of their polemics against identity or permanence indicates the strength of the persistence of identity or permanence as a complementary element in being as in knowing. Sa eva ca pratyaksavisayo yatah tasmat tadeva svalaksanam (Nyayabindu with Nyayabindutika, Bibliotheca Buddhica, VII, p. 13). Stcherbatsky translates this as: "Since it is just that thing which is the object (producing) direct perception, therefore the particular (i. e., the unique moment, the thing in itself) is the exclusive object of sense-perception." Bud. Log., Vol. II, p. 36. Although a unique particular is the object of perception its knowledge cannot be had at the perceptual level (see the following f.n.). It is only at the conceptual level that the mind can form a cognitive image or notion of the particular by imposing the conceptual forms, such as the universals, relations, etc., (Such forms are collectively designated, by the Buddhist, as samanyalaksanas in contrast with the svalaksanas) on it. The curious thing about the notion of the object thus ained is that it does not. according to the Buddhist, represent the object as such but represents, on the contrary, the negation, or "the rejection", of what is other than-or the opposite of-the object (anyapoha). For instance, a cow is said to be the negation of non-cow (agonivrttih.) Similarly, "bitter" (tikta) is described as the negation of "non-bitter" and "sweet" (madhura) as the negation of "non-sweet". (See S.V. Jha, p. 317, f.n. 121-122.) While discussing "Inference" Randle states on the authority of Uddyotakara, "the real meaning" of apoha, a term to be presently referred to, as

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48 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE follows: "If you say A is B, your real meaning may be that A is not not B-or, if you prefer, that A is not not-B,--or again, that not-not A is B, or even that not-not A is not-not not-not B." (Indian Logic in the Early Schools, London etc., 1930, p. 182, f.n. 1; see also p. 261, f.n. 2 and 3.) Apohavada is the name given to this theory according to which an object is conceived to be the negation of its opposite. Dinnaga is the earliest exponent of this theory. He expounded it in his Pramana-samuccaya (ch. V; see HIL, p. 287) in the extreme negative form which has just been illustrated. This form is specifically designated as anyapohavada in distinction from other two forms which will presently be mentioned. A powerful polemic has been directed against this negative theory by several Brahminical and the Jaina writers from the points of view of their respective schools. The most notable Brahminical writers are : Uddyotakara (Nyayavartika, Bib. Ind. II. 2.65; TBV, p. 200 f., and TSS, karikas 982-1000), Vacaspati. misra's Nyayavartikatatparyatika, Apohavada, E. T. in Bud. Log., Vol. II. Appendix V), Bhamaha (TSS, karikas 912-914; ka. 13 has been quoted below in a context similar to this. See infra, ch. XI.), Kumarila (MSV, the extensive ch. on apoha), Jayanta (Nyayamanjari, ed. Gangadhara Sastri Tailanga, Benares, 1895, Pt. I, p. 316) and Bhartshari (Vakyapadiya, ed. Gangadhara Sastri Manavalli, Benares, 1887, ch. II, karikas 118-154). The following are the notable Jaina critics of this theory: Abhayadeva (an extensive treatment of the topic in his TBV, pr. 173-270), Prabhacandra (PKM, 43-451 and NKC, Vol. II, pp. 551-566), Haribhadra (AJP, Ch. IV) santyacarya (NVVS, pp. 96-98) and Siddharsi (in Vivrti on Nyayavatara, P. L. Vaidya's edn., p. 4 f.). Most of the above critics point out that the total lack of any reference to a positive content in Dinnaga's negative notion of apoha exposes the notion to a suicidal danger (e. g. MSV, karikas 134, 142-145, 147, etc., NKC, Vol. II, p.563, the end of para. 1; and AJP, Vol. II, p. 403, ka, 6). Among others Kumarila, Prabhacandra, and santyacarya emphasise the fact that logically speaking, even the notion of apoha does, or at any rate should, refer to a positive content, or a real object. For according to them, negation does not refer to void, of which apoha is said to be a variant form (cf. apohasabdavacyatha sunyatanyaprakarika /MSV, p. 576, ka. 36), but to some different positive entity (cf. bhavan

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CHAPTER IL 49 taram abhavo hi / MSV, p. 566, ka. 2; sarvatha asatah pratibhasa ayogat / AJP, Vol. II, p. 351; NVVS, p. 97, lines 17-18; and NKC, Vol. II, p. 562, line 8). The significance of negation in the Jaina metaphysics will be treated at the appropriate place. (See infra, ch. V.) A . As a result of the many-sided attack by the various critics, the most notable of whom have just been noticed, the Buddhist attitude towards apohavada underwent what might be described after Hegel as a triadic course of development. The thesis of Dinnaga that apoha signifies nothing but negation fails to commend itself to santaraksita and Kamalasila. These latter thinkers take a realistic view-which may be described as an antithesis to that of Dinnaga-in which apoha signifies a positive content (bahyarthadhyavasayi, arthapratibimbakam-see e.g., TSS, ka. 1011 and the PK thereon). They treat negation (in the sense that 'the nature of this thing is not the nature of the other thing') as only an implication which does not form an integral part of the positive felt content' but arises later when reflection plays upon the 'felt content' (see TSS, karikas 1013-1015 and the PK thereon.) Ratnakirti comes upon this scene, where we find an unbridged gulf between the negative and the positive views on apoha, and attempts a synthesis. As a necessary step in this attempt he rules out the realistic argument that apoha denotes a positive content only (nasmabhih apohasabdena vidhireva kevalo'bhipretah / SBNT, p. 3) and that the negative import is just a later logical implication following the elusive perceptual presentation of the positive ("felt') content. (Ibid.) He is equally firm in repudiating the converse view of the Negationist' (anyapohavadin) that apoha is purely negative (napyanyavyavsttimatram / Ibid.) and that its positive reference is a later logical deduction (ibid.). His own view is that apoha is both positive and negative in its meaning (or content), and that both these elements are presented at once (anyapohavisisto vidhih sabdanam arthah / Ibid. See also the Preface, p. 1, para 2, and Keith's Buddhist Philosophy, Oxford, 1923, p. 317). Thus we find three decisive landmarks in development of apohavada, viz., the purely negative view of the pioneer Dinnaga, the positive view of santaraksita and his alter ego Kamalasila, and lastly, the reconciliatory view of Ratnakirti.

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50 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE In the triangular fight over the interpretation of the natue of apoha, Ratnakirti emerges, as just noticed, as a victorious synthesist of the two opposing trends. This victory seems to point to the truth that the true nature of any aspect of reality, nay, of the entire reality, consists in a synthesis of the positive and the negative aspects. The realization of the need for such a comprehensive synthesis, within howsoever limited an aspect it may be, is the result of a bold departure from the purely negativistic beginnings of the theory. But even the bold genius of Ratnakirti stopped short of breaking through the narrow framework of the nominalistic metaphysics of momentariness, and of extending the limited truth of his discovery over the whole range of reality. The reverence for the master Dinnaga seems to be so overpowering that none of the dissenters from Dinnaga, the champion of negativism, has had the courage to declare openly the fact that he is dissenting. Even Ratnakirti is no exception in this matter. They have all tried to rationalize, or read their minds into the view of the master.. (This aspect of whether apoha denotes a positive, or a negative, or both positive and negative, signification of objects, is one among the several aspects, such as the nature of the universal, the relation between the word and the object, and so on, with which apohavada is concerned. As a matter of fact, even the present aspect of the theory seems to have been keenly debated, not merely between the Buddhist and the nonBuddhist thinkers as indicated by the reference to the nonBuddhist critics and their works in this footnote-but also between many Buddhist thinkers themselves at various stages. For instance, Ratnakirti hints two groups of philosophers who held the positive or the negative view of the theory. They are referred to as vidhivadins and pratisedhavadins, respectively, in his Apohasiddhi, SBNT, p. 3. Jnanasri belongs, as can be seen in PVD, 167 ff., to the latter one. The Tibetan literature on apohavada is said to be "very vast" (see Bud. Log., Vol. II, p. 404). Dharmottara also is said to have written a special work on the subject. Von E. Frauwallner's articles on Beitrage zur Apohalehre' in the Vienna Oriental Journal (Vol. XXXIX, pp. 247-285; Vol. XL, pp. 51-94; Vol. XLII, pp. 93-102; and Vol. XLIV, pp. 233-287, including a Tibetan text) deal with this subject at some length.

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CHAPTER II 51 perception is the only source of their direct knowledge. There is nothing besides these ultimate constituents" (paramarthasat), which neither extend in space (desananugata) nor stretch in duration (kalananugata) beyond the twinkling flashes of moments. Unlike the monads of Leibnitz which, though windowless' in relation to other monads' communicate with God, these unique reals of Buddhism are entirely self-contained and therefore form a procession of full-stops as it were, in the process of reality. They are entirely disparate or unconnected'. Connection or relation is, as has already been observed, imposed on them by our distorting imagination (kalpana). Being exclusive or self-sufficient they do not change. Change is spontaneous and they are, therefore, selfproductive and self-destructive. Hence nothing can destroy a thing if the power of destruction is not inherent in its 1. Rut the But the so-called direct knowledge is 'speechless' or indescribable (anabhilapya) because an attempt to describe the "brute fact', or percept (i. e. perceived something) is necessarily accompanied by overlaying the percept with ideal or mental categories. Uddyotakara is, therefore, right in characterising that this percept is like a dumb man's dream' (mukasvapnavat). Cf. Randle's Fragments from Dinnaga, p. 84 and fin, i thereon. 2. Dharmottara observes that 'ultimate reality is in its turn the ultimate particular' (see NBT, p. 17 and Bud. Log., Vol. I, p. 192). They differ also in respect of their being entities which reflect the entire universe which is pregnant with the past and the future--from their own points of view. The svalaksanas (unique reals) are efficient rather than reflecting forces. 4. Although they are similar' to each other the similarity' or continuity does not, according to Buddhism, form part of their inmost nature (see supra, p. 44 ff., f.n. 2). 5. The following celebrated' verse, previously uttered by the Bodhisattva, is cited by Buddha on the eve of his (Buddha's) death. That change is two-fold (growth' and 'decay ') as well as spontaneous or inherent in all things ("their nature', there

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52 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE nature even as nothing can bring it into existence if such power is not already within it. A jar, for instance, appears to be destroyed by the blow of a staff but this is not really so. The destruction must be entirely attributed to the natural potency of the fleeting forces which previously emerged into existence to become the phenomenon that is the jar'. This potency for momentary self-emergence and self-destruction is called arthakriyasamarthyam and it is the very essence of reality (arthakriyasamarthyalaksanatvad vastunah). For the Buddhist, momentariness and efficiency are inseparable. Reality is momentary because it is efficient and it is efficient because it is momentary. Anything which is fore, not something ab extra) is specifically uttered in the second and the third lines of the verse: *anicca vata sankara uppadavvaya dhammino / uppajjittva nirujjhanti tesam vupasamo sukho // Maha sudassana suttanta, The Digha Nikaya, Pali Text Society, Vol. II, p. 199. The following is the E. T. of the verse : How transient are all compound things! Growth is their nature and decay, They are produced, they are dissolved again; To bring them all into subjection that is bliss. Sacred Books of the Buddhists, Vol. III, p. 232. See also Intro., pp. 194-195. Cp. The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, pp. 1-5. 2. For reference to the Buddhist works wherein this idea, Biz: arthakriyasamarthyam, is dealt with, see infra, ch. V. What follows, is a Buddhist polemic against the possibility of causal efficiency (arthakriyakaritvam) in the substance-view (dravyavada) of any description. The Jaina has no objection to join the Buddhist in this polemical attack but he does so on two conditions: one, that the substance-view attacked by the Buddhist is of the extreme or

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CHAPTER II 53 non-momentary and non-efficient is unreal!. This attitude puts the Buddhist in opposition to the Naiyayika and others who subscribe to the notion of a permanent substance. If the substance is permanent, the Buddhist would argue, there are only two ways of its being efficient in the production of its effects : the one simultaneous, the other successive. Both lead to absurdity: in the first case, the substance ought to produce all the effects it is capable of in the very first moment of its existence. Nothing should stand in the way of the spontaneous production of its effects. But if it produces all its effects, as it should, at once, then its potency is exhausted and its continued existence in the subsequent moments will be empty and meaningless. If, however, it continues to exist even though it is not potent or productive, then another difficulty sets in, viz., the incompatibility between productivity (samarthya) in the first moment and non-productivity (asamarthya) in succeeding moments. This militates against the fundamental law of all existence, viz., nothing which has opposed characteristics can be one entity (viruddhadharmadhyasavan nasavekah). exclusive type (ekantadravyavada) and, two, that it is also of the static type (kutasthanityavada). These conditions will again be mentioned (see infra, ch. V) in the course of the section on arthakriyakaritvavada (see infra, ch. V). A criticism against the Buddhist view of this vada, in the light of the Jainas' own of the subject, will also be discussed in that section. As a matter of fact, momentariness, efficiency, causality and reality are treated as synonyms and, conversely, what is non-momentary or non-efficient, non-causal, is unreal (nissvabhavatvat) or non-existent (abhavarupa eva): akaranam asad eval PK'on TSS, ka. 384; see also Bud. Log., Vol. I, p. 124 ff. 2. See supra, p. 23 and f.n. 3 thereon.

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54 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Again, the Buddhist feels that his opponent fares no better in the other case also, viz., that the permanent substance can produce its effects successively. The Buddhists here ask why the permanent should not produce all its effects at once, instead of in succession. For if it is in the nature of the substance to produce a certain number of effects, then it is absurd, he would argue, to maintain that it cannot produce B while it has been producing A inasmuch as both are, as it were, in its womb. The Buddhist would drive this matter to an issue and plead that if the substance cannot produce B together with all the effects inherent in it, then it can never produce any effect at all and remains barren forever like a piece of stone. If, on the other hand, his opponent approves of the contention, then he is reduced to the plight of accepting the simultaneous productivity of the whole range of effects by the substance. Both these alternatives are therefore uncongenial to the substantialist thesis. Furthermore, the Buddhist tries to silence the opponent who might plead that the substance does not produce all its effects at once owing to the absence of its auxiliaries' (sahakari) and that it will bring out the effects gradually as the auxiliaries come to its aid. The Buddhist comes down upon his opponent here and asks the opponent whether or not the auxiliaries make a difference to the substance. If they make any difference then the efficiency of the permanent in produc 1. In the estimation of the Buddhist the opponents' (the target is the Nyaya-Vaisesika reality) notion of causality involves not merely the manifest absurdities, which are being so trenchantly criticised, but also the additional absurdity of being conceived on 'the anthropomorphic pattern of Bud. Log., Vol. I, p. 128 f.

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CHAPTER II ing the cause is compromised and becomes dependent upon other things in order to be efficient. If, on the contrary, they do not make any difference to its nature, then it is futile to plead for inoperative and ineffective (akincitkara) elements in a thing. Applying this logic to the instance of the seed and the plant, the Buddhist argues that the plant is not the result of the productivity of an identical seed helped by the auxiliaries of rain, etc., but is an entirely different thing. In other words, the seed in itself is different from the seed in combination with its auxiliaries and, therefore, difference is ultimate. Failure to comply with this conclusion would lead the Buddhist to say that the seed as modified by auxiliaries is opposed to its initial unmodified condition. Such opposition does violence to the law that no two opposed things are one entity. The Buddhist, therefore, would conclude that causal efficiency is the essence of the simple and unique moments each of which is totally different from the others' (trailokya-vyavarta). 55 Thus we see that in Buddhism permanence (or continuity or being) is treated as a mere subjective imposition (vikalpa) 1. The exceptions, of course, are the Vatsiputriyas (also called the Abhidharmikas or Vaibhasikas), whose partial divergence from the extreme antagonism to the substantialist view has already been touched upon (see supra, p. 19, f.n. 1) and the Madhyamikas who treat any positive view-whether it be the substantialist view or, for that matter, the erroneous doctrine of momentariness, under their negative and destructive method of prasanga (a form of reductio ad absurdum by means of which the inherent weaknesses of the opponent's doctrine is claimed to be exposed; here one is reminded of a similar method used by Zeno and Sriharsa).

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56 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE on the absolutely different discrete, simple, momentary and unique events which constitute the process of reality. The Buddhist has persistently rebelled against any trace of substantialist' influence. This extreme attitude of denial regarding substantiality and the soul is a consistent development of the initial triple postulate of anicca, anatta and duhkha. This denial is but the negative aspect of the positive creed of relentless 'becoming' resembling a vast show in which the atomic entities or snapshots ceaselessly race to tell a story which does not proceed from within themselves but is fabricated by the onlooker. Each real is a monad from which there is no way out and into which there is no entrance. Such a position cannot help becoming solipsistic'. 1. In his comments on the following statement of Dharmakirti Santaraksita suggestively touches upon the essential pointsboth critical and constructive-bearing on the whole argument of arthakriyakaritva as stated here: yadi na sarvam krtakam va/ pratiksanavinasi syat aksanikasya/ kramayaugapadyabhyam arthakriya ayogat/ arthakriyasamarthyalaksanamato nivrttam/ asadeva syat/ etc. VND, pp. 7-8, and the Vipancitartha thereon. See also HBT, pp. 118 ff., PVD, II. 3-4 (and the MV thereon), and SBNT, p. 74. 2. Dharmakirti seems to have been aware of this 'danger' and therefore to have attempted to escape from it by trying to make out a case for his position in his special "Tract on the Repudiation of Solipsism" (or "Establishment of the Existence of Other Minds"). The case-judging from Stcherbatsky's 'short summary' of the tract which is available in Tibetan-does not seem to be strong enough to rid the Buddhist position from the solipsistic consequences because Dharmakirti's argument seems to rest on the supposed weakness of his opponent's argument rather than on the inherent strength of his own. See Bud. Log. Vol. I, pp. 521-24.

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CHAPTER II 57 The wealth of human adventure and evolution becomes one vast fiction built on--but does not actually rest on--the mere fleeting moments. The ethical and spiritual motive underlying this repudiation of substance or soul is clear. It is to do away with a continuant' having a prior and posterior existence and offering an enduring basis for the mutations of life and matter. This is considered to be the basis of avarice and egoism which breed the ills of life. To relieve the world from suffering meant, on this theory, to rid the evil-stricken beings from their pre-occupation with that which endures and lures them away from the path of prajna. But in achieving this Buddhism has overshot the mark. Or rather, the logical result of this view is that in the attempt to be cured of ailments man tends to be cured of life itself. Furthermore, speaking ethically, man has no basis for selflessness once he has lost the self. This prescription is as radical and extreme as its Vedantic opposite which over-reaches its aim by offering a universal but static self or the absolute, and denying the ultimate validity to the values of this mighty frame' of the mutating world which must form an integral part of reality. Reality flies on both wings--the right wing of the Vedanta with its allegiance to the Upanisadic being, and the left wing of the nairatmya metaphysics (becoming) descending from the deep intuition of Buddha. 1. Cf. "Having seen by wisdom all the passions and evils arising from the view of Atman (satkayadrsti), and having also known that the object of it is Atman, a Yogin denies its existence." This is V. S. Bhattacharya's E. T. of a verse by Candrakirti in Madhyamakavatara, VI. 123. See The Basic Conception of Buddhism, p. 72 and f.n. 23 thereon.

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58 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE An adequate metaphysics does not annul but conserves and transfigures the obstinate elements of permanence and change. No doubt both the great systems display a rigorous internal consistency, but they lack comprehensiveness. Unless the claims of the two brothers are evenly accommodated philosophy becomes a haunted house constantly assailed by the ghost of the maltreated brother. An inclusive view of reality is a sure corrective to the one-sidedness. It should, therefore, be based on a concrete conception in which the co-ordinate ideas of being and becoming, identity and difference, universal and particular are harmoniously comprehended. The failure of each of the two great systems so far considered is at once grand and fruitful-grand because of the depth of insight each has revealed in bringing out a massive system of thought into which some of the sublime elements of human thinking are wrought and fruitful because each has exhausted all the weapons it could possibly bring into its fight against the other and thereby shown how the inadequate postulates with which it started inevitably lead to a partial reading of the secrets of complex reality. Great as it is, this failure points to the need for a sturdy synthesis of the elements 'permanence' and 'change', 'identity' and 'difference', and 'universal' and 'particular' at all levels -ontological, epistemological and logical. A brief account of each of the schools which have attempted such a synthesis is offered in the following chapters.

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CHAPTER III The Schools of Philosophy in which Identity Subordinates Difference : A. The Sankhya System B. The Bhedabheda Systems of : (i) Bhartsprapanca (ii) Bhaskara and Yadavaprakasa (iii) Nimbarka (iv) Ramanuja C. Hegelianism

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A. CHAPTER III The Sankhya System Having viewed, in the course of the two previous chapters, Advaitism and Buddhism, and found that the one upholds 'identity' and the other 'difference', we may endeavour, in the course of the present chapter, to examine a few systems of philosophy in which difference (bheda) is subordinated to identity (abheda). The systems which figure here, in the order of their treatment are: (A) The Sankhya; (B) the Bhedabheda schools of (i) Bhartrprapanca, (ii) Bhaskara and Yadavaprakasa, (iii) Nimbarka, and (iv) Ramanuja; (C) Hegelianism, an important school of Western philosophy, is added to the above notable systems of Indian philosophy for the reason of its striking resemblance to, as well as divergence from, the Jaina view, in respect of some important dialectical features. directly Without going into highly controversial and not relevant questions like how early' (before 1. According to R. Garbe the Sankhya and the Yoga are "the two oldest systems (of philosophy) which India has produced" (see his Intro. to the Bhagavadgita, E. T., Ind. Ant., 1918, p. 14). Incidentally, in his 'estimation', the Sankhya is also "the most significant system of philosophy that India has produced". (See his Preface to Vijnanabhiksu's Sankhyapravacanabhasya, p. XIV.) H. Jacobi points out Kautilya's references in the Artha

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62 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE sastra (about 300 B. C., according to him) to this system (see The Early History of Indian Philosophy, E. T., Ind. Ant., 1918, p. 102 ff.). In his Early Sankhya E. H. Johnston has made an attempt 'to trace the evolution (or 'the historical development') of the (Sankhya) doctrine up to its culmination in the Sankhyakarikas" by the method of sorting out, and assessing, 'four classes' of evidence. An earlier part of the same attempt is embodied in his paper on "The Numerical Riddle in the Svetasvatara Upanisad', JRAS, 1930, pp. 855-878. Previously, S. N. Das Gupta also has endeavoured to trace the early developments of the Sankhya, particularly as they are found in the Carakasamhita of Caraka (see HIP, Vol. I, p. 213 ff.). Johnston credits Das Gupta with being 'the first to bring to notice the historical importance' of Caraka's account. B. N. Seal's Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, and P. C. Ray's Hindu Chemistry, offer highly suggestive remarks on the naturalistic side of the Sankhya philosophy. With regard to the relation between the Sankhya and the Upanisads opinions vary: some hold that the Sankhya sytem is 'almost as old as the Upanisads' and 'independent in origin'. (Badarayana's rejection of the idea that the Sankhya represents Upanisadic teaching is significant in this connection; see OIP, p. 267 f.). Others maintain that it is 'based on the Upanisads', that the leading conceptions of its philosophy are already found in the 'varied teachings' of the Upanisads, or, to express the same somewhat specifically, that 'the realistic tendencies of Upanisads receive emphasis in the Sankhya 'conception of the universe', and that certain important divergences in the system from the Upanisads are the result of a natural process of criticism and development of one side of the Upanisadic teaching'. But the generality of writers (except those who suggest 'borrowings' by the Upanisads, of 'the doctrines already extant in the Sankhya system'-a suggestion which is repudiated as 'methodologically unsound' in Keith's The Sankhya System, p. 7) find an impact of the Upanisads, at any rate the earlier ones, on the Sankhya, although some attribute to this impact certain positive doctrines in the Sankhya, and others a keen 'opposition' or 'reaction' which led to the development of the doctrines in it. Keith, however, admits both results of the impact (ibid.). See, in this connection, OIP, p. 267; TP, Vol. I, p. 259 ff., Vol. II, p. 249 ff.; the article on 'The Sankhya', ERE, especially p. 190; and Keith's work, already cited.

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CHAPTER III Isvaraklsna', the great exponent of the classical form of this school) did the Sankhya originate, and whether and to what extent, it is an original system, we may safely affirm that this school represents one of the earliest attempts, among the orthodox systems, to effect a synthesis' between identity' or With regard to the question of the relation between the Sankhya system and Buddhism, Stcherbatsky, in his excellent and lengthy review of Vidushekhara Bhattacharya's The Basic Conception of Buddhism, observes that "the Sankhya system preceded Buddhism in time and constitutes its (the latter's) philosophical basis". He cites names of scholars such as H. Jacobi, Pischel, H. Oldenberg and even R. Garbe, in support of his thesis. E. J. Thomas, like Senart, however, finds that "the most certain parallelisms (between the two schools) are crossed by evident discordances" (see his History of Buddhist Thought, pp. 80 and 91, as well as f.n. 2 thereon). Stcherbatsky's comparison between the 'dharmas' of the Buddhists and the 'gunas' of the Sankhyas, and between the pratityasamutpada' of the former and the parinamavada' of the latter, are, like several other ideas touched upon in course of the review, of highly suggestive significance. The review, referred to in this paragraph, is entitled 'The Dharmas of the Buddhists and the Gunas of the Sankhyas' in the Indian Historical Quarterly, 1934, pp. 737-760 (see especially p. 753 f.). For a few observations bearing on the relation between the Sankhya and the Jaina systems, on matters such as purusa and jiva, and praksti and ajiva, respectively, see PrSKU, Intro., p. LXII ff. 1. It is generally acknowledged that isvarakrsna's Sankhyakarika is the earliest work available on the Sankhya system. Max Muller, however, thinks that the Tattvasamasa is the earliest. (See his The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, London, 1928, p. 224 ff.) 2. In this connection it is observed : "Thus it remains a moot ques tion to this day whether the Sankhya represents an original doctrine or is only derived from some other".OIP, p. 13. See also supra, p. 61, f. n. 1. For Hiriyanna's confusion of the Sankhya notion of identityin-difference with that of the Jaina, as well as for a critical comment thereon, see infra, p. 68, f.n. 1. 3.

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64 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE permanence and difference' or change. Of the two primordia realms the Sankhya recognises as together constituting the entire reality, the first is the realm of a plurality of statically permanent (kutasthanitya') selves (purusas") and the second of dynamically constant (parinamanitya) nature (praksti). Purusas being pure (svacchah) and static entities, or undifferenced identities, the problem of synthesising identity and difference is confined, exclusively, to the realm of prakyti. Praketi is conceived to be a permanent framework within which is set the cosmic play of change. Change consists in the evolution of different configurations or patterns resulting from the different combinations of the three gunas, viz., sattva, rajas, and tamas, the ultimate or irreducible constituent elements of praksti. The configurations thus evolved, or the evolutes, eventually dissolve themselves in their matrix, prakrti, this dissolution or involution being the other aspect of change. An eternal cycle of these alternating evolutions and involutions is conceived to be the inherent nature of prakrti. 1. Cf. na prakstir na vikstih purusah / Sankhyakarika, ka.3. 2. S.S. S. Sastry has noticed that the early Tamil work, Manime khalalai, refers to one purusa only in the Sankhya system. See his Sankhyakarika, Madras, 1948, Intro., p. 18, f.n. 4. Logically plurality of purusas (purusabahutvam) necessitates postulating plurality of prakttis since praksti is said to be meant for the enjoyment (bhoga) and salvation (apavarga) of a purusa. If the same praksti is imagined to play infinite roles to infinite purusas then it is hard to explain how the intrinsically non-intelligent (aviveki) can accommodate itself to the infinitely different needs of the individually peculiar purusas. The Sankhya does not seem to have any satisfactory explanations for these difficulties.

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CHAPTER II 65 Although change, in this system, is genuinely real', it is not radical or total as it is conceived to be under the arambhavada (the doctrine of new creation) of the NyayaVaisesika philosophy. According to the arambhavada an effect, the result of change, is considered to be a totally novel creation completely different from the cause although it inheres in the cause as a quality does in a substance. The effect jar (ghata), for instance, is described under arambhavada as the counterpart of its antecedent non-existence (pragabhavapratiyogi). That is, when the jar comes into being its prior non-existence ceases to be, the prior non-existence and the posterior existence being totally different from each other. This view, also called asatkaryavada, is in sharp contrast to the Sankhya view of satkaryavada' (the theory of identity of the cause and its effect) according to which the cause abides in the effect as, for instance, the yarns abide in the fabric, the difference between the two being that the latter manifests a particular arrangement (samsthanabheda) of the former'. 1. Cf. karyam prakstisvarupam virupam ca / Sankhyakarika, ka. 8. 2. Cf. infra, Ch. VII. 3. For a discussion of the two contrasting doctrines of satkarya vada and asatkaryavada (or arambhavada), see Vacaspati Misra's Tattva-Kaumudi, comm. on ka. 9 (in G. Jha's edn., pp. 20-24) 4. Cf. prasarya iha yathangani kurmah samharate punah / The Mahabharata, XII, ch. 253. This illustration of the tortoise (kurma) is beautifully elucidated by Madhavacarya. See SDSC, pp. 225-226. 5. evam abhede siddhe, tantara eva tena tena samsthanabhedena parinatah pato, na tantubhyo'rthantaram patah 1. See TattvaKaumudi (Jha's edn.), p. 22. John Davies has noticed the following interesting statement in Sir William Hamilton's works: "What is the law of causality? Simply this....that all that we at present come to know as an .

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66 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Thus lack of identity between the two terms (the cause and the effect) necessarily indicates the lack of any causal relation as, for instance, in the case of a horse and a cow. Accordingly, what is meant by the production and the destruction of an effect is simply the revelation (avirbhava) and the concealment (tirobhava), respectively, of a particular form of prakrti depending, as already noticed, on the preponderance or the diminution in the relative proportions of its three ultimate constituents. One of the two important conclusions emerging from the treatment of parinamavada, as applied to prakrti, in the Sankhya metaphysics, is that change or difference is a genuinely real feature of reality. But this conclusion is overshadowed by the other, and more important, conclusion arising from the supreme importance attached to satkaryavada in the sphere of prakrti. The truth of this doctrine, viz., identity of the cause and the effect, leads the Sankhya to elevate the importance of identity to such level that change or difference, however genuine it may be considered to be, becomes dwarfed in importance.' Treating the effect as an effect must have previously existed in its causes". Hindu Philosophy, 2nd edn., London, 1894, p. 33, f.n. 1. 1. Therefore, Hiriyanna's comparison of the Jaina notion of identity-in-difference with that of the Sankhya, as indicated in the following statement of his, though true in a broad sense, is to be understood as subject to this important qualification. Contrasting the Sankhya notion of causality with that of the NyayaVaisesika he observes: "The material cause and the effect are not taken here to be quite distinct, as in the Nyaya-Vaisesika.., they form, on the other hand, an identity in difference, as in Jainism." EIP, p. 109. (Italics mine.)

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CHAPTER III 67 entirely novel creation is of course an extreme view. But treating the cause as primary and the effect secondary amounts to disregarding the co-ordinate importance of change or difference. As a matter of fact a firm instance on the logic of satkaryavada may even lead to a wholesale repudiation of difference. This is proved in the case of Advaitism'. As the philosophy of a realist the Sankhya tries to reconcile the doctrine of satkaryavada with that of parinamavada. Partiality for the former, however, so much dilutes the truth of the latter that difference' is subordinated to 'identity'. When the undivided supremacy of identity in the realm of purusas is considered in conjunction with the primacy of identity over difference in the realm of praksti, the Sankhya's adherence to permanence as a more primordial principle of reality becomes an undoubted proposition. bhAta B. (i) The Bhedabheda Philosophy of Bhartsprapanca Bhartaprapanca' is an early thinker who lived long anterior to Sankara and Suresvara. He maintains a form of 1. As a result of treating difference as appearance, and not reality, Advaitism has been more appropriately described as satkaranavada. This doctrine differs from satkaryavada in the greater degree of emphasis it lays on the cause. The distinction between the two doctrines is, therefore, one of degree rather than of kind. None of the works of the early thinker has come down to us. Reference to, and discussions of, the various aspects of his views are, however, found in some Vedantic works which often quote expressions from his writings. A number of "Fragments of

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68 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE bhedabhedavada', or dvaitadvaitavada', a doctrine of 'identityin-difference's, or of unity-in-diversity'. According to this doctrine brahman, the ultimate reality, evolves itself into the manifold world of objects and the selves (jivas) and the relation between brahman on the one hand and the world and the selves on the other is one of identity and difference. Owing to the evolutionary character of brahman this doctrine may also be called a type of brahmaparinamavada". As brahman, in the metaphysics of Bhartsprapanca, is "not robbed of its manifestations" or the evolutes, viz., the world and the selves, but possesses them, its nature is said to be saprapanca, Some of the examples by which the dual nature of identity in difference', in brahman on the one hand and in the jivas and the world on the other, is illustrated are the Bhartsprapanca" have been brought together, by Hiriyanna, in a paper bearing this title (see Proceedings and Transactions of the Third Oriental Conference, Madras, 1924, pp. 439-450). In the article 'Bhartrprapanca: An Old Vedantin' contributed to The Indian Antiquary, 1924, pp. 77-86, the same writer has attempted, "a tentative reconstruction of Bhartsprapanca's doctrine in its broad outline". There have been practically no further attempts, before or since the publication of the two contributions, just mentioned. The two contributions named will be referred to as FrBH and BOV, respectively. The sources from which the fragments' are taken, and on which the 'recon struction' is based, are mentioned in the course of the body and the footnotes of the two works. See, for instance, BOV, p. 78 and FrBH, p. 439. BOV. p. 82, and K. C. Bhattacharya's Studies in Vedantism, Cal cutta, 1909, p. 25. 3. FrBH, p. 439 and BOV, p. 78, etc. 4. BOV, p. 82. . FrBH, p. 439. 6. Cf. BOV, p. 7, f.n. 2. mai mico

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CHAPTER III snake and its coils, hood, etc.', the 'sun and its rays', and 'unagitated and the agitated ocean". Bhartrprapanca does not see anything incompatible' in the idea of the homogeneous (para) brahman envolving itself into a heterogeneous (apara) universe of selves and objects. On the contrary he sees in the latter the fulfilment of the evolving urge in the former. His view, that there is no incompatibility or 'discrepancy' between bheda or diversity and abheda or unity in the integrated principle of bhedabheda, which is described as "the ultimate Truth", is further accentuated by his theory of knowledge designated as pramanasamuccayavada. According to this vada perception explicitly gives diversity although unity also is implicit in perceptual truth. Similarly the scripture explicitly reveals unity, although diversity is also implicit in the scriptural 'truth'. Neither truth-perceptual (or empirical) or scriptural (or revealed)-is more true than the other; both are "equally valid". There is, therefore, no "conflict" between them. This view is in sharp contrast with the Sankara view that empirical knowledge is 'on a lower footing' than revealed knowledge, and, that, in the ultimate analysis, revealed knowledge (of unity) or paravidya 5. 69 1. BOV, pp. 78-79, and IP, Vol. II, pp. 789-790. 2. Cf. BOV, p. 82. 3. FrBH, p. 440. 4. Cf. BOV, p. 82. Of this theoretical side jnanakarmasamuccyavada is the practical counterpart, or 'corollary'. See FrBH, p. 440. Cf. svanubhavaddvaitasya advaitasya srutivasat (pramanyam)/ BOV, p. 82, f.n. 44. Elsewhere we meet with a statement that 'dvaitam' (also) is 'paramarthasatyam'; evam sarvam idam dvaitam paramarthasatyam. See IP, Vol. II, pp. 789-790. 6. BOV, p. 82.

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70 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE is alone the absolute or sole truth (not the empirical knowledge, or apara vidya, which is ultimately false). Thus while the former view affirms that the two kinds of knowledge are valid "in exactly the same sense", the latter one assigns them to two different spheres', between one being ultimately true and the other false. This difference between the two views is indeed of a basic and far-reaching philosophical significance. It is, therefore, no wonder that it evokes from Sankara a sharp criticism against the dvaitadvaita thesis of Bhartrprapanca. The criticism is that "although rules of action may admit of exceptions or alternatives, a truth does not; truth does not depend on any one's choice. Two contradictory attributes, dvaita and advaita, dual and single, cannot both be true of the same thing. Yet the sea and its waves are said to be identical-indifference. In fact the union of contradictories is not denied of phenomenal objects, it is denied only of the noumenon, the 'simple' eternal object (nitya-niravayavavastu-visayam hi viruddhatvam avocama dvaitadvaitasya na karya-visaye savayave)."* The above criticism by Sankara has, if anything, some abstract logical force derived from the unitary basis of his philosophy, but not any concrete ontological conformity. The relationless unitary ultimate has no appeal either to Bhartrprapanca or, as will be evident from the following sections, 1. 2. 3. Ibid. Cf. BOV, p. 78. K. C. Bhattacharya, op. cit., p. 25.

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CHAPTER IIT 71 to any other bhedabhedavadins, within the metaphysical range of brahmaparinamavada. This is but a brief account of the principal features of the bhedabheda view of Bhartsprapanca, based, mainly, on Hiriyanna's "tentative reconstruction of Bhartsprapanca's doctrine in its broad outline". Even in course of this brief attempt one cannot help noticing the fact that Bhartsprapanca displays, behind his valiant effort to accord equal validity to the principle of difference (bheda), an indisputable predilection for unity (abheda, identity), in the form of upholding brahman as the evolving basis of the world and the jivas. This position necessarily involves the logical fact that brahman, like the prakrti of the Sankhya', is the matrix, and, therefore, the primary real from which everything else is derived. Merely designating the derived universe of matter and life as of equal reality to that of brahman is not warranted by the logic of brahmaparinamavada. Therefore, in the battle for difference' Bhartsprapanca obtains a partial victory. The Bhedabheda Metaphysics of Bhaskara and Yadavaprakasa Bhaskara and Yadava are two of the most notable postSankara thinkers according to whom reality is an evolution from brahman (brahmaparinama) exhibiting, simultaneously, 1. For a comparison between the doctrines of the Sankhya and Bhartsprapanca, see BOV, pp. 85-86.

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72 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE the dual character of difference and non-difference or identity (bhedabheda or bhinnabhinna). The evolution is a real transformation of the unitary brahman into the manifold world and the finite selves. This position, like that of Bhartsprapanca, is in sharp contrast with the vivartavada according to which the world is a 'cosmic fiction'or a phenomenal appearance (maya) occurring owing to ignorance (avidya)' which is sublated when true knowledge (jnana) ? reveals itself. A further important divergence on the part of this position from that of the latter doctrine concerns causal relation: While the two thinkers under study treat the world as a finite, but real, manifestation, or effect, of the infinite ultimate (brahman)" the vivartavadin repudiates the intrinsic reality of any causal relation between the world and the ultimate principle. This is so because, in the bhedabheda view of the former, the effects, say, the jar, the pot and the platter etc., are 1. For the distinction, in meaning, between maya as 'the principle of cosmic illusion' (or cosmic fiction') and avidya (ignorance) as the 'incidence', of maya, on the individual, see OIP, p. 348, f.n. 1 and p. 365 f. 2. Evidently this doctrine strikes Bhaskara as propounding the view that the world (which is infected with bheda) is epistemic' in its being (pratitikasatta), or that it exists for the individual (purusapeksaya) in ignorance. Bhaskara sharply attacks this view and (cf. narashedan na hi jneya vastunah sada satyata/ na hi rupam anandhanam satyam andhesvasad bhavet/ Brahmasutra with the Comm. of Bhaskaracarya, ed. Vir ovari Prasada Dvivedin, Benares, 1903, p. 18) and affirms that our experience of bheda is not phenomenal but real (tasman na bhedadarsanam avidya/ Ibid., p. 19). 3. See the somewhat lengthy but highly lucid comm. on II, 1.14. Bhaskaracarya, op. cit., p. 9288. 4. See below f.n.

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CHAPTER III the genuine states' (avasthas) of clay, whereas, in the abheda view of the latter, the clay alone-by which is meant the ultimate principle---is real: mittikety eva satyam", the states, or the effects, of clay being phenomenal or intrinsically unreal. A further consequence arising from this difference between the two views is that the bhedabhedavadins consider the world as not merely real, as just pointed out, but also describable (nirvacaniya), since words, it is pointed out, are eminently expressive of the truth; atha namadheyam satyasya satyam'. The abhedavadin, on the contrary, considers the world, which is maya, as indescribable (anirvacaniya) or 1. Cf. tasmat bhedadarsanato'vidya na mithya paramatmano'vastha, visesah prapanco'yam etc. Bhaskaracarya, op. cit., p. 96. 2. Sankara stresses 'eva' in this sutra (of the Chandogya Upanisad, VI. 1.4) in order to accentuate his view that the cause is really and truly nothing butclay', and that the effect is 'a name merely' (namadheyam), having its origin in 'mere speech' (vacarambhanam), and is, therefore, 'untrue' (asatyam). See SBE, Vol. XXXIV, Pt.1, p.320. Bhaskara puts this case as follows: atra kecin mayavadam avatarayanti mTttikety eva satyam ity avadharanat karanam eva satyam karyam anstam asatyam anadikalapravsttavidyavasat ayam bhedah pratibhasate na paramarthato'sti etc. Bhaskaracarya, op. cit., p. 93. This vivarta view, that cause alone is real (karanam eva satyam), is incongruous because one cannot speak of a cause without its correlative effect, sharing the reality of the cause. The vivartavadin is indeed aware of the fact that the illusory world needs a basis (aspada or adhisthana) for its appearance, and maintains, consequently, that brahman or sat provides the sole basis. He also concedes that brahman cannot be called 'the cause 'in strictness. It is, according to him, called so by courtesy so to speak (upalaksana). This way of playing fast and loose with the principle of causality which is admittedly unreal, intrinsically, offends the logical conscience of Bhaskara as of many others. Cf. ibid., p. 92 ff. 3. Bhaskaracarya, op. cit., p. 93. See also P. N. Srinivasachari's The Philosophy of Bhedabheda, 2nd edn., Madras, 1950, p. 59 ff.

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74 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE indefinable. This is the reason why the former group of thinkers feels that the tests like neti neti (not thus, not so), or neha nanasti kincana (there is no plurality of existence), etc., deny plurality and finitude (bheda) in the absolute or brahman, but not, as the group interprets, plurality and finitude as such'. Both Bhaskara and Yadava sternly maintain that identity and difference co-exist in all that is". Every object of experience is, they say, a blend of the generic basis and the specific transformations of the generic basis. Brahman, the ultimate basis of the manifold universe of objects and selves, is conceived as retaining its infinity, purity and perfection even while it finitizes itself into the universe of objects and selves". It is, therefore, the infinite cause, or the unitary ground, of the finite diversities both of which form, in this view, not mutually incompatible', but correlative elements of the total reality. Despite their agreement on the basic position of the bhedabheda or bhinnabhinna approach to the nature of reality Bhaskara and Yadava differ on a few points, two of which deserve mention here. In the first place, brahman, according to Bhaskara, is the unconditioned absolute which, by virtue of upadhis, or "limiting adjuncts', conditions itself into the 1. Cf. karyarupena nanatvam abhedah karanatmana / hematmana yathabhedah kundaladyatmana bhida // Ibid., p. 18. Cf. tasinat sarvam ekanekatmakam na atyantam abhinnam bhinnan va / Ibid., p. 101. 3. Cf. Srinivasachari, op. cit., p. 144, and IP., Vol. II, p. 670. 4. Cf. IP., Vol. II, p. 671.

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CHAPTER III 75 diverse world of objects and selves. Upadhis or limitations are conceived by him to be real? (satyopadhis), not fictitious (mithyopadhis). The conditioned state of the unconditioned is compared to an enclosed or limited space in a jar, and the enclosed space is, nevertheless, thought to be continuous with the universal space. This principle of upadhis, which is considered as the necessary condition of the evolution of the world from the unconditioned, or the unlimited, absolute, is brought in by Bhaskara to bridge the gulf between the infinite and unitary absolute and the finite and multitudinous world. Yadava, on the contrary, does not feel the need of postulating anything like upadhis to intervene between the evolving brahman and the evolved world. He is content with investing brahman with an inherent power, or sakti, by virtue of which brahman can finitize itself into the world of diversities just as an ocean can spontaneously break itself into waves, ripples, and foam. Secondly, Bhaskara and his followers maintain that Brahman has two parts, a spirit part (cidamsa) and a material part (acidasa)', the latter being a medium through which brahman transforms itself into the finite world'. Yadava, on the contrary, gives his ontology a certain spiritualistic orientation by denying qualitative differences between God (Isvara or brahman) and consciousness (cit) on the one hand, and between consciousness and matter (acit) 1. Cf. Srinivasachari, op. cit., pp. 51, 69-72 and 144. For Rama nuja's objections against the notion of upadhis, see pp. 214-215. 2. Ibid., p. 144. 3. Cf. ibid., p. 6.

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76 on the other'. "Acit", observes Srinivasachari, describing Yadava's philosophy, "is the object which can develop into the subject and consciousness sleeps in the matter and wakes up in the sentient being"." Yet, strangely enough Bhaskara emphasises the abheda texts and, consequently, emphasises the ultimacy of identity (ananyatva), in spite of his professed dualism of brahman and upadhis, while Yadava emphasises the eternality of difference, as well as of unity, despite his belief in a kind of pan-spiritualism". JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Whatever may be the differences existing between Bhaskara and Yadava with respect to certain specific issues, two of which have been just noticed, these two thinkers primarily aim at setting forth a metaphysical scheme in which reality is "neither a bare unity nor a mere plurality-but a vital synthesis of both". But while they have succeeded in considerably weakening the vigour of the Advaitic claims for a pure being, or a 'bare unity', which is bereft of all determinations or diversities, they have not succeeded in escaping the consequences of incongruously endeavouring to rear an imposing structure of diversity (the world and the selves, bheda) on the foundation of unity (brahman or abheda). They credit unity with 'being' the source and the destiny 1. Ibid. 2. Ibid., p. 145. Also cf. p. 6, f.n. 1, wherein a confirmatory observation, on this point, is cited from Tatparya-dipika of Sudarsanacarya. 3. 4. On the entire question of this difference between the views of the two thinkers, see ibid., p. 145, IP, Vol. II, pp. 671-672 and Brahmavadin, Vol. V, p. 470. Cf. Hiriyanna's Foreword to Srinivasachari's op. cit., p. VII.

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CHAPTER III 77 of diversity. This necessarily leads to the ultimate elevation of unity to the status of the primal principle and to the corresponding degradation of diversity to the level of a secondary or derivative element, in reality'. The ingenuous devices like the concepts of upadhi and avasthas have not, therefore, prevented the satkaryavada systems of Bhaskara and Yadava from assigning to bheda, the principle of difference', an intrinsically subordinate role to which it (bheda) is assigned in all forms of satkaryavada. B. (iii) Nimbarka's System of Svabhavika Bhedabheda Among the bhedabheda schools, derived from brahmaparinamavada', Nimbarka's svabhavika' bhedabhedavada goes farthest in recognising both identity and difference as Cf. Bhaskaracarya, op. cit., p. 141 where abheda is characterised as svabhavika or 'natural' and bheda as aupadhika or 'adventitious'. Distinguishing the viewpoints of sankara, Bhaskara and Yadava L. Srinivasachar rightly observes : .... srisankarasiddhante bhedabhedavisaye bhedah avidyakah abhedah pardmarthika iti / sribhaskarasiddhante bheda aupadhikah abhedah svabhavika iti / sriyadavasiddhante bhedah vyaktilaksanah abhedah saktilaksana iti etan matatraye bheda aupadhikah abhedo mukhya iti pratibhati / Darsanodaya, Mysore, 1933, p. 194. Cf. VPSN, Pt. III, p. 194, the last two paragraphs. 3. Cf. VPSN, Pt. I, pp. 292-297. See Nimbarka's Vedanta-parijata-saurabha (called a Comm. on Brahmasutras), ed. V. P. Dvivedin, Benares, 1910, III. 2. 27 and 28; and Anantarama Deva's Tattvasiddhanta-bindu, Benares 1913, slokas 12 and 24; and the same writer's Vedantaratnamala, Brindavan, 1916, sloka 45. These three works will be referred to hereafter as Saurabha, Bindu and Ratnamala respectively.

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78 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE 'equally real' (tulyabalatvat)'elements in reality. Referring to this point Ghate observes that "....if at all we insist on seeing in the sutras one of the five systems' under discussion, it can be at the most the 'bhedabheda' system of Nimbarka, according to which both bheda and abheda are equally real, without the idea of any subordination of one to the other'8. 1. Cf. Srutyantasuradruma, by Purushottama Prasada, Benares, 1908, pp. 67 and 69, and Ratnamala, slokas 47 and 48. Supporting the equal reality of bheda and abheda, Bindu (sloka 13) declares : abhedah kevalo bhrantih tatha bhedo'pi kevalah / srutism;tiviruddhatvat vivekinam asammatah// For the erroneous consequences issuing from the two views of atyantabhedavada and atyanta (kevala) bhedavada, see slokas 3, 4, 7 and 8. Nearly every work, under the present system, contains at least a short account of criticisms, in general, against the two views just mentioned, as well as criticisms, in particular, against the views of Sankara's mayavada, Bhaskara's aupadhika bhedabhedavada, Ramanuja's cidacidvisistaparamesvaravada. See, for instance, Devacarya's Siddhanta-jahnavi (a gloss on the Brahmasutras; together with Sundarabhatta's sub-comm. Siddhantasetuka, Benares, 1906, pp. 30-56), Purusottama's Vedantaratnamanjusa (concerned mainly with 'mayavadanirakarana'), and Srutyantasuradruma (Benares, 1908), pp. 11 ff., and 61 ff. etc.; and Madhava-Mukunda's Para-paksa-giri-vajra (a review of whose controversies with the non-Nimbarka, par ticularly advaita, views is given in HIP, Vol. III, pp. 416-439). 2. The five systems referred to here, are those of sankara, Rama. nuja, Nimbarka, Madhva and Vallabha. 3. V. S. Ghate's The Vedanta, Poona, 1926, p. 183 (Reference to the sutras follows this passage). See also Indian Antiquary, Vol. II, 1939, p. 324; and P.N. Srinivasachari's The Philosophy of Bheda eda, 2nd edn.. Madras, 1950. p. 155 (for a reference to S. Majumdar's view). That the claim that there is no 'subordination of one to the other' is, eventually, incompatible with any form of satkaryavada or brahmaparinamavada, under which Nimbarka's school figures, has already been, and will again be, touched upon at the end of this section. CON

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CHAPTER III 79 This system is designated as svabhavika or natural particularly in distinction from aupadhika' bhedabhedavada of Bhaskara in so far as difference (bheda), here, is conceived, not as an 'adventitious' (aupadhika) element, but as one which is as natural as identity. We may now consider the essential features of this system and then see how far the claim of the equal reality of both identity and difference is tenable. Three reals are admitted by Nimbarka in his philosophy : bhokt? (the enjoyer, or the jiva), bhogya (the enjoyable, or the world) and niyant? (the controller, or isvara, or brahman"). The relation between isvara (God) and the jivas on the one hand, and between isvara and the world on the other, is conceived to be one of non-difference-in-difference or unity-indiversity (dvaitadvaita"). The relation is, as just noticed, not adventitious' (aupadhika) as in the Bhaskariya system, nor is it unreal (asatya) as in the sankara system". It is both natural (svabhavika) and real (satya). 3. 1. See Vedantaratnamanjusa, pp. 6-7; VPSN, Pt. III, pp. 85-86 and 182 ff., especially, p. 197, para. 3 and Siddhanta-jahnavi (and Setuka thereon), p. 30 ff. bhokta bhogyam niyanteti trairupyam ca yatharthakam // Ratnamala, p. 25. See also Vedantaratnamanjusa (on sloka 7), p. 84. Cf. tasmat svabhaviko bhedah trayanam eva niscitan / atha abhedo'pi vijneyah svabhavikah tathocyate // Ratnamala, sloka 37. See also the verses following this, Siddhanta-jahnavi, p. 44, and Setuka, pp. 46-47. See Siddhanta-jahnavi (and Setuka thereon), pp. 30-33. Another important possible view is that of Ramanuja's visistadvaita or complex whole in which brahman represents the element of identity (advaita) or substance (prakarin), and the world (acit) and the individual selves (cit) represent the element of differ

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80 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE ence, or diversity (visesa), or attributes (prakaras). This view, like the other two, comes in for sharp criticism in Nimbarka's svabhavika dvaitadvaita philosophy. Deferring a somewhat lengthy treatment of visistadvaita metaphysics until the next section, we may mention here two important points of difference between the two schools in order to get a clearer view of their respective viewpoints: In the first place Ramanuja's conception of visistadvaita is, as will be noticed elsewhere, one in which identity subordinates difference in a more emphatic way than it does in Nimbarka's conception of svabhavika dvaitadvaita. It is more emphatic in the sense that, in the former case, less attempt is made to conceal the bias for identity than in the latter one. Being based on satkaryavada both schools lead, inevitably, to a view in which identity has a superior role. Nevertheless the latter has to surrender itself to the final conclusion much against its intended aim (see the end of the next para here), while the former, when logically pressed, will, perhaps, accept its final position. This difference is implicit in the spirit as well as in the procedure of either system. Before proceeding to the next point it is necessary to point out, here, a misconception, entertained by at least one modern critic, regarding whether identity or difference is more primary in the conception of visistadvaita. This critic feels that identity is secondary for him (Ramanuja) and not primary like difference (P. T. Raju in the New Indian Antiquary, Vol. II, 1939, p. 323). That this is his confirmed opinion is indicated by its reiteration on the next page of the same journal. This is definitely contrary to the spirit as well as the letter of Ramanuja's brahmaparinamavada in which brahman, ex hypothesi, holds undisputed supremacy over its 'attributes' of cit and acit. The whole trend of Ramanuja's theory, with its emphasis on Isvara as the only independent substance, and the source and sustenance of the modes, points to identity, not difference, as more primary (cf. IP, Vol. II, p. 755). Nimbarka, on the contrary, accords, in his metaphysics, an equal measure of reality, at any rate theoretically, to both identity and difference. The second point of difference between the two schools arises from the difference in the treatment accorded to cit and acit in the two schools. In visistadvaita school cit and acit are, as already noticed, attributes of brahman. Although, as attributes, they are, according to this school, at one with (abhinna) brahman, they do not, owing to their distinction from (bhinnatvat)

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CHAPTER III 81 Nimbarka impresses upon the truth of this non-differentin-the-different relation between brahman and the 'jiva-jagat' by means of the stock Vedantic examples like a serpent and its coils and the sun and its rays. The serpent (ahi) in its coiling state (kunqalavasthayam) is conceived to be different from the serpent as it is in its normal elongated posture (svabhavika lambayamanavasthayam); and yet the two serpents are also regarded as non-different (or identical) in so far as the coiled one is an effect of the (elongated or) normal one which is the cause. Being a satkaryavadin Nimbarka considers the effect as being pre-existent--or, more precisely, an undifferentiated" (avyakta) existent-in its brahman, corrupt brahman with even a trace of their defects (evam cetanacetanayor brahmavisesanatve'pi tadbhinnatvan na tadqunasankaryagandho'piti / Siddhanta-jahnavi, p. 42). This view does not commend itself to the exponents of svabhavika bhedabhedavada. They maintain that the function of an attribute (vise. sana) is to differentiate (vyavartakatvam) the particular object to which the attribute belongs from other object or objects to which it does not belong. Cit and acit, being attributes of brahman, should, they insist, differentiate brahman from other objects. But, they continue, there is no other object than brahman from which brahman could be distinguished. To say that the attributes, viz., cit and acit, distinguish brahman from themselves would therefore be, according to them, absurd owing to the fact that the attributes belong to brahman and, therefore, their task is not to distinguish the object, to which they belong, from themselves but from other objects which do not possess them. There being no such other objects the entire Visistadvaitic thesis, concerning cit and acit as attributes, is, they conclude, erroneous. For a lucid exposition of this argument see Siddhanta-jahnavi, p. 43 f., and Bindu, slokas 17-22. See Saurabha, III. 2. 27 and 28; VPSN, Pt. II (pp. 552-556); and HIP, Vol. III, p. 416, f.n. 1, and p. 434, f.n. 1 (for a lucid passage from Para-paksa-giri-vajra). See Ratnamala, sloka 103.

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82 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE cause, and, therefore, identical (ananya), at any rate to that extent, with the cause'. The example of the sun and its rays also is understood in the same way : the sun and its rays are, it is believed, two distinctive manifestations, and yet are, at once, identical as light. The truth conveyed by such analogies is that brahman or Isvara is identical with the world and the selves as their causal basis and, at the same time, is different from the latter in that the latter are genuinely different or visible manifestations of the former, which is the invisible or transcendental support of all that is. This view is believed to obviate the incongruous dichotomy between nirgunabrahman and sagunabrahman since it is believed to affirm the dual nature of brahman, viz., the co-presence of transcendence and immanence. Without going into a minute analysis of the various aspects of Nimbarka's philosophy we can, even from the brief sketch attempted here, deduce that Nimbarka's svabhavikabhedabheda view fares no better than the other bhedabheda views of the satkarya, or the brahmaparinama, type, with respect to the principle of difference. The realm of difference, which consists of the world and the selves, has its source of being in brahman and is, therefore, considered by Nimbarka as dependent (paratantra) in relation to the supremely independent (svatantra) brahman". It is, therefore, not logical to invest 1. Cf. tadananyatvam karanasadbhave karyopalabdheh / Saurabha, II. 1.15; see also this comm. on the preceding and the next sutras. 2. Cf. Srinivasachari, op. cit., p. 157. 3. Cf. upadanan nimittam ca brahmaiva jagatah param / karyam capi sadevedan jayate brahmanah satah / Ratnamala, sl. 102. 4. Ibid., slokas 48-65.

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CHAPTER III 83 it with a status which is co-ordinate with that of identity (or brahman). In order to be mutually co-ordinate elements both identity and difference must be equally primary which, though claimed to be so, is not the case in Nimbarka's philosophy. That Nimbarka favours asserting that both the elements are "equally real" is due to the awareness of the equal importance of the element of difference' also in reality. There is, however, no logical warrant for the status or the degree of reality associated with difference in his system. This is inevitable in the case of any bhedabheda system which, like the present one, is a form of satkaryavada or brahmaparinamavada. As a matter of fact the persistent claim, made by this system, for the equal reality between the two unequally real spheres-unequally real because the one (viz. of brahman) is supremely independent, or primordial, and the other (viz. of the world and the selves) solely dependent, or derived-makes the system open to the objection of not mere incongruity but of contradiction. This is somewhat surprising in a system which accuses the Jaina view of self-contradiction. B. (iv) Ramanuja's Visistadvaitism Ramanuja's philosophy of Visistadvaita' (the doctrine 1. See The Brahmavadin (Madras, 1900), Vol. V, p. 425 for the E. T. of a brief but lucid passage, from Ramanuja's Vedantadipa, giving a summary sketch of this doctrine. See also Vedantadipa (ed. Bhattanathaswamy, Benares, 1902), Avatarika, pp. 1-8, and the comments on sutra 2, p. 11 f., and Vedantasara (also by Ramanuja, ed. Bhagavatacharya, Brindavan, 1905) on the same 80., p. 2 ff.

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84 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE of unity with difference') is as opposed to nirvisesasattvavada" (the doctrine of differenceless identity) of Sankara, as it is to bhinnabhinnavada (the doctrine of identity in difference) of Bhaskara, Yadava, Nimbarka, and other bhedabhedavadins". It is based on the notion of visistaikyam or the complex whole, in contrast with that of svarupaikyam or absolute identity (of Sankara). A complex whole includes both unity and difference (or diversity) as integral elements 1. This doctrine is also variously described as qualified nondual ism, pan-organismal monism, qualified monism and so on. Cf., for instance, Rangacharya's Ramanuja and Vaissavism, Madras, 1909, p. 34; P. N. Srinivasachari's The Philosophy of Visistadvaita (to be referred to as Visistadvaita, hereafter), Madras, 1943, p. 614, IP, Vol. II, p. 661, and EIP, p. 178. The doctrine is called visistadvaitam because of its insistence "The non-duality of two different objects, visistayor advaitam" (IP, Vol. II, p. 686, f.n.1). Describing the meaning (artha) of the term V. Krishnamacharya writes: "tad evam visistadvaitam iti padasya eso'rthah paryavasannah visistasya asesa-cid-acidvisistasya brahmanah advaitam aikyam visistadvaitam iti / asesacid-acid-visistam brahmaikam eva tattvam iti 'ekam eva advitiyam' ityadisruter arthah / Vedantakavali (of Bucci Venkatacarya, ed. V. Krishnamacharya, Madras, 1950), upodghatah, p. X. For the interpretation and elucidation of Ramanuja's own statement of the meaning: visistantarbhava eva aikyam, see OIP, p. 399, and f. n.1, and EIP, p. 178. 2. For a polemical exposition of Sankara's nirvisesavada and Ramanuja's savisesavada, as well as for the refutation of the former and the demonstration of the latter-all based on Ramanuja's Srabhasya-see V. K. Ramanujachari's The Three Tattvas, Kumbhakonam, 1932, Sections III and IV; and the corresponding portions (under The Great Purvapaksa') in the Vedanta-Sutras, with Comm. of Ramanuja, Tr. G. Thibaut, Oxford, 1904, pp. 20 ff. See The Three Tattvas, Sections VIII and IX and The VedantaSutras, I. 1.1, pp. 189-197 and 459 f. Contrasting Visistadvaita with Buddhism (which recognises the concept of visesana, but not of visesya) on the one hand, and

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CHAPTER III 85 whereas an absolute or bare identity (sanmatrabrahmavadam) excludes difference as a delusive appearance'. In terms of modern philosophy while Ramanuja upholds both the 'that' and the 'what', Sankara adheres to the 'that' only. The "what'in Ramanuja's philosophy is described as the attribute, or the mode (prakara) which is related to the that'or the substance (prakarin). Acit, or the principle of material objects, and cit, or the principle of individual spirits constitute the modes of the substance which is God (isvara) in this philosophy. The three together, viz., acit, cit, and isvara, form the ultimate triad of Visistadvaitism. The individual or the finite selves and the world of matter etc., are also said to form the body (sarira) of isvara, who is their indwelling (antaryamin)", supporting (adhara) and with Advaitic monism (which recognises the concept of visesya but not of visesana) on the other, P.N. Srinivasachari writes : "The Buddhistic view of quality without substance is countered by the monistic view of substance without qualities and these extremes find their reconciliation in the Visistadvaitic theory of the world as the visesana of Brahman". Visistadvaita, p. 230 f, Cf. The Vedanta-Sutras, pp. 38-39 and the comments beginning with : brahma ca sanmatrarupam / astityeva kevalam vaktum sakyate na tu idysam tadssam iti etc., in Srimadbhagavadgita (with Ramanuja's bhasya and Venkatanatha's Gloss thereon, ed. V. G. Apte, Poona, 1923), p. 20. Tattvatrayam cidacidisvaras ca / Lokacarya's Tattvatrayam with Varavaramuni's Bhasya, ed. Swami Bhagavatacharya, Benares, 1899, p. 3. See also SDSC, p. 66. See the opening verse of Vedantasara. Sakalacarya observes : sarvavasthacidacidvastunah paramatmasariratvam! Sakalacaryamatasangraha, ed. Ratna Gopala Bhatta, Benares, 1907, p. 6. See Ramanuja's Vedarthasangrahah, with Sudarsanasuri's Tatparyadipika (ed. Sridharanidhara Sastry, Brindavan, Sam. 1978) p. 11 f., and Tattvatrayam and the Bhasya, p. 89. 2.

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86 controlling (niyantr) cause (karana)'. The body is, therefore, defined by Ramanuja as "Any substance which a sentient soul is capable of completely controlling and supporting for its own purposes, and which stands to the soul in an entirely subordinate relation". Thus Ramanuja maintains that the absolute is a supreme organism consisting of a cosmic soul and its dependent (sesa) bodily parts (the world and the selves) which serve its purpose. The bodily parts, or the modes, are conceived to be identical with (ananya)' God as they are at one with him in their substance. But they are also said to be different from (svabhavabhinnas ca) God, just as a body is different from its soul. 1. Isvara in this philosophy is not merely the upadana cause but also the nimitta and the sahakari cause. This follows of course from the Satkarya basis of this philosophy. Tattvatrayam and the Bhasya, pp. 102 ff., especially p. 109. The views of the Vaisesikas, the Sankhyas and also of others are criticised here. See also Srinivasa's Yatindramatadipika, ed. Ratna Gopal Bhatta, Benares, 1907, p. 37. The Vedanta-Sutras, p. 424. As a matter of fact Ramanuja believes that it is only isvara or the 'Supreme Soul' that can possess a body unconditionally: cf. "Everything in this world, whether individual souls or material things, form the body of the Supreme Soul, and therefore He alone can be said to possess a body unconditionally (nirupadhikah sarira atma)." V. A. Sukhtankar's "Teachings of Vedanta according to Ramanuja', Vienna Oriental Journal, Vol. XXII, pp. 128-129. See also f.n. 1 on p. 128 for an explanation of the word 'unconditionally'. For "The evolution of the concept of Sesa", see B. C. Law Volume Pt. II, pp. 123-127. cetanacetanam visvam ananyam brahmato bhavet / Srinivasacarya's Sri-bhasya-vartika, ed. Ratna Gopal Bhatta, Benares, 1907, p. 53, stanza 80; see also what follows. Cf. Sakalacarya's description of paramatma (God) as atyantavilaksana in relation to the modes on the authority of Srsti in his Sakalacarya-mata-sangraha, p. 5. Cf. also Ramanuja's own 2. 3. JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE 4. 5.

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CHAPTER III 87 Here a natural doubt arises as to why modes which are really different from God should not be claimed to be substances like God. Ramanuja's reply to this doubt is that what makes a mode is its complete dependence' on a substance, and that cit and acit-irrespective of their being different from or identical with, or both different from and identical with, God-can, therefore, be only modes but not substances. This dependent relation of a mode to its substance is compared to the relation of an adjective (visesana) to a substantive (visesya). Although an adjective has, it is believed, some distinctive existence of its own, it cannot be understood without reference to, or rather without dependence upon, the subject (the substantive) it qualifies." The relation between the substance (isvara) and the modes is said to be one of "inseparability" (apythaksiddhisambandha)". This relation is said to hold between a sub observation: "In general, wherever we cognise the relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby, the two clearly present themselves to our mind as absolutely different". Vedantasutras, pp. 42-43 (the italics are mine). Here it is hard to resist the feeling that Ramanuja himself has fallen into the error of contradiction with which he charges bhedabhedavadins and others. For one wonders if Ramanuja can fully succeed in reconciling the notion of an anyatvam with that of atyantavilaksanatvam within the limits of the same logic as he employs against others. . Cf. "Matter and self are the adjectives of the absolute only in the sense that the attribute cannot be known apart from its substance or subject." Visistadvaita, p. 233. That the 'modal dependence' suggested by this statement, does not rule out the idea of the 'monadic uniqueness' on the part of an adjective or attribute, is further pointed out by the same critic from whom ... the statement is quoted here. Ibid., p. 234. 2. Describing the nature of this sambandha, Hiriyanna observes :

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88 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE stance and its attributes, or between one substance and another when one of them is spiritual. It is considered to be "the pivot on which his (Ramanuja's) whole philosophy turns". By virtue of its internal character it often tends to be distinguished from the Nyaya-Vaisesika idea of samavaya to which it is otherwise similar in regard to its recognition of the reality, the mutual necessity, and the distinctiveness of the relata in it." The complex unity which the above relation is designed to establish is pointed out to be clearly demonstrated in the great statement (mahavakya) 'tat tvam asi' (that thou art). In Ramanuja's interpretation, tat (that), in the statement, signifies brahman, which is the source (adhara) as well as the indwelling (antaryamin) force of the living and the non-living creation: tvam (thou) signifies the individual soul which is held to be "connected with non-intelligent matter". Together, the two, viz., the living and the non-living creation, form, as already noticed, the body of Isvara. The central meaning of the text, in this philosophy, is the affirmation 1. 2. "It connotes that one of the two entities related is dependent upon the other in the sense that it cannot exist without the other also existing and that it cannot be rightly known without the other also being known at the same time." EIP, p. 177. OIP, p. 399. The fact that aprthaksiddhi or 'inseparability' is, except for its internal character, parallel to samavaya' does not come in the way of Ramanuja's explicit rejection of samavaya. See Vedantasutras, p. 498. For an account of samavaya, see infra, Ch. VII. Further, aprthaksiddhi seems to be regarded by Visistadvaitism more as the nature of, than as a relation between, the relata or the entities, although it is also sometimes spoken of as a relation. Cf. OIP, p. 398, f.n. 5.

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CHAPTER III 89 of the complex, or the organic unity of the whole, viz., isvara and the souls in association with matter. In other words, the text signifies, according to Visistadvaitism, the idea of a concrete unity--not the abstract Advaitic identity--which is constituted by brahman and the attributes of cit and acit qualifying brahman'. Ramanuja invokes support for his interpretation of the above text from the notion of samanadhikaranya or the "grammatical principle of the co-ordination of words in a sentence" 2. According to grammarians samanadhikaranya, or co-ordination, conveys the abiding of several attributes in a common substrate; or "the application to one thing of several words for the application of each of which there is a different motive"? The aim of co-ordination is, therefore, "just to convey the idea of one thing being qualified by several attributes". Here'one thing'evidently refers to the unchanging unitary principle of Isvara and the 'several attributes' to the realms of cit and acit which are marked by difference, muta For a fuller discussion of the nature and implications of tat tvam asi in the present school, see Sribhasya (text, Abhyankar's edn.), p. 110 ff., Vedantasutras, pp. 129-138, and sribhasya, Vol. I, E.T. by Mr. Rangacharya and M. B. Varadaraja Aiyangar, Madras, 1899, pp. 211-224, Vedarthasangraha, p. 37, etc., and Sukhtankar, op. cit., pp. 288-289. For the various interpretations of this maha vakya by the different Vedantic schools see Visista dvaita, p. 594 ff. 2. Visistadvaita, p. 38. Vedantasutras, pp. 79-80. Cf. bhinnapravsttinimittanam sabdanam ekasmin arthe vrttih samanadhikaran vam iti sabdikah / Sribhasya (text, Abhyankar's edn.), p. 59. See also what precedes this statement and Vedarthasangraha, p. 51. 4. Vedantasutras, p. 79.

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90 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE tion and plurality. The unchanging unity of brahman is thus understood, in this view, to be co-ordinate with the changing diversities of its attributes. Brahman (isvara), the substance, and cit and acit, the modes which are believed to be coordinately bound up with the substance, what is described as prakaraprakaribhava, or the substance-attribute relation. It is questionable whether Ramanuja does not overstrain the slender grammatical co-ordination in seeking from it a sanction for his theory of reality as a complex whole." Two important points to be noticed in Ramanuja's view of reality are : (a) that he emphasises, as against Advaitism the reality, in the attributes, of difference, and concomitantly with difference, of change and plurality; and (b) that he affirms, as against the bhedabheda view of reality, the unchanging character of brahman which, nevertheless, is the source of all change in the modes, by virtue of its inherent powers. The distinction from Advaitism has already been pointed out by means of the contrasting notions of visistaikyam and svarupaikyam. The distinction from the bhedabheda view will be noted presently when the notable features of Ramanuja's criticism against this view, as represented by Bhaskara and Yadava, are considered. Meanwhile it may 1. For a discussion of the principle of co-ordination in relation to Visistadvaitism see sribhasya (text, Abhyankar's edn.), p.59 ff. and ibid. (intro., and notes, pt. 2), p. 24; Vedarthasangraha (as well as Tatparyadipika) p. 51 ff., Sribhasya (M. Rangachari's edn.), p. 112 and f. n. 75 (wherein Kaiyyata's definition of this principle is cited and reference to Panini and Patanjali is made in this connection). For two critical observations on this question, see infra, p. 96 f. and f. n. 3 and 1 thereon.

