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fic features' of the object concerned, without, of course, losing sight of the fact that they cannot stand by themselves without the support of the generic properties in the larger setting of concrete reality. For example, when a person is asked to bring a mango fruit he attempts to bring mango, but not any other fruit, although he is aware of the fact that mango is only a species in the genus of fruit.'
When the generic correlative of a specific feature is entirely ignored the resultant fallacy comes to have only the semblance of the vyavahāra standpoint (vyavahāranayābhāsa) of which there can be no better example than the materialism. of Cārvāka in Indian philosophy.
The above three standpoints, viz., naigama, sangraha and vyavahāra, come under the first comprehensive category, viz., dravyārthikanaya. This is so because these standpoints. concern themselves with the durable side (dravyasaṁsparsi) of concrete reality. The remaining four standpoints, viz., rjusutra, sabda, samabhirüḍha and evambhuta, engage themselves in the analysis of the fleeting side (paryāyasaṁsparsi) of concrete reality. Hence their collective designation (paryāyārthikanaya), the second of the two comprehensive cate
gories.
Among the four paryayanayas only the first one, viz., rjusūtranaya, which will presently be dealt with, makes a direct ontological reference to an aspect of reality, viz., the
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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
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višeṣātmakamevārthaṁ vyavahāraś ca manyate/
viseṣabhinnaṁ samanyam asatkharaviṣaṇavat// NKV, kā. 8. Ibid., kärikäs 9 and 10.
PNTA, VII. 26. For two other instances see LTB, V, kā. 42 and the NKC thereon in NKC, Vol. II, pp. 631-5.
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