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166 JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE advanced is that both elements are concurrently revealed to our observation.
At this juncture it is necessary to point out a grave misapprehension which has implicitly prejudiced the opponents of Jainism with regard to the Jaina attitude to the problem of contradiction : The Jaina has been generally assumed to indulge, almost wantonly, in contradiction, particularly in relation to the development of his theory of reality. He has, of course, continually repudiated this assumption. In fairness to the impartial canons of philosophical criticism it is obligatory on the part of critics to realise the distinction between an avowedly conscious attempt to build up an ontological scheme on the foundation of contradiction, and an attempt to frame an ontological scheme which might seem to some critics to lead to a contradiction. The former attempt does not, but the latter does, absolve the author of the scheme from the intention of entertaining contradiction as an important element in the scheme. The Jaina seems to have persistently met with such a misconception of his ontological endeavour at the hands of even such great thinkers as Śankara and Dharmakīrti—not to mention several others whose dialectical acumen is of a lesser order. The Jaina himself does not think even for a moment that his theory of reality is built upon, or even leads to, contradiction. He is as zealous in the avoidance of contradiction as any of his adverse critics. Nowhere has he been seen to compromise on this subject. The three forms of contradiction just referred to sufficiently indicate his adherence to a non-contradictory approach to the problem under consideration. In a proper dialectical evaluation of the essential concepts in a certain
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