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CHAPTER III 91 be observed that Ramanuja's criticism against the bhedabheda philosophy is primarily directed against the common bhedabheda thesis of a self-contradictory reality of identityin-difference. It is because they hold this thesis that bhedabhedavadins are described as 'jainagandhi' (Jaina-like) Vedantins, and, therefore, as indulging, like the Jainas, in expounding an "untruthful' (self-contradictory) view of reality (ayathabhasanacaturah)? The curious irony of this situation is that Ramanuja himself, like the bhedabhedavadins thus criticised, is a brahmaparinamavadin, and is even described, quite rightly, as attempting a "re-interpretation of bhedabheda"". Consequently, Ramanuja is nearer to, if not one among, bhedabhedavadins like Bhaskara and Yadava, than to any other type of Vedantins, like Sankara. Never Cf. yadi bhaskarayadavaprakasau nigamantasthitinirnayapravinau / aparaih kimivaparaddham arya ayathabhasanacaturidhurinaih // ata eva nirgunabrahmavadinam pracchannabauddhaprasiddhavadanayor api jainagandhivedantinau itinamadheyam anu. sosruyamahe / Vedantadesika's Sankalpasuryodaya, ed Krishnamacharya, Adyar, 1948, p. 322 f., p. 86. Commenting on the phrase ayathabhasanacaturaih, the commentator of Prabhavilasa (on the above work) observes : syadasti syannasti ityayathabhasanacaturyadhurinaih / Writing under the phrase jainagandhivedantinau iti the same commentator observes : ekasya vastunah aikarupyakathanat tathatvam / In Prabhavali, a further comm. on the above work, K we see the following comment on this phrase : evar jainaih samanayogaksematvat jainagandhivedantinau iti nama jagati prasiddham / See also what follows. Ibid. Some modern critics also confirm this view. See Brahmavadin, Vol. V, pp. 467468, and Vol. VI, p. 233. A further amplification of the objection of virodha in Jainism is found in Sribhasyavartika, verses 125-129. "Ramanuja explicitly rejects the theory of bhedabheda in many places in his Sribhasyam. But his Visistadvaita is really a

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92 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE theless Ramanuja is as much against Bhaskara and Yadava as he is against Sankara. The following are the notable points of Ramanuja's criticism against Bhaskara and Yadava : In the first place, the Bhaskariya and Yadaviya thesis of reality as simultaneous distinction and non-distinction (bhedabheda or bhinnabhinna) is, as just noticed, self-contradictory. This is believed to be so on the ground that distinction and non-distinction cannot co-exist as they do in the bhedabheda philosophy, after the manner of Jainism. In brief, the bhedabheda thesis represents an effort to reconcile the irreconcilable. Secondly, if in order to escape from the above difficulty, Bhaskara and Yadava seek to affirm that non-distinction, or identity, is genus and distinction, or difference, is species, and that both genus and species constitute the two aspects of everything, then it is held that they tend to divide the indivisible into two compartments. Further, this attitude on the part of bhedabhedavadins will, it is contended, not with any convincing reason on the side of Ramanuja, lead to a situation in which difference will tend to be more primary. If true, as Ramanuja believes it to be, this primacy of difference over identity will, of course, militate against the accepted thesis of a co-ordinate scheme of identity-in-difference. Thirdly, if, on the contrary, bhedabhedavadins declare that the two elements of distinction (bhinna) and non reinterpretation of bhedabheda". Identity-in-difference, P. T. Raju, The New Ind. Ant., Vol. XII, Nos. 1-6, 1939, pp. 321-322. See also p. 323 of the same article and his idealistic Thought in India (London, 1953), p. 154.

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93 distinction (abhinna) should, despite their difference, form a single entity, on the ground that their essence is brahman, then the critic will point out that they become liable to the opposite error of holding non-distinction, or identity, as the fundamental reality. CHAPTER III Thus none of the three possibilities, which correspondingly centre round the notions bhinnabhinna (simultaneous distinction and non-distinction), bhinna (distinction), and abhinna (non-distinction), is, according to Ramanuja, tenable; and consequently bhedabhedavada, it is concluded, falls to the ground.' Bhedabhedavadins, however, defend themselves against this, as against Advaitic attacks, on the firm ground that the co-existence of bheda and abheda in reality is an indisputable, and, therefore, uncontradictable, verdict of pramana or valid knowledge. If this co-existence is a valid truth, then the several objections of Ramanuja will lose their force. The fact that bhedabhedavadins have not fully succeeded in defending this truth does not detract from the value of their recognition of the truth. It is needless to go minutely into the polemical subleties of bhedabhedavadins in defence of their position. Some of the arguments from the bhedabheda viewpoint have been outlined in the course of our account of the several schools of bhedabheda philosophy. 1. Cf. Vedantasutras, pp. 134-135, 189-193 and 195 f. 2. Cf. the following observation which represents the general bhedabheda attitude to the problem: pramanatas cet pratiyate ko virodho'yam ucyate / virodhe cavirodhe ca pramanam karanam matam //

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94 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Ramanuja's objections against the bhedabheda philosophy, however, serve, in a somewhat indirect manner, as an indication of his attitude towards the Jaina view of reality. A direct statement of this attitude, touching in particular the point of self-contradiction in Jainism, is made in the course of his comments on the well-known sutra of Badarayana : "Not so, on account of the impossibility in one". Commenting, Ramanuja observes : "Difference (bhinnatvam)... consists in things being the abodes of contradictory attributes; non-difference, not any more than the generic character of a horse and that of a buffalo, can belong to one animal." Concluding his comments, Ramanuja reiterates, "Things which stand to each other in the relation of mutual non-existence cannot after all be identical." 3 Deferring a treatment of the Jaina solution to the above objection of self-contradictoriness urged not merely by Visistadvaitism but also by the other Vedantic, as well as the Buddhistic, schools, a few critical observations may be made here on the implications of Ramanuja's own theory of reality. All the efforts of Ramanuja to weave difference as an independent entity into the texture of a brahman-ridden reality have proved unsuccessful and resulted in what is, after all, a "temperate monism", as Max Muller calls it. No system which is dominated by an infinite absolute-an absolute which is the source and explanation of all that is finite, or 1. Vedantasutras, p. 516. 2. Ibid., p. 518. 3. Ibid., p. 518. 4. See infra, Ch. V.

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CHAPTER III 95 diverse-can, as it has been repeatedly pointed out, result in a justly comprehensive scheme of reality in which the principle of difference, and all that it implies, can enjoy an intrinsically real and co-ordinate status. Despite its professions to the contrary, Ramanuja's Visistadvaitism must be counted among such systems, for it holds that brahman is the supreme reality and cit and acit are, despite their supposedly distinctive status' of existence, real only in so far as they derive their reality from brahman. Under this scheme the course of reality becomes a one-way traffic--that is, one in which reality flows only from the infinite absolute to the so-called real and finite world and the selves--but not a genuinely comprehensive synthesis resulting from an interaction of the independent, but complimentary, elements of identity and difference. Thus there can be little doubt that in Ramanuja's philosophy, identity, represented by brahman, is, as shown in the present account, the primary principle; and difference, represented by the modal elements of cit and acit, is the secondary principle having brahman for its source and 1. That brahman is, strictly speaking (vastutastu), the only real principle (ekameva), in visistadvaita as in the other schools of Vedanta (vedantanam) in the opinion of Srinivasa : vastutastu vedantanam cidacidvisistam advaitam ekameva brahmeti tatparyam/ ata eva cidacidvisistan brahmaikam iti upakramya tameva prakaram nirupitavan/atah cidacidvisisto.... narayana evaikam tattvam iti visistadvaitavadinam darsanam iti siddham // srinivasa's Yatindramatadipika, p. 47; see also p. 39, and cf. evam sarvavasthavasthitacidacidvastusarirataya tatprakarah paramapurusa eva karyavasthakaranavasthajagadrupena avasthita iti..../ sribhasya (S. Abhyankar's edn., text, p. 119). See also Vedantasara, pp. 8-9.

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96 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE explanation. This stands out clearly in spite of the fact that Ramanuja has not evolved a clear and well-grounded conception of difference in all respects. The ambiguous treatment of difference is evident when we see, for instance, that it (difference) is considered, on the one hand, as a component and therefore a genuinely real and distinct element in the complex whole (visistaikyam) of reality, and, on the other, as something which does not touch' --for contact would mean introducing the taint of imperfection-brahman which is believed to be unchanging in nature. It has just been noticed that, however ambiguous may be its nature, difference is definitely believed to occupy a subordinate or secondary place in relation to identity, in Ramanuja's metaphysics. Nevertheless, we find two criticsRaju and Srinivasacarya-who are inclined to take the view that for Ramanuja difference is primary (mukhya) and identity secondary (gauna)". That this view (somewhat casually hinted at, and not accompanied by any serious supporting arguments), is not tenable is clear from the main drift of Ramanuja's viewpoint. Whatever plausibility there is for an equal or co-ordinate--certainly not any superior (primary) -- status of difference, derives eventually from the grammatical principle of co-ordination, or samanadhikaranya. There are 1. Cf. supra, p. 79, f.n. 4. The New Ind. Ant., Vol. II, Nos. 1-6, 1939, p. 321, f.n. 4. See also the same author's (Raju's) Idealistic Thought in India, p. 154 f.n. 2. srinivasacarya's Darsanodaya, p. 194. 3. That samanadhikaranya signifies not merely unity but also and co-ordinately with unity-difference is clearly pointed out

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CHAPTER III 97 at least two considerations which weaken this principle of coordination as a basis of the argument for a co-ordinate status of difference. First samanadhikaranya conflicts with the most fundamental basis of satkaryavada' which governs the entire philosophy of Visistadvaita. It is an established fact that in any form of satkaryavada difference is subordinate, not equal, to identity. Secondly, deriving an ontological fact from the notion of samanadhikaranya amounts to, as it has been rightly pointed out, taking "the grammar of language for the grammar of reality's. These various considerations point to the fact that the principle of difference is in essence subordinated to that of identity in Ramanuja's metaphysics. by Ramanuja. Cf. "But if there be no difference of 'modes' there can be no sa manadhikaranya." Sukhtankar, op. cit., p. 290. 1. For a full statement of satkaryavada, or the doctrine that "the effect is non-different from the cause" (karanad ananyan karyam) in Visistadvaitism, and a comparison with the attitude of the Vedanta and other schools to the problem, see ibid., pp. 142-149. EPI, p. 179. In the twenty-fourth series (1953) of the Riddell Memorial Lectures, at the University of Durham, on Languages, Standpoints and Attitudes, (O. U. P.), H. A. Hodges observes how "insoluble problems were....created for metaphysics, merely because linguistic forms were misinterpreted into ontological theories", and how, "so much of metaphysics has consisted of errors like these, that many have come to think that metaphysics is nothing else but misuse and misinterpretation of language" (p. 20). Supporting these remarks Hodges again maintains: "Grammatical forms have been taken as evidence of ontological relations; because facts can be described in sentences, it has been thought, that the structure of a sentence reflects the structure of the existing world." etc., p. 19; see also : what follows.

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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE C. Hegelianism Among modern philosophers in the West Hegel most nearly approximates to Jainism in that he evolves a systematic dialectical synthesis which comprehends both identity (substantivity) and difference (relativity) in the structure of reality. "Substantiality and Relativity are" says Caird, describing Hegel's philosophy,"thus seen to be not two ideas, but one, and the truth is to be found not in either separately but in their union; which means that nothing can be said to be substantial in the sense of having existence independent of relation, but only in the sense of including its relativity in its own being." Neither 'Being' (Substantiality) alone, nor 'Non-Being' ('Relativity', 'Nothing' or 'Other ') alone, but 'Determinate Being '' ('Becoming'), the union of the Continuing, Caird writes, "In other words, nothing is substantial except in so far as it is a subject or self which maintains itself in change, because its change is determined by its own nature, and is indeed only the necessary manifestation of nature...... The real substance has to be sought for, not in the two things taken separately, but in the principle which divides and at the same time unites them........ Thus that alone can truly be called a reality which maintains and realises itself in the process of differentiation and reintegration of differences." Edward Caird's Hegel, Edinburgh and London, 1883, pp. 174-175. 2. "Of course Being is sometimes imagined, for instance, as pure light, as the clearness of unclouded vision, and Nothing as pure night; and their distinction is thus connected with this well known sensuous difference. But in fact, if this pure seeing be imagined more exactly, it is easy to perceive that in absolute clearness as much or as little is seen as in absolute darkness, and that one kind of seeing, as much as the other, is pure seeing,

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CHAPTER III 99 two', constitutes reality. As a matter of fact "Being" and "Nothing" are said to be contradictory* 'moments' (or that is, a seeing of Nothing. Pure light and pure darkness are two voids which are the same. We can distinguish only in determinate light, that is, since light is determined by darkness in clouded light,-and, equally in determinate darkness, that is, since darkness; and this is just because clouded light and illumined darkness contain distinction in themselves and therefore are Determinate Being". Hegel's Science of Logic (tr. by W. H. Johnson and L. G. Struthers, 1929, London), Vol. I, p. 105. 1. "The simple idea of pure Being was first enunciated by the Eleatics, as the Absolute and as sole truth; especially by Parmenides, whose surviving fragn.ents, with pure enthusiasm of thought first comprehending itself in its absolute abstraction, proclaim that "Being alone is, and Nothing is not at all".-It is well known thatin orientalsystems, and essentially in Buddhism, Nothing, or the Void, is the absolute principle.-Heraclitus was profound enough to emphasise in opposition to this simple and one-sided abstraction the higher total concept of Becoming, saying: "Being is no more than Nothing is", or "All things flow", which means, everything is Becoming Popular sayings, chiefly oriental, to the effect that everything which is has in its birth the germs of its decay, while death conversely is entrance to a new life, express at bottom the same union of Being and Nothing. Ibid., pp. 95-96. Although Hegel is concerned, in the course of the present passage, with deriving confirmation, and, in some measure, authority or sanction, for his dialectic of synthesis (of being and non-being) from the illustrious ancient Greek, it is a well-known fact that the Greek thinker, viz., Heraclitus, is more correctly associated with propounding, in keen contrast with Parmenides, almost an uncomprising philosophy of change (becoming used in a somewhat more onesided sense than by Hegel') than with reconciling the two opposed trends referred to, by Hegel, here. This is indicated by the very fragment just cited by Hegel, viz., "All things flow" as well as by analogies of fire etc. This consideration does not, however, affect the truth of Hegel's argument for the reconciliation or synthesis of being and non-being. Cf. "Being, first, is determined as opposed to Other in general." Ibid. 91.

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100 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Croce is inclined to treat the two 'moments' or elements as 'distincts' rather than as opposites' or contradictories in Hegel's philosophy. Distinguishing and defending this procedure Croce writes: "The logical category of distinction is one thing, and the category of opposition is another. As has been said (at many places in course of the chapter from which this passage is taken), two distinct concepts unite with one another, although they are distinct; but two opposite concepts seem to exclude one another. Where one enters the other totally disappears. A distinct concept is presupposed by and lives in its other which follows it in the sequence of ideas. An opposite concept is slain by its opposite." Elucidating this contrast further he adds that opposites "do not constitute peaceable and friendly couples" (e. g., true and false, good and evil, being and non-being, life and death etc.)...."Opposition gives rise to deep fissures in the bosom of the philosophical universal and of each of its particular forms, and to irreconcilable dualisms." B. Croce's What is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel, E. T.. by Douglas Ainslie, London, 1915, pp. 10-11. (Words within the first pair of brackets are mine, and the examples cited within the second pair are selected from among Croce's own given in a passage on p. 11.) Croce draws the further implications of imposing the "deep fissures" of opposition on philosophical thinking. One of them, for instance, is the tendency to affirm one of the opposites and deny the other or vice versa. That which is affirmed tends to become the whole truth and that which is denied to become a "necessary illusion". Hence the two should, according to Croce, be regarded as 'one-sided truths' or 'fragments' awaiting 'integration'. (Cf. ibid., p. 14 ff.) Replacing Hegel's dialectic of contradictories by that of 'distincts' is indeed a significant contribution of Croce to Hegelianism and philosophy in general. But even Croce is finally ensnared by the magic of the Hegelian doctrine of the "Concrete Universal". (Cf. ibid., pp. 20, 22, 32, etc. Reference to the 'integration' of the 'fragments', just noticed, also suggests the fact of this ensnarement.) Reserving our criticisms against this specific doctrine for a later occasion it may be observed here that Croce's modified form of the dialectic of 'distinct' is in greater harmony with the Jaina view of real as constituted by identity (dhrauvya) and difference (paryaya) which are mutually complementary elements. This complementary character of the element is particularly accentuated

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CHAPTER III 101 abstractions) clamouring for reconciliation or synthesis. They represent the thesis and the antithesis leading to the synthetic whole, or concrete universal, which forms the basis of a new start in the working of the triadic law. Unlike the Vedantin and the Buddhist, and very much like the Jaina, Hegel does not frame the picture of reality through the 'annulment' or obliteration of one of the opposing elements of identity and difference but by a sturdy constructive synthesis of identityin-difference which alone, according to him, is the truth' of reality. The two elements are not believed to be connected by a tour de force; they hang together by 'inner necessity'. Up to this point Hegel and the Jaina agree in most important respects. But when Hegel tries to derive synthesis from the Absolute, that 'far-off divine event towards which everything proceeds, they part company. For Hegel the Absolute (the Idea, the Ideal, the Reason) is the supreme allcomprehending whole which operates as a presupposition of each of its finite aspects. It is the bottom of the inverted pyramid of Hegel's philosophy supporting and sustaining the massive structure of finite and relative moments'. "All else", he tells us, "is error, confusion, opinion, strife, caprice and impermanence". It is the Absolute that is the supreme synthesis of all finite syntheses which are but 'transitions' or mile-stones in our 'ceaseless progression' in the process of the repudiation of the fallacy of contradiction or virodhabhasa by the Jaina thinker, in the sequel. 1. "This comprehensive development of the notion of the Absolute is the entire system of the philosophy of the Absolute." J. B. Baillie, ERE, 573. See also what follows.

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102 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE toward it. Moreover whatever objectivity there is in Hegel is due to the 'self-externalization of the Asolute. By his predominant emphasis on the Absolute Hegel ends as the philosopher of 'identity' although he begins well by treating identity and difference as co-ordinate elements and is second to none in his attack upon the theory of pure Being as well as of its opposite abstraction. For the Jaina also identity and difference are co-ordinate, or equally vital, elements in reality. The real, for him, however, is not the rational ultimate (the Absolute), as it is for Hegel, although it is cognisable (ineya) to the mind. In other words, rationality or thought, (which, in the final analysis is equated by Hegel to the Absolute), cognises, rather than constitutes, reality or the universe. Nor does reality or the universe derive its being or truth from the Absolute. It is, on the contrary, a selfmoving concern. Further, the Jaina seems pre-eminently to base his findings on experience, whereas Hegel seems to do so on a logical analysis although both recognise the objectivity, at any rate the objective reference, of thought or judgment. A further significant feature arising from the differing background of metaphysical assumptions concerns the nature of the dialectical analysis itself in the two schools. There is an inherent urge in the 'moments' or alternatives, under the Hegelian dialectic, for conjunction, synthesis or integration. The moments, which are least inclusive wholes, mutually integrate themselves into a wider synthetic whole. Thus they have the character of self-transcendence or self-dissolution stamped on them. We may, therefore, characterise this Hegelian synthesis as a conjunctive dialectic, or conjunctive synthesis.

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CHAPTER III 103 Under the Jaina dialectic, on the contrary, each moment' or alternative, of experience, is conserved alongside other *moments' in its distinctive individuality. In the total fabric of experience the moments' are, therefore, neither transcended nor annihilated but preserved, in all their distinctness, displaying a complex network of relation to other'moments' of experience. We may, therefore, describe the Jaina dialectic as the disjunctive synthesis or the disjunctive dialectic. In virtue of these differences Hegelianism swings, despite its resemblance to Jainism in important respects as already noticed, to the side of the Sankhya system and the other schools of philosophy in which difference of bheda is subordinated to identity or abheda.

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CHAPTER IV The Schools of Philosophy in which Difference Subordinates Identity : A. The Vaisesika System B. The Dvaita System (of Madhva)

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CHAPTER IV The Systems of Philosophy in which Identity is subordinated to Difference Having observed, in the course of the previous chapter, how 'difference' is subordinated to identity' in the several systems including Hegelianism, we may now briefly turn to two noteworthy examples in Indian thought, in which the converse thesis is upheld, viz., subordination of identity to difference. The two examples to be now considered in so far as they have a bearing on the problem of 'identity-indifference', are (a) the Vaisesika system and (b) the Madhya system of Dvaitism. A. The Vaisesika System This system is an atomistic pluralism. It adopts a sixfold classification of categories or padarthas, viz., substance (dravya), quality (guna), activity (karma), generality (samanya), difference or particularity (visesa) and intimate relation 1. 'Intimate or necessary relation' is a better translation of samavaya than 'internal relation'. This is so because the term 'internal' indicates that the inner character of the relata will, as will be noticed below, in ch. VII, be affected and, consequently, the relata will tend to become an identity which abolishes otherness or distinction which is the very essence

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108 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE (samavaya). Non-existence (abhava) was later' on added as a seventh category. This system attaches a predominant importance to the category of visesa". It maintains this category as a fundamental ontological and functional principle. Even the name Vaisesika is derived from the term visesa. This term visesa is used to denote every individual element of particularity or difference as well as the whole group of such elements the of the Vaisesika philosophy. For a further treatment of the contrast between necessary relation and internal' relation as describing the inseparable (ayutasiddha) nature of the relata in samavaya see the opening portion of the chapter just referred to. See ILA, p. 204 f., SP, p. 7 (notes), H. Ui's The Vaiscsika Philosophy, ed. F. W. Thomas, 1917, London, pp. 123-124, footnotes 1 and 2 on p. 124, and p. 183, and IP, Vol. II, pp. 219-221. A. M. Bhattacharya and N. C. B. Bhattacharya clearly affirm that Sivaditya was the first to add abhava as the seventh category to the traditional list of six categories (see their edn. of Sapta padarthi, 1934, Calcutta, Intro. p. X). 2. Owing to such predominant importance attached to visesa the Vaisesika becomes 'essentially a philosophy of distinctions' See IP, Vol. II, p. 176 and Garbe's observations quoted in the following footnote. Garbe observes : "Difference (visesa), the fifth category...... holds an important place in the Vaisesika system, inasmuch as, by virtue of it the difference of the atoms renders possible the formation of the universe. The name, therefore, of the entire system, Vaisesika, is derived from the word for difference (visesa)". (See his article on Vaisesika', ERE.) It should, however, be noted here that difference is attached not merely to atoms but also, as noticed below, to all the ultimate entities forming the basis of the distinctions among such entities. Also cf. visesapadarthas tu darsanantarakaraih na manyate, ata eva asya darsanasya visesadarsana iti samjna, etanmatanuyayinam api vaisesika iti sarjna....../V on VD in VD, p. 458. See also ILA, p. 179, f. n. 1; PDS, p. 32; OIP, p. 225; and SP, p. 3 (notes). 3.

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CHAPTER IV 109 number of which is said to be infinite (te anantah). Every simple or ultimate entity (nityadravya) is believed to have a visesa rooted in it. It is by virtue of the visesa thus rooted in it that an entity can be differentiated from all other entities. This is so not merely in the case of ultimate entities which are otherwise indistinguishable from one another, e.g., one atom (anu) from another, one liberated soul (muktatma) from another or one manas from another", but also among all other entities in the universe. If visesas are granted to be the differentiating elements 5. See Jinavardhanasuri's Comm. quoted in SP, p. 5 (notes). vinasarambharahitesul nityadravyesu anvakasakaladigatmamanassu pratidravyam ekaikaso vartamanah....../ PB, p. 691. See also SP, p. 5 (for the Comm. quoted) and TRD, p. 277. Hence visesas are characterised as vyavrttibuddhihetevah. PB, p. 691. anyanimittasambhavat / Ibid. nityesu tulyakstigunakriyesu paramanusu muktatmamanassu etc. Ibid. The direct means of differentiation among the ultimate entities are of course visesas themselves. The proximate means of differentiation among the non-ultimate or composite bodies are, however, the distinctions among the component parts constituting the bodies (avayavabhedadavayavibhedah). But, in the ultimate analysis, even these distinctions among the component parts are based on the indivisible atoms from which the parts are formed. Hence all differentiations are based, directly or indirectly, on the visesas. Cf. "Thus a jar is distinguished from a piece of cloth; because the component parts of the first are distinct from those of the latter; and so on we may argue, until at last we arrive at the ultimate constituents of matter viz., atoms, which are indivisible. The same reasoning cannot be applied to distinguish one atom from another, since an atom has no further component parts." SP, p. 5 (notes). See also Saptapadarthi (A. M. Bhattacharya and N.C. B. Bhattacharya's edn.) p. XXXVIII f., f.n. 63.

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110 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE severally abiding in all entities, simple (ultimate) and composite, living and non-living, then the question arises how one visesa is to be differentiated from another. It would, indeed, be a paradox if the distinguishing element itself remains indistinguishable (avicesasvarupah) from the other such elements. If, in order to avoid this anomaly, a further distinguishing (vyavartaka) element for each visesa is admitted there comes in the situation of regressus ad infinitum' (anavastha). For, every additional visesa (visesantara) postulated to account for the distinctness of a visesa, gives rise to the need of a further visesa, and the latter, again, to a still further visesa and so on in an endless succession, Anticipating this insuperable difficulty Prasastapada, and more particularly, his commentator Vyomasiva, lay down that a visesa is also selfdifferentiating (svatovyavartaka). That is, a visesa is not merely other-differentiating but also self-differentiating in its nature, just as a lamp (pradipa) is both other-revealing and self-revealing." The unique place accorded to the principle of visesa, or difference, in the Vaisesika system has earned for the Vaisesika the title of being semi-nihilistic (ardha-vainasika), or, at any rate, semi-Buddhistic. This is so because the 1. See PB, p. 691 f., and the Vyomavati thereon (p. 694 f.). Jina vardhanasuri refers to another fallacy, viz., atmasraya, arising from the theory of visesas, see SP, p. 6 (Notes). For how the "modern school of Nyaya" treats the question of visesa, see ILA, p. 196 and S. Bhaduri's Studies in Nyaya-Vaisesika Metaphysics (Poona, 1947), p. 146 and f.n. 1 thereon, where reference is made to Raghunatha siromani's work. 2. Ibid. See also The Vaisesika System (B. Faddegon, 1918, Amsterdam), p. 125.

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CHAPTER IV 111 unique atomistic entities, viz., the visesas conceived by the Vaisesika philosopher, have, despite their divergent traits in other respects, a close resemblance to the unique and discrete particulars conceived under the Buddhistic doctrine of svalaksanavada. The Vaisesika is, however, saved from propounding, like the Buddhist, a philosophy of total difference by introducing into the Vaisesika theory of reality the principle of samavaya, or the necessary relation, which may be loosely described as the element of identity in the system. Samavaya represents the relational bond between such two inseparable (ayutasiddha) relata as dravya (substance) and guna (property). It would, therefore, be better to describe it as a unifying or synthesising principle than as identity, although it is the nearest equivalent to identity in the Vaisesika system. A somewhat closer treatment of it may be reserved for a later occasion. It has, however, already been suggested that samavaya, despite its being a so-called intimate or necessary relation, is after all external in nature and therefore does not make any difference to the inward being of the entities it connects. This external character, therefore, weakens its claim for being treated as genuine identity. In maintaining the external character of samavaya, the Vaisesika is no doubt in keeping with the temper of his "philosophy of distinctions". It is difference rather than unity or identity which is the basic rule of the system. If samavaya were invested with a rich internal character it would cut at the root of his atomistic, pluralistic 1. See Chapter VII. 2. See Chapter VII.

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112 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE and realistic philosophy of difference and incline it towards some kind of idealism. As it stands this system is, as already pointed out, one in which "diversity (or difference) and not unity (or identity) is at the root of the universe". In other words this system subordinates identity to difference. B. Madhva's Dvaitism An even greater' stress than in the Vaisesika system is laid on visesa, the principle of difference, in Dvaitism which is built up on the two ultimate postulates", the Independent (svatantra) and the Dependent (paratantra or asvatantra), the former postulate representing the supreme God and the latter comprising the selves, the material world and nonexistence.* 1. 66 OIP, p. 225. (The words within brackets are mine.) 2. In the first place, although distinctions in the Vaisesika system, even among the composite bodies, are ultimately derived from visesas, visesas are restricted to the simple or ultimate substances only (see above under the Vaisesika system, p. 109, f.n. 6). In Dvaitism, however, visesas are postulated not only in the case of (ultimate or eternal) substances but in that of all categories even non-existence. Secondly, while in the Nyaya-Vaisesika (or the Vaisesika) visesa accounts for the difference which is assumed to exist between two things, here (in Dvaitism) it accounts for making difference where there is none". See EIP, p. 194 f. Considerations like how visesa is of comprehensive and great importance and how it lends significance to identity will become clear in the course of the present section. 3. 4. See SDAC, p. 87 and RRS, p. 168. The selves, and the material world, called cetana principle and the acetana principle, respectively, are together treated as

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CHAPTER IV 113 Fundamental as it is in the Vaisesika system, visesa is even more so in Dvaitism, on account of the Dvaitic belief that the entire course of reality is directly within the 'relentless grip' of this 'power' or 'potency?! Being at the heart of everything real, this 'power' is said, by no means figuratively, to be the very 'nature' (svarupa or svabhava) of everything. "Bheda", it is said, "is dharmisvarupa." "It exists, guides, and controls matters here and hereafter. Earth and Heaven, secular and spiritual, all concerns of daily routine life, and all concepts of the intellectual life, and conditions of scientific disciplines--all come under the relentless grip of difference. The fundamental form of objects is difference." "Difference is thus the very stuff of the cosmos." "By a mere stroke of the pen, by a mere fiat, a speculative gesture, or an adroit assertion, or a craze for unity-mongering it would be impossible to deny or annihilate the difference that is constitutive and foundational of all reality--of sentient and non-sentient creation.". Madhva, on whose writings the statements quoted above are based, himself declares: "Diverse and of diverse attributes are all things of the universe" (bhinnas ca bhinna 2. existence or bhava, non-existence or abhava being treated as a distinctive category. See RRS, p. 168 ff. 1. See RRS, p. 511, para 1. Ibid., p. 296. The following observations, also made by Madhva, are to the same effect : (i) padarthasvarupatvat bhedasya / bhedastu svarupadarsana eva siddhah / asya bheda iti tu padarthasya svarupam itivat / Ibid., p. 583. (ii) bhedastu sarvavastunam svarupam naijam avyayam/ See HIP, Vol. IV, p. 155, f.n. 1. 3. RRS, p. 287. 4. Ibid., p. 292. 5. Ibid., p. 299.

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114 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE dharmas ca padartha nikhila ami'); or that "It (difference) lurks in everything" (so'sti vastusvasesatah). Such statements are stated to express the "general metaphysical position" of Dvaitism. This is a position in which "The Cartesian Cogito should be considerably amended, if not completely altered. What does Descartes say? 'I thinktherefore, I am.' Madhva would alter it to 'I differtherefore, I am.' It is thus a position in which "Existence means difference, and difference means existence--though not literally." If the statement that "Existence means difference and difference means existence..." and perhaps similar other statements (e. g., that "Difference is, ... the very stuff of the cosmos" etc.), which declare the identity of 'existence and stuff', are not to be taken 'literally', it is difficult to see how Madhva and his followers treat visesa as an ontological principle at all. As a matter of fact Dvaitins, like the Vaisesikas, speak of an infinity of visesas, corresponding to the infinite diversity of the nature of an entity within itself, as well as to the infinite range of entities in the universe, from which a particular entity is differentiated. It is doubtful whether what is considered as the 'nature' or the power' of an entity can be treated as the entity itself. It sounds somewhat illogical that a 'power' is considered to 1. EIP, p. 187, and p. 210, note 9. 2. RRS, p. 298. 3. Cf. EIP, p. 187. 4. RRS, p. 298 f. 5. See IP, Vol. II, p. 746, and Jayatirtha's Vadavali (Adyar, 1943), Notes, p. 203.

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115 be an entity. If it were not so considered it would not be possible to speak of an 'infinity' of visesas which are further asserted to be downright perceivable facts. By treating visesa as a 'power' or 'potency' the Dvaitin seems to think that he has avoided the charge of infinite regress' to which Prasastapada's view of visesa as a distinctive entity is believed to be liable. It is affirmed that "visesa (peculiar power and potency etc.) is sui generis, self-sufficient and self-explanatory".2 The main defensive argument advanced on behalf of the 'self-explanatory' character of visesa is that it, like any 'ultimate category', cannot be explained, and that it, on the contrary, explains itself and 'others'. This sounds more like a dogmatic assertion than a logical argument. Further the Dvaitin seems to make capital out of the position assumed by the Advaitin, his principal opponent, on the question of avidya'. The latter is stated to consider 'avidya' as being somehow there projecting the cosmic illusion. If this could be regarded by the Advaitin to be sufficiently self-explanatory, then why not, the Dvaitin argues, treat visesa as such, that is, as an 'ultimate category' which is 'self-explanatory". All this seems to be rather poor defence of a notion which is invested with a fundamental significance in Dvaitism. Even Dasgupta, a favourable critic of Dvaitism, CHAPTER IV C 1. Cf. RRS, p. 512. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. HIP, Vol. IV, p. 179.

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116 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE passes the verdict of a 'weak' defence on a great Madhva dialectician who does not seem materially to add to the argument for difference just noticed. The exponents of Dvaitism credit the notion of difference, as seen above, with such fundamental and comprehensive significance that we are apt to understand the system as one of uncompromising difference. It is indeed not uncommon that this system is described as suddhabhedavada. In his crusading zeal for bheda Madhva interprets the celebrated texts' in such a manner that they are made to yield a bheda view of reality. Atma tat tvam asi (soul! 'that art thou '), for instance, is construed as atma atat tvam 'asi" (soul! thou are not that) and thereby difference, not identity, is elicited ini 1. For (a) the five-fold distinction (pancabheda) of visesa, as well as for (b) how visesa is svabhavika or real, not aupadhika or conditional or fictitious, see (a) SDSC, p. 94; Helmuth von Glasenapp's Madhva's Philosophie des Visnu-Glaubens, pp. 14-15, especially p. 15, f.n. 1 (where the relevant lines from Anuvyakhyana and reference to other works are cited) and RRS, pp. 598, and 139, f.n. 4; and (b) RRS, pp. 135, 228 and 427. See The Brahmavadin (Madras, 1900), Vol. VI, p. 233. Adverting to Madhva's attitude in interpreting the Brahmasutras, Ghate observes that "the very fantastic and forced manner in which he (Madhva) interprets many of the sutras leaves no doubt about the fact that he would have set aside the sutras altogether, but that their uncontested authori. tativeness prevented him from doing so". V. S. Ghate's The Vedanta, Poona, 1926, p. 33. 4. See SDSC, p. 97, and RRS, p. 601 ff., especially p. 601, f.n. 22, and p. 604. See also pp. 212-215, 263 f., 278, 321 and 680. Gauda-purnananda-chakravartin, however, suggests a somewhat different interpretation of this text. He interprets it as "thou art not Its" (tasya tvam asi). See The TattvaMuktavali, JRAS, New Series, Vol. XV, p. 139 (text), verse 6, and p. 155, E. T. by E. B. Cowell and f.n. 4.

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CHAPTER IV 117 from it. Nevertheless Dvaitism does recognise identity also under a more comprehensive designation of its philosophy, viz., savicesabhedavada. Savisesabhedavada' is described as a doctrine of "identityin-difference", or, more correctly, identity associated with difference, or, identity "amidst's difference. The relation of a substance (guni) is believed to be identical with its attribute (guna) or attributes". "... Attributes of the supreme Narayana (God) are", for instance, "identical with Him" 6. Yet this identity of the substance and its attributes is believed to depend upon the operation of visesa, which functions in all cases of identity"?? It is on account of the operation' or 'function of visesa that we are said to understand that although the substance and its attributes are identical they are also different--or rather, they are identical 1. RRS, pp. 293, 510 and 628. See also EIP, p. 189 and the article The Savisesabheda Theory' in A Volume of Eastern and Indian Studies (presented to Prof. F. W. Thomas), 1939, Bombay, pp. 230-235. 2. RRS, p. 293. 3. EIP, p. 189. 4. RRS, p. 293. 5. Cf. EIP, p. 191. 6. RRS, pp. 509, 510 etc. It sounds rather strange that not merely the attributes and similar determinations' are identical with God but also are 'identical with one another': cf. "Guna (attribute), Karma (action and activity) and similar determinations of Brahman are of the essential, foundational and fundamental (sic) nature of Brahman. They are inseparable from the nature of Brahman. They are identical with Brahman. In virtue of this identity the attributes are identical with one another or devoid of all difference..." etc. Ibid., p. 504 f. See also what follows. 7. Ibid., p. 509, :

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118 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE because' they are different-as indicated by the very expression substance and its attributes, which implies a distinction between the two. There is an important trend in Dvaitism which deserves notice in our discussion of the role of identity 'amidst' difference. In spite of the claim that Dvaitism is a "radical pluralism" and that "everything is unique" etc., the only "independent entity" in this system is God and everything else is "absolutely dependent upon his will"." As a matter of fact, it is pointed out that "Madhva goes so far as to ascribe even the being of everything also to God". It is not, therefore, surprising that Dvaitism maintains that all words are said ultimately to refer to God. Even a moderate twist of 'God-intoxicated' monotheism will yield first-rate material for a monistic idealism which can install identity as the sole reality and, thereby, banish difference by which Dvaitism, rather incongruously, sets such a high store." his 1. Cf. "There is 'Visesa' which will step in and account for the fundamental identity between the essential nature of anything and the thing itself..." RRS, p. 506. Also, "The object and so many differences are identical with one another and yet separate from one another. There is no mystery in that sort of relationship. There is no miracle either. There is what Madhva calls Visesa in every object". Ibid., pp. 297-8. See also p. 511. This would mean that visesa is not merely the basis of difference, as it ordinarily means, but also of identity although identity is secondary in relation to difference. The entire position, however, does not seem to hang together consistently. EIP. 2. 3. Ibid., p. 519. 4. 5. 6. Cf. ibid., p. 192, and RRS. RRS, p. 500. Cf. EIP, p. 190, para 2.

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CHAPTER IV 119 Dvaitism, as it stands, however, declares : "An individual or an object is what it is in virtue of its difference from other objects belonging to the same class or genus and difference ipso facto from members of another class or genus. Whether the linguistic medium is used or not, whether there is outward expression or not, difference is the essential constituent of an object or individual. An object is what it is only on account of its difference from other objects. Difference is emphasised. In accordance with the pragmatic purpose of the subject, and in accordance with the fundamental and essential constitution of the objects themselves, difference is stressed. It is difference that lends significance to identity".! This admission of fact that "It is difference that lends significance to identity" brings Dvaitism under the category of the Vaisesika system in which identity is subordinated to difference. It is, therefore, not surprising that Madhva, like many of the other earlier commentators on Vedantasutras, finds in the Jaina view of reality, viz., a co-ordinate conception of identity-in-difference, 'an admission' which, it is stated, is not merely "against all reason and proof' but even 'contradictory'. 1. RRS, p. 239 (italics are mine). See also p. 509 where identity is referred to as a 'doctrinal fact'. See The Vedantasutras, with Madhva's Comm., E.T. S. Subba Rau, Madras, 1904, p. 119. Cf. also : Sri Brahmasutrartha Saigraha (The Brahmasutras of Badarayana, expounded in Kanarese, in accordance with the Commentary of Madhvacarya) P. Ramchandra Row, Madras, 1903, p. 97.

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CHAPTER V The Jaina Philosophy of Identity-in-Difference in which Identity is Co-ordinate with Difference

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CHAPTER V The Jaina Philosophy of Identity-in-Difference in which Identity is Co-ordinate with Difference Our preceding inquiry has been based on the central thesis of our entire present contention, viz., that neither 'identity' or permanence alone, nor 'difference' or change alone, nor even the preponderance of either over the other, but a synthetic co-ordination of both the basic elements, will lead to a balanced and adequate metaphysical view of reality. In the process of the enquiry, we have been led to formulate an exhaustive classification of all the philosophical views into five major types the fifth one being represented by the Jaina as conforming to the requirements of a balanced and adequate metaphysical approach to the problem of reality. The critics have found fault with this co-ordinate approach of the Jaina thinkers and feel that it inherently involves the fatal error of contradiction which in turn gives rise to a series of other errors. The Jaina has to vindicate his position against such charges. Such a vindicative effort necessarily presupposes a positive metaphysical position of his own. This position is broadly designated as anekantavada or the theory of manifoldness and indeterminateness. This comprehensive theory of manifoldness is an ontology or a theory of reality, as well as an epistemology or a theory of knowlege. The anekanta

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124 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE ontology postulates a reality which is immensely complex or manifold. Correspondingly, the anekanta epistemology postulates a theory of manifold methods of analysis (nayavada) and synthesis (syadvada) by means of which the complex reality can be apprehended by the mind. Besides these methods the anekanta epistemology postulates what is generally described as a theory of the ways of knowing (pramanas). The ways of knowing are broadly classified by the Jaina thinkers into two categories, viz., pratyaksapramana and paroksapramana. The former is the direct or immediate way of knowing and the latter is the indirect or mediate way of knowing. Each category is subdivided into further stages or divisions. It is impossible to deal with all the problems connected with the anekanta ontology and epistemology within the moderate compass of this work. In the case of the epistemological discussions, for instance, our attention is largely confined to a critical exposition of the two major methods of knowledge, viz., nayavada and syadvada, omitting, almost entirely, any elaborate references to the two ways of knowing, viz., pratyaksapramana and paroksapramana, as well as to the several problems therewith connected. Even in the case of the treatment of the anekanta ontology, our attention is mainly focused on the examination, the elucidation and the illustration of the most fundamental ontological presupposition, viz., the co-ordinate concept of identity-in-difference. The entire anekanta ontology is only an elaborate structure built up on this basic presupposition. The several topics dealt with in the various chapters like those on the Relations,

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CHAPTER V 125 Jatyantaravada, or Arthakriyavada, are intended to reveal the manifestations of this presupposition in the different departments of reality. It is also necessary to point out here that no rigid separation between the ontological and epistemological discussions can be made in the course of our treatment of the various topics in this work. Nevertheless the three chapters beginning with anekantavada, especially those on mayavada and syodvada, may be described as largely epistemological as against the others which are largely ontological. The only topic which could be treated in relative isolation from ontological considerations is the one which is concerned with the ways of knowing (pramanas). But it has been excluded from the scope of the present work for the reason already stated. * The main purpose of the present undertaking is to show, in the course of its progress, that the notion of identity-indifference is the pivot on which the entire ontological and the epistemological development in the Jaina philosophy turn. Anekantavada is but an elaboration of the implications of this pivotal idea worked out in the various spheres of reality and knowledge. An exposition of this central idea of identity-in-difference, through a dialectical examination of its various implications as revealed in the various aspects of reality, is a necessary task. This is so especially for the reason that even competent scholars of Indian philosophy have often been inclined to consider the Jaina metaphysics as an "unsystematical system" in which "a mass of philosophical tenets" is not "upheld by one central idea". The phrases quoted here were uttered by Hermann Jacobi in the opening

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126 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE part of his address to the Third International Congress for the History of Religions in 1908. To quote him in full : "All those who approach Jaina philosophy will be under the impression that it is a mass of philosophical tenets not upheld by one central idea, and they will wonder what could have given currency to what appears to us an unsystematical system. I myself have held, and given expression to this opinion', but I have now learned to look at Jaina philosophy in a different light. It has, I think, a metaphysical basis of its own, which secured it a position apart from the rival systems both of the Brahmanas and of the Buddhists".? It is a pity that Jacobi did not give a fuller expression to his ideas after he "learned to look at Jaina philosophy in a different light". Nevertheless he has suggested, in the address just referred to as well as in a few other brief writings, the lines on which he thought about the subject. Nor do any other writers seem to have approached the subject at any considerable length, on the dialectical lines of investigating the pervasiveness of one central idea in the different ramifications of the Jaina metaphysics. After making these general observations concerning the present study we may now proceed to consider the ontological position of anekantavada. The most celebrated text the implications of which form almost the entire theoretical foundation of the Jaina philosophy 1. In 1878, he wrote in his Introduction to the Kalpasutra of Bhadra bahu (Leipzig, 1879); p. 3, that the philosophy of Mahavira "scarcely forms a system, but is merely a sum of opinions (pannattis) on various subjects, no fundamental ideas being there to uphold the mass of philosophical matter." 2. SJJ, p. 48.

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CHAPTER V 127 of being is : "The real is characterised by birth or origination, death or destruction, and sameness or continuity (utpada-vyaya-dhrauvya-yuktam sat)." Everything real must have, according to the postulate embodied in this text of Umasvati, the triple character of productivity (utpada), destructibility (vyaya), and, at the same time, permanence or persistence (dhrauvya) underlying it. Conversely whatever lacks the one or the other of this triple nature is a mental abstraction having no title to reality. Productivity and destructibility constitute the two aspects of change and may, therefore, be together characterised as the dynamic aspect of reality, the static aspect being represented by permanence or dhruvatva'. That is, utpada and vyaya, being the two facets of the process of change, will be treated together, throughout this work, under the comprehensive single principle of change; 1. TSUJ, V. 30. 2. On being asked by Indrabhuti, his foremost apostle (ganadhara): "What is the nature of reality ?" (kim tattam) Mahavira is reported to have first answered : "origination" (uppannez va) and then, after the same question was successively repeated, "destruction" (vigamei va), and "persistence" (dhuvei va). Cf. A. R. Kapadia's The Canonical Literature of the Jainas, 1941, Bombay, p. 3, and the extract from Haribhadra Suri's Comm. on Avassaya and its Nijjutti in f.n. 4 thereon. Modification; becoming; difference; discreetness; plurality; manyness; manifoldness; the occurrent; and dynamism-are some of the epithets generally used in varying contexts, as synonyms for change (bheda or paryaya) which have, in Jaina metaphysics, the constituents of productivity (utpada or utpatti) and destructibility (vinasa or vyava). Similarly, substantiality: substratum; being; identity; non-difference; continuity; continuance; unity; oneness; the continuant; statism, as well as endurance and persistence, are used for permanence (dhruvatva, dhrauvya or anvaya). Besides being a correlative to "becoming" the term "being" could also be

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128 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE taken in its wider acceptation as a "substance" or dravya which includes both "being" in its narrow sense and becomming. That is, it could signify either one, or the totality of the two aspects of a dravya, viz., permanence and change, but in which sense it is taken at a particular place will be evident from the context. Often "non-being" (asat or abhava) also is used as a correlative of "being" (sat or bhava) when, of course, the latter is treated in its narrow sense. Here a doubt naturally arises whether "non-being" could be taken as equivalent to or at least as constitutive of "becoming" which is the obvious correlative of "being". The answer would be in the affirmative as will be evident, in the sequel. Meanwhile, it may be stated, in passing, that "non-being" as applied to a particular case, say, a jar, does not mean merely the affirmation of what the jar is in itself, but also the negation of the nature of a cloth, or a fruit, in the jar. In words, the "non-being" of the jar consists in what the jar is not from the point of view (kathancit) of the cloth or the fruit. This negation of the nature of the cloth or the fruit in the jar is, according to Jainism, an absolutely necessary part of the nature of the jar. For a full comprehension of the jar consists, on this view, not only in knowing what the jar is in itself, but also what it is not with reference to the cloth and the fruit etc. Thus in so far as "not-being" is a necessary complement to "being" in the make-up of an object, it touches the dynamic aspect of reality. In other words while being or affirmation in its narrow acceptation is constitutive of identity, non-being or negation is constitutive of difference. The most widely used pairs of correlatives in course of this work are : identity and difference, the continuant and the occurrent, and permanence and change. In the case of the first pair the combined form, viz., identity-in-difference or identities of difference, is better adapted to express the coordinate subsistence of the two basic elements in reality, and the fact that identity precedes difference in the formula does not indicate any primacy of the former over the latter element as in the case of philosophies which subordinate difference to identity, since both elements have a co-ord status in reality. The second pair of "the continuant" and

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CHAPTER V 129 and dhrauvya, being the enduring principle in the nature of things, will be represented as the principle of permanence underlying the ceaseless changes in things. Thus the most fundamental truth laid down by Umasvati in the above sutra is that permanence and change are entwined in everything real. The fact that both the Vedantin who adheres to a totally static view, and the Buddhist who adheres to a totally dynamic view, join issue with the Jaina who endeavours to blend both the static and the dynamic postulates into an integrated metaphysical view, is but inevitable. This is the case also with the other schools of philosophy which follow suit with "the occurrent" is taken from W. E. Johnson's Logic (Cambridge, 1924), Pt. III, Intro. pp. XVIII f., 80, 84-85, where it bears a more or less similar import to the correlation of dhrauvya and paryaya. 1. Akalanka explains utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya as follows : svajatyaparityagena bhavantaravaptih utpadah / tatha purvabhavavigamo vyayah/ dhruve sthairyakarmanordhruvatiti dhruvah/ (Under 'dhruvah' he adds : dhruvasya bhavah karma va dhrarvyam/) TRAG, p. 238, karikas 1, 2 and 3. See also TSV, p. 434. For the three derivative meanings of the term 'dravya' in respect of its permanent aspect (dhrauvyam), as well as for a comparison of the Jaina notion of dravya with similar notions in other systems of Indian philosophy see PMHS, Bhasatippani, pp. 54-55. See also SHM on ga. 28 in VBJ and Siddhasena Gani's Tika on Tattvarthadhigamasutra (H. R. Kapadia's edn.) V. 29. The meanings and the divisions of paryaya are extensively discussed in STP, III. 32-37, in Siddhasena Gani's Tika (reference just given). The significance of these two ideas, viz., dravya and paryaya will, however, become increasingly clear in the process of our treatment of the various topics in the following chapters. 2. Vide the third and the fourth groups of systems in the fivefold classification (supra).

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130 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE the Vedantin and the Buddhist in claiming to detect, from their respective viewpoints, a radical self-contradiction in the Jaina synthesis of permanence and change. The success of the Jaina synthesist in framing a durable ontological foundation for the entire edifice of the anekanta metaphysics is to be measured by the strength with which he would be able to vindicate his integrated viewpoint, not merely by pointing out that his viewpoint has an intrinsic validity, but also by bringing to bear upon it a dialectical power equal to the task. Matching an unerring vision with a robust rational defence is the work of a supreme philosophical genius. It is idle to dogmatise about whether the Jaina has stood the test successfully and triumphed over the obstacles in the way of his establishing his thesis. It is doubtful if any major philosophical problem can ever be solved by anybody or by any school once and for all. This much, however, may be said to his credit, viz., that he has at least perceived the problem and has gone some way at least towards achieving its solution. Before proceeding to a dialectical examination of the most important implications of his metaphysical position, it would be worth while to see if his fundamental claim that permanence and change constitute the basic elements of reality is borne out by any major philosophical thinkers of the past and the present. That it is so, and, therefore, that the Jaina view in respect of its ultimate postulate of identity-in difference is not a lonely cry in a philosophical wilderness, may be confirmed by appealing to the impressive testimony, of three great thinkers who, in spite of wide divergencies in

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CHAPTER V 131 respect of their tenets, countries and age, profoundly concur. with the Jaina. These thinkers are A. N. Whitehead, Kumarila Bhatta and Immanuel Kant. Their confirmatory views may now be stated briefly in order of their mention here : Whitehead A. N. Whitehead finds the formulation of "the complete problem of metaphysics", viz., "the metaphysics of substance'", and "the metaphysics of 'flux?", in the two lines of the hymn : Abide with me; Fast falls the eventide. Elucidating how these lines embody "a full expression of the union of the two notions", viz., permanence and flux, he observes : "Here the first line expresses the permanences, abide ', 'me' and the 'Being addressed; and the second line sets these permanences amid the inescapable flux. Here at length we find formulated the complete problem of metaphysics. Those philosophers who start with the first line have given us the metaphysics of substance '; and those who start with the second line have developed the metaphysics of 'flux'. . But, in truth, the two lines cannot be torn apart in this way; and we find that a wavering balance between the two is a characteristic of the greater number of philosophers".' This 1. PrR, p. 318. A little earlier also he speaks in the same strain : "The elucidation of the meaning involved in the phrase 'all things grow', is one chief task of metaphysics. But there is a rival notion, antithetical to the former. I cannot, at the moment, recall one immortal phrase which expresses it with the same completeness as that with which the alternative notion has been rendered by Heraclitus.

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132 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE passage expresses, succinctly and beautifully, the need for an 'integral' viewpoint in which the ultimate postulates of 'permanence and flux' are harmoniously blended. Kumarila Kumarila maintains, almost in identical terms as the Jaina, the nature of reality to be of threefold character: Production (utpada), Continuance (sthiti) and Destruction (bhanga). In the Vanavada of his great Vartika, Kumarila observes: "When the Vardhamanaka being broken up, a Rucaka is made (out of the same gold), then the person who desires to have the former, becomes sorry, while one desiring the latter ornament likes the process, while a third person who only desires gold remains indifferent, unaffected. Therefore, the object (gold) must be admitted to have a threefold character. Because, unless the object partook of Production, Continuance and Destruction, there could not be (with regard to it) the three notions (of like, dislike and indifference). There can be no sorrow (or dislike) without destruction of the object desired; and there can be no pleasure without production (or appearance of the object desired); and lastly, there can be no indifference without continuance or permanence (of the desired object)." 1 This other notion dwells on the permanences of things-the solid earth, the mountains, the stones, the Egyptian Pyramids, the spirit of man, God". Ibid., pp. 317-318. 1. SVJha, pp. 332-333. The kas. run as follows: vardhamanakabhange ca rucakah kriyate yada / tada parvarthinah sokah pritis capyuttararthinah // 21 // hemarthinas tu madhyasthyam tasmad vastu trayatmakam / notpadasthitibhanganam abhave syan matitrayam // 22 // *

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CHAPTER V 133 Touching upon the absence of any contradiction in the co-existence of unity and diversity in the same object, Kumarila observes elsewhere : "As in the case of the variegated colour, we can optionally fix upon any one of the various colours (without any contradiction), simply because the object (colour) is of a variegated character-so, in the same manner we could fix upon the diversity or unity..." Finally, it is significant to note that Kumarila recommends a middle position' (madhyasthata) between the two extremes na nasena vina soko notpadena vina sukham / sthitya vina na madhyasthyam..........// Cf. the following ka. of Samantabhadra : ghatamaulisuvarnarthi nasotpadasthitisvayam / sokapramodamadhyasthyam jano yati sahetukam // AMS, ka. 59. See also VVas and ASA thereon. In another ka., following the above one, the same idea is illustrated by a different analogy. Ibid., pp. 30-31. Elucidating the word "trayatmakam" in ka. 22 cited above Parthasarathimisra writes: trayatmakam utpattisthitivinasadharmatmakam-ityarthah / NR on ka. 22, p. 619, and Bhattaputra Jayamisra also adds, in the same context : tasmad bhangotpadasthityatmakarupatrayayuktar vastu pratiyate/SVTJ, p. 84. Mallisena draws our attention, in this connection, to Patanjali's theory of nityanitya (the abiding and the changing) nature of substance (dharmi), and its (dharminah) threefold modification (trividhah khalvayam dharminah parinamo dharmalaksanavastharupah), and, points out how the latter (parinama) is accepted to be "at once distinct from and identical with the former" (dharma). Vide SM (text), p. 16, and ibid. (notes), p. 46, where Dhruva gives an extract from Vyasa-Bhasya on Patanjali-Sutra, III. 13. 1. SVJha, p. 292. The ka, is as follows: citratvad vastuno'pyevam bhedabhedavadharanam/ samanyamse tu niskrsya bhedo yena prasadhyate // Parthasarathimisra, commenting on this ka., observes : nanavarne hi vastuni ya eva varno nisklsya darsayitum isyate sa eva Sakyo darsayitum, evar nanarupe vastuni sarvasya bhedabhedadeh sambhava iti / MSV, p. 561, NR on ka. 58.

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134 of the bheda (anya) view and the abheda (ananya) view each of which (aikantikam) is characterised as fallacious (mrsa).' Kant JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE "The actual objects of our experience," observes Watson, interpreting Kant's 'Analogies of Experiences', are necessarily conceived of as substances, i. e., as things which in all their changes, yet maintain their identity... If we suppose that substances could come into being or cease to be, we destroy the condition under which alone there is any unity in our experience. . . There is no experience, then, except of objects which are determined as permanent in the process of change.' Showing how 'both elements', viz., 'the succession' (change) and 'the permanent' ('the abiding') are 'indeed, inseparably involved' in all existence Norman Kemp Smith clearly states: "Substance, Kant insists, is not a bare static existence in which changes take place, but a dynamic energy which by its very nature is in perpetual necessitated change. Change is not change in, but change of, substance."" 1. dusita sadhita vapi na ca tatra balabalam/ kadacin niscitam kaiscit tasman madhyasthata varam // tato'nyananyate tasya sto nastas ceti kirtyate/ tasmaccitravadevasya mrsa syadekarupata // MSV, p. 633. PKEW,-p. 199. In the words of Kant himself: "I find that in all ages not only the philosopher, but even the common understanding, has preposited this permanence as a substratum of all change in phenomena; indeed, I am compelled to believe that they will always accept this as an indubitable fact. Only the philosopher expresses himself in a more precise and definite manner, when he says: "In all changes in the world the substance remains, and the accidents alone are changeable." 3. CPRM, p. 138, CPRMax, pp. 161-166. 4. CKCPR, p. 362. 2. 112

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CHAPTER V 135 Paton confirms this, emphasising at the same time the subtlety of the matter : "The concept of change," he observes, "has to be interpreted in the light of the doctrine that succession can be determined only in relation to the permanent. Coming into being and passing away are not to be taken as changes of what comes into being and passes away. A change is a way of existing which follows upon another way of the same thing's existing. That is to say there is an exchange, or substitution, of one state of a thing for another state of that thing, but the thing itself must remain the same thing. We cannot say that a thing has changed, unless it remains the same thing; and we can put this paradoxically by saying that it is only the permanent, or substance, which changes, while the transitory, or the accidents', do not change, but rather are exchanged, for one ceases to be and another takes its place." 1. Just as the gunas and paryayas are not inessential, but vital and positive traits in Jainism, so also the so-called 'accidents' in Kantian metaphysics are not really accidental or superficial and negative traits, but are "positive determinations of the essential character of the object". Emphasising this point Watson observes: "The determinations of substances are not accidents' in the sense of something without which the object would still be what it is : they are just the manner in which the substance exists, or they are positive determinations of the essential character of the object, not determinations related to the object negatively. It is true we sometimes speak as if the modes in which a thing exists were accidents that merely adhere in it and are not essential to its existence. But this mode of speech, though it is natural in certain cases, is not strictly accurate, and is apt to lead to the false notion that the substance can exist, and be what it is, independently of its accidents." PKEW, p. 197; KMEP, Vol. II, p. 217. Cf.: "A mere succession which is not a succession of states of something which remains identical in an unconnected series of endings and beginnings, and with respect to it, "duration',

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136 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE There are, indeed, vital differences between the Jaina and the Kantian metaphysics, e. g., the latter's transcendentalism with its concomitant notion of the thing-in-itself (Dingan-sich), the treatment of space and time as the forms of sensibility, the phenomenality of the world, and several other doctrines with which the Jaina does not concur'. However, Kant's insistence on the need of the co-existence of permanence and change in the realm of the experienced world marks a significant confirmation of the cardinal Jaina doctrine of identity-in-difference with a Western system which is considered to be the watershed of modern Western metaphysics. Having observed how the three great thinkers, Whitehead, Kumarila and Kant, agree with Jainism on the truth of the fundamental Jaina axiom of the co-existence of permanence and change, or identity-in-difference, a further critical analysis of the essential implications of Umasvati's sutra, viz., utpadavyayadhrauvyayuktam sat, may now be attempted. The strength of the proof that identity and difference which has meaning with regard to changes, i. e., succession proper, has no meaning at all." KTKP, p. 272. Caird and others also make frequent references to this "two-fold aspect" of reality so that "all existence is summed up in permanent substances and their states". CPKE Vol. I, p. 488. See also, pp. 490 ff., SCKCE, pp. 152-153 and Critic of Pure Reason, p. 151, ff., Francis Raywood, pub. by William Pickering, 1948, London. To the Jaina the thing-in-itself is inacceptable since he maintains the knowability of all reality. Nor does he consider space and time to be forms of sensibility since the two are intrinsically real and form a necessary part of the physical universe. As a realist he also repudiates the phenomenality of the world and considers it to be unreservedly real.

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CHAPTER V 137 are in a co-ordinate synthesis marks also the measure of success and reasonableness of the Jaina metaphysical position. In order, therefore, to demonstrate that identity and difference are harmonious co-existents, and not irreconcilable or contradictory elements, a critical examination of the Jaina view may be attempted in answer to the following four questions : (a) Does not identity infect difference with its own character, i. e., identity, and convert the latter, i. e., difference, into something of its own nature, in a substance? (b) Or, alternatively, does not difference infect identity with its own character, i. e., difference, and convert the latter, i. e., identity, into something of its own nature, in a substance ? In other words, (a) and (b) mean, respectively, that identity should eschew difference, or difference should eschew identity; and that either the one, or the other, but not the two together, can be the ultimate ontological postulate. Consequently, the truth of (a) indicates a triumph of the identityview, and the truth of (b) of the difference-view. If the truth of neither (a) nor (b) is conceded, and the ultimacy of the postulate of identity-and-difference is adhered to, then the following question would be raised : (c) Does not the hypothesis of identity-and-difference in a substance invoke upon itself the combined evils of both (a) and (b)? If the opponent still finds the Jaina, even under the threat of (c), not pleading guilty to the charge of the irreconcil

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138 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE ability or self-contradictoriness with regard to his hypothesis of the ultimacy of the dual postulate, then an unequivocal answer would be demanded to the following question : (d) Could the Jaina formulate a satisfactory theory which would avoid the objections under (a), (b) and (c) as well as suggest a constructive view of reality? Of these four questions, the first and the second are evidently advanced from the points of view of the theorists of identity (abhedavadin) and of difference (bhedavadin) respectively. Prima facie, the third question is directed against the Jaina because the target of the criticism under question is some kind of identity and difference or ubhayavada. The Jaina, however, does not identify himself with the kind of theory implied by (c) since it is, according to him, suggestive of a mechanical combination of the theories implied by (a) and (b). His own theory-which is undoubtedly a type of the philosophy of identity-in-difference, but sharply distinguished from the schools bearing the same description by its unmistakably unique approach to the nature of reality-is described as "Jatyantaravada' which may be rendered as the theory of uniqueness or theory of unique synthesis. Besides avoiding the pitfalls under the abovementioned first three questions, this theory is claimed to put forth a distinctive view of the nature of reality. A consideration of the four questions may now be undertaken. In carrying out this procedure it will be both convenient and necessary to treat the first two questions, viz., (a) and (b), jointly, and the other two separately. A

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CHAPTER V 139 further treatment of the nature and content of identity in relation to an important problem in modern metaphysics and of an important distinction concerning the nature of difference, will also be found necessary to enable us to obtain a somewhat closer grasp of the Jaina solution to the problem of reality. This will also be found in the sequel'. Now the questions (a) and (b)----which lay down that either identity should obliterate difference or vice versa, owing to their inherent mutual opposition-may be jointly stated, together with all the further erroneous consequences imputed to be entailed in their subsistence. The Jaina hypothesis that identity and difference can somehow (kathancit)" exist together in the same medium is untenable (na yuktam) owing to Virodha (contradiction) and the other erroneous consequences (dosas) implied (upalaksita) by Virodha. If, it is argued, the paryayas are, in any sense, of the same nature' as the dravya, their continuant locus (asraya), then 1. Vide infra, Chap. VIII. "Is dravya a concrete universal?" and "What is Paryaya?"- these two controversial problems will be discussed immediately after the Jaina attitude to the present questions is studied. 2. See infra, p. 141 ff. The Jaina view is characterised as kathancit bhedabhedavada in contrast with the theories of absolute identity (ekantika abhedavada) and of absolute difference (ekantika bhedavada) which are rejected by the Jaina. Hemacandra succinctly puts the argument as follows: dravyaparyayayor aikantikabhedabhedapariharena kathancid bhedabhedavadah syadvadibhir upeyate, na casau yukto virodha. didosat / PMHS, p. 28. 5. Because the Jaina admits that the relation between dravya and its paryayas is bhedabheda.

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140 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE they also acquire (prapnuvanti) identity' (dravyatva), since they are ex hypothesi at one with the dravya (dravyad avyatiriktatvat). In other words, identity cannot accommodate (dussadhya) difference, owing to the law that "dual character can never subsist in any single thing". Conversely, the same circumstance, viz., the sameness" (abhedatva), or the oneness (ekatva) of the dravya and the paryayas, renders dravya-- which is said to be of unchanging nature (avikrtam or abhinnasvabhavatvam)-into something indistinguishable from (avyatiriktam) the mutable paryayas". That is, difference (paryaya) does not allow identity to reside with itself in a real owing to its nature of "exclusiveness" (vyavrttimad rupam). An attempt to weave identity into the texture of difference within the being of a real results, it is said, in the inevitable transformation of the former into the latter. If the Jaina is not (in fact he is not) prepared to accept either of the alternatives of undifferenced identity or unqualified difference resulting from the two conflicting parts of the 1. yad anugatatmarupavyatiriktam tad anugatatmakam eva, yatha dravyarupam... / PK, p. 120. Also, yadiva te'pi paryayah sarve'py anugatatmakah / dravyavat prapnuvanty esam dravyenaikatmata sthiteh // TSS, ka. 318. See also ka. 320. 2. samaveso na caikatra tayor (i. e., sadasator) yukto virodhatah // TSS, ka. 1675...... dvirupatvam naivaikatrasti vastuni (ibid., ka. 1676). Again, yatrabhedas tatra tadviparito na bhedo'vakasam labhate, etc., PK, p. 119. 3. vyavrttimadrupavyatiriktam ca dravyam iti / PK, p. 120. 4. agaune caivam ekatve dravyaparyayayoh sthite / vyavrttimad bhaved dravyam paryayanam svarupavat // TSS, ka. 317.

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CHAPTER V 141 joint question just stated, then he is confronted with the following dosas' or fallacies, to which his bhedabhedavada or dravyaparyayatmakavada is said to be liable : 1. Virodha (contradiction); 2. Vaiyadhikaranya or Vyadhikaranata ('transfusion', or 'absence of a common abode'); 3. Anavastha (regressus ad infinitum); 4. Sankara (confusion); 5. Vyatikara ('Exchange of Natures '); 6. Samsaya (doubt); 7. Apratipatti (non-apprehension); 8. Visayavyavasthahani (indeterminability of the true nature).' 1. Excluding the one karika attributed to the Naiyayikas (yaugaih) by Vadideva, viz., samsayavirodhavaiyadhikaranyasankaram athobhayadosah / anavastha vyatikaram api jainamate sapta dosah syuh // SRK, p. 738. We do not come across anywhere among the works of the non-Jaina critics, where dosas are fully mentioned. The non-Jaina critics mainly concern themselves with Virodha, although Sankara (BBSB, II. 2.33) and Kumarila add Samsaya or Sandigdha (Kumarila has done so in the course of two kas., in defence of "anekatvavada" or "anekantavada". See MSV, Vanavada, kas. 79 and 80. For a reference to this, see infra.) and santaraksita and his commentator Kamalasila Sankarya (Sankara) to Virodha. (TSS, ka. 1722, and PK thereon.) Whether or not the dosas other tha Virodha are explicitly mentioned by the opponents of the Jainas, they are presumed to be implied (upalaksita) by Virodha which is considered to be their main basis (muladhara). Hence their individual enumeration and refutation is, however brief, necessary in any polemical examination of the Jaina view. The number and the order of the dosas in this classification are as adopted by Hemacandra and Mallisena (See PMHS, I. 1.30, p. 28, and SM, p. 150 (text)). Some writers like Prabhacandra cite ubhaya (or ubhayadosa) and omit No. 8 (PKM, p. 526) and others like Akalanka, the earliest Jaina logician to defend the Jaina position against such dosas, and Vasunandi, cite ubhaya and abhava omitting Nos. 7 and 8. (See AGAV, p. 103, and VVAS, on AMS, ka. 20). All these writers retain, in spite of the difference of one or two dosas, a classification of eight dosas. Abhayadeva and Vadideva, however,

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142 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE 1. Virodha'. Most of the schools of Indian thought, which are based on the Brahmasutras, consider, as it has been observed under their treatment of the sutra : naikasmin na sambhavat, that Virodha is the most insurmountable difficulty vitiating the Jaina view of reality. Virodha is a state of represent a trend of opinion which refers only to seven instead of eight dosas. Between these two thinkers the former rejects Nos. 5, 7 and 8, just adding ubhayadosa to the remainder of the classification (See TBV, pp. 451-452, and SRK, p. 738). Gunaratna, however, enumerates as many as nine dosas adding Vyavaharalopa, Pratyaksadipramanabadha and Asambhava in place of Nos. 7 and 8 (TRD, p. 232). For an explanatory note on these three additional dosas as well as on Ubhaya and Abhava, see infra, p. 146, f.n. 3. Ordinarily Virodha signifies the particular dosa of contrary or contradictory opposition. But it has also the collective significance of indicating all the other dosas, enumerated here, by way of upalaksana (cf. SM (notes), p. 264). Another noteworthy feature with regard to opposition is that Indian thinkers, particularly the realistic schools like Jainism, do not seem to make any sharp distinction between contrareity and contradiction as in Aristotelian logic. Contradiction, according to Aristotle, signifies bare and total negation whereas contrareity is a partial negation of a specific attribute, with an implicit affirmation of an opposite attribute. For instance, when I assert "this is not yellow" under contradiction the entire universe of discourse is divided into two spheres, "yellow" and "non-yellow", and the "nonyellow" sphere is sharply ranged over against the "yellow" sphere in the relation of a bare and total negation, the two spheres, between them, exhausting the entire universe of discourse. In contrareity, on the other hand, the same assertion, viz., "this is not yellow", signifies the negation of "yellow" with the implicit assertion of "this is red" or "this is blue" aceording to the suitability of the context. There are, no doubt, in Indian literature and philosophy the conceptions of prasajyapratisedha and paryudasa, which are compared to be the Naiyayika's atyan tabhava ('absolute or

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CHAPTER V mutual opposition', e. g., between 'blue' and 'non-blue, (nilanilavat), 'hot' and 'cold' (sitosnavat) or 'light' and 143 total negation') and anyonyabhava (mutual negation) respectively. Describing the distinction between the two, Cowell observes: Where the negation is prominent it is called prasajyapratisedha; but where it is not prominent, we have the paryudasa negation (SDSC, p. 250, f.n. 1). But these seem to be more in the nature of literary conventions, than of ontological principles of contradiction and contrareity, which have a more adequate and precise philosophical significance. The editor of AJP quotes two verses from the Sahityadarpana describing the two conceptions. See Vol. II, (notes), p. 276. The Jaina conception of opposition seems to be largely akin to the latter kind, at any rate insofar as it asserts that identity, or being, necessarily implies its corresponding correlative of difference or non-being. This approach is countenanced by the fact that the Jaina does not subscribe to the hyperlogical or more conceptualistic approach of a Sriharsa or Nagarjuna, whose hyperlogicism lands them in an absolute of the bare sat (absolute affirmation), or an equally brave void (absolute negation). The extremes of a Sriharsa or a Nagarjuna, the results of a logically subtie sophistication, seem to indicate the fact that truth lies between such extremes. The modest approach of the Jaina conforms to the rule that the laws of logic should closely follow the course of nature. In other words, experience should, according to him, determine logic but not the other way about. This partiality for the factual side of things makes the Jaina suspicious of all transcendental dialectics which drive a wedge between the paravidya and aparavidya or samvrtisatya and paramarthasatya. In fact his dogged adherence to the facts of nature has earned for him, in his approach to the problem of reality, the reputation of being too empirical, like the Pragmatists in the West. Although the note of cynicism attaching to this reputation dubs the Jaina a slow-crawling earthworm rather than a high-soaring transcendent bird, the story of the scientific temper of all ages seems to confirm the fact that excessive preoccupation with the clouds seems to yield more poetry and grander mysticism, which are more often than not less true to the crude facts in the life of nature. 1. parasparapariharasthitilaksano'yam virodha iti / AJP, com., p. 11.

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144 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE darkness' (chayatapavat) at the same place and the same time. A simultaneous affirmation of the two contradictory elements with reference to an identical situation is, therefore, a logical absurdity. Similarly identity (abheda) and difference (bheda) are, it is argued, mutually opposed, and therefore positing (vidhi) the one means denying (nisedha) the other'. Since the two can never co-exist in the same substratum", any attempt to weld the two, viz., identity and difference, being and non-being, or affirmation and negation, into the structure of a real is too fanciful (kalpita) to be resorted to by any sane-minded person (svasthacetasa). 2. Vyadhikaranata is an error which arises when two entirely opposed natures or characters tend to subsist in a single abode (adhikarana) while they ought to subsist in two different abodes. Identity and difference, being entirely opposed to each other, as has just been observed under fault 1. sattvasattvayoh parasparapariharena sthitatvat sitosnasparsavat / TRD, p. 231. See also SBT, p. 81f. Arcata observes: 'utpadavyayadhrauvyayuktam sat'ity etad apy ayuktam, dhrauvyenotpadavyayayor virodhad ekasmin dharminyayogat / HBT, p. 146. tadbhavas catadbhavah parasparavirodhatah / ekavastuni naivayam kathancid avakalpyate // vidhanapratisedhau hi parasparavirodhinau / sakyam ekatra no kartun kenacit svasthacetasa // TSS, kas. 1729 and 1830. See also PK thereon. Haribhadra trenchantly puts the argument for the opponent: katham ekam eva ghatadirupam vastu saccasacca bhavati tatha hi sattvam asattvapariharena vyavasthitam, asattvam sattvapariharena; anyatha tayor avisesah syat / tatas ca yadi sat katham asat? athasat katham sad? iti ekatra sattvasattvayor virodhat, tatha coktam yasmat sattvam asattvan ca viruddham hi mitho dvayam / vastvekam sadasadrupam tasmat khalu na yujyate // AJP, p. 11.

