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CHAPTER VIII
257
exhibits a complete lack of the awareness of the divergences just referred to. The mentalizing tendency of a real is indicated in the dictum, repeated almost verbatim from Hegel, that everything which is real is rational' as well as in what follows, and the primacy attached to identity over difference is indicated in the reference, at the end of the passage, to the loss and the dissolution of their duality in a higher unity'.
These two important considerations do not, therefore support the close comparison which Nahar and Ghosh have made between the Jaina notion of reality and that of the absolutistic concrete universal, although there are some comparable traits between the former school and the preabsolutistic, or the relative' phases of Hegelianism to which a reference has been already made at some length.'
B. Are Guņas the same as, or different from, Paryāyas ?
Having briefly occupied ourselves with the controversy, given rise to by some modern Hegelian enthusiasts, whether a dravya could be treated as a case of a concrete universal, and found that it cannot be, we may now proceed to a study of a considerably earlier controversy concerning the relation between a paryāya (modification or mode) and a guna (quality or property) in a dravya. There are three views
1. See supra, p. 98 ff. 2. The third 'view' is, as will be indicated later (infra, p. 265),
more a tendency than a well-defined doctrine. 17
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