Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge

SR No.: 001608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Y J Padmarajiah
Publisher: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal
Publication Year: 1963
Total Pages: 444
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Epistemology, & Anekantvad
File Size: 23 MB

Page 219

200
JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
There are two considerations—the one critical and the other constructive-which concurrently underlie the postulation of jātyantaratva as a trait in reality. Critically, the notion of jātyantaratva aims not merely at repudiating indirectly the ekānta doctrines just referred to of simple reals, but also at directly undermining the Vaiseșika's ubhayavāda, with which the bhedābhedavāda or the anekāntavāda (of which the jätyantaravāda is a corollary) is persistently confused by the Buddhistic thinkers. This is why Akalanka contrasts jātyantaravāda with the other theories by designating the former as a case of pakṣāntara' (a view which signifies the resultant real as a product distinct from--not merely as something interchangeable with the constituent factors) and the latter as cases of pakşasankara (a view which signifies the real as a confused complex).
1. Mallişeņa agrees with Akalanka in treating the Jaina as
pakşāntara : nityānityapakşavilakṣaṇasya pakşantarasyangīkriya
mānatvāt/SM (text), p. 20. 2. Akalanka is inclined to use this epithet, viz., pakşasankara.
for both the two ekānta doctrines of the identity-view (sadvada) and the difference-view (asadvada) as well as for the ubhayavāda (which is but a numerical summation of the two) although it is more appropriate in the latter (ubhayavada) owing to the fact that, in the latter, there are two factors, identity and difference--which are mixed (misra), ex hypothesi, in a mechanical togetherness. The only sense, however, in which the term would severally apply to the two ekānta doctrines also is when each of them is understood as mixing in a confused jumble: a real identity with an unreal difference (the mäyà as superimposed on the sat) or a real differen with an unreal identity or continuity (the unreal santāna or continuity as superimposed on the discrete moments (kşaņas) the only reals recognised by kșanikavāda). But this seems to be a rather far-fetched meaning; its indirect truthfulness is incontrovertible. It is, therefore, necessary to note that