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CHAPTER V 145 No. 1, cannot be found together without bringing about a "split in the integrity of the locus". An endeavour to locate the two in two different abodes will, it is said, violate the Jaina answer to the objection that the two characters refer to two aspects of the same thing, and not to two different things, and would in turn become the target of a new difficulty, viz., 3. Anavastha or regressus ad infinitum, for the following reason : each of the two 'aspects of a thing-identity and difference--will have to be at once both identical with, and different from, the other, if at least for the reason of avoiding absolutism or extremism (ekantatva), to which the Jaina objects. This bifurcation, once started, will go on ad infinitum. 4. Sankara or confusion is another difficulty which is assumed to overtake the Jaina in the pursuit of his theory. It arises when there is an incidence of two mutually opposed natures in either of the two elements, viz., 'identity' or difference'. That is, identity will be an abode both of itself and of its opposite'. Difference also will behave in a similar way. Such behaviour on the part of either is thought to introduce a state of confusion into the abode concerned. 5. Vyatikara or Mutual Exchange of natures is yet another of the erroneous consequences attributed to the Jaina view. The incidence of the two opposed natures of identity and difference in a common abode leads, it is stated, to a 'inutual exchange", of their natures. This would result in the yugapadubhayapraptis sarkarah / PMHS, f.n. 3. Vimaladasa, however, describes it as: sarvesan yugapat praptis sankarah / SBT, p. 82. 2. Cf. parasparavisayagamanam vyatikarah / SBT, p. 82.

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146 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE absurd state of identity behaving like difference and vice versa. 6. Samsaya or Doubt: The simultaneous prediction of both identity and difference of a real is said to bring about a lack of definiteness (idam ittham eveti niscetum asaktih) or doubt, in our minds. For a mind which is confronted with two natures in a real would be unable to know definitely whether the one or the other of the two is the nature of the real. In other words, doubt hinders the grasp of the unique nature of a thing (asadharanakara'). Such a 'forked road situation' of mind is said to lead further to: 7. Apratipatti, or a failure to achieve a proper apprehension of anything. Then, finally, we are said to face of impossibility 8. Visayavyavasthahani or the determining any coherence or order in the realm of objective reality. These myriad discrepancies led by, or rather attri 1. vastuno'sadharanakarena niscetum asakteh samsayah / SM, p. 151 (text). 2. Mallisena characterises it as pramanavisayavyavasthahani. 3. For a statement of these dosas, vide PMHS, p. 28; SBT, pp. 81-82; PKM, p. 526; AGAV, p. 103; TBV, pp. 451-452; TRD, pp. 231232 (Ref. in BM); SVS and SKL thereon, p. 266 f.; SRK, pp. 737-738; and SM (text), pp. 150-151. In the last two works these dosas are mentioned in the context of the relation between the universal (samanya) and the particular (visesa) which is, after all, an aspect of the wider problem of the relation between identity and difference. A brief reference may be made here to the five other dosas noticed by Gunaratna and others (vide supra, p. 141, f.n. 2): 9. Pratiniyatavyavaharalopa, or simply vyavaharalopa, 10. Pratyaksadipramanabadha, 11. Asambhava, 12. Ubhaya and 13. Abhava. These are the five other dosas not mentioned by Hemacandra and Mallisena. 9. Pratiniyatavyavaharalopa is a dosa which introduces chaos in the uniform, or orderly, nature of things. This is said to

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CHAPTER V 147 arise from the Jaina belief in the manifold nature of all things (sarvasyanekantatmakatve'rgikriyamane). If reality is of multiple nature, that is, if all natures or characters subsist in all things, then a person proceeding to get water (jala) may find himself getting fire (anala) and another person proceeding to get fire may find himself getting water. 10. Pratyaksadipramanabadha is what is contrary to all experience of reality by perception and other means of valid knowledge. That is, the bhedabheda nature of reality, as conceived by the Jaina, is not borne out perceptually or inferentially or in any other manner. 11. Asambhava may be described as impossibility, resulting from the supposedly absurd view of reality held by the Jaina. Cf. TRD., p. 232. 12. Ubhayadosa : In the bhedabheda structure of reality the abhedatva signifies unitariness or oneness (ekantenaikatmatva) and the bhedatva signifies manyness or plurality such that there arises the twofold dosa of unity (ekasvabhavaivam) subsisting in plurality (anekantatve) and vice versa (anekasvabhuvatvam ekantatve). (PKM, p. 52, and SRK, p. 739.) 13. Abhava: The nature of this dosa is not clearly indicated. Abhayadeva, however, seems to understand it as a dosa which is presumed to rest on the non-cognisability (apratibhasatve) of the incongruous reality as supposed to be contemplated by the Jaina theory: An incongruous real is, as stated under dosa No. 10 in this f.n., what is contrary to experience and consequently what is contrary to experience is as good as being non-existent (abhava, cf, TBV, p. 452). It is not possible to demarcate clearly and severally the specific features of these dosas since they are highly over. lapping among themselves in their character. For instance ubhayadosa which refers to ekatva or anekatva of the bhedabhcdatmakavastutya may, with a slight turn in the expression be easily included in, or identified with, vadhikaranatadosa which also refers to the need for more than one, instead of one abode or nature. Similarly there is very little or practically no significant difference between the dosas Nos. 7 and 8 on the one hand and those of Nos. 10, 11 and 13 on the other. Even" tually all other dosas are derived from, and therefore traceable to, virodha, the supposedly root evil, against which the Jaina has to marshal out all his dialectical resources.

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148 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE buted to the protean evil (dosa) of virodha are said to befall the Jaina theory of reality which is variously described as identity-in-difference (bhedabheda), or being (sat or bhava) and non-being (asat or abhava), or affirmation (vidhi) and negation (pratisedha). Broadly speaking, virodhadosa is at the back of even the four questions under which we have been endeavouring to examine, critically and comprehensively, the ontological implications of the Jaina theory, although it (virodhadosa) has been enumerated as one of the several dosas in this connection. Obviating this principal evil should, therefore, form the most important part of the Jaina defence against the dialectical charges of the opponent schools whether the charges be the four questions--the first two of which come under the present review-or the seven or more dosas centering round, or deriving from, virodha. There is, in this connection, an important idea which forms the nucleus of almost the entire defensive or refutational as well as of the constructive metaphysical endeavour of the Jainas. It concerns the operative method of combining identity and difference, or being and non-being, or affirmation and negation, into the discriminative synthesis of a real, in which they are necessary, complementary and equal elements. Realization of the vital significance of this idea will reveal it, not merely as a direct answer to the imputation of virodha to the Jaina view, but also as a key to a fuller understanding and appreciation of the comprehensive metaphysical edifice represented by the twofold superstructure of nayavada (the theory of standpoints) and syadvada (the dialectic of relativism) or saptabhangi (the theory of sevenfold predication) which in turn are

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CHAPTER V . 149 reared on the foundation of anekantavada (the doctrine of manifoldness). Deferring an allusion to syadvada or saptabhangi, nayavada and anekantavada to a later stage, we may now address ourselves to an analysis of the central idea which offers the modus operandi of synthesising identity and difference, being and non-being, or affirmation and negation, as a necessary preliminary to the refutations of the charges made against the Jaina view : Every entity comprises, within the fullness of its being, two constituent elements, both equally important, viz., what is itself (svatattva) and what is other-than-itself (paratattva). A jar (ghata), for instance, is constituted not merely by all the traits entering into its making, but also by the numerous other traits which constitute entities like a cloth (pata), a fruit (phala) or a book (pustaka), which are not, or are other than, the jar. The former group of traits forms the positive element (sat or vidhi), that is, what the jar is per se, and the latter group the negative element (asat or nisedha), or whatis-not (or what-is-other-than) the jar? Both the positive and the negative elements constitute the two moments or the two poles of the entity, viz., the jar in the present instance. If reality is considered on the one hand to be all positive, or merely existent (ekantabhavatmake), then everything would be everything else (vaisvarupam syat or sarvatmakam syat). On this hypothesis neither the distinctions among the entities, nor the diverseness of character within the same entity, could be explained : "If a thing had only positive 1. Cf. sarvapadarthanam svarupena sattvam pararupena casattvam / TRD, p. 234.

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150 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE nature, the nature would not be its own; it is because of its negative nature, its differentiation from other things, that a thing possesses its specific nature." Advaitism, owing to its consistent adherence to the principle: ekam evadvitiyam brahma, therefore, explains away the principle of difference. If reality is considered, on the other hand, to be all negation or non-being (ekantabhavatmakatve) then everything would become devoid of any intrinsic nature (nissvabhavata syat) and then the world would be, as has been conceded by the Voidist (Sunyavadin) "a tissue of false things, falsely related" and would vanish like mist...when subjected to philosophic investigation"". 1. SM (notes), p. 165. 2. Cf. anubhava esa mrsa. Nagarjuna's Madhyamika ka. (St. Petersburg Edn.), p. 58. Quoted in OIP, p. 220, f.n. 1. 3. Regarding the controversy whether the Sunyavadin is a nihilist, scholars like Hiriyanna, Dhruva and others maintain, against critics like Sogen and Stcherbatsky, that sunyavadin is a nihilist advocating 'void' or 'essencelessness'-also rendered as 'Emptiness' or 'Universal Void' of all reality as the outcome of philosophic investigation. Hiriyanna observes: "Not the Hindus alone, but the Jainas also, hold the Madhyamika to be a nihilist." OIP, p. 222. He also points out Candrakirti's distinction between the genuine nihilism and the 'common or vulgar nihilism' as consisting in that the former is the result of 'a logical scrutiny', whereas the latter of merely 'a dogmatic or whimsical denial'. The 'result' or conclusion is, of course, the same, viz., all is negative (sarvasunyataiva param tattvam). Ibid., especially f.ns. 1 and 3, in the latter of which two important Jaina authorities (from one of which the. Sanskrit quotation just given within the brackets is taken) are cited. See also SM, Intro. p. CXVII. S. Mookerjee also writes to the same effect: "If non-existence were to be the sole and exclusive character of things, nothing would be existent and, consequently, neither affirmation nor negation of anything would be possible. Paradoxical as it may appear, this is,

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CHAPTER V 151 The Nyaya-Vaisesika no doubt accepts the reality of bhava and abhava, but as "things which are in themselves separate". This method of treating the two as being mutually exclusive (paraspara-vivikta) does direct violence to the integral character of reality (hence the Jaina maxim : sarvabhavanam hi bhavabhavatmakam svarupam"). "The Naiyayika errs" a discerning critic observes in this connection, "by emphasising the one or the other as the exclusive characteristic. But the nature of reals, as has been sufficiently proved by the Jaina, is not exclusive or extremistic. It is existent-cum-non-existent." * This conception of reality as bipolar is the cornerstone of the anekanta ontology. Its wide operative force will become evident in course of the account, in the sequel, of syadvada-saptabhangi and nayavada, the two main methods originating from the fundamental conception of anekantavada, whose ontological aspect is suggested or hinted by the formula of Umasvati.' however, the position seriously maintained by the Voidist (sunyavadin), if we are to believe the interpretation of Candrakirti, the commentator of Nagarjuna, and the criticism of the rival philosophers constitute a faithful representation of the position of Nagarjuna". JPN, p. 82. Whether or not the Sunyavadin believes in a transcendental realm of truth (vivrtisatya) is immaterial in so far as he repudiates 'essencelessness' (nissvabhavata) in the so-called empirical world which, for the Jaina at any rate, is a genuine reality. . 1. Gunaratna, therefore, describes this school as : Kanadayauga - * bhyupagataparaspara-vivikta-dravya-paryayaikanta / TKD, p. 231 2. SM (text), p. 91. 3. JPN, p. 68. Regarding the identification of anekantavada or anantadharmatmakavada with the truth of Umasvati's formula, viz., utpada

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152 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE The positive and the negative elements of a real are not conceived to be related ab extra. They are, as already observed, mutually integral or organic and, therefore, the method for the obtainment of their integral connectedness is not by forging an external linking of them-for that there is no such external linking will be alluded to under the topic of relations-but by making a proper analysis of the internal structure of things, which exhibit, as the monads of Leibnitz do, a complex or manifold network of forces. The moment the fact that the positive and the negative elements form the two sides of the shield of reality is lost sight of, one goes the way of the Advaitin or Sunyavadin. For the Advaitin created the positive aspect of the real, or identity, into the sole principle of reality, just as the Sunyavadin allowed an unrestricted sway of the negative principle on his theorisings, which resulted in the negativistic absolute of the Void. Nor did the Naiyayika fare better by treating each element as being in a severe isolation from the other. Whatever his other faults, the Jaina has maintained, steadily and firmly, the delicate balance of these two elements in the equilibrium of reality. There is due to his conviction that position and negation, or identity and difference, are not mutually opposed with any "aggressive repugnancy of two things that cannot co-exist without collision" but are compelling complements. Each shows 'ragged edges' without vyayadhrauvyayuktam sat, Gunaratna observes: anantadharmatmakasyaivotpadavyayadharmatmakatvam yuktiyuktam ... etc., TRD p. 229. He also gives here an inferential demonstration as well as an explanation of this idea.

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CHAPTER VI E 153 the other. Or, more correctly, the one without the other is not so much half real as unreal. Reserving a further reference to the several finer points of, and the supplementation to, this integral truth of the bhavabhavasvarupatva, or sadasatsvarupatva, of reality, we must take a somewhat closer view of the concept of negation. This is necessary for at least one important reason, viz., that it (negation) is frequently equated to the idea of difference (bheda) which seems to have, unlike pure negation, a positive implication : we have just observed that a concrete jar is the product of the dual principle of the position of jarness and the negation of what-is-other-than-jarness, which is inclusive of clothness (patatva), fruitness (phalatva) and so on. Negation, or 'what-is-other-than-jarness' in the present context, seems to have (in point of fact, it actually has), like its positive counterpart, a positive trait in so far as it signifies what-is-other-than-jarness'. This is so because although we negate clothness', 'fruitness' and 'bookness', etc., under 'what-is-other-than-jarness', in the jar the traits so negated are after all certain determinate traits having a peculiar existence of their own and being connected with 1. Cf. MSV, p. 476, ka. 12. The significance of this ka. is rendered as follows: "Every object has a double character : with regard to its own form, it exists (i.e., as jar a jar exists); while with regard to the form of another object, it does not exist (i.e., as cloth the jar does not exist). Both forms are equally entities; sometimes people cognise the one, sometimes the other". Continuing further to explain the sense' of Kumarila, it is clearly remarked "that the fact of the nonexistence of the cloth in the jar simply means that the cloth in its non-existent form inheres in another object, the jar, and

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154 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE without, of course, being confused with their positive counterpart (svatattva) in an intimate union. If these negative traits were mere non-existents-non-existents' (tuccha) in an unreal sense of the word--then they could not be described as clothness' or 'fruitness' etc. Total negation is one thing and negation of determinate, or even determinable, traits with reference to an existent is quite another. The latter type of negation is negative in a particular ontological setting, although in a different ontological setting these traits may assume a definitely positive character like the jarness in the present context. In other words, position and negation are relative terms and what is the one under one set of circumstances may become the other under a different set of circumstances.' The factors determining whether an aspect of a particular factual situation is positive or negative depend upon the material (dravya), the place (ksetra), the time (kala) and the state (bhava) attaching to the situation. The first and the last among these four factors specify the internal and the remaining two factors specify the external condition of the fact or the object in question. In other words, the material as such, produces the cognition of its non-existent form in the jar", SVJha, p. 244. The italics and what is included within the brackets are as in the original. Another ka., also of Kumarila, bears out the same truth : nastityapi ca samvittir na vastvanugamadste / jnanam na jayate kincidupastambanavarjitam // MSV, p. 478, ka. 16 and SVJha, p. 245. Cf. svadharmyapeksaya yo dharmah sattvadih / sa eva svadharmantarapeksaya dharmi / evam evanekantatmakavyavasthopapatten / TRD, p. 235.

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CHAPTER V 155 (svadravya), from which the object in question is made, the spatial and the temporal setting (svaksetra and svakala), in which it is located, and the state (sva-bhava) it manifests in the specific context concerned, are the fourfold (svadravyadicatustaya) factors, which differentiate the positive aspect of the object concerned from the corresponding negative fourfold factors (paradravyadicatustaya : paradravya, paraksetra, parakala and parabhava), associated with the other or the concomitant negative aspect of the object. A doubt is raised, at this stage, whether the positive aspect, comprising its fourfold determining characteristics, would not be after all the same as the negative aspect, comprising the corresponding fourfold negative characteristics.' This doubt is of course based on the assumption that the positive aspect, like its negative counterpart, belongs to an identical entity; therefore it (the positive aspect) ought to be the same as the other one. This amounts to the identification of position and negation, or being and non-being. The Jaina dialectician promptly objects to this treatment of the situation and reaffirms his position that the two are distinctive elements, although they refer to an identical entity and can, therefore, reside in the same entity since the entity is of a manifold nature. Here he lays stress on the fact that identification of a part (amsa), viz., the positive aspect (bhava), with the other part, viz., the negative aspect (abhava), results in the dual fallacy of dissolving the bhava in the abhava (which means all that is 1. svadravyadisattvam eva paradravyadyasattvam/ AJP, Vol. I, p. 38 ff.

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156 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE positive in the entity), and, consequently, of treating abhava as the entire content of the entity. When abhava or negation becomes the sole content of the entity, the entity disappears without a trace. Like his opponents the anekantavadin is well aware of the fact that predicating two opposing characters of the same aspect of an entity is of course a contradiction : tenaiva svabhavena sac casacceti viruddham etat.' This contradiction is, as will be shown in the sequel, as objectionable to the Jaina as it is to his opponents. But what the opponents have persistently missed observing here is that the so-called 'opposing characters' refer to the two different aspects of an entity and, consequently, become necessary and complementary components of it." This negation, as observed in the concrete setting of the anekanta ontology, is an essential or organic element in the constitution of an entity, which is an intrinsic-extrinsic complex. It is not a vacuum subsisting alongside an unconnected positive existent in a compartmental entity. It is an almost axiomatic belief, on the part of the anekanta vadin, that nature, or reality, abhors vacuum. He maintains, therefore, that negation comprises manifold traits collectively 1. AJP, Vol. I, p. 44. This repudiation of the attempt falsely to identify bhava with abhava contains within itself also the implicit condemnation of the converse attempt to identify abhava with bhava. There is, however, an interesting point which supplements the general trend of the repudiation: abhava, if identified with bhave becomes indistinguishable from the latter and, consequently the entity in question-or, for that matter the entire reality in general-becomes an indifferenced or negationless existence. which is evidently fictitious,

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CHAPTER V 157 designated as otherness (paratva) in every real. This otherness is nothing other than the principle of difference in the constitution of reality which is identity-in-difference. Thus negation with the Jaina is a significant negation which embodies a rich content within itself and not a species of total vacuity. The proportion of the content' comprised in the notion of negation or otherness depends, according to the Jaina thinkers, upon the range of reality engulfed within the context or situation concerned. A customer who wishes to buy a jar from a shop will be satisfied with bringing, under the aspect of otherness, the several kinds of wares which are not jars, whereas a kevalin (a realised soul) will have, in his vision which is sub specie aeternitatis, an illimitable plenitude of objects in their infinite network of complex relations present to him against a contemplated situation. : This relativistic trend of thought finds its consummate expression in the idea that the full knowledge of anything is inextricably bound up with the full knowledge of everything and vice versa. This truth is lucidly expressed by a stanza which states that "he who knows one thing completely knows all things, and that "he alone who knows all things knows anything completely". 1. Cf. evam cailcasminnarthe jnate sarvesam arthanam jnanam / sarvapadarthaparicchedam antarena tannisedhatmana ekasya vastuno viviktataya paricchedasambhavat / SM (text), p. 92. eko bhavah sarvatha yena drstah sarve bhavah sarvatha tena drstah / sarve bhavah sarvatha yena drsta eko bhavah sarvatha tena drstah // SM (text), p. 92 and OIP, p. 171.

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158 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE A canonical gatha, quoted by Mallisena, also runs to the same effect: je egan janai se savvam janai / je savvam janai se egam janai // SM (text), p. 92. The notion of relativity has had a long and varied history of development in Indian as well as in Western philosophy. Its influence, under several forms akin to the Jaina view of anekanta (manifold or indeterminate) reality, will be alluded to elsewhere. (See ch. IX.) Its application in Western philosophy ranges from Protagoras, the author of the well-known dictum: "Man is the Measure of all things", in ancient Greece, to Albert Einstein, the originator of the celebrated theory of Relativity, in physics today. The reverberations of the Einsteinian theory, of physics, on the numerous branches of human knowledge, including philosophy, have been heard in increasing measure, for about a quarter of a century. The notion of relativity is associated with theories such as are not merely divergent but are, often, mutually opposed. For instance, Berkeleyan idealism and Humean scepticism are, despite their opposition in important respects, both described as relativistic on the common grounds that they maintain that the "inmost nature" of "things" is "unknowable, inscrutable, and inconceivable, not to us merely, but to every other creature" (see J. S. Mill's An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, 2nd ed., London, 1865, p. 10). This meaning of relativity is reminiscent also of Kant's "unknowableness of things in themselves" as well as of Herbert Spencer's "ever unknown" or "unknowable reality existing behind all appearances" (H. Spencer's First Principles, 6th ed, The Thinkers Library, London, 1937, p. 55). There are many thinkers, ancient and modern, who subscribe to this view (vide Spencer, op. cit., p. 55, and Mill, op. cit., p. 11). Sir William Hamilton's impressive "Testimonies", classical and other, substantiating the "relativity of knowledge", in the sense in which relativity is referred to in the present paragraph, are of considerable interest. H. Spencer's and J. S. Mill's chapters on "The Relativity of All Knowledge" and "The Relativity of Human Knowledge" in the First Principles (ch, IV) and An Examination (chapters II and III), just cited, are of no less interest.

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CHAPTER V W. Wundt, a great psychologist of the period prior to that of Einstein's theory of relativity, enunciates 'the law of relativity' which coincides, at any rate in one of the essential implications, with the Jaina conception of the manifold (anekanta) nature of conciseness (cf. ch. IX). His 'law', supported also by Thomas Hobbes and Alexander Bain, maintains "that every phase of experience is influenced by every other phase of experience of the moment, and also by the whole past history of consciousness" (see Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. II, ed. J. M. Baldwin, 1911, New York, p. 450; see also the editor's Handbook of Psychology, 2nd edn., London, 1890, pp. 58-63; James Ward's article on "Psychology" in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed., 1891, London, p. 558; H. Hoffding's Outlines of Psychology, E. T. by M. E. Lowndes, 1891, London; and Mill's op. cit., p. 6 and f. n. thereon). This 'law' has also been affiliated, by its authors, to the Berkeleyan and Humean tenet of the 'unknowableness' of the 'inmost' nature of reality. The implication of interrelatedness of each phase of experience to all phases of experience, according to this 'law' is therefore a superimposition upon the theory of 'unknowable' reality. The point of comparison between this 'law' and the Jaina conception of manifold reality does not, therefore, extend beyond the common point of interrelatedness between the two schools in question. Further, the 'law' is bound by two limitations with respect to the comparison: (1) that it is purely psychological and, on the side of Jainism, applies only to the sphere of consciousness and not to total reality of which consciousness is a part and (2) that it superadds to itself the philosophical theory of an 'unknowable' reality in sharp contrast to Jainism which subscribes to an attitude of direct access to, or cognition of, reality. A. N. Whitehead however, complements the truth of Wundt's psychological relativity, touching, by means of his principle of 'the signi ficance of events', the objective side of reality: "Returning to the significance of events", he observes in The Principle of Relativity (Cambridge, 1922, p. 26), "we see there is no such thing as an isolated event. Each event essentially signifies the whole structure. But, furthermore, there is no such thing as a bare event." (See also The Concept of Nature, Cambridge, 1920, p. 29, para 2, etc.) These two sides of the truth of relativity, viz., the subjective side as advanced by Wundt and the 159

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160 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE objective side as advanced by Whitehead, give, between them, of course in a rough and ready manner, the total scope of the meaning attached by the Jaina philosophers to the notion under consideration. The Einstein theory of relativity has given rise to a new development of the notion of relativity in the framework of a four-dimensional reality (for the meaning of the fourth dimension' see the lucid passage in S. A. Eddington's The Romanes Lecture on the Theory of Relativity and its Influence on Scientific Thought, Oxford, 1922, pp. 15-16). Making allowance for the differences in the cosmological structure between the highly complex physical theory of Relativity of Einstein and philosophical theory of relativity in Jainism we observe that the two theories are governed by one or two important features which suggest a considerable mutual affinity between them. A brief indication of these features may be made here: Stating the position of relativity in Einstein's theory Viscount Haldane observes (The Reign of Relativity, London, 1921, p. 85; see also p. 88, para 2): "Two systems at a distance from each other, moving in different directions and with different velocities, may, for observers in them of a common object, be productive of results signifying different truths, in the form of shapes and measurements of space and time as actually and correctly observed". In other words, an object is not just what it appears to be from one viewpoint and the other viewpoints are not deviations from, or distortions of, that one absolute or isolated presentation. An object is, in the words Sir A. Eddington, perhaps the greatest exponent of the Theory of Relativity so far in England, "a symposium of worlds presented to different viewpoints" (The Nature of the Physical World Everyman's Library, London, 1935, p. 275). "The more stand-. points, the better" (The Romanes Lecture, p. 24). Bertrand Russell calls individual viewpoints 'aspects' or 'private worlds' and defines an object ("thing') as system of aspects', or a 'system of perspectives', or simply perspectives'. (Cf. "The system consisting of all views of the universe, perceived and unperceived, I shall call the system of perspectives'. I shall confine the expression 'private worlds' to such views of the universe as we actually perceive.... Thus an aspect if a 'thing' is a member of the system of aspects which is the thing." OKEW, pp. 95-6). Both Eddington and Russel admit the possibility of

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11 CHAPTER V "correlation" among the "worlds" or "private worlds" which have their basis in the object or "the referent" (cf. The Nature of the Physical World, p. 275, and OKEW, p. 96). Otherwise such a lack of intercommunication among such "worlds" leads to a solipsistic world-view, an interpretation which H. Dingle makes of the theory of Relativity. The snag in any mentalistic hypothesis, such as that of Dingle and, in the ultimate analysis, of Eddington himself (as will presently be shown) is that it does eventually, lead to a solipsistic universe despite any professions to the contrary (see Part II, chap. IX for criticisms against idealism, in general, and for a controversy in this specific issue, between Dingle & others. Dingle is logical (but not necessarily truthful) in so far as he is aware of the solipsistic implications of his interpretation. 161 The elements of 'standpoints' and 'aspects', so far considered have an unmistakable resemblance to anekantavada, in general, and nayavada and, to some extent, syadvada, the two primary modes of anekantavada, in particular, although this resemblance does not admit of a close point-for-point correspondence. A naya, or a standpoint, offers, according to Jainism, a partial truth of a real (vastvamsagrahi naya), whose full truth could be comprehended in a totality or 'symposium' of such partial truths or presentations, actual and possible. Similarly, the word 'syat' in 'syadvada' is indicative of the other inseparable but distinguishable 'aspects' or presentations in any complex entity. Further, the immense complexity of a real, under the theory of Relativity, answers, in general, to the manifold or indeterminate (anekatva) structure of reality under the Jaina theory of relativity. Lastly, the question whether relativity is rooted in a subjective or an objective universe, according to the theory of Einstein, is closely bound up with the treatment of the notion of relativity in relation to Jainism. As Haldane points out (The Reign of Relativity, p. 53) there are two schools of thought which interpret Einstein's relativity. One of them tends towards "mentalism" and the other towards objectivism or realism. The great Eddington himself is a notable adherent to the former view, also called structuralism. In his exposition of the theory of Relativity he observes: "All through the physical world runs that unknown content, which must surely be the stuff of consciousness...... And, moreover, we have

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162 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Having gone, in considerable detail, into the way in which being and non-being, or identity and difference, have been integrated in concrete reality, we may now resume the treatment of the dosas which have been already formulated, elsewhere. The leading dosa is, as already observed, virodha or contradiction, and the other dosas are only the expression of its various aspects. The refutation of virodha implies, found that where science has progressed the farthest the mind has but regained from nature that which the mind has put into nature". Concluding this thesis he further remarks, "We have found a strange foot-print on the shores of the unknown. We have devised profound theories, one after another, to account for its origin. At last, we have succeeded in reconstructing the creature that made the foot-print. And Lo! it is our own." (Space, Time and Gravitation, Cambridge, 1920, pp. 200-201. See also the Reign of Relativity, p. 105, and Broad's elucidation and criticism of Eddington's thesis presented at the Symposium on "The Philosophical Aspect of the Theory of Relativity", Mind, N. S., 1920, pp. 414-49). Giving us a "glimpse of Reality" "reached" by "the modern scientific theories" which evidently include the theory under consideration, the same thinker speaks: "To put the matter crudely, the stuff of the world is mind-stuff.... The mind stuff is the aggregation of relations and relates which form the building material for the physical world". (The Nature of the Physical World, pp. 266 ff.) A counterblast to this mentalism of some "experimental philosophers" like Eddington, and, at the moment, of H. Dingle, comes from an even larger number of equally competent "experimental philosophers" and others, the most notable among them being Max Born, A. N. Whitehead, Bertrand Russell, H. P. Ushenko and Henry Margenau. Reference is made elsewhere (see Part II, chap.IX), to the views, realistic or objectivistic, of the latter group of thinkers, excepting that of A. N. Whitehead since it has been referred to in this footnote. H. Dingle's view, as well as the criticisms thereon, may also be noticed thereunder. The relevance of some of the ideas considered in course of this footnote to the Jaina conception of reality will become even more evident at the later stages of this work.

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CHAPTER V 163 therefore, a substantial part of the refutation-though a somewhat implicit one-of the others also. A brief reference to the criticism of each of the other dosas is also made with a view to give completion to the dialectical examination of the ontological stand taken by the Jaina : There are, according to the Jaina, three' possible forms (rupas) in which virodha can occur: 1. Vadhyaghatakabhava (the destructive opposition); 2. Sahanavasthanabhava (the non-congruent opposition) and 3. Pratibadhyapratibandhakabhava' (the obstructive opposition). The first one holds between two 'hostile' participants or factors one of which is stronger than and, therefore, destructive (ghataka) of the other (vadhya) if the two are brought together (samyoge). The illustration cited under this form of opposition is that of the mongoose (nakula) and the serpent (ahi) between which the the mongoose is stronger and, therefore, the preying agent in relation to its prey, the serpent. The condition that the agent and the patient (the serpent) should be brought together in a single situation is important in view of the fact 1. On a closer examination the three forms, an account of which follows immediately, seem to make a cross division although each of the three has more or less a specific feature of its own. The opposition between a mongoose and a serpent has been instanced as coming under vadhyaghatakavirodha, although it would not be wrong to bring it under either of the two other forms of virodha. This overlapping division does not, however, affect the truth of the Jaina stand, 2. The English equivalents, though somewhat inadequately rendered, are adopted for brevity. When fully rendered they become: 1. The opposition of the destroyed and the destroyer, 2. The opposition of non-congruence', and 3. The opposition of the obstructed and the obstructor, respectively. The term 'non-congruence'is after S. Mookerjee's rendering.

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164 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE that if they remain two independent or separate facts they would not be opposed. If opposition could come into play even when they are separate or unconnected factors, then no serpent could ever exist in a world which is inhabited by the species of mongoose. Similarly there would be no fire left in a world where there is water. The paradox of the situation is that the two factors cannot, however, be brought together into a state of lasting union owing to their inherent opposition to each other. Even if they are coerced into a union the stronger member would destroy the weaker one and become the sole occupant, or the content, of the situation. Such a union of being and non-being with an imminent danger of a destructive union hanging upon it is not admitted to exist even for a moment (ksanamatram api) between sat and asat in the anekanta ontology. This is so because the participant factors are admitted to be of equal strength (tulyabalatvat) and, therefore, of a co-ordinate nature which admits of no fissure, in a real which can be described as unified complex or a complex union. 2. Sahanavasthanabhava, or the congruent opposition, is a form of contradiction which occurs in the case of two states which can not exist together in one substratum. It is possible for the two states in question to exist at different periods of time (kalabhedena) but they cannot do so, it is stated, at the same period of time. In a raw state a mango, for instance, is green (syama). In a ripe state the same mango becomes yellow (pita). But the raw and the ripe states cannot, it is admitted, exist together in the mango since the two states are, in the present case, consecutive (purvottarabhavinau). The Jaina maintains that this form of virodha also cannot affect

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CHAPTER V 165 his conception of reality as astitvanastitvarupatmaka in as much as both astitva and nastitva are concurrently revealed to exist together in concrete fact. If the two states, viz., astitva and nastitva, are consecutive, or exclusive, then when astiva prevails all would be indistinguishably existent, and similarly, when nastitva prevails all would become totally nonexistent. In such circumstance the occurrence of astitva when all is nastitva and vice versa becomes an absurd proposition: sarvathaiva satah punar atmalabhabhavat, sarvatha casatah punar abhavapraptyanupapatter naitayos sahanavasthanam yujyate'. Hence to avoid this anomaly it is appropriate to assume that astitva and nastitva are concurrent in reality. 3. Pratibadhyapratibandhakabhava, or the obstructive opposition, is said to occur between two events or facts when one obstructs the occurrence of the other. The removal of the obstructing fact is, under this form of contradiction, the necessary antecedent condition for the occurrence of the other. To quote a traditional example, under the protective influence of a moonstone' (candrakantamani, the fictitious gem with cooling property) the rays of the sun cannot, it is said, burn us. That is, the occurrence of the burning effect is conditional upon the removal of the heat-obstructing stone. Similarly heat, which is an obstructing factor to cold, needs to be removed before a body feels cold. The Jaina view of astitvanastitvasvarupatva of reality is not accepted to be liable to this form of virodha also. The obvious reason 1. SBT, p. 88.

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166 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE advanced is that both elements are concurrently revealed to our observation. At this juncture it is necessary to point out a grave misapprehension which has implicitly prejudiced the opponents of Jainism with regard to the Jaina attitude to the problem of contradiction : The Jaina has been generally assumed to indulge, almost wantonly, in contradiction, particularly in relation to the development of his theory of reality. He has, of course, continually repudiated this assumption. In fairness to the impartial canons of philosophical criticism it is obligatory on the part of critics to realise the distinction between an avowedly conscious attempt to build up an ontological scheme on the foundation of contradiction, and an attempt to frame an ontological scheme which might seem to some critics to lead to a contradiction. The former attempt does not, but the latter does, absolve the author of the scheme from the intention of entertaining contradiction as an important element in the scheme. The Jaina seems to have persistently met with such a misconception of his ontological endeavour at the hands of even such great thinkers as Sankara and Dharmakirti--not to mention several others whose dialectical acumen is of a lesser order. The Jaina himself does not think even for a moment that his theory of reality is built upon, or even leads to, contradiction. He is as zealous in the avoidance of contradiction as any of his adverse critics. Nowhere has he been seen to compromise on this subject. The three forms of contradiction just referred to sufficiently indicate his adherence to a non-contradictory approach to the problem under consideration. In a proper dialectical evaluation of the essential concepts in a certain

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CHAPTER V 167 school of thought, understanding the concepts as their authors wish them to be understood before proceeding to find out their faults is not the least part of a critic's duty. There is a deeper consideration underlying the repudiation of the forms of contradiction with regard to the Jaina conception of reality. It lies in the fundamental difference in the approach to the problem of reality between the Jaina and the non-Jaina--especially the idealistic Advaitic and the Buddhist-schools. The difference may be stated, in modern phraseology, to be one between aposteriorism and apriorism. Aposteriorism signifies a direct appeal to experience and apriorism to some kind of 'intuition' which is "pure and transcendental". The intuitional or the aprioristic view would not of course object to the idea of experience being the sphere of verification of a truth. But it objects to the treatment of experience as the sole determinant of the knowledge and of the validity of its truth. This point of view is clearly expressed in the following observation : "The opposition between being and non-being is known a priori and does not stand in need of verification to validate it. Its validity is self-certified, and though experience may illustrate its truth it does not confer validity upon it. Its validity is intrinsic, being derived from the aprioristic constitution of our thought-principle. If experience is found to be in consonance with this law, as known a priori, it is true and valid, and if it is found to be at variance with it, it must be rejected as false".! 1. JPN, p. 18.

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168 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE The aposterioristic view of the Jaina, on the contrary, takes the attitude that experience is the source of the knowledge as well as of the validity of its truth. There is, on this view, no transcendental or transempirical region of pure' thought, from which the so-called contingent and particular truths can derive their truthfulness or validity and universality. Experience which gives rise to a knowledge of truths also imprints on it the signature of their selfcertitude and self-validity. This assumption, viz., that experience is the source of knowledge and the validity of all truths, underlies the Jaina assertion that if experience does not vouch for contradiction', then contradiction itself is false' and not the experience. Hence the Jaina feels that his view of reality as existence-cum-non-existence (bhavabhavatmaka or sadasadatmaka) is irrefutably valid. v 1. The refutation of Virodha, supposedly the most important of the dosas attributed to the Jaina theory of reality, is 1. pratiyamane vastuny avirodhat. PKM, p. 93. See also PHMS, p. 28. Pascal offers a corrective to those who are so obsessed with contradiction that they see it even where it is not. Although the Jaina does not subscribe to Pascal's view as indicated in the following passage, it is interesting to observe how Pascal gives a glimpse into the other side of the picture, as it were, than the one given by the idealistic enthusiasts: "Contradiction is", observes Pascal, "a poor sign of truth; much that is certain is open to contradiction, much that is false passes without contradiction. Neither is contradiction a mark of untruth, nor absence thereof a mark of truth". Pascal's Pensees, p. 95, H. F. Stewart, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London (1950).

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CHAPTER V 169 believed to weaken considerably the strength of the other dosas. These dosas have already been formulated elsewhere and referred to as being eventually the various aspects of virodha. One or two points of criticism against each of them may, however, be briefly supplemented to the above account of the Jaina refutation of contradiction. 2. The vyadhikaranatadosa or the fault that the Jaina notion of reality as bhava and abhava requires two abodes, loses its point owing to the fact that both bhava and abhava are unconflictingly revealed (pratibhasanat) together in a single locus (ekadhikaranatvena)'. 3.. Anavastha or the infinite regress, as applied to the Jaina theory, is claimed to need an endless progression of predicating sattva and asattva in their togetherness, of each aspect, viz., sattva and asattva of the continually-increasing series of the pairs of sattvasattva characteristics in a substance. The Jaina adduces the following argument against this charge : sattva and asattva are, according to him, the attributes of substance (vastu) itself and cannot, therefore, be treated as further attributes of attributes which they would be if the opponent is right. This principle is clearly stated by Gunaratna: sattvasattvadayo vastuna eva dharmah, na tu dharmanam dharmah, dharmanam dharma na bhavantiti vacanat.' Umasvati also authoritatively 1. napi vaiyadhikaranyam; nirbadhabodhe bhedabhedayoh sattva sattvayor va ekadharataya pratiyamanatvat / PKM, p. 535, and NEEP, p. 371. See also TRD, p. 236, PMHS, p. 28, and TBV, p. 452. 2. TRD, p. 234. Cf. NKC, p. 371, and PKM, p. 536.

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170 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE confirms this truth in the sutra : dravyasraya nirgunah gunah'. Sattva and asattva, the attributes of a vastu only, cannot, therefore, give rise to further pairs of similar attributes. Hence the question of anavastha, the Jaina concludes, does not arise in his case.' 4. Sankara, and 5. Vyatikara : Neither sarkara (confusion) nor vyatikara (exchange of natures) between bhava and abhava would arise from the Jaina point of view owing to the admitted fact that the variegated character of reality is clearly evident as in the case of a multi-coloured gem (mecakaratna) or of a similar fabric (citrapata). Moreover, 1. TRAG, p. 243. Further, in course of his defence of the Jaina stand against this charge, Gunaratna distinguishes two kinds of infinite regress (anavastha): one the vicious' infinite, and the other the nonvicious or the 'harmless' (asakta) infinite. The names he gives them respectively, are mulaksatikari (lit. that which cuts the root) and amulaksatikari (lit. that which does not cut the root). They are so described because the first one tends to cut at the very root of the substance it analyses and the second one to 'save' the root. The second one is also described as being indicative or illuminative of the manifoldness of reality (amulaksatikaritvena pratyutanekantasyoddipakatvat). See TRD, p. 234, and compare the stanza, quoted by Gunaratna, with the one pointed out by Dasgupta as having been quoted by Jayanta (HIP, Vol. I, p. 160, f. n. 1). Although both of them describe the two distinctions of the vicious' and the 'harmless' infinites the latter half of the stanza quoted by Gunaratna is adapted to express the 'anantya' or 'the anekantatva' principle of Jaina ontology. It is, however, a pity that Gunaratna does not fully work out the implications of his argument and show how the 'harmless' infinite-which he exalts as being a 'bhusana'-is directly applicable to the Jaina theory which is, ex hypothesi, accepted as being free from any kind of infinite regress.

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CHAPTER V among the diverse shades of colour in such objects no one shade is taken for another nor does. any of them exchange its character for that of another. Because they all together form an intelligible and unitary pattern in which each shade has its own specific place and feature. Similarly the unitary bhava would be empty without the diversified abhava; and the diversified abhava would be meaningless without the . unitary bhava. Once the mutual necessity of the two is realised the question of confusion and misplacement in regard to the two elements in reality would not arise. 171 6. Samsaya: that doubt or lack of definiteness (adrdhapratiti) would haunt a mind confronted with the dual nature of reality is, according to the Jaina, also ill-founded owing to the vivid revelation of both being and non-being (sattvasattvayoh sphutarupenaiva pratiyamanatvat) in a vastu'. An acute observation of Kumarila also bears out this truth. 7. Apratipatti, and 8. Visayavyavasthahani: A complex structure as well as a coherent order being indubitably transparent in a real denial of either would be, according to 1. TRD, p. 236, and PMHS, p. 28. 2. This occurs in the following passage where Kumarila also maintains the doubtlessness (na sandigdham; suniscitam) of the non-absolute character (anekatva; anyananyatva or sattvasattvarupatva) of our knowledge of a vastu: "This fact of the nonabsolute character of an object, does not render our cognition of it doubtful (or invalid). Because it is only where cognition itself is doubtful that we can have its invalidity. In the present case, however, our cognition is perfectly certain, viz., that the object is of non-absolute... character (and as such, the validity of this cognition cannot be doubted)". SVJha, p. 344. 3. pratipanne ca vastuny apratipattir iti sahasam/ PMHS, p. 28.

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172 the anekantavadin, untruthful.' Hence these two dosas also are inapplicable to the Jaina conception of reality. 1. JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Arthakriyakaritvavada Hitherto the various objects of the abhedavadin and the With regard to the five dosas noticed on p. 146, f. n. 3, there is nothing strikingly new beyond what has already been given under the statement of the modus operandi by which being and non-being are synthesised in reality, as well as of the eight dosas hitherto dealt with. The refutation of fault No. 9, viz., pratiniyatavyavaharalopa, by virtue of which there would be, it is contended, a 'chaos' in the order of things-a 'chaos' in which a person proceeding to get water might get fire and vice versa-is contained in the statement of the modus operandi by which svatattva and paratattva are combined (supra, p. 149 ff.). In other words, water or fire has its own specific nature which is distinguishable from everything else. Were it not so, chaos would certainly break out among things as well as in our cognitions of them (cf. TRD, p. 236). Reference has already been made to the overlapping character of the refutations of the various dosas on p. 146, f. n. 3, and p. 163, f. n. 1. This is particularly evident in the case of the remaining four faults; viz., ubhaya (no. 12), pratyaksadipramanabadha (no. 10), asambhava (no. 11) and abhava (no. 13), which have also been noted in course of the same footnote. The answer to the charge of uhhayadosa would be, as already indicated, a variation of the answer to the charge of vyadhikaranatadosa. That is, just as bhava and abhava can reside in the same abode, so also oneness and manyness can. Similarly, the faulty notions of 'being contrary to all experience', 'impossibility', and 'non-existence' (the last two of these being the consequences of the first one), which have been brought under no. 10, no. 11 and no. 13 respectively, have been repudiated, in spirit if not in letter also, under the one or the other of the eight dosas, particularly under virodha, apratipatti and visayavyavasthahani. Cf. TRD, p. 236.

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CHAPTER V bhedavadin to the Jaina view of reality have been jointly stated and the answers from the Jaina point of view also have been outlined. There is, however, one important principle which the Buddhist claims to be closely connected with his bhedavada and on which it is necessary to ascertain the Jaina stand. It is the principle of arthakriyakaritva or causal efficiency which is considered by the Buddhist to form the essence of reality. The Buddhist's arguments against the applicability of this principle to any kind of abhedavada or dravyavada have already been considered' at some length. The Jaina shares the Buddhist's opposition to dravyavada almost entirely, although some Buddhist critics imagine', not rightly, as will be shown in the process of answering the present as well as the next question, that this opposition to dravyavada affects the Jaina position as well, in so far as the Jaina theory is concerned with the dravya as an element of reality. There are, however, two important points of difference between the Buddhist and the Jaina in the meaning they attach to dravyavada in their common denunciation of the view which connects this notion of arthakriyakaritva with dravyavada. First the Buddhist is against dravyavada of any kind, while the Jaina is against ekantadravyavada. Secondly, the Buddhist's attack actually turns out, whatever his profession may be, to be on the hypothesis of the static (kutasthanitya) dravya whereas the Jaina's attack is also on 4. 173 1. See NBD, p. 103, NBTD, p. 17, PVD, II. 3, and HBT, p. 145 ff. See supra, pp. 52-56. 2. 3. See, for instance, TBV, p. 327 ff., PHMS, pp. 25-26, AVP, St. 26 and the SM. thereon, etc. See infra, p. 187, f.n. 4, p. 190, f.n. 1, and p. 193.

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174 the same hypothesis but only as a contrast to his own theory of the dynamic (parinami) dravya. It is needless to recount the Jaina arguments against ekantadra vyavada since they are largely on the same lines as those of the Buddhist', which have already been noticed earlier except for the difference with respect to the connotation of dravyavada just stated. The Jaina dialecticians" like Prabhacandra, Hemacandra, Abhayadeva and Mallisena do not merely show, with the Buddhist, the inapplicability of the principle of causal efficiency to the hypothesis of dravyaikantavada. They also pursue the consequences of the application of this principle even into the sphere of the Buddhist hypothesis of ksanikavada, the paryayaikantavada or the anityavada' as the Jainas would call it-which maintains that reality is a series 1. JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE 2. 3. 4. Cf. TBV, p. 729. See supra, pp. 52-56. Akalanka is perhaps the earliest Jaina writer to dispute the relevance of the idea of arthakriyakaritva, in its two modes (to be mentioned presently) to the nityavada or the dravyaikantavada on the one hand and to the ksanikavada or the paryayaikantavada on the other. He observes: arthakriya na yujyeta nityaksanikapaksayoh / kramakramabhyam bhavanam sa laksanataya mata // AGAM (and AGAV thereon), p. 4. See also PKM, pp. 498-499, PMHS, pp. 25-27, TBV, pp. 324-331, 400-403 and 728-729, SM, pp. 18-20, NVVS, p. 91, AVV, p. 202 and SRK, p. 731. Vacaspatimisra, Jayantabhatta and Bhadanta Yogasena are among the early non-Jaina critics of the Buddhist idea of arthakriyakaritva. They all, of course, criticise it from the points of view of their respective doctrines. See NVTT, pp. 554-556, NM, pp. 453 and 464, TSS, kas. 428-434, and PK thereon. ekantanityavadanitye'pi kramakramabhyam arthakriyasambhavat / PKM, p. 499. See also NVVS, pp. 91-92.

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CHAPTER V 175 of discrete moments without the thread of an inner connectedness. They try to show how arthakriyakaritva-a principle so dearly cherished by the Buddhist, who went, at certain stages, even to the extent of deriving' his very conception of reality, viz., ksanikavada, from it, or, at any rate, of identifying it with ksaaikavada--deserts him when the consequences of its application to his theory of reality are examined. Without going into much detail the main features of the Jaina argument may be outlined as follows : The Jaina contends that causal efficiency is incongruous* with the doctrine of momentariness or ksanikavada-also We can distinguish three meanings in the evolution of the principle of arthakriyalaritva from the early times. At first it conveyed the simple meaning of the fulfilment (siddhi) of any need', then it meant 'action' (anusthiti) and finally it came to mean the efficiency of causing any action or event or simply the causal efficiency, which became the universally accepted definition of existence'. See HIP, Vol. I, p. 163, f.n. 1. Or to express its development in a somewhat different way at first, it was treated as a criterion of knowledge', then as a 'criterion of existence', and lastly, as 'the other name of existence' (that is arthakriyakaritva came to be regarded not merely as a characteristic of reality but as reality itself: arthakriyakaritvameva sattvam tacca ksanikanameveti, HBT, p. 145). Das Gupta draws our attention to the fact that athough it was historically derived from the prior doctrine of momentariness, later on, momentariness itself was sought to be proved as 'the logical result of the doctrine of arthakriyakaritva'. Ibid., p. 154, f.n. 1, and p. 209, f.n.2. But whatever the variations in its meaning may have been, fundamentally arthakriyakaritva is treated by the Buddhist thinkers as the essence, or the characteristic, which is universally concomitant with all existence. There fore, it is used in this sense in the course of this work. 2. Prabhacandra mentions four dosas, viz., asiddha, viruddha, anai kantika and kalatyayapadista, which are incidental to ksanikavada in its relation to arthakriyakaritva. See NKC, Vol. I, p. 379 ff.

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176 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE called the ekantanityavada or paryayavada-although the Buddhist himself considers causal efficiency as the very essence of his doctrine. The Jaina endeavours to prove his contention by analysing the only possible two modes in which causal efficiency can function in a reality which consists of discrete and perishing moments (pratiksanavinasibhava) without any thread of inner necessity connecting them into some kind of unity. The two modes are succession or consecutiveness (krama or paurvaparya) and succession (akrama) or simultaneity. The causal efficiency cannot, the Jaina maintains, function successively owing to the fact that the momentary existence (ksanas) lack abiding nature and, therefore, can have neither spatial nor temporal extension. Successionspatial or temporal-involves the notions of 'before' and 'after' which are absent from the moment. In confirmation of this contention both Hemacandra and Mallisena cite a stanza which may be rendered as follows: "Whatever is a a point of space is there alone and whatever is at an instant of time is also exclusively there. Thus in this (hypothesis, viz., the paryayaikantavada) there is no spatial or temporal extension for the entities."1 1. If the Buddhist replies to this contention by stating that although the moments perish and have no extension in space or time they do form a continuous series (santana), which The stanza runs: yo yatraiva sa tatraiva yo yadaiva tadaiva sah/ na desakalayor vyaptir bhavanam iha vidyate // non SM (text), p. 19.

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CHAPTER V 177 does not perish and, therefore, enables the moments to be successive, then the Jaina propounds to his opponent an inescapable problem: In the first place, santana or the continuous series is an unreal fiction (santanasyavastutvat). Even the opponent has to admit this, since there is, according to him, nothing else than the self-sufficient moments. Secondly, supposing the reality of santana is conceded for the sake of the argument, even then the Buddhist position will be as illogical as before, for santana also would then have to share, ex hypothesi, the momentary character of the units in it. This would be a needless duplication of momentariness in another medium (santana) which is not merely imposed, falsely, on the momentary units, but also can never sustain any continuance in it.' Lastly, if any continuance or non-momentariness is acquiesced in by the Buddhist, then the poignant sarcasm? (suggesting self-impeachment or self-conviction) of Jayanta and Hemacandra would be fully deserved by the Buddhist who thereby compromises his ardent passion for the notion 1. This Buddhistic notion of santana like its analogous notion of "logical construction" or "symbolic fiction" as developed by Russell, has been criticised earlier. See pp. 44 (-50), f.n. 2. Jayanta disarms his opponent by the following observation : athapi nityam paramarthasantam santananamanam upaisi Bhavam / uttistha bhikso phalitas tavasah so'yam samaptah ksanabhangavadah // NM, p. 464 (quoted by Hemacandra also in PMMS, p. 27). Hemacandra also remarks in the same strain : athaksanikatvam; susthitah paryayaikantavadah. PMHS, p. 26. See also SM (text), 12 P. 19

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178 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE of exclusive momentariness (bhedaikanta) and admits what he has all along fought against. The Buddhist fares no better in his plea for the other mode, viz., the simultaneous functioning of the causal efficiency which might be supposed to repose in the vanishing moments of his conception. This may be illustrated by means of the example of a fruit which simultaneously reveals diverse effects like colour, taste, etc. In this case a question which naturally arises is whether the colour-moment' (rupaksana) and the 'taste-moment' (rasaksana) arise from an identical or single nature of the moment, or from different or many natures of it. If they were to arise from a single nature, then they would all be the same for the obvious reason that they arise from the self-same nature (yadyekena svabhavena janayet tada tesam ekatvam syad ekasvabhavajanyatvat") and, therefore, would not admit of diversity. If they were to arise, on the contrary, from many natures-some effects like colour arising from a material cause (upadanabhavena) and others like taste arising from co-operative auxiliary factors (sahakaritvena)--then the Jaina would ask whether the many natures are integral (atmabhutah), or non-integral (anatmabhutah), to the causal moment. If they are non-integral-that is, if they do not belong--to the cause then evidently they cannot in any sense claim to constitute the intimate nature (svabhavatvahanih) of the cause in question. If they are, on the contrary, integral to the nature of the cause, then either (a) they will lose their 1. That is, rasadiksananam. 2. PMHS, p. 27.

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CHAPTER V diversity or manyness, and become identically the same (svabhavanam vaikatvam prasajyeta') since they are said to proceed from a single cause, or, for that matter, become the cause itself, inasmuch as they are non-different from it (tad avyatiriktatvat tesam tasya caikatvat) or (b) the cause itself -which is admitted to be of a single or identical nature--will become diversified because of the fact that the plurality of natures and the variety of effects (svabhavabhedah karyasankaryan ca) will inevitably split its integrity. Arguing on the part of the Buddhist that this contingency of plurality of natures and diversity of effects would not arise in this case, owing to the fact that such plurality and diversity are due to the cause being upadana (material) at one place (that is, with respect to rupa or colour in the present example), and sahakari (auxiliary) at another (that is, with respect to rasa or taste in the present example), would not be helpful to him. For this plea will not, in the least, mitigate the tendency of the cause to diversity and plurality which are too obvious in the Buddhist arguments. Hence the argu d 179 1. SM (text), p. 19. 2. Ibid. 3. SM (text), p. 19. Moreover, if the Buddhist denies, as he does, interaction between the so-called upadana and the sahakari factors in a causal event he will fall into the error of treating a causal connection as a casual coincidence. For instance if the seed (upadana) on the one hand and the co-operative (sahakari) factors of soil water and light, etc., on the other are treated simply as several independent series of potencies extraneously conjointed to bring a sprout (the effect) into life, then how such erratically casual coincidences could form a nexus of uniformly recurrent cause-effect relation becomes hard to explain.

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180 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE ment for the simultaneous functioning of the causal efficiency in a momentary real also becomes a nullity.' Thus the above account indicates that neither in the dravyaikantavada nor in the paryayaikantavada is there any, logical warrant for the function of the principle of causal efficiency. That conjunction of these two hypotheses into a mechanical theory, called ubhayavada, will also prove equally unsatisfactory in this regard will be shown in course of the treatment of the next question immediately following this. The Jaina understands by arthakriyasamarthya a capacity for generating the practical consequences as indicated by Hemacandra in his sutra: arthakriyasamarthyat. This meaning is the same as what the Buddhist means by causal efficiency. The Jaina maintains also that arthakriyakaritva constitutes a unique property (asadharanarupa or laksana) of a concrete real. This is laid down by Hemacandra in his sutra on the subject: tallaksanatvadvastunah." The concrete real, however, is an integral synthesis of continuity and transience or identity and difference. This is signified by his adherence to the dravyaparyayatmakatyavada. Accordingly, the only kind of reality which offers an adequate field for the operative play of arthakriyakaritva is believed by the Jaina to be the one which is contemplated by his integral view. - tasmatksanikasyapi bhavasyakramenarthakriya durghata etc. SM (text), p. 20. Vide ibid., sutra 32 and the vrtti thereon. Vide ibid., sutra 32 and the vrtti thereon. 4. Cf. dravyaparyayatmakasyaiva vastuno'rthakriyasamarthatvad ity arthah. PMHS, p. 25. Also cf. ksano'pi na khalu so'sti yatra vastutpadavya yadhrauvyatmakam nasti (SM, text, p. 20).

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CHAPTER V It is noteworthy that, in this connection, Hemacandra observes that the urge for right knowledge springs from the need of practical consequences.' Here Hemacandra strikes an unmistakably pragmatic note. That action is the source as well as the test of knowledge is the fundamental principle of the many-sided developments of pragmatism in the West. 181 1. arthakriyarthi hi sarvah pramanam anvesate. Also see what follows.

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CHAPTER VI The Externalistic Doctrine of Identity-in-Difference (Ubhayavada) versus The Doctrine of a Unique and Integral Synthesis of Identity-in-Difference (Jatyantaravada)

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CHAPTER VI The Externalistic Doctrine of Identity-in-Difference (Ubhayavada) versus The Doctrine of a Unique and Integral Synthesis of Identity-in-Difference (Jatyantaravada) Starting with a brief statement of the Jaina view of reality, as embodied in the basic formula of Umasvati, we have so far addressed ourselves to the task of seeking confirmation for that view from three great representative thinkers, and then of launching out on a dialectical examination of the implications of that view under a scheme of the statement and the refutation of four questions. Two of the four questions have been jointly stated and refuted. In the process of their examination the Jaina view has been found to be confronted with a series of objections, among which contradiction, confusion, infinite regress and a few others are notable ones. In order to clarify the Jaina stand against those objections, it has been found necessary to dilate upon, incidentally, the means by which being and non-being are synthesised in concrete reality, as well as upon the significance of negation as an element of reality. The treatment of the mode of synthesising being and non-being as well as of the significance of negation as a component element of reality is aimed at serving the dual purpose of having provided the necessary

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186 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE ontological background for the refutation of the various objections (contradiction being the most important one among them) referred to in the foregoing account, and of forming the basis of a discussion of the doctrines of nayavada and the syadvada-saptabhangi which will be briefly presented in the sequel. Lastly, in the course of the Jaina answer to bhedavada [the question (b)] we have tried to disprove the Buddhist contention that causal efficiency (arthakriyakaritva) can have an operative force only within the ontological scheme of ksanikavada, and to establish the validity of that principle within the exclusive sphere of a dravyaparyayatmaka reality. There still remain two more questions, viz., (c) and (d),. which demand our attention before the treatment of the fourfold questionnaire is brought to a close. The question (c) concerns ubhayavada or the theory of two-fold nature of reality, or of identity and difference, and the question (d) concerns jatyantaravada or the theory of uniqueness-uniqueness obtaining in every manifestation of identity-indifference constituting an object in reality-which aims at remedying the defects of ubhayavada. We may begin with the first of these two questions. Ubhayavada Ubhayavada postulates that identity and difference are separate, or at any rate, separable, entities entering into the making of an object. It may be, therefore, described as a mechanical or a composite theory of reality in so far as it

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CHAPTER VI 187 treats dravya and paryaya (guna) as external or independent' entities. This is why Gunaratna describes this view as : kanadayaugabhyupagata-parasparaviviktadravyaparyayaikante, etc.?, although it considers dravya as the substratum (asraya) of the gunas. The Vaisesika is the author of this view although it is falsely fathered upon the Jaina also by the Buddhist logicians, Arcata and Durveka.' As a matter of fact, the Jaina thinkers themselves, viz., Siddhasena, Abhayadeva, 1. Cf.: "Though thus dependent upon a dravya, they (gunas) are conceived as altogether distinct from it, for they can by themselves be known and as such must, according to the doctrine (the Nyaya-Vaisesika) be independent realities. They are what they are in complete independence of everything including the dravyas to which they belong...."OIP, p. 232. See also TS, p. 82 (notes), where the gunas are characterised as 'accidents' attaching to substance, the Ens. 2. TRD, p. 231. See also the following f.n. 3. In course of our treatment of ubhayavada only the Vaisesika (the kanada) is referred to as the author of the theory, although the Naiyayika (the yauga) also shares this view in important essentials. Curiously enough Arcata chooses the Jaina as the main target of his criticism against this ubhayavada in his Dravyaparyayayor anekantavada-khandana HBT, pp. 104-107 (and the Aloka thereon), particularly the kas. 20, 25 and 24. The first two of these kas. have been quoted (infra) and the last one hints that the dravyaparyayavada would not be different from accepting a mixed view of kutasthanityata in regard to dravya and ksananasita in regard to paryaya, together. (As a matter of fact Ratnakirti categorically affirms that there can be no third possibility beyond the alternatives of ksanikatva and aksanikatva in this regard : ksanikaksanikapariharena rusyantarabhavat....p. 77, SBNT). The criticism of the Vaisesika view, however, follows immediately the attack on the Jaina. Siddhasena firmly repudiates the falsity (micchattam) of the Vaisesika position in ga. 49, STP, p. 656. Although the 5. Sia

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188 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Haribhadra, Hemacandra and Mallisena, have taken a strong line of criticism against this view of the Vaisesika (kanabhunmata). A statement of the Vaisesika school concerning the subordination of identity to difference has already been made earlier' by pointing out the predominant importance given to the concept of visesa or particularity by the Vaisesika, like the Jaina, acknowledges the reality of both dravya and paryaya (guna), he treats each of them as being absolute and, therefore, as being mutually independent (annonnaniravekkha). He, therefore, resorts to ubhayavada (dohi vi naehi niam). The two views, or nayas, which are mixed, or contained, in the ubhayavada of the Vaisesika, are the dravyarthikanaya (davvatthiyanaya) and paryayarthikanaya (pajjavatthiyanaya) each of which is severally illustrated by him in the following ga., with reference to the Kapila. (the Sankhya) darsana and the sauddhodana (the Buddhist) darsana respectively: jam kavilam darisanam eyam davvatthiyassa vattavvam / suddhoana tanaassa u parisuddho pajjavaviappo 1/ 18 //. STP, p. 656. Owing to their extreme (suddha or parisuddha) or exclusive character the two nayas or doctrines, whether singly, as in the Kapila darsana or sauddhodana darsana, or jointly, as in the Vaisesika darsana, are called the parasamayas' or heresies. In his extensive com. on ga. 49, Abhayadeva expounds, and refutes, the most controversial problems of the Vaisesika philosophy. The problem of ubhayavada is, however, touched upon at the opening and the concluding parts of the com. Hemacandra devotes to the Vaisesika metaphysics as many as six kas. (4-9) in his AVD and a few brief but lucid passages specifically to ubhayavada in his own com. on the sutras 30-33 in his Pramanamimamsa (pp. 25, 27 and 29, PMHS). Mallisena, in his elaborate com. on the six kas. of AVD, especially under the ka. 5, vividly brings out, in occasional polemical passages, the critical implications of this view (SM, pp. 10 ff. (text), especially pp. 13-20). Lastly, Haribhadra 1 makes occasional critical observations on this question in his critique on the nature of reality in his AJP, Vol. I (particularly pp. 65-66 and 71-76). 1. See supra, pp. 107-112.

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CHAPTER VI 189 school. At present we are, therefore, concerned only with noticing how the mechanical hypothesis of ubhayavada (which also applies to the Vaisesika philosophy in so far as the predominant difference and the subordinate identity form a mechanical combination in the hypothesis) is unsatisfactory. This consideration will point to the necessity of treating bheda and abheda as two different aspects of an integral or vital synthesis instead of as two external entities conjoined in a composite object, which would evidently be two entities in one, although it (the composite object), is erroneously treated as one. It will also bring into the picture of reality the important trait of jatyantarata by virtue of which each real would be cognised as something sui generis. The second factor, viz., jatyantarata, will receive a greater stress in the next question, than the first one, because it has not figured so far in our inquiry into the nature of reality, except by a casual reference to its name on a few occasions. To resume our consideration of the present question, the externalism between dravya and paryaya (guna) makes ubhayavada not into one consistent theory which it is supposed to be, but into a conjunction', or mixture (misra or misravada) of two independent, or even opposed theories of dravyavada and paryayavada. The reason for this is that dravya and paryaya are treated as numerically different entities, although they are supposed to exist as a single object. This is why Arcata is right in urging against this theory that 1. Abhayadeva describes it as: svavisayapradhanatavyavasthita nyonyanirapeksobhayanayasritam / TBV, p. 704. 2. Cf. viruddhadharmayogena stambhakumbhadibhedavat / TSS, ka. 561.

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190 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE it lays itself open to the combined evils' of both Identity-view and Difference-view. The initial error of ubhayavada is, from the Jaina point of view, the acceptance of the idea that dravya and guna (paryaya) are completely independent" despite the alleged 'dependence' of the latter (guna) on the former. Besides robbing dravya and paryaya of their mutual dependence as complementary elements in an entity, this idea of absolute independence between dravya and paryaya leads the Vaisesika to resort to a metaphysical tour de force, viz., 1. Referring to the fictitiousness (kalpanak?ta) and falsity (mrsarthata) of the Identity-view (abhedavada) and Differenceview (bhedavada or paryayavada or dravyavada) individually Arcata observes : abhedasyaparityage bhedah syat kalpanakstah / tasyavitathabhave va syudabhede mTsarthata // HBT, p. 106, ka. 20. Although the substance of this criticism against the two extreme views is the same as that of Siddhasena's criticism in his ga, 49 (supra, p. 187, f.n. 5), Arcata treats the Jaina, as already noted, as the main target of this as well as of the following charge: bhedabhedoktadosas ca tayor istah katham na va/ pratyekam ye prasajyante dvayor bhavah katham na te // Ibid., ka. 25 (for a slight variation of the second line of this ka., as quoted by Hemacandra, see PMHS, p. 29, and p. 804, line 18). Both Hemacandra and Municandra agree with this criticism against ubhayavada: dravyaparyayavadayos ca yo dosah sa ubhayavade'pi samanah. PMHS, p. 29. idamuktam bhavati.. kevalabhedapakse abhedapakse ca ye prageva nirupita dosas ta ubhayapaksabhyupagamam sutaram prapnivanti / AJPV on Haribhadra's com. on AJP, Vol. I, p. 13. 2. dravyagunayor asankirnasvabhavatvat / HBT, p. 107. inadibhyo vyavsttarupani / TBV, p. 656. Cf. also supra, p. 187, fn. 1.

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CHAPTER VI 191 the enunciation that a dravya can remain devoid of a guna even though for an instant, after its birth, and that it can also outlast, by an instant, the destruction of the material cause from which it is produced. Whatever the circumstances which might lead the Vaisesika to perform this curious metaphysical feat, the acknowledgement of the separability between dravya and guna makes his position highly vulnerable' to the attack as to how the entities so external to each other get, when brought together, fused into such an intimate union as could be described as a single object. 1. Kesavamisra observes: dravyan nirgunam eva prathaman utpadyate. Or again: tasmat prathame ksane nirguna eva ghato gunebhyah purvabhaviti... TB, Pt. I, p. 8. "In consonance with the realistic and pluralistic spirit of the doctrine," a modern writer observes in this connection : "these qualities are all regarded as separately real or as having their own being, although they are never found by themselves. Theoretically a substance may, provided it is a product, exist without a quality for a little while." EIP, p. 93. "....a jar for example is destroyed one instant after the destruction of the halves (kapala) out of which it is made." The same writer further observes: "There is in this view the difficulty of satisfactorily explaining the continuance, for however short a period it may be, of the effect after its material cause is gone." OIP, p. 241. There will arise several other objections also against the notion, viz., that dravya couid be nirguna at the first moment : (1) How could a jar, for example, be perceived at the first moment while even the Vaisesika accepts the rule that gunas like colour and touch, are necessary for the perception of a dravya? (2) Would the jar be called a dravya at the moment when it is nirguna in the face of the definition, given by the Vaisesika himself, that a dravya is a substratum of gunas (gunasraya) (See NKB, p. 369)? Acceptance of imperceptibility as demanded by (1) and pleading, in answer to (2), that a 'dravya' may have capacity for being a substratum of gunas but may not be necessarily possessed of them always would be but evasive answers.

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192 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE The tendency to externalise everything has also compelled the Vaisesika to postulate a God (isvara or Mahesvara) for explaining the creation and destruction of the changing world. This deus ex machina amounts to a confession of failure in evolving an intrinsically self-sufficient notion of reality. A further anomaly arising from the mechanistic conception of ubhayavada in the Vaisesika metaphysics is the division of dravyas into eternal (nitya) or permanent ones and noneternal (anitya) or transient ones. The eternal ones are said to be primary or simple substances (nityadravyan tvasamavetam eva') and the non-eternal ones are said to be secondary or composite products derived from the simple ones (anityadravyam karyarupatvad avayavasamavetam"). This assignment of eternality or permanence to one division and of transience or change to another one results, at any rate according to the Jaina and the Buddhist critics, in a theory of two worlds in one of which, permanence enjoys an uninterrupted or lonely existence, and in the other there is the play of change in evidence initiated in a perpetually alternating cycle of creation and destruction by God or Mahesvara. From among the residents of the world a further order of substances is singled out. This order is said to consist of soul (atma, including paramatma or God), space 1 & 2. See NKB, p. 370. 3. In keeping with the mechanistic temper of the system the Vaisesika's idea of change does not signify any internal or dynamic transformation (parinama) in a product but only its change of place' (parispanda). Cf. OPI, p. 233.

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CHAPTER VI 193 (dilc), akasa' and time (kala). These substances are said to be so absolutely eternal that they do not give rise to the products (dravyabhavinah) of the transient realm. This bifurcation of the world into two or three independent orders of permanence and change, or identity and difference, does not commend itself to the Jaina. Lastly, even arthakriyakaritva or causal efficiency cannot, according to the Jaina, come into play in such a world of being so sharply separated. How causal efficiency cannot operate in the static realm of a mere dravya has been already pointed out from the point of view of the Buddhist philosophy.' Hemacandra is in total agreement with the Buddhist in regard to the inapplicability of causal efficiency, either at the level of simultaneity or of succession, in a static dravya. He goes further in demonstrating how it cannot be operative even in a world of discreet momentariness which is the view of the Buddhist himself. This aspect of the problem also has been pointed out earlier. The Vaisesika's ubhayavada, 1. Dik or space and akasa are different in the Vaisesika system. Akasa is some'ethereal substance filling the space and having sound as its distinction. 2. Hemacandra describes the entire position as follows: kanadastu dravyaparyayavubhavapyupagaman pothivyadini gunadyadhararupani dravyani, gunadestvadheyatvat paryayah/ te ca kecit ksanikah, kecit yavaddravyabhavinah, kecin nitya iti kevalam itaretaravinirlunthitadharmidharmabhyupagamasasamicinavadinah/ He concludes the argument by stating: ekantabhinnanam kenacit kathancit sambandhayogadityahnikyapakse'pi visayavyavastha / PMHS, p. 27. 3. See supra, pp. 52-56, and also the Sec, on Arthakriyakaritvavada (p. 172 ff.). 4. See supra, p. 174 ff.

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194 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE which is but a conjunction of dravyavada and ksanikavada (paryayavada), is shown by Hemacandra and the other Jaina thinkers, to lend itself doubly' to the lack of any play of causal efficiency. In view of the incongruities indicated in course of the present question the Jaina rejects ubhayavada in favour of jatyantaravada which is claimed to avoid the pitfalls met with in the present and the previous questions. Jatyantaravada It has been discovered, in course of our attempt to answer the three questions (a), (b), and (c) concerning the nature of reality, that neither the pure identity-view (dravyaikantavada)", nor the pure difference-view (paryayaikantavada), nor even the composite view of identity and difference (ubhayavada or parasparaviviktadravyaparyayaikantavada) but only an integral view of 1. 'Doubly' because the Buddhist charges (with which the Jaina identifies himself subject to the two limitations indicated on p. 173, supra) made against the paryayaikantavada (in the course of the previous question) of the Buddhist, will together hold against the mechanical theory of the Vaisesika who conjoins the above two extreme theories into his ubhayavada. Although the Advaita view of reality is generally considered to be the dravyaikantavada (the identity-view) par excellence, the Sankhya view is also considered by the Jaina writers to be a very good example of a dravyaikantavada. Therefore, the Jaina writers sometimes refer, in this connection, to both or to either (as Gunaratna does in the phrase where reference to the paryayaikanta of the Buddhist also is made: sankhyasaugatabhimata-dravyaparyayaikantayoh / TRD, p. 231) of the two. See supra, p. 187 (f.), f.n. 5, etc. 2. 3.

