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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
observed in course of this section, and, as confirmed by Sankara' himself, the sine qua non of a relation. The incompatibility between the absolutistic or the monistic dogma and the dualistic requirement of relation leads the Vedāntin altogether to deny relation either of samyoga or of samavāya, and, to accept the principle that there can be nothing like a relation apart from the object supposed to be joined by it."
In answer to the opponent's assertion that samyoga and samavāya are also subsistent' owing to the fact that we find, in experience, distinct designations or terms denoting their being (sabdapratyayadarśanat), Sankara observes that even where there is only one object there may be many designations referring to it in accordance with its myriad intrinsic' (svarūpa) and extrinsic' (bāhya) predications. One and the same Devadatta, for instance, may be, Sankara adds, the object of the epithets a man', 'a Brāhmaṇa', 'learned-inVeda','affable!, ' a boy', 'a youth', 'an old man', 'a father' and 'a son' etc. Therefore the objects themselves (sambandhināveva) can be fittingly termed by the epithets 'samyoga'and 'samavāya'and, there need be no third entity
1. dvayāyattatvāt sambandhasya / BBSB(text), II. 2.19, p. 61. 2. napi samyogasya samavayasya vā sambandhasya sambandhivya
tirekenāstitve kiñcit pramāņam asti / Ibid. Ibid. See the next f.n. infra. sambandhisabdapratyayavyatirekeņa saryogasamavāyaśabdapratyayadarśanāt tayor astitvam iti cet / na / ekatve'pi svarūpa. bahyarūpāpekṣayānekaśabdapratyayadarśanāt / yathaiko'pi san devadatto loke svarūpam sambandhirūpam cäpekşyānekaśabdapratyayabhāg bhavati manuşyo brahmaṇaḥ śrotriyo vadānyo bālo yuva sthavirah pitā putrah pautro bhrātā jāmāteti.../ Ibid., p. 61f.
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