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CHAPTER VI
existence of a simple real is thoroughly repugnant to the Jaina. Uniqueness or singularity' cannot, according to him, arise from such absolutely simple real whether the real be the Advaitic Brahman or the Buddhistic kṣaṇikasantāna (series of full stops as it were). For there is little room in such a real for anything else than its own bare subsistence (sat). Hence the truth underlying the Advaitic dictum : naikasmin na sambhavät, or the Buddhistic dictum: yo viruddhadharmavān nāsāvekaḥ1, betrays not the contradictoriness of the anekanta real but the logical consummation of the monolithic or simple form of reality. Jatyantaratva can, therefore, arise, it is believed, from the foundation of a manifold or variegated real which alone could afford the basis for the co-ordinate existence of diverse elements or components, as well as for their casual interplay, which in turn results in the emergence of a fully-fledged unique or singular entity. Therefore it is by no means an accident or a casual fancy that the Jaina conceives anekanta svarupatva as a synonym of paramärthasat (true reality) and conceives it as the pivot on which his entire philosophical-ontological and epistemological-developments turn. Thus anekantaväda, with which alone the notion of jatyantaratva is affirmed to be concomitant, offers the most thoroughgoing ontological antithesis to the ekänta (extreme or monolithic) doctrine-single or composite-in Indian philosophy.'
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1. See infra, p. 23-24 (and the footnotes).
2. For a reference to the synonymousness of anekantavāda with utpādavyayadhrauvyātmakavāda and to its being the necessary basis for the notion of jātyantaratva, see TRD, pp. 229 f. and 244 ff.
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