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CHAPTER VI 195 identity-in-difference offers an adequate definition of reality.' The present question, the last in the series of four questions with which we started a critical exposition of the Jaina conception of reality, aims at dealing briefly with how and why the Jaina regards every real as not merely an indissoluble (parasparananuviddha) union of identity-in-difference but also--this is the matter of immediate concern-as something sui generis (jatyantara). The Jaina ontologist maintains that a real is a synthesis of identity-in-difference and that each such synthesis is jatyantara or sui generis. That is, the combination of identity and difference in a real is not a numerical summation but a vital synthesis of the two elements. Each such synthesis is also said to be unique, in the sense that when the real is analysed the two elements of identity and difference exhaust 1. yata evotpadaditrayatmakam paramarthasat / TRD, p. 229 2. Cf. "A real is a unity and diversity in one, and the relation involved is neither one of absolute identity nor one of absolute otherness, but something different from both. It is sui generis... ..." JPN, p. 207. 3. Cf. evam hyubhayadosadidosa api na dusanam / samyagjatyantaratvena bhedabhedaprasiddhitan // AJP, Vol. I, p. 72. Akalanka also remarks : ubhayadosa(viz., sadasadekantapaksadosa)prasanga iti cet na jatyantaratvan narasimharupavati TRAG, p. 225. Through expressing himself not merely against the view that a real is 'ubhayarupa' (composite) but also against the other two extreme dogmas, viz., that a real is merely 'dravyarupa' and that it (the real) is merely paryayarupa', Hemacandra also asserts the manifold (sabala) and unique (jatyantara) character of the real as follows: ayam arthah-na dravyarupan na paryayarupan nobhayarupam vastu, yena tattatpaksabhavi dosah syat, kintu sthityutpadavyayatmakam sabalam jatyantarameva vastu / PMHS, p. 29.

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196 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE between themselves the entire content of the real, although they display a distinctive (visista) structural and functional individuality-not found in the individual constituent elements--in their combination. This is illustrated by the oft-quoted instance of Narasimha' (the Man-lion): As the name itself suggests, Narasimha is a combination of nara (man) and simha (lion). Nevertheless, it indicates a being which is somehow different, in its combination, from the parts severally entering into its making, although it is impossible to get such a being outside the parts in question. Similarly jaggery (guda) and ginger (nagaram or sunthi) are said to cause phlegm (kaphahetuh) and bile (pitta 1. Durveka explains this being as: hiranyakasipuvadharthanirmita narasimhatmalah / HBTA, p. 343. 2. Cf. na naro nara eveti na simhah sinha eva va / sabdavijianakaryanam bhedajjatyantaram hi tat// na narah simharupatvat na simho nararupatah/ samanadhikaranyena narasimhah prakirtitah// Quoted in AJP, Vol. I, p. 71, f.n. 1 and NKC, Vol. I, p. 369. The first verse is quoted also in Siddhasena Gani's Com. on Tattvarthadhigamasutra, Kapadia's edn., p. 377, as well as in JTVS, p. 11 (with slight variations in the last work). The verse following it in JTVS as well as in TRD and all the verses preceding it in TRD may also be seen. For a variant verse in which the same analogy is expressed, see SM (text), p. 20, and TPSJ, p. 79. Besides TPSJ see also TSS, kas. 325, 1733-1736 (together with PK on all these kas.), HBT, p. 104, and HBTA, P. 343 (in all of which reference is made to it either for a statement of, or a criticism against, the Jaina position). This analogy is cited in a few other non-Jaina works (e. g. NVVS, p. 261, the tippani against p. 88, line 16), often in somewhat different contexts. See also AGAV, pp. 103 and 108, TSV, p. 435, PKM, p. 536, TRD, p. 245, AJP, Vol. I, pp. 65, 77 and 302, SJPT, pp. 214 and 215, AVV, p. 147, NVVS, pp. 87-88 and SM (text), p. 151.

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CHAPTER VI 197 karanam) respectively but when compounded (militayoh), they lose their respective harmful effects (dosan) and become something different' (anyadeva, dravyantaramidan gudanagarakhyam or gudanagarabhesajam) despite the retention of the basic ingredients revealed in the analysis of the compound substance. A more familiar example in this connection would be that of water and its constituent elements. When analysed, under electrolysis, water resolves itself into two molecules of hydrogen and one molecule of oxygen. That water is a distinctive or unique substance in comparison with its constituents is a scientific commonplace. These instances indicate the lines on which the Jaina treats every entity as a unique phenomenon in relation to its constituent factors of identity and difference. This uniqueness is not a mere external* appendage but an inherent trait manifesting itself in the ceaseless vortex of causal interaction among the entities in the universe. In his Gifford Lectures Samuel Alexander makes a suggestive observation which brings out the spirit of the 1. Cf. na catra bhedabhedapaksabhavi doso gudanagarasamjnitavastvabhyupagamat / taduktam gudascet kaphahetuh syat nagaran pittakaranam / tannu amanyatevedam gudanagarasamjnitam // NVVS, pp. 87-88 (with tippani against p. 88, line 1, and p. 261), HBT, p. 106 (together with HBTA, P. 349). 2. Some of the other analogies given in illustration of the jatyantara character of a real are those of Umesvara (NKC. Vol. I, p. 349), the multi-coloured (citra or mecaka) gem (ibid.) or mayuranda (TRD, p. 244) etc. 3. That external factors like spatial and temporal considerations are not irrelevant is shown below (supra, p. 201 f.)

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198 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Jaina notion of jatyantaratva as an argument against a world of repetitive cycle of entities and events : "Bare repetition it may be affirmed does not even exist. Manufactured articles are not identical though they may be identical within certain limits of precision. It is, however, true that the more closely instances reproduce each other the less useful they are for scientific discovery." Leibniz is more emphatically clear on this point. He states: "There is nothing in the universe which does not enjoy a certain singularity, which is to be found in no other thing."* He asserts, under the principle of the 'Identity of Indiscernibles', that not even any two leaves of a tree or any two drops of water or of milk could be entirely alike' because of the fact that "The things are...... distinguishable in themselves". The jatyantara trait of an entity is grounded in the fundamental manifoldness (anekantasvarupatva) which is believed by the Jaina to be at the heart of all reality. The 1. Repetitive in the sense of lack of individuality among entities. 2. Space, Time and Deity, S. Alexander (London, 1920), Vol. I, p. 231. 3. Mon., p. 222, f.n. 15. 4. Explaining this principle of the 'Identity of Indiscernibles' with respect to a Monad, the Leibnizian conception of a real, Leibniz writes: " Indeed, each Monad must be different from every other. For in nature there are never two beings which are perfectly alike and in which it is not possible to find an internal difference or at least a difference founded upon an intrinsic quality". Ibid., p. 222. See ibid., p. 37, f.n. 1 and A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, B. Russell, (2nd Edition, 1949), pp. 55 ff. and 220.

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CHAPTER VI existence of a simple real is thoroughly repugnant to the Jaina. Uniqueness or singularity' cannot, according to him, arise from such absolutely simple real whether the real be the Advaitic Brahman or the Buddhistic ksanikasantana (series of full stops as it were). For there is little room in such a real for anything else than its own bare subsistence (sat). Hence the truth underlying the Advaitic dictum : naikasmin na sambhavat, or the Buddhistic dictum: yo viruddhadharmavan nasavekah1, betrays not the contradictoriness of the anekanta real but the logical consummation of the monolithic or simple form of reality. Jatyantaratva can, therefore, arise, it is believed, from the foundation of a manifold or variegated real which alone could afford the basis for the co-ordinate existence of diverse elements or components, as well as for their casual interplay, which in turn results in the emergence of a fully-fledged unique or singular entity. Therefore it is by no means an accident or a casual fancy that the Jaina conceives anekanta svarupatva as a synonym of paramarthasat (true reality) and conceives it as the pivot on which his entire philosophical-ontological and epistemological-developments turn. Thus anekantavada, with which alone the notion of jatyantaratva is affirmed to be concomitant, offers the most thoroughgoing ontological antithesis to the ekanta (extreme or monolithic) doctrine-single or composite-in Indian philosophy.' 199 1. See infra, p. 23-24 (and the footnotes). 2. For a reference to the synonymousness of anekantavada with utpadavyayadhrauvyatmakavada and to its being the necessary basis for the notion of jatyantaratva, see TRD, pp. 229 f. and 244 ff.

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200 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE There are two considerations--the one critical and the other constructive-which concurrently underlie the postulation of jatyantaratva as a trait in reality. Critically, the notion of jatyantaratva aims not merely at repudiating indirectly the ekanta doctrines just referred to of simple reals, but also at directly undermining the Vaisesika's ubhayavada, with which the bhedabhedavada or the anekantavada (of which the jatyantaravada is a corollary) is persistently confused by the Buddhistic thinkers. This is why Akalanka contrasts jatyantaravada with the other theories by designating the former as a case of paksantara' (a view which signifies the resultant real as a product distinct from--not merely as something interchangeable with the constituent factors) and the latter as cases of paksasankara (a view which signifies the real as a confused complex). 1. Mallisena agrees with Akalanka in treating the Jaina as paksantara : nityanityapaksavilaksanasya paksantarasyangikriya manatvat/SM (text), p. 20. 2. Akalanka is inclined to use this epithet, viz., paksasankara. for both the two ekanta doctrines of the identity-view (sadvada) and the difference-view (asadvada) as well as for the ubhayavada (which is but a numerical summation of the two) although it is more appropriate in the latter (ubhayavada) owing to the fact that, in the latter, there are two factors, identity and difference--which are mixed (misra), ex hypothesi, in a mechanical togetherness. The only sense, however, in which the term would severally apply to the two ekanta doctrines also is when each of them is understood as mixing in a confused jumble: a real identity with an unreal difference (the maya as superimposed on the sat) or a real differen with an unreal identity or continuity (the unreal santana or continuity as superimposed on the discrete moments (ksanas) the only reals recognised by ksanikavada). But this seems to be a rather far-fetched meaning; its indirect truthfulness is incontrovertible. It is, therefore, necessary to note that

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CHAPTER VI 201 The most serious objection associated with the confusion of the Jaina theory with that of the Vaisesika-a critical reference has been already made to the other two ekanta theories at the beginning of the present question is that the Jaina theory, like its erroneous counterpart, involves contradiction in the constitution of its real. The affirmation, on the part of the Jaina, of the mutual complimentariness or the integratedness of identity and difference in a real in contrast to the mere extraneous or composite togetherness of the two, as maintained by the ubhayavadin, has been observed under the treatment of ubhayavada, to knock the bottom out of the charge of the contradiction. That is, the integrated or the indissoluble (parasparananuviddha) structure of the real directly gives the lie to the opponents' charge of contradiction against the Jaina conception of a real. Anekantasvarupatva, the raison d'etre of the integrated concreteness of a real, is hereby asserted to be the negation of contradictoriness, or the affirmation of complimentariness. The proof of contradiction would, therefore, mean the disproof of the anekantasvarupatva of all reality. But the possibility of such a proof is flatly denied by the Jaina on the strength of the warrant of experience, at perceptual and other levels, which is maintained to reveal the ultimacy of the anekanta truth in all reality. Constructively, uniqueness or 'singularity' is a positive trait attending upon every phase of causal process which the principle of jatyantaravada or paksantaravada is proximately directed against ubhayavada (which has the semblance of jatyantaravada) although its indirect criticism against the other ekanta doctrines also is indubitably implicit.

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202 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE marks a transition or evolution from an anterior manifold entity to a more inclusive or less inclusive posterior entity. It is conditioned by the determinate factors-external and internal within the fourfold range of the dravya (the material factor), the ksetra (the spatial location), the kala (the temporal reference) and the bhava (the intrinsic nature), governing the context of the causal occurrence concerned. It is not traceable to any one of these factors singly but arises from the totality of all the factors prevailing in the causal setting from which a new entity emerges. Besides imprinting a certain distinctiveness or individuality upon the entities and events in the universe the presence of this factor, viz., jatyantaratva, saves the reality from becoming a universal mass of mere being or a conglomeration of incommunicable atomistic particulars, or a mere conjunction of such being and such particulars in a warring medium miscalled a real. Briefly, the Jaina answer to the problem of the nature of reality-the problem which has been so far dealt with in course of the four questions-is that everything is a manifold entity, or an identity-in-differents, with an imprint of individuality in it, and that the world is a vast society of such entities which act and react upon one another in their ceaseless process of causal transformations.

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CHAPTER VII Is relation an Entity, or a Mental Construction, or a Structural Manifestation of Identity-in-Difference in Reality?

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CHAPTER VII RELATION Connectedness is an indubitable experience of reality. Whether it is (a) an independent entity alongside the various things of the Universe, or (b) a mental construction imposed on a disjoined heap of reality of the human mind, or (c) something which is objective, without being an entity, and an experience, which is not merely subjective is a question which is supremely important in any inquiry into the nature of reality and knowledge. Hence a brief study of relation, with the necessary reference to its implications, for instance, whether it is external or internal and valid or invalid, may be attempted here. The entire discussion will, to anticipate the conclusion, reveal that relation is the structure of reality which is identity-in-difference. A. Relation as an Objective Independent Entity : The Naiyayika', the extreme realist, advances the theory 1. "The Naiyayika' and 'the Vaisesika' are largely interchange able in course of this discussion, except for an important difference of opinion between them, viz., that the former treats samavaya as perceptual, whereas the latter treats it as infer ential. See infra, p. 212 (f.), f.n. 5. 2. The predominant note of this extreme' realism is the em phasis on the full knowableness and independence not merely

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206 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE that relation is a real (vastava) entity intervening between two terms or the relata (sambandhinau) as a tertium quid (padarthantara2) or a distinct 'link' connecting them into a relational unity. 1. 2. of the world from the knowing mind, but also of each part from the others in the objective and pluralistic universe. This spirit is signified by the postulate that there can be no objectless knowledge (na cavisaye kacid upalabdhih/ NBV, p. 220) as well as that what is 'cognitively distinguishable' is 'different' (pratitibhedat bhedo'sti / NM, p. 312). For the reality (vastutva) of relation, see ILE, 2, f.n. 2, p. 131. Each of the two kinds of relation, viz., samyoga and samavaya (to be presently explained) is termed as 'padartha' or category. Samyoga (the conjunctive relation or conjunction), however, is said to a be quality and, therefore, dependent upon, though distinct from, a substance (dravya) which is the most important of the seven categories, whereas samavaya (the 'necessary relation') is treated as an independent category. While characterising samavaya as a 'padartha' a distinction is advanced by the Naiyayika, viz., that samavaya is a 'subsistent' (bhava), but not an 'existent' (satta). (BPV, p. 30, ka. 13, and SWK, p. 107). Hiriyanna refers to this 'distinction between subsistence and existence' as 'quite fundamental to' as well as 'quite in accordance with' 'the basic principles' of Vaisesika philosophy. (IPC, p. 162, and p. 163, f.n. 1). Cf. "Suppose, for instance," observes Russell, "that I am in my room. I exist, my room exists, but does 'in' exist? Yet obviously the word has a meaning; it denotes a relation which holds between me and my room. This relation is something, although we cannot say that it exists IN THE SAME SENSE in which I and my room exist". (Problems, p. 90). A little further he continues 66 ....we shall say that they (universals in which relations are included, cf. ibid., p. 97) SUBSIST or HAVE BEING, The where 'being' is opposed to 'existence' as timeless. world of Universals, therefore, may also be described as the world of being". (Ibid., p. 100).

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CHAPTER VII A relation' is 'conjunctive"" (samyoga-sambandha) when the relata are 'separable" (yutasiddha), and 'necessary' or 'intimate' (samavaya-sambandha) when they are 'inseparable' (ayutasiddha)". The strict non-admission of any internality between even the 'inseparable' relata under samavaya is a character 3. 207 1. dvividhah sambandhah samyogah samavayasceti / TB, Pt. I, p. 5. 2. For conjunction as a 'transient' connection and its threefold distinction, see Mis. Es., Vol. II, p. 302, and BP with SMV, kas. 114-116. The relata are 'separable' (yuta) in the sense that they were separate before being conjoined, e.g., the hand and the book (hasta-pustaka-samyoga); apraptayos tu ya praptih saiva samyoga iritah / BP, ka. 114, and they can be again separated at our will. Conjunction is, therefore, a purely adventitious or external relation. 4. 'Necessary' or 'intimate' relation seems to be a more satisfactory translation of samavaya than 'inherence', although the latter is more widely current, for 'inherence' is suggestive of an internal character, whereas samavaya is, as indicated in the next paragraph, an external, though inseparable (aprthaksiddha) relation. 5. tatrayutasiddhayoh sambandhah samavayah / TB, Pt. I, p. 5. Also see SDA, p. 278, ka. 66, and TRD thereon. For the meanings of 'ayutasiddha' and 'yutasiddha' as well as for the gradual widening of the scope of the meaning of 'ayutasiddha' from its original and narrow application to the relation of the container and the contained (adharadheyabhava) to a five-fold one, see PDS, with NK, pp. 35-36. 6. Internality should mean, according to some critics, identity (atmarupa) of the relation with the relata. This would mean that the relation would be a constitutive or 'intrinsic' element in the being of the relata. (Cf. Bradley: "But every relation, as we have learnt, essentially penetrates into the being of its terms, and, in this sense, is intrinsical; in other words, every relation must be a relation of content." AR, p. 347. Also cf. "We should then have to ask if, in the end, every possible relation does not involve a something IN

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208 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE istically significant feature about the Nyaya conception of relation. This is, of course, in consonance with the realistic and pluralistic ontology of this system. The relata in samavaya remain, therefore, mutually external,' although they are held together in an 'extrinsic' unity by samavaya. This externality is believed to guard samavaya against the 1. which it exists, as well as between which it exists, and it might be difficult to reconcile the claims of these prepositions." PL, Vol. I, p. 28. Elsewhere we come across the following remark: "A term in the end (we have seen) can stand in no relation into which it, itself, cannot enter". CE, Vol. II, p. 645). Acceptance of this position would eventually result in the total obliteration of relation as a distinctive entity owing to the fact that what constitutes the nature (svabhava) of the relata cannot exist as an independent entity intervening between the relata which are alleged to be combined by the relation. Kumarila gives a brief but clear statement of this argument: atha tasyatmarupatvan nanyasambandhakalpana / abhedat samavayo'stu svarupam dharmadharminoh // MSV, p. 180, ka. 149 f., also see NV thereon. The description of samavaya, by an eminent writer, as an "internal relation" does not, therefore, accord with the spirit of the Nyaya view of reality. Contrasting sarnyoga with sa mavaya, he observes, "Samyoga takes place between two things of the same nature which exist disconnectedly and are for a time brought into conjunction. It is external relation while samavaya is an internal relation". IP, Vol. II, p. 217. Hiriyanna, however, puts forth the correct view: "Even samavaya, it is necessary to add, has to be explained as an external relation, although it is usual to represent it as internal in modern works on the Nyaya-Vaisesika." OIP, p. 230. Again, "...in all cases alike, samavaya leaves the terms it relates unaffected. (See f.n. under "unaffected" for reference to a Vaisesika maxim and Muktavali). In other words, it is an external relation like samyoga. The very fact that it is independent and relates ultimately simple factors shows that it cannot be an internal one". IPC (1927), p. 162.

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CHAPTER VII 209 danger of its becoming an identity and, thereby, playing the Naiyayika into the hands of the Advaitin. For if the Naiyayika were to accept even a partial interpenetration of the terms and their relation, there would be no stopping short, at any rate according to the Vedantin, of being driven to a total merging of the two, rendering, thereby, the relation itself a superfluous entity. This would put him on the highroad to absolutism in which not merely the duality of the terms in a relation but also the entire scheme of reality will become a seamless' coat. Athalye is, therefore, perfectly right, from the Naiyayika's point of view, when he observes that "....it is the theory (of samavaya) that makes them (the Naiyayikas) so intensely realistic in marked opposition to idealistic schools like Vedanta".' The other important characteristics of samavaya are that it is eternal (nitya), one (eka) and all-pervasive (sarvavyapaka or vyapaka). Thus' according to the Nyaya ontology a relation whether conjunctive or necessary--is an objectively real and 1. "Relations exist only in and through a whole which cannot in the end be resolved into relations and terms. And', 'together' and 'between' are all in the end senseless apart from such a whole." Additional Notes, PL, Vol. I, p. 112. Notes: 50. 2. TS, with DNB, Notes, p. 9, f. 8. 3. These involve one another. What is meant by 'eternality' here is uncausedness (akaranatva) or improducibility and, therefore, indestructibility: na hyasya kincit karanam pramanata upalabhyate iti. PB, p. 697. This is intended to be aimed at avoiding the fallacy of infinite regress (anavastha) inasmuch as what is produced needs a productive agent and the pro 14

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210 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE ductive agent in turn, a further productive agent and so on. See U in VD, p. 350, where sankara Misra repudiates the views that samavaya is other-caused or self-caused and affirms it is uncaused. See also TS, Notes, p. 97, SP, Notes, p. 6, and RML, pp. 148-149. The relata are, of course, said to be produced and destroyed while the relation (samavaya) is intact. samavayas-tveka eva, TS, p. 6, sec. 8 and SP, p. 5 (text), ka. 9; sarvatraikah samavaya iti gamyate, PB, p. 697; na ca samyogavan nanatvam, ibid., p. 696; PBTS, with KR, p. 172. The absolute oneness or sameness of samavaya inevitably raises the question how it can avoid an 'intermixture of the categories' (padartha-sankara) which would lead, for instance, cowhood to reside in men instead of in cows. To this the Vaisesika replies that the distinctness of the categories is sustained by the difference of the substrata and their attributes (adharadheya-niyamat); nanu yady ekah samavayo dravyagunakarmanam dravyatvagunatvakarmatvadivisesanaih saha sambandhaikatvat padarthasankara-prasanga iti, na adharadheyaniyamat (PB, P. 697; see also U on VD, VII. 2. 26, and cf. SM, p. 32 (text), line 29, as well as the note on P. 81 (notes), Vines 29-3D), where reference is made to different media or avacchedakas of samavaya. The unique character of samavaya, corresponding to the substantiality (dravyatva) of substance (dravya) or to the attributeness (gunatva) of attribute (guna), etc., is the cognitive pattern "this subsists in that" (ihedam-pratyaya. or iheti-pratyaya-darsana). This pattern or mark is said to be the invariable feature of samavaya and, therefore, to denote the unity (oneness) or the sameness of samavaya in the diverse situations of its occurrence. See PB, p. 696. The other important considerations adduced in support of the oneness of samavaya are 'economy' (laghava) and lack of evidence to the contrary: yatha dravyam sat gunah sat karma sadityekakarapratitivisayatvat nanatvasadhakapramanabhavat laghavac ca satta eka, tatha ghatah samavetah patan samaveta ityady-anugatapratitivisayatvat bhedakapramanabhavat. laghavac ca samavayopyeka evetyarthah / Von U, VD, p. : see also SPS, with M, p. 18, ka. 8. 6. samavayasyaikatvan-nityatvad vyapakatvac ca / SM, p. 41. Cf. also ibid., intro. p. xcii. 7. The three characteristics, and their implications, just re ferred to, together with the others, in behalf of samavaya,

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CHAPTER VII 211 distinct entity co-existing with, and connecting, the relata in a relational situation. An entirely opposite view to that of the Naiyayika is held by the Buddhist who maintains, with the as well as of relations in general, will all come in, as will be seen in the sequel, for sharp criticisms at the hands of the Jaina and the non-Jaina thinkers. The Jaina does go some way with the Naiyayika in so far as he (the Jaina) concedes relation as an objective fact, though not as an independent entity. 1. Dharmakirti--with the exception of santaraksita and his lucid commentator, Kamalasila, who have addressed themselves to an acute criticism of a part of the problem, viz., Samavaya (vide TSS, kas. 823-866, and PK. thereon)-is the only Buddhist thinker who has developed a critique on the problem of relations in his works (e. g., PVD with VM, pp. 370-374) particularly in Sambandhapariksa (see HML, p. 319) from which 22 karikas have been preserved, in Sanskrit, by Prabhacandra in PKM (p. 504 ff.). While criticising Dharmakirti, Prabhacandra adds, here and there, a few short explanatory comments. A few of these karikas are found in the brief polemical accounts of Vidyanandin (TSV, pp. 148-149), Vadidevasuri (SRK, pp. 812 ff.) and of Prabhacandra himself in his other work (NKC, Vol. I, pp. 305-309). An account of the twenty-four kinds of relations (paccayas), as expounded in the seventh and the last work of the Buddhist Pali canon, Abhidhamma Pitaka, has been given, in Pali, in The Patthanuddesa Dipani (The Buddhist Philosophy of Relations), by Ledi Sayadaw, E. T., by S. V. Nyana, pub. by U. Ba Thah and Da Tin Tin, 1935, Rangoon. An earlier account by the same writer (spelt differently as Ledi Sadaw), given in course of three "letters", E. T. by S. L. Aung, is published under the title On the Philosophy of Relations, JPTS, 1915-1916, Ed. by Mrs. Rhys Davids, 1916, London. Two other accounts of the same topic are:--The Compendium of Philosophy (Abhidhammattha-sangaha), Pt. VIII, E. T. by S. L. Aung, Ed. by Mrs. Rhys Davids, PTS, 1910, London; and the article on "Relations" (Buddhist), by G. A. F. Rhys Davids, ERE. All these accounts deal with the subject of relations mainly from

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212 Advaitin', a subjective view of relations. According to Dharmakirti a relation, like a universal, is a conceptual fiction', fabricated by the mind, having no objective reality (na vastavah), the only reals being the unrelated (niranvaya or unmixed or amisra)' or simple moments enjoying, severally, an isolated or exclusive existence (svatmanisthitah; svayambhavah; vyavrttarupah). Being neither perceptual nor inferable' perception and inference are the only two sources JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE the ethico-theological point of view of the early Pali Buddhism, and do not, therefore, concern themselves with the philosophical development which the problem acquired at the hands of the dialectical masters like Dinnaga and Dharmakirti. Owing to the absence of any direct philosophical bearing on the treatment of the problem in this study no reference is made to these accounts. 1. See infra, p. 223 ff. 2. sambandhah kalpanakrtah, sambandhacinta, PVD, III. 237; vikalpite kalpananirmite sambandhe...., MV, p. 371; na vastuvyatirekena sambandho....kalpanamatratvat, TSV, pp. 148-149. Cf. this position with Hume's notion "that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences" (quoted) JPPSM, Vol. II, p. 33. tan (bhavan) misrayati kalpana, spd. ka. 5, and Prabhacandra's comments thereon, PKM, p. 506, and NKC, p. 306; see also SRK, pp. 813-814. On the basis of this conceptualist nature of relations the Buddhist denies any relation between a verb (kriya) and its agent (karaka) as, for instance, between 'drive away that white cow' and 'Devadatta' in the statement "Devadatta, drive away that white cow with your stick" (devadatta, gam abhyaja suklam dandena). Vide spd. ka. 6, and Prabhacandra's comment preceding it, PKM, p. 506. For a critical exposition of this argument, as applied to the causal relation, from the Buddhist point of view, see PKM, p. 511 ff. 3. 4. There is, it is necessary to note, a cardinal difference of opinion, between the Naiyayika and the Vaisesika concerning

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CHAPTER VII of knowledge according to Buddhism-relation is unreal (avastu). Pursuing his demonstration of the unreality of relation Dharmakirti makes a searching analysis into the possible kinds and the anatomy of a relational situation and endeavours to show that the Naiyayika's defence of the reality of a relation is entirely baseless.1 213 Assuming the opponent's viewpoint, Dharmakirti argues that the only two' possible ways of entertaining a relation in general, are by treating it as (a) Dependence (paratantrya) or rather, interdependence, and (b) Interpenetration (rupaslesa) or interfusion, of the relata entering into the relation in question. If we grant the first alternative, then the question arises whether the 'dependence' is between two full-fledged existents (nispannayoh) or between existents which have not yet emerged into full being (anispannayoh). If it is, on the one hand, between two full-fledged existents, then the the means of cognising samavaya; the former considers that samavaya is apprehended by perception and the latter by inference-pratyaksah samavaya iti naiyayika ahuh / NKB, p. 961; samavayo'tindriyah anumeya eva iti vaisesika ahuh / Ibid., p. 962; pratyalesah samavaya iti naiyayikas tadapy anupapannam samavayo'tindriyah...VD, p. 353, also UV thereon. Samyoga also is maintained, by the Naiyayika, to be apprehended by perception but by two senses only. Vide TS, p. 87 (Notes). and See the last line of ka. 1, quoted infra, p. 214, f.n. 2. 1. 2. sambhandho'rthanam paratantryalaksano va syad rupaslesa laksano va syat? PKM, p. 104. See also p. 214, f.n. 2. The context in which the problem is treated is the question of the relatedness among the atoms in a so-called concrete object. The Buddhist assumes an object to be an aggregation (sanghata) of unrelated (asambaddha) atoms.

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214 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Buddhist would argue, there is no need for a relation since such absolutely independent existents need no relating entity for the simple reason that they are, by hypothesis, severally self-sufficient entities and, therefore, admit of no dependence whatsoever (paratantryabhavat)?. Such an imposition of dependence on two independent entities would, in Buddhist view, result in introducing contradiction in an otherwise relationless situation. If, on the other hand, the dependence is argued to be between two entities which are yet to come into being (anispannayoh), then it would be absurd to talk about relating two entities which are yet to be." The second hypothesis of the interpenetration or interfusion of the relata fares, according to Dharmakirti, no better, since here also, as in the other case, the argument is beset with a contradiction: the interfusing relata should, on this 2. 1. paratantryavihinatvat siddhasyetyapare viduh / TSV, p. 146, ka. 10, Vidyananda uses "siddha' and 'asiddha' also fornispanna and 'anispanna' respectively. prathamapakse kim asau nispannayoh sambandhinoh syad ani$pannayor va? na tavad anispannayoh, svarupasyaivasattvat Sasasvavisanavat nispannayos ca paratantryabhavad asambandha eva / Having thus stated the Buddhist argument Prabhacandra corroborates with the following ka. from Dharmakirti : paratantryain hi sambandhah siddhe ka paratantrata / tasmat sarvasya bhavasya sambandho nasti tattvatah // PKM, spd., p. 504, ka. 1. Also see SKR, p. 812. Vidyananda refers to another possible view which is not so much a third as the combined view of the two stated above. This combined view is also repudiated by the Buddhist as being liable to the defects of both the views together (paksadvayabhavidosanusangat). Vide PVD, and MV thereon. III. 236, and TSV, p. 146.

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CHAPTER VII 215 hypothesis, remain two' in the resultant relational situation despite their mutual merging, inasmuch as a relation presupposes two disparate relational entities. But, it is contended, how can the merging take place if the merging relata are not fused or transformed into one indistinguishable whole or identity in the process? In other words, the interfusing relata should satisfy the incompatible requirements of retaining their duality (dvistatva) even in their resultant integration (slesa) into a relational whole, and of becoming a perfectly related whole, in which case there results an identity (aikya)--identity, because the two become onewhich goes against the fundamental pre-requisite of all relations that they should have two discreet entities." The moment the possibility of the two relata becoming a single relatum (identity) is accepted this acceptance would be insisted upon by the Buddhist logician in conformity to the logical necessity of the argument: this is the reason why the Naiyayika cautiously maintains the extrinsic character of even samavaya--the duality of the relational structure will then disappear and along with it, the need for a relation also owing to the absurdity of attempting to relate a single entity.* 1. A sambandha always presupposes two things : dvistatvat tasya (sambandhasya). PKM, p. 505. sambandhinor abhave sambhandhayogat / Ibid., and NKC, p. 305. Retaining duality would run counter to the integrating character of the rupaslesa relation : sambandhinor dvitve rupaslesavirodhat. PKM.p.505. Vide also NKC and SRK, p. 305 and p.812 respectively. 4. See above f. n. See supra, p. 207, and f.n. 6 thereon. tayor aikye va sutaram sambandho'bhavah / PKM, p. 505. tayor aikye'pi na sambandhah sambandhinor abhave tasyaghatanat/ TSV p. 147. See also SRK, p. 812.

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216 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Another argument which is mentioned, in passing, as meeting with the Buddhist objection is tendency to treat the notion of "continuousness', or nairantarya-which means absence of any gap or interval (antarabhavarupam)* between the two terms-as constituting the rupaslesa relation. This idea of continuousness is summarily rejected by the Buddhist as a negative (atattvika or tattvikatvayoga') one (because the absence of something is passed for a positive entity which, in his opinion, militates against the opponents' (Naiyayika's) acceptance of sambandha as a positive entity. Stretching the argument further, the Buddhist questions why his opponent should not accept "the presence of a gap" (santarata)' or the lack of continuousness, as the rupaslesa relation. This implies that nairantarya is as arbitrary as 1. nairantaryan tayo rupaslesah; na / PKM, p. 505. See also TSV, p. 147, and SRK, P. 812. Also the next f.n. 2. Vidyananda vividly renders it as chidramadhyaviraha. TSV, p. 148. This notion of gaplessness attributed to the Naiyayika, seems to be intended to defend his position against a split which cuts asunder a related whole into two independent, and therefore, unrelated entities. This is viewed, of course from the Buddhist angle. The Buddhist, however, contends, and rightly so, according to what rupaslesa ought to be, that the acceptance of gaplessness does not, as stated at the end of the paragraph, save the Naiyayika from playing into the hands of the Advaitin and accepting an unqualified identity. 3. The editor gives the equivalent of 'atattvika' as 'abhava' (tucchabhavarupatvad abhavasya). PKM, p. 505, f.n. 3. 4. Both Vidyananda and Vadidevasuri use this phrase. TSV, p. 147, and SRK, p. 812. 5. nirantaratayas ca sambandharupatve santarata'pi katham sam bandho na syat? PKM, p. 505. anyatha santaratvasya sambandhaprasangatvat / TSV, p. 148, and NKC, Vol. I, p. 305.

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CHAPTER VII 217 santarata and, therefore, that there is no logical bar against accepting the one or the other as the rupaslesa relation, although both are equally absurd. The Naiyayika, however, cannot concede santarata between the relata since even the utmost closeness (santarata) would not save him from the charge of the Buddhist who demands, under rupaslesa, nothing short of a 'total merger' or fusion of the relata entering into the relation. Nor does such closeness banish duality or the separateness of the relata in the composite whole resulting from such admission. Acceding to a 'total merger' would inevitably land him in the forbidden region of identity, to the delight of the Advaitin. A further dissection into the implications of the rupaslesa relation is attributed to the Buddhist dialectitian: If the relata are interfused, is the fusion, he asks, total (sarvatmana) or partial (ekadesena)? If it is total, he answers, then the fusing relata become a single mass of identity. An aggregation, or a plurality, of atoms (anunam pindah) becomes on this hypothesis, indistinguishable from, or identical with, just a single atom (anumatrah) and then, on this score, the question of relation does not at all arise in the case of a single entity. If, on the other hand, the interfusion (slesa) is partial (ekadesena)--that is, if a part of a relatum comes into contact with another part of the other relatum-then the problem arises whether each of the related parts is identical with (atmabhutah) or different from (parabhutah) each of the corresponding unrelated parts in the relational whole. It cannot be said, he adds, that the related and the unrelated parts, within a relation, are identical. If it is so, a part of the

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218 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE relatum becomes identical with the whole of it and, in such circumstances, describing the relation as partial would become absurd. This also gives rise to the error of rejecting two entities, given by hypothesis, in favour of one entity which does not admit of any relation. In order to escape this dilemma, if the opponent (the Naiyayika) accedes to the idea of a split, or distinction of parts, in the relatum-this would be inevitable if the present principle of relation is accepted-then arises the consequence of disintegrating a unitary relatum into two parts, one of which is in relation and the other out of the relation, which is an absurd proposition. For, once the compartmentalising a relatum into the related and the unrelated parts is acquiesced in, the Buddhist will naturally compel the opponent to accept the inevitable fallacy of an infinite regress. This is because division of a relatum gives rise to two parts--the one related and the other unrelated-and, again, division of the related part, leaving out the other one, gives rise to similar two parts, and then again, a further division into further two parts, and thus goes on a progression of successive and unending divisions.' In the light of the above arguments Dharmakirti concludes that there can be no rupaslesa sambandha between two distinct entities, and that all entities are, therefore, 1. The elaboration of these implications is based on the follow g passage of Prabhacandra who puts the argument as follows: kinca asan rupaslesah sarvatmana ekadesena va syat? sarvatmana rupaslese anunam pindah anumatrah syat / skadesena tac-chlese kim ekadesas tasyatmabhutah, parabhutah va? atmabhutas cet, na ekadesena rupaslesas tadabhavat / parabhutas cet; tair apy anunam sarvatmanaikadesena rupaslese sa eva paryanuyogo'navastha ca syat / PKM, p. 505; also NKC, Vol. I, p. 350.

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CHAPTER VII 219 discreet by nature, and, as such, do not admit of any relation whatsoever. Then Dharmakirti proceeds to unravel two more rifts in the conception of relation as a real entity combining two terms, or relational factors, involved in it. It is impossible to conceive a relation without the relata it combines. It is, therefore, appropriate to consider relation, he pleads on behalf of his opponent, as involving, or forming the basis (asraya) of, the duality (dvistatva) of its terms. In other words relation cannot be conceived of as a distinct entity without its attribute (dharma) of the terms contained in it. When this is conceded Dharmakirti probes into the implications of this view and tries to show an inconsistency. In view of the fact that relation is admitted as an objectively real and independent entity (sat) it ought to be, on the strength of this admission, a self-sufficient entity; that is to say, it should not have any lack or "expectancy' (apeksa) for anything else' (para; the reason is described as sarvanirasamsatvat). If it shows any kind of 'lack' or expectancy', then it forfeits its claim for its very existence (anyatha sattvavirodhat) owing to the fact that nothing can, according to the opponent, exist without the condition necessary for its existence-here the condition for its existence are its relata-being fulfilled. Therefore, if relation is to be considered an absolute entity it should not, the Buddhist 1. rupasleso hi sambandho dvitve sa ca katham bhavet/ tasmat prakrtibhinnanam sambandho nasti tattvatah" // PKM, spd., p. 505, ka. 2. 2. The lack' here refers to the existence of relation being conditional upon the existence of the relata.

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220 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE maintains, require the necessity of the relata in it and, consequently, should exist in its own right. An analysis of its requirements, however, exhibits the serious lack of dependence upon its relata for its existence. It cannot therefore exist, Dharmakirti affirms, as a full-fledged and independent real (tan na parapeksa nama yadrapah sambandhah siddhyet'). When the truth of Dharmakirti's contention in the above argument is recognised, the falsity of the converse of the argument could also be easily perceived : a non-existent relation cannot, as it has been just observed, exhibit any 'expectancy' for the necessity of the relata inasmuch as the relata will not, then, have any basis for their subsistence (apeksadharmasraya-virodhat"). Lastly, Dharmakirti scathingly brings out a major inconsistency which, from the Idealist point of view, is destructive of the opponent's strength in upholding the reality of relation. Relation is acknowledged, as it has been repeatedly pointed out, by the Naiyayika to be a distinct entity besides the relata in a relational situation. This provokes the Buddhist dialectician to the presentation of a new dilemma inherent in the relationship between the consti 1. PKM, p. 505. 2. Ibid. 3. The purport of this argument is contained in the following ka. of Dharmakirti : parapeksa hi sambandhah so'san katham apeksatel sams ca sarvanirasamso bhavah katham apeksate// PKM, spd., p. 505, ka. 3. See also NKC, Vol. I, p. 306, SRK, p. 813, and TSV, p. 148.

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CHAPTER VII 221 tuent elements of the situation, viz., the relation itself (sambandha) and its relata (sambandhinau). Is the relation, it is questioned, identical with (abhinnah; anarthantaram) the relata, or different from (bhinnah; arthantaram) them ? If it is argued to be identical with them, then comes the Buddhist retort that there will either be the relata only (sambandhinaveva, na sambandhah') or the relation only (sa eva va na taviti"), not the two together. If, on the contrary, the other position is advanced, viz., that the relation is different from the relata, then it would be asked, how could the relata which are absolutely (kevalau) independent of the relation be related by it at all ? No two things, which lack some kind of mutual affinity can be related. Further, granting the opponent's supposition that a relation is a distinctive entity alongside the relata (sambandho'rthantaram) the Buddhist objects how the two relata could be related by one relation' at all ? Positing another relation in order to relate each relatum to the relation in question, would raise the difficulty of endlessly positing an increasing multiplicity of such relations landing the Naiyayika in an in PKM, p. 505. Vidyananda comments: Yady anarthantaram tada sambandhinaveva prasajyete / tatha ca na sambandho nama / TSV, p. 148; also see SRK, p. 813. 2. PKM, p. 505. 3. sa (sambandhah) tato'rthantaram cet sambandhinau kevalau kathar sambaddhau syatam / TSV, p. 148. See also SRK, p. 813. For a reference to sankara's view in this matter, vide p. 222, f.n. 1. 4. tenaikena sambandhena saha dvayoh sambandhinoh kah sambandhah ? PKM, p. 505.

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222 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE escapable regressus ad infinitum (anavastha). In consequence of this 'absurd' (atiprasanga) hypothesis, and the other simi. lar difficulties', the most important of which have been so far considered, Dharmakirti finally, and categorically, rules out the notion of relation as an independent entity as a false one (na vastavi)". Sankara and his followers are at one with Dharmakirti 1. sambandantarabhyupagame canavastha syat tatrapi sambandhantaranusangat/ Ibid., p. 505-506; see also SRK, p. 813. parenaikena sambandhad iti cet tenapi na sambandhah / TSV p. 148. The consequence of regressus ad infinitum, as a result of recognizing two absolutely distinct relata, is clearly argued out by sankara. Vide BBSB, II. 2. 13. For the Jaina answer to this charge, see infra, p. 232 (ff.), f.n. 2. Another criticism which Dharmakirti brings in, is the stock Buddhist argument that a relation or the relata should, like everything real, satisfy the requirement of serviceability or usefulness (arthakriyakaritva or upakaritva). Referring to samavaya, in a similar context, he observes : nityasyanupakaritvad akurvanas ca nasrayah 1. PVD, III. 231 See also PKM., spd., p. 510, ka. 21. Prabhacandra meets this criticism, from the Jaina point of view, by carrying the fight into the enemy's camp. See infra, pp. 226-7. 3. tan na sambandhinoh sambandhabuddhir vastavi..../ PKM, p. 506. Dharmakirti expresses the purport of this argument in the following ka.: dvayor ekabhisambandhat sambandho yadi tad dvayoh / kah sambandho'navastha ca na sambandhamatis tatha // PKM, spd., p. 506, ka. 4. 4. See, for instance, "The Refutation of Relation" (sambandhakhandanam) by sri Harsa, KKS, pp. 1090-1099. Here, sri Harsa's treatment of the problem is mainly concerned with the refutation of the relation of the 'container' (adhara) and the "contained' as well as of samavaya, and does not make any significant novel contribution to the content of the subject.

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CHAPTER VII 223 in their denial of relation as an objective and independent entity intervening between the relational terms. It is needless to go into the elaborate subtleties--some of which have already been anticipated in substance, if not in letter, by Dharmakirti of the critique that both Sankara, his commentators and others following him, have launched out on this subject. Just one or two' important features which indicate the Vedantic attitude towards the problem may, however, be referred to here: The Vedantic view of reality is fundamentally based on the postulate that the effect is nothing other than 'a specific state-of-existence (samsthanamatram) of the cause itself'.' This doctrine has already been found to render the acceptance of any genuine or ultimate duality of any kind unreal and therefore illogical. But duality is, as has been frequently 1. For further criticisms see BBSB (text), II. 2. 3, IP, Vol. II, pp. 218-219. na hi karya-karanayor bheda asritasrayabhavo va vedantavadibhir abhyupagamyate, karanasya iva samsthanamatram karyam ity abhyupagamat / BBSB (text), II. 2. 17, p. 62. See also BBSB, II. 1. 16, pp. 25-26 and PHO (E.T.); upapattyanubhavabhyam na karyasya karanad-anyatvam / Bhamati, BSB, p. 521. It is necessary to note, in this connection, that the Sankhya also takes the same view of non-difference between the cause and the effect, or rather, that the effect already pre-exists in the cause. See SKIS, ka. 9. This evidently leads to the rejection of relation-particularly samavayam in the Nyaya sense of the term, viz., that there should be two genuinely different entities for a relation (a third entity) to relate. Consequent upon the rejection of samavaya the Sankhya comes somewhat nearer the Jaina on the particular point of viewing "the nature of object in question" as serving the purpose of the samavaya relation : "The category of inherence, Samavaya....is rejected in favour of the simpler view that what it means is really to be expressed by the nature of the object in question." SSKH, p. 105.

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224 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE observed in course of this section, and, as confirmed by Sankara' himself, the sine qua non of a relation. The incompatibility between the absolutistic or the monistic dogma and the dualistic requirement of relation leads the Vedantin altogether to deny relation either of samyoga or of samavaya, and, to accept the principle that there can be nothing like a relation apart from the object supposed to be joined by it." In answer to the opponent's assertion that samyoga and samavaya are also subsistent' owing to the fact that we find, in experience, distinct designations or terms denoting their being (sabdapratyayadarsanat), Sankara observes that even where there is only one object there may be many designations referring to it in accordance with its myriad intrinsic' (svarupa) and extrinsic' (bahya) predications. One and the same Devadatta, for instance, may be, Sankara adds, the object of the epithets a man', 'a Brahmana', 'learned-inVeda','affable!, ' a boy', 'a youth', 'an old man', 'a father' and 'a son' etc. Therefore the objects themselves (sambandhinaveva) can be fittingly termed by the epithets 'samyoga'and 'samavaya'and, there need be no third entity 1. dvayayattatvat sambandhasya / BBSB(text), II. 2.19, p. 61. 2. napi samyogasya samavayasya va sambandhasya sambandhivya tirekenastitve kincit pramanam asti / Ibid. Ibid. See the next f.n. infra. sambandhisabdapratyayavyatirekena saryogasamavayasabdapratyayadarsanat tayor astitvam iti cet / na / ekatve'pi svarupa. bahyarupapeksayanekasabdapratyayadarsanat / yathaiko'pi san devadatto loke svarupam sambandhirupam capeksyanekasabdapratyayabhag bhavati manusyo brahmanah srotriyo vadanyo balo yuva sthavirah pita putrah pautro bhrata jamateti.../ Ibid., p. 61f.

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CHAPTER VII 225 (vyatiriktavastu) existing apart from them (the objects).' In other words Sankara's view of relation is that it has no existence apart from the objects which may be called the relata, by courtesy--and its use signifies neither a mechanical nor an inseparable connection among them but just a synonym for the objects themselves. This negative attitude of Sankara towards the problem of relation is essentially the same as that of Dharmakirti except for the fact that the latter has brought a more acute and thorough dialectical analysis to bear upon the problem. The Jaina View In keeping with his reconciliatory metaphysical standpoint the Jaina offers a via media between the extreme externalism of the Naiyayika and the equally extreme illusionism or idealism of the Buddhist and the Vedanta schools. An attempt is made here to state the Jaina view of relation, first, in relation to the Buddhistic and the Vedantic approach, and then, to the Nyaya approach, to the problem. The Jaina postulates the reality or the factuality of relation as a deliverance of the direct and objective experience. He, therefore, posits relation not merely as inferable', but 1. tatha sambandhinor eva sambandhisabdapratyayavyatirekena san yoga-samavayasabdapratyayarhatvam, na vyatiriktavastvastitvena / Ibid. p. 62. 2. atas tad (sambandhah)anyathanupapattes casau siddhah. PKM p. 514.

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226 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE also as an indubitably perceptual' fact. He does so in opposition to what he considers as the aprioristic dialectic of Buddhism, and by implication, of the Vedanta also, wherein the mind imposes its own forms upon, instead of obeying the dictates of the events of the objective realm. This is the spirit underlying Prabhacandra's contention that the Buddhist seriously errs, not merely by ignoring what is directly perceivable, viz., the relational element, but also in describing it as a conceptual fiction (kalpana) which is anything but perceptible. This does violence to a 'brute' fact of perceptual validity. If the Buddhist denial of the perceptual validity of relation is right, then, linen and its yarn, or the linen and its colour etc., ought to be seen as separate entities; but Prabhacandra rightly asserts that they are always perceived together. This constant togetherness is not conceived to be possible without the actual connecting factor of a relation. One of the grounds on which the Buddhist bases the inadmissibility of relation is the lack of serviceability or practical utility (upakaritva, arthakriyakaritva) attributed to relation. Prabhacandra effectively turns the table on the Buddhist by applying this test to the Buddhist conception of objects in general, and thereby shows how the relational element is a constituent factor in the make-up of the objects. If the atoms, for instance, are absolutely exclusive or discreet 1. sambandhasyadhyaksenaivarthanam pratibhasanat/ Ibid. 2. katham ca sambandhe pratiyamane pratiyamanasyapyasambandhasya kalpana pratitivirodhat? Ibid. 3. See supra, p. 222, f.n. 2.

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CHAPTER VII entities, as the Buddhist maintains, then Prabhacandra asks, atom A is unconnected with atom B, and atom B with atom C, and atom C in turn with atom D and so on in any concrete object, say, a pitcher. Being a conglomeration of such unconnected units or atoms, it ought not to be a 'pitcher' at all useful for fetching or holding water in. Similarly when a tender bamboo is pulled with a string tied to it, it ought not, on the Buddhist theory, to bend as it does. Such phenomena are inexplicable unless the atoms composing the objects are admitted to be cohesive, that is, capable of being connected or combined to become concrete and useful objects. The Buddhist cannot deny the occurrence of such phenomena and such undeniability amounts, according to the Jaina philosopher, to a covert admission of a relational factor in the texture of objective experience. 1. See supra, pp. 213-214. 2. See PKM, p. 514. Alluding to Dharmakirti's objection' to paratantryasambandha, one of the only two possible kinds of relations conceded--conceded, of course, only for disproving, since no relation is accepted to be intrinsically valid-by the Buddhist logician, Prabhacandra remarks that far from being untrue it (paratantrya-sambandha) is a matter of common knowledge (pratititah suprasiddhatvat). However, Prabhacandra accepts its reality with the qualification that the essential nature of paratantrya is unification of the relata (ekatvaparinatilaksanaparatantryasyarthanam)," not mere 'dependence' as described by the Buddhist. In the eventual negation of the dependence-relation by the Buddhist, Prabhacandra 227

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228 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE sees the repetition of the error just referred to in the instances of the pitcher and the bamboo, viz., the impossibility of denying it without implying a tacit acceptance of its reality. Because the negation of pervasiveness with reference to the relata is itself an attempt to invest the relata with a relational trait. In other words, attributing a lack of dependence or pervasiveness to the relata amounts to positing a relation between the relata. No negation is, as a Western' idealist would say, absolute; it generally implies an affirmation of something. An attempt to deny the very thing which is, in some form (kvacit) accepted, is, according to Prabhacandra, a form of contradiction. The consequence which is supposed, as already indicated, to result from accepting the paratantrya-sambandha, viz., the non-necessity for a relation between any two either 'fullfledged' or 'wholly finished' (nispannayoh) or 'not-yetemerged' (anispannayoh), entities is also resolved by Prabhacandra by his explanation that both alternatives are the two aspects of a single total situation which is identity of differents. A piece of linen, for instance, even prior to its coming into existence as a fabric, that is, when it is still anispanna, exists (pataparinamotpatteh prag api sattvat) in the form of yarn which is already nispanna (tantudravyataya nispanna eva). Or, conversely, the yarn as the material cause, or substance, is concurrently existent, as itself (svarupena), with the yarn as linen which is yet 1. "The bare form of negation is not adequate to fact; it contains mere emptiness or ignorance; we nowhere come upon a mere 'not-something'..e ..every affirmative denies and every negative affirms." EIB, p. 134.

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CHAPTER VII 229 anisparna, or non-existent, as its effect or modification. In other words, the yarn, as the dravya, is the element of identity and the linen, as its parinama, is the element of difference. both together constituting the relational situation. Here, as everywhere else, identity as the substantial element is the continuant' (or the continuing principle, anvaya or dravya) existing in the yarn as well as in the linen, but difference, as the modified form of the substance, is yet distinguishable-in the sense that linen is not quite the same as the yarn-from identity. Therefore, generically, the Jaina view of relation is that it is an identity of differents or different terms. As regards Dharmakirti's contention that the rupaslesa-sambandha, or the relation of interpenetration, the second possible relation, could have only two modes, viz., total (sarvatmana) interfusion or partial (ekadesena) interfusion, and that both are untenable for the reasons already adduced, Prabhacandra maintains that Dharmakirti's analysis is both wrong and inexhaustive. It is wrong to say that we encounter any paradoxical situation here, for relation could often be one of total merging, and at other times, of partial contact depending upon the nature of the relata involved. There is, for instance, a wholesale merging, or mutual permeation between the 3. 4. tantudrayam api svarupena nispannar pacaparinamarupatayanispannam / PKM, p. 515. See infra, p. 217 ff. Ibid. Prabhacandra describes this process as follows: kvaccit tu nikhilapradesanam anyonyapradesanupravesatah-yatha saktutoyadinam...PKM, p. 515. It is, however, necessary to note here that in spite of such 'wholesale' permeation the relata retain their distinctness, and never become a single relatum. It is

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230 meal' (saktu) and water (toya) blended with it, whereas there is only a partial contact between the hand and the table when the palm of the hand comes into contact with the surface of JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE interesting to compare the Buddhist notion of 'merging' in which the relata are 'lost', and the Jaina notion in which the relata are 'distinct', with the distinctions made by Parker and William James: Parker distinguishes 'two types of unity'. "In one case", he observes, "the related elements interpenetrate and are lost; in another case, they remain distinct from one another" (The Theory of Relations, SNde W, p. 272). Similarly, James also refers to a "partial conflux" or "a concatenated union" and contrasts it with a "total conflux" or a "through-and-through type of union". The Thing and Its Relations, JPPSM, Vol. II, p. 35. 1. The meal obtained from grinding fried corns. 2. In the case of a 'partial contact', that is, when the palm is in contact with the surface of the table, the Jaina does not posit that the contact is between the whole hand and the entire table. He admits that only a part of the hand is in contact with a part of the table. This admission of parts might immediately put the Buddhist on the offensive and provoke from him the retort how such admission of parts in or the divisibility of, the objects can accord with the Jaina notion of impartite, or indivisible, atoms. nanv evam (that is, samsatvavastuprakarena) paramanunam apy amsatvaprasangah syat? PKM, p. 515. The words in the round brackets are from the editor's note in f.n. 15, ibid. The whole passage, opening with this statement, is quoted later in this f.n. See next page. In this connection Prabhacandra offers a brief, suggestive and 'irrefragable' (anuttaram) answer on which McTaggart's remarks, also made in connection with relations, seem to make an unconscious vartika. (The relevant remarks from both the authors are quoted, in appropriate places, in course of this note). Although his answer appears to be ingenious, it vividly brings out the spirit of manifoldness pervading the Anekanta philosophy: 'Parts' which mean divisions into which an atom is said to be divisible, do not, according to Prabhacandra, refer to the possibility of physically dividing an atom which is located in a particular spatial point, and, is really impartite, in the physical sense. They refer, it is suggested, to an

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CHAPTER VII infinite diversity, or to the fact of the infinitely manifold relatedness of an atom to the other atoms similarly located. The Jaina does not believe in the existence of absolutely simple entities. A real, say even an atom, is not a lonely being but a star in a constellation of similar entities, which assume, in their multitudinous groupings, various patterns and magnitudes which are determined by the laws of their internal compulsions and external pressure, and bear, accordingly, an infinity of relations, internal and external, total and partial, immediate and mediate, to the other phenomena in the universe. A real is, indeed, an independent existent but it is also a complex focus or network of relational forces. It is as it were a knot into which the strands of such forces are woven. The fact of the star or the knot being tethered to a point or a stretch of space, need not condemn it to a bare unrelated existence. The idea of the universe as a realm of interacting and interlocked elements of reality will be touched upon elsewhere (ch. IX.). 231 The aim of this note is somewhat to enlarge upon the implications of Prabhacandra's important distinction between the two meanings of "having parts" (amsatva) or divisibility, viz., (a) physical partition, and (b) infinite diversity or manifoldness of nature (anantadharmatmakatva) exhibiting a varied relational structure. He agrees with his Buddhist opponent on the impartiteness of the ultimate units or atoms of nature, but he also puts forward the other meaning which brings out the vital aspect of its manifold nature. As a matter of fact, he even suggests that such divisibility or manifoldness is possible because of the impartiteness of the units of nature. No fixed character can, after all, attach to a floating phantom or tyrannically isolated units of 'windowless monads '. nanv evam paramanunam apy amsatvaprasangah syad ity apy anuttaram; yato'tramsa-sabdah svabhavarthah, avayavartho va syat? yadi svabhavarthah, na kascid dosas tesam vibhinnadigvibhagavyavasthitanekanubhih sambandhanyathanupapattya tavad va svabhavabhedopapatteh/ avayavarthas tu tatra sau nopapadyate/ tesam abhedyatvenavayavasambhavat/ na caivam tesam avibhagitvam virudhyate/ yato'vibhagitvam bhedayitum asakyatvam, na punar nihsvabhavatvam / (PKM, p. 515).

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232 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE the table. In the infinitely variegated (citra) nature of things the one, or the other, or even both, might occur at a time and any kind of rigid legislation as to their occurrence could be motivated only by an artificial logic which does not take full cognizance of the plenitude and variety of the things in nature. There are two very important considerations to be noticed in this connection. In the first place, however closely the "We have come to the conclusion then, that no simple substance can exist, and that every substance that exists is divided into parts, which again have other parts, and so on, to infinity...... If we are compelled to add to this, the further conclusion that no substance can, without contradiction, be divided into parts of parts to infinity, we could not escape from contradiction any way. If, on the other hand, we should find that infinite series of parts of parts would involve a contradiction unless the substances had a certain nature, we should be certain that all substances had that nature, since under no conditions could they have the infinite series of sets of parts which they do have. NEMc, Vol. I, p. 192. Incidentaliy, the charge of regressus ad infinitum (anavastha) directed by the Buddhist against the Realist (see supra, p. 222 and also f.n. 1 thereon) as resulting from an attempt to relate two "absolutely distinct' entities, is suggestively answered by Prabhacandra, and his answer is borne out by McTaggart (NEMC, Vol. I, p. 142 ff.). The Buddhist would, indeed, be right if the relata are 'absolutely different' (atyantabhede) from each other. But, owing to the fact that they are, according to Prabhacandra, of the nature of identity and difference-which is entirely different from either view when each of them is taken singly and totally (anekantavastuno natyantabhedabhedan jatyantaratvat / PKM, p. 515)-the relation obtaining between is a unique synthesis partaking of both the elements which enter it. This consideration, combined with the fact that the relatedness of the relata is not something ab extra but is grounded in the very nature of the relata, sets at nought the accusation of the vicious infinite against the Jaina view. Cf. PKM, p. 515, and NEMc, Vol. I, ch, xxiii.

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CHAPTER VII relata permeate each other, they do not lose their individuality. If they do, they cease to be as such. Here we see that the Jaina does accept a kind of internal relation but he does so in the same degree as he accepts internal change in the objects, and also consistently with the external changes happening to them. The change happening when a wooden stick is burnt to ashes is internal as compared with the conjunctional or external change occurring when a few such sticks are tied in a bundle. In adopting this attitude the Jaina avoids the two extremes of the Naiyayika externalist with whom an effect makes a complete break with the cause (arambhavada), and, even samavaya is a mere external relation, and, of the Vedantin with whom the cause alone is, and the effect is not, and, therefore, a relation, if any, can operate within the being of an identical entity. That relation is an objective fact-not an objective entity-grounded in the relata themselves, and that it is internal or external in accordance with the relative proportions of the intimacy or distinctness of the relata concerned in a particular situation are the important consequences resulting from the attitude the Jaina has adopted toward the problem of relations. 1. The other consideration relates to the notion of 'uniqueness' (jatyantararupatva) attaching to a relation: The Jaina looks upon the relation resulting from a combination of the relata in it as something unique (jatyantara), or sui generis, in comparison with the combining relata. That is, the resultant product emerging from the effectuation of the 233 As a matter of fact, a relation can never be substained on a strict absolute hypothesis.

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234 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE relation is something novel and peculiar although it necessarily accommodates the respective natures of the combining relata. Necessity and novelty', to express the same in the idiom of western logic, are, therefore, the characteristics of the resultant relation. The uniqueness of relation is the element of novelty-not by any means a novel entity but a character or a trait-emerging from the relational transformation in which the natures of the relata are not totally annihilated but become overlaid with, as it were, a new informing trait. This idea is elucidated by the beautifully suggestive analogy of painting. A painted picture is indeed a product of a variety of paints and patterns, but yet it is not equivalent to a mechanical sum 1. Necessity refers to the constituent factors, or the terms already existing, and novelty to the emergent feature attendant upon the fruition of a relation. The satkaryavada of the Sankhya system may, in spite of its evolutionary character, be said to exemplify the element of necessity inasmuch as the entire world-process derives, though gradually, from prakrti, under the influence of purusa. Nothing new is created at any stage, since the history of the entire reality is an alternation of evolution and involution. The Nyaya-Vaisesika seems, prima facie, to be what might be described as novelistic, in contrast to the necessitarian view of satkaryavada. It is described as arambhavada, owing to the fact that the effect of a cause appears to be totally novel in comparison with its cause. But a closer examination shows that it is almost as necessitarian as the other; because it is more appropriate to describe the effect as merely different, not novel, from its cause. In the case of two different things, the question of novelty does not arise. Novelty is cognised to be so only against a background of necessity or permanence and when both form the ingredients of a single total situation. The notion of 'jatyantararupatva' seems to fit in appropriately only with the view of identity-in-difference.

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CHAPTER VII mation of the paints and patterns. It is a unity and, at that, a novel unity, resulting from, and existing concurrently with, the paints and designs in a certain order. Similarly a relation is a unique combination of the constituent relata. 235 The Jaina is at one with the Nyaya-Vaisesika in entertaining relation as a part of the real and objective world. There are, however, two points of significant difference which call for a brief reference although they have been anticipated at several places in course of this account. The first concerns the question of an independent existence of relation as a distinct entity, and, the second, of samavayasambandha (necessary relation). The Jaina attitude to the first question is that relation is something which is integral to the terms but not something which is an absolutely independent entity. This does not at all mean that it is subjective or mental as the Buddhist means. It is indeed an objective fact serving as a link as it were between the terms of relation. The 'link' need not necessarily mean an independent existent. What is objective need not be an absolute or separate entity somehow penetratA relation ing into the being of the terms from without : refers to the capacity of the terms for an 'intrinsic' or 'extrinsic' determination between themselves by virtue of the relational power seated in them. In spite of the diversities in the relatedness, between the terms, ranging from the most intimate or inseparable, to the most mechanical, or separable, kind, all relations are specific embodiments of identity-in-difference. This approach to relation as identity-in-difference containing, within itself, the power of bringing into connection the varie

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236 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE gated contents of reality is sure to bring upon itself not merely the reproach of the idealists (the Buddhist and the Vedantin whose views have already been examined) but also of the extreme realists, viz., the Naiyayika to whom any reference to internality is disagreeable. The reproach from both sides would be that the Jaina holds a contradictory view owing to the incompatibility of identity and difference, or of internality and externality. But once the manifold nature of things is granted, it is easy to understand that the Jaina position is inevitable. As Russell clearly points out a consistent monist finds relation needless for the obvious reason that there should be, for a relation, at least two entities which are irreducible to each other. But this is, ex hypothesi, impossible. Relationing is equally impossible with a consistent pluralist who subscribes to an unrelated series of momentary entities. Hence the Buddhist and the Vedantin have repudiated, rightly from their respective points of view, relation as a part of reality. The Nyaya-Vaisesika also admits relation as third entity but unless he accepts it as being, in some degree, grounded in the relata, it is impossible for him to avoid infinite regress. There cannot be a genuine relational 'transaction' between externally conjoined relata. Hence the theory of identity of differents seems to be the only possible hypothesis on which any genuine element of relation can work. The most surprising fact about the development of the Nyaya philosophy is that it compromises, at the hands of the neo-Naiyayikas, some of its fundamentals and arrives at a

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CHAPTER VII 237 position which, if developed to its logical conclusion, will approach the Jaina viewpoint.' This fact becomes particularly evident in the case of samavaya which, as will be presently seen, is given up all but in name. The admission of svabhavasambandha' or svarupasambandha, the 'natural' or the simple relation, offers the thin end of the wedge in dispensing with relation as a tertiary entity in a relational situation. This notion of svarupasambandha connotes that the terms themselves contain, within their nature, the relational trait which is as objectively real as 1. Cf. JPN, p. 232. 2. sarjnamatrena, na vastutathabhavah / STP, p. 704. 3. Cf. Sri Harsa's observation that the Naiyayika regards the 'nature' of things also as their 'determinant': svabhavasyapi bhavata niyamakatvangikarat / KKS, p. 1091. Chatterjee writes: "Unlike the relations of conjunction and inherence Svarupasambandha is not distinct from the terms related by it. Rather, the relation is itself constituted by one of the relata....the relation is constituted by the object, or is due to the nature of the object." NTN, p. 188. The distinction, in the Nyaya philosophy, between rela as a 'third unity' (an independent entity) and relation 'without a third relating unity' as Stcherbatsky renders it expresses the difference between 'separable conjunction' (samyoga) and 'inseparable conjunction' (samavaya) on the one hand, and the simple relation' (svabhavasambandha) on the other. The former is found with the reality of the 'link' (anubhuyamana sambandha, or vigrahavan sambandha) and the latter without the reality of the link but yet objec tive. Cf. Log., Vol. II, f.n. 3, p. 287. 4. Cf. JPN, p. 232, and RML, pp. 153-154. Regarding the direct ness of the temporal and spatial relation, Ingalls writes : "Everything resides directly in time by a temporal relation. Time thus acts like space (dik) in that it is a substratum, for all entities." NNLI, p. 78. 5. Just because relatedness is 'resident' in the relata, the ideal

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238 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE the terms themselves. Its application is unfortunately restricted to the cases of visayavisayibhava (the subject-object relation) and visesanavicesyabhava (the substance-attribute relation, such as (a) the absent jar and 'the empty space' (bhavabhavayoh) and (b) (i) the spatial relations ist objection that relatedness disappears, or becomes, under the circumstances, merely a 'way of looking at things' (conceptualistic), is not endorsed by the Naiyayika (in this respect the Jaina is with the Naiyayika). The Naiyayika never accepts the position of non-relatedness of even the 'natural property' (svabhavadharma) of things : cf. "We have to accept it (svarupa) as a relation because without some relation we cannot explain our sense of one thing being resident in another." RML, p. 153. It is a significant fact that svarupasambandha is attributed, by the Naiyayika, even to samavaya, although it is normally distinguished from the latter, and definitely from samyoga, as 'a third relation' (see NTN, p. 188) and is said to explain' such cases as do not come under either samavaya or samyoga. Cf. IPC, 1927, p. 165, where Hiriyanna, while discussing the nature of samavaya, remarks that "it (samavaya) is directly connected with the relata", and then, adds, in a f.n., "This is technically described as svarupasambandha, i. e., it is self-related not unrelated". Its self-relatedness is said to be due to the fact that it cannot being an independent category (padartha), abide in a dravya or a cause. The important fact to be noted, in this connection, is that eventually, even the Naiyayika has to admit the nature of things as the determining factor of at least one kind of relation. A wider scope of its applicability is not resorted to by him owing to his commitment to a radical pluralism. As for the Jaina, anything which does not have its own nature, which is the source of all relations, is to be described with Mallisena, as 'nissvabhava" 'avastu', sasavisana, or nothing (SM (text), p. 33). The compelling truth of nature' as the determining factor is somewhat indicated by the Naiyayika's limited acceptance of svabhavasambandha. Treating all relata as 'naturally' related will save the Naiyayika from an unduly formal and hyperrealistic procedure.

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CHAPTER VII 239 (daisikavisesanata) and (ii) the temporal relations (kalikavisesanata). Nevertheless its extension to cover the entire range of the relational nature of things is but the logical culmination of such a limited acceptance. Moreover, the consideration of the economy of thought (laghava) and the faithfulness to experience demands such extension. Kumarila' also supports this thesis and admits that there is nothing like a separate relational link which is an independent intermediary between the relata and that the terms contain within themselves the relational trait which brings about the contact between things. The acceptance of this fact, viz., that relation is an objective factor residing in the relata themselves, and is, therefore, their (svabhava or svarupa) leads him to the conclusion that relation is nothing else than identity-in-difference which constitutes the nature of things. The Jaina concurs fully with this view and believes that objects have a natural disposition (yogyata) for mutual contact at all levels and this disposition, described as relation, forms an integral aspect of the nature of things as identity-in-difference. The untenability of the Nyaya position is particularly evidenced in its surrendering, at the hands of the 1. See Bud. Log., Vol. II, f.n. 3, p. 287, and f.n. 8, p. 290. Also, RML pp. 153-154. 2. He characterises samavaya as svarupar dharmadharmino; see supra, p. 222, f.n. 2. 3. Vide Intro, SN, p. xcii, JPN, pp. 232-233. # There is samavaya of smell in earth and not in water; SO the samavaya is many, say moderns". Dinakari, quoted in MML, f.n. 1. (The statement runs as: prthivyam gandhasya

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240 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE later' Naiyayikas, the oneness (ekatva), and the eternality (nityatva) of samavaya, for manyness (anekatva) and transcience (anityatva). Consequently, with the admission of manyness what was conceived as all-pervasive (vyapaka) became something which is restricted to individual objects. This triple change in the conception of samavaya has been actuated by the compelling force of the opponent schools like the Buddhists, the Vedantins, the Mimamsakas and the Jainas. The Jaina does not concede the occurrence of the 'ihapratyaya' or ihabuddhi ("in-ness')-.g., the linen is in the yarns (iha tantusu patah) --which is held by the samavayah, na jale ityadi pratiteh samavayasya nanatvam iti navyah / BPVK, p. 113.) Also see NNLI, f.n. 162, p. 75, and f.n. 165, p. 76. "The later Naiyayikas and the Mimamsakas following Prabhakara refuse to view samavaya either as eternal or one." IPC, 1927, p. 162, f.n. 3. (The references indicate the Prabhakara view of samavaya : samavayo nana nityas ceti Prabhakarah, U on VD, p. 353, also see thereon.) "Samavaya, Inherence, cannot be regarded as everlasting, because it is actually found to be ephemeral; for instance, the Inherence between the Community and the Individual comes into existence when the Individual is produced, and perishes as soon as that Individual perishes." PMS, p. 63. See also, ibid., p. 93, where "Eternal contact" is regarded as a contradiction in terms, Dhruva maintains that the "earlier logicians" could not accept a plurality of samavayas since they feared that the quality of number would be associated with it. See Notes, SM, p. 81. But it is difficult to see how they could avoid accepting even "one" as a number, 1. For the statement of the early Naiyayikas on the oneness, the eternality and all-pervasiveness of samavaya, see supra, p. 209 and the footnotes thereon. 2. Abhayadeva describes this as a fancy induced by the bias towards one's own system: svasamayahitavasanaprakalpita iva. TBV, p. 700 ff. Cf. tadeha ihavijnanam paresam eva vartate, svasiddhantanuragena nadartum lau kikam tu tat / TSS, ka. 827.

