Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge

SR No.: 001608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Y J Padmarajiah
Publisher: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal
Publication Year: 1963
Total Pages: 444
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Epistemology, & Anekantvad
File Size: 23 MB

Page 256

CHAPTER VII
237
position which, if developed to its logical conclusion, will approach the Jaina viewpoint.' This fact becomes particularly evident in the case of samāvaya which, as will be presently seen, is given up all but in name. The admission of svabhāvasambandha' or svarūpasambandha, the ‘natural' or the simple relation, offers the thin end of the wedge in dispensing with relation as a tertiary entity in a relational situation. This notion of svarūpasambandha connotes that the terms themselves contain, within their nature, the relational trait which is as objectively real as
1. Cf. JPN, p. 232. 2. sarjñāmātreņa, na vastutathābhāvaḥ / STP, p. 704. 3. Cf. Śri Harsa's observation that the Naiyāyika regards the
'nature' of things also as their 'determinant': svabhāvasyäpi bhavatā niyamakatvāngīkārät / KKS, p. 1091. Chatterjee writes: "Unlike the relations of conjunction and inherence Svarūpasambandha is not distinct from the terms related by it. Rather, the relation is itself constituted by one of the relata....the relation is constituted by the object, or is due to the nature of the object.” NTN, p. 188.
The distinction, in the Nyaya philosophy, between rela
as a 'third unity' (an independent entity) and relation 'without a third relating unity' as Stcherbatsky renders it expresses the difference between 'separable conjunction' (samyoga) and 'inseparable conjunction' (samavāya) on the one hand, and the simple relation' (svabhāvasambandha) on the other. The former is found with the reality of the 'link' (anubhūyamāna sambandha, or vigrahavan sambandha) and the latter without the reality of the link but yet objec
tive. Cf. Log., Vol. II, f.n. 3, p. 287. 4. Cf. JPN, p. 232, and RML, pp. 153-154. Regarding the direct
ness of the temporal and spatial relation, Ingalls writes : “Everything resides directly in time by a temporal relation. Time thus acts like space (dik) in that it is a substratum,
for all entities." NNLI, p. 78. 5. Just because relatedness is 'resident' in the relata, the ideal