Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge

SR No.: 001608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Y J Padmarajiah
Publisher: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal
Publication Year: 1963
Total Pages: 444
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Epistemology, & Anekantvad
File Size: 23 MB

Page 225

206
JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
that relation is a real (vastava) entity intervening between two terms or the relata (sambandhinau) as a tertium quid (padarthantara2) or a distinct 'link' connecting them into a relational unity.
1.
2.
of the world from the knowing mind, but also of each part from the others in the objective and pluralistic universe. This spirit is signified by the postulate that there can be no objectless knowledge (na caviṣaye kacid upalabdhiḥ/ NBV, p. 220) as well as that what is 'cognitively distinguishable' is 'different' (pratitibhedat bhedo'sti / NM, p. 312).
For the reality (vastutva) of relation, see ILE, 2, f.n. 2, p. 131. Each of the two kinds of relation, viz., samyoga and samaväya (to be presently explained) is termed as 'padartha' or category. Samyoga (the conjunctive relation or conjunction), however, is said to a be quality and, therefore, dependent upon, though distinct from, a substance (dravya) which is the most important of the seven categories, whereas samavāya (the 'necessary relation') is treated as an independent category.
While characterising samavāya as a 'padartha' a distinction is advanced by the Naiyayika, viz., that samavaya is a 'subsistent' (bhava), but not an 'existent' (sattä). (BPV, p. 30, kā. 13, and SWK, p. 107).
Hiriyanna refers to this 'distinction between subsistence and existence' as 'quite fundamental to' as well as 'quite in accordance with' 'the basic principles' of Vaiśeşika philosophy. (IPC, p. 162, and p. 163, f.n. 1).
Cf. "Suppose, for instance," observes Russell, "that I am in my room. I exist, my room exists, but does 'in' exist? Yet obviously the word has a meaning; it denotes a relation which holds between me and my room. This relation is something, although we cannot say that it exists IN THE SAME SENSE in which I and my room exist". (Problems, p. 90). A little further he continues 66 ....we shall say that they (universals in which relations are included, cf. ibid., p. 97) SUBSIST or HAVE BEING, The where 'being' is opposed to 'existence' as timeless. world of Universals, therefore, may also be described as the world of being". (Ibid., p. 100).