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CHAPTER VII 241 Vaisesika to be the sine qua non of samavaya. According to him, no such 'in-ness' intervenes between the terms. Nor does he admit the relation of samavaya as something which conditions the terms.' He postulates spontaneity (svabhava) of relatedness which is immediate or direct (svataeva) between the terms themselves. This applies not merely to samavaya but to the whole range of relatedness in propositions which embody, within the being of their terms, the objective content which is identity-in-difference. In the instance of the yarn and the linen "yarn' is the identical or 'continuant', and 'linen' the changing (modificational) or occurrent', element. The 'continuant' (dravya) and the 'occurrent' are no doubt interrelated and this interrelatedness is as objective' a feature as the relata themselves. It is in the very nature (svabhava) of the relata to be mutually and appositely or appropriately--this latter feature is implied by the term 'yogyata' and is intended as an answer to the objection of intermixture' (sankara) of the relata related. Sankara' and his followers also are inclined to treat 1. na ca vrkse sakha ityadikapi matih samavayanibandhana / TBV, p. 701. 2. padartha api svata eva parasparam abhisambaddha bhavanti / SRK, p. 790. The next fn. gives the instance. Or better still in the example of atman and jnana (knowledge). 4. Cf. The following observation of William James: ".... the relations that connect experience must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system". JPPSM, Vol. I, p. 534 (James has put these words entirely in italics). 5. napi samyogasya samavayasya va sambandhasya sambandhivyatirekenastitve kincit pramanam asti / BSB, II. 17, p. 521 f. "It is absolutely necessary for you (the Naiyayika) to regard the nature of all things as determinants (as it is only 16

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242 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE 'naturalness' (svabhavata) of relation-or relation as a part (atmabhuta) of the terms themselves-as a less unsatisfactory hypothesis for the Naiyayika. The difference, however, between Jainism and Vedantism (and for that matter, also Buddhism, which takes relation as merely conceptualistic) is that the former takes relation as a real and objective trait whereas the latter as unreal and a subjective fancy. The Naiyayika's fallacy, according to the Jaina view, is that relation is treated as an independent entity. The indefensibility of the Nyaya position is pointed out to be inherent in the view held by the Nyaya pluralist: He rigidly clings to the argument that not merely the relata are absolutely different (ativa bheda) from each other but also that even the relation combining them is totally different from either of the relata.' 1. by means of its nature that anything can ever be determined"; IT, Vol. V, p. 273 (ET. Khandana-khanda-khadya, II. 85). tadatmyapratites ca dravyagunadinam samavayakalpananarthakyam/ BSB, II. 1. 18, p. 486. tasmat karanasyatmabhuta saktih saktes catmabhutam karyam / Ibid. Vacaspati Misra also observes: sattvam tu svabhavata eva sad iti na sattvantarayogam apeksate, tatha samavayah samavayibhyam sambaddhum na sambandhantarayogam apeksate svayam sambandharupatvad iti / Bhamati on II.1.18, ibid., p. 468. All that we cognise are the two relata, one of which is the dharmi (substratum: dharmanamasrayabhuto dharmi) and the other, dharma (attribute), and no third independent entity -corresponding to 'lac' (rala) rivetting two separate stones (silasakalayugala)-is, according to Hemacandra, cognised besides these two, either by perception or by inference: ayam dharmi ime casya dharma ayam caitatsambandhanibandhanasamavaya ityetat tritayam vastutrayam na cakasti jnanavisayataya na pratibhasate yatha kila silasakalayugalasya mitho'nusandhayakam raladidravyam tasmat prthak trtiyataya pratibhasate...../ SM (text) p. 32. As a matter of fact, between any two totally different entities the very distinction that the one is dharmi, and the

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CHAPTER VII 243 This naturally raised the legitimate objection that the two absolutely different relata cannot be related by a relation-whether it be samyoga or samavaya--without a further relation relating the relata to the initial relation. The second relation, again, necessitates a third, and the third, in turn, a fourth, and so on, interminably, landing the Naiyayika in the muddle of an infinite regress. By extending the notion of svarupasambandha, which has already been accepted in some form, within a limited sphere of experience, over the entire range of experienced reality and, thereby, conceiving the relational element to be embedded in the terms themselves, the Naiyayika can avoid the above difficulties. This would tone down his close adherence to difference and bring him nearer to the other dharma, cannot arise; much less does, therefore, the question of relating them arise if only for the reason that no such tertiary entity is vouchsafed to us in our experience; na dharmadharmitvam ativabhede vsttyasti cen na tritayam cakasti / AVD, p. 31, ka. 7. SM (text); see also SM on the ka. The acceptance of such an absolute distinction leads the Naiyayika to the curious position of holding caitanya or jnana (caitanyam jnanam, p. 38, SM) to be absolutely separate from atman connected with it (atman) by samavayasambandha This samavayasambandha is supposed to avoid the contingency of why the jnana of Caitra should not belong to Maitra since jnana is adventitious to both persons alike. But this sambandha does not seem to help the Naiyayikasamavaya being one, eternal and all-pervasive, and therefore identically the same (sarvatra vitter avisesat) in both persons. Vide SM, p. 41. The Jaina also accepts difference between the dharmi and the dharma (cf. prativastusvabhavabhedad iti / SM (text), p. 32) but not in the absolute sense. See Note 8, p. 80 (Notes), SM. 1. samavayasya samavayantarena vsttyabhyupagame tu, tatrapya-- parasamavayakalpane'navastha natidustara / SDS, p. 252 f., TRD.

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244 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE acceptance of the view that relation is of the nature of identity-and-difference to which the Jaina subscribes. The Sankara and the Saugata view, which treats relation to be mind-created, contradictory and even illusory, shows scant regard to the intrinsic objectivity of the relational element in the make-up of things. These considerations leave the Jaina view of relation as identity-of-differents' unaffected. It strikes a golden mean between regarding relation as a solid and independent entity and a fanciful myth in the subjective realm. 1. It is interesting to note that in recent contemporary Western philosophy also a similar development of thought, concerning the problem of relations, has taken place. F. H. Bradley's view approximates to that of the idealist sankara and Dharmakirti.Russell opposes Bradley and takes the line of the Naiyayikas. Several writers like Parker, William James and McTaggart have views which come between the two extremes of Bradley and Russell. There are, of course, fundamental differences in their metaphysical postulates, not merely among these western thinkers themselves but also between them and the Indian philosophers. There is, however, an unmistakable correspondence, in the three major trends of relational thinking between the western thinkers and their Indian counterparts. The following few statements and references from some of the western writers will indicate their respective alignments : Bradley : "Relational experience must hence in its very essence be called self-contradictory.... it can claim no title higher in the end than that of a necessary makeshift." CE, Vol. II, p. 635. A little further he writes that accepting "relational truth as final" leaves us "hopelessly in a blind maze of unending regress" ibid., p. 641, and the chap. on Relations, p. 62, f.n. 1. See also p. 207, f.n. 6, in this work. Russell: "Hence we admit that the relation, like the term it relates, is not dependent upon thought, but belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not create." Problems, p. 98. "When it ('a fact') consists of a rela

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CHAPTER VII 245 tion between two things, it has three constituents, the things and the relation. When it consists of a relation between three things, it has four constituents, and so on." OKEW, p. 61. Between these two extremes we have the others whose views correspond, at least in some essentials, to the Jaina viewpoint : De Witt Parker : "They (relations) are neither divided up among the terms, as Leibnitz thought, nor suspended between them, as Russell would have us believe, but character of the terms when united. We should not think of the unity which relation involves as a link or a tie or as glue, as a thing which externally affixes itself to elements and thus unites them. We should think of relations as rather running through terms, as embedded in them....; or if we cannot help thinking of them as bonds, we should picture them as so tight that they cut into the flesh and leave no space between." The Theory of Relations, SNDW, pp. 250-251. See also ibid., p. 260. "Since everything exists both on account of itself and of other things, there would be a part of the thing which would remain the same before the entrance into the new relationship and another part which would be different." (p. 261). See also p. 241 (the last paragraph wherein he suggests a compromise between 'different theories'), pp. 258-260 (where he replies to an 'objection'), and ibid., pp. 271-272, para. Nos. 1, 7 and 8. William James characterises the relational experience as a "primordial and empirically incorrigible" and "intelligible factor" of reality. "Continuities and discontinuities" (which may be taken to be equivalent to the factors of identity and difference which, according to the Jaina, together form the nature of things) are said to be factors which "compenetrate harmoniously' and are said to be "Co-ordinate". JPPSM, Vol. II, p. 30 and p. 35. The Thing and its Relations, CPP, pp. 29-41. Striking a note of finality on the nature or "constitution" of things as the basis of the co-ordinate elements of "continuities" and "discontinuities" James writes : "Somewhere we must leave off with a constitution behind which there is nothing". Ibid., p. 39, f.n. 14. See also "A Treatment of Relations", "A World of Pure Experience", 2 articles : 1. pp. 533-543 and 2. pp. 561-570, JPPSM, Vol. I. For reference ome important points of resemblance between McTaggart's and the Jaina theory of relations, see supra, pp. 230, f.n. 2.

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CHAPTER VIII A Consideration of Two Controversies Concerning Dravya and Guna (and/or Paryaya) with a view to Clarifying the Nature of Both: (1) How far could a Dravya be treated as A Concrete Universal? (2) Are Gunas the Same as, or Different from, Paryayas?

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CHAPTER VIII A Consideration of Two Controversies Concerning Dravya (Substance) and Guna (and/or Paryaya) with a View to Clarifying the Nature of Both Our investigation so far has led us to the conclusion that reality is a co-ordinate synthesis of identity-in-difference and that every real accordingly is a unique embodiment of identity-in-differents. There are, however, two controversies which further elucidate the nature of dravya and of paryayas in the anekanta ontology. One of them owes its genesis to an impact of recent Western philosophy (Hegelianism and neoHegelianism) on Indian thought and is, therefore, modern, and the other is a natural development arising from an impulse to obviate an inherent inconsistency and dates back, at any rate in its more conscious form, to the times of Siddhasena Divakara. These controversial problems are : A. whether a dravya could be described as a concrete universal, and B. whether the paryayas are the same as, or different from, the gunas, in a dravya. They deserve at least a brief notice and, therefore, an attempt may be made to consider their salient features. A. How far could a Dravya be treated as a Concrete Universal? In a fit of Hegelian enthusiasm, two critics, Nahar and Ghosh, have attempted to find in the Jaina notion of dravya

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250 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE an echo of the Hegelian and the neo-Hegelian idea of the concrete universal.' For Hegel, as for Bradley and Bosanquet, Describing a real in Jainism as 'The Absolute' the two critics proceed: "The Absolute is the Universal. This Universal is not the abstract Universal of the formal logic but the concrete Universal. The absolute expresses itself in A ...... A is the particularisation of the Universal...... The Universal comes out of Itself and particularises Itself in the particular objects......" etc. EJNG, p. 166. A passage like this could be taken, almost at random, from any page in Hegel, Bradley, or Bosanquet. The last sentence, in particular, looks like a faithful parody on the well-known Hegelian dictum : that the Absolute goes out of itself, returns to itself to be itself. The tendency to compromise the co-ordinate status of difference in a manifold real as a result of this bold Hegelianisation of Jainism is too obvious. This is corroborated, on the side of Western philosophy, by Bosanquet who, in course of his treatment of the 'concrete universal', observes: "The universal is just that character of experience which overcomes the 'is not' by reducing it to an element harmonious with and corroborative of the 'is'. It is the self in the other?." The Principle of Individuality and Value (1912), p. 46. The concepts of the 'is' and the 'is not have been noted already to signify identity and difference respectively. 'Reducing' the 'is not' to a foil which sets off the glory of the 'is' is a familiar idealistic rigmarole. Expounding Hegel's view, Stace observes that "the universal is the absolute and ultimate being which is the foundation of all things, which produces the world out of itself". (Italics in the text). The Philosophy of Hegel (Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London, 1924), p. 14. The neo-Hegelian Bradley writes: "But in the concrete universal, which has guided our steps, and which has appeared as the identity of analysis and synthesis, we have turned to truth and made our peace with reality." PL, Vol. II, p. 487, (22nd edn., 1940). While controverting the view of Bosanquet, the other great neo-Hegelian, N. K. Smith, points out that the doctrine of the concrete universal is "Hegelian in origin" (Mind, 1927, p. 156) and S. Alexander adds that this doctrine is "nowhere

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CHAPTER VIII 251 the two great modern heirs of Hegelian absolutism, the Absolute, which is identity par excellence, is the supreme consummation, and the sole presupposition, of our entire philosophical quest. Furthermore, it (the Absolute) is also said to be the perfect concrete universal.' Being completely identical with itself" this 'being' of the concrete universal does not admit expounded with more effect and enthusiasm than by Mr. Bosanquet". Space, Time and Deity, Vol. I, p. 233, S. Alexander, (The Humanities Press, New York, 1950). We notice this 'enthusiasm'in Bosanquet's own words: "The recognition of this logical form (the concrete universal) as the true type of universality is the key to all sound philosophy." The Principle of Individuality and Value. It may be doubted, for a moment, that the words "logical form", in the above statement of Bosanquet, do not bring out the ontological significance of the concrete universal. But that they do so will be realised when it is remembered that 'the identity of knowing and being' (and therefore of the 'thought' and the thing'), as will be pointed out later in course of this topic (infra, p. 255) forms "the basic principle of all idealism". This truth of the ontological significance of the concrete universal is further demonstrated by the self-contradictory idealistic argument that the true (the concrete) universal is the perfect 'Individual' and that the only such perfect 'Individual' is of course the supremely 'Real' (the ontological principle), or the Absolute. Cf. "We say then with Bradley, following, of course, Plato and Hegel, that the Individual which, as we have seen, is the only true form of the universal, is the Real." Bosanquet, op. cit., p. 68, f.n. 3. (See also PL, Vol. II, p. 487). "......the Absolute is the concrete universal". P. T. Raju's Thought and Reality (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1937), p. 174. 2. Hegel no doubt speaks, as already observed (supra, p. 98, f.n.2) of mere identity as 'pure light' and of mere difference as 'pure night', and of both as 'two voids'. This seems to be opposed to such a description of the Absolute, which is the

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252 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE of difference (of which change, plurality, etc. are but variant forms) or otherness or, as it is otherwise called, 'the opposite', being lastingly and coordinately rooted in reality. At best it allows difference, in its course of "self-dispersion', as a 'transitional' phenomenon which appears for a moment only to dissolve itself into the matrix of identity--identity which, in the course of its development, culminates in the supreme state of the Absolute. In brief, this entire development is one of the Absolute going out of itself and finally returning unto itself. This fact that Absolute Idealism celebrates, under concrete universal, as being 'completely identical with itself'. From the Hegelian point of view, however, difference figures as a transitional, and even necessary, element, but it does so only during the relatively imperfect stages of the development of reality towards the ultimate stage of the absolute. But when the development reaches its consummation in the Absolute, the Absolute, conducting itself as an all-enveloping identity in which difference, if it exists at all, would be hushed into a a silent or theoretic existent and would, therefore, be functionally effete. Hence the description of the Absolute as being "completely identical with itself" would be, it will be explained, perfectly right. To the Jaina at any rate, this treatment of difference, viz., recognising its necessity at the so-called transitional stages of development and trifling with it eventually (by assigning to it a theoretically subordinate status which logically amounts almost to an actual cancellation or annulment) at the supreme level of the Absolute, will appear as hunting with the hound and running with the hare. 1. Cf. "Hence we have now reached the idea of a being which in passing outwards into its opposite passes only into itself, and this opposite does not become anything different, but remains even in the opposition, completely identical with itself." Stace, op. cit. p. 222. (Italics in the text.) A little further on Stace adds: "Hence in determining B (the opposite) A determines itself."

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CHAPTER VIII 253 the notion of the concrete universal, the triumph of identity, ignoring the primal importance due to difference, is too obvious to need any further treatment at length. Identifying the Jaina concept of a dravya, which accords to difference an equally primordial status to that of identity, with the Hegelian concrete universal, therefore, does violence to an important point of principle. Besides the non-recognition of difference also as a co-ordinating primal element of reality, the Absolute Idealism, with its adherence to the doctrine of the concrete universal, treats all reality as ultimately 'spiritual'' or 'mental'?. This 'panlogism' or mentalism leads the idealist 10 Concluding his great work, Bradley observes: "We may fairly close this work then by insisting that Reality is spiritual. There is a great saying of Hegel's, a saying too well known, and one which without some explanation I should not like to endorse. But I will end with something not very different, something perhaps more certainly the message of Hegel. Outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any reality, and the more anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real." AR (9-10th imp., 1930), p. 489. Hegel himself observes: "The aim of knowledge is to divest the objective world that stands opposed to us of its strangeness, and, as the phrase is, to find ourselves at home in it: which means no more than to trace the objective world back to the notion-to our inmost self." The Logic of Hegel (Trd. by W. Wallace, 1892, Oxford), p. 335. Cf. "The universe is nothing but the content of consciousness." Stace, op. cit., p. 73. "The absolutely concrete is the mind." The Logic of Hegel, p. 295. "The Notion of the Absolute fully realised, in and for itself, is thus Mind'...." ERE, Vol. VI, p. 574. Not satisfied with reducing the objects' to 'minds' the Absolute Mentalist proceeds to reducing them to one 'mind'. Cf. Alexander's remark while criticising Bosanquet's view : 2.

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254 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE uphold the identity of the real' and 'the rational', 'the thing' and 'the thought', 'the experienced' and 'the experience'. "The real is the rational" and "the rational is the real" is a Hegelian commonplace signifying the interchangeability or the eventual identity of reality and rationality. The Jaina, who, as a realist, firmly believes in an ultimately or irreducibly dualistic reality of souls and the material world, does not, therefore, subscribe to this idealistic spiritualisation of the world. This second radical difference, in the approach to reality, between the Jaina on the one hand and Hegel and the neo-Hegelians on the other, prevents a facile identification of the Jaina conception of reality--whether this reality be the macrocosmic dualistic universe of spirits and the physical world, or the microcosmic real of dravya and paryaya-with the mentalistic concrete universal into which the principle of difference (macrocosmically the physical "The very objects of the mind themselves, it is urged, are, not indeed minds, but mind....". The Basis of Realism (The Annual Philosophical Address to the British Academy, 1914), p. 28. Contrasting his own position with that of the Absolute, Alexander adds: "....the realist does not commit the mistake of declaring, therefore, that things are, in their real and deep seated nature, mind." Ibid., p. 29. 1. "The identity of knowing and being is, in fact, the basic principle of all idealism." Stace, op. cit., p. 73. "That the thing is identical with the thought-this means that there is no absolute separation between subject and object, for the object is within the subject." Ibid. (Italics in the book.) This is why the absolutist asserts that, finally, there is onlyand that would be only one-experience: cf. "And there is no distinction here between the experience and what is experienced." Bradley's Essays on Truth and Reality (1914, Oxford), p. 196. Further, Bradley adds elsewhere : "And Reality is one experience self-pervading., etc." AR (9th imp., 1930), p. 489.

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CHAPTER VIII 255 universe and microscosmically, the paryayas) or 'the Other': would be untraceably absorbed'.? These two major divergences--not to speak of the other cognate ones concerning, for instance, unity and plurality, or the non-occurrence or the otherwise of the 'compresence' of the universal and particular in a real--militate against a wholesale comparison being made--except with reference to the earlier phase of Hegelianism, and, within the limits to which a reference has been made earlier-between the absolutistic idea of the concrete universal and the Jaina notion of a real. But the authors of An Epitome of Jainism seem to ignore these divergences, and, to reduce Jainism to an imperfect copy of the Hegelianism in respect of the problem in question. In their attempt at comparison of the two schools they write, for instance, that "everything which is real is rational", and add, as if by way of elucidating this truth: "The thinker and the object thought of are nothing apart from each other. They are twain and yet 1. "The Other, which it asserts, is found on enquiry, to be really no Other.... And the form of otherness or of opposition again has no sense, save as an internal aspect of that which it endeavours to oppose." AR (9th imp., 1930), p. 463. "....Mind on its part is not merely a world beyond Nature and nothing more : it is really, and with full proof, seen to be mind, only when it involves Nature as absorbed in itself." The Logic of Hegel, p. 180. (Italics mine.) Bradley confirms this truth: "Nature is an abstraction from experience, and in experience it is not co-ordinate with spirit or mind. For mind, we have seen, has a reality higher than Nature, and the essence of the physical world already implies that in which it is absorbed and transcended. Nature by itself is but an indefensible division in the whole experience." AR (9th imp., 1930), p. 470.

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256 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE one.... They have no meaning or existence taken individually and in their union they are not two separate things stuck together but two that have lost or dissolved their duality in a higher unity." This passage, like the other several passages in the book which are suffused with a "blind adoration to the German Idealism", as Chakravarti describes," 1. EJNG, p. 109 and p. 114. 2. By a curious irony this critic also becomes, eventually, a victim to the Hegelian hypnosis of which he is initially critical in the authors of the Epitome and goes to the extent of even declaring firmly that "The Jaina metaphysics does not contemplate the Hegelian absolute." (PSKC, Intro., p. li). Referring to the Jaina conception of dravya as an 'organic unity' of 'permanency in change' he writes, in a later passage: "Hegel is responsible for introducing such a conception of reality in modern thought. Jainas in their conception of Dravya have anticipated such a modern idea, several centuries in advance. Of course the concept was not fully worked out because of other limitations peculiar to their age." Op. cit., p. 5. One might concede that there is, as it has been already pointed out earlier (supra, pp. 98-101), a certain similarity between the Jaina view of reality and that of Hegelianism with respect to the latter's 'relative' or 'transitional' phases. But it cannot be conceded that the Jaina view, when 'fully worked out' would, unless there was a radical departure from its fundamental ontological presupposion (viz., the bhedabheda nature of reality), ever take the Hegelian view in its (the latter's) final form of absolutism (abhedavada or the identity view) by which Hegel firmly swears. But Chakravarti seems to regret that the Jaina view did not take the final form of Hegelianism "because of other limitations peculiar to their (the Jainas') age." While admitting that the Jaina metaphysics has, in general, remained comparatively stagnant in its growth, it would be wrong to think, on this specific issue, that it would be more logical if it had gone the way of Hegel in search of an Absolute. If it did so it would fall into the very pitfall which it has been doing its best to avoid throughout its polemical history.

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CHAPTER VIII 257 exhibits a complete lack of the awareness of the divergences just referred to. The mentalizing tendency of a real is indicated in the dictum, repeated almost verbatim from Hegel, that everything which is real is rational' as well as in what follows, and the primacy attached to identity over difference is indicated in the reference, at the end of the passage, to the loss and the dissolution of their duality in a higher unity'. These two important considerations do not, therefore support the close comparison which Nahar and Ghosh have made between the Jaina notion of reality and that of the absolutistic concrete universal, although there are some comparable traits between the former school and the preabsolutistic, or the relative' phases of Hegelianism to which a reference has been already made at some length.' B. Are Gunas the same as, or different from, Paryayas ? Having briefly occupied ourselves with the controversy, given rise to by some modern Hegelian enthusiasts, whether a dravya could be treated as a case of a concrete universal, and found that it cannot be, we may now proceed to a study of a considerably earlier controversy concerning the relation between a paryaya (modification or mode) and a guna (quality or property) in a dravya. There are three views 1. See supra, p. 98 ff. 2. The third 'view' is, as will be indicated later (infra, p. 265), more a tendency than a well-defined doctrine. 17

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258 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE involved in this controversy which aim at the determination of the principle of change or difference which is constituted by these elements of paryaya and guna: First, that the two, viz., paryaya and guna, refer to the same unitary principle of change under two different names; secondly, that the two are two distinctive elements or aspects, the onc, viz., the paryaya, being an external mode and the other, viz., the guna, being an internal attribute, the two together constituting the principle of change; and, thirdly, that the two are mutually identical as well as different. The three views are described as the Abhedavada, the Bhedavada and the Bhedabhedavada respectively, and the authors of each view will be referred to in the appropriate places. 1. Abhedavada Siddhasena Divakara is the champion of this view that paryaya and guna are synonyms' (tullattha or tulyarthau) signifying the principle of change. This change consists in the external and the internal transformations of all entities consistently, of course, with the continuance of the entities. In proving the identity of paryaya and guna, Divakara, bold as he is in often departing from tradition, appeals to revelation' (desana) as almost the sole argument on his This topic has been discussed in STP, ch. III, gas. 9-14. Prefacing the ga. 12 the Commentator, Abhayadeva, remarks: atha tatra guna eva paryayasabdenoktah tulyarthavat / TBV, p. 635. Continuing the line (after tulyarthatvat), cited in the above f.n., Abhayadeva adds "agamacca", and quotes the following statement from the agama : ya eva paryayah sa eva gunah / Ibid.

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CHAPTER VIII 259 side : "Lord Mahavira has," he observes, "once and for all, acknowledged only two points of view namely Dravyastika and Paryayastika; now if the idea of Guna would have been altogether different from the Paryaya, he would have certainly admitted a third viewpoint, namely that of Gunastika." This appeal to tradition has a special force in view of the fact that the theory of abhedavada, propounded by Divakara, is not widely held and is strongly opposed by even Kundakunda, Umasvati and others. Divakara is, however, supported in his view by Siddhasena Gani', Haribhadra", Hemacandra', Yasovijaya and, among modern critics, by Hermann Jacobio 1. STP, ga. 10. Tr. Athavale and Gopani (ST, ch. III, p. 120). The gatha runs as follows: do una naya bhagavaya davvatthiya-pajjavatthiya niyaya / etto ya gunavisese gunatthiyanao vi jujjanto // See also Abhayadeva's introductory statement to this ga.) vastutah paryayah guna ityaikantikam / Siddhasena Gani's Tattvarthatika, Pt. I, (ed. H. R. Kapadia, Bombay, 1926), p. 428. Cf. The lengthy passage, in STP, p. 633 (f. n.) from sastravarta. samuccaya, wherein Haribhadra offers, in substance, the same arguments as Siddhasena Divakara. Hemacandra's attitude to the problem is indicated by the total absence of any reference to the concept of guna in his treatment of the real (vastu) in either the relevant sutra (viz. pramar visayo dravyaparyayatmakam vastu) or his own com. thereon, in his work Pramnanamimamsa. Vide PMHS, pp. 24-25. 5. Jacobi's view is that there was "no room for an indepen dent category 'quality' at the early epoch in the development of metaphysics" and that paryaya included the qualities. To quote his own words, ".... the ancient Jaina texts usually speak only of substances, dravyas, and their development or modifications, paryayas, and when they mention gunas, qualities, besides, which however is done but rarely in the Sutras and regularly in comparatively modern books only, this seems to be a later innovation due to the influence which the

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260 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Yasovijaya distinguishes between the 'sahabhavi', the simultaneous or the intrinsic aspect, and 'kramabhavi', the successive or the extrinsic aspect, of paryaya, and identifies guna with the former. He observes that each of the two names is a specific sign (visesasamjna) for its corresponding aspect and brings the two signs together under the generic sign (samanyasamjna) of paryaya. By thus treating guna as a kind of paryaya he is able to assert, with Divakara, that the twofold' framework of dravyastika and paryayastika is adequate to comprise the full content of reality. philosophy and terminology of Nyaya-Vaisesika gradually gained over the scientific thoughts of the Hindus. For on the side of paryaya, of development or modification, there seems to be no room for an independent category 'quality'since paryaya is a state in which a thing, dravya, is at any moment of its existence, and this must, therefore, include qualities, as seems to be actually the view embodied in the oldest text." JSJ. Pt. II, p. xxxiv. He also refers to this view of paryaya as a "mark of antiquity" of Jainism. Whatever might be the date of the "ancient Jaina texts" or "Sutras" in which the problem of paryaya has been treated, it is hard to think of Kundakunda's Pravacanasada or Umasvati's Tattvarthadhigamasutra, works which mention regularly' the distinct category of guna, as comparatively modern books only'. It would, perhaps, be better to recognise that postulating the distinct category of guna must have been done at a considerably early period, may be in the early centuries of the Christian era, posterior, of course, to the period when paryaya alone was accepted as the more inclusive category. This must have come about from the spontaneous perception of an obvious gap in the ontological picture of a dravya as well as from the "influence of the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophy as suggested by Jacobi and Upadhaye (see PrSKU, Intro., p. Ixvii f.). 1. iti dravyaparyayarthikabhedaddvaividhyameva / Vivrti on Yaso vijaya's Nyayalokah (The Sri Jaina Grantha Prakasaka Sabha, Ahmedabad, vik. sam. 1974), p. 203. See also the early part

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CHAPTER VIII 261 2. Bhedavada Bhedavada, the opposite of the view held by Siddhasena Divakara and some others, is championed by Kundakunda, Umasvati, Pujyapada and Vidyananda. This upholds the distinction of paryaya and guna. Kundakunda describes the protagonists of the Abhedavada, or the Paryayavada as it is otherwise called owing to its belief in the oneness (aikantikam) of paryaya and guna, as 'false believers (parasamaya) who are deluded by modifications (pajjayamudha)'. As against their view he expresses his own dualism of guna and paryaya which, in combination with the dhrauvya (or dravya) element, give rise to the triune conception of a real (attho) which reveals itself as of "dravyagunaparyayasvabhava". This triune conception is described by Amrtacandra as the true (paramesvari) one. In the words of Kundakunda himself : "The object of knowledge of the passage. In this connection the following line is quoted : davvatthiyo ya pajjavanayo ya sesa vigappa sim/ See PrSKU, ch. II. ga. 1. Commenting on "pajjayamudha hi parasamaya" in the ga. Jayasena observes: yasmaditthambhutadravyagunaparya yaparijnanamudha .... bhedavijnanamudhasca parasamaya mithyadrstayo bhavantiti / In the same connection Amstacandra writes: hato hi bahavo'pi paryayamatramevavalambya tattvapratipattilaksanam mohamupagacchantah parasamaya bhavanti / Ibid., pp. 121-122. iyam hi sarvapadarthanam dravyagunaparyayasvabhavaprakasika paramesvari vyavastha sadhiyasi, na punaritara| Ibid., p. 121. Although guna and paryaya may be collectively designated as attributes, guna is generally rendered as equality and paryaya as modification or mode,

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262 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE is made up of substances, which are said to be characterised by qualities, and with which, moreover, are (associated) the modifications." A substance is, therefore, that which is endowed with qualities and accompanied by modifications. Despite their common abode, there is, between guna and paryaya, a considerable difference : a guna is, according to Kundakunda, a trait which is deeply embedded in the being of a dravya and is therefore called 'sahabhavi', simultaneous or intrinsic. A paryaya, on the contrary, is a relatively extrinsic feature appearing in a dravya for a time and disappearing later giving place to another paryaya. It is, therefore, called 'kramabhavi's_successive or extrinsic. It is, however, necessary, to remember that a dravya is invariably accompanied not merely by the ever-inseparable 2. W 1. attho khalu davvamao davvani gunappagani bhanidani / tehim puno pajjaya..... PrSKU, ch. II. See also the comms. on this ga. In his comm. Amftacandra refers to 'vistara' and 'ayata' as synonyms of guna and paryaya respectively and also distinguishes two kinds of paryaya, the 'svabhava' and the vibhava'. Ibid. p. 119. gunavam ca sapajjayam jam tam davvam hi vucchanti // Ibid., ch. II, ga. 3See also, gas. 4 & 15, ibid., and 10, 13 in PSKC. Guna and paryaya are also called anvayi, or inclusive, and vyatireki, or exclusive, respectively. Evidenty, the inclusiveness refers to the inwardness of guna in dravya and the exclusiveness refers to the separation of one paryaya from another in the succession of paryayas happening in a dravya. Vide PrSKU, p. 121, Jayasena's Com. It is necessary to note here the difference between Kundakunda's and Yasovijaya's use of the terms 'sahabhavi' and 'kramabhavi'. Kundakunda treats the term as referring to two distinct existents (bhavantarau) while Yasovijaya does so as referring to two aspects of the single principle, viz., paryaya (vide supra, p. 260).

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CHAPTER VIII 263 guna' which is either generic (samanya) or specific (visesa)' but also by some paryaya or the other. That is, a dravy may be, at a particular moment, without this or that paryaya but it can never be without some paryaya going with it. In this sense paryaya is as essential an attribute in a dravya as a guna, although the former is internal and the latter external. In modern parlance, guna and paryaya together constitute the "what' whereas dhrauvua constitutes the 'that' of a vastu. 1. This prefix 'ever', though apparently superfluous, has been advisedly used here in order to distinguish the Jaina idea of inseparableness of dravya and guna from that of the NyayaVaisesika. According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika a guna, though intimately or 'inseparably' related (samaveta) to dravya, is said to enter into the dravya a moment after the latter's birth, and to cease to be a moment after the latter's cessation. The Jaina, on the contrary, does not entertain such a paradoxical situation. He believes in the unconditional inseparability of dravya and guna without prejudice, of course, to their distinctions. svakiyavisesasamanyagunebhyah. . . . sarvadravyani gunatmakani bhavanti/ PTSKU, p. 121. The distinction between a samanyaguna and a visesaguna may be illustrated by a simple instance: amurtatva or formlessness is a generic or common quality (samanyaguna) between space (akasa) and a pure soul. Being a receptacle for (avakasasthanayogyatvam) objects is the specific quality (visesaguna) of space and consciousness (cetana) of a soul. Cf. PrSKU, ch. I, ga. 10, the Comms, thereon and Intro., p. Ixviii. While comparing guna and paryaya A. N. Upadhye refers to them as "inseparable and separable accidents" respecti (PrSKU, Intro., p. lxvi). This does not seem to be happy even as a 'rough' comparison, for paryaya, like guna, is, despite its extrinsic character, almost as 'inseparable' from dravya as a guna in as much as no dravya, in the Jaina view, could be ever found without some paryaya. Upadhye himself is not unaware of this fact of inseparableness of paryaya and

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264 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Another difference which is said to be observed between guna and paryaya is that when the one remains the same the other may vary. The qualities of gold, for instance, will remain the same when it is transformed into the various modifications like a ring, a bangle or a chain. Conversely, the modification of jarness will remain the same among several jars made from different substances like gold, silver or clay which vary in qualities from one another. Thus guna and paryaya are two distinct elements constituting, in their togetherness, the nature of a dravya in the Jaina ontology as expounded by Kundakunda and his commentators. It is needless to give individual statements of the views held, among others, by Umasvati, Pujyapada and Vidyananda, since all these writers substantially concur with Kundakunda in maintaining the distinction between guna and paryaya. Umasvati's view may, however, be briefly mentioned. He enunciates his bhedavada in the sutra: Substance is possessed of qualities and modifications (gunaparyayavad dravyam). In contrast with Siddhasena's view that paryaya comprehends, and is another symbol (samjnantaram) for, guna, he categorically declares that paryaya is not merely a dravya (vide, ibid., p. lxv), although he chooses a comparison which understates the case. Moreover, the epithet 'accident' as applied, in particular, to guna, is, despite the adjective 'inseparable', inappropriate in view of the fact that no 'accident', however 'inseparable' it is from a dravya, can adequately represent the depth of the intimateness commanded by a guna in its dravya. 1. STSU, V, Su. 37.

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CHAPTER VIII different symbol but also a distinct subsistent (bhavantaram)1 existing, along with guna, in the substance. 1. 3. Bhedabhedavada The third 'view', viz., bhedabhedavada, could be described more as a tendency than as a well-developed attitude. It suggests a coalescence of mutual identity and difference between guna and paryaya in a substance. Akalanka an Vadideva seem to hold this view. Akalanka, for instance, holds at once that gunas themselves are, or are identical with, paryayas (tato guna eva paryayah)', and that they (gunas) are also a distinct category from paryayas, a fact which is sanctioned, according to Akalanka, by scriptural authority (gunabhavadayuktiriti cennarhatpravacanahrdayadisu gunopadesat). It is interesting to observe that both Akalanka and Siddhasena derive sanction of the same divine authority for their contrary views on the present question. 265 bhavantaram samjnantaram ca paryayah. Ibid. The Com. on Su. 37. For definitions of guna and paryaya (or parinama) see ibid., V, Sutras 40-44 and the Com. thereon. 2. Concerning the abheda side of the problem, Akalanka remarks: guna eva paryaya iti va nirdesah/ athava utpadavyayadhrauvyani na paryayah/ na tebhyo'nye gunah santi tato guna eva paryayah iti.../ Supplementing this, and as if in answer to Siddhasena's repudiation of the independent status of the category of guna on the basis of the scriptural authority (infra, p. 258) Akalanka refers to the bheda view of the matter as follows: gunabhavadayuktiriti cennarhatpravacanahrdayadisu gunopadesat/ uktam hi arhatpravacane "dravyasraya nirguna guna" iti/ etc... TRAG, p. 243. These statements concerning both the views, occur in course of the com. on the sutra of Umasvati already referred to on p. 170. The manner in which Akalanka has

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266 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Vadideva approaches the problem under consideration on the same lines as, but more consistently than, Akalanka : "The question may be asked," he observes, ""Why are gunas and paryayas, which are presumably the same, differentiated?' The answer would be that while gunas always (kalabhedapeksaya) inhere in an entity, paryayas come one after another (kalavibhedapeksaya). (Hence the two, viz., guna and paryaya, are different). It may, however, be observed that the difference between the two is not absolute (sarvatha) because of the fact that they are partly identical, which is not at all an incompatible circumstance' (with their difference). Surely the difference between the two is not (as great) as it is between a pillar and a jar; nor is the identity (abheda) between them (as indissolubly intimate) as it is between a thing and its nature (svarupavat). The difference consists in the peculiar nature (svarupapeksaya) of each and the identity in their (common) abode (dharmyapeksaya)".' merely juxtaposed the two views does not seem to be very convincing; it even tends to leave the impression that the two views are somewhat paradoxical and that they are not properly synthesised into the form of a bhedabhedavada. Vadideva puts the matter in a more consistent form. Reference to Vadideva's view will presently follow. kathancidabhedasyapyavirodhat / See the following f.n. nanvevam ta eva gunastha eva ca paryaya iti katham tesam bheda iti cet / maivam / kalabhedavibhedapeksaya tadbhedasyanubhuyamanatvat/....na caivamesam sarvatha bheda ityapi mantavyam / kathancidabhedasyapyavirodhatvat / na khalvesam stambhakumbhavadbhedo-napi svarupavadabhedah / kintu dharmyapeksayabhedah / svarupapeksaya bheda iti / SRK, p. 736. The English rendering is mine and is free, including the transposition of the last two sentences as well as the simple and obvious correction of "kalabheda...." into "kalabheda" of the Sanskrit original

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CHAPTER VIII 267 Thus we see a divergence of opinion among the three views so far outlined, regarding the relation between guna and paryaya. But it does not materially affect the fundamental conception of a real which is the foundation of the Jaina metaphysics: A real has been observed in Jaina ontology to be an enfoldment of the permanent and the changing elements within its being. Whether the changing element is a comprehensive and unitary (abheda) concept, designated by Divakara as Paryaya, or a dual (bheda) concept consisting of two distinct elements known as guna and paryaya, it does not impair the basic structure of the real in so far as it (the changing element) remains an inseparable complement of permanence. This approach has been envisaged by Vadideva who endeavours to combine the two elements in his bhedabhedavada' in which bheda is represented severally by the 'peculiar nature' (svarupapeksaya) of guna and of paryaya and abheda by the common residence (dharmyapeksaya) of guna and paryaya, in their inseparable togetherness in the dharmi. On a critical analysis of this situation we find that the spirit of Vadideva's argument is largely agreed to by the two so-called extreme theorists also, viz., the abhedavadin and the bhedavadin. For, all the three schools now under consideration agree on the following three factors as being indispensable for anything to be a real : 1. Continuance (dhrauvya); 2. Quality which is internal to (sahabhavi) the real; and 3 transformation (parinama) which consists in the process of See supra, pp. 265-6.

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268 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE successive (kramabhavi), more or less extraneous events happening in the real. The main difficulty which has led to the disagreement on the relation between guna and paryaya is that abhedavadin considers himself a nominalist (hence the belief that the difference between guna and paryaya is one of name only) and bhedavadin a realist (hence the assertion that guna and paryaya are not merely two different names but also that they signify two distinct existents corresponding to the names). But the abhedavadin is not quite right in thinking that he is a nominalist owing to the fact that he does recognise the existence of guna also, even though in an indirect form, viz., as something which is incorporated in paryaya. As a matter of fact Yasovijaya even goes to the extent of singling out sahabhaviparyaya and naming it specially as guna.' Hence the rift between the abhedavadin and the bhedavadin is not so great as to disrupt the uniform agreement between them on the basic structure of a real which is the foundation of the Jaina ontology. Vadideva's statement of the case, in the form of his bhedabhedavada, not merely embodies a compromise between the other two rather extreme viewpoints but also suggests the right solution which is in consonance with the basic ontological presupposition of the Jaina philosophy. 1. See supra, p. 260.

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PART II ETISTEMOLOGY A. ANEKANTAVADA, the Theory of Manifoldness, the Most Consistent Form of Realism; B. NAYAVADA, the Theory of Standpoints; C. SYADVADA, or Saptabhangi, the Dialectic or Conditional or Sevenfold Predication.

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CHAPTER IX Anekantavada or The Theory of Manifoldness

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CHAPTER IX Anekantavada or the Theory of Manifoldness The Most Consistent Form of Realism Anekantavada is the heart of Jaina metaphysics and Nayavada and Syadvada (or Saptabhangi) are its main arteries. Or, to use a happier metaphor, the bird of anekantavada flies on its two wings of nayavada and syadvada. It is beyond the scope of the present work to give a full exposition, not to mention an ample critical assessment, of even some of the most essential aspects of these three topics. The traditional viewpoints are, of course, presented in the old Prakrt and Sanskrit works. But no sizeable literature, which is commensurate with the magnitude and importance of these problems, and which represents any significant effort for achieving a reorientation of these problems to the trends of modern thought, has yet come into existence although the need of such effort cannot be exaggerated. However, consistently with the aim of the present study that it should confine itself to certain important problems which have received inadequate or little attention, we may discuss, in the present chapter, how anekantavada--the theory of manifoldness or indetermination-manifests itself as the most consistent form of realism in Indian philosophy. A glimpse into some significant implications of nayavada and syadvada will also follow the inquiry into anekantavada. 18

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274 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE As already shown, while repudiating the idealistic notion of the concrete universal, the theory of identity-in-difference, the metaphysical presupposition of anekantavada, animating all the spheres of Jaina philosophical thinking, recognises the objectivity of the material universe. The objectivity of the universe signifies the fact that the universe is independent of the mind or consciousness. This independence, or the duality of consciousness and the material universe, necessarily presupposes the principle of distinction, which exerts a compulsive force until the logical goal of this principle is reached in the form of the development of the Jaina concepts of reality and knowledge into the comprehensive scheme of anekanta realism. In other words, once the initial step is taken, namely the recognition of the principle of distinction as being at the root of the duality of the mind and the world, there is no stopping short of working out, to their logical conclusion, the consequences of the operation of the principle of distinction. The claim that anekantavada is the most consistent form of realism lies in the fact that Jainism has allowed the principle of distinction to run its full course until it reaches its logical terminus, the theory of manifoldness of reality and knowledge. The first significant step to be taken, once the operative principle of distinction is accepted, is the postulation of a multiplicity of ultimate reals constituting the cosmos. The material or the objective world is constituted, according to Jaina ontology, by five ultimate reals : viz., matter (pudgala) space (akasa), time (kala), the medium of motion (dharma) and the medium of rest (adharma); and the mental or the subjective world consists of an infinity of independent minds, or

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CHAPTER IX spirits, in their conditioned or free existence. An analysis, on the physical as well as on the mental side, reveals, therefore, a multiple or pluralistic universe. The other step, which, along with the corollary to be referred to a little later in this chapter, fulfils the purpose of the ubiquitously operative principle of distinction, and which imparts the name of 'anekantavada', after which the entire Jaina metaphysics is often known, is the postulation of manifoldness, or inherent complexity, within each of the reals in the universe. In other words, reality, according to Jainism, is not merely multiple but each real, in its turn, is manifold or complex to its core. Reality is thus a complex web of manyness (aneka) and manifoldness (anekanta). The central thesis of the Jaina is, according to a modern critic, "that there is not only diversity but each real is equally diversified". 1 1. JPNM, p. 70. 275 " The 'diversification' or manifoldness-also described as indeterminateness' or indefiniteness '-may be illustrated by the two instances of matter and space in the physical universe. Dealing with the atomic theory of matter and space in Jainism Hiriyanna observes: "The atoms, according to it (Jainism) are all of the same kind, but they can yet give rise to the infinite variety of things so that matter as considered here is of quite an indefinite nature. Pudgala has, as we know, certain inalienable features, but within the limits imposed by them it can become anything through qualitative

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276 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE differentiations. The transmutation of elements is quite possible in this view and is not a mere dream of the alchemist. The material world evolves from the diversification of these homogeneous atoms into aggregates of earth, water, fire and air. It is pointed out that "Jainism also, like Upanisads, does not stop in the analysis of the physical universe at the elements of prthvi, etc. It pushes it farther back where qualitative differentiation has not yet taken place. But while in the latter the ultimate stage is represented by the monistic principle of Brahman, here it is taken by an infinity of atoms. "" Indicating that the character of indefiniteness or indeterminateness is extended to the sphere of quality also the same writer further observes : "It is not qualitatively only that matter is indefinite. Quantitatively also it is regarded as undetermined. It may increase or decrease in volume without addition or loss." A further treatment of the notion of manifoldness of matter has been offered in the chapter on Relations, in connection with the problem whether an atom has, and if so in what sense it has, an infinite part (amsa), despite the fact it is impartite (niravayava) in its nature. In the course of the treatment of the problem we have met with an occasion to discuss the light which is shed on it by three thinkers, viz., Prabhacandra and McTaggart on the one hand and Abhayadeva 1. OIP, p. 212 f. 2. Ibid. The phrase 'an infinity of atoms' may be substituted, without being incorrect, 'an infinity of diversified atoms'. 331 3. Ibid. Cf. the following fragment of Empedocles in Greek philosophy: "Earth increases its own mass and Air swells the bulk of Air." Burnet's Early Greek Philosophy, the edn. Adam & Charles Black, London, 1952, p. 212.

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CHAPTER IX 277 on the other. Again, in the present instance of matter', the brief hints hitherto given of the Jaina atomic theory sufficiently indicate the nature of indeterminateness or manifoldness in reality. Space or akasa is another example of a manifold real.' Its manifoldness is connoted, as in the case of matter, by its possession of parts. According to Abhayadeva as well as Prabhacandra even an incorporeal or formless real may contain parts or divisions, as evidenced by the obvious instance of atman", which contains cognitive and other powers. Abhayadeva points out further that to be divisible does not necessarily mean that the parts" should be put together at some point of time prior to division. In other words the divisibility of space is a spontaneous feature. The entire argument on the manifoldness of space, as well as of other reals, is developed by Abhayadeva in his polemic against the Naiyayika view of akasa. According to 2. 1. For a somewhat clearer view of the problem, this account of the indeterminateness of matter may be read in conjunction with the controversy regarding the savayavatva or otherwise of an atom in an earlier chapter (ch. VII). Cf, nanvanarabdhamurtimaddravyavayavatve gaganadinam niravayavatvaprasakter anekantatva ekatvavyaghatah, na...TBV, p. 641, For an explanation of the term anarabdha, occurring in this quotation, see infra, f. n. 5. akasasya...savayavatvarn ghatader ivopapannan savayavama kasar himavat-vindhyavaruddhavibhinnadesatvat / Ibid. 4. Ibid., p. 642, lines 9-11; cp, amurtasyapyatmano jnanadyadhi karanatvapratiteh / PKM, p. 563, 5. The term for the state in which the parts need not be put together prior to division is anarabdha.

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278 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE the Naiyayika akasa or "ether'' is one (eka)' or partless (na nana or niravayavi) and, consequently, it is all-pervading (vibhu) and eternal (nitya) --the distinctions, therefore, like ghatakasa and mathakasa are, like the concepts here' and 'there', a superimposition (upadhi) upon that eternally unchanging medium. But the Jaina believes in the genuine divisions of infinite pradesas which are as much objectively existent as the medium of which they are divisions. Were it not so, the two towns, say, Pataliputra and Mathura which, like the two mountains, the Himavat and the Vindhya, occupy different locations of space (nanakasapradesah), would, he affirms, 1. Besides akasa or ether' the Naiyayika recognises another entity, viz., dik, which is translated as 'space'. But in actual fact it is akasa, not dik, which corresponds to the Jaina conception of space'. nanvakasamapi kii prthivyadivan nana/netyaha-taccaikamiti / bhede pramanabhavadityarthan/ Tarkadipika on the su. 14 of TS (text, p. 11) which runs as: sabdagunamakasam/ taccaikam vibhu nityam ca // ekatvadeva sarvatropalabdher vibhutvamangikartavyamityaha vibhviti / Ibid. 4. vibhutvadevatmavan nityamityaha- nityam ceti / Ibid. 5. Cf. "The epithetoneimplies that the mention of numerous akasas such as ghatakasa and mathakasa in common parlance is due to upadhi and cannot be real". Ibid., Notes, pp. 127-128. Akalanka's term for 'upadhi' is 'aupacariki' or 'adhyaropa'. Calling the person 'Manavaka'a 'lion' because of the former's fierceness (kraurya) and bravery (saurya) etc., is cited as an example of upacara. Similarly, the attribution of pradesas or parts to the partless medium of akasa is from the point of view of the Naiyayika, a case of upadhi, or upacara: pradesa-kalpana niravayavatvadaupacariki simhavat // TRAG, p. 202, ka. 9. 6. Vide TBV, p. 642. .

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CHAPTER IX 279 tend to be at one location (taddesabhavinyeva) which is an absurd proposition.' But the Naiyayika may advance a more ingenious argument by stating that the savayavatva of akasa is like a monkey in relation to a tree (kapiv?ksasamyogavat). That is, the statement that the 'monkey is sitting on the tree' denotes that the monkey in question is sitting on the branch of the tree (sakhavacchedena) but not on the tree itself, or rather on the root of the tree (mulavacchedena). This analogical argument indicates the truth that just as the idea of the tree in its relation to the idea of the monkey does not pervade the latter fully (vyapyavrttitvam or samastyavrttitvam)' but does so, if at all, only partially, so also does akasa pervade its socalled avayavas at best only partially. This partial pervasion of the tree in the monkey, or of the akasa in the parts, is described as avyapyavittitvam or avyapyavrtti. This relation of avyapyavrtti aims at suggesting that, eventually, akasa does not directly possess the avayavas, or if it does possess any at all, it does so only in a remote and superficial way so that it would not be far wrong to say that the parts are almost unreal. The Jaina would, of course, turn the tables on the Naiyayika by 1. Commenting on his own ka. (16), viz., dravyanam pratiniyata pradesavasthanat, Akalanka observes : Ihanyesu akasapradesesu pataliputram sthitam anyesu ca mathura ato nanakasapradesah / makasam tasya yaddese pataliputram taddesabhavinyeva mathurapi syat / Ibid., p. 203. 2. This argument and the supplementary argument on samyoga as described in the following paragraph are elaborated on the basis of suggestive hints thrown in by Abhayadeva in the course of his commentary. See TBV, p. 602. 3. vyapyavrttitvan tu samastyavsttitvami / Ibid.

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280 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE rejoining that all the latter's verbal subtleties have not succeeded in ruling out a reference in the latter's argument-however indirectly it might be-to the avayavas with regard to akasa. It is, as a matter of fact, quite obvious that the Naiyayika's analogy of the tree and the monkey would fall to the ground if the essential element of the branch of the tree is removed from it. Another important consideration which undermines the Naiyayika's thesis of indivisibility (niravayavatva) of akasa in the above argument of kapiveksasamyoga hinges on the relation of samyoga figuring in it. The sitting monkey is conjoined to the branch of the trees by way of samyoga or external relation. Samyoga is admitted by the Naiyayika himself as a guna, and a guna in turn is admitted to need a dravya for its asraya', or support. The support in the analogy under consideration is the tree and, correspondingly, the support for the avayavas of akasa, is evidently akasa itself. This means that the avayavas of akasa are not a case of either upadhi or avyapyavTtti as is evidenced by the grounds admitted by the Naiyayika himself. Thus this as well as the previous argument as advanced by the Nyaya school presupposes, at any rate indirectly, the Jaina thesis of the savayavatva of akasa. Akalanka also does not see eye to eye with the Naiyayika on the question of impartite akasa. He is inclined to feel that the divisibility of akasa would be incompatible with the divisibility of a material object. In other words, the 1. saryogasya gunatvena dravyasritatvat tadabhave ca tadabhavat / Ibid, See also TS, su. 4.

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CHAPTER IX 281 indivisible akasa is not a favourable receptacle for the divisibility of an object like a jar' (dravyavibhagabhavat). The last significant argument which is brought by Abhayadeva to bear upon the present issue concerns the Nyaya view of sound (sabda) as the special quality (visesaguna) of akasa. It is a commonplace universal experience that a particular sound prevails (vartate) only at a particular place (ekadese eva) but not everywhere (na sarvatra) and that the sound subsequently fades away (vinasyati) from where it is heard. If the Nyaya thesis of the partless-or unitary and, consequently, of the eternal--akasa were right, then every sound, for that matter even the distant word uttered by the divine Brahman (brahmabhasitam) would be straightaway heard by us everywhere (sarvagatatvar syat), and would remain everlasting (nityam)". In point of fact even the usage (vyapadesa) that "a particular sound prevails only at a particular place but not everywhere" would be evidently impossible under the conception of a partless akasa. Besides even the established fact of the transitoriness of sabda would militate against the Nyaya conception of an all-pervasive Commenting on his own ka. (5), niravayavatvanupapattiriti cen na dravyavibhagabhavat /, Akalanka observes: yatha ghato dravyato vibhagavan savayavah na ca tathaisam dravyavibhagostiti niravayatvam prayujyate // TRAG, p. 202. Cf. yadi ca savayavan nabho na bhavet tada srotrakasasamavetasya sabdasya brahmabhasitasyapyupalambho'smadader bhavet niravayavailakasasrotrasamavetatvat/ TBV, p. 641. yadi ca savayavam akasam na bhavet, sabdasya nityatvam sarvayatatvan ca syat / Ibid. na hi niravayavatve 'tasyaikadese eva sabdo vartate na sarvatra' iti vyapadesah sangacchate/ Ibid.

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282 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE (vibhu) akasa. Nor does the Nyaya belief in what might be described as the wave theory of sound'-that is, the theory according to which sound is transmitted by waves-work without presupposing a divisible akasa. Hence the Nyaya view of akasa' points, according to Abhayadeva, to the Jaina thesis of the savayava nature of akasa. Thus the Jaina view of akasa is that it is an objective real having infinite parts or pradesas" ("space-points') which signify its anekanta nature (nanatvam ityanekantah"). . Cf. na ca niravayavatve akasasya santanavsttya agatasya sabdasya srotrenapyupalabdhih sambhavati anyanyakasadesotpattidvarena tasya srotrasamavetasyanupapatteh jalataranganyayenaparaparakasadesadavaparaparasabdotpattiprakalpanayam kathan nakasasya sava yavatvam / TBV, p. 642. For a further reference to a few other consequences resulting from the Nyaya view of akasa, see ibid., pp. 641-642. 3. anantabhagapramitam akasadravyam / Brahmadeva's Dravyasar grahavrtti (Davva-samgaha by Nemicandra S. Chakravarti, ed. S.C. Ghosal, Arrah, 1917), p. 24. 4. A pradesa or 'space-point' is 'the space occupied by an atom'. PrSKU, p. 17 (E. Tr.), f. n. 4. The pradesas are, however, limited to physical space' (lokakasa) only, the other part of akasa being a 'non-physical space' (alokakasa). Ibid. 5. Vide TRAG, p. 203, ga. 19 and the com. thereon. The manifoldness of time is indicated not merely by an infinity of intrinsically real (paramarthika) units called kalanus or time-atoms' which form the basis of the conventionally temporal (vyavaharika) distinctions like the minute, the hour, the day, the year and so on, but also by the diverse effects which are brought about by the instrumentality of the kalanus which permeate the events in the universe. Cf. so'nantasamayah/ TSVJ, V. 40, "The Jaina Theory of Time", Y. G. Padmarajiah (a paper read in the Indian Philosophical Congress Trivandrum, 1947) and TRAG, V. su. 22, especially the ki. 14 and the comm. on both. For further light on the manifoldness in various senses, of akasa as well as on dharma and adharma,

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CHAPTER IX Lastly the soul or atman, an individual centre of experience among an infinity of similar centres in the realm of consciousness, is the subjectivistic instance of manifoldness in Jainism. It is needless to enlarge upon the manifold nature of an atman since it is evident in every one of the infinite states (anantabhavas or parinamas) as well as in the multiple powers which are attributed to atman."' There are at least two considerations which indicate the manifoldness of atman: First, an atman, like the Liebnizian entelechy, mirrors the the entire universe within itself as a unique centre of experience. The universe it mirrors, or comprehends, is an infinitely complex one. Hence its experiential powers must be manifold, or commensurate with the complexity of the experienced universe. This is an implication of Vadideva's idea that difference in the cognised (visaya) signifies a (corresponding) difference in the cognition (vikalpa) concerned' as well as of the characteristically Jaina idea of relativity of knowledge, which signifies that "the full knowledge of everything is inextricably bound up with the full knowledge of everything and (vice versa)". 283 the medium of motion and that of rest respectively, see TRAG, p. 210 ff., su. 12, ka. 27 and its comm. It is, however, necessary to observe that the nature of manifoldness in the case of dharma and adharma has not been very clearly developed, although their conformity to the supreme law of the entire reality as expressed in the celebrated formula of Umasvati, viz., utpadavyayadhrauvyayuktam sat, has been clearly stressed. Vide TB on ST, p. 641 f., ga. 33. 1. Cf. the Vivrti and Prabhacandra's comm. thereon-NKC, Vol. II, p. 686 and p. 689 respectively. 2. visayabhede hi siddhe vikalpabhedah sidhyati / SRK, p. 755.

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284 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Secondly, atman, as conceived by the Jaina thinkers, is the exact antithesis of the Advaitic Brahman. The Advaitic Brahman, as pointed out on several occasions in the course of this work, is a monolithic conception, or an unredeemed identity. Being antithetical to this extreme Advaitic conception the Jaina notion of atman is that of an infinitely diversified centre of experience. The significance of manifoldness characterising the consciousness in the latter's function of apprehending the many-faceted universe has crystallized itself into the twofold dialectic of the nayavada and the syadvada to which reference will be made in the course of this section. In our endeavour to trace the logical steps which have led the Jaina conception of reality to the most consistent form of realism in Indian philosophy, we have been able to observe that in consequence of recognising the force of the principle of distinction inherent in all realistic procedure, the Jaina has postulated an independent objective world as against the world of consciousness, and has proceeded to posit manyness in reality and manifoldness in each real. The progress from multiplicity of reals to manifoldness of each such real consists chiefly in advancing from the number to the nature of the reals. The last step, which completes the logical picture of this realistic procedure, is an implicit recognition of what may be called, after Kant, the Principle of 'Reciprocity', or of 'Interaction', or of 'Community', among the reals in the universe. Except for an occasional hint here and there the principle of Reciprocity or Interaction is more implied than expressly

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CHAPTER IX 285 stated or developed in Jainism. Nevertheless its necessity and importance are undoubtedly clear. It would not, therefore, be inappropriate if we approach Kant for an explicit formulation of this idea which is germane to the fundamental notion of Anekanta in Jainism. It has been observed earlier that the Anekantavadin postulates the interrelatedness of all reals in the universe, and, therefore, that one who has a total cognisance of one thing would have a total cognisance of everything and vice versa. This interrelatedness or relativity of nature evidently involves, at any rate in its narrow sense, the permeation of the relational factor in reality, but does not explicitly specify the dynamical element of interaction among the reals. It is this dynamical or active element which is provided for by the principle of 'reciprocity' or 'interaction', or 'community " (commercium). Without the reciprocity of the manifold' the interrelatedness, therefore, becomes 'merely an ideal relation', whereas with it the inter-relatedness becomes a 'real one'. This is the significance of the description of reciprocity as "the action and reaction of quite different substances, of which each determines the other's state..". Prichard's instance of 1. Kant formulates this principle under his 'Third Analogy', as: "All substances, so far as they coexist, stand in thorough-going community, that is, in mutual interaction". In his earlier formulation (first edition) Kant uses 'reciprocity' in place of 'community'. KCPR, p. 233. 2. This is one of the two Latin meanings of the original German 'Gemeinschaft'. See KCPR (1923), p. 381, f.n. 5.

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286 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE the 'reciprocal influence" between 'a lump of ice' and 'fire' clearly illustrates this idea of interaction." Describing reciprocity as a 'double refraction.... of objects upon each other', Caird refers to it, in Kant's own words, as "the condition of the possibility of the things themselves as objects of experience"". In Kantianism, as in Jainism, the principle of reciprocity goes beyond the 'co-existence' or the interrelatedness of the substances, and explains the 'dynamical community' among them. This is in sharp contrast with the 'isolation of the individual substances' as found in the individualism of Leibniz or the momentariness of Hume and Buddhism. The terms like anyonyatmakatva' (mutuality) or anyonyavyaptibhava (mutual pervasiveness), used by Abhayadeva and Haribhadra in the somewhat limited context of a concrete real, correspond, at least in a limited degree, to the Kantian idea of 'reciprocity' or 'dynamical community' among the reals in Jainism. When we consider, however, the Jaina view of the universe as a fully interrelated or relativistic" (sapeksa) system of reals, which in turn are causally efficient (arthakriyakari) it is not difficult to see that the feature of Kantian 1. For the slight difference in the meaning between 'influence,' and 'community or reciprocity', see KCPR, p. 234. 2. KJKP, p. 303 f. The last sentence, in the description of the illustration (p. 304) refers to "the determination of the unobserved states coexists with the observed states". 3. CPKE (Vol. 1), p. 535. 4. TBV, p. 645. 5. AJP, Vol. I, p. 132. 6. Vide infra, p. 157 ff. (together with the footnotes). 7. Vide infra, the section on Arthakriyakaritvavada, especially the last page.

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CHAPTER IX 287 'reciprocity'is implicitly contained in the structure of reality as envisaged by Jainism.' In course of this brief enquiry into, and the illustration of, the steps in the development of the spirit of distinction involved in the theory of the Anekanta (the manifold or indeterminate) nature of reality we have observed that the notion of manifoldness not merely presupposes the notion of manyness or pluralism, but also contains the activistic implication of reciprocity or interaction among the reals in the universe. Although manifoldness is the most significant step in the dialectical analysis of the Jaina conception of reality, it comprehends and presupposes the other steps within its scope as a logical necessity. That is, independence (of consciousness and the world), pluralism, interrelatedness and reciprocity or dynamism are component factors in the amplitude of the ontological as well as the epistemological significance of the relativistic notion of manifoldness or indetermination with which the entire reality is, according to Jainism, stamped (syadvadamudrankitam). Before proceeding, finally, to consider the theories of standpoints (nayavada) and of the Conditional Predication (syadvada) or the Sevenfold Dialectic (saptabhangivada, as syadvada is otherwise called), it is necessary to point out that the whole above account of the nature of anekantavada, 1. The notion of a mere interrelated universe has an idealistic flavour. The Jaina is a thoroughgoing realist. This realistic spirit cannot, therefore, remain satisfied with a mere interrelatedness, but demands an impact or 'a double refraction', among the dynamic reals which influence or impinge upon one another proximately or remotely.

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288 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE has aimed at progressively demonstrating the fact that anekantavada is the most consistent form of realism in Indian philosophy. The claim that Anekantavada is the most consistent form of realism in Indian philosophy hinges mainly on the fact that it has allowed the maximum scope for distinction to play its role. It will take us far afield if we go closely into the problem of elucidating how the analytical function of distinction is inherent in any realistic procedure. This problem deserves to be specifically brought within the focus of the discussion of comparative Indian philosophical thought although some broader questions--like how the notion of anekanta is found, in some measure and form, even in some non-anekanta' schools of philosophy, a conscious, 1. The reconciliatory spirit (samanvayadrsti) which consists in an endeavour to harmonise, by various methods, different or apparently conflicting views in a new synthesis, is found, in however imperfect a manner it may be from the Jaina point of view, among the several non-Jaina schools of philosophy. Some of the notable instances are: (a) the Ajnanavada. (agnosticism) of Sanjaya (vide B. M. Barua's A History of PreBuddhistic Indian Philosophy, Calcutta Univ., 1925), pp. 328-330; and JSJ, Pt. II, Intro. p. XXVIII-IX, (b) the Vibhajyavada ('the Critical Method of Investigation' as contrasted with what the Buddha himself describes as the Ekantavada, or the one-sided method, in Majjhima-nikaya, Sutta 99, vide NVVS, Prastavana, p. 11) or the Madhyamapratipada (samyutta, vide PMHS, Bhasatippanani, p. 62) of the Buddha which induced him to treat prevalent opinions with all due consideration' (JSJ, Pt. II, Intro., p. XXIX); (c) the celebrated four-fold (catuskoti) antinomial method of the Madhyamika founder, Nagarjuna (cf. atastattvam sadasadubhayanubhatmakacatuskotivinirmuktam sunyameva / Sarva-darsana-sangraha, Ed. V. S. Abhyankar, Govt. Oriental (Hindu) Series, Poona, 1924; see also pp. 572-3 in

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CHAPTER IX 289 balanced and systematic treatment of it being a special feature of Jainism-have been noticed with some degree Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamikakarika, Ed. la Vallee Poussin, Bib. Bud., St. Petersbourg, 1913); and (d) the critique, on the eight doctrines, of Gautama (vide ch. IV, Ahnika, sutras 14-43 in Gautama's Nyayasutras, E.T. Ganganatha Jha, Poona Oriental Series, Poona, 1939). Despite the fact that these methods are treated in the respective systems with which they are severally associated, in the spirit and form resembling the Anekantavada, they have not been considered to be so fundamental and pervasive (vyapaka) as they have been in Jainism. It is, therefore, no surprise that the early critics of Anekantavada like Dharmakirti (see PVD, ch. III, kas. 180-1 and MV thereon, and f.n. 3), and Sankara, the earliest commentator on the Brahmasutras of Badarayana, make Jainism the target of their polemic against Anekantavada. This is done on an even more elaborate scale by Arcata also (HBT, pp. 104-107). Furthermore, some schools like the Bhedabhedavada, especially of Bhartsprapanca whose system is even referred to as anekanta' (vide PMHS, Bhasatippanani, p. 62, f.n. 3); the Bhatta-Mimamsa and the Sarkhya have an anekanta bias with respect to some of their methods and ideas. While criticising the concept of 'vaicitrya' which is so vital to Anekantavada, santaraksita significantly attributes it to the Mimamsa (Vipra) as well as the Samkhya (Kapila) systems also (kalpanaracitasyaiva vaicitryasyopavarnane / ko namatisayah prokto vipranirgranthakapila// TSS, ka. 1776). Arcata, who also chiefly attributes it to Jainism and criticises, describes it as vaicitryam' or 'vicitram' as: vicitram hirupan sabalamucyate; or, vicitrata ca nanasvabhavata (HBT, p. 104). These considerations indicate the influence which the notion of anekanta has, unwittingly or otherwise, in various forms and degrees, on the systems other than Jainism in Indian philosophy. For two further references bearing on this thesis see the next two footnotes. For a brief treatment (with occasional references to, and quotations from the texts) of this topic with regard to the non-Jaina systems see PMHS, Bhasatippanani, pp. 61-63, NVVS, Prastavana, p. 11 ff.; and ST, Intro. 150-2. . 19

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290 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE of attention by a few old writers' and contemporary critics. A brief attempt has, however, been made in the immediately preceding pages to show how the impelling logic of distinction, inherent in all realistic metaphysics, has led to the evolution of the Jaina conception of reality from the simple notion of dualism to the complex one of manifoldness or indetermination. All that is necessary for our purpose now is to indicate how this notion of manifoldness or indetermination is the most consistent and inevitable manifestation of the realistic spirit in Indian philosophy. This fact, that the theory of manifold or indeterminate reality is the most significant form of realism in Indian philosophy, could be adduced from the following two considerations : First, that the Jaina conception of reality admits of the principle of distinction which is the universal and basic axiom of all realistic metaphysics. Having admitted it the Jaina view allows this principle to exercise its full logical function so that every detail of the universe, physical and mental, becomes an infinitely diversified fact of nature. Secondly, the Advaita absolute, which is the exact logical antithesis to the Jaina conception of the diversified real, does For instance, by Siddhasena Divakara, at several places in his STP, Ch. III; by Mallisena in his SM, pp. 16-17(the systems referred to are those of the Svayambhuvas and the Prakrantavadins, or the Vaisesikas. See the Editor's explanations of these terms in his Notes, pp. 45-58); and, by Gunaratna in his TRD, pp. 237-244 (the systems referred to are those of Bud. dhism in general, as well as the Vaisesikas and the Sauntrantikas in particular, the Naiyayikas, the Vaisesikas, the Samkhyas and the Mimamsakas). 2. See the end of f.n. 1, and AGAM, Prastavana, p. 90.

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CHAPTER IX 291 not admit of distinction in any form in its ultimate nature of pure being (sat), and, therefore, develops itself, inevitably, into a spiritualistic ekantavada par excellence. This fact proves, indirectly, that once the initial assumption of distinction is allowed to operate-as it should be, since distinction is an irrefutable fact of reality-it leads to the Jaina view, as a logical necessity, of an indeterminate reality. In other words, the developments of the two contrasting conceptions of reality, the Jaina and the Advaita, reveal the truth that if we follow a strictly monistic hypothesis of Advaitism we must inevitably accept some kind of mentalism or spiritualism which asserts the identity of the knower and the known, or rather the reality of the knower and the falsity of the known which, consequently, is treated as a projection of the knower. It is, therefore, not a surprise that Advaitism in India, like its Hegelian counterpart in the West, received the characteristically subjectivistic interpretation of the drstissstivada of Prakasananda, which has its counterpart in the Berkeleyan theory of esse est percipi. Alternatively, in order to avoid a mentalistic or subjectivistic orientation in our approach to reality, if distinction or objectivity is admitted to be real, anekantavada represents the most logical form which such a realistic procedure can take. Owing to the decisive significance of this issue the two considerations just outlined deserve a some-what closer notice here. We may start with the second one first : 1. The Advaitic absolute is what may be described as a monolithic conception. It is also driven home to us, repeatedly, that its nature, like that of the Hegelian absolute,

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292 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE is mentalistic or epistemic (pratitikasattvam). Nothing else than it is real. This pan-psychic reality cannot, in the nature of the case, admit of objectivity or an independent non-mental principle. Hence the question of distinction cannot arise in it. If it does, we have to find something which is to be distinguished from the absolute. There is nothing answering such a description. It is not possible to speak of a distinction in a real where there is no possibility of an actual separableness in some genuine sense. This is the story of all idealism, viz., that the real therein stages its duel with itself, or, at best, its shadow; it enacts a play in which the dramatis personae consist of one character only; or it constitutes a musical scale which consists of one note onlynamely, itself. Not merely this, it is also the duel as well as the participant in it; the play as well as the player; and the music as well as the musician. Hegel at least tries to integrate difference in the ascending order of his triadic dialectic but, eventually, with the same result as his Indian counterpart. It may, however, be argued that Sankara does recognise 1. Pratitikasattvam sarvasyeti siddham/ p. 537, Advaitasiddhi of Madhusudanasarasvati (with three commentaries, ed. N. S. Ananta Krishna Sastri, Bombay, 1917). avidyayonayo bhavah sarve'mi budbuda iva / ksanamudbhuya gacchanti jnanaikajaladhau layam // Ibid. (quoted by the author from Sruti). etat sarvam mana eva / (quoted in Gaudabrahmanandi, a com. on the above work Ibid., p. 537). jagato manahparinamatvamuktam Ibid. Lastly, asmadatmanah sarve pranah sarve lokah sarve vedah sarvani bhutani / (quoted by Nyayamrtakara) Ibid., p. 538. 2. See the above f.n., particularly the second quotation.

