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CHAPTER VII
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discreet by nature, and, as such, do not admit of any relation whatsoever.
Then Dharmakirti proceeds to unravel two more rifts in the conception of relation as a real entity combining two terms, or relational factors, involved in it.
It is impossible to conceive a relation without the relata it combines. It is, therefore, appropriate to consider relation, he pleads on behalf of his opponent, as involving, or forming the basis (āśraya) of, the duality (dviştatva) of its terms. In other words relation cannot be conceived of as a distinct entity without its attribute (dharma) of the terms contained in it. When this is conceded Dharmakīrti probes into the implications of this view and tries to show an inconsistency. In view of the fact that relation is admitted as an objectively real and independent entity (sat) it ought to be, on the strength of this admission, a self-sufficient entity; that is to say, it should not have any lack or "expectancy' (apekṣā) for anything else' (para; the reason is described as sarvanirāśamsatvät). If it shows any kind of 'lack' or expectancy', then it forfeits its claim for its very existence (anyatha sattvavirodhät) owing to the fact that nothing can, according to the opponent, exist without the condition necessary for its existence-here the condition for its existence are its relata-being fulfilled. Therefore, if relation is to be considered an absolute entity it should not, the Buddhist
1. rüpaśleşo hi sambandho dvitve sa ca katham bhavet/ tasmāt prakrtibhinnānāṁ sambandho nästi tattvatah" //
PKM, spd., p. 505, kā. 2. 2. The lack' here refers to the existence of relation being
conditional upon the existence of the relata.
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