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CHAPTER IX 293 some kind of objectivity at the so-called empirical level of existence (vyavaharikasatta). But he does so only as a mere 'epistemic' phenomenon which is not of the substance of the real in a straightforward way. His grand tour de force only proves the obstinacy of objectivity, which cannot be explained away even by his logical genius. Hence the term 'objective' in the so-called Objective idealism is a misnomer. It attributes 'objectivism' to a philosophy of objectless reality. Further, the mental realm, the realm of souls which are the centres of experience, should and does command its legitimate place and importance in any reasonable scheme of reality, but the total mentalization of the objective world by the schools of idealism imports into their scheme a kind of anthropomorphism. Had it not been for this Alexander would not have proclaimed his mission to "de-anthropomorphise" philosophy. Despite its length his statement on this question bears reproducing here. Writing under "The Spirit of Realism" he observes: "The temper of realism is to de-anthropomorphise : to order man and mind to their proper place among the world of finite things; on the one hand to divest physical things of the colouring which they have received from the vanity or arrogance of mind, and on the other to assign them along with minds their due measure of self-existence. But so deeply is the self-flattering habit of supposing that mind, in its distinctive character of mind, is in special sense the superior of physical things, so that in the absence of mind there would be no physical existence at all, that Realism in questioning its prerogative appears to

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294 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE some to degrade mind and rob it of its richness and value." The mere magnification of the mental principle into a cosmic one and the description of its function as an act of objectivisation does not make the real either any the less mental or the more objective. The ghost of objectivity or independence cannot be laid by the magic of verbal trickery. It comes back in some kind of awkward form as an empirical' or 'epistemic' phenomenon or an 'antithesis'. There is, therefore, nothing strange in the fact that the mind-ridden Absolute Idealism gave rise to the curious doctrine of DrstisTstivada or Jnatasattavada of Prakasananda and others, which affirms that a thing exists only when it is perceived. In this view the "blue", for instance, and its awareness are one, and there is no external object apart from its cognition."* Alluding to this view an Indian critic observes : "The whole world is thus only a psychic modification and has no reality outside the mind." Prakasananda himself observes: "The wise maintain the psychological ideality of the world, the ignorant its objective reality." 1. "The Basis of Realism" (p. 1), an Address by S. Alexander to the British Academy in 1914. 2. P. N. Srinivasachari's Aspects of Advaita (Sri Krishna Library series, Madras, 1949), p. 16. 3. Ibid. See also pp. 97-98. 4. Jnanasvarupamevahur jagadetadvicaksanah / arthasvarupari bhramyantah pasyanteti kudrstayah // The following line also expresses the same idea more pithily: drstireva bhavet srstird!'stiststimate../ These lines have been quoted in M. N. Sircar's The System of Vedantic Thought and Culture (published by University of

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1. This view, in which 'spirit greets the spirit', or drsti is srsti, has its close parallel in the well-known Berkeleyan view esse is percipi. Referring to the relation of the 'unthinking things' of the objective world to this 'intuitive or self-evident' principle Berkeley observes: "Their esse is percipi; nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them."' Drstisrstivada and its close Western parallel have been mentioned here, not merely because they are a particular school of idealism but because they represent the tendency of all idealism towards subjectivism." As a critic observes: 2. CHAPTER IX 295 Calcutta, 1925), p. 126, footnotes 1 and 2. See also pp. 125-26 (the text). Madhusudana also observes: imameva ca drstisrstivadamacaksate asmims ca pakse jiva eva svajnanavasajjagadupadananimittam ca / dravyam ca sarvam pratitikam / Siddhantabindu (of Madhusudana with a Com. by Purusottama, ed. P. E. Divan, GOS, Baroda, 1933), p. 29. See also Advaitasiddhi and Prakasananda's Siddhantamuktavali (E. T. by Arthur Venis, Reprint from the Pandit, Benares, 1890), p. 25 ff. (text). Even the so-called 'opposite view' to this (drstisrstivada) viz., srstidrstivada, also retains the character of mentalism in so far as it maintains that the world is a "creation or emanation" from Brahman (see Siddhantamuktavali, Pref. p. II, f. n. 1). The difference, if there is any at all, is that in srstidrstivada the world is supposed to 'precede' our knowledge of it, while in drstisrstivada it is said to be concurrent with (because it is also the creation of) our knowledge. The difference, however, is not material owing to the fact that Brahman is only an extension of the individual psychic principle. Of the Principles of Human Knowledge (Vol. I of The Works of George Berkeley, in 4 Vols., ed. A.C. Fraser, Oxford, 1901), p. 259. Cf. Russell's observation that "...very many philosophers, perhaps a majority, have held that there is nothing except minds and their ideas. Such philosophers are called 'ideal ists" etc. Problems, p. 14; see also p. 37.

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296 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE "The forms of idealism like objective idealism and absolute idealism are only attenuated forms of subjective idealism and the true subject transcends the subject-object relation."' In his celebrated essay "The Reputation of Idealism", G. E. Moore also is in full accord with this criticism. He characterises the notion of esse is percipi-conceding generously to the idealist that percipi need not mean "sensation' only but thought' also, both of course being 'forms of consciousness -as the ultimate premise of Idealism' in general. Confirming his attitude to the same notion, he further observes : "I believe that Idealists all hold this important falsehood." $ His choice of this notion as the most vulnerable point for attack in idealism has considerably strengthened the realistic stand for objectivity or independence in the analysis of the nature of reality.' 1. Srinivasachari in Aspects of Advaita, pp. 14-15 (the italics are mine). L. T. Hobhouse demonstrates this truth in a lucid and critical note wherein he analyses the positions of T. H. Green and B. Bosanquet. See his The Theory of Knowledge (third ed. London, 1921), p. 537 f., f. n. 2. 2. Philosophical Studies (The International Library of Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method, 1951 (reprinted), London), pp. 7-8. 3. Ibid., p. 12. The following witticisms make an interesting reading: !! would be more appropriate, in this context, to substitute 'percept' wherever the term 'idea' occurs. So Beattie told Hume that the idea (or image) of a roaring lion is not a roaring idea, and that the image of an ass is not a long-eared sluggish idea; and he put some clownish questions' to Berkeley in the same spirit. "Where," he asked, "is the harm of my believing that if I were to fall down yonder precipice and break my neck, I should be no more a man of this world? My neck, Sir, may be an idea to you, but to me it is a reality and

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CHAPTER IX an important one too. Where is the harm of my believing that if, in this severe weather, I were to neglect to throw (what you call) the idea of a coat over the ideas of my shoulders, the idea of cold would produce the idea of such pain and disorder that might possibly terminate in my real death?" A Study in Realism (John Laird, C. U. P., 1920, Cambridge), p. 63. Repudiating the claim that the Modern Einsteinian Theory of Relativity supports idealism, Russell writes under the heading 'Realism in Relativity'; "It is a mistake to suppose that relativity adopts an idealistic picture of the world-using 'idealism' in the technical sense, in which it implies that there can be nothing which is not experience. The observer who is often mentioned in expositions of relativity need not be a mind, but may be a photographic plate or any kind of recording instrument. The fundamental assumption of relativity is realistic, namely, that these respects in which all observers agree when they record a given phenomenon may be regarded as objective, and not as contributed by the observers." Bertrand Russell on 'Relativity', Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., The Univ. of Chicago, 1950. See also his The A. B. C. of Relativity (London, 1925), pp. 219-20. "a Max Born, the great theoretical physicist, also offers a similar vindication of the 'reality' of the pre-existing external material world. This is done in answer to Herbert Dingle's thesis. Dingle puts to himself the fundamental question, viz. "What exactly is it that physicists are doing?" The answer: "That can be answered satisfactorily only in terms of experience, not of the external world." In his reply to Dingle, Max Born describes the former's viewpoint as standpoint of extreme subjectivism" or "physical solipsism" and endeavours to restore, by means of several technical and lay arguments, common sense to the relativistic, quantum, (for an unequivocal support of Max Plank to an external world "which is 'independent of ourselves', something absolute that we are facing..." see Albert Einstein: Philosopher-scientist, 2nd ed., ed. P. A. Schilpp, New York, 1951, p. 136 f.) and other theories of science and, thereby, to philosophy. (Vide H. Dingle's lecture to the British Association, 1951, on "Philosophy and Physics", 1850-1950, in Nature (London), Vol. 168, pp. 63036, especially p. 634, para 2, and Max Born's article on "Physical Reality" in the Philosophical Quarterly (ed. T. M. Knox), Vol. III No. 11 for April 1953, pp. 139-149.) A. P. Ushenko is 297

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298 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE II. Thus the Advaitic attempt at building up a structure of reality from which the independence of the objective world is explained away has been revealed, in our analysis so far, to tend towards some form of mentalism. Even if any other school of idealism attempts to bring anything in ab extra into the being of its ultimate realm the attempt would be foredoomed to failure in the same measure as its denial of self-existence to the objective universe. Nothing short of a forthright recognition of the independent and intrinsic nature of reality will ever succeed in avoiding the mentalization or spiritualization of the non-spiritual realm of reality. Once the claim of independence as an integral part of reality is initially conceded, then, it becomes the thin edge of the wedge; that is, the operative force of the principle of distinction thus introduced in the real will work itself out, through various stages of increasing approximation like duality, plurality and reciprocity towards the anekanta view of reality. The dialectical evolution of these approximations another fierce critic who joins issue with Dingle: "If I am asked to mention," he observed, "some particular metaphysics which clearly does not fit in with the theory of relativity, I should name solipsism." Albert Einstein, p. 613. Yet another writer of today to whose views on the present problem Einstein himself has paid a serious attention is Henry Margenau. Margenau's argument for the reality or objectivity of the universe, under Einstein's theory, cannot be cited here, but merits our attention. Vide his article on "Einstein's Conception of Relativity" in Albert Einstein (see 4, pp. 252-57), and his recent work, The Nature of Physical Realitu, The GrawHill Book Co. Inc., New York, the sections on The Reality of Data, Other Selves, pp. 297-9, and the Real World, pp. 299-305; and the entire chap. (21) on The Contours of Reality, pp. 44867.

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1. CHAPTER IX or stages has been already traced out earlier in course of this section. According to the Jaina dialecticians the several schools which do recognise the independent objectivity of the world have inevitably, though often unwittingly, been confronted with the necessity of acknowledging the anekanta view, at least in some aspects of their conception of reality as well as of knowledge. The instances, which, among others include the Mimamsa, the Sankhya, and the Vaisesika schools, have already been mentioned elsewhere. He feels that they all have stopped short of consciously allowing the principle of distinction to reach its logical conclusion in an indeterminate approach to the problem. If the compulsive force of the spirit of anekanta is allowed to have its sway, then, according to him, reality would be infinitely diversified.' The optimum point of the restless force of distinction is represented in the inexhaustible diversification of every detail in the physical and the mental universe consistently, of course, with the equally enduring identities in nature. The theory of manifoldness is therefore the story of the gradual unfoldment of the implications of distinction which is at the heart of everything. If this cardinal truth is disproved, then the entire structure of the anekanta philosophy will collapse like a house of cards. To summarise the entire argument: The essence of realism is the principle objectivity, independence, or dis 299 The Vaisesika comes nearest, particularly with respect to his atomism, to anekavada, but he stops at the level of what may be described as mechanical pluralism, rather than in determinate relativism of the Jainas. Cf. supra, ch. on Arthakriyakaritvam and the Vaisesika's Ubhayavada.

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300 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE tinction. The alternative to the non-acceptance of this principle in reality is some form of idealism which is generically inadequate and has a tendency towards subjectivism. Acceptance of the intrinsic objectivity of the world marks the starting point of the functioning of distinction which progressively develops until the point of culmination is reached in the fact of the indeterminate and manifold nature of reality. It is in the logical necessity of the development from the initial simple state of distinction to that of infinite diversification of everything real, physical or mental, that the justification of the claim of Anekantavada as the most consistent form of realism lies.

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CHAPTER X Nayavada or The Theory of Standpoints

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CHAPTER X NAYAVADA (The Theory of Standpoints) Anekantavada as a theory of reality, according to which reality is infinitely manifold, or relativistic in its determinations, has been observed to be inherent in the co-ordinate conception of identity-in-difference. It has also been pointed out, at the beginning of our treatment of anekantavada that the nayavada, or the method of standpoints, and syadvada, or the method of dialectical predications, are the two main wings of anekantavada. A brief attempt may be made, in this part, to bring out how the two theories, viz., nayavada and syadvada, bring out and sustain the relativistic character of reality. Logically, nayavada and syadvada are two complementary processes forming a natural and inevitable development of the relativistic presupposition of the Jaina metaphysics. They form a scheme which is pre-eminently one of correlative methods' rather than of theories of reality although they both presuppose and explain the primordial notion that all reality is relativistic. Nayavada is principally an analytical 1. While dealing, principally, with nayavada Rao characterises 'Jainism' as follows: "It is essentially a method and an attitude." The Half-Yearly Journal of the Mysore University, New Series, Section A-Art, March 1942, p. 79.

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304 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE method investigating a particular standpoint of a factual situation according to the purpose and the level of equipment of the experient (jnatr). The particular standpoint thus investigated is one among a multitude of different viewpoints which, in their totality, reflect the full nature of the situation. Syadvada, or Saptabhangi, is, essentially, a synthetical method designed to harmonise the different viewpoints arrived at by nayavada.' I 2 Making a further distinction between mayavada and syadvada Upadhye" maintains that the former is "primarily conceptual" and the latter "mainly verbal". Although not quite incorrect, this distinction is apt to be somewhat mis 2 1. Cf. "...each of the nayas comprehends things from only one particular standpoint, knowledge derived from a naya therefore is partial and incomplete. To comprehend things in all their aspects, therefore, a special mode or form must be found. This, according to the Jains, is their Syadvada or the doctrine of many possibilities." The Nyayavatara (Ed. by P. L. Vaidya, Bombay, 1928), Intro. p. XL. 1. "The nayas refer to the parts of the thing, whereas the saptabhangi refers to the things as a whole; nay have relation to analysis, whereas saptabhangi relates thesis; nayavada is the analytical method of knowl whereas saptabhangi is the synthetical method of kng a thing." H. L. Jhaveri's The First Principles of the Jaina Philosophy, London, 1910, p. 42. See also NKV, Intro. pp. 21-22. Also, Liv | nayanamekanisthanam pravrtteh srtavartmani / | sampurnarthaviniscayi syadvadasrutamucyate // The Nyayavatara, ka. 30. See also Siddharsi's Comm, thereon. 2. He observes: "Syadvada is a corollary of Nayavada: the latter is analytical and primarily conceptual and the former is synthetical and mainy verbal". PrSKU, Intro. p. LXXXV. Incidentally (see SJJ, p. 17 and p. 52), it would be more correct to say, with Jacobi, that syadvada is a 'logical complement' than a 'corollary' of nayavada.

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CHAPTER X 305 understood if we are not aware of the background against which it is made. This is because the so-called 'primarily conceptual' method is also verbal, inasmuch as it not merely requires the aid of words for the expression of its various standpoints but also has as many as three, among its seven, standpoints which are exclusively concerned with the verbal problems, and are therefore designated as sabdanayas. Similarly, in contradistinction to the verbal elements of the conceptual' nayavada, the mainly verbal' method of syadvada is so much charged with the epistemological character that we might say that its verbal side is more instrumental than intrinsic in value. The term 'conceptual' may, however, be applied to the four dravyanayas, under nayavada, with relatively greater propriety. But under syadvada no distinctions, such as the verbal modes of syadvada and the non-verbal or the epistemological modes of syadvada, can be made since all modes are both verbal and epistemological. This is so in spite of the fact that much care and exactitude are needed in the verbal formulation and manition of the modal judgments. Leaving ide the epistemological content of the modal judgments for the moment, the description of all the modes of syadvada as verbal also may give rise to a possible objection that such a description should not be applied to the mode which contains the 'inexpressible' (avaktavya) as its predicate. For the 'inexpressible'is, ex hypothesi, a verbal failure insofar as it is incapable of a 'co-presentation or a simultaneous expression of the positive and the negative traits of a real in a single attempt. Describing a mode as verbal 20

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306 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE when a signal verbal failure is inscribed on it would, therefore, be, according to the possible objector, paradoxically objectionable. Deferring a fuller discussion of the modal predicate, the 'inexpressible', to the next chapter, we may briefly indicate here the line of argument the Jaina would take in answering the present objection. The Jaina answer to this objection, it may be noted, necessarily entails a reference to the third mode of syadvada also : The predicate 'the inexpressible' dors indeed record a signal verbal failure in expressing, at once, the great amplitude of the variegated reality as embodied in every factual event. But this failure is not due to the inherent unknowability, and, consequently, of the inexpressibility of reality, as in the case of the theories underlying the formulae like "sa esa neti neti" or "catuskotivinirmuktatvam" or "anirvacaniyata". It is, on the contrary, due to the bewildering wealth of impressions directly pouring into the human mind whose limitations of powers are such that it cannot at once grapple with all the impressions by way of all-comprehending attention and precise expression. Hence the postulation of the predicate in question. The only verbal feature of the predicate is the symbol (samjna) 'avaktavya' employed in designating the predicate. This symbol declares the inadequacy of the verbal machinery when confronted with such cognitive situations. But this does not mean that avaktavya is the last word in our cognitive venture and, consequently, that we are inescapably condemned to be cognitively overwhelmed and verbally dumb. What is not simultaneously expressible can be expressed by a gradual process in the order of the atten

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CHAPTER X 1 tion severally paid to the manifold features in the situation. concerned. This fact introduces a sequential outlet (kramarpana) for what would otherwise remain a 'paradoxically objectionable' position. In other words, if the mode of avaktavya were an absolute position (sarvathaikantadrsti) it would certainly be 'a paradoxically objectionable' position, but since the mode represents a relative position (kathancidekantadrsti) it leaves room for a sequential alternative which guarantees a gradual unfoldment of the entire complex structure of the factual situation in hand. 307 Words have a vital role to play in the process of the unfoldment of the complex or the simple meanings of reality in spite of their limitations as noticed under the 'inexpressible" (avaktavya) mode. Communication of the meanings of reality either to us (svarthah) or from us to others (pararthah) is said to be an inherent power (svabhaviki saktih) in words. Devabhadra, for instance, observes that every specific meaning is resident in a particular 1. Referring to this saktih or yogyata Prabhacandra observes: yogyata hi sabdarthayoh pratipadyapratipadakasaktih, jnanajneyayor jnapyajnapakasaktivat/ NKC, Vol. II, p. 538. See also PKM, p. 428, where also he writes to the same effect when commenting on the following Pariksamukha sutra: sahajayogyata sanketavasaddhi sabdadayah vastupratipattihetavah/ Ibid., p. 427. (Here 'sabdadayah', or words etc., means words, gestures made by fingers, etc. (angulyadivakya) and any similar signs.) In NKC, Vol. II, p. 541, the same writer again observes: saktis tu svabhaviki yatha rupaprakasane caksuradeh tatha arthaprakasane sabdasyapi/ Vadideva also makes similar observations on this question. See SRK, pp. 702-3. A brief comment of Kumarila also is of interest in this connection: sarvo hi sabdo'rthapratyayanartham prayujyate (Tantravartika, I. 3. 8).

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308 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE word.' Siddharsi supports this idea from another angle by remarking that there are no objects (artha) without names.* Maladhari Hemacandra believes that everything cognisable is also expressible in some way." The Jaina is, however, cautious in not stretching this belief in the natural power of words to the extent of advocating the identity (tadatmya) of essence between the word and its meaning. Had it not been so he would find himself an ally of Bhartrhari and the other grammarian philosophers who maintain the doctrine of sabdadvaitavada. According to the Jaina words are only expressive (vacaka) or, as Yasovijaya puts it, suggestive (jnapaka) symbols rather than productive (karaka) entities of meanings. In other words, what is meant by the remark that a meaning resides in a word is nothing more than forcefully stating that the word has the natural power of expressing the meaning which is not produced by, or derived from, it. The meaning is eventually rooted in the nature of things in reality, but is conveyed to us through the natural expressive capacity of words. The main purpose of introducing here the above brief discussion on the linguistic aspect of syadvada has been to show how far syadvada can be described as 'mainly verbal', for that matter, a 'verbal' method at all. The discussion or, 1. pratyartham sabdanivasad iti/ Nyayavatara (of Siddhasena Divakara, with Siddharsi's Vivrti and Devabhadra's Tippana, ed. P. L. Vaidya, 1928, Bombay), p. 81. 2. nirabhidhanarthabhavat / Ibid., p. 80. 3. 4. kascit tu gamyataya sarvo'bhilapyah../ SHM, on ga. 143, VBJ. sabdanam ca arthajnapakatvam na tu karakatvam / SKL, p. 250.

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CHAPTER X 309 indicates the undoubted necessity for a precise scheme of linguistic symbols (vacanavinyasa). But the scheme of linguistic symbols is only the garb of the modal judgments which represent a system of alternative and exhaustive aspects of truth of a particular factual situation investigated by syodvada. The content being such judgments syodvada is essentially an epistemological method. This pre-eminently epistemological character of it becomes more evident when we remember that the knowledge obtained by its use is conceived to be the human analogue of the perfect knowledge (kevalajnana) attained by the perfect souls (kevalins), the difference between the two being that the one is mediate (asaksat) and the other immediate (saksat'). The purport of the entire argument is that the distinction between conceptual' and verbal' is a relative one, and therefore that when it is associated with the two methods under consideration, it should be done subject to the consideration outlined in course of the argument. The logical justification for the formulation of these two methods of nayavada and syadvada consists in the fact that the immense complexity of the relativistic universe is too baffling for the human mind, with its limited range of perceptual and other capacities, to penetrate at once, into its full secrets. In the process of grasping the bewildering universe analysis, or nayavada, naturally precedes synthesis, or syadvada, and the two methods together offer an articulated knowledge of the universe. After this comparative estimate 1. Cf. syadvadakevalajnane sarvatattvaprakasane / bhedah saksadasa ksac ca.....// AMS, ka. 105.

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310 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE of the two methods we may now proceed to consider them in their natural order. The Definition of Nayavada A naya is defined as a particular opinion or (abhipraya or abhimata) or a viewpoint (apeksa)--a viewpoint which does not rule out other different viewpoints and is, thereby, expressive of a partial truth (vastvamsagrahi) about an object (vastu) --as entertained by a knowing agent (jnat??). A naya is a particular viewpoint about an object or an event, there being many other viewpoints which do not enter into, or interfere 1. This is the general definition (samanya laksana) of a naya. The specific feature (visesa laksana) of each particular naya will be noticed later on. To express the nature of a naya, in the words of Prabhachandra: anirakrtapratipakso vastvamsagrahi jnaturabhiprayo nayah / PKM, p. 676. There are numerous variant forms of the definition of a naya. But they all express substantially, but often more elaborately, the whole, or a part, of the connotation so briefly indicated by Prabhachandra's definition. See, for instance, NKC, Vol. II, p. 606 f., f.n, 1, in which the editor has enumerated about as many as thirty such variant forms. In AGAM, pp. 142-3 (tippanani), under 'naya' the same editor has made a few editions to the forms, The following, not necessarily found in the above-mentioned two places, may, however, be cited here: arthasyanekarupasya dhih pramanam tadamsadhih / nayo dharmantarapeksi durnayas tannirakTtih // ASA on AMS, 1.47. pramanaparicchinnasya anantadharmatmakasya vastuna ekadesagrahinah taditara msapratiksepino adhyavasayavid esa nayah/. JTBY, p. 21 (cf. PNTA, VII. 1, and SRK thereon, in SRK, p. 1044). nayantiti rayah anekadharmatmakam vastu ekadharmena nityamevedam anityameveti va nirupayanti/" See NKC, Vol. II, p. 606 f., f.n. 1.

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CHAPTER X 311 with, the particular viewpoint under discussion. Although the other viewpoints do not enter into the perspective of the particular viewpoints under discussion they constantly, as it were, attack its frontiers, and await its reconciliation with them in the sphere of a fuller and more' valid knowledge which is the sphere of pramana. 1 Cf. audasinyaparayanas tadapare camse bhaveyur nayah/ ABHI, p. 1853. This phrase "more valid" is advisedly used here. This becomes clear when we notice the controversy, met with in Jaina works, as to whether the partial truth conveyed by a naya is as valid as the full truth conveyed by pramana. Vidyananda attempts an answer to this by employing an analogical argument, often repeated by writers since, in which he compares naya to a part of a sea which is pramana (TSU, p. 118, ka. 5 and the tika thereon). See also SRK, pp. 1044-7. Insofar as the part is identical with the whole-it is identical since it is a legitimate part of the whole-a naya shares the validity, at any rate in some measure, of pramana. But, insofar as it is different from the whole-it is different from the whole, in some sense, otherwise the part and the whole become indistinguishable-a naya is invalid. The conclusion implied is a simple one, viz., that a part(naya) is not eschewed by the whole (pramana); that the whole itself would not be but for the combination of such parts; that the part is valid (manatmako nayah; napyasatyo nayah) so far as it goes, and that it becomes invalid when its partial truth is taken to be the whole truth when it is called a nayabhasa, or kunaya, or durnaya. The above conclusion is generally agreed to in spirit if not in letter also, but most writers including Vidyananda, Jinabhadra and his commentator Maladhari Hemacandra, however, do not seem to accede to this conclusion whole-heartedly, although they do not eventually disagree with it (see VBJ, ga. 2277 and SHM thereon). For some of the expressions with which they describe the nature of nayas are more appropriate to the description of the nature of nayabhasas or durnayas. For instance, nayas are said to be incapable of being vastuno gamakah (pratyekavasthayam tadagamakatvat). Further, they

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312 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Theoretically the viewpoints from which an object or an event could be perceived are not merely numerous' (anekavikalpa) but infinite' in number (anantaprakaram) because even the humblest fact of existence is infinitely manifold and therefore can be an object of various modes of analysis. But this way of looking at the subject is too broad (vyasa or vistara) or gross (sthula) and, therefore, does not vouchsafe to us a compact view of reality on the basis of which we can develop a practicable analytical method by means of which we may tackle reality piecemeal and obtain partial glimpses of its truth. The view of reality, conceived under the great division consisting of two inclusive categories, viz., dravyarthikanaya or the substantive view, and paryayarthikanaya or the modal (or the modificational) view, is, however, considered to be an answer to the demand. The categories are ". are said to be heretical (mithyatmadrstitvat), contradictory (virodhato, or virodhitvat), inimical (vairivat) in their character. Another factor which seems to confirm the attitude of Jinabhadra, more especially of his great commentator, is the quotation, by the latter, of a devotional verse, the second line of which is in tune with the view suggested by the two writers: udadhaviva sarvasindhavah samudirnastvayi natha drstayah / na ca tasu bhavan pradrsyate pravibhaktasu saritsvivodadhih// See VBJ, ga. 2266 and SHM, on 2265-6. 1. javaiya vayanavaha tavaiya honti nayavaya / STP, III. 47. javanto vayanapaha tavanto va nayavi sahavo / VBJ, ga. 2265. vyasato'nekavikalpa iti / PNTA, VII. 4 and the SRK thereon in SRK, p. 1047. 2. nayas canantah/ SM (text), p. 161. 3. 4. See PNTA, VII. 4 and the SRK thereon. Cf. dravyaparyayarupasya sakalasyapi vastunah/ nayavamsena netarau sakalasyapi vastunah // Tattvarthasara, ka. 38. Vadideva brings out very clearly and elaborately, the

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CHAPTER X 313 also called, briefly, as dravyanaya and paryayanaya respectively. The view of reality conceived under the division is described as the concise (sanksepa or samasa) one in contrast to the other (the broad) one. By a process of further analysis the Jaina thinkers have been led to the formulation of the methodological scheme consisting of seven ways of looking at reality. They are enumerated in the following order of decreasing denotation": naigama, sangraha, vyavahara, rjusutra, sabda, samabhirudha, and evambhuta". Generally among these the first three are considered to be dravyanayas or substantive standpoints and the other four paryayanayas or modal standpoints". Reserying to a later stage the consideration of the question whether the number of these seven ways of viewpoints can be reduced to six, or five, or even less, either by elimination of any of them, or by subsumption of some of them under the one or the other of the seven viewpoints, we may now proceed to point. out, with illustrations, the nature and function of these seven viewpoints. progressive decrease in denotation, from every preceding naya to its succeeding one, in the course of as many as seven sutras and his own comm. thereon. See ONTA, VII. 46-52 and the SRK thereon. 1. See PNTA, VII.5 and the SRK thereon. 2. Cf. purvah purvanayo bhumavisayah karanatmakah / parah parah punah suksmagocaro hetumaniha// Nayavivarana, ka. 98. 3. See TSUJ, I. 33. 4. dravyartho vyavaharantah paryayarthas tatoparah / TSV, p. 268. 5. See infra.

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314 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Naigamanaya (the teleological or the universal-particular standpoint) Naigamanaya relates to the purpose (sankalpa)' or the end of a certain continuous series of actions which are represented by one or a few of their number. For instance, a person carrying fuel, water, and rice, when asked "What are you doing?" says "I am cooking" instead of saying "I am carrying fuel" and so forth. This means that the general purpose of cooking controls the entire series of actions which are represented by one or more of them such as carrying the materials or drawing water enabling us thereby to grasp the purpose which governs the individual factors relating to it. This is the aim or function of the naigama standpoint. According to another interpretation naigamanaya is described as the standpoint of the non-distinguished". By the non-distinguished' is meant the absence of distinction or discrimination between the universal or the generic and the particular or the specific elements of the object under review. Accordingly, the meaning of the term naigama is analysed as 'not' (na) 'one' (eko) "understanding' (gamah), that is, not understanding or distinguishing either the generic element alone, or the specific element alone, but taking the object in in its concrete unity. One of the instances given in illustration of this non-distinction is that of the term 'bamboo'. When we use this term in a statement such as "Bamboo 1. arthasankalpamatragrahi naigamah / TRAG, p. 65, ka. 2. anispannarthasankalpamatragrahi naigama iti nigamo hi sankalpan tatrabhavah tatprayojano va naigamah / SRK, p. 1052. 2. Cf. SRK, p. 1052 f. See also Tattvarthasarah, ka. 44. 3. yadva naikam gamo yo'tra sa satam naigamo matah/ TSV, p. 269. 4. NKC, ka.5. Jair' Education International

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CHAPTER X 315 grows here in plenty", from the 'non-distinguished' point of view, the distinction between the generic and the specific features of the bamboo is not within the focus of our attention, although it is undoubtedly at the back of our minds. This truth, namely, that when some aspect of concrete situation in reality is in the foreground of our attention the other aspects recede into the background, is one of the cardinal principles of the modern Gestalt, or Configurationist, school of psychology. Also, it holds good of not merely the 'nondistinguished' standpoint, but also of all the others under the present method. Although the two interpretations of naigamanaya, the one! emphasising its teleological character and the other its 'nondistinguished' character, are mentioned to be different, the difference between them does not seem to be always sharp and material. This is evident when we notice that the principle of non-distinction between the universal and the particular is inherent in, or, at any rate, is not repugnant to, the purpose governing the actions in the relevant context such as the above-mentioned instance of cooking. It must, however, be admitted that when a'non-distinguished'instance like "the bamboo grows here in plenty" is viewed from the angle of the first interpretation the teleological element is not so evident, although it would not be an impossible idea to think of some instances wherein the two elements could go together. Taking both sides of the argument into consideration we may safely conclude that at least in a considerable number of instances, the difference between the elements of teleology and non-distinction is a matter of difference in

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316 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE emphasis. This view does not, however, bar the possibility of even a radical difference between the two interpretations in a certain number of situations considered under the present standpoint. The non-distinction of the naigama standpoint is not, as just indicated, absolute. It does imply distinction but in a relative sense only. If the distinction is asserted absolutely, then arises the fallacy called naigamabhasa, of which the Nyaya-Vaisesika' system, which maintains an absolute distinction (atyantabhinnatva) between its categories, is an illustration. Sangrahanaya (the class view) This standpoint concerns itself with the general' or the class character of a factual situation, unlike the naigama standpoint which includes the specific character as well. Just as naigamanaya is not hostile to the intermingled character of concrete existence, so also sangrahanaya is not repugnant to the complementary feature of visesa which is not included in it. Sangrahanaya marks a step further from naigamanaya in that it differentiates, in its analytical process, the common character from the universal-cum-particular complex which every real is. For instance, when, pointing to a solitary tree at some distance from you, you observe to a stranger asking for direction, "turn left near the tree there", it is not relevant to 1. See PNTA, VII. 12 and the SRK thereon. See also Nayapradipa, p. 101, and Nyayavatura (P. L. Vaidya's edn.), p. 82. samanyamatragrahi paramarsah sangraha iti/ PNTA, VII. 13. See also the SRK thereon, as well as TSV, p. 270, ka, 51. 3. See NKV, ka. 6. Jain Education International

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CHAPTER X 317 the occasion to mention whether "the tree there" is mango, banyan, or any other, although "the tree" must be one of these. For there can be no universal without a particular', or a genus without species, although in a particular context the mention of the former will serve the purpose in hand. Similarly, when we state that everything is sat (being) it makes a perfectly understandable proposition, although it provisionally shuts out its necessary complement of asat (non-being). Laying such an exaggerated emphasis on the universal as to leave no room at all for the particular leads to sangrahabhasa, a fallacy of which the Sankhya and the Advaita schools of philosophy are notable instances. Vyavaharanaya' (the standpoint of the particular) In contrast with the sangraha standpoint the vyavahara standpoint specialises itself in being concerned with the speci 4 1. Ibid. 2. visvamekam sadavisesaditi/ PNTA, VII. 16. 3. sangraho'pyasesavisesavisesapratiksepamukhena samanyamekam samarthayamano durnayah.... / Nyayavatara (P. L. Vaidya's edn.), p. 85. sangrahabhiprayapravsttah sarve'pyadvaitavadah sankhyadarsa. nam ca. / See also PNTA. VII. 17 and 18 and the SRK thereon. The reason why the Sankhya system is instanced here is stated by Prabhacandra; vikaravikarinoh sankhyaistadatmyabhyupa gamat/ NKL, Vol. II, p. 629. 5. This vyavaharanaya should be distinguished from another naya, bearing the same name and occurring in a different classification of nayas into niscayanaya (the true viewpoint) and vyavaharanaya (the conventional or empirical viewpoint). There is nothing common between the two except the name.

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1 318 fic features' of the object concerned, without, of course, losing sight of the fact that they cannot stand by themselves without the support of the generic properties in the larger setting of concrete reality. For example, when a person is asked to bring a mango fruit he attempts to bring mango, but not any other fruit, although he is aware of the fact that mango is only a species in the genus of fruit.' When the generic correlative of a specific feature is entirely ignored the resultant fallacy comes to have only the semblance of the vyavahara standpoint (vyavaharanayabhasa) of which there can be no better example than the materialism. of Carvaka in Indian philosophy. The above three standpoints, viz., naigama, sangraha and vyavahara, come under the first comprehensive category, viz., dravyarthikanaya. This is so because these standpoints. concern themselves with the durable side (dravyasamsparsi) of concrete reality. The remaining four standpoints, viz., rjusutra, sabda, samabhirudha and evambhuta, engage themselves in the analysis of the fleeting side (paryayasamsparsi) of concrete reality. Hence their collective designation (paryayarthikanaya), the second of the two comprehensive cate gories. Among the four paryayanayas only the first one, viz., rjusutranaya, which will presently be dealt with, makes a direct ontological reference to an aspect of reality, viz., the 1. JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE 2. 3. visesatmakamevartham vyavaharas ca manyate/ visesabhinnam samanyam asatkharavisanavat// NKV, ka. 8. Ibid., karikas 9 and 10. PNTA, VII. 26. For two other instances see LTB, V, ka. 42 and the NKC thereon in NKC, Vol. II, pp. 631-5.

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CHAPTER X 319 aspect of flux (paryaya). The other three are concerned with the verbal questions of the meanings of the modal side of reality. On the basis of this distinction, viz., the aspect involving an ontological reference and the aspects involving verbal references, the standpoints are also classified as arthanayas (or arthatantra), and sabdanayas (or sabdatantra), the former class including within itself the first four, and the latter class, the last three.' Jinabhadra, however, chooses to treat ljusutranaya as one of the dravyanayas on the ostensible ground that it has a direct ontological reference like the other dravyanayas. But this is not widely accepted. Now the treatment of the four paryayanayas or the modal standpoints may be resumed. Rjusutra (the standpoint of momentariness) The sjusutra standpoint relates to the momentary nature of a thing. It is narrower than the vyavahara standpoint in that it looks at a particular thing as the thing appears at a particular moment. This standpoint is in operation 1. tatrarjusutraparyantah catvaro'rthanaya matah| trayah sabdanayah sesah sabdavacyarthagocarah// Nayavivaranam (by an unknown author, ed. Pannalal Caudhuri, Digambara Jaina Grantha Bhandara, Kasi, Vira Samyat 2451), ka. 97. See also Tattvarthasava, ka. 43. 2. VBJ, p. 2262, ka. 77. 3. Cf. rjusutrah sa vijneyo yena paryayamatrakam) vartamanailcasa mayavisayam parigshyatell Tattvarthasarah (by Amrtacandrasuri, printed in the Prathamagucchaka, sri Digambara Grantha Bhandara, Kasi, Vira Sam. 2451), ka. 47. See also JTBY, p. 22. Siddharsi explains rjusutranaya as follows: tatrarjupragunamakutilam atitanagatavakraparityagat vartamanaksanavivarti vastuno rupam sutrayati nistankitam darsayatiti rjusutrah/ Nyayavatara (P. L. Vaidya's edn.), p. 77. See also NKV, karikas 11 and 12.

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"320 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE when, for instance, we treat an actor, who is enacting the role of a king on the stage, as the king for the moment. While recognising the importance and the relative validity of this 'occurrent aspect in the life of reality we are not expected to lose sight of the continuant' character of reality. An over-emphasis on the fleeting aspect of concrete reality has, according to nayavadin, led the Buddhist to treat this partial truth as the sole foundation of his conception of reality. Sabdanaya (the standpoint of synonyms) Among the remaining three paryayanayas or the modal standpoints sabdanaya is the first verbal viewpoint. Besides referring to this specific viewpoint the term "sabdanaya" is also employed as a collective designation for all the three viewpoints, including the present one, because of the fact that all the three are mainly concerned with verbal problems. In order to distinguish the present verbal standpoint from the other two similar viewpoints we may specifically designate the present one as the viewpoint of synonyms since it is largely concerned with synonymous words". The present standpoint of synonyms refers to the function of synonymous words which, despite their differences in For an elaborate criticism of the various schools of Buddhism, as illustrating this nayabhasa, see TBV, (on STP, I, ga. 5), p.317 ff. sabdah samabhirudhaivambhutau te sabdabhedagah / Tattvarthasara, ka. 42. tasmadeka eva paryayasabdanamartha iti sabdah / Nyayavatara (P. L. Vaidya's edn.), p. 80. See also NKV, ka. 14, TSV, p. 274, ka. 87 and Nayavivarana, karikas 90-91. :3.

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CHAPTER X 321 tense, case-endings, gender, number and so forth, convey the same meanings.' For instance, the words kumbha, kalasa and ghata denote the same object (ekarthavacakah), viz., a jar which is one of the forms taken by clay. Similarly the words Indra, Sakra and Purandara denote one and the same individual in the same manner as the words globe, orb and sphere denote, despite their several differences, the same circular entity. A misapplication of this standpoint by treating, for instance, two synonymous words as being utterly identical in their meanings is said to lead to the fallacy called sabdanayabhasa. The sabdadvaitavadins and a few other schools in Indian philosophy are said to have committed this fallacy. I * Samabhiruuhanaya (the etymological standpoint) The etymological standpoint represents an advance upon the standpoint of synonyms although it is narrower in its scope than the latter. Its advance consists in the fact that it distinguishes the meanings of synonymous words purely on their etymological grounds." The synonyms Indra, Sakra and 1. yo vartanam ca manyate ekarthe bhinnalingadinam, sa sabdanayo bhaaitah.. // Laghunayacakram, ka. 40. Also: sabdaprsthato'rthagrahanapravanah sabdanayah linga sankhyakalakarakapurusopagrahavyabhicaranivsttiparatvat/ Dhavalatika (quoted in GAM, tippanani, p. 147). 2. See Nyayavatara (P. L. Vaidya's edn.), pp. 82 and 90; and NVUS, tippanani, p. 277. paryayasabdabhedena bhinnarthasyadhirohanat/ nayah samabhirudhah syat....// TSV, p. 273, ka. 76. paryayasabdesu niruktibhedena bhinnamartham samabhirohan samabhirudha iti/ PNTA, VII. 36, and NKC, Vol. II, p. 638, f. n. 1, the extracts from Dhavalatika and Jayadhavala. 21

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322 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Purandara denote, according to the conventional approach (rudhih, upacarah) of sabdanaya, the same individual whereas they do not do so if their difference in their etymological derivation is taken into consideration.' Indra, for instance, signifies one who is 'all prosperous' and the other two names signify one who is 'the all powerful' and the destroyer of the enemies' respectively. 2 "Hence the difference in the roots" as a critic remarks in this connection "must mean a corresponding difference in the terms and therefore in their meanings." Had it not been for this standpoint a jar (ghata), in the opinion of an old writer, would become indistinguishable from linen (pata). The truth of this viewpoint is based on the following two principles in the Jaina philosophy of language: The first principle is that whatever is knowable is also expressible. That is, knowledge, or the meaning of anything in reality, is not possible except through the means of words. The second 1. sabdanayo hi paryayabhede'pi arthabhedamabhipraiti, samabhirudhastu paryayabhede bhinnanarthanabhimanyate/ JTBY, p. 22. Devasuri also confirms this: tannaikarthavacino dhvanayah santi, rudhih punaravicaritatadarthanamiti samabhirudhah/ Nyayavatara (P. L. Vaidya's edn.) This writer contrasts rudhita-sabdas (conventional words) from vyutpatti-sabdas (words based on their etymological derivations). See ibid., p. 74. 2. sacipatireko'pyartha indanasakanapuradaranabhedat bhidyate / indatitindrah saknotiti sakrah/ puram darayatiti purandara itil Tattvarthasutra (with Bhaskaranandi's Sukhabodha, ed. by A. Shantiraja Sastry, Mysore, 1944), p. 25. 3. Cf. ye nirabhidhana vartante arthah tesam sabdat parthakyena vastutvasiddhiriti cet na, nirabhidhanarthabhavat.../ tatas ca sarve'rtha vidyamanasvavacakah, arthatvat, ghatarthavaditi pramanat../

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CHAPTER X 323 principle is that, strictly speaking, there can be only one word for one meaning and vice versa. Accordingly, several words which are conventionally supposed to convey one and the same meaning, have in actual fact as many meanings as the number of words found there. That is, this priniciple does not recognise any synonymous terms but maintains a determinate relation between a meaning and its word (vacyavacakaniyama). It may be contended that the non-recognition of synonymous terms under samabhirudhanaya contradicts the recognition of such terms under sabdanaya. The nayavadin does not see any contradiction between the two viewpoints. This is so because, according to him, samabhirudhanaya applies stricter canons of etymological derivation and grammatical propriety than is done by sabdanaya which treats words in a rough and ready manner at the level of uncritically accepted conventions or usage. Since the two principles, just referred to, are going to be dealt with at some length in the process of Nyayavatara (P. L. Vaidya's edn.), p. 80. Devabhadra also observes : pratyartham sabdanivasaditi/ Ibid., p. 81. Referring to the interdependence (anyonyapeksa) of word and meaning Siddhasena Gani adds: yadi yatha vyanjanam tathartho yatha carthah tatha vyanjanam, evam hi sati vacyavacakasambandho ghatate anyatha na..! Tattvarthadhigamasutram (Kapadia's edn.), Vol. I, p. 24. On 'vyanjanam' and 'arthah' he remarks: vyanjanam vacakah sabdah, artho'bhidheyo vacyah/ Ibid. See also SHM on ga. 143, VBJ, p. 90. 1. sabdarulho'rtho'rtharudhah tathaiva punah sabdah| Nayacara (ka. 42). tato yavanto'rthasya svabhidhayaka dhvanayah tavanto'rthabhedah/ Devabhadra on Nyayavatara (P. L. Vaidya's edn.), p. 81. See also the passages dealing with the principle of avaktavya under syadvada.

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324 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE their application to some important problems in syadvada, it is unnecessary to enlarge upon their further implications here. Evambhutanaya (the 'such-like' standpoint) Evambhutanaya, or the such-like' standpoint, is a further specialised form of the application of the verbal method. It calls for a different designation for each of the different attitudes which the same object assumes under different conditions. It is even more rigorous than the etymological viewpoint in that it treats the different attitudes of the object denoted by different designations as numerically different entities.' Purandara, for instance, should be, according to this naya, designated as such only when he is actually engaged in the act of destroying his enemies. Similarly the designation Sakra is appropriate only when he is actually manifesting his prowess. A cow ceases to be a cow when she is not in actual motion; and the onomatopoeic designation of a ghata would no more denote the ghata when the ghata is not producing the peculiar sound 'ghat, ghat'. Consequently, because of this insistence that designations should be derived from the different functional states of what is ordinarily known as the same object, Purandara becomes as different from Sakra as a cow is different from a jar. Before concluding this chapter we may briefly notice the difference of opinions among the writers on nayavada on the question whether the number of nayas, viz., seven, can be 1. See PNTA, VII. 40, and NKV, karikas 17-18.

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CHAPTER X 325 reduced. There are mainly three traditions (paramparas) which are based on the number of nayas occurring in the classification adopted by each of them within the framework of reality which is conceived to be fundamentally drazyaparyayatmaka (identity-in-difference) or samanyavisesatmaka (universal-cum-particular). The first one adopts a classification of seven nayas. Our treatment of the subject has been based on this classification. The order in which the seven nayas have been treated in our account, viz., naigama, sangraha, vyavahara riusutra, sabda, samabhirudha, and evambhuta, has also been recognised by this tradition. The second tradition adopts a classification of six nayas eliminating, from its classification, naigamanaya which is the first among the seven nayas recognised by the first tradition. The third tradition reduces the number from seven to five' by subsuming samabhirudhanaya and evambhutanaya, the last two standpoints within the first classification, under sabdanaya, and thus treating them as two subdivisions of the latter, Umasvati himself is largely responsible for the first and the third traditions. For the concerned sutra of his great work, Tattvarthadhigamasutra, gives, in its Digambara version, the enunciation of the seven nayas, in their natural order, whereas the same sutra gives, in the Svetambara ---- -- 1. naigamasangrahavyavahararjusutrasabda nayah / Sabhasyatattva. dhigamasutrani (ed. by Motital Laghaji, Poona, Vira Sam. 2453), I. 34. naigamasangrahavyavahararjusutrasabdasamabhirudhaivambhuta nayah/ TSUJ, I. 33. 3. See the above f. n. For Private & PersonalUse Only

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326 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE version of his work, the enunciation of only five nayas, treating the last two nayas as subdivisions of sabdanaya. All the Digambara writers and most of the Svetambara writers also adhere to the former tradition'. The latter tradition is confined to the relevant sutra by Umasvati in the svetambara version of his work, as well as to the Bhasya which is ascribed to Umasvati himself by the Svetambara writers. The second tradition, the tradition of the six nayas, is maintained by Siddhasena Divakara' with his characteristic vigour and independent judgment. Besides these three traditions there are four more views according to which the number of nayas is severally one, two, three or four. A passing mention may be made of these views : When our attention is focussed on the aspect of the generic universal (mahasamanya), viz., being (satta), the entire gamut of reality, which, on a fuller analysis, is universal-cum-particular, appears as one pure and uniform existence. This abstract way of looking at reality is described as the pure and the absolute viewpoint (suddhaniscayanaya"). 1. See, for instance, TSV, I. 33, TRAG, I. 33, etc. The notable instances among the works of the svetambara writers, are PNJA, Ch. VII, SRK thereon, and SM (text), p. 161. Cf. ST, Intro. pp. 141-2. Jinabhadra Gani also follows Siddhasena Divakara on this point. Ibid. Cf. samanyadesatastavadeka eva nayah sthitah/ TSV, I. 33, ka. 2. This line is found in Nayavivarana also : see ka. 18. material difference seems to exist between this viewpoint and one of the subdivisions of sangrahanaya, viz., parasangrahanaya. Cf. parasangrahastavat sarvam saditi sanglhnati/ TSV, p. 271. Cf. also PNTA, VII. 15.

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327 The nayavadins consider this standpoint as a class by itself. This is the first of the four views just referred to. Reality may often be viewed either from the generic or the specific angle of vision. When it is the former we are said to be governed by the generic viewpoint or samanyanaya, and when it is the latter we are said to be governed by the specific viewpoint or visesanaya. This classification' is the same as the substantive (dravyarthika) and the modal (paryayarthika) viewpoints. This classification, which consists of two members, is the second of the four views. CHAPTER X Siddhasena Divakara suggests a classification of three standpoints although he generally accepts a classification of six standpoints. He does so by subsuming sabda, samabhirudha and evambhuta nayas under rjusutranaya. This is because he considers rjusutranaya as the foundation of the entire modal (paryayastika) approach to reality and, therefore, the other three as its sub-divisions (suhumabheya)". This reduction of four nayas to one, viz., rjusutranaya, coupled with the further elimination of naigamanaya, leaves only three nayas, viz., sangraha, vyavahara, and rjusutra. Lastly, Samavayangatika formulates a method by which we obtain a classification of four nayas. It divides naigamanaya into two subdivisions, viz., samanyanaigama (that which comprehends the universal aspect in reality) and visesanaigama (that which comprehends the particular aspect in reality), and subsumes them under sangrahanaya and vyava 1. 2. Cf. Syadvadamanjari (J. C. Jain's edn.), p. 323 f. See STP, ga. 5 and the extensive comm. (TBV) thereon.

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328 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE haranaya, respectively. Further, it brings samabhirudhanaya and evambhutanaya under sabdanaya so that the resultant classification we obtain under this scheme consists of sangraha, vyavahara, sjusutra and sabda nayas.' Thus we find that we can obtain many classifications, based on different methods, even within the framework of the substantive and modal categories and of the seven standpoints based on these categories. There are many minor classifications outside the scheme of the standpoints treated in this chapter. As a matter of fact there are several subdivisions under each of the standpoints dealt with here. Any attempt at cataloguing the numerous classifications and enumerating the more numerous subdivisions will be needlessly cumbrous. For such an attempt, even if feasible, naigamanayo dvividhah samanyagrahi visesagrahi ca 1 tatra yah samanyagrahi sa sangrahe'ntarbhutah, visesagrahi tu vyavahare / tadevan sangrahavyavahararjusutrasabdaditrayaTM caika iti catvaro nayah/ Samavayangatika (quoted in J. C. Jain's edn. of Syadvadamanjari, p. 324, f. n. 2). See also the following observation by Maladhari Hemacandra: sangrahavyavahararjusutralaksanah trayo'tra nayah vivaksyante/ ekastu sabdanayah paryayastikah tada catvaro mulanaya bhavanti/ Comm. on VBJ, ga. 2264. 2. For an account of such classifications and subdivisions (upa nayas) of the various nayas see Devasena's Laghunayacakram and Navadhikarana (both printed in Nayacakradisangrahah, ed. by Vamsidhara, Bombay, 1920): Amrtacandra's Tattvarthasara, Devasena's Alapapaddhati, and Nayavivarana by an unknown author (all these three works published in the Prathamagucchaka, Digambara Grantha Bhandara, Kasi, ed. by Pannalal Chaudhari, Vikram Sam. 1982); Yasovijaya's Nayarahasya and Nayapradipa (included in a collection of works: Adhyatmasara, etc., Nyayacarya-Yasovijayajiksta Granthamala, Bhavanagar, 1909); and the portions dealing with nayavada in the

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CHAPTER X 329 is not likely to give considerably more light on the nature, the significance and the function of the analytical method of nayavada than can be done by a consideration of the most fundamental division of categories (viz. dravyarthikanaya and paryayarthikanaya) and of the seven viewpoints based thereon. Hence the present chapter has confined itself to the treatment of only the essential aspects of the subject. The various standpoints outlined in course of this chapter offer an analysis of the manifold reality from their respective angles of vision. Such an analysis results in a wealth of partial truths which will be harmonised into a coherent scheme of knowledge by the employment of the synthetical method of syadvada' which will be dealt with in the next chapter. The complementary functions of the two methods, viz., nayavada and syadvada, remind us of the oft-quoted parable of the elephant and the blind men. To express the same truth after Siddhasena Divakara's analogy nayas offer the discrete (visanjutta) or individual jewels (mani) which are strung together, by means of syadvada, into a necklace (rayanavali).' standard works like UBJ and its comm., SRK, TSV, STP and its comm., and NKC. The mutual necessity, or the complementary character of the two methods, viz., nayavada and syadvada, as well as the corrective character of nayavada, in relation to the dogmatic (ekanta) character of the closed' systems of philosophy (this aspect of the problem will be presently touched upon in the next paragraph) is suggestively expressed by Devasena as follows: yasmannayena vina bhavati narasya syadvadapratipattih// tamat sa boddhavya ekantam hantukamena/l Laghunayacakram, ka. 3. 2. See STP, I, gathas 22-25. .

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330 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Further, the philosophy of standpoints is also a warning against, as well as a corrective to, the closed' or the architectonic' systems. Describing nayavada as a 'philosophy of standpoints' a critic observes: "It is a revolt against the tendency in philosophers to build closed systems of philosophy. According to Jainism, the universe in which we live is an active universe, plastic and full of possibilities and no particular current of thought can fully comprehend it. In order to do justice to the complexity and variety of such a universe, thought must not be hurried to any easy terminus but must be allowed to follow its course freely and meander through the whole field of experience, crossing and recrossing it, so as to create a great confluence of standpoints rather than a closed system. The tendency ingrained in the philosophers to build architectonic systems is inimical to the adventure of thought...... Each philosopher approaching reality from a particular and a partial standpoint, looks upon the one he adopts as the only true standpoint. Jainism rejects the idea of the absolute which is playing havoc in the field of philosophy by creating absolute monisms, absolute pluralisms, and absolute nihilisms. By thus rejecting the absolute and the one-sided, it claims to save philosophy from the chaos of conflicting opinions. Without partiality to any one it promises to give us a theory of relativity which harmonises all standpoints." 1 1. G. H. Rao : The Half-Yearly Journal of the Mysore University, March, 1942, pp. 79-80.

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CHAPTER XI Syadvada or The Dialectic of Conditional Predication

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CHAPTER XI SYADVADA (The Conditional Dialectic) or SAPTABHANGI (The Theory of Sevenfold Predication) In the course of our treatment of nayavada or the theory of standpoints, it has already been observed that syadvada is a method which is complementary to that of nayavada, and that while nayavada is analytical in character, syadvada functions as a synthetical method. That is, nayavada analyses one of the standpoints under the aspect of identity (dravyarthikanaya) or of difference (paryayarthikanaya); and syadvada further investigates the various strands of the truth delivered by a naya, and integrates them into ai consistent and comprehensive synthesis. Each such strand is called a bhanga which is referred to, variously, as a mode, or a predication or an alternative or a possible truth. Describing the relation between the two methods Dasgupta observes : "There is no universal or absolute position or negation, and all judgments are valid only conditionally. The relation of the naya doctrine with the syadvada doctrine is therefore this, that for any judgment according to any and every naya there are as many alternatives as are indicated by Syadvada." The indeterminate or anekanta reality is Supra, p. 303 ff. 2. HIP, Vol. I, p. 181.

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334 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE thus analysed into various standpoints and each standpoint in turn is examined with respect to its various strands of truth and, finally, all the strands are woven together into the synthesis of the conditional dialectic. Owing to their function of analysis and synthesis the methods of nayavada and syadvada may also be described as the disjunctive dialectic and the conjunctive dialectic, respectively. Further, saptabhangi, or the theory of sevenfold predication, is treated as synonymous with syadvada owing to the fact that the number of possible or alternative truths under the conditional method of syadvada are, as will be noticed hereafter, seven only. The fact that the term 'syadvada' is often treated as standing for the entire Jaina philosophy is due to the great importance attached to the method of the conditional dialectic with which it (the term) is most intimately connected.' The controversy as to whether 'syadvada' is a synonym of 'saptabhangi' or of the entire Jaina philosophy is, therefore, a needlessly scholastic one', at any rate from the philosophical standpoint. . Cf. "The doctrine of the Indefiniteness of Being is upheld by a very strange dialectical method called Syadvada, to which the Jains attach so much importance that this name frequently is used as a synonym for the Jaina system itself.". Studies in Jm., p. 16. In his introduction to AJP, Vol. I, p. X, Kapadia states that the term syadvada is synonymous with the term anekantavada, and, therefore, is wider in its scope than the term saptabhangi which is only a part of it. He is, however, not sure of his position although he had adduced a few authorities in his support. But as Jacobi suggests, as seen in the above f.n., syadvada could

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CHAPTER XI 335 Before we set forth the modes of syadvada and their principal features, and, at the end, a few relevant criticisms against the method as a whole, it would be helpful to remember here what has already been stated' with regard to the two groups of factors which, together, determine the nature of a real. The first group of such factors is the positive one referring to the material (dravya) of the make, the spatiotemporal setting (ksetra and kala) and the state (bhava), like black or red, or big or small and so forth, of a jar (ghata) which may be cited here as an example. The second group of factors is a negative one referring to the material, and so on, of things like linen (pata) which form the negative counterpart (nisedha-pratiyogi) of the jarness (ghatatva) of the jar. The negative counterpart (patatva, etc.) is, as has already been noticed, as much constitutive of the full-fledged nature of the jar as the positive one. These groups of factors are briefly described in Sanskrit as svadravyadicatustaya and be used in an inclusive sense of anekantavada owing to the paramount importance attached to saptabhangi with which it (syadvada) is primarily synonymous. Moreover, none of the authorities adduced by Kapadia decisively supports his thesis. There is at least one great and old authoritative writer, viz., Prabhacandra, who contradicts Kapadia's thesis. (Interpreting Akalanka's phrase 'syadvadeksanasaptakam', Prabhacandra writes: syadastityadi saptabhangamayo vadah/ See the Comm. on LTP, ka. 51, in NKC, Vol. II, p. 655). But over and above all these considerations the reason why syadvada is generally and rightly treated as synonymous with saptabhangi is that the particle syat invariably accompanies every bhanga (or mode) in saptabhangi. It would, therefore, be perfectly natural to describe saptabhangi alternatively as syadvada or the doctrine of syat. It is rather strange that this obvious reason has not even suggested itself to Kapadia. Supra, pp. 154-155 etc. 1.

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336 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE paradravyadicatustaya, respectively. They may be referred to, briefly, in English, as self-quaternary and other-quaternary. After these few preliminary observations we may now proceed to elucidate the nature and the modes of the method of the sevenfold predication. Syadvada' (The Conditional Dialectic) or Saptabhangi (The Theory of Sevenfold Predication) Syadvada or Saptabhangi is that conditional method in in which the modes, or predications (bhangah) affirm (vidhi), negate (nisedha) or both affirm and negate, severally (p?thagbhuta) or jointly (samudita), in seven different ways, a certain attribute (dharma) of a thing (vastu) without incompatibility? (avirodhena) in a certain context (prasnavasat)." 1. Although'syadvada' is the most popular name it has various synonyms like samharavada, sarvavastusabalavada, akulavada sankirnavada, tadatattvavada, and vibhajyavada. See AJP, Vol. I, Intro. p. IX and f. n. 5 thereon. Incompatibility includes not merely consistency with the other modes, in the method, but also with the valid knowledge, per ceptual (pratyaksa) or otherwise (paroksa). 3. Cf. Mallisena's definition: ekatra jivadau vastuni ekaikasattvadi dharmavisayaprasnavasat avirodhena pratyaksadibadhapariharena prthagbhutayoh samuditayos ca vidhinisedhayoh paryalocanayakstva syacchabdalanchito vaksyamanah saptabhih prakaraih vacanavinyasah saptabhangiti giyate/ SM, pp. 142-3. Akalanka puts the same, cryptically, as follows: prasnavasat ekatra vastuni avirodhena vidhipratisedhakalpana saptabhangi/ TRAG, p. 24. The following two definitions are by Vadideva and Vimaladasa, respectively: Ekatra vastuni ekaikadharmaparyanuyogavasat avirodhena vyastayoh samastayos ca vidhinisedhayoh kalpanaya syatkarankitan saptadha vakyaprayogah saptabhangi/ PNTA, EV 14 in SRK, p. 716. tallaksanam tu prasnikaprasnajnana-prayojyatve sati ekavastuvisesyaka-aviruddhavidhipratisedhatmaka-dharmaprakaraka-bodhajanaka-saptavakyaparyapta-samudayatvam/ SBT, p. 3.

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CHAPTER XI That is, no modal assertion, or proposition,-simple or complex; affirmative, negative or both,-can, at once, express anything other than an aspect (prakara) of the truth of a thing. The full truth, or rather the synthesis of truths, can result only from a well-ordered scheme of propositions (vacanavinyasa). Each proposition is, therefore, relative to, or alternative with, the other propositions which, in their totality, present the full of the thing with respect to the particular attribute predicated of it. The Jaina maintains that saptabhangi offers such a well-ordered scheme in which the modes (bhangas) are exclusive of one another, but are at the same time, in their totality, exhaustive of the many-sided truth of the indeterminate real under discussion. 337 It has just been noted that the term 'syadvada' means conditional or relativistic dialectic and is synonymous with 'saptabhangi'. We may examine, somewhat more closely, the meaning of this term owing to its well-merited importance in the system : The name 'syadvada' is due to the prefix 'syat' which is an invariable accompaniment of every predication. This particle 'syat' which is treated by most of the Jaina writers as an indeclinable' (avyaya) although, generally, modern writers-some of them perhaps unknowingly-consider it in its obvious sense of being a form derived from the Sanskrit root 'as' (to be) in the potential mood, third form, singular.' Another term equi 1. See infra, p. 338, f.n. 3. See also Nyayakusumanjali by Muni Nyayavijaya, ed. H. R. Kapadia, Bombay, 1922, p. 177. For the other several meanings' of 'syat' as an indeclinable, see AJP, Vol. II, Intro. p. CXV, f.n. 2. 2. OIP, p. 163. 22

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338 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE valent to 'syat' is 'kathancit' and no word or phrase in English is adequate to bring out precisely the significance of either word. Some of the suggested English equivalents like 'probably', 'may be', 'perhaps', 'indefinitely' and so forth are inadequate, if not somewhat misleading. Its main significance lies in its emphasis on the indeterminate or manifold nature of the real which--like all other reals-comes within its purview. Indeterminateness or manifoldness means that the "reals cannot be determined as possessing only such and such attributes and not the rest". Discussing the spirit of syadvada a modern critic observes: "It signifies that the universe can be looked at from many points of view, and that each viewpoint yields a different conclusion (anekanta). The nature of reality is expressed completely by none of them for in its concrete richness it admits all predicates. Every proposition is therefore in strictness only conditional. Absolute affirmation and absolute negation are both erroneous".' It is this conception of reality as extremely indeterminate in nature' that is suggested or illumined' by the term 'syat's A phrase which will approximately bring out this indeterministic significance of syat' would be from a certain point of view', or 'in a certain sense', or some other equivalent form. Another Sanskrit word which is used to suggest that each of the conclusions signified by the seven modes is exclusive --that is, does not encroach upon the province of the conclu 1. SM, p. 151 (text). 2. OIP, p. 163. Syadityavyayamanekantadyotakam / SM, p. 151 (text).

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CHAPTER XI 339 sions pointed out by the other modes--is 'eva' which may be translated as 'only' or 'certainly' (or in some equivalent form such as there is no doubt', or without doubt'). For instance, the first mode, syadastyeva ghatah, means: "In a certain sense, the jar exists without doubt." This sense of exclusion' (vyavityartham) seems to be more prominent than that of 'definiteness' (avadharanartham) although the one implies the other and both the functions-which may also be described as restrictive force and the definitive (or deterministic) force, respectively-are inherent in the word. The syodvadins warn us against allowing 'eva' to proceed beyond its prescribed limits of exercising the restrictive and deterministically articulating influence on the mode within which it functions. That is, its force (samarthya) is confined to the avoidance of intrusions from the other modes and to the bringing of a definitive articulation into the mode with which it is connected. If, on the contrary, it leads to the extreme position of setting up the particular mode or aspect, with which it is connected, as the sole manifestation of the truth of the object concerned, then it 1. In the words of Vidyananda 'eva' is 'vyavacchedaprayojanah, TSV, p. 137. Contrast the difference in the emphasis of the two functions of the word in JPN, p. 147, and Nyayakusumanjali, p. 178. 2. Cf. avadharanam ca atra bhangenabhimatarthavyavstyartham upattam / itaratha anabhihitatulyataivasya vakyasya prasajyeta, pratiniyatasvarthanabhidhanat/ taduktam vakye'vadharanam tavad anistarthanivrttayel kartavyo'yam anyathanuktasamatvat tasya kutracit // SRK, p. 717. For further elucidation of the idea contained in this passage as well as for the three distinctions of 'evakara' viz., ayogabodhakatva, anyayogabodhakatva, and atyantayogabodhakatva, see SBT, pp. 21-29.

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340 gives rise to an absolutism which does not recognise the fact that there are other aspects (apeksah) of truth, in the object, than the one reflected by it. JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Schools which build up their systems on the foundation of some single concept or the other, which represents only one facet of the many-sided truth in reality, illustrate this narrow and dogmatic approach. They are called nirapeksavadas in contrast to sapeksavada which is another name for syadvada. Thus whatever the aspect represented by a mode, under the conditional method of sevenfold predication the term 'syat' is an invariable accompaniment of the mode for the very reason that it suggests that the determinate context of the mode is carved out as it were from the indeterminate richness of reality, and the term 'eva' holds forth the determinate context in its clear outline. But it is necessary to note here that the two terms 'syat' and 'eva' need not necessarily be stated explicitly in a modal proposition. They are always logically inherent in the nature of a modal judgment whether or not they are verbally specified." 1. 2. 3. 4. Cf. kartsnyaikadesena ca tattvarthadhigamanupapatteh/TSV, p. 142. sarvatra syatkaro'bhyupagantavyah/ NKC, Vol. II, p. 692. Cf. syacchabdaprayoge sarvathaikantavyavacchedena anekantapratipatterasambhavat, evakaravacane vivaksitarthapratipattivat SBT, p. 30. Cf. also the following ka. by Vidyananda: syacchabdadapyanekantasamanyasyavabodhane / sabdantaraprayogo'tra visesapratipattaye // TSV, p. 136, ka. 55. samarthyac ca aprayoge'rtho gamyah syadevakarayoh / Quoted from Siddhiviniscaya Tika in NKC, Vol. II, p. 961, f.n. 6. nanvaprayukto'pi syacchabdo vastuno'nekantasvarupatvasamarthyat pratiyate, sarvatraivakaravat, iti cet satyam / SBT, p. 31. Also: aprayukto'pi sarvatra syatkaro'rthat pratiyate/ vidhau nisedhe'pyanyatra kusalas cet prayojakah // LTB and NKC thereon, in NKC, Vol. II, p. 692. See also SM (text) p. 143 f. and TSV, p. 137, ka. 56 and the comm. thereon.

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CHAPTER XI 341 Now the seven modes, or predications, and their characteristics may be treated with reference to the stock example of a jar (ghata) and its negative counterpart (nisedha-pratiyogi) linen (pata). In doing so we may first enumerate the seven modes, then explain the three primary concepts, viz., the being (astitva), non-being (nastitva) and the inexpressible (avaktavyatva), together with the elementary or simple propositions given rise to by them; and, lastly, point out the remaining complex' propositions which result from combining two or more simple ones. The seven modes are :(1) In a certain sense, the jar is (syadasti' ghatah). (2) In a certain sense, the jar is not (syannasti ghatah). (3) In a certain sense, the jar is and is not (syadasti nasti ca ghatah"). 1. A slight departure from the procedure laid down here will be made in the case of the third mode (syadastinasti) which, complex proposition, will be treated jointly with the fourth simple proposition (syadavaktavya). This will be done in order to bring out the important difference between the concepts of 'consecutive presentation' (kramarpana) and co-presentation (saharpana) involved in the two modes, respectively. 2. For brevity the adverb 'eva' is dropped in all the modal statements here, but the indeclinable'syat' is retained. Some writers interchange the sequence between the third and the fourth modes, but this does not make any material difference. While dealing with the fourth mode, Vadideva observes, in this connection :-ayam ca bhangah kaiscit tstiyabhangasthane pathyate, trtiyascaitasya sthanel na caivamapi kasciddosah, arthavisesasyabhavat/ SRK, p. 719. As a matter of fact the same ancient author, Kundakunda, states these two modes in a different order in his two works. Cf. PrSKU, II. 23, and PSKC, ga. 14.

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342 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE (4) In a certain sense, the jar is inexpressible (syadavak tavyo ghatah). (5) In a certain sense, the jar is and is inexpressible (syad astyavaktavyasca ghatah). (6) In a certain sense, the jar is not and is inexpressible (syannastyavaktavyasca ghatah). (7) In a certain sense, the jar is, is not and is inexpressible (syadastinasti cavaktavyasca ghatah). The three fundamental concepts making up the seven predicates, in the seven modes, singly, in twos, or all together, are 'is' (asti), 'is not' (nasti) and inexpressible' (avaktavya). A predicate containing any one of them involves a simple judgment, and a predicate containing any two or all the three of them involves a complex judgment. Consequently, the first two modes, and the fourth mode, are assertions of simple judgments and the remaining four of complex judgments. These judgments, whether simple or complex, are always made against the background of the indeterminate reality which is suggested by the qualifying term syat'. Not being absolute or independent the concepts of the "being' (astitva) and the 'not-being' (nastitva) cannot be fully explained except in their mutual relation. Mere being' is fictitious without the co-ordinate element of 'non-being' and vice versa. Each can, however, be described as an isolated aspect of, or abstraction from, a concrete real. 1. vastuno'stitvam nastitvenavinabhutam nastitvam ca teneti/ SM, p. 144 (text). This idea that a real is a positive-negative complex is expressed by Candraprabhasuri as follows: svaparatmanopadanapohanavyavasthapanadyam hi vastutvam i Candraprabhasuri's Prameya-Ratna-Kosa, ed. L. Suali, Bhavanagar, 1912.

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CHAPTER XI 343 The first mode, represented by the proposition, "In a certain sense the jar is", asserts the existent or positive aspect of the jar. By virtue of the fact that the existence of the jar is inseparably bound up with the non-existence of linen (pata) etc. in it, what the proposition signifies is that for some reason at the moment of our making the assertion, our attention is being focussed primarily' (pradhanataya) on the existent aspect of the jar. As already explained earlier, the existent aspect of the jar is to be understood in terms of its self-quaternary, and the non-existent aspect, in terms of the other-quaternary. If, on the contrary, the jar is understood to be capable of being the linen as well (itararupapattyapi), then it will surely lose its very nature (svarupahaniprasangah) as a distinctive existent', viz., a jar. This claim for a distinctive existence is guaranteed by the implicitly understood term 'eva' in the proposition." 1. vivaksavasac canayoh pradhanopasarjanabhavah/ SM, p. 144 (text). prathame bhange sattvasya pradhanabhavena pratitih, etc. SBT, p. 9. This idea is beautifully expressed by Amotacandra in the following stanza: ekenakarsanti......... 2. See supra, pp. 335-336; see also pp. 154.155. syatkathancit svadravyaksetrakalabhavarupena astyeva sarvar kumbhadi, na punah paradravyaksetrakalabhavarupena/ tatha hi kumbho dravyatah parthivattvenasti, na jaladirupatvena, ksetratah pataliputrakatvena, na kanyakubjaditvena, kalatah saisiratvena, na vasantaditvena, bhavatah syamatvena, na raktatvadina/ anyatha itararupapattya svarupahaniprasanga iti / SRK, p. 717. For a discussion on svadravyadicatustaya and its negative counterpart see supra. tatra svarupadibhin astitvamiva nastitvamapi syadityanistarthasya nivrttaye syadastyevetyevakarah/ tena ca svarupadibhirastitvameva na nastitvamityavadharyate/ SBT, p. 21.

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344 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE The second fundamental concept is 'non-being' (asat). It is embodied in the second predication, viz., 'the jar is not'. This concept is easier to understand after recognising the nature and function of its positive counterpart (vidhipratigogi), viz., 'being' (sat). It is the negatiye (nisedha) element in the determinate context of the concrete nature of the jar in the example. That is, despite its name 'negative element' this concept is a co-ordinate and constituent element in the full make-up of the jar. The fact that negation constitutes a necessary element in reality has already been dealt with, at some length, in an earlier chapter' and, therefore, nothing more than the mere mention of it is called for here. This important fact warrants the formulation of a distinctive conditional predication which is provided for in the second mode. The main significance of the second mode lies not in the false statement that the jar does not exist as the jar but in the irrefutable statement that the jar does not exist as linen or anything else. When we focus our attention exclusively (pradhanataya) on this negative aspect of the jar, as we do under certain conditions, we are said to be viewing the jar in the perspective of the second mode. Nonexistence in the second predication is not, therefore, a vacuous predicate but is the obverse of the existent side of the object. In other words, non-existence or 'non-being is a determinate fact with a content and not a void. This is so because under the category of the 'non-being' all that should not figure within the 'being' of the jar is sought to be ruled out. 1. For a discussion on negation see supra, pp. 153 ff.

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CHAPTER XI 345 An objection to treating the present mode as a logical complement to the previous mode is that the two modes being mutually opposed, are self-contradictory. A refutation of this objection forms the subject of a specific account in an earlier chapter and, indeed, runs as an undercurrent throughout the body of this work. It is, therefore, sufficient to remember here that the two elements, constituting the two modes, are not merely non-contradictory-because, if they were, the qualification without incompatibility" (avirodhena) in the definition of syadvada, would be meaningless--but are mutually necessary complements in the real. Contradiction would arise if the opposition were between the two absolute assertions "the jar exists" and "the jar does not exist". The source of such a fault lies in the objector's mistake in construing the latter assertion, viz., "the jar does not exist", as being equivalent to "the jar does not exist as a jar". The true interpretation of it should be that "the jar does not exist as linen, or water etc." There is surely no contradiction in the latter interpretation because of the fact that it is based on the assumption that the assertion is a relative (kathancit) and determinate (niyata) abstraction from a complex and concrete real. The third and the fourth modes may be treated jointly 1. See supra, pp. 142-144 and pp. 163-169 (with f. notes). See supra, p. 336. For a refutation of a further charge that syadvada brings about a situation of doubt (samsayavisayatvasambhava) owing to the co-existence of the relative concept of the non-existence (kathancidasattvam) with that of the existence(kathancitsattvam), see SBT, pp. 6-7 and TRAG, p. 26.

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346 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE in order to bring out their difference more clearly. They are enunciated as : "In a certain sense the jar is and is not", and "In a certain sense, the jar is inexpressible", respectively. These two modes present the "being' (astitva) and the nonbeing' (nastitva) together. But there is a great difference in the presentation (arpanabheda) they make of the togetherness of the two modes. The third mode offers successive presentation (kramarpana) and the fourth one offers a simultaneous presentation (saharpana) of the two concepts. These two kinds of presentation are also translated as consecutive presentation" or "differenced togetherness", and "co-presentation" or "undifferenced togetherness".! Although the third mode appears to be one proposition, it entails, in actual fact, two propositions which are expressed as one owing to a certain verbal facility. But the verbal togetherness does not signify a logical compresence of the propositions, or the concepts they embody. The fourth mode introduces the third primary concept, viz., the inexpressible' (avaktavya) in its predicate. Before dealing with the Jaina conception of the inexpressible and its difference from the consecutive predicate, in the third mode, it would be of some interest to trace the dialectical stages 1. See JTA, pp. 45 and 47. 2. avaktavya is often translated as "the unspeakable" or "the un describable". Commenting on the eminent suitability of this term 'avaktavya', in an attempt to express the two primary aspects of a real (ghata) Akalanka remarks: na canyah sabdah tadubhayatmavasthatattvabhidhayi vidyate/ ato'sau ghatah vacanagocaratitatvat syadavaktavya ityucyate/ TRAG, p. 25. The nature and the importance of this concept, viz., avaktavya, will be hereafter clarified.

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CHAPTER XI 347 through which the concept of the inexpressible has evolved in Indian philosophy. An account of the evolution will not merely give us an estimate of the general significance of the concept, but also will indicate the relation in which the concept stands to similar concepts in other Indian schools. A brief account of it may, therefore, be attempted here. We may distinguish four stages through which the concept of the inexpressible has passed in its evolutionary process. These stages, it should be noted, at the outset, do not necessarily represent a chronological order of development but a logical one. In the first place, we meet with a tendency in the Rgveda which is suggestive of a negative attitude to the problem. The seer, confronted with the mystery of the universe which reveals both sat (being) and asat (non-being), tends to feel that the universe is neither being nor non-being (cf. the primal state of reality, he says. "Then was not non-existent nor existent...." Rgveda, the "Song of Creation", Bk. X, Hymn 129, E. T. by R. T. H. Griffith). This somewhat naive and negative attitude that the real is neither being nor non-being may be described as one of anubhaya. The next tendency is a positive one, and is represented by certain Upanisadic utterances like : "sadasadvarenyam" ("The great Being'as being and not being', Mundakopanisad, II. 2. 1; tathaksat dvividhah somya bhavah prajayante.... Ibid., II. 1. 1) and "samyuktametat ksaramaksaram ca vyaktavyaktam bharate visvamasah" (That which is joined together as perishable and imperishable, as manifest and unmanifest-the Lord ... supports it all. Svetasvataro

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348 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE panisad, 1. 8). It conceives both being and non-being as inherent in reality. Owing to the positive character this, tendency may be described as the ubhaya phase (in which both are real) of the concept, Before touching upon the third phase in the evolution of the concept it is necessary to note two significant features in the above two tendencies. First, although both attitudes refer to the elements of being and non-being they suggest the two elements as being merely together. As yet there does not seem to be any attempt to weld the elements into a single complex mode. Nor has any definite awareness of the impossibility of expressing the two elements, simultaneously, in. a single concept dawned upon these poet-philosophers. Secondly, the two elements are conceived to be mutually opposed rather than complementary. The third phase is met with, again, in certain otherUpanisadic utterances like "sa esa neti neti" (Bihadaranyakopanisad, IV. 5. 15); "yato vaco nivartante aprapya manasa saha" (Taittiriyopanisad, II. 4); or "naiva vaca na manasa praptum sakyah" (Kathopanisad, II. 6. 12). In this phase there is a clear awareness of the unutterableness of the ultimate owing to the fact that an attempt at utterance is. beset with contradictoriness. Hence, although this phase is also negative' like that of the Rgveda it marks an 1. Cf. "This world, O Kaccana,....generally proceeds on a duality, on the 'it is' and the 'it is not'. But O Kaccana, whoever perceives in truth and wisdom how things originate in the world, in his eyes there is no 'it is not' in this world. Whoever, Kaccana, perceives in truth and wisdom how things pass away in this world, in his eyes there is no 'it is' in this world...," Quoted in H. Oldenberg's Buddha, (E. T. by W. Koey, 1882, London), p. 249.

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CHAPTER XI 349 advance upon the naivete of the latter in so far as it is distinctly aware of the inexpressibility of the ultimate. In order to distinguish this logically sophisticated phase from the simple negative tendency of the Rgveda we may call this the stage of avaktavya, or anirvacaniyata, after the Vedantic usage. Not merely the modes (kotis) of sat and asat but also the mode of sadasat are associated with anirvacaniyata. Although anirvacaniyata signifies unutterableness like the Jaina notion of avaktavyatva it differs from the latter by insisting upon absolute (sarvatha) unutterableness. The :specific term by which the Jaina refers to this absolute type of avaktavyatva is avyapadesya which is in contrast with his own relativistic notion according to which sat and asat are jointly or consecutively (kramarpanaya) expressible (kathancidvyapadesya). Incidentally, one is reminded, here, of the fact that the Buddha's 'avyakstas' and Nagarjuna's conception of the ultimate as being, 'catuskotivinirmukta'! are, after making allowance for the respective differences in the metaphysical tenets and, consequently, in the modes 1 The paradoxical situation involved in the absolute unuttera. bleness (anabhilapyatva) of the position of catuskotivinirmuktatvam comes in for a sharp polemic by Samantabhadra and his two commentators, Vasunandi and Akalanka. Samantabhadra contends that a strict insistence on the principle of "anabhilapyatvam'should prevent its advocates from indulging in the description of what cannot, ex hypothesi, be described (avaktavyacatuskotivikalpopi na kathyatam/ AMS, ka. 46). Consequently, referring to the distinctions (kotis) like sat, asat, in relation to the indescribable' (or possibly the Void or Sunya) is like introducing an adjective or a qualification where there is no substantive or the qualified (asarvantamavastu syat avisesyavisesanam/ Ibid). For the entire argument, see ibid., karikas 45-50 and the comms, VVas and ASA thereon.

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350 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE of expressing the concept of the inexpressible, cognate with the concept of anirvacaniyata, or avyapadesya, as the Jaina would call them. Another important difference of this anirvacaniya view from that of the relativistic inexpressible of the Jaina, is that the former assumes sat and asat, singly or jointly, to be absolutely independent and contradictory while the latter assumes them to be relative and complementary. On the basis of this difference the former view is designated as nirapeksavada and the latter sapeksavada. The attribution of absolute independence to sat and asat in their combination as sadasat paves the way for the development of the conception of the ultimate absolute (brahman) which utterly transcends words and eventually constitutes itself into the transcendental realm of truth (parasatya or paramarthasat). In other words, the verbal and logical transcendentalism becomes the metaphysical transcendentalism which relegates the antinomies of sat, asat and sadasat to the intrinsically unreal empirical realm. The last phase in the dialectical evolution of the idea of the inexpressible is represented by the relativistic (sapeksa) view of syadvadin. The distinctive features of relativism and complementariness in the Jaina view of the inexpressible have already been brought out while contrasting them with the absolutistic view of the anirvacaniyavadin. Instead of fighting shy of their supposed contradictoriness and other difficulties the Jania treats the two elements of sat and asat, in their combination, as a necessary, inevitable and distinctive feature of our objective experience and, consequently, tries to assign them a place in the framework of his dialectical

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CHAPTER XI 351 scheme of modal propositions. In the above account of the four stages in the evolution of the notion of the inexpressible, in Indian philosophy, an attempt has been made to show the relation in which the Jaina notion of the inexpressible stands to the views of certain other schools about the same notion. Incidentally, certain general features like the relativism (sapeksatva) and the complementariness of the combining concepts of being and non-being, in the same predication, have also been brought out in the account. Now, the status and the significance of this notion, in the scheme of the conditional dialectic (syadvada), as well as the manner in which this notion is to be differentiated from the consecutive concept involved in the third predication of the dialectic, are yet to be further elucidated. But such an elucidatory attempt presupposes a knowledge of the Jaina view of the relation between a word and its meaning, since the development of the concept. of the inexpressible is directly based on that view. Hence a brief reference may be made to show how the Jaina treats language as a medium of the meaning of reality. It is a well-known fact, in Indian philosophy, that Bhartuhari, the author of the great classic on the philosophy of grammar, the Vakyapadiya, puts forth a well-finished, elaborate, and powerful thesis that "the whole order of reality, subjective and objective, is but the manifestation of word"." 1. JPN, p. 111; also cf. Vakyapadiya, with Punyaraja's Comm. (Ed. by Gangadhara Sastri Manavalli, Benares, 1887), 1.119. The relevant ka, in Vakyapadiya is prefaced by Punyaraja as follows: idanim sabdasyaiva jaganmulatvam prapancayati. Then

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352 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Expression, according to him, is "the very essence of consciousness and, hence, all that exists. Therefore, whatever exists and whatever is thought of, is completely expressible." This thesis represents an extreme viewpoint. An antithesis to Bhartshari's viewpoint is presented by certain utterances of the Upanisads which, as noticed during the treatment of the third phase in the development of the indefinable, were, later on, developed into the well-articulated theories of anirvacaniyata in Advaitism, and similar ideas in certain trends of Buddhism. This antithetical view maintains that the ultimate is absolutely beyond the reach of words, and, when any attempt is made to 'reach' the ultimate through words they are found utterly to conceal, nay, even distort it. follows the ka. beginning with: sabdesvevasrita saktirvisvasyasya nibandhani/ Commenting on this Punyaraja further ob serves : sarva apyarthajatayah suksmarupena sabdadhisthanah / 2. According to Bhartrhari "There is no cognition which is not interpenetrated with word. Thought is impossible without verbal expression. It is language that makes cognition illuminative of its objects." This item is beautifully expressed by the following celebrated ka. of Bhartshari: na so'sti pratyayo loke yah sabdanugamadste) anuviddhamiva jnanam sarvam sabdena bhasatel/ Vakyapadiya, I. 124, and for its E. T. see JPN, p. 111. For a similar importance attached to sabda by the author of Kavyadarsa see The Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar (P. C. Chakravarti, Calcutta University, 1936), p. 39, especially n. 2 thereon. This Philosophy of Grammar as well as his "Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus" in the Journal of the Department of Letters, Vol. XII, University of Calcutta, 1925, give an exposition of Bhartphari's general posi tion in relation to the Mimamsakas, the Naiyayikas and others. 3. See supra, pp. 348-350.

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CHAPTER XI 353 Here again the Jaina strikes the balance between the two extremes and maintains that reality is both expressible and inexpressible, and, that there is no contradiction in holding this position since reality is so from different points of view.? It is in defence of this position that the Jaina view of the relation between a word and its meaning comes into the picture. According to syodvadin one word expresses one meaning only. The relationship between a word and its meaning is designated by the Jaina as vacyavacakaniyama or ekarthatvaniyama', and, by some non-Jaina writers, on the subject, as : nanasabdavada". Both these designations affirm their common essential conviction that a word, which appears to convey more meanings than one, is to be treated, not as one word, but as as many words as the number of meanings it appears 1. Expressibility is a consecutive possibility and inexpressibility is an attempt at a co-presentation and, therefore, is a verbal impossibility. 2. Commenting on his own ka., viz., arpanabhedadavirodhah pitr putradisambandhavat, Akalanka writes : tadyatha ekasya devadattasya jatikularupasamjnavyapadesavisistasya pita putro bhrata bhagineya ityevamprakarah sambandha janyajanakatvadisaktyarpanabhedat na virudhyantel na hyekapeksaya piteti sesapeksayapi pita bhavati/ sesapeksaya tu putradivyapadesabhak/ na ca pitaputradikstam sambandhabahutvam devadattaikasya na/ virudhyatetadvad astitvadayo na yanti virodham ekatra/ TRAG, p. 26. 3. See SBT, p. 61. Although their actual designation is not used Vidyananda expresses its meaning in the following statement: sabdasya ca prativisayam manatvat sarvagunanam ekasabdavacyatayam sarvarthanam ekasabdavacyatapatteh sabdantaravaiphalyat/ TSV, p. 136. 23

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3 to convey.' We have already met with an expression of this attitude towards the present question under the etymological standpoint (samabhirudhanaya") in the chapter on Nayavada. For instance, the word 'gauh'-we say the 'word' in the singular in conformity to popular usage, we should say, in strictness, a multitude of words-is said to convey a cow (pasu), a vahika, earth (prthivi), heaven (svarga), a point of compass, a word (pada), and 'a ray of light' (kirana). Similarly the English words like play, pound, file, etc. stand for more than one meaning. But the Jaina does not agree with the popular view that the very same word, among such words, can convey all the meanings associated with it by commonsense and listed against it by lexicographers. He believes', 1. Besides indicating this idea Vimaladasa also points out the consequences of its violation: nanu sarvesam padanam ekarthaniyame nanarthapadocchedapattiriti cenna, gavadipadasyapi prasiddhasya tattvato'nekatvat, sadrsyopacaradeva tasyaikatvena vyavaharanat/anyatha sakalarthasyapi ekasabdavacyatvapatteh arthabhedena anekasabdaprayogavaiphalyat/ SBT, p. 61. svargadyanekarthavisayataya See supra, pp. 321-324, and SBT, p. 61, where the author writes: yathaiva hi samabhirudhanayapeksaya sabdabhedad dhruvo'rthabhedah tatha arthabhedadapi sabdabhedah siddha eva/ anyatha vacyavacakaniyama vyavaharavilopat/ Four of these meanings are given in the Hindi comm. on SBT, p. 61, and five of them (with the addition of the meaning, a 'word') are given in JPN, p. 117. Vahika, though not given in either work, is widely referred to in Vakyapadiya and other works. 2. 3. JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE 4. Prabhacandra puts forth this idea of one word for one meaning in a somewhat different form (substituting that simultaneous inexpressibility of the positive and the negative meaning of a word for a similar inexpressibility of more than one meaning of a so-called synonymous word) in a polemic against a particular theory of the import of words (apohavada). Although the theory controverted is not specifically mentioned

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CHAPTER XI 355 with Bhamaha', that in spite of the common structural and phonetic pattern the word 'gauh', when uttered or written against any one of the several meanings, is a specific symbol different from what appears to bem-and structurally and phonologically is the same symbol against another meaning connected with it. In other words, the word 'gauh' as meaning' a cow' is different from the word 'gauh' as meaning a 'vahika'. The fact that two or more by him it is evidently the theory, sponsored by Ratnakarasanti, which propounds "that a word denotes something positive, and at the same time differentiates it from all others. The two acts, one positive and the other negative, are", according to this theory, "simultaneous. It is not a positive action followed by negation nor is it a negative act followed by assertion.' (SBNT, preface, p. 1). To quote the words of Ratnakarasanti himself: nasmabhirapohasabdena vidhireva kevalo'bhipretah/ napyanyavyavsttimatram, kintvanyapohavisisto vidhih sabdanamarthah/ Ibid., p. 3. This view is opposed to the widely accepted view of apoha which consists in 'mutual negation' (parasparaparihara or anyavyavrtti, as referred to by Ratnakarasanti in the above quotation) between point-instants (see Stcherbatsky's The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, p. 157, f. n. 3). Criticising the above view, of Ratnakarasanti, that one word (dhvani) may generate in us two cognitions (vijnanadvaya), one positive and the other negative, at once, Prabhacandra writes: athaikenaiva gosabdena buddhidvayasya utpadat na paro dhvanir mrgyah; na ekasya vidhikarino nisedhakarino va dhvaner yugapat vijnanadva. yalaksanaphalanupalambhatvidhinisedhajnanayos ca anyonyam virodhat katham ekasmat sainbhavah/ PKM, pp. 431-2. Bhamaha is at one with Prabhacandra on this question. See the following f. n. Bhamaha, like syudvadin, holds that "no single word can have two fruits' or meanings, as is evidenced by the following ka. quoted with approval by Prabhacandra: nanu jnanaphalah sabda na caikasya phaladvayam/ apavadavidhijnanam phalamekasya vah katham // Ibid., p. 432. Commenting on this ka., quoted also by santaraksita, Kamalasila observes: na hyekasya vidhikarinah nisedhakarino va sabdasya yugapadvijna nadvayalaksanam phalam/ TSS., ka. 913, and the P. thereon. 1.

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356 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE meanings have the same linguistic symbol (samjna) is, according to the Jaina, simply a matter of linguistic coincidence just as in the case of two persons, who are entirely different from each other in many respects, having the same name, say Devadatta. The farthest that the Jaina could go concerning the question of the occurrence of the same symbol against several meanings is that he can conceive every instance of its occurrence as being only similar (sadrsyopacaradeva)', linguistically, to the other instances. In the general position' taken up by the Jaina on the problems of the philosophy of language our concern here is with the specific problem of the relation between word and 1. See supra, p. 354, f. n. 1. 2. The following works deserve attention for their treatment of the problems concerning the philosophy of language from the Jaina point of view : PKM, ch. III, pp. 391-465; NKC, Vol. II, ch. IV, pp. 530-604, ch. V, pp. 636-54, ch. VI, pp. 690-766. 3. Closely allied to this problem of word-meaning relation is the question whether the meaning of a word resides in the word as a natural power (svabhava) or is associated with it as a mere convention. In the debate on this question the Mimamsaka takes the former view and the Naiyayika takes the latter view. In conformity with his reconciliatory attitude the Jaina takes the middle position between these two extremes. Accordingly, he believes that although meaning is natural potency of a word it needs the aid of convention for its discovery as well as its expressive use. "The power," it is said, "is natural, but is made effective only by convention. We have to learn the relation of words to facts and this shows that knowledge of convention is necessary for understanding the meanings of words. But the knowledge of convention is only a means to the discovery of the power of the word and does not make the postulation of power unnecessary or redundant." (JPN, p. 119). But whatever the relative proportions of the role played by power and convention, the stand taken by the Jaina with regard to the problem of word-meaning relation is consistently maintained (cf. ekapa

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CHAPTER XI 357 meaning (samjnasamjni-sambandha). Having noticed that he favours the view that every distinctive meaning needs a distinctive word (pratiniyatavacyavacakabhava) for its medium, we may now resume our treatment of the copresentative predicate of the inexpressible (avaktavya) and of its differentiation from the consecutive-presentative, in their respective modes, under the method of seven-fold predication. If the above principle of one word for one meaning is granted, then the concept of the inexpressible in syadvada lends itself to an easy grasp. The fourth mode, viz., "The jar is inexpressible", is an attempt to present the aspects of being' and 'non-being' in the jar, at once (yugapat), and, as primary meanings. Although both these aspects are the inalienable features of the jar a simultaneous attention to both aspects is a psychological and logical impossibility. Moreover being' conveys the meaning of one aspect and 'non-being' of the other. A conveyance of both meanings at once is incompatible with the established rule, viz., vacyavacakaniyama. To say that one word, like avaktavya in the present dasya pradhanataya anekadharmavacchinnabodhakatvam nastiti niyamasyoktatvat / SBT, p. 66. See also supra, pp. 42, 354 (f.ns. 1, 2 and 4) and 374 (f. n. 1), as well as pp. 42, 43 (f. n. 3), 44 (f. n. 1). For a further discussion on how collective terms like army (sena), forest (vana) etc., and how terms expressing plural number, like trees (vsksah) etc., can be explained in terms of the Jaina conception of word-meaning relation, see SBT, pp. 63-67. The relevant grammatical points, bearing on the explanation of these terms, especially the terms involving the plural number, are also mentioned by the way, often in opposition to Panini's view on the matter (ibid.).

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358 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE context, can convey both the meanings at once would not be correct, according to the Jaina, because of two reasons : first that no word can convey more than one meaning at a time, and secondly, even if it can, our mind can attend to them only in a successive order. A further mention of these difficulties incident to the concept will presently be made. No such difficulties arise in the case of the third predication which is concerned with presenting, consecutively (kramarpanaya), the two aspects of being' and 'nonbeing', although it is expressed in the shortened form of a single proposition. It is because of this consecutive element that this mode is aptly called differenced togetherness' (or distinguishable togetherness) in contrast to the phrase " undifferenced togetherness' (or undistinguishable togetherness) which signifies avaktavya. Both aspects are primitive', co-ordinate and mutually irreducible. Our mental (perceptual and other) as well as expressive' (bodhanasamarthyam and vacanasamarthyam) faculties being ill-adapted for comprehending and asserting both of them at once in their primary togetherness (ubhayapradhanyam) we can grasp and assert them either successively or confess to our inability to do if asked to do it at a single stroke. This is precisely what is done under the third and the fourth modes, respectively." It is contended that the third mode is redundant, or 1. iti sakalavacakarahitatvadavaktavyai vastu yugapatsattvasat tvabhyam pradhanabhavarpitabhyam akrantan vyavatisthate/ SM, p. 145, 2. See SBT, p. 62, PNTA, IV. 15, and SRK thereon in SRK, pp. 718-719.

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CHAPTER XI 359 superfluous, and, therefore, is unjustifiable' as a distinctive alternative in the dialectical scheme of conditional predications. The reason pleaded for this contention is that it does not exhibit any unique or novel feature of objective reality, being almost a mechanical conjunction of the two simple predicates contained, severally, in the first and second modes. While not denying the fact that it is a conjunctive predication, the Jaina does not agree with the contention that it is redundant. A conjunctive proposition embodies a judgment of consecutive togetherness which is no less a unique or distinctive moment of factual significance than any other, and, cannot, therefore, be expunged from a methodological scheme which pretends to synthesise, exhaustively, all possible moments, or alternatives, within its fold. A similar consideration applies to the concept of the inexpressible. This concept confronts us with a logical, psychological, and verbal failure to embody, within any one symbol (sanketa), the two fundamental aspects of reality, with equal prominence. This is indeed an inconvenient predicament inevitable in any effort to take in, in one sweep, the whole range of truth. But the inconvenient or the impossible is not necessarily illogical or untrue. Limitations in the range of human powers of thinking and expression entail such a failure. But even this failure is a necessary step to be reckoned with in the dialectical method of syadvada. Being at once an inescapable and unique fact in our grappling with reality it cannot but be provided for as a dialectically 1. See SBT, p. 69 f.

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360 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE possible or alternative position. K. C. Bhattacharya clearly expresses this position in the following words: "It (the inexpressible) is objective as given : it cannot be said to be not a particular position nor to be non-existent. At the same time it is not the definite distinction of position and existence : it represents a category by itself. The commonsense principle implied in its recognition is that what is given cannot be rejected simply because it is not expressible by a single positive concept. A truth has to be admitted if it cannot be got rid of even if it is not understood." The remaining three' modes are derived from combining the three primary concepts in such a way that these three, combined with the four modes hitherto expounded, exhaust all the possible or alternative aspects of truth concerning the object in question (the jar in the present instance). The fifth mode, viz., "In a certain sense, the jar is, and is inexpressible", asserts the truth of the "being' of the jar conjointly with the inexpressible truth of the compresence (or co-presentation) of the being and the non-being of the same object. This is a combined mode derived from 1. JTA, p. 48. 2. After mentioning the four ways' or 'steps' of the formula (syadvada) Hiriyanna observes: "It may seem that the formula might stop here. But there are still other ways in which the alternatives can be combined. To avoid the impression that those predicates are excluded, three more steps are added. The resulting description becomes exhaustive, leaving no room for the charge of dogma in any form." OIP, p. 165. 3. Cf. yugapad asan ketikenaikenaiva sabdena vaktur vivaksitah kumbhah sams ca vaktavyas ca bhavati, ghato'vaktavyas ca bhavatityarthah dese tasya ghatatvat, dese cavaktavyatvad iti/ SHM in VBJ, ga. 2232.

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CHAPTER XI 361 bringing together the first and the fourth predicates in a complex expressed judgment. The sixth mode, viz., "In a certain sense, the jar is not, and is inexpressible", asserts the truth of non-being of the jar conjointly with the inexpressible truth of the compresence of the 'being' and the 'non-being' of the same object.' This, again, is a combined mode resulting from bringing together the second and the fourth predicates in a complex expressed judgment. The seventh and last mode, viz., "In a certain sense, the jar is, is not, and is inexpressible", combines the consecutive presentation of the "being' and the 'non-being', conjointly with the co-presentation or compresence, of the 'being' and the "non-being' of the jar.' This mode is evidently a resultant of bringing together, within its fold, the third and the fourth predicates of the conditional dialectic. Unlike the first two and the fourth predications, each of which contains a simple predicate involving one of the three primary concepts, the fifth, the sixth and the seventh predications are, severally, complex in structure, the last one being the most complex among them. This is so because they are assertions of complex judgments. These are the seven modes each of which contains one 1. Cf. tatha, ekadese paraparya yaih asadbharenarpito visesito'nyasmirs tu dese svaparaparyayaih sadbhavasadbhavabhyam sattva sattuabhyam yugapad asanketikenaikena sabdena raktum viraksitah kumbho'sannavaktavyas ca bhavati / Ibid. 2. Ibid.

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362 alternative truth while all together contain the total truth' of a situation in which any feature predicated of a real is investigated. The reason why the number of modes is neither more nor less than seven is because, it is believed, any complex situation is amenable to treatment by this seven-fold technique if one is an adept in using it. It means every conceivable problem' regarding a factual situation can be reduced to the terms of these seven angles from which it can be viewed. Any attempt to add or subtract a mode will be found to be impossible since addition finds the mode already there, among one of the existing seven modes, and the subtraction will mutilate an essential limb from scheme." In the event of a fresh situation arising with regard JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE 1. Jinabhadragani sums up the complex position of Syadvada in the following gatha: sabbhavasabbhavobhayappio saparapajjaobhayao/kumbhakumbhavattavvobhayaruvaibheo so// VBJ., ga. 2232. Explaining this ga. Maladhari observes:.. tatha hi-svaparyayaih, paraparyayaih, ubhayaparyayais ca sadbhavena, asadbhavena, ubhayena, carpito visesitah kumbhah kumbhakumbhavaktavyobhayarupadibhedo bhavati-saptabhangi pratipadyata ityarthah SHM in VBJ, p. 910. In a similar Vidyananda and Samantabhadra sum up the entire position in two and four karikas, respectively. See AMS, 14 and 16; and TSV, p. 128, 49-52. manner 2. 3. For instance, applying syadvada to the postulation that reality is one we get the following conclusions: the reality is one (syadekah); the reality is non-one or many (syadanekah); the reality is both one and many (syadekascanekasca); the reality is inexpressible (syadavaktavyah); the reality is one and also inexpressible (syadekascavaktavyah); the reality is many and also inexpressible (syadanekascavaktavyah); and, the reality is one, many and also inexpressible (syadekascanekascavaktavyasca). Cf. bhangassattvadayassapta samsayassapta tadgatah/ jijnasassapta sapta syuh prasnassaptottarani ca// quoted in SBT, p.8. This refutes objections such as the one by Kumarila who feels that "When

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CHAPTER XI 363 to the same problem under a different setting it can again be dealt with by the application of this method. All the conclusions accumulating from the varied application of this method will, eventually, give us a conspectus of the complex truth with regard to a problem. The whole method, therefore, may be said to be one which helps a patient inquiring mind in its adventure of mapping out the winding paths running into the faintly known or unknown regions of reality and bringing them within the bounds of human knowledge. Now we may consider some important criticisms directed against syadvada. A few criticisms, considered by the critics directing them to be fatal to syadvada, come from the vedantic quarters, especially advaitic absolutism. This is inevitable since advaitic absolutism and syadvadic relativism are diametrically opposed to each other in their fundamental presuppositions. Although these criticisms originated with the founders of the vedantic schools it would be better to see them (the criticisms) through the eyes of the modern exponents of vedanta. An elaborate refutation of them lies outside the limits of this work. A few remarks may, however, be made in answer to them inserting, here and there, some observations of the critics themselves who, to some extent, answer, perhaps somewhat unwittingly, their fellow-critics. seven principles are admitted then there may also be a hundred" (saptabhangi prasadena satabhangyapi jayate) PSKC, p. 14. Chakravarti observes in this connection : "The complex nature of a real object or dravya is amenable to description by the above seven and only seven propositions." Ibid., p. 12.

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364 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Hiriyanna, by no means an unsympathetic exponent even of Jainism, observes : "The half-hearted character of the Jaina enquiry is reflected in the seven-fold mode of predication (sapta-bhangi), which stops at giving us the several partial views together, without attempting to overcome the opposition in them by a proper synthesis. It is all right so far as it cautions us against one-sided conclusions but it leaves us in the end. ... with little more than one-sided solutions. The reason for it, if it is not prejudice against absolutism, is the desire to keep close to common beliefs." ! In another work of his also the same criticism is made with some more incisive touches on one or two points. One additional point mentioned there, on the authority of Badarayana, Sankara, and other absolutists, is that "If all our knowledge concerning reality is relative, they say (the old Indian critics like Sankara, Ramanuja etc.), the Jaina view must also be relative. To deny this conclusion would be to admit, at least, one absolute truth; and to admit it would leave the doctrine with no settled view of reality, and thus turn it into a variety of scepticism."" From these observations we may elicit two points of criticism : The first one is that syadvada is a form of "electicism" because it is "a mere putting together of the several partial truths without "a proper synthesis". This is expressed even more trenchantly by a follower of Hiriyanna who, after characterising "The Jaina Philosophy of Relativity" as 1. OIP, p. 172 f. 2. EIP, p. 69. 3. Ibid., p. 68.

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CHAPTER XI 365 "refreshingly modern" and as "a happy blend of naturalistic and spiritualistic, realistic and idealistic tendencies", observes: "Just the philosophy' is perhaps what many contemporary philosophers would say. But on close scrutiny, it fails to satisfy some of the deepest metaphysical and religious aspirations of mankind. Its fascination is the fascination of an eclecticism-a philosophy of compromise." This is said to be "the central defect" arising from the relativism of syadvada. The second criticism of syadvada, made by Hiriyanna, is that it (syadvada) is "variety of scepticism". "Prejudice against absolutism", the reason imputed by Hiriyanna for such "scepticism", is even more conclusively advanced by Radhakrishnan, who, after mentioning "the strong points of the theory of knowledge of the Jainas and defending it against the attacks of the Vedantins" remarks : "Yet in our opinion the Jaina logic leads to a monistic idealism (by which he means 'the hypothesis of the absolute') and so far as the Jainas shrink from it they are untrue to their own logic." After casually complementing syadvada as the "most searching dialectic" Belvalkar gives such a twist to his statement of syodvada that it is made to sound like scepticism, 1. "Anekantavada or The Jaina Philosophy of Relativity", G. Hanumantha Rao, The Half-yearly Journal of the Mysore University, March, 1942, p. 79. 2. Ibid., p. 87 f. 3. IP, Vol. I, p. 305. 4. "The Undercurrents of Jainism" (an article in the Indian Philo sophical Review, Vol. I, No. 1, 1917, edited by A. C. Widgery and R. D. Ranade, Bombay), p. 33.

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366 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE or rather, the even more non-committal attitude of "agnosticism". He writes : "As is well-known, this theory denies the possibility of any predication : S may be, or may not be, or may both be and not be, P. With such a purely negative or agnostic attitude one cannot have any dogma; and Sankaracarya lays his finger accurately on the weakest point in the system when he says. As thus the means of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge, are all alike, indefinite, how can the Tirthankara (Jaina) teach with any claim to authority, and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether indeterminate?'" Besides this charge of agnosticism Belvalkar manages to raise a fresh issue which, however, he links up with agnosticism. He remarks that "the dialectic (of syadvada) could not have sprung up from the same teacher or one and the same philosophical background".' This means that, according to him, syadvada is incompatible with, or at any rate, does not naturally emerge from, the Jaina philosophy of identityin-difference. Connecting this issue with his favourite charge of agnosticism he writes in his notes on Brahmasutrabhasya, "Sankaracarya, no less than the Sutrakara,.... succeeds in proving that, as a mere 'anaikantika' (sic) theory of predication, the Syadvada must return upon itself and end in doubting the doubter himself".: Rao strengthens him by placing in his hands a further weapon in the form of charging syadvada with "self-contradiction". To quote Rao's own 1. Ibid., p. 32. 2. Ibid. 3. BBSB, p. 181 (Notes).

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CHAPTER XI 367 words: "We see the tendency to please everybody and to compromise and in trying to compromise it involves itself in self-contradiction; the saviour of all systems is committing suicide.". From this joint attack of Belvalkar and Rao emerges the third charge that syadvada is contradictory to the Jaina philosophical position in general as well as that it is self-contradictory. A systematically elaborate answer to each of these three charges, viz., eclecticism, agnosticism and contradiction including self-contradiction, lies, as already mentioned, outside the scope of this work. Moreover, if a glance is cast over the various chapters of this work, especially these last three parts, it will be seen that these criticisins have been met in spirit, if not in letter, according to the lights vouchsafed to the Jaina thinkers. We may, therefore, confine ourselves to a few remarks against each charge drawing upon, wherever possible, the remarks by the critics themselves who, on certain points, answer one another. We may begin with the first criticism : Is syadvada an eclecticism? Eclecticism is a "term applied to a system of philosophy or theology that strives to incorporate the truth of all systems, or the method by which it is made". "Since an eclectic system is a loose piece of mosaic work, rather than an organised body of original thought", it is said, "the term in philosophy has come to be one of reproach"." 1. <Page #387
368 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE We may examine syadvada in the light of the definition of eclecticism as given here. So far as the first statement in the definition of eclecticism is concerned, there is nothing objectionable to syadvada. For syadvada is a "system of philosophy" which, "strives to incorporate the truth of all systems" as well as a "method by which it (that is, 'incorporating the truth of all systems ') is made." The critics also do not grudge this claim on the part of Jainism but they are doubtful whether Jainism can provide an adequate answer to the charge that it is "a loose piece of mosaic work rather than an organised body of original thought". Further, even as regards this charge they are keen not so much on the point of syadvada being a product of "an original thought" as on that of its being "a loose piece" in which the parts do not hang together in an organised or systematic closeness. This emphasis on the question of closeness should be the leading factor in our refutation of the present charge. . That the seven modes of syadvada express "partial truths" which do not firmly hang together, as a logical necessity, is only the prima facie view of syadvada. That 1. The types of the absolute (nirapeksa) doctrines repudiated by each of the seven modes may be gathered from the following passage: samkhyena yat sattvaikantyam upagatam tannivsttaya adyo bhangah/ sunyatvavadyupagata-asattvaikantyanivsttaye duitiyo bhangah/ kalabhedena sattvasattve tarkikopagate tadanaikantyaya tTtiyo bhargah/ vedantina anirvacaniyatvam upagamyate tadanaikantyaya caturtho bhangah/ sattvavadinan prati sattvenanirvacaniyatvam purvapaksinodbhavitam, asattvavadinan prati asattvenanirvacaniyatvam purvapaksinodbhavitam, sadasattvavadinan prati tabhyamanirvacaniyatvam purvapaksavadinodbhavitam, tadanaikantyadyotanaya avasistastrayo bhangah/ Quoted in BBSB (Notes), p. 183.

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CHAPTER XI 369 their truths are severally partial is true. But from this it does not necessarily follow that they are an odd collection of arbitrary 'half truths' lacking in proper synthesis, or system. The fact that the truths presented by them are alternative truths which individually touch every aspect, and, together, all the aspects, of a situation in a systematic way has been borne in upon us, in some measure, in the course of the present chapter. A certain actuality, like the jar, an example with which the modes have been illustrated, is looked at from the possible seven angles and the deliverance of these modal judgments does represent a synthesis which is neither 'loose'nor unsystematic. Unfortunately no nonabsolutistic system can provide the sort of idealistic synthesis' which "can satisfy the deepest metaphysical and religious aspirations of mankind". Under the absolutistic prescription a proper synthesis can proceed from the sole real, viz., the absolute. But one fails to understand where the need for a synthesis' arises in the case of a secondless absolute. A synthesis' of any description is possible when there are more alternatives, loose or firm, than one. If it is so, it is impossible to understand the protests of the absolutists against any lack of synthesis when no synthesis at all is possible with a unitary absolute. By 'synthesis', therefore, the absolutist critics mean an obliteration of alternative truths in favour of the one asserted by the fourth mode in syadvada. It is not a mere 'prejudice against absolutism'? 1. Ascribing this 'prejudice to the syadvadin has elicited a counter-charge of a speculative bias' from a critic in rather strong terms: "...And it would be the height of sacrilege to the system of Jaina speculation to attempt an unnecessary twisting 24

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370 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE but a deep difference in the approach of philosophical analysis that prevents syodvadin from throwing in his lot with a despotic absolute which brooks no rivalry from coexistent truths and, therefore, should raise no issue of synthesis. It is the love of a superficial reconciliation that lies at the back of the claim that syadvada is a "halfway house to absolutism". Thus the synthesis achieved by syadvada is one of discriminative unity rather than of a secondless unit which cannot be approached either by synthesis or by analysis. The conception of a unitary absolute has been, no doubt, a constant lure for mysticism and poetry. But the sphere of reality is often less lofty and very much less ethereal. Absolutism escapes from the harrowing problems of existence under the master excuse of the absolute. But it is through a tortuous process of analysis and synthesis that the secrets of elusive reality grudgingly yield themselves. This is provided for by kayavada and syodvada respectively. If by lack of proper synthesis' syadvadin does not instal an absolute at the centre as well as on the periphery of his philosophy and logic syadvada pleads guilty to the charge and will be satisfied to remain an unrepentent sinner. The threat of its modes not hanging together does not baffle him since he is not unwilling to retain to some extent distinctive of facts, to impose an absolutist or monist interpretation on their conception of truth and reality, as has been done in some quarters, on the plea of pseudo-simplicity, or perhaps owing to speculative bias". Narimohana Bhattacharya's paper on "The Jaina Conception of Truth and Reality" (Proceedings of the First Indian Philosophical Congress, 1925, Calcutta University, Calcutta, 1927), p. 165.

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CHAPTER XI 371 ness or even exclusiveness in the modal conclusions. He feels perhaps that the distinctions of the modal truths look to an absolutist eye grossly exaggerated. But they are bound together also by the unity of the dialectical principle under which the aspects of a factual situation are investigated and synthesised. Syadvada may be an eclectic synthesis from the point of view of absolutism which demands a 'block' universe or a 'seamless coat' but is not unfaithful to the genius of its own philosophical position which demands a discriminative synthesis which it undoubtedly is. The next charge against syadvada, viz., that it is "a variety of scepticism" or "agnosticism", may now be examined. A sceptical or agnostic philosophy or method is based on "the opinion that real knowledge of any kind is unattainable".! More particularly agnosticism is an attitude of "knownothingness". Therefore a sceptic is defined as "One who, like Pyrrho and his followers in Greek antiquity, doubts the possibility of knowledge of any kind, who holds that there are no adequate grounds for certainty as to the truth of any proposition whatever".' It is not possible to see how syodvada could be called sceptical or agnostic while it firmly repudiates any such association and has its genesis, at least partially, in an attempt to fight, as will be presently shown, the agnosticism. (ajnanavada) of Sanjaya. According to syadvada each modal truth is valid so far as it goes, and, instead of being annulled, it is supplemented and transfigured, by the other six 1. 2. 0. E. D. under "scepticism". Ibid. under "sceptic".

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372 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE modal truths, all the seven truths together giving us a full range of the complex truth concerning a particular problem of a fact in reality. Each truth is as it were a single note in the full scale of seven notes which are severally distinctive, in respect of place and function, and, in their totality, interdependent and exhaustive. The aim of syadvada being to achieve such a comprehensive synthesis which includes the specific cognitive manifestations it is not correct to describe the doctrine-either as a theory or as a method-as sceptical or agnostic. Often it is true that a doctrine leads to results contrary to those it intends to achieve. But syadvada seems to be such a one to a superficial observer. Speaking of anekantavada in general, a writer makes the following statement which is fully applicable to syadvada which is an essential method of anekantavada. "Unfortunately", he observes, "it has been a neglected branch of study; it is often misunderstood or half-understood; that is why it is often adversely criticised". It is of paramount importance that a philosophical theory or method must be first understood in terms of its own canons or motives before it is subjected to any critical examination by alien criteria. From the exposition of syadvada in the present chapter, as well as from the few remarks specifically made here, in answer to the present charge, one will find, at least in some measure, that the charge of scepticism is not well-founded. Because nowhere do we come across, in the accounts of syadvada, the expression of the attitude of "know-nothingness" or of 1. "References to Syadvada in the Ardhamagadhi Canon", Proceedings and Transactions of the Ninth All India Oriental Conference, Trivandrum, Dec. 1937, Trivandrum 1940, p. 668.

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CHAPTER XI 373 "the opinion that real knowledge of any kind is unattainable". In the light of these few observations on the non-sceptical attitude of syadvada we find that Belvalkar gives a rather misleading twist to the nature of the method as a whole by stating the doctrine in such form as he has done. As has already been remarked, even historically syadvada arose in an appreciable degree, 'as a happy way leading out of the maze of the ajnanavada' (agnosticism). This is expressed by Jacobi in the following passage: "Would any philosopher have enunciated such truisms, unless they served to silence 1. An attempt to assess the historical claims of the different opinions on the development of syadvada and its modes will take us far afield. However, for some information on these opinions, see SM, Intro. pp. LXXIV-LXXVIII; Syadvadamanjari (by Mallisena, Ed, with Hindi Tr. by Jagadisacandra, Bombay. 1935) 26-29; NVVS, Prastavana, pp. 35-50; AJP, Vol. II, Intro. pp. CX-CXII; PrSKU, pp. LXXXVI-LXXXVIII : A. N. Upadhye's paper on "References to Syadvada in the Ardhamagadhi Canon", Proceedings and Transactions of the Ninth All India Oriental Conference, Trivandrum, Dec. 1937, Trivandrum, 1940 pp. 669-672, and The Canonical Literature of the Jainas (H. R. Kapadia, 1941, Bombay), pp. 218-220. Whatever might be the value of the opinions as to the nature, the extent and the sources of influence on the development of syadvada and its modes, we may safely assert that, philosophically speaking, syadvada was an inherent necessity in the system of anekantavada. This fact of its having been an inherent philosophical necessity need not invalidate the equally important fact that syadvada enlarged its range in answer to a varied external demand. No doctrine or method, particularly the latter, can, after all, arise from an atmosphere of a philosophical vacuum. The great critical philosophy and the critical method, of Kant, if it could possibly arise at all, would be little more than an idle speculation were it not for the rationalistic dogmatism of Descartes, Spin oza, and Leibniz as well as for the empiristic scepticism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Any genuine growth in philosophical thinking is thus a story of action and reaction between vital ideas.

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374 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE some dangerous opponents? The subtle discussion of the agnostics had probably bewildered and misled many of their contemporaries. Consequently the syadvada must have appeared to them as a happy way leading out of the maze of the ajnanavada. It was the weapon with which the agnostics assailed the enemy, turned against themselves. Who knows how many of their followers went over to Mahavira's creed convinced by the truth of saptabhanginaya?" As regards the third charge, directed by Belvalkar, that syadvada cannot spring from "one and the same philosophical background", and the supplementary charge, directed by Rao, that syadvada itself suffers from "self-contradiction", we may allow the charges to be answered by three of their fellow critics themselves. Answering Rao and Belvalkar in order, of course unwittingly, Radhakrishnan observes: "Sankara and Ramanuja criticise the Saptabhangi view on the ground of the impossibility of contradictory attributes co-existing in the same thing". After quoting the relevant passage from Ramanuja he proceeds to say: "The Jains admit that a thing cannot have self-contradictory attributes at the same time and in the same sense. All that they say is that everything is of a complex nature, and identity in difference. The real comprehends and reconciles differences in itself. Attributes which are contradictory in the abstract co-exist in life and experience. The tree is moving in that its branches are moving and it is not moving since it is fixed to its place in the ground". Then incidentally dis 1. JSJ, Pt. II, Intro. p. XXVIII. 2. IP, Vol. I, p. 304.

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CHAPTER XI 375 missing another point of criticism that "the Saptabhangi doctrine is of no practical utility" or "an expression of personal opinion over which we need not linger", the same critic proceeds to answer the specific charge by Belvalkar : "Nor can it be contended" he observes, "that the Saptabhangi doctrine is inconsistent with the other views of the Jaina philosophy. It is a logical corollary of the anekantavada, the doctrine of the manyness of reality. Since reality is *multiform' and ever changing, nothing can be considered to be existing everywhere and at all times and in all ways and places, and it is impossible to pledge ourselves to an inflexible creed". Confirming Radhakrishnan on the second point of criticism, which is the main charge of Belvalkar, Hiriyanna briefly observes : "The, thought underlying it (saptabhangi) is inherent in the doctrine, although its clear enunciation seems to belong to the present period." The same opinion is suggestively expressed by R. G. Bhandarkar also. Incidentally Belvalkar's misleading interpretation of *anekantavada' as an 'indefinite' doctrine--which in turn means a shifting or evasive doctrine-is corrected by Hiriyanna's correct description of it: Interpreting 'anekanta' as meaning 'indeterminate in nature' Hiriyanna remarks: "This does not, however, mean that it is altogether indefinite but only that it cannot be defined absolutely. It is this idea that is conveyed by the sevenfold statement as a whole and it expresses the nature of reality in several steps, because no single mode of doing so is adequate to it." 1. Ibid., EIP, p. 67.

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376 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE We gather from a consideration of the present charge, as well as of the other two charges, that the critics advance contrary criticisms even on the same point, as well as from the same viewpoint, viz., monistic absolutism. The irony of the situation is particularly evident in the fact that contradictory arguments are presented on the very issue of alleged contradiction and self-contradiction in syodvada. Among others there seem to be two important reasons underlying the misconceived criticisms of the critics on syadvada : The first is that they do not note an explicit reference in the very definition of syadvada to the important condition that the modal judgments should not be 'incompatible' (avirodha) not merely with the other modal judgments within the sphere of syadvada, but also with 'valid knowledge, perceptual, or otherwise', in the entire sphere of experience. Had this been fully recognised Rao's criticism on 'self-contradiction' would perhaps be not as strong as it is now. Then, the Saviour of all systems' would be found not committing suicide' but performing its benevolent mission of saving the absolutisms from their excessive dogmatism. The second reason is their failure to realize the true significance, place and function of negation in Jaina philosophy, in general, and in syadvada in particular. Since this subject has been dealt with, at several places, it is needless to enlarge upon it any further. In concluding this chapter it would not be out of place to quote a passage by R. B. Perry which bears a striking resemblance to syodvada in suggesting a procedure which, as in syadvada, is at once a critique on 'vicious intellectualism

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CHAPTER XI 377 (which brings in its train errors like 'exclusive particularity') and a positive programme of dealing with reality. Perry observes".... 'vicious intellectualism" proceeds as though a conceptual truth about a thing were the exclusive truth about the thing; whereas it is true only so far as it goes. Thus the world may be truly conceived as permanent and unified, since it is such in a certain respect. But this should not lead us, as it has led certain intellectualists, to suppose that the world is therefore not changing and plural. We must not identify our world with one conception of it. In its concrete richness it lends itself to many conceptions. And the same is true of the least thing in the world. It has many aspects, none of which is exhaustive of it. It may be taken in many relations or orders, and be given different names accordingly. As it is immediately presented it contains all these aspects as potentialities for the discriminating and abstracting operations of thought. "Vicious intellectualism' thus rests on the errors that I have already referred to as exclusive particularity' and 'definition by initial predication': the false supposition that because a thing has one definable character, it cannot also have others and that because it has been named first for one of its aspects, the others must be reduced to it or deduced from it." Continuing further, he writes: "Now the fault of vicious intellectualism 'evidently lies in the misuse of concepts, and not in the nature of the concepts themselves. There is nothing to prevent our supposing that the abstractness of 1. "Vicious intellectualism' is explained as follows: "To conceive a thing as d, and then assume that it is only a, is to be 'viciously'intellectual." (p. 234).

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378 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE single concepts can be compensated for by the addition of further concepts, or by some conceptual system in which the presence and interrelation of many concepts is specially provided for. In this case the remedy for the shortcomings of concepts would be more concepts. ....". Syadvada gives, in its own way, such a "conceptual system in which the presence and interrelation of many concepts is specially provided for". Or, rather, the concepts", or to put the matter in terms of syadvada, "the modes of truth" are "not merely many truths, but alternative truths" under the "conceptual system" of syadvada.

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CONCLUSION This study commenced with a search for a balanced view of reality in which the elements of identity and difference would find their due place. The search led us to the formulation of a scheme involving five possible approaches to the problem. The first four approaches were examined and found wanting. Mere identity was recognised to be as inadequate as mere difference as an explanation of the total experience of reality. Nor did the other two possibilities, viz., identity-in-difference in which identity subordinates difference and identity-in-difference in which difference subordinates identity, prove to be any more satisfactory. Only a co-ordinate view of identity-in-difference, it was discovered, could serve as a satisfactory basis for the totality of our ontological experience. Confirmation for this view was sought from the schools of Kumarila, Kant and Whitehead. Next, certain flaws or fallacies (dosas) alleged to vitiate the Jaina view--the most important being that of contradiction--was examined and refuted from the Jaina viewpoint. The analysis revealed that some critics who claimed to discern these fallacies were labouring under a misapprehension as to the nature and importance of the idea of significant or determinate negation which forms the pivot of the Jaina viewpoint. Others, it was pointed out, confused the externalistic view of identity and difference (designated

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380 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE as ubhayavada or misravada) with the integral view of identity-in-difference which is the Jaina view of reality. It was found that in order to expose this confusion the Jaina thinkers had to emphasise the necessity of treating everything real as not merely a co-ordinate and integral synthesis, but also as a unique (jatyantara) one. A further pursuit of our inquiry into some aspects of reality brought out the truth that only the principle of a co-ordinate synthesis could form an adequate basis for their existence and function. It was noticed, for example, that outside the framework of identity-in-difference the solution to the problem of relation (sambandha) would have to take the form either of crude realism or of subjectivism. Similarly, it was found that the principle of causal efficiency (arthakriyakaritvam) could not function in a reality which was not a co-ordinate synthesis of identity-in-difference. After discussing two controversies which shed some light on the notions of substance (dravya) and attribute (paryaya as well as guna) the ontological part of the present study was concluded. The second part of the work concerned itself with some problems of epistemology with particular emphasis on anekantavada, nayavada and syadvada. It was not possible to treat other questions of epistemology, e. g., the ways of knowing and the nature of validity. Anekantavada-the doctrine of manifoldness (or 'indeterminateness')-was shown to be not so much a method as the source or presupposition of the other two methods. When viewed in the light of this doctrine reality was seen to reveal

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CONCLUSION 381 itself not merely as many (anantatmakam) but also as infinitely manifold (anantadharmatmakam) or indeterminate in every detail. The principle of distinction, the motive force of realism in any form, was observed to have reached its logical terminus in this doctrine. Hence the claim that anekantavada is the most consistent form of realism in Indian philosophy. In the process of substantiating this claim the several logical phases in the evolution of anekantavada (from a simple state of distinction to that of infinite diversification, encompassing the physical and the mental realms) were traced and illustrated. It was next pointed out that Nayavada, the doctrine of standpoints (the analytical method or methods), and Syadvada, the dialectic of conditional predication, or simply the conditional dialectic (the synthetical method), stemmed from Anekantavada. The first was observed to be a scheme of analytical methods and the second a synthetical method involving seven progressive steps. Together the two methods were looked upon as forming a comprehensive scheme of correlative instruments designed to aid an apprehension of the complex structure of reality. Each method, or each step involved in it, was individually treated and its significance and implications were duly noted. The work has aimed throughout at a comparative treatment of the problems under discussion. It was endeavoured to avoid strained and far-fetched comparisons or contrasts. Further, the treatment in this study of criticisms and controversies has been undertaken not from the citadel of sectarian dogmas but from the standpoint of a certain system of logic, a system deserving of better attention thanithas hitherto received.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY - Abbreviations, in alphabetical order, of the works consulted or quoted ABHI AGAM with AGAV AGAV AJP with AJPV Abhidhanarajendra (a lexicon of Jaina Prakrit, explained in Sanskrit) by Vijayarajendra, 7 vols., etd. by Dipavijaya and others, Ratlam, 1910-1925. Akalanka-Granthatrayam by Akalanka, with his own Comm. Vivsti (AGAV), etd. by Mahendra Kumar Sastri, Singhi Jaina Granthamala, Ahmedabad - Calcutta, 1939. See AGAM with AGAV. Anekantajayapataka by Haribhadra, 2 vols., with Haribhadra's own Comm., and with Vivarana (AJPV)-Supercomm. by Municandra, etd. by H. R. Kapadia, Baroda, 1940 (vol. I) and 1947 (vol. II). Apta-Mimamsa by Samantabhadra, with Vuitti (VVas) by Vasunandi and Astasata (ASA) by Akalanka, etd. by Gajadharalal Jain, Sanatana Jaina Granthamala, Kasi, 1914. AMS with VVas and ASA AR ASA AVD with SM Appearance and Reality, by F. H. Bradley, Oxford, 1940, (10th impression). See AMS. Anyayogavyavacchedadvatrimsika by Hemacandra, with Mallisena's Comm. Syadvadamanjari, etd. by A, B. Dhruva, Bom. Sans, and Prak. Ser., Bombay 1933. Astasahasriby Vidyananda, etd. by Vamsidhara, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1915. The Brahmasutra of Badarayana with Sankara's Bhasya, 2nd edn., etd. by S. K. Belvalkar with E.T. and Notes, Poona, 1931. Bibliotheca Indica. AVV BBSB Bib. Ind.

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384 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Bom. Sans. Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, and Prak. Ser. BP Bhasapariccheda with Siddhanta-Muktavali of with Visvanatha Pancanana, etd. by E. Roer, Bib. SMV Ind., Calcutta, 1850. BPV Bhasapariccheda by Visvanatha, etd. with E. T. by J. R. Ballantyne, Calcutta, 1851. BPVK Bhasapariccheda (or Karikavali) by Visvanatha Pancanana, with Comms. Muktavali, Dinakariya and Ramarudriya, etd. by Laksmana Sastry, Kasi Sans, Ser., Benares, Samvat 1890. BSB The Brahmasutra Sankara Bhasya, with Comms. Bhamati, Kalpataru and Parimala, etd. by Anantakrisna Sastry, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay 1938. Bud. Log. Buddhist Logic by Th. Stcherbatsky, 2 vols., Leningrad, 1930 (vol. II) and 1932 (vol. I). CCBS The Central Conception of Buddhism, by Th. Stcherbatsky, Price Publication Fund, London, 1923. CE Collected Essays, by F. H. Bradley, 2 vols., Oxford, 1935. Chow. Sans, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series. Ser. CKCPR A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason by Norman Kemp Smith, Macmillan & Co., London, 1930. CP Compendium of Philosophy (Abhidhammattha sangaha), PTS edn., London, 1910. This work contains "A Compendium of Rela tions" in Pt. VIII. SRKE The Critical Philosophy of Kant, 2nd, edn., by Edward Caird, 2 vols., James Madehose & Sons, Glasgow, 1909. CPRM Critique of Pure Reason by Kant, E. T. by J. M. D. Meiklejohn, George Bell & Sons, London, 1887.

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CPRMax EIP EJNG ELB ERE GOS HBT with HBTA HBTA HIP ILE IP IPC IT JAOS JPN JPPSM 25 BIBLIOGRAPHY Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, E. T. by F. Max Muller, Macmillan & Co., London, 1881. 385 The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, by M. Hiriyanna, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1949. An Epitome of Jainism, by P. C. Nahar and K. C. Ghosh, Calcutta, 1917. The Essentials of Logic, by Bernard Bosanquet, London, 1903. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, etd. by James Hastings, Edinburgh, 1918. Gaekwad's Oriental Series. Hetubindutika of Arcata, with Aloka by Durveka, etd. by Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Muni Shree Jinavijayaji, GOS, Baroda, 1949. See HBT. A History of Indian Philosophy, by S. N. Dasgupta, 4 vols., Cambridge, 1922, 1932, 1940, and 1949. Indian Logic in Early Schools, by H. N. Randle, London, 1930. Indian Philosophy, by S. Radhakrishnan, 2nd edn., 2 vols., George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1931. Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1927, Calcutta Univ., 1929, pp. 159-166 ("What is Samavaya", by M. Hiriyanna). Indian Thought, a Quarterly Journal devoted to Sanskrit Literature, etd. by G. Thibaut and Ganganatha Jha, Allahabad (not continuing now). Journal of the American Oriental Society. The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism, by Satkari Mookerjee, Bharati Mahavidyalaya Publications, Jaina Series, No. 2, Calcutta, 1944. The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, etd. by Frederick J. D. Woodbridge, 2 vols.

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386 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE JPTS JSJ JTA JTBY JTVS Vol. I, Jan.-Dec., 1904. (This contains two articles by William James on "A World of Pure Experience" : (i) pp. 533-543 and (ii) pp. 561570.) Vol. II, Jan.-Dec., 1905. (This contains an article by William James entitled "The Thing and Its Relations", pp. 29-41. This article and the two articles in Vol. I deal with the problem of relations.) Journal of the Pali Text Society. Jaina Sutras, Pt. I and Pt. II, E. T. by H. Jacobi, Oxford, 1895. (The Sacred Books of the East, Vols. XXII and XLV respectively.) The Jaina Theory of Anekantavada, by K. C. Bhattacharya. An article in the Philosophical Quarterly, the Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner, April, 1925. Jaina Tarkabhasa by Yasovijaya, etd. by Sukhalalji Sanghavi, Ahmedabad-Calcutta, 1938. Jainatarkavartikam with the Vrtti by Santyacarya, etd. by Vitthal Shastri, Benares, 1917. Karika. Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, by Norman Kemp Smith, Macmillan & Co., London. 1950. Khandanakhandakhadya by Sri Harsa (with extracts from the Comms.of Anandapurna, Citsukha, Sankaramisra and Raghunatha), etd. by Lakshmana Sastri Dravida, Chow. Sans. Ser., Benares, 1914. Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, by H. J. Paton, 2 vols., George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1936. See PBTS. Kant's Theory of Knowledge, by H, A. Prichard, Oxford, 1909, See SPS. H. T. Colebrooke's Miscellaneous Essays, etd. by T. E. Colebrooke, 2 vols., London, 1873. Ka. KCPR KKS KMER KR KTKP M Mis. Es.

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Mon. MSV with NR MV NB NBD NBTD with NBD NBV ND with NBV NEMC NK NKB NKC Comm. on LTB NKV NM NNLI NR NTN BIBLIOGRAPHY 387 The Monadology and the other Philosophical Writings by Leibniz, E. T. by Robert Latta, O. U. P., London, 1951. Mimamsa-sloka-vartika of Kumarila with Nyayaratnakara of Parthasarathi Misra, etd. by Rama Sastry Tailanga, Chow. Sans. Ser., Kasi, 1898. See PVD. See TS with TD and NB. See NBTD. The Nyayabindu-tika with the Nyayabindu, both by Dharmottara, etd. by P. Peterson, Bib. Ind., Calcutta, 1929. See ND. The Nyaya-Darsana with the Nyaya-Bhasya of Vatsayana, Bib. Ind., Calcutta, 1865. The Nature of Existence, by J. M. E. McTaggart, 2 vols., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1921. See PDS. Nyayakosa, by Bhimacarya Jhalakikar, 3rd edn., Bom. Sans. and Prak. Ser., Poona, 1928. a Nyaya-kumuda-candra, by Prabhacandra, Comm. on Laghiyastraya of Bhattakalanka, etd. by Mahendra Kumar Shastri, Manik Chandra Digambar Jain Series, Bombay, 1938. The Naya-Karnika by Vinaya Vijaya, etd. with E. T. by M. D. Desai, The Library of Jaina Literature, Vol. III, Arrah, 1915. Nyayamanjari by Jayanta Bhatta, etd. by G. Sastri Tailanga, Viz. Sans. Ser., Benares, 1895. Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyaya Logic, by D. H. Ingalls, Harvard Oriental Series, Cambridge (Mass.), 1951. See MSV. The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge, by S. C. Chatterjee, Calcutta University, 1939.

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388 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE NVTT NVVS OIP OKEW PB PBTS with KR PC PDS with NK PKEW Nyayavartikatatparyatika by Vacaspati Misra, etd. by Rajeshwara Sastri Dravid, Kasi Sans. Ser., Benares, 1925. Nyayavataravartika-vitti by santi Suri, etd. by Dalsukh Malvania, Singhi Jain Series, Bombay, 1949. Outlines of Indian Philosophy, by M. Hiriyanna, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1931. Our Knowledge of the External World, by Bertrand Russell, reprinted, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1949. Prasastapadabhasyam, with Sukti, Setu and Vyomavati, etd. by Gopinath Kaviraj and Dhundiraj Sastri, Chow. Sans. Ser., Benares, 1924. Prasastapadabhasyatikasangraha, with Kanadarahasya, by Sankara Misra, etd. by Vindhyesvari Prasada Dvivedin, Chow. Sans. Ser., Benares, 1917. See SP. The Padarthadharmasangraha of Prasastapada, with the Nyayakandali of Sridhara, E. T. by G. Jha, reprint from the Pandit, Benares, 1916. The Philosophy of Kant Explained, by John Watson, James Madehose & Sons, Glasgow, 1908. See TSS with PK. See TSS with PKJha. Prameya-Kamala-Martanda by Prabhacandra, 2nd edn., a Comm. on Pariksamukha-Sutra of Manikyanandi, etd. by Mahendra Kumar Shastri, Bombay, 1941. Principles of Logic by F. H. Bradley, 2nd edn., 2 vols., Oxford, 1940. Pramana-Mimamsa by Hemacandra, etd. with Bhasa-tippana, by Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi, Singhi Jaina Granthamala, Ahmedabad-Calcutta, 1939. Purva-Mimamsi in its Sources by Ganganatha Jha, etd, with a Critical Bibliography, by Umesha Mishra, Benares Hindu University, Benares, 1942. PK PKJha PKM PL PMHS PMS

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BIBLIOGRAPHY 389 Problems PrSKU PSKC PVD with MV RML RRS SBE SBNT The Problems of Philosophy by Bertrand Russell, Reprinted, Home University Library, London, 1951. Pravacanasara by Kundakundacarya, with the Sk. Comms. of Amotacandra and Jayasena and the Hindi Comm. of Pande Hemaraja, etd. with Eng. Intro. and E. T. by A. N. Upadhye, Bombay, 1935. Pancastikayasara by Kundakunda, etd. with Eng. Intro. and E. T. by A. Chakravarti, The Sacred Books of the Jaina Series, Arrah, 1920. Pramanavartika by Dharmakirti, with a Vstti by Manorathanandin, etd. by Rahula Sankrityayana, published as Appendixes to BORSJ, Vols. XXIV XXXI, 1938-40. Relations in Modern Logic, by Rasvihari Das, in Calcutta Review, Nov.-Dec. 1932. Reign of Realism in Indian Philosophy, by R. Naga Raja Sarma, Madras, 1937. Sacred Books of the East. Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts, etd. by Haraprasad Shastri, Bib. Ind., Calcutta, 1910. Saptabhangitarargini by Vimaladasa, Rayacandra Granthamala, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, Vira Samvat 2431. A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, by A. C. Ewing, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1938. Saddarsana-samuccaya, by Haribhadra, with Tarkarahasyadipika by Gunaratna, etd. by L. Suali, Calcutta, 1905. The Sarva-darsana-samgraha by Madhava Acarya, E. T. by E. B. Cowell and A. G. Gough, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., London, 1914. See VBJ with SHM. Studies in Jainism, containing three articles by H. Jacobi, Jaina Sahitya Samsodhaka Studies, No.1, etd. by Jina Vijaya Muni, Ahmedabad, 1946. SBT SCKCE. SDS with TRD SDSC SHM SJJ

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390 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE SJPT SKIS SKL SM SMV SNDeW SP with PC SPD SPS with M Studies in Jaina Philosophy, by Nathmal Tatia, pubd. by the Jaina Cultural Research Society, Benares, 1951. The Sankhyakarika of Isvarakrsna, etd. with E. T. by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Univ. of Madras, 1948. See SVS. See AVD with SM. See BP. The Self and Nature (containing "The Theory of Relations", ch. IX, pp. 212-273), by DeWitt H. Parker, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1917. Saptapadarthi by Sivaditya, with Padarthacandrika by Sesananta, etd. by V. S. Ghate, 2nd edn., Bombay, 1919. Sambandha-pariksa by Dharmakirti. Karikas from this work have been quoted in PKM, p. 504 ff. Saptapadarthi by Sivaditya, with Mitabhasini by Madhava, and two other Comms., etd. by Amarendra Mohan and Narendra Chandra, Calcutta Sans. Ser., Calcutta, 1934. Syadvada-ratnakara, 5 parts, by Vadidevasuri, a Comm. on Pramananayatattvalokalankara by the same author, Arhata-mata-prabhakara Ser., etd. by Motilal Laghaji, Poona, Vira Sam. 2452-2457. The Sankhya System, by A. B. Keith, 2nd edn., The Heritage of India, Calcutta, 1924. Sanmati-Tarka by Siddhasena Divakara, etd. by Sukhalal Sanghavi and Bechardas Doshi, E. T. from Gujarati, Dalsukh Malvania, Bombay, 1939. The Soul Theory of the Buddhists (The Appen. dix to the Abhidharmakosa of Vasubandu), E. T. with Intro. and Notes by Stcherbatsky, Petrograd, 1920. SRK Comm, on PTNA SSKH ST STBS

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BIBLIOGRAPHY 391 STP SVJha SVS with SKL SVTJ SWK TB Sanmati-tarka-prakarana, 5 pts., by Siddhasena Divakara, with the Comm. Tattvabodha-vidhayini (also known as Vada-maharnava) by Abhayadeva Suri, etd. by Sukhlal Sanghavi and Bechardas Doshi, Gujarat Puratattva Mandira Granthavali, Ahmedabad, Sam. 1980. Slokavartika, E. T. by Ganganatha Jha, Bib. Ind., Calcutta, 1901. Sastra-varta-samuccaya of Haribhadra, with the tika Syadvadakalpalata by Yasovijaya, etd. by Pt. Hargovinddas Trikamchand Shaw, Sethi Devchand Lalbhai Jain Pustakoddhar Series, No. 16, Bombay, 1914. Slokavartikataka (sarkarika) by Bhattiputrajayamisra, etd. by C. Kunhan Raja, University of Madras, Madras Univ. Sans. Ser., Madras, 1946. Six Ways of Knowing, by D. M. Datta, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1932. Tarkabhasa of Kesavamisra, Pts. I and II, etd. by A. B. Gajendragadkar and R. D. Karmarkar, Poona, 1934. See TS with TD and ND. Tattvopaplavasimha by Jayarasi Bhatta, etd. by Sukhlalji Sanghavi and R. C. Parikh, GOS, Baroda, 1940. Tattvartharajavartika, a Comm. on Umasvati's Tattvarthadhigamasutra by Akalanka, etd. by Gajadharalal Jain, Sanatana Jaina Granthamala, Kasi, 1915. See SDS. Tarka-Sangraha and Dipika, by Annambhatta, with Nyaya-bodhini by Govardhana, etd. by Y. V. Athalye and M. R. Bodas, 2nd edn., reimpression, Bombay Sans. and Prak. Ser., Bombay, 1930. Tattvasangraha by Santarak sita, with Pancika by Kamalasila, 2 vols., etd. by Embar Krishnamacharya, GOS, Baroda, 1929. TD TPSJ TRAG TRD TS with TD and NB TSS with PK

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392 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE TSS with PKJha TSUJ TSS with PK, E. T. by Ganganatha Jha, 2 vols., GOS, Baroda, 1937 and 1939. TSV (Comm. on TSU) UV VBJ with SHM Tattvarthadhigamasutra by Umasvati, etd. with -E. T. by J. L. Jaini, Sacred Books of the Jainas, Arrah, 1920. Tattvartha-sloka-vartika by Vidyananda, a Comm. on Tattvarthadhigamasutra by Uma. svati, etd. by Manoharlal Sastry, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, Vira Sam. 2444. See VD with UV. The Visesavasyaka Bhasya by Jinabhadra Gani Ksamasramana, with the Vivsti Sisyahita by Maladhari Hemacandra, etd. by Haragovinda, Benares, Vira Sam. 2437. The Vaisesika Darsana of Kanada with the Comm. Upaskara by Sankara Misra, etd. with his own Vivsti by J. Tarka Panchanana, Bib. Ind., Calcutta, 1891. Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series. VD with UV Viz. Sans. Ser. VND VPSN Vadanyaya by Dharmakirti, with Santaraksita's Comm. Vipancitartha, etd. by Rahula Sankrityayana, Appendix to JBORS, Vol. XXI, Pt. IV, Patna, 1935. Vedanta-Parijata-Saurabha of Nimbarka and Vedanta-Kaustubha of Srinivasa (Comms. on the Brahmasutras), 3 Pts., E. T. by Roma Bose, Calcutta, 1940, 1941, and 1943. See AMS. VVas Some works, which have not been widely used, have been referred to, with full particulars in the course of the text itself.

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. I (A). INDEX TO WORKS MENTIONED IN THE BIBLIOGRAPHY (in abbreviated form) ABHI 311 AGAM 174, 290, 310 AGAV 141, 146, 174, 196 AJP 48, 49, 143, 144, 155, 156, 188, 190, 195, 196, 286, 334, 336, 337, 373 AJPV 190 AMS 133, 141, 309, 310, 349, 362 AR 207, 253, 254, 255 ASA 133, 310, 349 AVD 188, 243 AVP 173 AVV 174, 196 INDEXES BBSB 15, 141, 222, 223, 224, 225, 366, 368 Bib. Ind. 15, 48 BM 146 BOV ("Bhartrprapanca: An Old Vedantin"--an article contributed to the Indian Antiquary, 1924, pp. 77-78) 68, 69, 70, 71 BP 207 BPV 206 BPVK 240 BSB 15, 223, 241, 242 Bud. Log. 19, 20, 21, 38, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 239 CCBS 38, 39 CE 208, 244 CKCPR 134 CPKE 136, 286 CPP 245 CPRM 134 CPRMax 134 DNB 209 EIP 66, 84, 88, 112, 114, 117, 118, 191, 364, 375 EJNG 250, 256 ELB 228 EPI 97 ERE 62, 101, 108, 211, 253 FrBH ("Fragments of Bhartrprapanca" by Hiriyanna in Proceedings and Transactions of the Third Oriental Conference, Madras, 1924, pp. 439-450) 68, 69 GAM 321 HBT 56, 144, 173, 175, 187, 190, 196, 197, 289 HBTA 196, 197 HIL 24, 48 HIP 17, 33, 36, 62, 78, 81, 113, 115, 170, 175, 333 HML 211 ILA 108, 110 ILE 206 IP 21, 69, 74. 76, 80, 84, 108, 114, 208, 223, 365, 374, 375 IPC 206, 208, 238, 240 IT 242

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394 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE JAOS 16, 17 JPN 20, 151, 167, 195, 237, 239, 339, 351, 352, 354, 356 JPNM 275 JPPSM 212, 230, 241, 245 JPTS 211 JRAS 62, 116 JSJ 260, 288, 374 JTA 346, 360 JTBY 310, 319, 322 JTVS 196 NTN 237, 238 NV 208 NVTT 174 NVVS 48, 49, 174, 196, 197, 288, 289, 321, 373 OIP 21, 43, 44, 62, 63, 72, 84, 88, 108, 112, 150, 157, 187, 191, 192, 208, 276, 337, 338, 360, 364 OKEW 45, 46, 160, 161, 245 KCPR 285, 286 KKS 222, 237 KMEP 135 KR 210 KTKP 136, 286 LTB 318, 340 LTP 335 Mis. Es. 207 MML 239 Mon. 198 MSV 36, 48, 49, 133, 141, 153, 154, 208 MV 56, 212, 214, 289 134, PB 109, 110, 209, 210 PBTS 210 PDS 108, 207 PHO 223 PK 21, 23, 49, 53, 140, 141, 144, 174, 196, 211 PKEW 134, 135 PKM 48, 141, 146, 147, 168, 169, 174, 196, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 225, 226, 227, 229, 230, 231, 232, 277, 307, 310, 355, 356 PL 208, 209, 250, 251 PMHS 129, 139, 141, 145, 146, 168, 169, 171, 173, 174, 177, 178, 180, 188, 190, 193, 195, 259, 288, 289 PMS 240 PNTA 310, 312, 313, 316, 317, 318, 321, 324, 326, 336, 358 Problems 206, 244, 295 PrR 131, 132 PrSKU 63, 260, 261, 262, 263, 282, 304, 341, 373 PSKC 256, 262, 341, 363 PTS 211 PVD 50, 56, 173, 211, 212, 214, 222, 289 NBD 38, 173 NBT 51 NBTD 19, 39, 173 NBV 206 NEEP 169 NEMC 232 NK 207 NKB 191, 192, 213 NKC 48, 49, 169, 175, 196, 197, 211, 212, 215, 216, 218, 220, 283, 307, 310, 314, 318, 321, 329, 335, 340, 356 NKL 317 NKV 304, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 324 NM 174, 177, 206 NNLI 237, 240 NR 133 RML 210, 237, 238, 239 RRS 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119 SBE 15, 16, 17, 73

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336, SBNT 49, 50, 56, 187, 355 SBT 144, 145, 146, 165, 339, 340, 343, 345, 353, 354, 357, 358, 359, 362 SCKCE 136 SDA 207 SDAC 112 SDS 243 SDSC 65, 85, 116, 143 SHM 129, 308, 311, 312, 323, 360, 361, 362 SJJ 126, 304 SJPT 196 SKIS 223 SKL 146, 308 SKR 214 SM 133, 141, 142, 146, 150, 151, 157, 158, 173, 174, 176, 177, 179, 180, 188, 196, 200, 210, 238, 240, 242, 243, 290, 312, 326, 336, 338, 340, 342, 343, 358, 373 SMV 207 SN 239 INDEXES SNdeW 230, 245 SP 108, 109, 110, 210 SPS with M 210 SRK 141, 142, 146, 147, 174, 211, 212, 215, 216, 220, 221, 222, 241, 242, 266, 283, 307, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 316, 317, 326, 329, 336, 339, 340, 341, 343, 358 SSKH 223 ST 259, 283, 289, 326 STBD 42 STBS 38, 40 STP 129, 187, 188, 237, 258, 259, 290, 312, 320, 327, 329 STSU 264, 265 SVJha 36, 47, 132, 133, 171 SVS 146 SVTJ 133 154, SWK 206 TB 191, 207, 283 TBV 48, 142, 146, 147, 169, 173, 174, 189, 190, 240, 241, 258, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 286, 320, 327 TKD 151 TP 62 TPSJ 196 TRAG 129, 170, 195, 265, 278, 279, 281, 282, 283, 314, 326, 336, 345, 346, 353 TRD 109, 142, 144, 146, 147, 149, 152, 154, 169, 170, 171, 172, 187, 194, 195, 196, 197, 199, 207, 243, 290 TS 187, 209, 210, 213, 278, 280 TSS 20, 21, 23, 39, 41, 48, 49, 53, 140, 141, 144, 174, 189, 196, 211, 240, 289, 355 TSU 311 TSUJ 127, 313, 325 TSV 129, 196, 211, 212, 214, 215, 216, 220, 221, 222, 313, 314, 316, 320, 321, 326, 329, 339, 340, 353, 362 TSVJ 282 UBJ 329 U on VD 210, 240 UV 213 395 V 240 VBJ 129, 308, 311, 312, 319, 323, 328, 360, 361, 362 VD 213 VM 211 VND 56 V on U, VD 210 V on VD in VD 108 VPSN 77, 79, 81 VVas 133 VVas on AMS 141, 349

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I (B). INDEX TO OTHER WORKS Brahmavadin, The 76, 83, 91, 116 Bshadaranyakopanisad 16, 348 Buddha 348 Buddhism in Translations 40 Buddhist Philosophy 49 Buddhist Philosophy of Uni versal Flux, The 20, 39, 46, 52 A. B. C. of Relativity, The 297 Abhidhammakosavyakhya 41 Abhidhamma Pitaka 211 Abhidhammattha-sangaha 211 Abhidhanarajendra 3 Abhidharmakosa 19 Abhidharmakosavyakhya 42 Adhyatmasara 328 Advaitasiddhi 292, 295 Ahnika 289 Alapapaddhati 328 Einstein: Philosopher Scientist 297, 298 Aloka (on HBT) 187 Anekantavada-Nirasah 22, 23 Anuvyakhyana 116 Aphorisms of the Vedanta 15 Apohasiddhi 50 Ardha-Magadhi Dictionary 3 Arthasastra 61-62 Aspects of Advaita 36, 294, 296 Avassaya and Its Nijjutti 127 Avatarika 83 Canonical Literature of the Jainas, The 127, 373 Carakasamhita 62 Central Conception of Bud dhism, The 20 Chandogya 31, 73 Compendium of Philosophy, The 211 Conception of Buddhist Nir vana, The 39, 45, 355 Concept of Nature, The 159 Critical Exposition of the Theory of Leibniz, A 198 Critic of Pure Reason 136 Basic Conception of Buddhism, The 41, 43, 44, 57, 63 Basis of Realism, The 254 B. C. Law Volume 86 Bhagavadgita 61 Bhamati 15, 223, 242 Bhasatippani (N) 129 Bhasyabhavaprakasika 15 Bhattamimamsa 289 Bibliotheca Buddhica 47 Brahmasutrabhasya 366 Brahmasutras 17, 77, 78, 116, 119, 142, 289 Brahmasutra with the Comm. of Bhaskaracarya 72, 73, 74, Darsanodaya 77, 96 Davvasamgaha 282 Dhavalatika 321 Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology 159 Die Lehre der Jainas 3 Dinkari 239 Dravyasangrahavrtti 282 Early Greek Philosophy 276 Early History of Indian Philo sophy, The 62 Early Sankhya 62 Encyclopaedia Britannica 159, 297 77

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INDEXES 397 Epitome of Jainism, An 255 Essays on Truth and Reality 254 Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, An 158, 159 Khandanakhancakhadya 33, 242 Laghunayacakram 321, 328, 329 Logic 129, 237 Logic of Hegel, The 253, 255 First Principles 158 First Principles of the Jaina Philosophy, The 304 Fragments from Dinnaga 51 Gaudabrahmanandi 292 Half-Yearly Journal of the Mysore University, The 303, 330, 365 Handbook of Psychology 159 Hegel 98 Hindu Chemistry 62 . Hindu Philosophy 66 History of Buddhist Thought 63 History of Pre-Buddhistic In dian Philosophy, A 288 Madhva's Philosophie des Visnu-Glaubens 116 Madhyamakavatara 57 Madhyamapratipada 288 Madhyamika-Karika 150 Madhyamika Sutra 32 Mahabharata, The 65 Maha Sudassana Suttanta, The Digha Nikaya 52 Majjhima-Nikaya 288 Manimekhalai 64 Mind 162, 250 Mulamadhyamikakarika 289 Mundakopanisad 347 Mysticism and Logic 43, 45, 46 Idealistic Thought in India 92, 96 Identity-in-difference 92 Indian Antiquary 3, 61, 62, 68, 78 Indian Historical Quarterly 63 Indian Idealism 18 Indian Logic in the Early Schools 48 Indian Philosophical Review 365, 366 Introduction to the Kalpasutra of Bhadrabahu 126 isa 15, 18 Nature 297 Nature of Physical Reality, The 298 Nature of the Physical World, The 160, 161, 162 Nayacakradisangrahah 328 Nayacara 323 Nayadhikarana 328 Nayapradipa 316, 328 Nayarahasya 328 Nayavivarana 319, 320, 326, 328 New Indian Antiquary, The 80, 92, 96 New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopaedia of Religious Know ledge, The 367 Nyayabindu with Nyayabindu tika 47 Nyayakusumanjali 337, 339 Nyayalokah 260 Nyayamanjari 48 Nyayapravesa 39 Nyayapravesavrtti 39 Nyayasutras 289 Jayadhavala 321 Journal of the Department of Letters, The 352 Kathopanisad 31, 348 Kavyadarsa 352

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398 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Nyayayartika 48 Nyayavartikatatparyatika, Apohavada 48 Nyayavatara 48, 304, 308, 316, 317, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323 to of the Oriental Conference (Third) 68; (Ninth) 372, 373 Proceedings of the First Indian Philosophical Congress 367, 370 Outlines of Jainism 3 Outlines of Psychology 159 Ramanuja and Vaisnavism 84 Ratnaprabha 15 Reign of Relativity, The 160, 161, 162 Rgveda 347, 348, 349 Romanes Lecture on the Theory of Relativity and Its Influence on Scientific Thought, The 160 Sabhasyatattvadhigamasutrani 325 Sacred Books of the Buddhists 40, 52 Sacred Literature of the Jainas Pancadasi 32 Pancastikayasara 3 Panjika 39 Parapaksagirivajra 78, 81 Patanjali-Sutra 133 Patthanuddesa Dipani, The 211 Pensees 168 Philosophical Quarterly 297 Philosophical Studies 296 Philosophy of Bhedabheda, The 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 82 Philosophy of Hegel, The 250, 252, 253, 254 Philosophy of Religions, On the 211 Philosophy of Sanskrit Gram mar, The 352 Philosophy of Visistadvaita, The 84, 85, 87, 89 Positive Sciences of the An cient Hindus 62 Pottapada Sutta 40 Prabhavali 91 Prabhavilasa 91 Pradipah 15 Prakatarthavivaranam 15 Pramanamimamsa 188, 259 Pramanasamuccaya 48 Prameya-ratna-kosa 342 Prathamagucchaka 319, 328 Pravacanasara 260 Principle of Individuality and Value, The 250, 251 Principle of Relativity, The 159 Principles of Human Know ledge, Of the 295 Proceedings and Transactions Sahityadarpana 143 Sakalacaryamatasangraha 85, 86 Samavayangatika 327, 328 Sambandhapariksa 211 Sankalpasuryodaya 91 Sankhyakarikas 62, 63, 64, 65 Sankhyapravacanabhasya 61 Sankhya System, The 62 Saptapadarthi 108, 109 Sarvadarsanasangraha 288 Sastravartasamuccaya 259 Science of Logic 99 Siddhantabindu 295 Siddhantajahnavi 78, 79, 81 Siddhantamuktavali 208, 295 Siddhantasetuka 78, 79 Siddhiviniscaya Tika 340 Six Systems of Indian Philo sophy, The 63 Space, Time and Deity 198, 251 Space, Time and Gravitation 162

Page #418
INDEXES 399 Three Tattvas, The 84 Tippana 308 Twelve Principal Upanisads, The 15, 18, 31 Sribhasya 84, 89, 90, 91, 95 sribhasyam (N) 91 sribhasyavartika 86, 91 sri Brahmasutrartha Sangraha 119 Srimadbhagavadgita with Ramanuja's Bhasya 85 Srutyantasuradruma 78 Studies in Jaina Philosophy 3 Studies in Jainism 334 Studies in Nyaya-Vaisesika Metaphysics 110 Studies in Post-sankara Dia lectics 36 Studies in Vedantism 68, 70 Study in Realism, A 297 Sukhabodha 322 svetasvatara 15, 62, 347-8 Syadvadamanjari 327, 328, 373 System of Vedantic Thought and Culture, The 294 Vadasthana 22 Vadavali 114 Vaisesika Philosophy, The 108 Vaisesika System, The 110 Vaisnavism, saivism and Mi nor Religious Systems 17 Vakyapadiya 48, 351, 352, 354 Vartika 132 Vartikam 15 Vedanta, The 78, 116 Vedantadipa 83 Vedantakavali 84 Vedanta-parijata-saurabha 77, 81, 82 Vedantaratnamala 77, 78, 79, 81, 82 Vedantaratnamanjusa 78, 79 Vedantasara 33, 35, 36, 83, 85, 95 Vedantasutras 119; - with Com. of Madhva 119 ; - with Com. of Ramanuja 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 93, 94 Vedarthasangrahah 85, 89, 90 Vienna Oriental Journal 17, 50, 86, 89, 97 Vipancitartha 56 Visuddhimagga (N) 40 Vivsti 49, 261, 283, 308 Volume of Eastern and Indian Studies, A 117 Vyasa-Bhasya 133 Vyomavati 110 Taittiriyopanisad 348 Tantravartika 307 Tarkabhasa 22 Tarkadipika 278 Tatparyadipika 76, 85, 90 Tattva-kaumudi 65 Tattvamuktavali, The 116 Tattvarthadhigamasutra 129, 196, 260, 323, 325 Tattvarthasara 312, 314, 319, 320, 328 Tattvarthasutra 322 Tattvarthatika 259 Tattvasamasa 63 Tattva-siddhanta-bindu 77, 78, 81 Tattvatrayam and the Bhasya 85, 86 Theory of Knowledge, The 296 Theory of Relations, The 230, 245 Thing and Its Relations, The 230, 245 Thought and Reality 251 OI Way to Nirvana, The 40, 41 What is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel 100 Works of George Berkeley, The 295 Yatindramatadipika 86, 95

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II. INDEX TO NAMES OF AUTHORS, ETC. [N=footnotes. References that follow N are to the footnotes.] Abhayadeva 174, 187, 276, 277, 281, 282, 286; (N) 48, 141, 147, 188, 189, 240, 258, 259, 279 Abhyankar, V. S. (N) 89, 90, 95, 288 Ainslie, Douglas (N) 100 Aiyangar, M. B Varadaraja (N) 89 Akalanka 200, 265, 266, 280 ; (N) 129, 141, 174, 195, 200, 265, 278, 279, 281, 335, 336, 346, 349, 353 Alexander, Samuel 197, 293 ; (N) 198, 250, 251, 253, 254, 294 Amptacandra 261 ; (N) 261, 262, 319, 328, 343 Apte, V. G. (N) 85 Arcata 187, 189; (N) 144, 187, 190, 289 Aristotle (N) 142 Athalye 209 Athavale (N) 259 Aung, S. L. (N) 211 Bhadanta Yogasena (N) 174 Bhaduri, S. (N) 110 Bhagavatacharya (N) 83, 85 Bhamaha 355 ; (N) 48, 355 Bhandarkar, R. G. 375 (N) 16, 31 Bhartphari 308, 351, 352; (N) 18, 34, 48, 352 Bhartsprapanca 26, 59, 61, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72 ; (N) 18, 68, 71, 289 Bhaskara 26. 59. 61. 71. 74. 75. 76, 77, 79, 84, 90, 91, 92; (N) 18, 72, 73, 77, 78 Bhaskaranandi (N) 322 Bhattacharya, A. (N) 36 Bhattacharya, A. M. (N) 108, 109 Bhattacharya, K. C. 360 ; (N) 68, 70 Bhattacharya, Narimohan (N) 370 Bhattacharya, N. C. B. (N) 108, 109 Bhattacharya, Vidushekhara, (N) 41, 43, 57, 63 Bhattanathaswamy (N) 83 Bhattaputra Jayamisra (N) 133 Black, Adam and Charles (N) 276 Bodhisattva (N) 51 Born, Max (N) 162, 297 Bosanquet 250 ; (N) 250, 251, 253, 296 Bradley, F. H. 2, 250 ; (N) 207, 244, 250, 251, 253, 254, 255 Brahmadeva (N) 282 Broad (N) 162 Badarayana 15, 21, 94, 364 ; (N) 62, 119, 289 Bailie, J. B. (N) 101 Bain, Alexander (N) 159 Baldwin, J. M. (N) 159 Barmenides (N) 33 Barua, B. M. (N) 288 Beattie (N) 296 Belvalkar 365, 366, 367, 373, 374, 375 Bergson (N) 19, 43 Berkeley 295; (N) 296, 373

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Buddha 42, 57, 349; (N) 40, 41, 51, 288 Burnet (N) 276 Burrow, Prof. T. 4 Caird, Edward 96, 286; (N) 98, 136 Candrakirti (N) 57, 150, 151 Candraprabhasuri (N) 342 Caraka (N) 62 Carvaka 318 Chakravarti (N) 256, 363 Chakravarti, A. 3, 256 Chakravarti, Nemicandra Chintamani, T. R. (N) 15 Citsukhamunim (N) 15 Citsukhi (N) 36 Cowell (N) 143 Cowell, E. B. (N) 116 Croce, B. (N) 100 INDEXES (N) 282 Chakravarti, P. C. (N) 352 Chatterjee (N) 237 Chaudhari, Pannalal (N) 319, 328 Dasgupta, S. N. 115, 333; (N) 18, 62, 170, 175 Devacarya (N) 78 Devasena (N) 328, 329 Devasuri (N) 322 S. Da Tin Tin (N) 211 Davies, John (N) 65 Descartes 114; (N) 373 Deva, Anantarama (N) 77 Devabhadra 307; (N) 308, 323 Dharmakirti 166, 212, 213, 214, 218, 219, 220, 222, 223, 225, 227, 229; (N) 56, 211, 212, 214, 220, 222, 244, 289 Dharmottara (N) 50, 51 Dhruva, A. B. (N) 39, 133, 150, 240 26 Dingle, H. (N) 161, 162, 297, 298 Dinnaga (N) 39, 48, 49, 50, 212 Divakara (see Siddhasena Divakara) Divan, P. E. (N) 295 Durveka 187; (N) 196 Dvivedin, Vindhyesvari Prasad (N) 72, 77 401 Eddington, Sir A. (N) 160, 161, 162 Einstein, Albert (N) 158, 159, 160, 161, 298 Empedocles (N) 276 Faddegon, B. (N) 110 Fraser, A. C. (N) 295 Frauwallner, Von E. (N) 50 Garbe, R. (N) 61, 63, 108 Gaudapada (N) 17 Gauda-purnananda-cakra vartin (N) 116 Gautama (N) 289 Ghate, V. S. 78; (N) 78, 116 Ghosal, S. C. (N) 282 Ghosh 249, 257 Glasenapp, Helmuth von (N) 116 Gopani (N) 259 Govindananda (N) 15 Green, T. H. (N) 296 Griffith, R. T. H. 347 Gunaratna 169, 187; (N) 142, 146, 151, 152, 170, 194, 290 Haldane, Viscount (N) 160, 161 Hamilton, Sir William (N) 65, 158 Haribhadra 188, 259, 286; (N) 48, 127, 144, 188, 190, 259 Hegel 2, 98, 101, 102, 250, 254, 257; (N) 49, 99, 100, 250, 251, 253, 256, 292 Hemacandra 174, 176, 177, 180, 181, 188, 193, 194, 259; (N) 139, 141, 146, 177, 188, 190, 193, 195, 242, 259

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402 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Heraclitus (N) 19, 99, 131 Hiriyanna, M. 71, 275, 364, 365, 375; (N) 33, 35, 44, 63, 66, 68, 76, 87, 150, 206, 208, 238, 360 Hobbes, Thomas (N) 159 Hobhouse, L. T. (N) 296 Hodges (N) 97 Hoffding, H. (N) 159 Hopkins, E. W. (N) 16 Hume 286; (N) 212, 296, 373 Indrabhuti (N) 127 Ingalls (N) 237 Isvarakrsna 63; (N) 63 Iyengar, H. Rangaswamy (N) 22 Jacobi, Hermann 125, 126, 259, 373; (N) 17, 31, 61, 63, 259, 260, 304, 334 Jackson, S. M. (N) 367 Jagadisacandra (N) 373 Jain, J. C. (N) 327, 328 Jaini, J. L. 3 James, William (N) 230, 241, 244, 245 Jayanta 177; (N) 48, 170, 177 Jayantabhatta (N) 174 Jayasena (N) 261, 262 Jayatirtha (N) 114 Jha, Ganganatha (N) 65, 289 Jhaveri, H. L. (N) 304 Jinabhadra 319; (N) 311, 312, 326, 362 Jinavardhanasuri (N) 109, 110 Jitari 22, 23 Jitaripada (N) 22 Jnanasri (N) 50 Johnson, W. E. (N) 129 Johnson, W. H. (N) 99 Johnston, E. H. (N) 62 Kaiyyata (N) 90 Kamalasila 21; (N) 23, 49, 141, 211, 355 Kant, Immanuel 5, 131, 134, 136, 284, 285, 286, 379; (N) 134, 158, 285, 373 Kapadia, H. R. (N) 127, 196, 259, 323, 334, 335, 337, 373 Kapila (N) 41 Kautilya (N) 61 Keith (N) 49, 62 Kesavamisra (N) 191 Knox, T. M. (N) 297 Koey, W. (N) 348 Krishnamacharya, V. (N) 84, 91 Kumarila Bhatta 2, 5, 36, 131, 132, 133, 136, 171, 239, 379; (N) 48, 141, 153, 154, 171, 208, 307, 362 Kundakunda 3, 259, 261, 262, 264 (N) 260, 262, 341 Laird, John (N) 297 Leibniz 51, 152, 198, 286; (N) 198, 245, 373 Locke 42; (N) 373 Lokacarya (N) 85 Lowndes, M. E. (N) 159 Madhava-Mukunda (N) 78 Madhusudana (N) 295 Madhusudanasarasvati (N) 292 Madhva 25, 26, 105, 112, 113, 114, 116, 118, 119; (N) 65, 78, 113, 116, 118, 119 Mahavira 259, 374; (N) 126, 127 Majmudar, S. 78 Maladhari Hemacandra 308; (N) 311, 328, 362 Mallisena 174, 176, 188; (N) 133, 141, 146, 158, 188, 200, 238, 290, 336, 373 Manavalli, Gangadhar Sastri (N) 48, 351 Margenau, Henry (N) 162, 298 Max Muller 94; (N) 63

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McTaggart 276; (N) 230, 232, 244, 245 Milinda, King (N) 40 Mill, J. S. (N) 158, 159 Moksakaragupta (N) 22 Mookerji, S. (N) 20, 39, 46, 150, 163 Moore, G. E. 296 Motilal Laghaji (N) 325 Municandra (N) 190 INDEXES Nagarjuna 349; (N) 143, 150. 151, 288 Nagasena (N) 40 Nahar 249, 257 Nimbarka 26, 59, 61, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84; (N) 77, 78, 80 Nyana, S. V. (N) 211 Nyayamritakara (N) 292 Nyayavijaya, Muni (N) 337 Oldenberg (N) 63, 348 Padmarajiah, Y. J. (N) 282 Panini (N) 90, 357 Parker, De Witt (N) 230, 244, 245 Parmenides (N) 99 Parthasarathimisra (N) 133 Pascal (N) 168 Patanjali (N) 90, 133 Paton 135 Paul, Kegan (N) 168 Perry, R. B. 376, 377 Pickering, William (N) 136 Pischel (N) 63 Planck, Max (N) 297 Plato (N) 251 Poussin, La Vallee (N) 40, 41, 289 Prabhacandra 174, 226, 227, 228, 229, 276, 277; (N) 48, 141, 175, 211, 212, 214, 218, 222, 229, 230, 231, 232, 283. 307, 310, 317, 335, 354, 355 Prabhakara (N) 240 Prakasananda 291, 294 Prasastapada 110, 115 Pritchard 285 Protagoras (N) 158 Pujyapada 261, 264 Punyaraja (N) 351, 352 Purushottama Prasada (N) 78 Purusottama (N) 78, 295 Pyrrho 371 403 Radhakrishnan, Prof. S. 4, 365, 374, 375 Raghunatha Siromani (N) 110 Raju, P. T. 96; (N) 80, 92, 96, 251 Ramanuja 25, 26, 59, 61, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 364, 374; (N) 18, 75, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 97 Ramanujachari, V. K. (N) 84 Ranade, R. D. (N) 365 Randle (N) 47, 51 Rangachari (N) 89, 90 Rangacharya (N) 84 Rao 366, 367, 374, 376 ; (N) 303 Rao, G. Hanumantha (N) 330, 365 Ratnacandra 3 Ratna Gopal Bhatta (N) 85, 86 Ratnakarasanti (N) 355 Ratnakirti (N) 49, 50, 187 Ray, P. C. (N) 62 Raywood, Francis (N) 136 Rhys Davids, G. A. F. (N) 211 Rhys Davids, Mrs. Caroline 42; (N) 211 Rhys Davids, T. W. (N) 40 Routledge (N) 168 Row, P. Ramchandra (N) 119 Russell, Bertrand 2, 236; (N) 43, 45, 46, 47, 160, 162, 177, 198, 206, 244, 245, 295, 297 Sadananda 33; (N) 33

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404 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Sadaw, Ledi (N) 211 Sakalacarya (N) 85, 86 Samantabhadra (N) 133, 349, 362 Sanjaya 371; (N) 288 Sankara 2, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 26, 31, 33, 34, 35, 37, 67, 70, 71, 84, 85, 91, 92, 166, 222, 223, 224, 225, 241, 292, 364, 366, 374; (N) 15, 16, 18, 31, 33, 34, 35, 73, 77, 78, 84, 141, 221, 222, 289 Sankaramisra (N) 210 Santaraksita 21; (N) 21, 41, 49, 56, 141, 211, 289, 355 Santyacarya (N) 48 Sastry, Shantiraja (N) 322 Sastry, S. S. S. (N) 64 Sayadaw, Ledi (N) 211 Schilpp, P. A. (N) 297 Schubring, W. 3 Seal, B. N. (N) 62 Senart (N) 63 Shastri, Anant Krishna 292 (N) Siddharsi 308; (N) 48, 304, 308, 319 Siddhasena 187, 264, 265; (N) 187, 190, 265 Siddhasena Divakara 249, 258, 259, 260, 261, 267, 326, 327, 329; (N) 259, 290, 308, 326 Siddhasena Gani 259; (N) 129, 196, 259, 323 Sircar, M. N. (N) 294 Sivaditya (N) 108 Smith, H. W. 3 Smith, (N) 250 Sogen (N) 150 Spencer, H. (N) 158 Spinoza (N) 373 Norman Kemp 134; Sridharanidhar Sastry (N) 85 Sriharsa (N) 33, 55, 143, 222. 237 Srinivasa (N) 86, 95 Srinivasacarya 96; (N) 86, 96 Srinivasachar, L. (N) 77 Srinivasachari, P. N. 76; (N) 36, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 82, 84, 85, 294, 296 Stace (N) 250, 252, 253, 254 Stcherbatsky 42; (N) 18, 19, 20, 38, 39, 40, 43, 45, 46, 47, 56, 63, 150, 237 Stewart, H. F. (N) 168 Struthers (N) 99 Suali, L. (N) 342 Subba Rau, S. (N) 119 Sudarsanacarya (N) 76 Sudarsanasuri (N) 85 Sukthankar (N) 17, 31, 32, 86, 89, 97 Sundarabhatta (N) 78 Suresvara 67 Tailanga, (N) 48 Tatia, (N) 3 Thah, U. Ba (N) 211 Thibaut, G. (N) 16, 17, 31, 84 Thomas, Dr. F. W. 4; (N) 108, 117 Thomas, E. J. (N) 63 Gangadhar Sastri Udayana (N) 41 Uddyotakara (N) 39, 47, 48, 51 Ui, H. (N) 108 Umasvati 127, 129, 136, 151, 169, 185, 259, 261, 264, 325, 326; (N) 151, 260, 265, 283 Umesvara (N) 197 Upadhye, A. N. 304; (N) 260, 263, 373 Ushenko, A. P. (N) 162, 297 Vacaspati Misra (N) 15, 39, 48, 65, 174, 242 Vadideva 265, 266, 267, 268, 283; (N) 141, 211, 216, 266, 307, 312, 336. 341

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Vaidya, P. L. (N) 48, 304, 308, 316, 317, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323 INDEXES Vajira (N) 40 Vallabha 26; (N) 34, 35, 78 Vamsidhara (N) 328 Varavaramuni (N) 85 Vardhamana (N) 41 Vasubandhu (N) 19 Vasunandi (N) 141, 349 Vedantadesika (N) 91 Venis, Arthur (N) 295 Venkatacharya, Bucci (N) 84 Venkatanatha (N) 85 Vidyananda 261, 264; (N) 214, 216, 221, 311, 339, 340, 353, 362 Vidyanandin (N) 211 Vidyaratna, R. N. (N). 15 Vimaladasa (N) 145, 336, 354 Vijayarajendra 3 Vijnanabhiksu (N) 61 Vyomasiva 110 Wallace, W. (N) 253 Ward, James (N) 159 Warren, H. C. (N) 40 Watson 134; (N) 135 Weber, A. 3 Whitehead, A. N. 5, 131, 136, 379; (N) 159, 160, 162 Widgery, A. C. (N) 365 Wogihara, Unrai (N) 41 Wundt, W. (N) 159 405 Yadava 26, 71, 74, 75, 76, 77, 84, 90, 91, 92; (N) 18, 77 Yadavaprakasa 59, 71 Yasomitra (N) 41 Yasovijaya 259, 260, 268, 308; (N) 260, 262, 328 Zeno (N) 33, 55

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III. INDEX TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL SECTS AND TENETS &C. [N=footnotes. References that follow N are to the footnotes.] Abhidharmika 41 Abhidharmikas (N) 55 Absolute Mentalist (N) 253 Advaita 24, 290, 291, 317 ; (N) 78, 79, 194 Advaitic 76, 89, 93, 167, 199, 284, 291, 298, 363;. (N) 85 Advaitin 115, 152, 209, 212, 217; (N) 216 Advaitism 18, 24, 26, 32, 34, 37, 61, 67, 90, 291, 352 ; (N) 33, 34, 35, 67 Aristotelian (N) 142 175, 179, 188, 194, 211, 212, 213, 214, 216, 222, 230, 232; non-Buddhist (N) 39 Buddhistic 4, 11, 21, 23, 39, 40, 94, 111, 199, 200, 225; (N) 19, 43, 44, 85 ; semi-Buddhi stic 110 Buddhists 54, 126, 240 ; (N) 19, 24, 46, 63 Digambara 325, 326 Dvaita 25, 26, 105 Dvaitic 113 Dvaitin 115 Dvaitins 114 Dvaitism 107, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119; (N) 112 Einsteinian (N) 158, 297 Eleatics (N) 99 Bauddha (N) 22 Bergsonian (N) 19, 46 Berkeleyan 291, 295; (N) 158, 159 Bhaskariya 79, 92 Brahmanas 126 Brahmavadin (N) 91 Brahminical 1, 17; (N) 48 Brahminism 1 Buddhism 1, 4, 18, 24, 26, 27, 37, 38, 41, 42, 44, 51, 55, 57, 61, 213, 226, 242, 286, 352; (N) 19, 20, 21, 38, 39, 41, 43, 45, 46, 47, 51, 63, 84, 99, 212 Buddhist 14, 21, 22, 23, 25, 42, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 101, 111, 129, 130, 167, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 186, 187, 192, 193, 211, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 225, 226, 227, 235, 236, 320 ; (N) 19, 20, 21, 22, 43, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 56, 174, Hegelian 100, 102, 249, 250, 251, 253, 254, 257, 291; (N) 250, 252, 256 ; neo-Hegelian 250 ; (N) 250; neo-Hegelians 254; Hegelianisation (N) 250 Hegelianism 26, 59, 61, 98, 103, 107, 249, 255, 257; (N) 256 ; neo-Hegelianism 249 Humean (N) 158, 159 Jaina 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 11, 13, 14. 15, 21, 24, 26, 27, 61, 83, 91 (-like), 94, 100, 101, 102, 103, 119, 121, 123, 124, 125, 126, 129, 130, 131, 132, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 145, 148, 149, 151, 152, 155, 156, 157,

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163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180, 185, 186, 187, 190, 192, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 225, 227, 229, 233, 235, 236, 237, 239, 240, 242, 244, 249, 253, 254, 255, 257, 264, 267, 268, 273, 274, 275, 277, 278, 279, 280, 282, 283, 284, 286, 287, 290, 291, 299, 303, 306, 308, 322, 334, 337, 346, 349, 350, 351, 353, 354, 356, 358, 364, 365, 366, 367, 376, 379, 380; (N) 20, 21, 22, 24, 36, 48, 49, 52, 63, 66, 129, 136, 139, 141, 143, 147, 150, 151, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 168, 170, 174, 187, 188, 190, 194, 198, 200, 211, 222, 223, 230, 231, 232, 238, 243, 245, 252, 256, 259, 260, 263, 278, 282, 287, 288, 311, 334, 356, 357, 359, 366, 369, 370; non-Jaina 13, 167, 353,; (N) 141, 174, 196, 211, 288, 289 Jainas 91, 148, 174, 240, 365; (N) 20, 23, 24, 53, 141, 150, 256, 299 Jainism 1, 2, 3, 25, 26, 92, 94, 98, 103, 136, 166, 242, 274, 275, 276, 283, 285, 286, 287, 289, 330, 364, 368; (N) 20, 21, 66, 91, 128, 135, 142, 159, 160, 161, 250, 260, 289, 303 Jains 374; (N) 304, 334 Kantian 136, 286; (N) 135 Kantianism 286 Kapila (N) 289 Kapila Darsana (N) 188 Kevaladvaita 26 Leibnizian 283; (N) 198 INDEXES Madhva 107, 116 Madhyamika 32, 35; (N) 32, 150, 288 Madhyamikas (N) 55 Madhyamika Buddhism (N) 17 Mimamsa 299; (N) 289 Mimamsaka (N) 356 Mimamsakas 240; (N) 240, 290, 352 407 Naiyayika 53, 151, 152, 205, 209, 211, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 220, 221, 225, 233, 236, 242, 243, 277, 278, 279, 280; (N) 19, 142, 187, 205, 206, 212, 213, 216, 237, 238, 241, 243, 278, 356 Naiyayikas 209, 240; (N) 141, 240, 244, 290, 352; neoNaiyayikas 236 Nayavada 269, 273, 301, 303, 310, 354, 381 Negationist (N) 49 Non-Nimbarka (N) 78 Nyaya 208, 209, 225, 236, 239, 242, 280, 281, 282; (N) 110, 208, 223, 237, 282 Nyaya-Vaisesika 65, 88, 151, 235, 236, 316; (N) 54, 66, 112, 187, 208, 234, 260, 263 Pali Canons 39 Paryayavada 261 Pragmatists (N) 143 Frakrantavadins (N) 290 Realist (N) 232 Sammatiyas (N) 41 sankara 32, 69, 79, 244; postSankara (N) 33; pre-sankara 32 Sankhya 26, 59, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 71, 103, 194, 299, 317; (N) 19, 25, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 71, 188, 223, 234, 289 Sankhyas (N) 63, 86, 290

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408 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Saptabhangi 273, 333, 336, 374, 375 Sauddhodana Darsana (N) 188 Saugata 244 Sautrantikas (N) 290 Suddhadvaita 26 Sunyavadin 150, 152; (N) 150, 151 Sutrakara 366 Svayambhuvas (N) 290 Svetambara 325, 326; (N) 326 Tirthankara 366 Upanisadic 15, 31, 32, 40, 57, 347, 348; (N) 17, 31, 41, 62 Upanisads 16, 31, 41, 276, 352; (N) 16, 33, 62 Vaibhasika 41 Vaibhasikas (N) 55 Vaisesika 26, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 119, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 200, 201, 241, 299; (N) 19, 25, 108, 112, 187, 188, 191, 192, 193, 194, 205, 206, 208, 210, 212, 299 Vaisesikas 114; (N) 86, 290 Vatsiputriyas 19; (N) 20, 41, 55 Vedanta 24, 26, 32, 57, 209, 225, 226, 363; (N) 16, 95, 97 Vedantanam (N) 95 Vedantic 11, 14, 27, 57, 81, 94, 223, 225, 349, 363; (N) 67, 89 Vedantin 25, 101, 129, 130, 209, 224, 233, 236; (N) 22, 25 Vedantins 91, 240, 365 Vedantism 242 Vedantist (N) 20 Vedic 31, 32 Vijnanavada 41 Visistadvaita 17, 25, 83, 84, 91, 97; (N) 79, 80, 95 Visistadvaitam (N) 84 Visistadvaitavada 26 Visistadvaitic (N) 81, 85 Visistadvaitism 83, 85, 89, 94, 95; (N) 88, 90, 97 Visistayor advaitam (N) 84 Voidist 150; (N) 151 Yadaviya 92 Yoga (N) 61 Yogacara 41

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INDEX TO SANSKRIT AND PRAKRIT WORDS [N-footnotes. References that follow N are to the footnotes.] IV. abhava 35, 108, 148, 151, 155, 156, 169, 170, 171; (N) 108, 113, 128, 141, 142, 146, 147, 156, 172, 216 abhavarupa eva (N) 53 abheda 5, 34, 37, 61, 69, 71, 73, 76, 78, 93, 103, 134, 144, 189, 266, 267; (N) 77, 78, 265 abhedatva 140; (N) 147 abhedavada 173, 258, 259, 261; (N) 190, 256 abhedavadin 73, 138, 172, 267, 268 abhimata 310 abhinna 93 abhinna brahman (N) 80 abhinnah 221 abhinnasvabhavatvam 140 abhipraya 310 acetana (N) 112 acidamsa 75 acit 75, 76, 85, 87, 89, 90, 95; (N) 79, 80, 81 adhara 85, 88; (N) 222 adharadheyabhava (N) 207 adharadheyaniyamat (N) 210 adharma 274; (N) 282, 283 adhikarana 144 adhisthana (N) 73 adhityasamutpada (N) 44, 45 adhyaropa (N) 278 adhyaya (N) 17 adrdhapratiti 171 advaita 37, 70, 78 agama (N) 258 agamacca (N) 258 agauna 21 agonivrttih (N) 47 27 ahi 81, 163 aikantikam 134, 261 aikatmata 21 aikya 215 ajnana (N) 35 ajnanavada 371, 373, 374; (N) 288 ajiva (N) 63 akaranatva (N) 209 akasa 193, 274, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282; (N) 193, 263, 278, 282 akasas (N) 278 akincitkara 55 akrama 176 aksanikatva (N) 187 akulavada (N) 336 alokakasa (N) 282 amisra 212 amsa 155, 276 amsatva (N) 231 amulaksatikari (N) 170 amurtatva (N) 263 anabhilapya (N) 51 anabhilapyatva (N) 349 anabhilapyatvam (N) 349 anaikantika 366; (N) 175 anala (N) 147 ananda 40 anantabhavas 283 anantadharmatmakam 381 anantadharmatmakatva 231 anantah 109 anantaprakaram 312 anantatmakam 381 anantya (N) 170 ananya 82, 86, 134 (N)

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410 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE ananyatva 76 anarabdha (N) 277 anarthantaram 221 anatmabhutah 178 anatta 40, 43, 56 anavastha 110, 141, 145, 169, 170, 222; (N) 170, 209, 232 aneka 275 anekadharmatmakavada (N) 151 anekanta 24, 123, 124, 130, 151, 156, 164, 199, 201, 249, 274, 275, 282, 285, 287, 288, 298, 299, 333, 338, 375; (N) 20, 158, 159, 230, 289; non-anekanta 288 anekantasvarupatva 198, 199, 201 anekantatva (N) 170; degtve (N) 147 anekantavada 2, 6, 13, 24, 123, 125, 126, 149, 151, 199, 200, 269, 271, 273, 274, 275, 287, 288, 291, 300, 303, 372, 375, 380, 381; (N) 141, 151, 161, 199, 289, 334, 335, 373 anekantavadin 22, 23, 156, 172, 285; (N) 23 anekasvabhavatvam (N) 147 anekatva 240; (N) 147, 161, 171 anekatvavada (N) 141 anekavada (N) 299 anekavikalpa 312 angulyadivakya (N) 307 anicca 39, 40, 43, 56 anirvacaniya 36, 73, 350; (N) 36 anirvacaniyata 306, 349, 350, 352 anirvacaniyavadin 350 anispanna 228, 229; (N) 214 anispannayoh 213, 214, 228 anitya 192 anityatva 240 anityavada 174 annonnaniravekkha (N) 188 antarabhavarupam 216 antaryamin 85, 88 anu 109 anubhaya 347 anubhuyamana sambandha (N) 237 anugama (N) 22 anugatatmakah 21 anumatrah 217 anunam pindah 217 anusthiti (N) 175 anuttaram (N) 230 anvaya (N) 127 anvayi 229; (N) 262 anya 134 anyanyatva (N) 171 anyapoha (N) 47 anyapohavada (N) 48 anyapohavadin (N) 49 anyatvam (N) 87 anyavyavrtti (N) 355 anyayogabodhakatva (N) 339 anyonyabhava (N) 143 anyonyapeksa (N) 323 anyonyatmakatva 286 anyonyavyaptibhava 286 apara 69 aparavidya 70; (N) 16, 143 apavarga (N) 64 apeksa 219, 310 apeksah 340 apoha 6; (N) 47, 48, 49, 50 apohavada (N) 48, 49, 50, 354 apratibhasatve (N) 147 apratipatti 141, 146, 171; (N) 172 aprthaksiddha (N) 207 aprthaksiddhi (N) 88 aprthaksiddhisambandha 87 arambhavada 65, 233; (N) 65, 234 ardhavainasika 110 arpanabheda 346 artha 308; (N) 84 arthah (N) 323

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INDEXES 411 arthakriyakari 286 arthakriyakaritva 173, 175, 180, 186, 193, 226; (N) 56, 174, 175, 222 arthakriyakaritvam 2, 6, 380; (N) 52, 299 arthakriyakaritvavada 172 ; (N) 53, 286 arthakriyasamarthya 180 arthakriyasamarthyam 52 ; (N) 52 atiprasanga 222 ativa bheda 242 atma 192 atmabhuta 242 atmabhutah 217 atmabhutah 178 atmadrstau (N) 41 atman 40, 277, 283, 284 ; (N) 41, 57, 241, 243 atmarupa (N) 207 atmasraya (N) 110 atmatattvaviveka (N) 41 atmavada 41 attho 261 atyantabhava (N) 142 atyantabhedavada (N) 78 atyantabhede (N) 232 atyantabhinnatva 316 : atyanta(kevala) bhedavada (N) 78 'atyantavilaksana (N). 66 atyantavilaksanatvam (N) 87 atyantayogabodhakatva (N) 339 arthakriyasamarthyat 180 arthakriyavada 125 arthanayas 319 arthanirapeksam (N) 39 arthantaram 221 arthapratibimbakam (N) 49 arthatantra 319 arthat notpadyate (N). 39 arupa 31 as 337 asadharanakara 146 asadharanarupa 180 asadvada (N) 200 asaksat 309 asakta (N) 170 asamarthya 53 asambaddha (N) 213 asambhava (N) 142, 146, 147, 172 asat 35, 36, 37, 148, 149, 164, 317, 344, 347, 349, 350 ; (N) 32, 35, 128, 349 asatkaryavada 65; (N) 65 asattva 169, 170 asatya 79 asatyam (N) 73 asiddha (N) 175, 214 aspada (N) 73 asraya 139, 187, 219, 280 asvatantra 112 asti 342 astitva 165, 341, 342, 346 astitvanastitvarupatmaka 165 astitvanastitvasvarupatva 165 atattvika 216; (N) 216 aupacariki (N) 278 aupadhika 79; (N) 77, 116 aupadhika bhedabhedavada 79; (N) 78 avacchedakas (N) 210 avadharanartham 339 avakasasthanayogyatvam (N) 263 avaktavya 305, 306, 307, 342, 346, 349, 357, 358; (N) 36, 323, 346 avaktavyam 7 avaktavyatva 341, 349 avasthas 73, 77 avastu 34, 213 ; (N) 238 avayavas 279, 280 avidya 72, 115; (N) 35, 72 avikstam 140 avirbhava 66; (N) 34 avirodha 376 avirodhena 336, 345 avisesasvarupah 110

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412 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE aviveki (N) 64 avyakptas 349 avyakta 81 avyapadesya 349, 350 avyapyavrtti 279, 280 avyapyavsttitvam 279 avyatiriktam 140 avyaya 337 ayata (N) 262 ayathabhasanacaturah 91 ; 'raih (N) 91 ayogabodhakatva (N) 339 ayutasiddha 111, 207; (N) 108, 207 bahya 224 bahyarthadhyavasayi (N) 49 bhanga 132, 333 ; (N) 335 bhangah 336 bhangas 337 bhava 148, 151, 154, 155, 169, 170, 171, 202, 335; (N) 113, 128, 156, 172, 206 bhavabhavasvarupatva 153 bhavabhavatmaka 168 bhavabhavayoh 238 bhavalaksanaprthakvat (N) 38 bhavarupa 35 bhavantaram 265 bhavantarau (N) 262 bheda 5, 31, 37, 61, 69, 71, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 93, 103, 113, 116, 134, 144, 153, 189, 267 ; (N) 35, 72, 77, 78, 127, 265 bhedabheda 17, 59, 61, 67, 69, 71, 72, 74, 77, 78, 82, 83, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 148 ; (N) 91, 92, 93, 139, 147, 256 bhedabhedatmakavastutva (N) 147 bhedabhedavada 26, 68, 93, 141, 200, 258, 265, 267, 268 ; (N) 266, 289 bhedabhedavadins 71, 73, 84, 91, 92, 93; (N) 87 bhedaikanta 178 bhedatattva 35 bhedatva (N) 147 bhedavada 173, 186, 258, 261, 264; (N) 190 bhedavadin 138, 173, 267, 268 bhinna 92, 93 bhinnabhinna 72, 74, 92, 93 bhinnabhinnavada 84 bhinnah 221 bhinnatvam 94 bhinnatvat brahman (N) 80-81 bhoga (N) 64 bhogya 79 bhoktr 79 bhusana (N) 170 bodhanasamarthyam 358 bodhi 42 brahmabhasitam 281 brahman 18, 26, 31, 32, 37, 68, 69, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 79, 81, 82, 83, 88, 89, 90, 93, 95, 96, 199, 276, 281, 284, 350; (N) 16, 17, 33, 34, 73, 79, 80, 81, 85, 95, 117 brahman-ridden 94 brahmaparinama 71, 82 brahmaparinamavada 18, 26, 32, 68, 71, 77, 83; (N) 34, 35, 78, 80 brahmaparinamavadin 91 brahmatmaka 26; (N) 34 brahmavivartavada 18 caitanya (N) 243 candrakantamani 165 catuskoti (N) 32, 288 catuskotivinirmukta 349 catuskotivinirmuktam (N) 33 catuskotivinirmuktatvam 306; (N) 349 cetana (N) 112, 263 chayatapavat 144 chidramadhyaviraha (N) 216 cidacidvisistaparamesvaravada (N) 78 cidamsa 75

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INDEXES 413 cit 75, 85, 87, 89, 90, 95; (N) 79, 80, 81 citra 232; (N) 197 citrapata 170 daisikavisesanata 239 darsana (N) 188 davvatthiyanaya (N) 188 desana 258 desananugata 51 dharma 219, 274, 336; (N) 133, 242, 243, 282, 283 dharmanairatmya (N) 41 dharmas (N) 63 dharmi 267 ; (N) 133, 242, 243 dharminah (N) 133 dharmisvarupa 113 dharmyapeksaya 266, 267 dhrauvya 127, 129, 261, 263, 267; (N) 100, 127, 129 dhrauvyam (N) 129 dhruvah (N) 129 dhruvatva 127; (N) 127 dhvani (N) 355 dik 193 ; (N) 193, 237, 278 ditti (N) 32 dosa 148, 162; (N) 142, 146, 147 dosan 197 dosas 5, 139, 141, 148, 162, 163, 168, 169, 172, 379; (N) 141, 142, 146, 147, 172, 175 dravya 6, 21, 22, 23, 107, 111, 139, 140, 154, 173, 174, 187, 189, 190, 191, 193, 202, 229, 241, 247, 249, 253, 254, 257, 261, 262, 263, 264, 280, 335, 380; (N) 22, 128, 129, 139, 187, 188, 191, 206, 210, 238, 256, 260, 262, 263, 264, 363 dravyabhavinah 193 dravyagunaparyayasvabhava 261 dravyaikantavada 174, 180, 194; (N) 174, 194 dravyanaya 313 dravyanayas 305, 313, 319 dravyaparyayatmaka 186, 325 dravyaparyayatmakatvavada 180 dravyaparyayatmakavada 141 dravyaparyayavada (N) 187 dravyarthika 327 dravyarthikanaya 312, 318, 329, 333; (N) 24, 188 dravyarupa (N) 195 dravyas 192 ; (N) 187, 259 dravyasamsparsi 318 dravyastika 259, 260 dravyatva 140; (N) 210 dravyavada 173, 174, 189, 194 ; (N) 52, 190 dravyavibhagabhavat 281 drsti 295; (N) 41 distisrstivada 291, 294, 295 ; (N) 295 dukkha 40, 56 durnaya (N) 311 durnayas (N) 311 dussadhya 140 dvaita 70 dvaitadvaita 70, 79 dvaitadvaitavada 68 dvaitam (N) 69 dvistatva 215, 219 eka 209, 278 ekadesena 217, 229 ekadhikaranatvena 169 ekameva (N) 95 ekamevadvitiyam 34 ekanta 199, 200, 201; (N) 200, 201 ekantabhavatmake 149; "katve 150 ekantadravyavada 173, 174 ; (N) 53 ekantanityavada 176 ekantatva 145 ekantavada 291 ; (N) 288 ekantenaikatmatva (N) 147 ekantika abhedavada (N) 139

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414 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE ekantika bhedavada (N) 139 ekarthatvaniyama 353 ekarthavacakah 321 ekarupataiva 22 ekasvabhavatvam (N) 147 ekatva 140, 240; (N) 147 ekatvavada 32 eva 339, 340, 343 ; (N) 73, 339, 341 evakara (N) 339 evambhuta 313, 318, 325, 327 evambhutanaya 324, 325, 328 ganadhara (N) 127 gatha(s). 4; (N) 158, 187, 188, 190, 258, 259, 261, 262, 263, 308, 311, 312, 323, 329, 341, 360, 362 gauh 354, 355 gauna 96 ghata 65, 149, 321, 322, 324, 335, 341 ; (N) 346 ghataka 163 ghatakasa 278; (N) 278 ghatatya 335 guda 196 guna 6, 107, 111, 117, 187, 189, 190, 191, 247, 249, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 280, 380: (N) 117, 188, 210, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265 gunas 64, 187, 247, 249, 257, 265, 266 ; (N) 63, 135, 187, 191, 259 gunasraya (N) 191 gunastika 259 gunatva (N) 210 guni 117 ihetipratyayadarsana (N) 210 Indra 321, 322 isvara 75, 79, 82, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 192; (N) 16, 80, 86 itararupapattyapi 343 jada 26; (N) 34 jainagandhi 91 jala (N) 147 jati 38 jatyantara 6, 195, 198, 233, 380; (N) 195, 197 jatyantararupatva 233; (N) 234 jatyantarata 189 jatyantaratva 2, 198, 199, 200, 202 ; (N) 199 jatyantaravada 125, 138, 183, 185, 186, 194, 200 ; (N) 201 jiva 26, 79; (N) 34, 63 jiva-jagat 81 jivas 68, 71, 79 jnana 72; (N) 241, 243 jnanakarmasamuccayavada (N) 69 jnapaka 308 jnatasattavada 294 jnatr 304, 310 jneya 102 kala 154, 193, 202, 274, 335 kalabheda (N) 266 kalabheda (N) 266 kalabhedapeksaya 266 kalabhedena 164 kalananugata 51 kalanus (N) 282 kalasa 321 kalatyayapadista (N) 375 kalavibhedapeksaya 266 kalikaviscsanata 239 kalpana 39, 51, 226; (N) 39 kalpanaksita (N) 190 kalpita 144 kanabhurmata 188 kanada (N) 187 kapala (N) 191 hasta-pustaka-samyoga (N) 207 Himavat 278 ihabuddhi 240 ihapratyaya 240 ihedampratyayadarsana (N) 210

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INDEXES kaphahetuh 196 kapivrksasamyoga 280 kapivrksasamyogavat 279 karaka 308; (N) 212 karana 86 karika (s) 4; (N) 21, 23, 36, 39, 41, 48, 49, 53, 65, 129, 132, 133, 140, 141, 144, 153, 154, 174, 187, 188, 189, 190, 196. 207, 208, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 219, 220, 222, 243, 278, 279, 282, 283, 289, 309, 311, 312, 316, 318, 319, 320, 321, 324, 326, 340, 351, 352, 353, 355, 362 karma 107; (N) 117 kathancidasattvam (N) 345 kathancidekantadrsti 307 kathancidvyapadesya 349 kathancit 139, 338, 345; (N) 128 kathancit bhedabhedavada (N) 139 kathancitsattvam (N) 345 keva advaitavada (N) 34 kevalajnana 309 kevalau 221 kevalin 157 kevalins 309 kirana 354 kotis 349; (N) 349 krama 176 kramabhavi (N) 262 260, 262, 263; kramarpana 307, 346; (N) 341 kramarpanaya 349, 358 kraurya (N) 278 kriya (N) 212 ksana (N) 38, 45 ksanamatram api 164 ksananasita (N) 187 ksanas 176; (N) 200 ksanikasantana 199 ksanikatva (N) 187 ksanikavada 174, 175, 186, 194; (N) 174, 175, 200 ksetra 154, 202, 335 kumbha 321 kunaya (N) 311 kundalavasthayam 81 kurma (N) 65 kutasthanitya 64, 173 kutasthanityata (N) 187 kutasthanityavada (N) 53 kvacit 228 laghava 239; (N) 210 laksana 180 lokakasa (N) 282 madhura (N) 47 madhyasthata 133 mahasamanya 326 mahavakya 88; (N) 89 Mahesvara 192 manas 109 mani 329 Man-Lion 196 mathakasa 278; (N) 278 Mathura 278 maya 17, 31, 72, 73; (N) 17, 31, 35, 72, 200 mayavada 18, 125; (N) 16, 17, 78 mayavadanirakarana (N) 78 mayuranda (N) 197 mecaka (N) 197 mecakaratna 170 micchattam (N) 187 militayoh 197 misra 189; (N) 200 misravada 5, 189, 380 mithya 34 mithyatmadrstitvat (N) 312 mithyopadhis 75 mrsa 134 415 mrsarthata (N) 190 mukasvapnavat (N) 51. mukhya 96 muktatma 109 muladhara (N) 141 mulaksatikari (N) 170

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416 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE mulavacchedena 279 murta rupa (N) 16 nagaram 196 naigama 313, 314, 316, 318, 325 naigamabhasa 316 naigamanaya 314, 315, 316, 325, 327 nairantarya 216 nairatmya 41, 57; (N) 40, 41 nairatmyavada 40; (N) 40, 41 nakula 163 namadheyam (N) 73 nanakasapradesah 278 nanasabdavada 353 nara 196 Narasimha 196 Narayana 117 na sat naivasat (N) 32 nasti 342 nastitva 165, 341, 342, 346 naya 310, 324, 333; (N) 161, 304, 310, 311, 313, 317 nayabhasa (N) 311, 320 nayabhasas (N) 311 nayas 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329; (N) 188, 304, 311, 317, 328 nayavada 2, 6, 7, 13, 124, 148, 149, 151, 186, 269, 273, 284, 287, 301, 303, 304, 305, 309, 310, 324, 329, 330, 333, 334, 370, 380, 381; (N) 161, 303, 304, 328, 329 nayavadin 320, 323, 327 nayavadins 327 na yuktam 139 nilanilavat 143 nimitta (N) 86 niranvaya 212 niranvaya ksanika 44 nirapeksa (N) 368 nirapeksavada 350 nirapeksavadas 340 niravayavatva 280 nirguna (N) 191 nirgunabrahman 17, 82; (N) 16 nirvacaniya 73 nirvisesasattvavada 84 nirvisesavada (N) 84 niscayanaya (N) 317 nisedha 144, 149, 336, 344 nisedhapratiyogi 335, 341 nispanna 228; (N) 214 nispannayoh 213, 228 nissvabhava (N) 233 nissvabhavata 150; (N) 151 nissvabhavatvat (N) 53 nitya 40, 192, 209, 278 nityadravya 109 nityam 281 nityanitya (N) 133 nityatva 38, 240 nityavada 44; (N) 174 niyantr 79, 86 niyata 345 paccayas (N) 211 pada 354 pada (N) 17 padartha (N) 206, 238 padarthantara 206 padarthas 107 padartha-sankara (N) 210 pajjayamudha 261 pajjavatthiyanaya (N) 188 paksantara 200; (N) 200 paksantaravada (N) 201 paksasankara 200; (N) 200 pancabheda (N) 116 pannattis (N) 126 para 69, 219 parabhava 155 parabhutah 217 paradravya 155 paradravyadicatustaya 155, 336 parakala 155 paraksetra 155 paramarthasat (N) 38 51, 199, 350;

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paramarthasatya (N) 143 paramarthasatyam (N) 69 paramarthatah (N) 38 paramarthika (N) 282 paramarthika-sat 34 paramarthiko bhedah 23 paramatma 192; (N) 86 paramesvari 261 paramparas 325 pararthah 307 INDEXES parasamaya 261 parasamayas (N) 188 parasangrahanaya (N) 326 parasatya 350 parasparananuviddha 195, 201 parasparaparihara (N) 355 paraspara-vivikta 151 parasparaviviktadravya paryayaikantavada 194 paratantra 82, 112 paratantrya 213, 227 paratantryabhavat 214 paratantrya-sambandha 227, 228 paratattva 149; (N) 172 paratva 157 paravidya 69; (N) 16, 143 parikalpita (N) 38 pariksamukha sutra (N) 307 parinama 33, 229, 267; 133, 192 (N) parinamanitya 64 parinamas 283 parinamat (N) 17 parinamavada 66, 67; (N) 16, 19, 63 parinami 174 parispanda (N) 192 parisuddha (N) 188 paroksa (N) 336 paroksapramana 124 paryaya 6, 22, 23, 140, 187, 189, 190, 247, 249, 254, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 319, 380; (N) 100, 127, 129, 139, 187, 188, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 265 417 paryayaikanta (N) 194 paryayaikantavada 180, 194; (N) 174, 194 paryayanaya 313 paryayanayas 313, 318, 319, 320 paryayarthika 327 174, 176, paryayarthikanaya 312, 318, 329, 333; (N) 24, 188 paryayarupa (N) 195 paryayas 21, 139, 140, 247, 249, 255, 257, 265, 266; (N) 22, 135, 139, 259, 262 paryayasamsparsi 318 paryayastika 259, 260, 327 paryayavada 176, 189, 194, 261; (N) 190 paryudasa (N) 142, 143 pasu 354 pata 149, 322, 335, 341, 343 Pataliputra 278 patatva 153, 335 paurvaparya 176 phala 149 phalatva 153 pita 164 pittakaranam 196-197 pradesa (N) 282 pradesas 278, 282; (N) 278, 282 pradhana (N) 19 pradhanataya 343, 344 pradipa 110 pragabhavapratiyogi 65 prajna 57 prakara 85, 337 prakaraprakaribhava 90 prakaras (N) 80 prakarin 85; (N) 79 prakrti 64, 66, 67, 71; (N) 25, 63, 64, 234 prakrtis (N) 64 pramana 93, 311; (N) 311 pramanas 3, 124, 125 pramanasamuccayavada 69

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418 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE sjusutranaya 318, 319, 327; (N) 319 Rucaka 132 rudhih 322 rudhita-sabdas (N) 322 rupa 31, 179 rupaksana 178 rupas 163 rupaslesa 213, 216, 217 ; (N) 215, 216 rupaslesa sambandha 218, 229 pramanavisayavyavasthahani (N) 146 prapnuvanti 140 prasajyapratisedha (N) 142, 143 prasanga (N) 55 prasnavasat 336 pratibadhyapratibandhaka bhava 163, 165 pratibhasanat 169 prat:bhasika 34 pratiksanavinasibhava 176 pratiniyatavacyayacakabhava 357 pratiniyatavyavaharalopa (N) 146, 172 pratisedha 148 pratisedhavadins (N) 50 pratitikasatta (N) 72 pratitikasattvam 292 pratityasamutpada (N) 44, 45, 63 pratyaksa (N) 336 pratyaksadipramanabadha (N) 142, 146, 147, 172 pratyaksapramana 124 prthagbhuta 336 psthivi 354 prthvi 276 pudgala 274, 275 ; (N) 20 pudgalanairatmya (N) 41 Purandara 321, 322, 324 purusa (N) 25, 63, 64, 234 purusas 64, 67 ; (N) 64 purusabahutvam (N) 64 purusapeksaya (N) 72 purvottarabhavinau 164 pustaka 149 sabala (N) 195 sabda 281, 313, 318, 325, 327, 328; (N) 352 sabdabrahmavada (N) 34 sabdadayah (N) 307 sabdadvaitavada 308; (N) 34 sabdadvaitavadins 321 sabdanaya 320, 322, 323, 325, 326, 328 sabdanayabhasa 321 sabdanayas 305, 319 sabdapratipattyadarsanat 224 sabdatantra 319 sadasadatmaka 168 sadasadvilaksana 35, 37; (N) 36 sadasat 349, 350 ; (N) 32 sadasatsvarupatva 153 sadnsyopacaradeva 356 sadvada (N) 200 sagunabrahman 82; (N) 16 sahabhavi 260, 262, 267; (N) 262 sahabhaviparyaya 268 sahakari 54, 179; (N) 86, 179 sahakaritvena 178 sahanavasthanabhava 163, 164 saharpana 346 ; (N) 341 sajatiya 31 ; (N) 31 sakhavacchedena 279 sakkayaditthi (N) 41 sakra 321, 324 saksat 309 sakti 75 rajas 64 rala (N) 242 rasa 179 rasadiksananam (N) 178 rasaksana 178 rayanavali 329 rjusutra 313, 318, 319, 325, 327, 328

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INDEXES 419 saktih (N) 307 saktu 230 samabhirudha 313, 313, 325, 327 samabhirudhanaya 321, 323, 325, 328, 354 samanadhikaranya 89, 96, 97; (N) 96, 97 samanvayadpsti (N) 238 samanya 38, 107, 263; (N) 23, 146 samanyaguna (N) 263 samanya laksana (N) 310 samanyalaksanas (N) 47 samanyanaigama 327 samanyanaya 327 samanyasamjna 260 samanyavisesatmaka 325 samarthya 53, 339 samasa 313 samastyavittitvam 279 samavaya 88, 108, 111, 207, 208, 209, 215, 224, 233, 237, 240, 241, 243; (N) 25, 88, 107, 108, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210, 211, 213, 222, 223, 237, 238, 239, 240, 243 samavayas (N) 240 samavaya-sambandha 207, 235; (N) 243 samaveta (N) 263 sambandha 2, 216, 221, 380 ; (N) 87, 215, 243 sambandhakhandanam (N) 222 sambandhinau 206 sambandhinaveva 224 samharavada (N) 336 samjna 306, 356 samjnantaram 264 sarjnasamjni-sambandha 357 samsaya 141, 146, 171 ; (N) 141 samsayavisayatvasambhava (N) 345 samskaravada (N) 19 samsthanabheda 65 samsthanamatram 223 samudita 336 samvsti-sat (N) 38 samvstisatya (N) 143 samyoga 163, 224, 243, 280 ; (N) 206, 208, 213, 237, 238, 279 samyogasambandha 207 samyoge 163 samyutta (N) 288 sandigdha (N) 141 sandratara (N) 18 sanghata (N) 20, 213 sanghatavada (N) 19 sangraha 313, 317, 318, 325, 327, 328 sangrahabhasa 317 sangrahanaya 316, 327; (N) 326 sankalpa 314 sankara 141, 145, 170, 241; (N) 141 sankarya (N) 141 sanketa 359 sankhyadi 23 sankirnavada (N) 336 sanksepa 313 sanmatrabrahmavadam 85 santana 176, 177; (N) 38, 44, 177, 200 santarata 216, 217 santanasyavastutvat 177 sapeksa 350 sapeksatva 351 sapeksavada 340, 350 saprapanca 68 saptabhangi 7, 148, 149, 269, 273, 304, 333, 334, 336, 337, 364, 374, 375; (N) 304, 334, 335 saptabhanginaya 374 saptabhangivada 287 sarira 85 sarvam prthak (N) 38 sarvanirasamsatvat 219 sarvatmana 217, 229 sarvatha 266, 349

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420 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGB sarvathaikantadrsti 307 sarvavastusabalavada (N) 336 sarvavyapaka 209 sasavisana (N) 238 sasvatavada (N) 46 sat 35, 36, 37, 148, 149, 164, 199, 219, 291, 317, 344, 347, 349, 350 ; (N) 32, 35, 73, 128, 143, 200, 349 satkaranavada (N) 67 satkarya 82; (N) 86 satkaryavada 65, 66, 67, 77, 83, 97; (N) 65, 67, 78, 80, 97, 234 satkaryavadin 81 ; (N) 25 satkayadrsti 41, 42; (N) 41, 57 satta 326 ; (N) 206 sattadvaita 16 sattva 64, 169, 170 sattvasattva 169 sattvasattvarupatva (N) 171 satya 79 satyopadhis 75 saurya (N) 278 savayava 282 savayavatva 279, 280; (N) 277 savisesabheda (N) 117 savisesabhedavada 117 savisesavada (N) 84 savvam 39 sena (N) 357 sesa 86 ; (N) 86 siddha (N) 214 siddhi (N) 175 silasakalayugala (N) 242 simha 196 sitosnavat 143 skandhas (N) 40 slesa 215, 217 sloka (N) 77 slokas (N) 77, 78, 81, 82 srsti 295 ; (N) 86 srstidrstivada (N) 295 sruti (N) 293 sthiti 132 sthula 312 suddha (N) 188 suddhabhedavada 116 suddhadvaitavada (N) 34, 35 suddhaniscayanaya 326 suhumabheya 327 sunthi 196 sunya (N) 349 sutra 94, 129, 136, 142, 170, 180, 264, 325, 326 ; (N) 17, 73, 83, 259, 264, 265, 278, 282, 283 sutrakara 366; (N) 17 sutras 78 ; (N) 17, 116, 188, 259, 260, 265, 289, 313 svabhava 113, 239, 241 ; (N) 41, 208, 262, 356 sva-bhava 155 svabhavabhedah 23 svabhavabhinnas ca 86 svabhavadharma (N) 238 svabhavasambandha 237; (N) 237, 238 svabhavata 242 svabhavatvahanih 178 svabhavika 79; (N) 77, 116 svabhavikabhedabheda 77, 82; ovada 77; (N) 81 svabhavika dvaitadvaita (N) 80 svabhavikalambayamana vasthayam 81 svabhaviki saktih 307 svacchah 64 svadravya 155 svadravyadicatustaya 155, 335 svagata 31 ; (N) 32 svakala 155 svaksctra 155 svalaksana (N) 38 svalaksanas (N) 47, 51 svalaksanavada 111 svarthah 307 svarupa 113, 224, 239; (N) 238 svarupahaniprasangah 343 svarupaikyam 84, 90 svarupapeksaya 266, 267

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INDEXES 421 tadatmya 38, 308 tadatattvavada (N) 336 taddesabhavinyeva 279 tamas 64 tat 88 tat tvam asi 88 (N) 89 tattvikatvayoga 216 tikta (N) 47 tirobhava 66; (N) 34 tirthikah (N) 41 tippani (N) 196, 197 toya 230 trailokyavyavarta 44, 46, 55 trayatmakam (N) 133 tuccha 35, 154 tucchavada 44 tullattha 258 tulyabalatvat 78, 164 tulyarthau 258 tulyarthatvat (N) 258 tvam 88 svarupasambandha 237, 243; (N) 237, 238 svarupavat 266 svarupena 228 svasthacetasa 144 svatantra 82, 112 svata eva 241 svatattva 149, 154 svatmanisthitah 212 svatovyavartaka 110 svayambhavah 212 syadasti ghatah 341 syadasti nasti ca ghatah 341; (N) 341 syadastinasti cavaktavyas ca ghatah 342 syadastyavaktavyasca ghatah 342 syadastyeva ghatah 339 syadavaktavyo ghatah 342 ; (N) 341 syadvada 2, 6, 7, 13, 124, 125, 148, 149, 269, 273, 284, 287, 303, 304, 305, 306, 308, 309, 324, 329, 331, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 340, 345, 351, 357, 359, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 376, 378, 380, 381 ; (N) 23, 36, 161, 304, 323, 329, 334, 335, 336, 345, 360, 362, 372, 373 syadvadamudrankitam 287 syadvada-saptabhangi 151, 186 syadvadeksanasaptakam (N) 335 syadvadic 363 syadvadin 350, 353, 370; (N) 23, 355, 369 syadvadins 339 syama 164 syannasti ghatah 34 syannastyavaktavyasca ghatah 342 syat 7, 337, 338, 340, 342; (N) 161, 335, 337, 341 ubhaya 348; (N) 141, 142, 146, 172 ubhayadosa (N) 141, 142, 147, 172 ubhayapradhanyam 358 ubhayarupa (N) 195 ubhayavada 138, 180, 183, 185, 186, 189, 190, 192, 193, 194, 200, 201, 380 ; (N) 187, 188, 190, 194, 200, 201, 299 ubhayavadin 201 upacara (N) 278 upacarah 322 upadana 179 ; (N) 86, 179 upadanabhavena 178 upadhi 77, 278, 280; (N) 278 upadhis 74, 75, 76; (N) 75 upakaritva 226; (N) 222 upalaksana (N) 73 upalaksana (N) 142 upalaksita 139; (N) 141 upanayas (N) 328 upanisad (N) 16 upodghatah (N) 84

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422 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE Mra-an 27, utpada 127, 132; (N) 127, 129 utpadavyayadhrauvyatmaka vada (N) 199 utpada-vyaya-dhrauvya yuktam sat 127, 136; (N) 151-152 utpatti (N) 127 vacaka 308 vacanasamarthyam 358 vacanavinyasa 309, 337 vacarambhanam (N) 73 vacyavacakaniyama 323, 353, 357 vada 69; (N) 53 vadhya 163 vadhyaghatakabhava 163 vadhyaghatakavirodha (N) 163 vahika 355 vaicitrya (N) 289 vaicitryam (N) 289 vairivat (N) 312 vaiyadhikaranya 141 vana (N) 357 Vanavada 132: (N) 141 Vardhamanaka 132 vartate 281 Vartika 132; (N) 230 vastava 206 vastu 169, 170, 171, 263, 310, 336; (N) 171, 259 vastuno gamakah (N) 311 vastutastu (N) 95 vastutva (N) 206 vastyamsagrahi 310 vibhajyavada (N) 288, 336 vibhava (N) 262 vibhu 278, 282 vicara (N) 39 vicitram (N) 289 vidhi 144, 148, 149, 336 vidhipratiyogi 344 vidhivadins (N) 50 vigrahavan sambandha (N) 237 vijatiya 31 ; (N) 31 vijnanadvaya (N) 355 vikalpa 39, 55, 283; (N) 39 vikara 33 vilaksana (N) 35 vinasa (N) 127 vinastah (N) 41 vinasyati 281 Vindhya 278 virodha 139, 141, 142, 148, 162, 163, 165, 168, 169; (N) 91, 141, 142, 147, 163, 172 virodhabhasa (N) 101 virodhadosa 148 virodhato (N) 312 virodhitvat (N) 312 viruddha (N) 175 viruddhadharmadhyasa 21 visanjutta 329 visaya 283 visayavisayibhava 238 visayavyavasthahani 141, 146, 171 ; (N) 172 visesa 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 188, 263, 316; (N) 23, 25, 80, 108, 110, 112, 116, 118, 146 visesaguna 281 ; (N) 263 visesa laksana (N) 310 visesana 87; (N) 81, 84, 85 visesanaigama 327 visesanaya 327 visesanavisesyabhava 238 visesantara 110 visesas 109, 111, 114, 115 ; (N) 109, 110, 112 visesasamjna 260 visesya 87; (N) 84, 85 visista 196 visistaikyam 84, 90, 96 vistara 312; (N) 262 vitarka (N) 39 vivarta 31, 33, 34 ; (N) 73 vivartavada 31, 32, 35, 72 ; (N) 16 vivartavadin 72; (N) 73 vivstisatya (N) 151

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INDEXES vrksah (N) 357 vrtti (N) 19 vyadhikaranata 141, 144 vyadhikaranatadosa 169; (N) 147, 172 vyanjanam (N) 323 vyapadesa 281 vyapaka 209, 240; (N) 289 vyapyavrttitvam 279 vyasa 312 vyatikara 141, 145, 170 vyatireki (N) 262 vyatiriktavastu 225 vyavacchedaprayojanah (N) 339 vyavahara 313, 317, 318, 319, 325, 327, 328 vyavaharalopa (N) 142, 146 vyavaharanaya 317, 327-8; (N) vyavaharanayabhasa 318 vyavaharika 34; (N) 282 vyavaharikasatta 293 vyavartaka 110 vyavartakatvam (N) 81 vyavrttarupah 212 vyavrtti (N) 22 vyarttibuddhihetavah (N) 109 vyavrttimat 21 vyavrttyartham 339 vyaya 127; (N) 127, 129 vyutpatti-sabdas (N) 322 yauga (N) 187 yaugaih (N) 141 yogin (N) 57 yogyata 239, 241 (N) 307 yugapat 357 yuta (N) 207 yutasiddha 207; (N) 207 423

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